Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Under the Labor Code, an employer is solidarily liable for legal 3. Rodolfo Velasco 147,114.43
wages due security guards for the period of time they were
4. Armando Ballon 116,894.70 In its motion for reconsideration, petitioner contended that it
received a copy of the labor arbiters Decision only on April 6, 1993,
5. Jose L. Cabrera 133,047.81 and that it filed on April 16, 1993 within the prescribed time, a
Notice of Appeal with a Memorandum on Appeal, a Motion to
6. Victor Aldeza 137,046.64 Reduce Appeal Bond and a surety bond issued by Prudential
Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. in the amount of P50,000.[4] Though
not opposed by the complainants and the security agency, the
TOTAL P789,154.39
arguments stated in the motion were not taken up by Respondent
Commission. Reconsideration was nonetheless denied by
=========== Respondent Commission in its Order of July 12, 1994, quoted
below:[5]
representing their monetary benefits in the amount of SEVEN
HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FIFTY FOUR Section 14, Rule VII of the NLRC New Rules of Procedure allows
PESOS AND 39/100 CENTAVOS (P789,154.39). [u]s to entertain a motion for reconsideration only on palpable or
patent errors [w]e may have committed in [o]ur disputed April 28,
Respondents are likewise ordered to pay attorneys fees in the 1994 resolution.
amount of P78,915.43 within ten (10) days from receipt of this
Decision. There being no such assignment here, [petitioners] motion for
reconsideration dated May 19, 1994 is hereby DENIED for lack of
All other issues are hereby [d]ismissed for failure of the merit.
complainants to fully substantiate their claims.
Hence, this recourse.[6]
The appeal filed by petitioner was dismissed by the National
Labor Relations Commission[2] in its Resolution promulgated April In a Resolution dated March 20, 1995, this Court issued a
28, 1994, for failure of the petitioner to file the required appeal temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents and their
bond within the reglementary period.[3] Pertinent portions of the agents from implementing and enforcing the assailed Resolution
challenged Resolution are herewith quoted: and Order until further notice.[7]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. Napoleon Mamon started working for the [security agency] on
October 7, 1989 and was assigned as office guard for three (3)
days without any pay nor allowance as it was allegedly an on[- he better tender his resignation because he cannot be given any
the-]job training so there [was] no pay[.] On October 10, 1989, he assignment although respondent was recruiting new guards and
was transferred to the residence of Mr. Benito Ong with 12 hours posting them.
duty a day receiving a salary very much less than the minimum
wage for eight (8) hours work until February 3, 1990 when he Arsenio Gazzingan started to work for the [security agency] on
received an order transferring him to Rosewood Processing, Inc. September 29, 1988. [Note: the introductory paragraph stated
effective that date xxx; [a]t Rosewood Processing, Inc., he was September 25, 1988.] He was assigned to Purefoods Breeding
required to render also 12 hours duty every day with a salary Farm at Calauan, Laguna and given a salary of P54.00 a day
of P2,600.00/month. He was not given his pay for February 1 and working eight (8) hours. After three (3) months, he was given an
2 by the paymaster of [the security agency] allegedly because the examination and passed the same. On December 26, 1988, he was
payroll could not be located so after 3 to 4 times of going back and given an increase and was paid P64.00/day working eight (8)
forth to [the security agencys] office to get his salary[;] [after] xxx hours; [h]e remained at the same post for 8 months and
two (2) days he gave up because he was already spending more transferred to Purefoods Feed Mill at Sta. Rosa, Laguna, with the
than what he could get thru transportation alone. On May 16, same salary and the same tour of duty, 8 hours[.] After four (4)
1991, Rosewood Processing, Inc. asked for the relief of Mamon and months, he was transferred to Purefoods Grand Perry at Sta. Rosa,
other guards at Rosewood because they came to know that Laguna, and after eleven (11) days on June 1989, he was
complainants filed a complaint for underpayment on May 13, 1991 transferred to Rosewood Processing, Inc. at Meycauayan, Bulacan
with the National Labor Relations Commission[.] On May 18 to 19, and required to work for 12 hours at a salary of P94.00/day for one
1991, [the security agency] assigned him to their [m]ain year. [In] June 1990, he was assigned at Purefoods DELPAN [to]
[o]ffice. After that, complainant was floated until May 29, 1991 guard x x x a barge loaded with corn and rendered 12 hours
when he was assigned to Mead Johnson Philippines work/day with a salary of only P148.00/day and after 24 days, he
Corporation. [A]t about a week later, [the security agency] was floated for one month. He reported to [the security agencys]
received summons on complainants complaint for underpayment office and was assigned to Purefoods Breeder Farm in Canlubang
and he was called to [the security agencys] office. When he rendering 8 hours work per day receiving only P78.00/day. After
reported, he was told to sign a Quitclaim and Waiver[] by Lt. R. 11 days, he asked to be transferred to Manila[.] [B]ecause of the
Rodriguez because according to the latter, he [could] only get a distance from his home xxx the transfer was approved but instead
measly sum from his complaint with the NLRC and if he of being transferred to Manila, he was assigned to Purefoods B-F-4
(complainant) [signed] the quitclaim and waiver he [would] be in Batangas rendering 12 hours duty/day and receiving
retained at his present assignment which [was] giving quite a good only P148.00 per day until January 28, 1991[;] and again he
salary and other benefits but if he [did] not sign the quitclaim and requested for transfer which was also approved by the [security
waiver, he [would] be relieved from his post and [would] no longer agencys] office[,] but since then he was told to come back again
be given any assignment. xxx He was given up to the end of July and again. [U]p to the present he has not been given any
1991 to think it over. At the end of July 1991, h[e] was approached assignment. Because of the fact that his family [was] in danger of
by the Security in Charge A. Azuela and asked him to sign the going hungry, he sought relief from the NLRC-NCR-Arbitration
quitclaim and waiver and when he refused to sign, he was told that Branch.
the following day August 1, 1991, he [would have] no more
assignment and should report to their office. Thinking that it was Rodolfo Velasco started working for the [security agency] on
only a joke, he reported the following day to the detachment January 5, 1987. He was assigned to PCI Bank Elcano, Tondo
commander Mr. A. Yadao and he was told that the main office xxx Branch, as probationary, and [for] working 8 hours a day for 9
relieved him because he did not sign the quitclaim and waiver. He days he received only P400.00. On January 16, 1987, he was
reported to their office asking for an assignment but he was told by assigned to [the security agencys] headquarters up to January 31,
R. Rodriguez that I no longer can be given an assignment so I had 1987, working 12 hours a day[; he] received only P650.00 for the
better resign. He went back several times to the office of the 16 days. On September 1, 1988, he was assigned to Imperial
[security agency] but every time the answer was the same[:] that Synthetic Rubber Products rendering 12 hours duty per day until
December 31, 1988 and was given a salary months[.] [I]n July, 1990, he was transferred to Holland Pacific &
of P1,600.00/month. He was later transferred to various posts like Paper Mills rendering 8 hours duty per day and receiving a salary
Polypaper Products working 12 hours a day given a salary of P2,400.00 per month until September 1990[.] [In] October
of P1,800.00 a month; Paramount Electrical, Inc. working 12 hours 1990, he was transferred to RMG residence rendering 12 hours
a day given P1,100.00 for 15 days; Rosewood Processing, Inc., duty per day receiving a salary of P2,200.00 per month for 3
rendering 12 hours duty per day receiving P2,200.00/month until months[.] [In] February 1991, he was transferred to Purefoods
May 16, 1991[;] Alen Engineering rendering 12 hours duty/day Corporation at Mabini, Batangas rendering 12 hours duty per day
receiving P1,100/month; Purefoods Corporation on Delta II with a salary of P3,600.00 per month for only one month because
rendering 12 hours duty per day received P4,200.00 a month. He he was hospitalized due to a stab wound inflicted by his
was relieved on August 24 and his salary for the period August 20 [d]etachment [c]ommander. When he was discharged from the
to 23 has not been paid by [the security agency.] He was hospital and after he was examined and declared fit to work by the
suspended for no cause at all. doctor, he reported back to [the security agencys] office but was
given the run-around [and was told to] come back tomorrow[.]
