DOMINICO C. CONGSON vs.

NLRC, NOE BARGO, ROGER HIMENO, RAYMUNDO complainants, thus the value of the tuna intestine and liver should be computed in
BADAGOS, PATRICIO SALVADOR, SR., NEHIL BARGO, JOEL MENDOZA, and EMMANUEL arriving at the daily wage.
CALIXIHAN,
Issue:
G.R. No. 114250 April 5, 1995
WON the value of the tuna intestine and liver should be computed in arriving at the daily
Facts: wage.

 Private respondents were hired on various dates by petitioner as regular piece-

rate workers. They were uniformly paid at a rate of P1.00 per tuna weighing thirty
(30) to eighty (80) kilos per movement, that is —they did the work of unloading
tuna from fishing boats to truck haulers; unloading them again at petitioner's cold
storage plant for filing, storing, cleaning, and maintenance; and finally loading the
processed tuna for shipment. They worked seven (7) days a week.
 During the first week of June 1990, petitioner notified his workers of his proposal
to reduce the rate-per-tuna movement due to the scarcity of tuna, to which the
respondents resisted.
 When they reported for work the next day, they were informed that they had
been replaced by a new set of workers and their request for dialogue was not
fulfilled.
 On 15 June 1990, private respondents filed a case against petitioner before the
NLRC Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch No. XI in General Santos City, for
underpayment of wages (non-compliance with Rep. Act Nos. 6640 and 6727) and
non-payment of overtime pay, 13th month pay, holiday pay, rest day pay, and five
(5)-day service incentive leave pay; and for constructive dismissal.
 With respect to their monetary claims, private respondents charged petitioner
with violation of the minimum wage law, alleging that with petitioner's rates and
the scarcity of tuna catches, private respondents' average monthly earnings each
did not exceed ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00).
 On 2 July 1990, private respondents filed another case against petitioner,
docketed as Case No. RAB; 11-07-50179-90 containing an additional claim for
separation pay should their complaint for constructive dismissal be upheld.
 Labor Arbiter: Petitioner was guilty of constructive dismissal and ordered to pay
separation pay and monetary claims for salary differentials, 13th month pay and
service incentive leave pay.
 NLRC: Affirmed in toto.
 On appeal to SC, assailed the accuracy of Labor Arbiter Aponesto's computations
in arriving at the monetary awards representing salary differentials, contending
that the parties agreed that complainants shall be paid P1.00 per 'bariles' per
movement BUT the intestines and liver of the tuna delivered shall go to the herein
Held:
No. The Labor Code expressly provides:
Article 102. Forms of Payment. —No. employer shall pay the wages of an
employee by means of, promissory notes, vouchers, coupons, tokens tickets,
chits, or any object other than legal tender, even when expressly requested by
the employee.
Payment of wages by check or money order shall be allowed when such manner
of payment is customary on the date of effectivity of this Code, or is necessary
as specified in appropriate regulations to be issued by the Secretary of Labor or
as stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement. (Emphasis supplied)
Undoubtedly, petitioner's practice of paying the private respondents the minimum wage
by means of legal tender combined with tuna liver and intestines runs counter to the
above cited provision of the Labor Code. The fact that said method of paying the
minimum wage was not only agreed upon by both parties in the employment agreement
but even expressly requested by private respondents, does not shield petitioner. Article
102 of the Labor Code is clear. Wages shall be paid only by means of legal tender. The
only instance when an employer is permitted to pay wages informs other than legal
tender, that is, by checks or money order, is when the circumstances prescribed in the
second paragraph of Article 102 are present.
We therefore find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent NLRC in
upholding Labor Arbiter Aponesto's award of salary differentials.
1

