1. Estate of Hemady v.

Luzon Surety
G.R. No. L-8437, November 28, 1956

FACTS:
The Luzon Surety Co. had filed a claim against the Estate based on twenty
different indemnity agreements, or counter bonds, each subscribed by a distinct
principal and by the deceased K. H. Hemady, a surety solidary guarantor, in all of them,
in consideration of the Luzon Surety Co.’s of having guaranteed, the various principals
in favor of different creditors.

The Luzon Surety Co., prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of the value
of the twenty bonds it had executed in consideration of the counterbonds, and further
asked for judgment for the unpaid premiums and documentary stamps affixed to the
bonds.

The lower court, by order of September 23, 1953, dismissed the claims of Luzon
Surety Co. against Hemady’s estate ., on two grounds: (1) that the premiums due and
cost of documentary stamps were not contemplated under the indemnity agreements to
be a part of the undertaking of the guarantor (Hemady), since they were not liabilities
incurred after the execution of the counterbonds;  and (2) that “whatever losses may
occur after Hemady’s death, are not chargeable to his estate, because upon his death
he ceased to be guarantor.”

ISSUE: WON the contingent claims chargeable against the estate.

HELD:
YES. Under the present Civil Code (Article 1311), as well as under the Civil Code
of 1889 (Article 1257), the rule is that — "Contracts take effect only as between the
parties, their assigns and heirs, except in the case where the rights and obligations
arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by
provision of law.

While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of
their decedent cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the
principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the deceased
but also to his obligations.

The heirs of a deceased person cannot be held to be "third persons" in relation to

any contracts touching the real estate of their decedent which comes in to their hands
by right of inheritance; they take such property subject to all the obligations resting
thereon in the hands of him from whom they derive their rights."

The contracts of suretyship entered into by K. H. Hemady in favor of Luzon

Surety Co. not being rendered intransmissible due to the nature of the undertaking, nor
by the stipulations of the contracts themselves, nor by provision of law, his eventual
liability thereunder necessarily passed upon his death to his heirs. The contracts,

1
therefore, give rise to contingent claims provable against his estate under section 5,
Rule 87.

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 2. Santos v. Lumbao
G.R. No. 169129, 28 March 2007

FACTS:
Rita Santos sold to Spouses Lumbao the subject property which is a part of her
share in the estate of her deceased mother Maria, who died intestate, through a
document denominated as “Bilihan ng Lupa.” After acquiring the subject property,
Spouses Lumbao took actual possession thereof and erected thereon a house which
they have been occupying as exclusive owners up to the present. As the exclusive
owners of the subject property, Spouses Lumbao made several verbal demands upon
Rita to execute the necessary documents to effect the issuance of a separate title in
favor of Spouses Lumbao insofar as the subject property is concerned.

Spouses Lumbao alleged that prior to Rita’s death, she informed one of the
spouses that she could not deliver the title to the subject property because the entire
property inherited by her and her co-heirs from Maria had not yet been partitioned.
Spouses Lumbao claimed that petitioners, acting fraudulently and in conspiracy with
one another, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, adjudicating and partitioning
among themselves and the other heirs, the estate left by Maria, which included the
subject property already sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao.

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of Rita are bound to the “Bilihan ng Lupa” executed by
Rita in favor of Spouses Lumbao.

HELD:
YES. The general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest applies in the present case. Article 1311 of the NCC is the
basis of this rule. It is clear from the said provision that whatever rights and obligations
the decedent have over the property were transmitted to the heirs by way of succession,
a mode of acquiring the property, rights and obligations of the decedent to the extent of
the value of the inheritance of the heirs. Thus, the heirs cannot escape the legal
consequence of a transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-interest because they
have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their common ancestor.
Being heirs, there is privity of interest between them and their deceased mother. They
only succeed to what rights their mother had and what is valid and binding against her is
also valid and binding as against them. The death of a party does not excuse non-
performance of a contract which involves a property right and the rights and obligations
thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the deceased. Similarly,
nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other party has a
property interest in the subject matter of the contract.

Thus, despite the death of the petitioners’ mother, they are still bound to comply with the
provisions of the Bilihan ng Lupa and must reconvey to Spouses Lumbao the property
which they bought from Rita.

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 3. Coso v. Fernandez Deza
G.R. No. 16763, 22 December 1921

FACTS:
The testator in this case is a married man and a resident of the Philippines and
was shown to have an existing illicit relationship with Rosario Lopez for many years.
Rosario Lopez remained in a close communication with him until his death. There is no
doubt that she exercised some influence over him. The testator executed a will in favor
of his illegitimate son with Rosario Lopez and also provides for her nineteen hundred
Spanish duros by way the reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in taking care of
the testator in Barcelona during the years 1909 to 1916, when he is alleged to have
suffered from a severe illness.

CFI of manila set aside the will on the ground of undue influence allegedly
exerted over the mind of the testator by Rosario Lopez.

ISSUE: Whether the influence exerted by Rosario Lopez to the testator is such of a kind
which the law contemplates as to be undue influence so as to nullify the will?

HELD:

NO. The rule as to what constitutes "undue influence" has been variously stated,
but the substance of the different statements is that, to be sufficient to avoid a will, the
influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the
testator as to destroy his free agency and make his express the will of another, rather
than his own.

The burden is upon the parties challenging the will to show that undue influence,
in the sense above expressed, existed at the time of its execution and we do not think
that this burden has been carried in the present case. While it is shown that the testator
entertained strong affections for Rosario Lopez, it does not appear that her influence so
overpowered and subjugated his mind as to "destroy his free agency and make him
express the will of another rather than his own."

Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as `undue,' if no

imposition or fraud be practiced, even though it induces the testator to make an unequal
and unjust disposition of his property in favor of those who have contributed to his
comfort and ministered to his wants, if such disposition is voluntarily made. (Mackall vs.
Mackall, 135 U. S., 1677.)

