Phil UA-30: Kant

4/23/20

Kant’s Critique of Rational Theology: the Ontological Argument

N.B. Kant thinks of the ontological argument as more important than the other two, which covertly
rely on it. Therefore, we will focus on the former.

Accordingly, the physico-theological proof of the existence of a single original being as the highest
being is grounded on the cosmological, and the latter on the ontological; and since besides these
three paths no more are open to speculative reason, the ontological proof from pure concepts of
reason is the only possible one - if even one proof of a proposition elevated so sublimely above all
empirical use of the understanding is possible at all. (A 630/B 658)

A. Kant’s extremely complex explanation of how it is we are lead to the Transcendenal Ideal (God).

1. Principal of (logical) determinability: Every concept, in regard to what is not contained in it, is
indeterminate, and stands under the principle of determinability: that of every two
contradictorily opposed predicates only one can apply to it, which rests on the principle of
contradiction and hence is a merely logical principle, which abstracts from every content of
cognition, and has in view nothing but the logical form of cognition. (A 571/B 659)

2. Principal of complete (real) determination: Every thing, however, as to its possibility, further
stands under the principle of thoroughgoing determination; according to which, among all
possible predicates of things, insofar as they are compared with their opposites, one must apply
to it. This does not rest merely on the principle of contradiction, for besides considering every
thing in relation to two contradictorily conflicting predicates, it considers every thing further in
relation to the whole of possibility, as the sum total of all predicates of things in general; and by
presupposing that as a condition a priori, it represents every thing as deriving its own possibility
(A 572-3/B 600-1)

3. How this leads us to the Idea “the sum total of all possibilities” (omnitudo realitatis)

The proposition Everything existing is thoroughly determined signifies not only that of every
given pair of opposed predicates, but also of every pair of possible predicates, one of them
must always apply to it; through this proposition predicates are not merely compared logically
with one another, but the thing itself is compared transcendentally with the sum total of all
possible predicates. What it means is that in order to cognize a thing completely one has to
cognize everything possible and determine the thing through it, whether affirmatively or
negatively. Thoroughgoing determination is consequently a concept that we can never exhibit in
concreto in its totality, and thus it is grounded on an idea which has its seat solely in reason,
which prescribes to the understanding the rule of its complete use.

4. How we, in turn, refine this “indeterminate” (unspecific) Idea into a single
“determinate” (specific) Ideal:

…we nevertheless find on closer investigation that this idea, as an original concept, excludes a
multiplicity of predicates, which, as derived through others, are already given, Or cannot coexist
 with one another; and that it refines itself to a concept thoroughly determined a priori, and
thereby becomes the concept of an individual object that is thoroughly determined merely
through the idea, and then must be called an ideal of pure reason. (A 573-4/B 601-2)

5. Why this Ideal must, in turn, be grasped as the “sum total of realities” (omnitudo realitatis)

Now no one can think a negation determinately without grounding it on the opposed
affirmation. The person blind from birth cannot form the least representation of darkness,
because he has no representation of light; the savage has no acquaintance with poverty, because
he has none with prosperity.* The ignorant person has no concept of his ignorance, because he
has none of science, etc. All concepts of negations are thus derivative, and the realities contain
the data, the material, so to speak, or the transcendental content, for the possibility and the
thoroughgoing determination of all things. Thus if the thoroughgoing determination in our
reason is grounded on a transcendental substratum, which contains as it were the entire
storehouse of material from which all possible predicates of things can be taken, then this
substratum is nothing other than the idea of an All of reality (omnitudo realitatis). (A 575-6/
B603-4)

6. All ordinary real things are derivative of this most real being. We arrive at our concepts of the
former by negating the latter. (Recall what Kant says about space as a whole prior to its parts)

Thus all the possibility of things (as regards the synthesis of the manifold of their content) is
regarded as derivative, and only that which includes all reality in it is regarded as original. For all
negations (which are the sole predicates through which everything else is to be distinguished
from the most real being) are mere limitations of a greater and finally of the highest reality;
hence they presuppose it, and as regards their content they are merely derived from it. All
manifoldness of things is only so many different ways of limiting the concept of the highest
reality, which is their common substratum, just as all figures are possible only as different ways
of limiting infinite space. Hence the object of reason’s ideal, which is to be found only in reason,
is also called the original being (ens originarium); because it has nothing above itself it is called
the highest being (ens summum), and because everything else, as conditioned, stands under it, it
is called the being of all beings (ens entium). Yet all of this does not signify the objective relation
of an actual object to other things, but only that of an idea to concepts, and as to the existence
of a being of such preeminent excellence it leaves us in complete ignorance. (A 579/B 601)

7. The connection between the Transcendental Ideal (God) and the disjunctive syllogism:

The logical determination of a concept through reason rests on a disjunctive syllogism, in which
the major premise contains a logical division (the division of the sphere of a general concept),
the minor premise restricts this sphere to one part, and the conclusion determines the concept
through this part. The general concept of a reality in general cannot be divided up a priori,
because apart from experience one is acquainted with no determinate species of reality that
would be contained under that genus. (A 577/B 605)

B. Up until this point, we have not yet assumed that such a thing exists, merely that it is a useful for
us to reflect upon it as an ideal our knowledge might gradually approach.
It is self-evident that with this aim - namely, solely that of representing the necessary thoroughgoing
determination of things - reason does not presuppose the existence of a being conforming to the
ideal, but only the idea of such a being, in order to derive from an unconditioned totality of
thoroughgoing determination the conditioned totality, i.e., that of the limited. For reason the ideal is
thus the original image (prototypon) of all things, which all together, as defective copies (ectypa),
take from it the matter for their possibility, and yet although they approach more or less nearly to it,
they always fall infinitely short of reaching it. (A 577-8/B 605-6)