Armando Ballon started as security guard with [the security [H]e [could] see that [the agency was] posting new recruits. He
agency] July 1990 [Note: the introductory paragraph stated June then complained to this Honorable Office to seek redress, hiring the
28, 1990] and was assigned to Purefoods Corporation in Marikina services of a counsel.
for five (5) months and received a salary of P50.00 per day for 8
hours. He was transferred to Rosewood Processing, Inc. on Victor Aldeza started working for the [security agency] on March
November 6, 1990 rendering 12 hours duty as [d]etachment 21, 1990 and was assigned to Meridian Condominium, rendering 12
[c]ommander and a salary of P2,700.00/month including P200.00 hours work per day and receiving a salary of P1,500.00 per
officers allowance until May 15, 1991. On May 16, 1991, he applied month. Although he knew that the salary was below minimum yet
for sick leave on orders of his doctor for 15 days but the HRM, Miss he persevered because he had spent much to get this job and
M. Andres[,] got angry and crumpled his application for sick leave, stayed on until October 15, 1990[.] On October 16, 1990, he was
that [was] why he was not able to forward it to the SSS. After 15 transferred to Rosewood Processing, Inc., rendering 12 hours duty
days, he came back to the office of [the security agency] asking for per day and receiving a salary of P2,600.00 per month up to May
an assignment and he was told that he [was] already 15, 1991[.] On the later part of May 1991, he was assigned to
terminated. Complainant found out that the reason why Miss UPSSA (Sandoval Shipyard) rendering 12 hours duty per day
Andres crumpled his application for sick leave was because of the receiving a salary of P3,200.00 per month. [Aldeza] complained to
complaint he previously filed and was dismissed for failure to [the security agency] about the salary but [the agency] did not
appear. He then refiled this case to seek redress from this Office. heed him; thus, he filed his complaint for underpayment[.] [The
agency] upon complainants complaint for underpayment xxx,
Jose L. Cabrera started working for the [security agency] as instead of adjusting his salary to meet the minimum prescribed by
security guard January, 1988 and was assigned to Alencor law[,] relieved him and left him floating[.] xxx When he
Residence rendering 12 hours duty per day and received a salary complained of the treatment, he was told to resign because he
of P2,400.00 a month for 3 months[.] [I]n May, 1988, he was could no longer be given any assignment.Because of this,
transferred to E & L Restaurant rendering 12 hours duty per day complainant was forced to file another complaint for illegal
and receiv[ing] a salary of P1,500.00 per month for 6 months[.] dismissal.
[I]n January, 1989, he was transferred to Paramount rendering 12
hours duty per day receiving only P1,800.00 per month for 6
months[.] [I]n July 1989, he was transferred to Benito Ong[s] Labor Arbiters Ruling
residence rendering 12 hours duty per day and receiving a salary
of P1,400.00 per month for 4 months[.] [I]n December, 1989, he
was transferred to Sea Trade International rendering xxx 12 hours The labor arbiter noted the failure of the security agency to
duty per day and receiving a salary of P1,900 per month for 6 present evidence to refute the complainants allegation. Instead, it
impleaded the petitioner as third-party respondent, contending Separation Pay _11,531.55 P147,114.43
that its actions were primarily caused by petitioners noncompliance
with its obligations under the contract for security services, and the 4. Armando Ballon
subsequent cancellation of the said contract.
The labor arbiter held petitioner jointly and severally liable with Wage Differentials P31,176.85
the security agency as the complainants indirect employer under
Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code, citing the case Backwages 81,874.00
of Spartan Security & Detective Agency, Inc. vs. National Labor
Relations Commission.[8] Separation Pay __3,843.85 P116,894.70
Although the security agency could lawfully place the
5. Jose Cabrera
complainants on floating status for a period not exceeding six
months, the act was illegal because the former had issued a
newspaper advertisement for new security guards. Since the Wage Differentials P30,032.63
relation between the complainants and the agency was already
strained, the labor arbiter ordered the payment of separation pay Backwages 91,483.63
in lieu of reinstatement.
Separation Pay _11,531.55 P133,047.81
The award for wage differential, limited back wages and
separation pay contained the following details:
6. Victor Aldeza
1. Napoleon Mamon
Wage Differentials P49,406.86
Wage Differentials P45,959.02
Backwages 83,795.93
Backwages 72,764.38
Separation Pay __3,843.85 P137,046.64
Separation Pay __7,687.70 P126,411.10
P789,154.39
2. Arsenio Gazzingan
=========
Wage Differentials P24,855.76
Rodolfo Velasco was assigned to petitioner from December 31, Petitioner is liable for wage differentials in favor of Aldeza
1988 until May 16, 1991. Thus, petitioner is solidarily liable for during the period he worked with petitioner, that is, October 16,
wage differentials during such period. Petitioner is not, however, 1990 until May 15, 1991.
liable for back wages and separation pay, because Velasco was no
longer working for petitioner at the time of his illegal dismissal. x x x On October 16, 1990, he [Aldeza] was transferred to
Rosewood Processing, Inc., x x x up to May 15, 1991[.] On the
Rodolfo Velasco started working for the [security agency] on later part of May 1991, he was assigned to UPSSA (Sandoval
January 5, 1987. x x x [On] December 31, 1988 xxx he was x x x Shipyard) x x x. Complainant [sic] complained to [the security
transferred to various posts like x x x Rosewood Processing, Inc., x agency] about the salary but [the security agency] did not heed
x x until May 16, 1991 x x x. He was relieved on August 24 and his him; thus, he filed his complaint for underpayment[.] [The security
salary for the period August 20 to 23 has not been paid by [the agency] upon complainants complaint for underpayment reacted
security agency]; [h]e was suspended for no cause at all.[27] xxx, instead of adjusting his salary to meet the minimum
prescribed by law[,] relieved him and left him floating[;] and when
he complained of the treatment, he was told to resign because he
Case No. NCR-00-07-0445-91 could no longer be given any assignment. Because of this,
complainant was forced to file another complaint for illegal
dismissal.[29]
Petitioner was the indirect employer of Ballon during the period
beginning November 6, 1990 until May 15, 1991; thus, it is liable The cause of Aldezas illegal dismissal is imputable, not to
for wage differentials for said period. However, it is not liable for petitioner, but solely to the security agency. In Aldezas case, the
back wages and separation pay, as there was no evidence solidary liability for back wages and separation pay arising from
presented to show that it participated in Ballons illegal dismissal. Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Code has no application.
The respondents also alleged thatOur Haus failed to pay them their The NLRC also ruled that the respondents are entitled to their
holiday, service incentive leave (SIL), 13th month and overtime respective proportionate 13th month payments for the year 2010
pays.9 and SIL payments for at least three years,immediately preceding
May 31, 2010, the date when the respondents leftOur Haus.
The Labor Arbitration Rulings However, the NLRC sustained the LA’s ruling that the respondents
were not entitled to overtime pay since the exact dates and times
Before the LA, Our Haus primarily argued that the respondents’ when they rendered overtime work had not been proven.22
wages complied with the law’s minimum requirement. Aside from
paying the monetary amount of the respondents’ wages, Our Haus Our Haus moved for the reconsideration23 of the NLRC’s decision
also subsidized their meals (3 times a day), and gave them free and submitted new evidence (the five kasunduans) to show that
lodging near the construction project they were assigned to.10 In the respondents authorized Our Haus in writing to charge the
determining the total amount of the respondents’ daily wages, the values of their meals and lodging to their wages.
value of these benefits should be considered, in line with Article
97(f)11 of the Labor Code. The NLRC denied Our Haus’ motion, thus it filed a Rule 65
petition24 with the CA. In its petition, Our Haus propounded a new
Our Haus also rejected the respondents’ other monetary claims for theory. It made a distinction between deduction and charging. A
lack of proof that they were entitled to it.12 written authorization is only necessary if the facility’s value will be
deducted and will not be needed if it will merely be charged or
included in the computation of wages.25 Our Haus claimed that it for the inclusion of the board and lodging’s values to their wages.
did not actually deduct the values of the meals and housing Second, Our Haus only withheld the amount of ₱290.00 which
benefits. It only considered these in computing the total amount of represents the food’s raw value; the weekly cooking cost (cook’s
wages paid to the respondents for purposes of compliance with the wage, LPG, water) at ₱239.40 per person is a separate expense
minimum wage law. Hence, the written authorization requirement that Our Haus did not withhold from the respondents’ wages.30 This
should not apply. disproves the respondents’claim that it deducted the full amount of
the meals’ value.
Our Haus also asserted that the respondents’ claim for SIL pay
should be denied as this was not included in their pro Lastly, the CA erred in ruling that the claim for SIL pay may still be
formacomplaint. Lastly, it questioned the respondents’entitlement granted though not raised in the complaint; and that the
to attorney’s fees because they were not represented by a private respondents are entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.31
lawyer but by the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO).
The Case for the Respondents
The CA’s Ruling
The respondents prayed for the denial of the petition.32 They
The CA dismissed Our Haus’ certiorari petition and affirmed the maintained that the CA did not err inruling that the values of the
NLRC rulings in toto. It found no real distinction between deduction board and lodging cannot be deducted from their wages for failure
and charging,26 and ruled that the legal requirements before any to comply with the requirements set by law.33 And though the claim
deduction or charging can be made, apply to both. Our Haus, for SIL pay was not included in their pro forma complaint, they
however, failed to prove that it complied with any of the raised their claims in their position paper and Our Haus had the
requirements laid down in Mabeza v. National Labor Relations opportunity to contradict it in its pleadings.34
Commission.27 Accordingly, it cannot consider the values of its meal
and housing facilities in the computation of the respondents’ total Finally, under the PAO law, the availment of the PAO’s legal
wages. services does not exempt its clients from an award of attorney’s
fees.35
Also, the CA ruled that since the respondents were able to allege
non-payment of SIL in their position paper, and Our Haus, in fact, The Court’s Ruling
opposed it in its various pleadings,28 then the NLRC properly
considered it as part of the respondents’ causes of action. Lastly, We resolve to DENYthe petition.
the CA affirmed the respondent’s entitlement to attorney’s fees.29
The nature of a Rule 45 petition ― only questions of law
Our Haus filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied its
motion, prompting it to file the present petition for review on
Basic is the rule that only questions of lawmay be raised in a Rule
certiorari under Rule 45.