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 4. Abangan v. Abangan
G.R. No. L-13431, November 12, 1919

FACTS:
On September 1917, the CFI of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will
executed on July 1916. The will is described in the following manner: First sheet:
Contains all the disposition of the testatrix, signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in
the name and under the direction of Ana Abangan) and signed by three witnesses.
Second sheet: contains only the attestation clause, duly signed by the same three
witnesses at the bottom but was not signed by the testatrix herself. Anastacia Abangan
(different person) et al. appealed from the decision. She said that the probate should
have been denied on three grounds: (1)Neither of the sheets were signed on the left
margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses; (2) The pages were not numbered by
letters; (3) It was written in a dialect that the testatrix did not understand.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will was validly probated

HELD:
Yes. The trial court was correct in admitting the probate. The circumstance
appearing on the will itself,  that it was executed in Cebu City and in the dialect of the
place where the testarix is a resident is enough to presume that she knew this dialect in
the absence of any proof to the contrary. On the authority of this case and that of
Gonzales v Laurel, it seems that for the presumption to apply, the following must
appear: 1) that the will must be in a language or dialect generally spoken in the place of
execution, and, 2) that the testator must be a native or resident of the said locality.
Moreover, the testator's signature is not necessary in the attestation clause because
this, as its name implies, appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator.

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 5. Estate of Abada v. Abaja
G.R. No. 147145, 31 January 2005
FACTS:
Abada died sometime in May 1940. His widow Paula Toray ("Toray") died
sometime in September 1943. Both died without legitimate children. Alipio C. Abaja filed
with the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (now RTC-Kabankalan) a
petition for the probate of the last will and testament ("will") of Abada. Abada allegedly
named as his testamentary heirs his natural children Eulogio Abaja and Rosario
Cordova. Nicanor Caponong opposed the petition on the ground that Abada left no will
when he died in 1940. Alipio filed another petition before the RTC-Kabankalan for the
probate of the last will and testament of Toray. Caponong filed a petition before the
RTC-Kabankalan praying for the issuance in his name of letters of administration of the
intestate estate of Abada and Toray. RTC-Kabankalan designated Belinda Caponong-
Noble ("Caponong- Noble") Special Administratrix of the estate of Abada and Toray.
RTC admitted and allowed the probate of the Last Will and Testament of Alipio Abada

ISSUE: Whether or not the last will of Abada be admitted to probate.

HELD:
YES. The notary and two of the witnesses who authenticate the will must be
acquainted with the testator, or, should they not know him, he shall be identified by two
witnesses who are acquainted with him and are known to the notary and to the attesting
witnesses. The notary and the witnesses shall also endeavor to assure themselves that
the testator has, in their judgment, the legal capacity required to make a will. However,
the Code of Civil Procedure repealed Article 685 of the Old Civil Code. Under the Code
of Civil Procedure, the intervention of a notary is not necessary in the execution of any
will. Therefore, Abada’s will does not require acknowledgement before a notary public.
Furthermore, the Court agrees with the appellate court in applying the rule on
substantial compliance in determining the number of witnesses. While the attestation
clause does not state the number of witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that
three witnesses signed it. We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of
Abada’s will. Abada’s will clearly shows four signatures: that of Abada and of three other
persons.

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 6. Javellana v. Ledesma
97 Phil. 258

FACTS:
The case involves the execution of the late Da. Ledesma of a will and codicil
which was admitted to probate by the CFI. Both will and codicil have Ramon Tabiana,
Gloria Montinola de Tabiana and Vicente Yap as witnesses.

The contestant of the probate of this will averred that the court below erred in
giving credence to their witnesses who are the cook and driver of the testator. They
claimed that Yap (one of the witnesses in the will) insisted on the signing of the will by
the testator before the notary public however Testator Da. Ledesma was not feeling well
that time and for such reason, the latter signed it only in the presence of Yap alone.
Accordingly, they alleged that the will and codicil were not signed and acknowledged by
the testator and the witnesses at the same time before the notary public.

ISSUE: Whether the signing and the acknowledgement of the will should be performed
in one single act of both the testator and the witnesses?

HELD:
No. At any rate, as observed by the Court below, whether or not the notary
signed the certification of acknowledgment in the presence of the testatrix and the
witnesses, does not affect the validity of the codicil. Unlike the Code of 1889 (Art. 699),
the new Civil Code does not require that the signing of the testator, witnesses and
notary should be accomplished in one single act. A comparison of Articles 805 and 806
of the new Civil Code reveals that while testator and witnesses sign in the presence of
each other, all that is thereafter required is that "every will must be acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses" (Art. 806). The subsequent
signing and sealing by the notary of his certification that the testament was duly
acknowledged by the participants therein is no part of the acknowledgment itself nor of
the testamentary act. Hence their separate execution out of the presence of the testatrix
and her witnesses can not be said to violate the rule that testaments should be
completed without interruption.
It is noteworthy that Article 806 of the new Civil Code does not contain words requiring
that the testator and the witnesses should acknowledge the testament on the same day
or occasion that it was executed.

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 7. Rivera v. IAC
G.R. No. L-75005-06, 15 February 1990

FACTS:
On May 30, 1975, Venancio Rivera died. On July 28, 1975, Jose Rivera, claiming
to be the only surviving legitimate son of the deceased, filed a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration over Venancio's estate. This petition was opposed by
Adelaido J. Rivera, who denied that Jose was the son of the decedent. Adelaido
averred that Venancio was his father and did not die intestate but in fact left two
holographic wills.

On November 7, 1975, Adelaido J. Rivera filed, also with the RTC Angeles City a
petition for the probate of the holographic wills. This petition was in turn opposed by
Jose Rivera, who reiterated that he was the sole heir of Venancio's intestate estate.

On November 11, 1975, the two cases were consolidated. Adelaido J. Rivera
was later appointed special administrator.