C. Where reason goes wrong is in treating this Ideal as if it had reality, or existed in the world.

Meanwhile this use of the transcendental idea would already be overstepping the boundaries of its
vocation and its permissibility. For on it, as the concept of all reality, reason only grounded the
thoroughgoing determination of things in general, without demanding that this reality should be
given objectively, and itself constitute a thing. This latter is a mere fiction, through which we
encompass and realize the manifold of our idea in an ideal, as a particular being; for this we have no
warrant, not even for directly assuming the possibility of such a hypothesis, just as none of the
consequences flowing from such an ideal have any bearing, nor even the least influence, on the
thoroughgoing determination of things in general, on behalf of which alone the idea was necessary.

D. The main source of this error: the idea that existence belongs to God by definition

Against all these general inferences (which no human being can refuse to draw) you challenge me
with one case that you set up as a proof through the fact that there is one and indeed only this one
concept where the non-being or the cancelling of its object is contradictory within itself, and this is
the concept of a most real being. It has, you say, all reality, and you are justified in assuming such a
being as possible (to which I have consented up to this point, even though a non-contradictory
concept falls far short of proving the possibility of its object).* Now existence is also
comprehended under all reality: thus existence lies in the concept of something possible. If this
thing is cancelled, then the internal possibility of the thing is cancelled, which is contradictory. (A
596/B 624)

E. Kant’s first counter-argument: the conditional nature of judgment

1. one believed one could explain this concept, which was ventured upon merely haphazardly,
and that one has finally come to take quite for granted through a multiplicity of examples,
so that all further demands concerning its intelligibility appeared entirely unnecessary. Every
proposition of geometry, e.g., "a triangle has three angles,” is absolutely necessary, and in
this way one talked about an object lying entirely outside the sphere of our understanding as
if one understood quite well what one meant by this concept. All the alleged examples are
without exception taken only from judgments, but not from things and their existence.' The
unconditioned necessity of judgments, however, is not an absolute necessity of things.d For
the absolute necessity of the judgment is only a conditioned necessity of the thing, e or o f
the predicate in the judgment. The above proposition does not say that three angles are
absolutely necessary, but rather that under the condition that a triangle exists (is given) (A
593-4/B621-2)

2. If I cancel the predicate in an identical judgment and keep the subject, then a contradiction
arises; hence I say that the former necessarily pertains to the latter. But if I cancel the
subject together with the predicate, then no contradiction arises; for there is no longer
 anything that could be contradicted. To posit a triangle and cancel its three angles is
contradictory; but to cancel the triangle together with its three angles is not a contradiction.
(A 594/B 622)

3. God is omnipotent; that is a necessary judgment. Omnipotence cannot be cancelled if you

posit a divinity, i.e., an infinite being, which is identical with that concept. But if you say,
God is not, then neither omnipotence nor any other of his predicates is given; for they are
all cancelled together with the subject, and in this thought not the least contradiction shows
itself. (A 595/B 623)

F. Another famous counter-argument: existence is not a real predicate.

1. Being is obviously not a real predicate, i.e., a concept of something that could add to the
concept of a thing. (A 598/B 627)

2. Both must contain exactly the same, and hence when I think this object as given absolutely
(through the expression, "it is"), nothing is thereby added to the concept, which expresses
merely its possibility. Thus the actual contains nothing more than the merely possible. A
hundred actual dollars do not contain the least bit more than a hundred possible ones. (Ibid.)

G. Another Kantian counter-argument: the OA conflates the distributive with the collective.

That we subsequently hypostatize this idea of the sum total of all reality, however, comes about
because we dialectically transform the distributive unity of the use of the understanding in
experience, into the collective unity of a whole of experience; and from this whole of appearance
we think up an individual thing containing in itself all empirical reality, which then - by means of the
transcendental subreption we have already thought - is confused with the concept of a thing that
stands at the summit of the possibility of all things, providing the real conditions for their
thoroughgoing determination (A 583-4/ B 662-3)

H. The finance example:

Thus the famous ontological (Cartesian) proof of the existence of a highest being from concepts is
only so much trouble and labor lost, and a human being can no more become richer in insight from
mere ideas than a merchant could in resources if he wanted to improve his financial state by adding
a few zeros to his cash balance. (A 603/B 631)

I. A practical proof of God’s existence.

Here I content myself with defining theoretical cognition as that through which I cognize what
exists, and practical cognition as that through which I represent what ought to exist. According to
this, the theoretical use of reason is that through which I cognize a priori (as necessary) that
something is; but the practical use is that through which it is cognized a priori what ought to
happen. Now if it is indubitably certain, but only conditionally, that something either is or that it
should happen, then either a certain determinate condition can be absolutely necessary for it, or it
can be presupposed as only optional and contingent. In the first case the condition is postulated (per
thesin), in the second it is supposed (per hypothesin). Since there are practical laws that are
absolutely necessary (the moral laws), then if these necessarily presuppose any existence as the
condition of the possibility of their binding force, this existence has to be postulated, because the
conditioned from which the inference to this determinate condition proceeds is itself cognized a
priori as absolutely necessary. In the future we will show about the moral laws that they not only
presuppose the existence of a highest being, but also, since in a different respect they are absolutely
necessary, they postulate this existence rightfully but, of course, only practically; for now we will set
aside this kind of inference. (A 633-4/B 661-2)