45 petition.36 However, in this case, weare confronted with mixed
questions of fact and law that are subsumed under the issue of
The Petition whether Our Haus complied with the legal requirements on the
deductibility of the value of facilities. Strictly, factual issues cannot
Our Haus submits that the CA erred in ruling that the legal be considered under Rule 45 except in the course of resolving if the
requirements apply without distinction ―whether the facility’s CA correctly determined whether or not the NLRC committed grave
value will be deducted or merely included in the computation of the abuse of discretion in considering and appreciating the factual
wages. At any rate, it complied with the requirements for issues before it.37
deductibility of the value of the facilities. First, the five kasunduans
executed by the respondents constitute the written authorization
In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in a. proof must be shown thatsuch facilities are customarily
the same context that the petition for certiorariit ruled upon was furnished by the trade;
presented to it; we have to examine the CA decision from the
prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence b. the provision of deductiblefacilities must be voluntarily
of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on accepted in writingby the employee; and
the basis of whether the NLRC decision, on the merits of the case,
was correct. In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the c. The facilities must be charged at fair and reasonable
CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the value.40
NLRC decision challenged before it. This is the approach that
should bebasic in a Rule 45 review of a CA ruling in a labor case. In
We examine Our Haus’ compliance with each of these requirements
question form, the question to ask in the present case is: did the
in seriatim.
CA correctly determine that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in ruling on the case?38 We rule that the CA correctly
did. a. The facility must be customarily furnished by the trade
No substantial distinction between deducting and charging a In a string of cases, we have concluded that one of the badges to
facility’s value from the employee’s wage; the legal requirements show that a facility is customarily furnished by the trade is the
for creditability apply to both existence of a company policy or guideline showing that provisions
for a facility were designated as part of the employees’
salaries.41 To comply with this, Our Haus presented in its motion
To justify its non-compliance with the requirements for the
for reconsideration with the NLRC the joint sinumpaang salaysayof
deductibility of a facility, Our Haus asks us to believe that there is
four of its alleged employees. These employees averred that they
a substantial distinction between the deduction and the charging of
were recipients of free lodging, electricity and water, as well as
a facility’s value to the wages. Our Haus explains that in deduction,
subsidized meals from Our Haus.42
the amount of the wage (which may already be below the
minimum) would still be lessened by the facility’s value, thus
needing the employee’s consent. On the other hand, in charging, We agree with the NLRC’s finding that the sinumpaang salaysay
there is no reduction of the employee’s wage since the facility’s statements submitted by Our Haus are self-serving.1âwphi1 For
value will just be theoretically added to the wage for purposes of one, Our Haus only produced the documents when the NLRC had
complying with the minimum wage requirement.39 already earlier determined that Our Haus failed to prove that it was
traditionally giving the respondents their board and lodging. This
document did not state whether these benefits had been
Our Haus’ argument is a vain attempt to circumvent the minimum
consistently enjoyed by the rest of Our Haus’ employees.
wage law by trying to create a distinction where none exists.
Moreover, the records reveal that the board and lodging were given
on a per project basis. Our Haus did not show if these benefits
In reality, deduction and charging both operate to lessen the actual were also provided inits other construction projects, thus negating
take-home pay of an employee; they are two sides of the same its claimed customary nature. Even assuming the sinumpaang
coin. In both, the employee receives a lessened amount because salaysay to be true, this document would still work against Our
supposedly, the facility’s value, which is part of his wage, had Haus’ case. If Our Haus really had the practice of freely giving
already been paid to him in kind. As there is no substantial lodging, electricity and water provisions to its employees, then Our
distinction between the two, the requirements set by law must Haus should not deduct its values from the respondents’ wages.
apply to both. Otherwise, this will run contrary to the affiants’ claim that these
benefits were traditionally given free of charge.
As the CA correctly ruled, these requirements, as summarized in
Mabeza, are the following:
Apart from company policy, the employer may also prove cannot pass the burden of the OSH costs of its construction
compliance with the first requirement by showing the existence of projects to its employees by deducting it as facilities. This is Our
an industry-wide practice of furnishingthe benefits in question Haus’ obligation under the law.
among enterprises engaged in the same line of business. If it were
customary among construction companies to provide board and Lastly, even if a benefit is customarily provided by the trade, it
lodging to their workers and treat their values as part of their must still pass the purpose testset by jurisprudence. Under this
wages, we would have more reason to conclude that these benefits test, if a benefit or privilege granted to the employee is clearly for
were really facilities. the employer’s convenience, it will not be considered as a facility
but a supplement.45 Here, careful consideration is given to the
However, Our Haus could not really be expected to prove nature of the employer’s business in relation to the work performed
compliance with the first requirement since the living by the employee. This test is used to address inequitable situations
accommodation of workers in the construction industry is not wherein employers consider a benefit deductible from the wages
simply a matter of business practice. Peculiar to the construction even if the factual circumstances show that it clearly redounds to
business are the occupational safety and health (OSH) services the employers’ greater advantage.
which the law itself mandates employers to provide to their
workers. This isto ensure the humane working conditions of While the rules serve as the initial test in characterizing a benefit
construction employees despite their constant exposure to as a facility, the purpose test additionally recognizes that the
hazardous working environments. Under Section 16 of DOLE employer and the employee do not stand at the same bargaining
Department Order (DO) No. 13, series of 1998,43 employers positions on benefits that must or must not formpart of an
engaged in the construction business are required to providethe employee’s wage. In the ultimate analysis, the purpose test seeks
following welfare amenities: to prevent a circumvention of the minimum wage law.
16.1 Adequate supply of safe drinking water a1. The purpose test in jurisprudence
16.2 Adequate sanitaryand washing facilities Under the law,46 only the value of the facilities may be deducted
from the employees’ wages but not the value of supplements.
16.3 Suitable living accommodation for workers, and as Facilities include articles or services for the benefit of the employee
may be applicable, for their families or his family but exclude tools of the trade or articles or services
primarily for the benefit of the employer or necessary to the
16.4 Separate sanitary, washing and sleeping facilitiesfor conduct of the employer’s business.47
men and women workers. [emphasis ours]
The law also prescribes that the computation of wages shall
Moreover, DOLE DO No. 56, series of 2005, which sets out the exclude whatever benefits, supplementsor allowances given to
guidelines for the implementation ofDOLE DO No. 13, mandates employees. Supplements are paid to employees on top of their
that the cost of the implementation of the requirements for the basic pay and are free of charge.48 Since it does not form part of
construction safety and health of workers, shall be integrated to the wage, a supplement’s value may not be includedin the
the overall project cost.44 The rationale behind this isto ensure that determination of whether an employer complied with the
the living accommodation of the workers is not substandard and is prescribed minimum wage rates.
strictly compliant with the DOLE’s OSH criteria.
In the present case, the board and lodging provided by Our Haus
As part of the project cost that construction companies already cannot be categorized asfacilities but as supplements. In SLL
charge to their clients, the value of the housing of their workers International Cables Specialist v. National Labor Relations
cannot be charged again to their employees’ salaries. Our Haus Commission,49 this Court was confronted with the issue on the
proper characterization of the free board and lodging provided by Our Haus is engaged in the construction business, a laborintensive
the employer. We explained: enterprise. The success of its projects is largely a function of the
physical strength, vitality and efficiency of its laborers. Its business
The Court, at this point, makes a distinction between "facilities" will be jeopardized if its workers are weak, sickly, and lack the
and "supplements". It is of the view that the food and lodging, or required energy to perform strenuous physical activities. Thus, by
the electricity and water allegedly consumed by private ensuring that the workers are adequately and well fed, the
respondents in this case were not facilities but supplements. In the employer is actually investing on its business.
case of Atok-Big Wedge Assn. v. Atok-Big Wedge Co., the two
terms were distinguished from one another in this wise: Unlike in office enterprises where the work is focused on desk jobs,
the construction industry relies heavily and directly on the physical
"Supplements", therefore, constitute extra remuneration or special capacity and endurance of its workers. This is not to say that desk
privileges or benefits given to or received by the laborers overand jobs do not require muscle strength; wesimply emphasize that in
above their ordinary earnings or wages. "Facilities", on the other the construction business, bulk of the work performed are
hand, are items of expense necessary for the laborer's and his strenuous physical activities.