RTC: found that Jose Rivera was not the son of the decedent but of a different
Venancio Rivera who was married to Maria Vital. The Venancio Rivera whose estate
was in question was married to Maria Jocson, by whom he had seven children,
including Adelaido. Jose Rivera had no claim to this estate because the decedent was
not his father. The holographic wills were also admitted to probate.

CA affirmed RTC.

Jose Rivera’s contention: He sought to show that Venancio was married in 1928
to Maria Vital, who was his mother. He submitted for this purpose the marriage
certificate of the couple, and his own baptismal certificate where the couple was
indicated as his parents. The petitioner also presented Domingo Santos, who testified
that Jose was indeed the son of the couple and that he saw Venancio and Jose
together several times. Jose himself stressed that Adelaido considered him a half-
brother. He insisted that Adelaido and his brothers and sisters were illegitimate children,
sired by Venancio with Maria Jocson.

Adelaido Rivera’s contention: To prove that there were in fact two persons by the
same name of Venancio Rivera, Adelaido offered Venancio Rivera's baptismal
certificate showing that his parents were Magno Rivera and Gertrudes de los Reyes, as
contrasted with the marriage certificate submitted by Jose, which indicated that the
Venancio Rivera subject thereof was the son of Florencio Rivera and Estrudez
Reyes. He also denied recognizing Jose as a brother.

ISSUE: WON the Venancio Rivera assailed by petitioner is the same Venancio Rivera
who died (said to be the father of Adelaido Rivera) – NO.

HELD:

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 We find from the evidence of record that the respondent court did not err in
holding that the Venancio Rivera who married Maria Jocson in 1942 was not the same
person who married Maria Vital, Jose's legitimate mother, in 1928. Jose belonged to a
humbler family which had no relation whatsoever with the family of Venancio Rivera and
Maria Vital. This was more prosperous and prominent. Except for the curious Identity of
names of the head of each, there is no evidence linking the two families or showing that
the deceased Venancio Rivera was the head of both.

Now for the holographic wills. The respondent court considered them valid
because it found them to have been written, dated and signed by the testator himself in
accordance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. It also held there was no necessity of
presenting the three witnesses required under Article 811 because the authenticity of
the wills had not been questioned.

The existence and therefore also the authenticity of the holographic wills were
questioned by Jose Rivera. In both proceedings, Jose Rivera opposed the holographic
wills submitted by Adelaido Rivera and claimed that they were spurious. Consequently,
it may be argued, the respondent court should have applied Article 811 of the Civil
Code, providing as follows:

In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness
who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will
and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least
three of such witnesses shall be required.

The flaw in this argument is that, as we have already determined, Jose Rivera is
not the son of the deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question. Hence, being
a mere stranger, he had no personality to contest the wills and his opposition thereto did
not have the legal effect of requiring the three witnesses. The testimony of Zenaida and
Venancio Rivera, Jr., who authenticated the wills as having been written and signed by
their father, was sufficient.

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 8. Nepomuceno v. CA
139 SCRA 206

FACTS:
Martin Jugo left a duly executed and notarized Last Will and Testament before he
died. Petitioner was named as sole executor. It is clearly stated in the Will that he was
legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, but
he had been estranged from his lawful wife. In fact, the testator Martin Jugo and the
petitioner were married despite the subsisting first marriage. The testator devised the
free portion of his estate to petitioner. On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition
for probate. On May 13, 1975, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition
alleging undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of
the execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having
admitted her living in concubinage with the testator.

The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator
admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner. Petitioner appealed to CA. On June
2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal denying the probate of the will. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid
except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void.

ISSUE: W/N the CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will
and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the
intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision.

HELD:
No. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the
Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and
declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void. The general rule is that in
probate proceedings, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination and
resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and
absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do
what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.

The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to
be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of
the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue
(Nuguid v. Nuguid). The Will is void under Article 739. The following donations shall be
void: (1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at
the time of the donation; and Article 1028. The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739,
concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions.

There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage
when Martin Jugo executed his Will. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy
because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom
he had been living in concubinage.

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 9. Gan v. Yap
G.R. No. L-12190, August 30, 1958

FACTS:
Gan filed a petition for the probate of a holographic will. The surviving husband
opposed contending that the deceased did not leave any will nor executed any
testament. The will itself was not presented. Judge San Jose refused to probate the
alleged holographic will executed by the deceased Felicidad Yap.

ISSUE: Whether a holographic will may be probated upon testimony of witnesses who
have allegedly seen it and who declared that it was in the handwriting of the testator.

HELD:
No. The execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may
not be proved by the testimony of witnesses who have read or seen it. The loss of the
holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof. Even if oral testimony were
admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will, we think the evidence
submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that
it fails to measure up to that “clear and distinct” proof required by Rule 77, Sec. 6.

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 10. Maononsong v. Estimo
G. R. No. 136773, June 25, 2003

FACTS:
Allegedly, Agatona Guevarra inherited a property from Justina Navarro, which is
now under possession of the heirs of Guevarra. Guevarra had 6 children, one of them is
Vicente Lopez, the father of petitioner Milagros Lopez-Manongsong. The respondents,
the Jumaquio sisters and Leoncia Lopez claimed that the property was actually sold to
them by Justina Navarro prior to her death. The respondents presented deed of sale
dated October 11, 1957. Petitioners filed a Complaint praying for the partition and for
the award of an area equivalent to 1/5 by right of representation. The RTC ruled that the
conveyance made by Justina Navarro is subject to nullity because the property
conveyed had a conjugal character and that Agatona Guevarra as her compulsory heir
should have the legal right to participate with the distribution of the estate under
question to the exclusion of others. The Deed of Sale did not at all provide for the
reserved legitimes or the heirs, and, therefore it has no force and effect against Agatona
Guevarra and should be declared a nullity ab initio.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rights of the compulsory heirs were impaired by the
alleged sale of the property by Justina.

