Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Recommended Citation
Peter E. Quint, What is a Twentieth-century Constitution?, 67 Md. L. Rev. 238 (2007)
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PETER E. QUINT*
238
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1. In Germany, the Weimar Constitution of 1919 was even longer than the Basic Law,
and it contained many adventurous provisions. WEIMARER REICHSVERFASSUNG [WRV] [Wei-
mar Constitution] (1919). The Constitution of India, often said to be the longest in the
world, contains approximately 390 sections, as well as twelve “schedules” containing addi-
tional material. The schedules alone occupy more than fifty pages in the printed volume
of the constitution.
2. Of course, once Congress has exercised its discretion to enact a statute, the Presi-
dent is obliged to “take Care” that the statute is “faithfully executed.” U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 3.
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7. Id. at 196–97.
8. The South African and German constitutions have also been interpreted to impose
an obligation on the state to protect individuals against other individuals or corporations,
under some circumstances. See Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938
(CC) (S. Afr.) (imposing an obligation on the government to take steps to protect individ-
uals against violence); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court]
Aug. 8, 1978, 49 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 89 (Kalkar
case) (F.R.G.) (recognizing the obligation of government to protect the population against
dangers arising from nuclear power plants). Questions about the precise extent to which
the constitution applies in relations between private individuals remains a subject of debate
both in South Africa and in Germany.
9. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 7.
10. Id. art. 6(4).
11. Id. art. 20(1) (emphasis added). Another provision of the Basic Law imposes simi-
lar obligations on the individual German states (Länder). Id. art. 28(1).
12. 87 BVerfGE 153 (1992).
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18. See, e.g., VERF. THÜR. [Constitution of Thuringia] art. 15 (state goal of appropriate
living space).
In addition to the “directive principles of state policy,” the Constitution of India also
includes a list of “fundamental duties” of Indian citizens. INDIA CONST. art. 51-A. The
Weimar Constitution of 1919 also contained constitutional “duties,” as did several earlier
constitutions in France and in at least one of the American states. Gerhard Casper, Chang-
ing Concepts of Constitutionalism: 18th to 20th Century, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 311.
19. On “third-generation” rights, see, for example, Natsu Taylor Saito, Beyond Civil
Rights: Considering “Third Generation” International Human Rights Law in the United States, 28
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 387 (1996–97).
20. Id. at 397 (quoting James Crawford, The Rights of Peoples: Some Conclusions, in THE
RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 57 (James Crawford ed., 1988)).
21. Indeed the constitutions of South Africa and India both have provisions that fall
into this category. The Constitution of South Africa requires the Government to “take
practical and positive measures to elevate the status and advance the use of [the indige-
nous languages of the people],” S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 6(2), and it also grants a degree of
recognition to the status of traditional leaders and systems of customary law. Id.
§§ 211–212. The Indian Constitution provides special protections for minorities with “a
distinct language, script or culture of their own.” INDIA CONST. arts. 29(1), 350-A, 350-B.
For other linguistic provisions in the Indian Constitution, see id. arts. 343–51.
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22. On this process, see generally PETER E. QUINT, THE IMPERFECT UNION: CONSTITU-
TIONAL STRUCTURES OF GERMAN UNIFICATION 112–22 (1997).
23. Interestingly, as far back as 1919, the Weimar Constitution contained a provision
declaring that “monuments of nature” as well as “the countryside” [die Landschaft] enjoy
the protection and cultivation of the state. WRV art. 150(1). Moreover, a number of the
new German state constitutions, adopted after unification, also contain environmental pro-
visions. See, e.g., VERF. SACHS. [Constitution of Saxony] (1992) art. 10.
24. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 24.
25. Id.
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safeguard the forests and wild life of the country”), and also among
the “Fundamental Duties” in Article 51-A(g). According to this provi-
sion, citizens have a duty “to protect and improve the natural environ-
ment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have
compassion for living creatures.”
IV. COVERAGE
One of the most striking differences between the laconic Ameri-
can Constitution of the eighteenth century and our twentieth-century
constitutions is that, as society and political structures have developed
in complexity, many additional subjects have been considered worthy
of constitutional attention. Thus, in addition to provisions on rights
and on the general structure of government, the Basic Law of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany and the South African Constitution have a
number of significant provisions on topics that are completely without
explicit coverage in the Constitution of the United States.