family's existence and subsistence so thatby express provision of
law (Sec. 2[g]), they form part of the wage and when furnished by Moreover, in the construction business, contractors are usually
the employer are deductible therefrom, since if they are not so faced with the problem ofmeeting target deadlines. More often
furnished, the laborer would spend and pay for them just the than not, work is performed continuously, day and night, in order
same. to finish the project on the designated turn-over date. Thus, it will
be more convenient to the employer if itsworkers are housed near
In short, the benefit or privilege given to the employee which the construction site to ensure their ready availability during urgent
constitutes an extra remuneration above and over his basic or or emergency circumstances. Also, productivity issues like
ordinary earning or wage is supplement; and when said benefit or tardiness and unexpected absences would be minimized. This
privilege is part of the laborers' basic wages, it is a facility. The observation strongly bears in the present case since three of the
distinction lies not so much in the kind of benefit or item (food, respondents are not residents of the National Capital Region. The
lodging, bonus or sick leave) given, but in the purpose for which it board and lodging provision might have been a substantial
is given.In the case at bench, the items provided were given freely consideration in their acceptance of employment in a place distant
by SLLfor the purpose of maintaining the efficiency and health of from their provincial residences.
its workers while they were working attheir respective projects.50
Based on these considerations, we conclude that even under the
Ultimately, the real difference lies not on the kind of the benefit but purpose test, the subsidized meals and free lodging provided by
on the purpose why it was given by the employer. If it is primarily Our Haus are actually supplements. Although they also work to
for the employee’s gain, then the benefit is a facility; if its benefit the respondents, an analysis of the nature of these benefits
provision is mainly for the employer’s advantage, then it is a in relation to Our Haus’ business shows that they were given
supplement. Again, this is to ensure that employees are protected primarily for Our Haus’ greater convenience and advantage. If
in circumstances where the employer designates a benefit as weighed on a scale, the balance tilts more towards Our Haus’ side.
deductible from the wages even though it clearly works to the Accordingly, their values cannot be considered in computing the
employer’s greater convenience or advantage. total amount of the respondents’ wages. Under the circumstances,
the dailywages paid to the respondents are clearly below the
Under the purpose test, substantial consideration must be given to prescribed minimum wage rates in the years 2007-2010.
the nature of the employer’s business inrelation to the character or
type of work performed by the employees involved. b. The provision of deductible facilities must be voluntarily
accepted in writing by the employee
In Mayon Hotel, we reiterated that a facility may only be deducted evidence.On the pretext that records prior to the July 16, 1990
from the wage if the employer was authorized in writingby the earthquake were lost or destroyed, respondent failed to produce
concerned employee.51 As it diminishes the take-home pay of an payroll records, receipts and other relevant documents, where he
employee, the deduction must be with his express consent. could have, as has been pointedout in the Solicitor General's
manifestation, "secured certified copies thereof from the nearest
Again, in the motion for reconsideration with the NLRC, Our Haus regional office of the Department of Labor, the SSS or the
belatedly submitted five kasunduans, supposedly executed by the BIR".52 [emphasis ours]
respondents, containing their conformity to the inclusion of the
values of the meals and housing to their total wages. Oddly, Our In the present case, Our Haus never explained how it came up with
Haus only offered these documents when the NLRC had already the valuesit assigned for the benefits it provided; it merely listed
ruled that respondents did not accomplish any written its supposed expenses without any supporting document. Since
authorization, to allow deduction from their wages. These five Our Haus is using these additional expenses (cook’s salary, water
kasunduans were also undated, making us wonder if they had and LPG) to support its claim that it did not withhold the full
reallybeen executed when respondents first assumed their jobs. amount of the meals’ value, Our Haus is burdened to present
evidence to corroborate its claim. The records however, are bereft
Moreover, in the earlier sinumpaang salaysay by Our Haus’ four of any evidence to support Our Haus’ meal expense computation.
employees, it was not mentioned that they also executed a Eventhe value it assigned for the respondents’ living
kasunduanfor their board and lodging benefits. Because of these accommodations was not supported by any documentary evidence.
surrounding circumstances and the suspicious timing when the five Without any corroborative evidence, it cannot be said that Our
kasunduanswere submitted as evidence, we agree withthe CA that Haus complied withthis third requisite.
the NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion in disregarding
these documents for being self serving. A claim not raised in the pro forma complaint may still beraised in
the position paper.
c. The facility must be charged at a fair and reasonable value
Our Haus questions the respondents’ entitlement to SIL pay by
Our Haus admitted that it deducted the amount of ₱290.00 per pointing out that this claim was not included in the pro forma
week from each of the respondents for their meals. But it now complaint filed with the NLRC. However, we agree with the CA that
submits that it did not actually withhold the entire amount as it did such omission does not bar the labor tribunals from touching upon
not figure in the computation the money it expended for the salary this cause of action since this was raised and discussed inthe
of the cook, the water, and the LPG used for cooking, which respondents’ position paper. In Samar-Med Distribution v. National
amounts to ₱249.40 per week per person. From these, it appears Labor Relations Commission,53 we held:
that the total meal expense per week for each person is
₱529.40,making Our Haus’ ₱290.00 deduction within the 70% Firstly, petitioner’s contention that the validity of Gutang’s
ceiling prescribed by the rules. dismissal should not be determined because it had not been
included in his complaint before the NLRC is bereft of merit. The
However, Our Haus’ valuation cannotbe plucked out of thin air. The complaint of Gutang was a mere checklist of possible causes of
valuation of a facility must besupported by relevant documents action that he might have against Roleda. Such manner of
such as receipts and company records for it to be considered as fair preparing the complaint was obviously designed to facilitate the
and reasonable. In Mabeza, we noted: filing of complaints by employees and laborers who are thereby
enabled to expediently set forth their grievances in a general
Curiously, in the case at bench, the only valuations relied upon by manner. But the non-inclusion in the complaint of the issue on the
the labor arbiter in his decision were figures furnished by the dismissal did not necessarily mean that the validity of the dismissal
private respondent's own accountant, without corroborative could not be an issue.The rules of the NLRC require the submission
of verified position papers by the parties should they fail to agree Treasury as trust fund and shall be disbursed for special allowances
upon an amicable settlement, and bar the inclusion of any cause of of authorized officials and lawyers of the PAO.57
action not mentioned in the complaint or position paper from the
time of their submission by the parties. In view of this, Gutang’s Thus, the respondents are still entitled to attorney's fees. The
cause of action should be ascertained not from a reading of his attorney's fees awarded to them shall be paid to the PAO. It serves
complaint alone but also from a consideration and evaluation of as a token recompense to the PAO for its provision of free legal
both his complaint and position paper.54 services to litigants who have no means of hiring a private lawyer.
The respondents’ entitlement to the other monetary benefits WHEREFORE, in light of these considerations, we conclude that the
Court of Appeals correctly found that the National Labor Relations
Generally a party who alleges payment as a defense has the Commission did not abuse its discretion in its decision of July 20,
burden of proving it.Particularly in labor cases, the burden of 2011 and Resolution of December 2, 2011.1âwphi1 Consequently
proving payment of monetary claims rests on the employeron the we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Court of Appeals' decision
reasoning that the pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records, dated May 7, 2012 and resolution dated November 27, 2012 in CA-
remittances and other similar documents — which will show that G.R. SP No. 123273. No costs.
overtime, differentials, service incentive leave and other claims of
workers have been paid — are not in the possession of the worker SO ORDERED.
but in the custody and absolute control of the employer.55
CORONA, J.:
[L]oss of confidence should not be simulated. It There is no need for a hearing or conference. We note a
should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which marked difference in the standards of due process to be followed
are improper, illegal or unjustified. Loss of as prescribed in the Labor Code and its implementing rules. The
confidence may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face Labor Code, on one hand, provides that an employer must provide
of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. It must be the employee ample opportunity to be heard and to defend
genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify an earlier himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires:
action taken in bad faith.
ART. 277. Miscellaneous provisions. x x x
The burden of proof rests on the employer to establish that
the dismissal is for cause in view of the security of tenure that (b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to
employees enjoy under the Constitution and the Labor Code. The security of tenure and their right to be protected
employers evidence must clearly and convincingly show the facts against dismissal except for a just and authorized
on which the loss of confidence in the employee may be fairly cause and without prejudice to the requirement of
made to rest.[14] It must be adequately proven by substantial notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer
evidence.[15] Respondents failed to discharge this burden. shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought
to be terminated a written notice containing a
statement of the causes for termination and shall
afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard
Respondents illegal act of dismissing petitioners was and to defend himself with the assistance of his
aggravated by their failure to observe due process. To meet the representative if he so desires in accordance with
requirements of due process in the dismissal of an employee, an company rules and regulations promulgated
employer must furnish the worker with two written notices: (1) a pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of
written notice specifying the grounds for termination and giving to Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by the
said employee a reasonable opportunity to explain his side and (2) employer shall be without prejudice to the right of
another written notice indicating that, upon due consideration of all the worker to contest the validity or legality of his
circumstances, grounds have been established to justify the dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional
employer's decision to dismiss the employee.[16] branch of the National Labor Relations Commission.