HELD:
No. The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public, is
a public document and prima facie evidence of its authenticity and due execution.
There is no basis for the trial court’s declaration that the sale embodied in the
Kasulatan deprived the compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes. As opposed to a
disposition inter vivos by lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for
valuable consideration does not diminish the estate of the seller. When the disposition is
for valuable consideration, there is no diminution of the estate but merely a substitution
of values, that is, the property sold is replaced by the equivalent monetary
consideration. The Property was sold in 1957 for P250.00.

The trial court’s conclusion that the Property was conjugal, hence the sale is
void ab initio was not based on evidence, but rather on a misapprehension of Article
160 of the Civil Code, which provides: “All property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership; unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife.” The presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code applies
only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of
acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. There was no evidence presented to
establish that Navarro acquired the Property during her marriage.

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 11. Bartolome v. SSS
G.R. No. 19253, November 12, 2014

FACTS:
John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He
was covered by the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP).
Unfortunately, he met an accident on board the vessel, wherein steel plates fell on him
resulting in his death. John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried.
Bernardina Bartolome, John’s biological mother and gave him up for adoption, initiated
a claim for death benefits under P.D. 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San
Fernando City, La Union, alleging that she was the sole remaining beneficiary of John.
The SSS denied the claiim stating that she was no longer the parent of John as he was
legally adopted by Cornelio Colocol based on the documentary evidence submitted by
Bartolome herself. On appeal, the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC)
affirmed the SSS ruling citing, stating that the adoption decree severed the relation
between John and Bartolome, effectively divesting her of the status of a legitimate
parent, and, consequently, that of being a secondary beneficiary.

ISSUE: Are the biological parents of the covered, but legally adopted, considered
secondary beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive the benefits
under the ECP?

HELD:
YES. Nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate parents"
pertain to those who exercise parental authority over the employee enrolled under the
ECP. In addition, assuming arguendo that the ECC properly equated legitimacy to
parental authority, Bartolome can still qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary.

When the Cornelio (the adoptive parent) died less than three (3) years after the
adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age. John’s minority
at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor. Under such circumstance,
parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents.

Reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is
not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 855222 (RA 8552), otherwise
known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:

Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is

granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the
legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minoror
incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the
adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.

The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration

of custody is concerned. The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental
authority, unlike the grounds for rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and

13
obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of
parental authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the
adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.

To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since RA 8552
was enacted after Cornelio’s death. Truth be told, there is a lacuna in the law as to
which provision shall govern contingencies in all fours with the factual milieu of the
instant petition. Nevertheless, We are guided by the catena of cases and the state
policies behind RA 855224 wherein the paramount consideration is the best interest of
the child, which We invoke to justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the best interest of
the child that someone will remain charged for his welfare and upbringing should his or
her adopter fail or is rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a time
the adoptee isstill in his formative years, and, to Our mind, in the absence or, as in this
case, death of the adopter, no one else could reasonably be expected to perform the
role of a parent other than the adoptee’s biological one.

Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is
severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents
are not entirely eliminated. In accordance with Art. 190 of the FC, the biological parents
retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the subject of
adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not
form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate
succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those
by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted.

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 12. Balanay v. Martinez
64 SCRA 452 (1975)
FACTS:
Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973
in Davao City at the age of 67. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr.,
and 6 legitimate children: Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo,
Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.

Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court for the probate of his mother's notarial
will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in English where Leodegaria Julian
declared (a) she was the owner of the "southern half of 9 conjugal lots (b) she was the
absolute owner of 2 parcels of land which she inherited from her father (c) it was her
desire that her properties should NOT be divided among her heirs during her husband's
lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties (d)
after her husband's death (age of 82 in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal
lands should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in that part of her will.
She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her.

Although initially opposing, Felix Balanay, Sr. signed a Conformation of Division

and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights manifesting that out of respect for his wife's will
he waived and renounced his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their 6 children.
In that same instrument he confirmed the agreement, which he and his wife had
perfected before her death, that their conjugal properties would be partitioned in the
manner indicated in her will. Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder
contended that the affidavit and conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void for
illegally claiming the conjugal lands.

David O. Montaña, Sr., claiming to be the lawyer of Felix Balanay, Jr., Beatriz B.
Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon filed a motion for leave of court
to withdraw probate of the will and requesting authority to proceed by intestate estate
proceeding also referring to the provisions relating to the conjugal assets as
compromising the future legitimes.

Lower Court: Will was void and converted to intestate proceedings. Felix Balanay, Jr.,
through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, asked for the reconsideration of the lower
court's order on the ground that Atty. Montaña had NO authority to withdraw the petition
for the allowance of the will.

Lower Court on motion for reconsideration: Denied and clarified that it declared the will
void on the basis of its own independent assessment of its provisions and not because
of Atty. Montaña's arguments.

ISSUE:Whether the will should be void and interstate proceeding should follow?

15
HELD:
NO. Illegal declaration does NOT nullify the entire will and may be disregarded.

The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will
does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that
the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition
had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where some of the provisions of a will are
valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the
invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the general
testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries" (95 C.J.S. 873).

16
 13. SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL ALCALA,  vs.
MANUELA ALCALA and JOSE DEOCAMPO,
G.R. No. L-13386             October 27, 1920

FACTS:
Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva,
married Francisco Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo Deocampo was born. Julian
Nieva died intestate on April 19, 1889, and her said son, Alfeo Deocampo, inherited
from her, ab intestate, the parcels of land. Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and without
issue on July 7, 1890. Thereupon the two parcels of land above-mentioned passed to
his father, Francisco Deocampo, by intestate succession. Thereafter Francisco
Deocampo married the herein defendant Manuela Alcala, of which marriage was born
Jose Deocampo, the other defendant herein. Francisco Deocampo died on August 15,
1914, whereupon his widow and son, the defendants herein, took possession of the
parcels of land in question, under the claim that the said son, the defendant Jose
Deocampoo (a minor) had inherited the same, ab intestate, from his deceased father.