Thus, the German Basic Law contains a provision generally regu-
lating political parties and describing their role in the polity. This
provision also authorizes the prohibition of anti-democratic parties by
the Constitutional Court.26 The South African Constitution provides
an explicit right to form and to be an active member of a political
party, but there is no provision for the banning of parties—a proce-
dure that would have raised unpleasant memories in South Africa.27
Of course, the whole concept of political parties in the modern sense
did not exist when the American Constitution was drafted in the late-
eighteenth century.
The Basic Law also contains a specific provision granting detailed
protections for labor unions,28 while the Constitution of South Africa
contains an even more detailed provision directed toward providing
balanced protections for workers and trade unions, as well as employ-
ers and employer associations, in labor relations and collective bar-
gaining.29 In another example, the Basic Law regulates (in a very
detailed manner) the circumstances under which an individual may
assert conscientious objection to military service.30
The following sections contain brief discussions of three addi-
tional areas in which the problems of the twentieth century seem to
have impelled inclusion of important areas of coverage that are basi-
A. Administration
The drafters of the U.S. Constitution were not much concerned
with providing rules and structures for the administration of govern-
ment. (After all, this was an era in which the Secretary of State had to
call on his brother for assistance when he wanted to have some com-
missions delivered to newly appointed justices of the peace.)31 In-
deed, the Constitution does not go further in the area of
administration than to refer from time to time to “executive Depart-
ments” or the “Heads of Departments.”32 The President, of course,
has the constitutional obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faith-
fully executed.”33
When the “administrative state” began its impressive rise in the
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, therefore, these devel-
opments in the United States basically relied on no explicit constitu-
tional provisions, but rather on a proliferation of statutory solutions.
In a number of interesting ways, however, our twentieth-century con-
stitutions do attempt to deal with the subject of administration. The
Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, makes
clear that most federal law is to be enforced by the administrative or-
gans of the states and not by the federal government itself.34 This is
an approach to the “vertical” separation of powers which contrasts in
an interesting manner with that of the United States: In the United
States, the states retain significant lawmaking power because most law
remains state law; in Germany, in contrast, almost all law is federal law
(including the civil and criminal codes), but the states retain signifi-
cant authority in part because they are responsible for administering
most federal law. Other provisions in the Basic Law, however, do al-
low the federal government to supervise the state administration of
federal law, when necessary. Moreover, the Basic Law explicitly sets
aside certain specific areas—such as air traffic control, the federal rail-
roads, the federal bank, and certain waterways—which remain under
direct federal control.35
In a contrasting technique, the South African Constitution tends
to rely on constitutionally mandated commissions to oversee the “pub-
lic administration,” whose “basic values and principles” are set out in a
lengthy series of very general statements.36 A Public Service Commis-
sion is responsible for monitoring the administration, furnishing ap-
propriate reports, and investigating grievances.37 In addition, in a
chapter entitled “State Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democ-
racy,” the constitution requires the establishment of a number of su-
pervisory officers such as an ombudsman, known as the “Public
Protector,”38 and an Auditor-General,39 as well as a series of commis-
sions covering areas such as human rights, rights of cultural, religious,
and linguistic communities, gender equality, and elections.40
In what seems to be an attempt to further the enforcement of
rights of social welfare referred to above, the South African Human
Rights Commission “must require relevant organs of state to provide
the Commission with information on the measures that they have
taken towards the realization of the rights in the Bill of Rights con-
cerning housing, health care, food, water, social security, education
and the environment.”41
B. Financial Provisions
In a similar manner, the eighteenth-century Constitution of the
United States does not say anything very specific about finances.
Rather, Congress is given the discretionary power to raise and collect
taxes and to spend for the general welfare, and Article I makes clear
that “[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives.”42
In contrast, however, our twentieth-century constitutions have
very elaborate provisions on what has been called the “fiscal constitu-
tion.”43 The financial provisions in both of these constitutions are
quite daunting in length and complexity. In at least one respect, how-
ever, they seek to achieve a common goal, and that goal is related, in
part, to the goals of social welfare which, as we have seen, are impli-
cated in both constitutions—albeit more extensively stated in the Con-
V. EMERGENCIES
Both of our twentieth-century constitutions also have very elabo-
rate provisions for emergencies. In the case of Germany, these provi-
sions were added to the Basic Law in 1968, after a national controversy
that helped propel the radical student movement of the late 1960s
into popular consciousness: members of the student movement and
other activists on the left feared that the introduction of the emer-
gency provisions foretold the slippage of Germany back into totalitari-
anism.46 These provisions are triggered in the case of actual or
imminent attack on the Federal Republic and permit (among other
things) the deferral of elections and government by a standing com-
mittee of Parliament.47 In point of fact, however, these emergency
provisions of the German Basic Law have never been employed.