The burden of proving that the termination was for a
valid or authorized cause shall rest on the employer.
(emphasis supplied)
Which one should be followed? Is a hearing (or conference)
The omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code, on the mandatory in cases involving the dismissal of an employee? Can
other hand, require a hearing and conference during which the the apparent conflict between the law and its IRR be reconciled?
employee concerned is given the opportunity to respond to the
charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented
against him:[17] At the outset, we reaffirm the time-honored doctrine that, in
case of conflict, the law prevails over the administrative regulations
implementing it.[18] The authority to promulgate implementing rules
Section 2. Security of Tenure. x x x proceeds from the law itself. To be valid, a rule or regulation must
conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling
statute.[19] As such, it cannot amend the law either by abridging or
(d) In all cases of termination of employment, expanding its scope.[20]
the following standards of due process shall be
substantially observed:
Article 277(b) of the Labor Code provides that, in cases of
termination for a just cause, an employee must be given ample
For termination of employment based on just opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.Thus, the
causes as defined in Article 282 of the Labor Code: opportunity to be heard afforded by law to the employee is
qualified by the word ample which ordinarily means considerably
more than adequate or sufficient.[21] In this regard, the
phrase ample opportunity to be heard can be reasonably
(i) A written notice served on the employee interpreted as extensive enough to cover actual hearing or
specifying the ground or grounds for termination, conference. To this extent, Section 2(d), Rule I of the
and giving said employee reasonable opportunity Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code is in conformity
within which to explain his side. with Article 277(b).
(ii) A hearing or conference during which Nonetheless, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules
the employee concerned, with the assistance of of Book VI of the Labor Code should not be taken to mean that
counsel if he so desires, is given opportunity to holding an actual hearing or conference is a condition sine qua
respond to the charge, present his evidence or non for compliance with the due process requirement in
rebut the evidence presented against him. termination of employment. The test for the fair procedure
guaranteed under Article 277(b) cannot be whether there has been
a formal pretermination confrontation between the employer and
(iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee. The ample opportunity to be heard standard is
the employee, indicating that upon due consideration neither synonymous nor similar to a formal hearing. To confine the
of all the circumstances, grounds have been employees right to be heard to a solitary form narrows down that
established to justify his termination. (emphasis right. It deprives him of other equally effective forms of adducing
supplied) evidence in his defense. Certainly, such an exclusivist and
absolutist interpretation is overly restrictive. The very nature of
due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures require an actual or formal hearing. Thus, we categorically declared
universally applicable to every imaginable situation.[22] in Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. Maguad:[25]
The standard for the hearing requirement, ample The Labor Code does not, of course, require a
opportunity, is couched in general language revealing the formal or trial type proceeding before an erring
legislative intent to give some degree of flexibility or adaptability to employee may be dismissed. (emphasis supplied)
meet the peculiarities of a given situation. To confine it to a single
rigid proceeding such as a formal hearing will defeat its spirit.
(b) a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory only WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
when requested by the employee in writing or decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 29, 2002 in CA-G.R.
substantial evidentiary disputes exist or a company SP No. 50536 finding that petitioners Felix B. Perez and Amante G.
rule or practice requires it, or when similar Doria were not illegally dismissed but were not accorded due
circumstances justify it. process and were illegally suspended for 15 days, is SET ASIDE.
The decision of the labor arbiter dated December 27, 1995 in NLRC
(c) the ample opportunity to be heard standard in the Labor NCR CN. 11-06930-93 is hereby AFFIRMED with
Code prevails over the hearing or conference the MODIFICATION that petitioners should be paid their
requirement in the implementing rules and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
regulations.
PETITIONERS WERE ILLEGALLY
SO ORDERED.
SUSPENDED FOR 30 DAYS
Moreover, while the Court has upheld the employer’s right to Lastly, PFIZER exhorts the Court to re-examine the application
choose between actually reinstating an employee or merely of Roquero with a view that a mechanical application of the same
reinstating him in the payroll, we have also in the past recognized would cause injustice since, in the present case, respondent was
that reinstatement might no longer be possible under certain able to gain pecuniary benefit notwithstanding the circumstance of
circumstances. In F.F. Marine Corporation v. National Labor reversal by the Court of Appeals of the rulings of the Labor Arbiter
Relations Commission,29 we had the occasion to state: and the NLRC thereby allowing respondent to profit from the
dishonesty she committed against PFIZER which was the basis for
It is well-settled that when a person is illegally dismissed, he is her termination. In its stead, PFIZER proposes that the Court apply
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other the ruling in Genuino v. National Labor Relations
privileges and to his full backwages. In the event, however, that Commission33 which it believes to be more in accord with the
reinstatement is no longer feasible, or if the employee decides dictates of fairness and justice. In that case, we canceled the
not be reinstated, the employer shall pay him separation pay in award of salaries from the date of the decision of the Labor Arbiter
lieu of reinstatement. Such a rule is likewise observed in the case awarding reinstatement in light of our subsequent ruling finding
of a strained employer-employee relationship or when the work or that the dismissal is for a legal and valid ground, to wit:
position formerly held by the dismissed employee no longer exists.
In sum, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to: (1) either Anent the directive of the NLRC in its September 3, 1994 Decision
reinstatement if viable or separation pay if reinstatement is no ordering Citibank "to pay the salaries due to the complainant from
longer viable, and (2) backwages.30 (Emphasis supplied.) the date it reinstated complainant in the payroll (computed at
₱60,000.00 a month, as found by the Labor Arbiter) up to and until
Similarly, we have previously held that an employee’s demand for the date of this decision," the Court hereby cancels said award in
separation pay may be indicative of strained relations that may view of its finding that the dismissal of Genuino is for a legal and
justify payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.31 This is valid ground.
not to say, however, that respondent is entitled to separation pay
in addition to backwages. We stress here that a finding of strained Ordinarily, the employer is required to reinstate the employee
relations must nonetheless still be supported by substantial during the pendency of the appeal pursuant to Art. 223, paragraph
evidence.32 3 of the Labor Code, which states:
xxxx the core of the seeming divergence is the application of paragraph
3 of Article 223 of the Labor Code x x x.
If the decision of the labor arbiter is later reversed on appeal upon
the finding that the ground for dismissal is valid, then the employer xxxx
has the right to require the dismissed employee on payroll
reinstatement to refund the salaries s/he received while the case The view as maintained in a number of cases is that:
was pending appeal, or it can be deducted from the accrued
benefits that the dismissed employee was entitled to receive from x x x [E]ven if the order of reinstatement of the Labor
his/her employer under existing laws, collective bargaining Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of
agreement provisions, and company practices. However, if the the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the
employee was reinstated to work during the pendency of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until
appeal, then the employee is entitled to the compensation received reversal by the higher court. On the other hand, if the employee
for actual services rendered without need of refund. has been reinstated during the appeal period and such
reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee is not
Considering that Genuino was not reinstated to work or placed on required to reimburse whatever salary he received for he is entitled
payroll reinstatement, and her dismissal is based on a just cause, to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the
then she is not entitled to be paid the salaries stated in item no. 3 period. (Emphasis in the original; italics and underscoring supplied)
of the fallo of the September 3, 1994 NLRC Decision.34 (Emphases
supplied.) In other words, a dismissed employee whose case was favorably
decided by the Labor Arbiter is entitled to receive wages pending
Thus, PFIZER implores the Court to annul the award of backwages appeal upon reinstatement, which is immediately executory. Unless
and separation pay as well as to require respondent to refund the there is a restraining order, it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter
amount that she was able to collect by way of garnishment from to implement the order of reinstatement and it is mandatory on the
PFIZER as her accrued salaries. employer to comply therewith.
The contention cannot be given merit since this question has been The opposite view is articulated in Genuino which states:
settled by the Court en banc.
If the decision of the labor arbiter is later reversed on appeal upon
In the recent milestone case of Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, the finding that the ground for dismissal is valid, then the
Inc.,35 the Court wrote finis to the stray posture employer has the right to require the dismissed
in Genuino requiring the dismissed employee placed on payroll employee on payroll reinstatement to refund the salaries
reinstatement to refund the salaries in case a final decision upholds [he] received while the case was pending appeal, or it can be
the validity of the dismissal. In Garcia, we clarified the principle of deducted from the accrued benefits that the dismissed employee
reinstatement pending appeal due to the emergence of differing was entitled to receive from [his] employer under existing laws,
rulings on the issue, to wit: collective bargaining agreement provisions, and company practices.