On September 30, 1915, the plaintiff herein, claiming to be an acknowledged

natural daughter of the said Juliana Nieva, instituted the present action for the purposes
of recovering from the defendants the parcels of land in question, invoking the
provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.

The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the plaintiff was an
acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva, she was not entitled to the property
here in question because, in its opinion, an illegitimate relative has no right to
the reserva troncal under the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the plaintiff is an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased
Juliana Nieva.

2. Whether or not an illegitimate relative within the third degree is entitled to

the reserva troncal provided for by article 811 of the Civil Code.

HELD:

1. Whether or not the plaintiff is an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased

Juliana Nieva.
It appears from the record that the said Juliana Nieva, while unmarried, gave birth to
the plaintiff on March 29, 1882, and that the plaintiff was duly baptized as her natural
daughter, of unknown father; that the said Juliana Nieva nourished and reared her said
child, the plaintiff herein; that the plaintiff lived with her said mother until the latter was
married to Francisco Deocampo; that the said mother treated the plaintiff, and exhibited
her publicly, as a legitimate daughter. The SC ruled that the plaintiff Segunda Maria
Nieva is an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva.

17
 2. Whether or not an illegitimate relative within the third degree is entitled to
the reserva
troncal provided for by article 811 of the Civil Code.

That article reads as follows:

Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the
latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is
obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which such property came.

Eminent commentators on the Spanish Civil Code, are unanimous in the opinion
that the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code apply only to legitimate relative. In
determining the persons who are obliged to reserve under article 811, Manresa says:
Article 811 does not distinguish; it speaks of the ascendant, without attaching the
qualification of legitimate, and, on the other hand, the same reason that exists for
applying the provision to the natural family exists for applying it to the legitimate
family. Nevertheless, the article in referring to the ascendant in an indeterminate
manner shows that it imposes the obligation to reserve only upon the legitimate
ascendant.

While Article 943, provides as follows:

A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall
such children or relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child.

To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural brother,
Alfeo Deocampo, by operation of law, would be a fragrant violate of the express
provision of the foregoing article (943).
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed,
without any finding as to costs. So ordered.

18
 14. CONSOLACION FLORENTINO DE CRISOLOGO, ET AL., vs.
DR. MANUEL SINGSON,
G.R. No. L-13876 February 28, 1962

FACTS:
Action for partition commenced by the spouses Consolacion Florentino and
Francisco Crisologo against Manuel Singson in connection with a residential lot located
a Plaridel St., Vigan, Ilocos Sur, with an area of approximately 193 square meters, and
the improvements existing thereon. Their complaint alleged that Singson owned one-
half pro-indiviso of said property and that Consolacion Florentino owned the other half
by virtue of the provisions of the duly probated last will of Dña. Leona Singson, the
original owner, and the project of partition submitted to, and approved by the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Sur in special Proceeding; that plaintiffs had made demands for
the partition of said property, but defendant refused to accede thereto, thus compelling
them to bring action. Defendant's defense was that Consolacion Florentino was a mere
usufructuary of, and not owner of one-half pro-indiviso of the property in question, and
that, therefore, she was not entitled to demand partition thereof.

Lower Court: Declared that the plaintiff is a co-owner pro-indiviso with the
defendant of the house and lot described in the complaint to the extent of each of an
undivided 1/2 portion thereof;

Defendant Singson appealed. It is admitted that Dña. Leona Singson, who died
single on January 13, 1948, was the owner of the property in question at the time of her
death. On July 31, 1951 she executed her last will which was admitted to probate in
Special Proceeding of the lower court whose decision was affirmed by the CA. At the
time of the execution of the will, her nearest living relatives were her brothers Evaristo,
Manuel and Dionisio Singson, her nieces Rosario, Emilia and Trinidad, and her
grandniece Consolation, all surnamed Florentino.

ISSUES: Whether or not the testamentary disposition, is alled sustitucion vulgar or for

a sustitucion fideicomisaria (mere sustitucion vulgar)

HELD:
Art. 774. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir
or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not
wish or should be unable to accept the inheritance.
A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it is to apply,
shall include the three mentioned in the next preceeding paragraph, unless the
testator has otherwise provided:
Art. 781. Fidei-commissary substitutions by virtue of which the heir is charged to
preserve and transmit to a third person the whole or part of the inheritance shall
be valid and effective, provided they do not go beyond the second degree, or
that they are made in favor of persons living at the time of the death of the
testator." .
Art. 785. The following shall be inoperative: .

19
 1. Fiduciary substitutions not made expressly, either by giving them this name
or by imposing upon the fiduciary the absolute obligation of delivering the
property to a second heir." ....

In accordance with the Art. 774, the testator may not only designate the heirs
who will succeed him upon his death, but also provide for substitutes in the event that
said heirs do not accept or are in no position to accept the inheritance or legacies, or die
ahead of him. The testator may also bequeath his properties to a particular person with
the obligation, on the part of the latter, to deliver the same to another person, totally or
partially, upon the occurrence of a particular event.

It is clear that the particular testamentary clause under consideration provides for
a substitution of the heir named therein in this manner: that upon the death of
Consolacion— whether this occurs before or after that of the testatrix — the property
bequeathed to her shall be delivered or shall belong in equal parts to the testatrix's
three brothers, Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio, or their forced heirs, should anyone of
them die ahead of Consolacion Florentino. If this clause created what is known
as sustitucion vulgar, the necessary result would be that Consolacion Florentino, upon
the death of the testatrix, became the owner of one undivided half of the property, but if
it provided for a sustitution fideicomisaria, she would have acquired nothing more than
usufructuary rights over the same half. In the former case, she would undoubtedly be
entitled to partition, but not in the latter.