Detailed emergency provisions are also found in the South Afri-
can Constitution.48 These provisions may be triggered if “the life of
the nation is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection, disor-
59. GG art. 3(3). Moreover, the factor of disability may not be taken into account in a
manner that disadvantages an individual—although legislative provisions that grant com-
pensatory advantages are presumably permissible. Id. A separate provision in the Basic
Law requires that the legislature create essentially equal conditions for “non-marital chil-
dren.” Id. art. 6(5).
60. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 9(3).
61. INDIA CONST. art. 15.
62. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 9(2); INDIA CONST. arts. 15(4); 16(4)–(4-A); see also GG art.
3(2) (provision of German Basic Law that may require affirmative action for women).
63. GG art. 5.
64. Id. art. 8.
65. Id. art. 9.
66. Id. art. 21.
67. Id. art. 17.
68. Id. art. 10.
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process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation”), the Constitution of South Africa has a very
elaborate provision on property, including a section on compensation
for expropriation which requires consideration of five separate fac-
tors, only one of which is “the market value of the property.”69
69. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 25. Provisions allowing expropriation of property with com-
pensation that is calculated at less than market value may reflect the redistributive goals of
constitutions that contain rights or principles of social welfare. The German Basic Law, for
example, follows the Weimar Constitution in providing that “property has its obligations”
(Eigentum verpflichtet), and it provides that “compensation is to be determined in accor-
dance with a just weighing of the interests of the community and of the persons affected.”
GG art. 14(2)–(3). The Basic Law also contains a provision authorizing the general expro-
priation of real property and the means of production (with compensation), although this
apparent relic of the immediate post-war era has never actually been implemented. Id. art.
15. For the complex history of expropriation of property under the Indian Constitution,
see AUSTIN, supra note 53, at 69–122. R
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70. On this point, see Peter E. Quint, Free Speech and Private Law in German Constitutional
Theory, 48 MD. L. REV. 247 (1989).
71. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. Article II, Section 2 explained how treaties were to be
made—by the President with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. See also
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (relating to international agreements made by the states).
72. Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
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73. GG art. 100(2). Although the Constitution of the United States provides no text on
this subject, the Supreme Court has found that the general rules of international law are
part of federal law. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). In contrast with the
rule of precedence provided in the Basic Law, however, it is generally thought that the
rules of international law may be superseded by a statute of Congress under United States
law.
74. GG art. 24(1)-(2).
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(through which the German Mark was replaced by the Euro) and reg-
ulates the relationship of Germany with the European Union.75 Also
as a result of the Maastricht Agreement, Article 28 of the Basic Law
was amended to grant local voting rights (and rights to be a candidate
in local elections) to citizens of other European Union states living in
Germany.
Although South Africa obviously does not have the same history
as Germany, and is not embedded to the same extent in regional insti-
tutions, international law also plays a highly significant role in the
South African Constitution. The prominence of international law
may well reflect the important role played by international action
(such as boycotts)—based on concepts of international human
rights—in the fall of the South African apartheid regime.
In interpreting the Bill of Rights, therefore, Section 39 of the
South African Constitution requires that the courts “must consider in-
ternational law; and . . . may consider foreign law.” In an interna-
tional conflict, moreover, “the state must comply with . . .
international humanitarian law” with respect to prisoners of war.76 In
light of South African history under apartheid, a long and detailed
constitutional section authorizing and regulating the security services
contains a number of provisions binding those services to interna-
tional law. According to Article 198(c), for example, national security
must be pursued in compliance with law, including international law.
Moreover, under Article 199(5), “the security services must act, and
must teach and require their members to act, in accordance with the
Constitution and the law, including customary international law and
international agreements binding on the Republic.” Finally, Sections
200(2) and 201(2)(c) of the South African Constitution generally im-
pose the requirements of international law on the defense forces.77
IX. CONCLUSION
Sometimes the process of comparative law can yield at least as
much illumination about one’s own system as about the foreign sys-
tems that one is investigating. Looking back at the eighteenth-century