However, if the employee was reinstated to work during the
On this score, the Court's attention is drawn to seemingly pendency of the appeal, then the employee is entitled to the
divergent decisions concerning reinstatement pending appeal or, compensation received for actual services rendered without need of
particularly, the option of payroll reinstatement. On the one hand is refund.
the jurisprudential trend as expounded in a line of cases
including Air Philippines Corp. v. Zamora, while on the other is the Considering that Genuino was not reinstated to work or placed on
recent case of Genuino v. National Labor Relations Commission. At payroll reinstatement, and her dismissal is based on a just cause,
then she is not entitled to be paid the salaries stated in item no. 3
of the fallo of the September 3, 1994 NLRC Decision. (Emphasis, Advisably, the sum is better left unspent. It becomes more logical
italics and underscoring supplied) and practical for the employee to refuse payroll reinstatement and
simply find work elsewhere in the interim, if any is available.
It has thus been advanced that there is no point in releasing the Notably, the option of payroll reinstatement belongs to the
wages to petitioners since their dismissal was found to be valid, employer, even if the employee is able and raring to return to
and to do so would constitute unjust enrichment. work. Prior to Genuino, it is unthinkable for one to refuse payroll
reinstatement. In the face of the grim possibilities, the rise of
Prior to Genuino, there had been no known similar case containing concerned employees declining payroll reinstatement is on the
a dispositive portion where the employee was required to refund horizon.
the salaries received on payroll reinstatement. In fact, in a catena
of cases, the Court did not order the refund of salaries garnished or Further, the Genuino ruling not only disregards the social justice
received by payroll-reinstated employees despite a subsequent principles behind the rule, but also institutes a scheme unduly
reversal of the reinstatement order. favorable to management. Under such scheme, the salaries
dispensed pendente lite merely serve as a bond posted in
The dearth of authority supporting Genuino is not difficult to installment by the employer. For in the event of a reversal of the
fathom for it would otherwise render inutile the rationale of Labor Arbiter's decision ordering reinstatement, the employer gets
reinstatement pending appeal. back the same amount without having to spend ordinarily for bond
premiums. This circumvents, if not directly contradicts, the
proscription that the "posting of a bond [even a cash bond] by the
xxxx
employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement."
x x x Then, by and pursuant to the same power (police power), the
In playing down the stray posture in Genuino requiring the
State may authorize an immediate implementation, pending
dismissed employee on payroll reinstatement to refund the salaries
appeal, of a decision reinstating a dismissed or separated
in case a final decision upholds the validity of the dismissal, the
employee since that saving act is designed to stop, although
Court realigns the proper course of the prevailing doctrine on
temporarily since the appeal may be decided in favor of the
reinstatement pending appeal vis-à-vis the effect of a reversal on
appellant, a continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the
appeal.
life of the dismissed or separated employee and his family.36
xxxx
Furthermore, in Garcia, the Court went on to discuss the illogical
and unjust effects of the "refund doctrine" erroneously espoused
in Genuino: The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that even if the
order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on
appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to
Even outside the theoretical trappings of the discussion and into
reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee
the mundane realities of human experience, the "refund doctrine"
during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher
easily demonstrates how a favorable decision by the Labor Arbiter
court. x x x.37 (Emphasis supplied.)
could harm, more than help, a dismissed employee. The employee,
to make both ends meet, would necessarily have to use up the
salaries received during the pendency of the appeal, only to end up In sum, the Court reiterates the principle that reinstatement
having to refund the sum in case of a final unfavorable decision. It pending appeal necessitates that it must be immediately self-
is mirage of a stop-gap leading the employee to a risky cliff of executory without need for a writ of execution during the pendency
insolvency.1avvphi1 of the appeal, if the law is to serve its noble purpose, and any
attempt on the part of the employer to evade or delay its execution
should not be allowed. Furthermore, we likewise restate our ruling
that an order for reinstatement entitles an employee to receive his We resolve in this petition for review on certiorari1 the challenge to
accrued backwages from the moment the reinstatement order was the September 30, 2010 decision2 and the January 13, 2011
issued up to the date when the same was reversed by a higher resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 112011.
court without fear of refunding what he had received. It cannot be
denied that, under our statutory and jurisprudential framework, This CA decision reversed the July 16, 2008 decision 4 of the
respondent is entitled to payment of her wages for the period after National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which, in turn,
December 5, 2003 until the Court of Appeals Decision dated affirmed the March 13, 2008 order5 of the Labor Arbiter (LA) in
November 23, 2005, notwithstanding the finding therein that her NLRC Case No. 00-04-05469- 2004. The LA granted the Motion
dismissal was legal and for just cause. Thus, the payment of such filed by petitioners Froilan M. Bergonio, Jr., Dean G. Pelaez, et.al.,
wages cannot be deemed as unjust enrichment on respondent’s (collectively, the petitioners) for the release of the garnished
part. amount to satisfy the petitioners’ accrued wages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Resolution The Factual Antecedents
dated October 23, 2006 as well as the Resolution dated April 10,
2007 both issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88987 On April 30, 2004, the petitioners filed before the LA a complaint
are hereby AFFIRMED. for illegal dismissal and illegal suspension with prayer for
reinstatement against respondents South East Asian Airlines
SO ORDERED. (SEAIR) and Irene Dornier as SEAIR’s President (collectively, the
respondents).
SECOND DIVISION On August 20, 2005, the petitioners filed before the LA a Motion for
issuance of Writ of Execution for their immediate reinstatement.
G.R. No. 195227 April 21, 2014
During the scheduled pre-execution conference held on September
FROILAN M. BERGONIO, JR., DEAN G. PELAEZ, CRISANTO O. 14, 2005, the respondents manifested their option to reinstate the
GEONGO, WARLITO O. JANAYA, SALVADOR VILLAR, JR., petitioners in the payroll. The payroll reinstatement, however, did
RONALDO CAFIRMA, RANDY LUCAR, ALBERTO ALBUERA, not materialize. Thus, on September 22, 2005, the petitioners filed
DENNIS NOPUENTE and ALLAN SALVACION, Petitioners, before the LA a manifestation for their immediate reinstatement.
vs.
SOUTH EAST ASIAN AIRLINES and IRENE On October 3, 2005, the respondents filed an opposition to the
DORNIER, Respondents. petitioners’ motion for execution.7 They claimed that the
relationship between them and the petitioners had already been
DECISION strained because of the petitioners’ threatening text messages,
thus precluding the latter’s reinstatement.
BRION, J.:
On October 7, 2005, the LA granted the petitioners’ motion and
issued a writ of execution.8
The respondents moved to quash the writ of execution with a The records show that the petitioners appealed the December 18,
prayer to hold in abeyance the implementation of the 2007 CA decision with this Court. In a resolution dated August 4,
reinstatement order.9 They maintained that the relationship 2008, the Court denied the petition. The Court likewise denied the
between them and the petitioners had been so strained that petitioners’ subsequent motion for reconsideration, and thereafter
reinstatement was no longer possible. issued an Entry of Judgment certifying that its August 4, 2008
resolution had become final and executory on March 9, 2009.
The October 7, 2005 writ of execution was returned unsatisfied. In
response, the petitioners filed a motion for re-computation of On January 31, 2008, the petitioners filed with the LA an Urgent
accrued wages, and, on January 25, 2006, a motion for execution Ex-Parte Motion for the Immediate Release of the Garnished
of the re-computed amount. On February 16, 2006, the LA granted Amount.
this motion and issued an alias writ of execution.10
In its March 13, 2008 order,15 the LA granted the petitioners’
On February 21, 2006, the respondents issued a motion; it directed Metrobank-San Lorenzo to release the
Memorandum11 directing the petitioners to report for work on ₱1,900,000.00 garnished amount. The LA found valid and
February 24, 2006. The petitioners failed to report for work on the meritorious the respondents’ claim for accrued wages in view of the
appointed date. On February 28, 2006, the respondents moved respondents’ refusal to reinstate the petitioners despite the final
before the LA to suspend the order for the petitioners’ and executory nature of the reinstatement aspect of its (LA’s) May
reinstatement.12 31, 2005 decision. The LA noted that as of the December 18, 2007
CA decision (that reversed the illegal dismissal findings of the LA),
Meanwhile, the respondents appealed with the NLRC the May 31, the petitioners’ accrued wages amounted to ₱3,078,366.33.
2005 illegal dismissal ruling of the LA.
In its July 16, 2008 resolution,16 the NLRC affirmed in toto the LA’s
In an order dated August 15, 2006,13 the NLRC dismissed the March 13, 2008 order. The NLRC afterwards denied the
respondents’ appeal for non-perfection. The NLRC likewise denied respondents’ motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.17
the respondents’ motion for reconsideration in its November 29,
2006 resolution, prompting the respondents to file before the CA a The respondents assailed the July 16, 2008 decision and
petition for certiorari. September 29, 2009 resolution of the NLRC via a petition for
certiorari filed with the CA.
The NLRC issued an Entry of Judgment on February 6, 2007
declaring its November 29, 2006 resolution final and executory. The CA’s ruling
The petitioners forthwith filed with the LA another motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution, which the LA granted on April 24, The CA granted the respondents’ petition.18 It reversed and set
2007. The LA also issued another writ of execution. 14 A Notice of aside the July 16, 2008 decision and the September 29, 2009
Garnishment was thereafter issued to the respondents’ depositary resolution of the NLRC and remanded the case to the Computation
bank – Metrobank-San Lorenzo Village Branch, Makati City – in the and Examination Unit of the NLRC for the proper computation of
amount of ₱1,900,000.00 on June 6, 2007. the petitioners’ accrued wages, computed up to February 24, 2006.