If the fiduciary did not acquire full ownership of the property bequeathed by will,
but mere usufructuary rights thereon until the time came for him to deliver said property
to the fideicomisario, it is obvious that the nude ownership over the property, upon the
death of the testatrix, passed to and was acquired by another person, and the person
cannot be other than the fideicomisario. It seems to be of the essence of a
fideicommissary substitution that an obligation be clearly imposed upon the first heir to
preserve and transmit to another the whole or part of the estate bequeathed to him,
upon his death or upon the happening of a particular event. For this reason, Art. 785 of
the old Civil Code provides that a fideicommissary substitution shall have no effect
unless it is made expressly ("de una manera expresa") either by giving it such name, or
by imposing upon the first heir the absolute obligation ("obligacion terminante") to
deliver the inheritance to a substitute or second heir.

A careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration shows that the
substitution of heirs provided for therein is not expressly made of the fideicommissary
kind, nor does it contain a clear statement to the effect that appellee, during her lifetime,
shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to her, naked
ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. It merely provides that
upon appellee's death, whether this happens before or after that of the testatrix, her
share shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix. The last will of the deceased Dña.
Leona Singson, established a mere sustitucion vulgar, the substitution Consolacion
Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be effective or to take place upon the death
of the former, whether it happens before or after that of the testatrix.

20
 15. IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELODIA FERRARIS.
FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO vs.
GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO, CATALINA FERARIS DE VILLEGAS,
JUANITO FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS
G.R. No. L-19382 August 31, 1965

FACTS:
Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to
Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944.
Thereafter, up to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for the summary
settlement of her estate, she has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still
unknown. More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the last time she was known
to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her
succession and distributing her estate among her heirs.

Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one-third (1/3) share in
the estate of her aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less, and which was
adjudicated to her in Special Proceeding of the same court. The deceased Melodia
Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was survived
only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-
sister of decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita,
and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children of
Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the
decedent). These two classes of heirs claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek
to participate in the estate of said Melodia Ferraris.

ISSUE: Can the decedent's uncles and aunts succeed ab intestato so long as nephews
and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed? (NO)

HELD:
Petitioner-appellant contends in the present appeal that she is of the same or
equal degree of relationship as the oppositors appellees, three degrees removed from
the decedent; and that under article 975 of the New Civil Code no right of representation
could take place when the nieces and nephew of the decedent do not concur with an
uncle or aunt, as in the case at bar, but rather the former succeed in their own right.
We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the
nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both
kinds of relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending to the common
ancestor and then descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art. 966). Appellant is likewise
right in her contention that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of
representation (i.e., per stripes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the
deceased, as provided expressly by Article 975.

Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy,
nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first
cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004,

21
1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under the last article (1009), the
absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to
the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. This was also
and more clearly the case under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately
preceded the Civil Code now in force (R.A. 386). Thus, Articles 952 and 954 of the
Code of 1889.

It will be seen that, brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces inherited ab
intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other collaterals succeeded only after the
widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed the spouse
on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased, but
without altering the preferred position of the latter vis-a-vis the other collaterals.
Appellants quote paragraph 2 of Tolentino's commentaries to Article 1009 of the present
Civil Code as declaring that Article 1009 does not establish a rule of preference. Which
is true as to "other collaterals," since preference among them is according to their
proximity to the decedent, as established by Article 962, paragraph 1.
Other collaterals. — The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in
intestate succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or children
of brothers or sisters. They are, however, limited to relatives within the fifth
degree. Beyond this, we can safely say there is hardly any affection to merit the
succession of collaterals. Under the law, therefore, relatives beyond the fifth
degree are no longer considered as relatives, for successional purposes.
Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this article should
be understood in connection with the general rule that the nearest relatives
exclude the farther. Collaterals of the same degree inherit in equal parts, there
being no right of representation. They succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them on account of the whole blood relationship. (Emphasis
supplied)

We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's
uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the
decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed. The decision appealed from,
in so far as it conforms to this rule, is hereby affirmed. No costs

22
 16. Intestate estate of the deceased spouses Magdaleno Fajardo and Candelaria
Firmalino. PETRONILA FAJARDO, v. MELCHOR FAJARDO,
[G.R. No. 32195. August 19, 1930.]
FACTS:
Appellant and appellee are brother and sister, and the sole heirs of the decedent
spouses. Appellant alleges that his father had long before death divided his estate
between his children, while appellee denies such partition.

The evidence shows that the appellant took possession of certain lands
belonging to his deceased father before the latter's death, paying the land tax and
appropriating the fruits thereof for his own personal use.

While the appellee, too, now holds certain land from the same predecessor, it
has not been shown that such tenure dates back to her father's lifetime. And both she
and her husband have testified that they took possession thereof only after her father's
death.

The record, then, does not bear out the allegation that the late Magdaleno
Fajardo divided his estate between his two children who are the parties herein.
At any rate, it does not appear that if such a partition was made, it was made in
accordance with law and is therefore enforceable.

ISSUE: WON there was a valid partition effected? (NO)

HELD:
There are only two ways in which said partition could have been made: By an
act inter vivos, or by will. In either case there were formalities which must be followed.
Manresa thus comments on articles 1056 et seq. of the Civil Code:
A testator may therefore partition his estate either by an act inter vivos or by will;
that is, following the proper formalities of one, or the other of these acts.
(Commentaries on the Spanish Civil Code, vol VII, p. 694, 5th edition.)

If the partition was made by an act inter vivos, it should have been reduced in
writing (sec. 335, No. 5, Code of Civ. Proc.) in a public instrument (article 1280, Civil
Code) because it was a conveyance of real estate. If by last will and testament, the
legal requisites should have been observed. Neither appears in the record to have been
done.