On December 18, 2007, the CA rendered its decision (on the illegal The CA agreed that the reinstatement aspect of the LA’s decision is
dismissal ruling of the LA) partly granting the respondents’ immediately executory even pending appeal, such that the
petition. The CA declared the petitioners’ dismissal valid and employer is obliged to reinstate and pay the wages of the
awarded them ₱30,000.00 as nominal damages for the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until the decision
respondents’ failure to observe due process. (finding the employee illegally dismissed including the
reinstatement order) is reversed by a higher court. Applying this
principle, the CA noted that the petitioners’ accrued wages could execution of the reinstatement aspect of the LA’s May 31, 2005
have been properly computed until December 18, 2007, the date of decision, i.e., the Opposition to the Issuance of the Writ of
the CA’s decision finding the petitioners validly dismissed. Execution, the Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution and the
Motion to Suspend the Order of Reinstatement. They also point out
The CA, however, pointed out that when the LA’s decision is that in all these pleadings, the respondents claimed that strained
"reversed by a higher tribunal, an employee may be barred from relationship barred their (the petitioners’) reinstatement, evidently
collecting the accrued wages if shown that the delay in enforcing confirming the respondents’ lack of intention to reinstate them.
the reinstatement pending appeal was without fault" on the
employer’s part. In this case, the CA declared that the delay in the Finally, the petitioners point out that the February 21, 2006
execution of the reinstatement order was not due to the Memorandum directed them to report for work at Clark Field,
respondents’ unjustified act or omission. Rather, the petitioners’ Angeles, Pampanga instead of at the NAIA-Domestic Airport in
refusal to comply with the February 21, 2006 return-to-work Pasay City where they had been assigned. They argue that this
Memorandum that the respondents issued and personally delivered directive to report for work at Clark Field violates Article 223,
to them (the petitioners) prevented the enforcement of the paragraph 3 of the Labor Code that requires the employee’s
reinstatement order. reinstatement to be under the same terms and conditions
prevailing prior to the dismissal. Moreover, they point out that the
Thus, the CA declared that, given this peculiar circumstance (of the respondents handed the Memorandum only to Pelaez, who did not
petitioners’ failure to report for work), the petitioners’ accrued act in representation of the other petitioners, and only in the
wages should only be computed until February 24, 2006 when they afternoon of February 23, 2006.
were supposed to report for work per the return-to-work
Memorandum. Accordingly, the CA reversed, for grave abuse of Thus, the petitioners claim that the delay in their reinstatement
discretion, the NLRC’s July 16, 2008 decision that affirmed the LA’s was in fact due to the respondents’ unjustified acts and that the
order to release the garnished amount. respondents never really complied with the LA’s reinstatement
order.
The Petition
The Case for the Respondents
The petitioners argue that the CA gravely erred when it ruled,
contrary to Article 223, paragraph 3 of the Labor Code, that the The respondents counter, in their comment,19 that the issues that
computation of their accrued wages stopped when they failed to the petitioners raise in this petition are all factual in nature and had
report for work on February 24, 2006. They maintain that the already considered and explained in the CA decision. In any case,
February 21, 2006 Memorandum was merely an afterthought on the respondents maintain that the petitioners were validly
the respondents’ part to make it appear that they complied with dismissed and that they complied with the LA’s reinstatement order
the LA’s October 7, 2005 writ of execution. They likewise argue when it directed the petitioners to report back to work, which
that had the respondents really intended to have them report for directive the petitioners did not heed.
work to comply with the writ of execution, the respondents could
and should have issued the Memorandum immediately after the LA The respondents add that while the reinstatement of an employee
issued the first writ of execution. As matters stand, the found illegally dismissed is immediately executory, the employer is
respondents issued the Memorandum more than four months after nevertheless not prohibited from questioning this rule especially
the issuance of this writ and only after the LA issued the alias writ when the latter has valid and legal reasons to oppose the
of execution on February 16, 2006. employee’s reinstatement. In the petitioners’ case, the respondents
point out that their relationship had been so strained that
Additionally, the petitioners direct the Court’s attention to the reinstatement was no longer possible. Despite this strained
several pleadings that the respondents filed to prevent the relationship, the respondents point out that they still required the
petitioners to report back to work if only to comply with the LA’s Resolution of this question of law, however, is inextricably linked
reinstatement order. Instead of reporting for work as directed, the with the largely factual issue of whether the accrued wages should
petitioners, however, insisted for a payroll reinstatement, which be computed until December 17, 2008 when the CA reversed the
option the law grants to them (the respondents) as employer. Also, illegal dismissal findings of the LA or only until February 24, 2006
contrary to the petitioners’ claim, the Memorandum directed them when the petitioners were supposed to report for work per the
to report at Clark Field, Pampanga only for a re-orientation of their February 21, 2006 Memorandum. In either case, the determination
respective duties and responsibilities. of this factual issue presupposes another factual issue, i.e.,
whether the delay in the execution of the reinstatement order was
Thus, relying on the CA’s ruling, the respondents claim that the due to the respondents’ fault. As questions of fact, they are
delay in the petitioners’ reinstatement was in fact due to the proscribed by our Rule 45 jurisdiction; we generally cannot address
latter’s refusal to report for work after the issuance of the February these factual issues except to the extent necessary to determine
21, 2006 Memorandum in addition to their strained relationship. whether the CA correctly found the NLRC in grave abuse of
discretion in affirming the release of the garnished amount despite
The Court’s Ruling the respondents’ issuance of and the petitioners’ failure to comply
with the February 21, 2006 return-to-work Memorandum.
We GRANT the petition.
Preliminary considerations: jurisdictional The jurisdictional limitations of our Rule 45 review of the CA’s Rule
limitations of the Court’s Rule 45 review of 65 decision in labor cases, notwithstanding, we resolve this
the CA’s Rule 65 decision in labor cases petition’s factual issues for we find legal errors in the CA’s decision.
Our consideration of the facts taken within this narrow scope of our
factual review power convinced us, as our subsequent discussion
In a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari, what we review are
will show, that no grave abuse of discretion attended the NLRC
the legal errors that the CA may have committed in the assailed
decision.
decision, in contrast with the review for jurisdictional errors that we
undertake in an original certiorari action. In reviewing the legal
correctness of the CA decision in a labor case taken under Rule 65 Nature of the reinstatement aspect of the
of the Rules of Court, we examine the CA decision in the context LA’s decision on a finding of illegal
that it determined the presence or the absence of grave abuse of dismissal
discretion in the NLRC decision before it and not on the basis of
whether the NLRC decision, on the merits of the case, was correct. Article 223 (now Article 229)21 of the Labor Code governs appeals
Otherwise stated, we proceed from the premise that the CA from, and the execution of, the LA’s decision. Pertinently,
undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC paragraph 3, Article 223 of the Labor Code provides:
decision challenged before it. Within this narrow scope of our Rule
45 review, the question that we ask is: Did the CA correctly Article 223. APPEAL
determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
in ruling on the case?20 xxxx
In addition, the Court’s jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition for review In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a
on certiorari is limited to resolving only questions of law. dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement
aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, pending
The present petition essentially raises the question – whether the appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under
petitioners may recover the accrued wages prior to the CA’s the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or
reversal of the LA’s May 31, 2005 decision. This is a question of separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in
law that falls well within the Court’s power in a Rule 45 petition. the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay
the execution for reinstatement provided herein. [Emphasis and overwhelming reason for its immediate and automatic execution
underscoring supplied] even pending appeal.29 The employer is duty-bound to reinstate the
employee, failing which, the employer is liable instead to pay the
Under paragraph 3, Article 223 of the Labor Code, the LA’s order dismissed employee’s salary. The Court’s consistent and prevailing
for the reinstatement of an employee found illegally dismissed is treatment and interpretation of the reinstatement order as
immediately executory even during pendency of the employer’s immediately enforceable, in fact, merely underscores the right to
appeal from the decision. Under this provision, the employer must security of tenure of employees that the Constitution30 protects.
reinstate the employee – either by physically admitting him under
the conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal, and paying his The employer is obliged to pay the
wages; or, at the employer’s option, merely reinstating the dismissed employee’s salary if he
employee in the payroll until the decision is reversed by the higher refuses to reinstate until actual
court.22 Failure of the employer to comply with the reinstatement reinstatement or reversal by a higher
order, by exercising the options in the alternative, renders him tribunal; circumstances that may bar an
liable to pay the employee’s salaries.23 employee from receiving the accrued wages
Otherwise stated, a dismissed employee whose case was favorably As we amply discussed above, an employer is obliged to
decided by the LA is entitled to receive wages pending appeal upon immediately reinstate the employee upon the LA’s finding of illegal
reinstatement, which reinstatement is immediately dismissal; if the employer fails, it is liable to pay the salary of the
executory.24 Unless the appellate tribunal issues a restraining dismissed employee. Of course, it is not always the case that the
order, the LA is duty bound to implement the order of LA’s finding of illegal dismissal is, on appeal by the employer,
reinstatement and the employer has no option but to comply with upheld by the appellate court. After the LA’s decision is reversed by
it.25 a higher tribunal, the employer’s duty to reinstate the dismissed
employee is effectively terminated. This means that an employer is
Moreover, and equally worth emphasizing, is that an order of no longer obliged to keep the employee in the actual service or in
reinstatement issued by the LA is self-executory, i.e., the the payroll. The employee, in turn, is not required to return the
dismissed employee need not even apply for and the LA need not wages that he had received prior to the reversal of the LA’s
even issue a writ of execution to trigger the employer’s duty to decision.31
reinstate the dismissed employee.
The reversal by a higher tribunal of the LA’s finding (of illegal
26
In Pioneer Texturizing Corp. v. NLRC, et. al., decided in 1997, the dismissal), notwithstanding, an employer, who, despite the LA’s
Court clarified once and for all this self-executory nature of a order of reinstatement, did not reinstate the employee during the
reinstatement order. After tracing back the various Court rulings pendency of the appeal up to the reversal by a higher tribunal may
interpreting the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. still be held liable for the accrued wages of the employee, i.e., the
671527 on the reinstatement aspect of a labor decision under Article unpaid salary accruing up to the time the higher tribunal reverses
223 of the Labor Code, the Court concluded that to otherwise the decision.32 The rule, therefore, is that an employee may still
"require the application for and issuance of a writ of execution as recover the accrued wages up to and despite the reversal by the
prerequisites for the execution of a reinstatement award would higher tribunal. This entitlement of the employee to the accrued
certainly betray and run counter to the very object and intent of wages proceeds from the immediate and self-executory nature of
Article 223, i.e., the immediate execution of a reinstatement the reinstatement aspect of the LA’s decision.
order."28
By way of exception to the above rule, an employee may be barred
In short, therefore, with respect to decisions reinstating from collecting the accrued wages if shown that the delay in
employees, the law itself has determined a sufficiently enforcing the reinstatement pending appeal was without fault on
the part of the employer. To determine whether an employee is From these facts and without doubt, there was actual delay in the
thus barred, two tests must be satisfied: (1) actual delay or the execution of the reinstatement aspect of the LA’s May 31, 2005
fact that the order of reinstatement pending appeal was not decision before it was reversed in the CA’s decision.
executed prior to its reversal; and (2) the delay must not be due to
the employer’s unjustified act or omission. Note that under the Second, the cause of the delay – whether the delay was not due to
second test, the delay must be without the employer’s fault. If the the employer’s unjustified act or omission. We answer this test in
delay is due to the employer’s unjustified refusal, the employer the negative; we find that the delay in the execution of the
may still be required to pay the salaries notwithstanding the reinstatement pending appeal was due to the respondents’
reversal of the LA’s decision.33 unjustified acts.
Application of the two-fold test; the In reversing, for grave abuse of discretion, the NLRC’s order
petitioners are entitled to receive their affirming the release of the garnished amount, the CA relied on the
accrued salaries until December 18, 2007 fact of the issuance of the February 21, 2006 Memorandum and of
the petitioners’ failure to comply with its return-to-work directive.
As we earlier pointed out, the core issue to be resolved is whether In other words, with the issuance of this Memorandum, the CA
the petitioners may recover the accrued wages until the CA’s considered the respondents as having sufficiently complied with
reversal of the LA’s decision. An affirmative answer to this question their obligation to reinstate the petitioners. And, the subsequent
will lead us to reverse the assailed CA decision for legal errors and delay in or the non-execution of the reinstatement order was no
reinstate the NLRC’s decision affirming the release of the garnished longer the respondents’ fault, but rather of the petitioners who
amount. Otherwise, we uphold the CA’s decision to be legally refused to report back to work despite the directive.
correct. To resolve this question, we apply the two-fold test.
Our careful consideration of the facts and the circumstances that
First, the existence of delay - whether there was actual delay or surrounded the case convinced us that the delay in the
whether the order of reinstatement pending appeal was not reinstatement pending appeal was due to the respondents’ fault.
executed prior to its reversal? We answer this test in the For one, the respondents filed several pleadings to suspend the
affirmative. execution of the LA’s reinstatement order, i.e., the opposition to
the petitioners’ motion for execution filed on October 3, 2005; the
To recall, on May 31, 2005, the LA rendered the decision finding motion to quash the October 7, 2005 writ of execution with prayer
the petitioners illegally dismissed and ordering their immediate to hold in abeyance the implementation of the reinstatement order;
reinstatement. Per the records, the respondents received copy of and the motion to suspend the order for the petitioners’
this decision on July 8, 2005. On August 20, 2005, the petitioners reinstatement filed on February 28, 2006 after the LA issued the
filed before the LA a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution for February 16, 2006 alias writ of execution. These pleadings, to our
their immediate reinstatement. The LA issued the Writ of Execution mind, show a determined effort on the respondents’ part to
on October 7, 2005. From the time the respondents received copy prevent or suspend the execution of the reinstatement pending
of the LA’s decision, and the issuance of the writ of execution, until appeal.
the CA reversed this decision on December 17, 2008, the
respondents had not reinstated the petitioners, either by actual Another reason is that the respondents, contrary to the CA’s
reinstatement or in the payroll. This continued non-execution of conclusion, did not sufficiently notify the petitioners of their intent
the reinstatement order in fact moved the LA to issue an alias writ to actually reinstate them; neither did the respondents give them
of execution on February 16, 2006 and another writ of execution ample opportunity to comply with the return-to-work directive. We
on April 24, 2007. note that the respondents delivered the February 21, 2006
Memorandum (requiring the petitioners to report for work on
February 24, 2006) only in the afternoon of February 23, 2006.
Worse, the respondents handed the notice to only one of the petitioners' accrued salary until the LA decision was reversed by
petitioners – Pelaez – who did not act in representation of the the CA on December 17, 2008. We, therefore, find that the NLRC,
others. Evidently, the petitioners could not reasonably be expected in affirming the release of the garnished amount, merely
to comply with a directive that they had no or insufficient notice of. implemented the mandate of Article 223; it simply recognized as
immediate and self-executory the reinstatement aspect of the LA's
Lastly, the petitioners continuously and actively pursued the decision.
execution of the reinstatement aspect of the LA’s decision, i.e., by
filing several motions for execution of the reinstatement order, and Accordingly, we reverse for legal errors the CA
motion to cite the respondents in contempt and re-computation of decision.1âwphi1 We find no grave abuse of discretion attended
the accrued wages for the respondents’ continued failure to the NLRC's July 16, 2008 resolution that affirmed the March 13,
reinstate them. 2008 decision of the LA granting the release of the garnished
amount.
These facts altogether show that the respondents were not at all
sincere in reinstating the petitioners. These facts – when taken WHEREFORE, in light of these considerations, we hereby GRANT
together with the fact of delay – reveal the respondents’ obstinate the petition. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the September 30, 2010
resolve and willful disregard of the immediate and self-executory decision and the January 13, 2011 resolution of the Court of
nature of the reinstatement aspect of the LA’s decision. Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. Sp No. 112011. Accordingly, we
REINSTATE the July 16, 2008 decision of the National Labor
A further and final point that we considered in concluding that the Relations Commission (NLRC) affirming the March 13, 2008 order
delay was due to the respondents’ fault is the fact that per the of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC Case No. 00-04-05469-2004.
2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (2005 NLRC
Rules),34 employers are required to submit a report of compliance Costs against the respondents South East Asian Airlines and Irene
within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the LA’s decision, Dornier.
noncompliance with which signifies a clear refusal to reinstate.
Arguably, the 2005 NLRC Rules took effect only on January 7, SO ORDERED.
2006; hence, the respondents could not have been reasonably
expected to comply with this duty that was not yet in effect when
the LA rendered its decision (finding illegal dismissal) and issued
the writ of execution in 2005. Nevertheless, when the LA issued
the February 16, 2006 alias writ of execution and the April 24,
2007 writ of execution, the 2005 NLRC Rules was already in place
such that the respondents had become duty-bound to submit the
required compliance report; their noncompliance with this rule all
the more showed a clear and determined refusal to reinstate.
All told, under the facts and the surrounding circumstances, the
delay was due to the acts of the respondents that we find were
unjustified. We reiterate and emphasize, Article 223, paragraph 3,
of the Labor Code mandates the employer to immediately reinstate
the dismissed employee, either by actually reinstating him/her
under the conditions prevailing prior to the dismissal or, at the
option of the employer, in the payroll. The respondents' failure in
this case to exercise either option rendered them liable for the