23
 17. LEONARDO NOTARTE, GUILLERMO NOTARTE, REGALADO NOTARTE AND
HEIRS OF FELIPE NOTARTE, v. GODOFREDO NOTARTE,
[G.R. NO. 180614 - August 29, 2012]
FACTS:
The properties subject of controversy form part of a 263,233-square meter land
situated in Barrio Quinaoayanan, Municipality of Bani, Province of Pangasinan. The
original registered owners with 1/7 share each are Vicenta Notarte, the wife of Hilario
Hortaleza; Paulino Notarte, married to Maria Camba; Juan Notarte, married to Gregoria
Castillo; Bernardo Notarte, married to Dorotea Orasa; Cirila Notarte, the wife of Luis
Castelo; Fausto Notarte, married to Martina Natino; and spouses Ricardo Namoca and
Eusebia Ortaleza. Vicenta, Paulino, Juan, Bernardo, Cirila and Fausto, all surnamed
Notarte, are brothers and sisters, while Ricardo Namoca is their cousin. Ï‚ Petitioner
Felipe Notarte is the uncle of respondent Godofredo Notarte whose father, Alejandro
Notarte, is the brother of Felipe. Felipe and Alejandro are the sons of Juan Notarte.
Petitioner Guillermo Notarte is the brother of Godofredo while petitioner Leonardo
Notarte is their cousin, being the son of Felipe. Petitioner Regalado Notarte is the son of
Leonardo.

On October 15, 1984, Godofredo bought from Patrocenia Nebril-Gamboa a

parcel of land, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale she executed in his favor and
describing the property. On the same date, Godofredo filed his Affidavit of Adverse
Claim in the Registry of Deeds to protect his rights on the land he acquired from
Patrocenia "pending the completion of all proper documents for the segregation of
separate portions of the whole parcel of land." Thereafter, Godofredo declared the land
in his name for the year 1985, indicating its area as 29,482 sq.m. Godofredo initially
filed in the MTC a complaint for "Partition, Subdivision Survey and Recovery of
Possession With Damages" against Felipe and Guillermo. An Amended Complaint for
"Recovery of Possession With Damages" was admitted by the said court, whereby the
prayer for subdivision survey of the adjoining lots respectively occupied by the parties
was abandoned. The Second Amended Complaint which included as additional
defendants Leonardo and Regalado.

Godofredo alleged that the land used to be intact but the petitioners, taking
advantage of his absence, took possession of portions of his land thereby reducing it to
barely 13,000 sq.m., with Guillermo occupying 6,333 sq.m. more or less on the southern
side, while Leonardo and Regalado jointly encroached over 8,272 sq.m. more or less on
the western side. Godofredo claimed that all demands upon the petitioners to return the
aforesaid portions and conciliations before the Barangay authorities failed.

In their Answer with Counterclaim, petitioners denied having encroached on

respondent s land, contending that respondent instituted this complaint to increase the
actual size of his land at the expense of the adjoining owners. Petitioners asserted that
they have been in actual, notorious, public and exclusive possession of their respective
parcels for a very long time even before respondent bought his property from
Patrocenia Gamboa. They claimed that their common ascendant, Felipe, owned 10
hectares of the property, which he acquired by purchase as early as 1951 and the latest

24
in 1967. The 37,604-sq. m. portion of Felipe s land being occupied by petitioners, which
area adjoins respondent s property on the west, was acquired by Felipe from James
Turner by virtue of a Quitclaim Deed dated April 2, 1951. Petitioners also alleged that
there are other co-owners of the whole undivided land, who are indispensable for the
final and complete determination of this case.

The MTC denied the motion stating that this would pre-empt the issues under
contention because of the ongoing trial to determine the boundaries of the subject
properties which are in dispute.

The RTC reversed the MTC. The RTC found that from the evidence it is
convincingly clear that respondent owns the 27,604 sq. m. described in his second
amended complaint and identified his land with the statement of its metes and bounds
and the visible limits thereof. Because there is overlapping of boundaries in this case,
the RTC said that the area of the adjoining parcels gains significance.

The CA which dismissed their appeal. The CA found that as early as 1951 and
even before the issuance of OCT, the registered owners have effected an oral or
informal partition of the big parcel of land, complete with the demarcation of its
boundaries as pertaining to the respective owners thereof by visible boundary limits
such as dike, "mojon," live trees and the like.

ISSUE: Whether the 263,000 sq. m. land covered by OCT No. 48098 had been
partitioned by the registered owners (YES)

HELD:
Under Article 1082 of the Civil Code, every act which is intended to put an end to
indivision among co-heirs is deemed to be a partition even though it should purport to
be a sale, an exchange, or any other transaction. Partition may thus be inferred from
circumstances sufficiently strong to support the presumption.

In this case, the original registered owners had either mortgaged or sold their
respective 1/7 shares, in whole or in part. Although the deeds of conveyances and
those early entries in OCT No. 48098 indicated the portions being mortgaged or sold as
pertaining to proindiviso shares, the said owners successors-in-interest eventually took
possession of the respective portions acquired by them beginning 1951 or thereabouts.
These transferees who are mostly relatives likewise introduced improvements on their
respective lots, and have also exercised acts of ownership thereon. That these
respective shares of the original registered owners were merely designated orally their
individual portions having been simply pointed to them, as testified to by respondent
and Patrocenia is immaterial.

On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of

equity have enforced oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed.
Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and
enforceable at law, equity will in proper cases, where the parol partition has actually

25
been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of
ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize and
enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has been
held or stated in a number of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties
went into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the
partition agreement, that equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree
title in accordance with the possession in severalty. It has been held or stated that parol
partition may be sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of
a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which possession
in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a court of
equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for the
purpose of concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold their
respective parts in severalty. A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that
the parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in
severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing
the existence of the partition. Under the doctrine of part performance, or have stated
that a part performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the operation of the
statute of frauds. It has been held that where there was a partition in fact between
tenants in common, and a part performance, a court of equity would have regard to
enforce such partition agreed to by the parties.

26
 18. MA. ELENA R. DIVINAGRACIA, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF THE
LATE SANTIAGO C. DIVINAGRACIA, v. CORONACION PARILLA, CELESTIAL
NOBLEZA, CECILIA LELINA, CELEDONIO NOBLEZA, AND MAUDE NOBLEZA,.
G.R. No. 196750, March 11, 2015
FACTS:
Conrado Nobleza, Sr. (Conrado, Sr.) owned a 313-square meter parcel of land
located at Cor. Fuentes-Delgado Streets, Iloilo City denominated as Lot 133-B-1-A.
During his lifetime, he contracted two marriages: (a) the first was with Lolita Palermo
with whom he had two (2) children, namely, Cresencio and Conrado, Jr.; and (b) the
second was with Eusela Niangar with whom he had seven (7) children, namely, Mateo,
Sr., Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo, 7 and Cebeleo, Sr. Conrado, Sr.
also begot three (3) illegitimate children, namely, Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo. Mateo,
Sr. pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. and was survived by his children Felcon, Landelin,
Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord. Cebeleo, Sr. also pre-deceased his
father and was survived by his wife, Maude, and children Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel.

According to Santiago, upon Conrado, Sr.’s death, Cresencio, Conrado, Jr.,

Felcon (in representation of his father, Mateo, Sr., and his siblings), Coronacion,
Celestial, Cecilia, Rogelio, Eduardo, and Ricardo sold their respective interests over the
subject land to Santiago for a consideration of P447,695.66, as embodied in a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement or Adjudication with Deed of Sale dated November 22, 1989,
which was, however, not signed by the other heirs who did not sell their respective
shares, namely, Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude (in representation of his husband,
Cebeleo, Sr., and their children). On December 22, 1989, the same parties executed a
Supplemental Contract whereby the vendors-heirs and Santiago agreed that out of the
aforesaid consideration, only P109,807.93 will be paid up front, and that Santiago will
only pay the remaining balance of P337,887.73 upon the partition of the subject land.
However, Santiago was not able to have TCT cancelled and the subject document
registered because of Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude’s refusal to surrender the said
title. This fact, coupled with Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude’s failure to partition the
subject land, prompted Santiago to file a Complaint for judicial partition and for
receivership.

For their part, Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude maintained that Santiago had no
legal right to file an action for judicial partition nor compel them to surrender TCT
because, inter alia: (a) Santiago did not pay the full purchase price of the shares sold to
him; and (b) the subject land is a conjugal asset of Conrado Sr. and Eusela Niangar
and, thus, only their legitimate issues may validly inherit the same.

RTC: The RTC ordered the partition of the subject land between Santiago on the
one hand, and Ceruleo, Celedonio, Maude, and the heirs of Mateo, Sr. on the other
hand and, consequently, the cancellation of TCT and the issuance of a new owner’s
duplicate certificate in favor of Santiago and the group of Ceruleo, Celedonio, Maude,
and the heirs of Mateo, Sr. Furthermore, Santiago did not validly acquire Mateo, Sr.’s
share over the subject land, considering that Felcon admitted the lack of authority to
bind his siblings with regard to Mateo, Sr.’s share thereon.

27
CA: The CA set aside the RTC Rulings and, consequently, dismissed Santiago’s
complaint for judicial partition. It held that Felcon’s siblings, as well as Maude’s children,
are indispensable parties to the judicial partition of the subject land and, thus, their non-
inclusion as defendants in Santiago’s complaint would necessarily result in its dismissal.

ISSUE: W/N Felcon’s siblings and Cebeleo, Sr. and Maude’s children are indispensable
parties to Santiago’s complaint for judicial partition. (They are indispensable parties)

HELD:
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action
in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The
party’s interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so
inextricably intertwined with the other parties’ that his legal presence as a party to the
proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the
dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Thus,
the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null
and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to
those present.

With regard to actions for partition, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court
requires that all persons interested in the property shall be joined as defendants, viz.:
SEC. 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. – A person having the right to
compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his
complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real
estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons
interested in the property. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are
indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of
the said parties.

In the instant case, records reveal that Conrado, Sr. has the following heirs,
legitimate and illegitimate, who are entitled to a pro-indiviso share in the subject land,
namely: Conrado, Jr., Cresencio, Mateo, Sr., Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio,
Ceruleo, Cebeleo, Sr., Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo. However, both Mateo, Sr. and
Cebeleo, Sr. pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. and, thus, pursuant to the rules on
representation under the Civil Code, 33 their respective interests shall be represented by
their children, namely: (a) for Mateo, Sr.: Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr.,
Tito, and Gaylord; and (b) for Cebeleo, Sr.: Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel.

The aforementioned heirs – whether in their own capacity or in representation of

their direct ascendant – have vested rights over the subject land and, as such, should
be impleaded as indispensable parties in an action for partition thereof. However, a
reading of Santiago’s complaint shows that as regards Mateo, Sr.’s interest, only Felcon
was impleaded, excluding therefrom his siblings and co-representatives. Similarly, with

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regard to Cebeleo, Sr.’s interest over the subject land, the complaint impleaded his wife,
Maude, when pursuant to Article 97235 of the Civil Code, the proper representatives to
his interest should have been his children, Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel. Verily, Santiago’s
omission of the aforesaid heirs renders his complaint for partition defective.

In this case, while it is conceded that Santiago bought the interests of majority of
the heirs of Conrado, Sr. as evidenced by the subject document, as a vendee, he
merely steps into the shoes of the vendors-heirs. Since his interest over the subject land
is merely derived from that of the vendors-heirs, the latter should first be determined as
co-owners thereof, thus necessitating the joinder of all those who have vested interests
in such land, i.e., the aforesaid heirs of Conrado, Sr., in Santiago’s complaint.

In fine, the absence of the aforementioned indispensable parties in the instant

complaint for judicial partition renders all subsequent actions of the RTC null and void
for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to those
present.

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