NORTH DAVAO MINING CORPORATION and ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST vs.
NLRC, LABOR ARBITER ANTONIO M. VILLANUEVA and WILFREDO GUILLEMA
G.R. No. 112546 March 13, 1996
Facts:
 Respondent Wilfredo Guillema was one among several employees of North Davao
who were separated by reason of the company's closure on May 31, 1992, and
who were the complainants in the cases before the respondent labor arbiter.
 On May 31, 1992, petitioner North Davao completely ceased operations due to
serious business reverses. When it ceased operations, its remaining employees
were separated and given the equivalent of 12.5 days' pay for every year of
service, computed on their basic monthly pay, in addition to the commutation to
cash of their unused vacation and sick leaves.
 However, it appeared that, during the life of the petitioner corporation, from the
beginning of its operations in 1981 until its closure in 1992, it had been giving
separation pay equivalent to thirty (30) days' pay for every year of service.
 Moreover, the employees had to collect their salaries at a bank in Tagum, Davao
del Norte, some 58 kilometers from their workplace and about 2 1/2 hours' travel
time by public transportation; this arrangement lasted from 1981 up to 1990.
 A complaint was filed with respondent Labor Arbiter by respondent Wilfredo
Guillema and 271 other separated employees for additional separation, back
wages, transportation allowance, hazard pay, housing allowance, food allowance,
post-employment medical clearance; and future medical allowance, all of which
amounted to P58,022,878.31 as computed by private respondent.
 Labor Arbiter: Ruled in favor of respondents and ordered petitioner to pay:
(a) Additional separation pay of 17.5 days for every year of service;
(b) Backwages equivalent to two (2) days a month times the number of
years of service but not to exceed three (3) years;
(c) Transportation allowance at P80 a month times the number of years of
service but not to exceed three (3) years.
 NLRC: Affirmed in toto; in granting transportation allowance, it held that
respondents time spent in collecting wages in a place other than the place of
employment is compensable notwithstanding that the same is done during official
time.
 Petitioner directly filed with SC a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Issue:
WON time spent in collecting wages in a place other than the place of employment is
compensable notwithstanding that the same is done during official time.
Held:
Yes. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his comment:
It is undisputed that because of security reasons, from the time of its operations,
petitioner NDMC maintained its policy of paying its workers at a bank in Tagum, Davao
del Norte, which usually took the workers about two and a half (2 1/2) hours of travel
from the place of work and such travel time is not official.
Section 4, Rule VIII, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides
that:
Sec. 4. Place of payment. — (a) As a general rule, the place of payment shall be at or near
the place of undertaking. Payment in a place other than the workplace shall be
permissible only under the following circumstances: (1) When payment cannot be
effected at or near the place of work by reason of the deterioration of peace and order
conditions, or by reason of actual or impending emergencies caused by fire, flood,
epidemic or other calamity rendering payment thereat impossible; (2) When the
employer provides free transportation to the employees back and forth; and (3) Under
any analogous circumstances; provided that the time spent by the employees in
collecting their wages shall be considered as compensable hours worked.
Thus, public respondent Labor Arbiter Antonio M. Villanueva correctly held that:
From the evidence on record, we find that the hours spent by complainants in collecting
salaries at a bank in Tagum, Davao del Norte shall be considered compensable hours
worked. Considering further the distance between Amacan, Maco to Tagum which is 2
1/2 hours by travel and the risks in commuting all the time in collecting complainants'
salaries, would justify the granting of backwages equivalent to two (2) days in a month as
prayed for.
Corollary to the above findings, and for equitable reasons, we likewise hold respondents
liable for the transportation expenses incurred by complainants at P40.00 round trip fare
during pay days.
2
 WON respondent was entitled to 13th month pay.

HOUSE OF SARA LEE vs. CYNTHIA F. REY Held:

G.R. NO. 149013 August 31, 2006 No. Respondent is not a rank-and-file employee and is, therefore, not entitled to
thirteenth-month pay.
Fact:
The NLRC and the CA are correct in refusing to award 14th and 15th month pay as well as
 The House of Sara Lee (petitioner) is engaged in the direct selling of a variety of the "monthly salary increase of 10 percent per year for two years based on her latest
product lines for men and women, including cosmetics, intimate apparels, salary rate." The respondent must show that these benefits are due to her as a matter of
perfumes, ready to wear clothes and other novelty items, through its various right.53 The rule in these cases is, she who alleges, not she who denies, must prove. Mere
outlets nationwide. allegations by the respondent do not suffice in the absence of proof supporting the
 It employs Credit Administration Supervisors (CAS) to supervise and monitor the same.54 With respect to salary increases in particular, the respondent must likewise show
credit collection of the Independent Business Managers (IBMs) and Independent that she has a vested right to the same, such that her salary increases can be made a
Group Supervisors (IGSs). A 38- or 52-day “rolling due date” is given to each of its component in the computation of backwages. What is evident is that salary increases are
IBMs and IGSs. a mere expectancy. They are by nature volatile and dependent on numerous variables,
 CAS is under the direct control and supervision of Branch Operations Manager including the company's fiscal situation, the employee's future performance on the job,
(BOM). Cynthia Rey was a CAS at the Cagayan de Oro Branch of the petitioner. She or the employee's continued stay in a position. 55 In short, absent any proof, there is no
was later transferred to Butuan City. vested right to salary increases.56
 While respondent was still working in Butuan City, she allegedly instructed the
Accounts Receivable Clerk of the Cagayan de Oro outlet, a certain Ms. Magi
Caroline Mendoza, to change the credit term of one of the IBMs of the petitioner,
a certain Ms. Mariam Rey-Petilla, who happens to be respondent’s sister-in-law,
from the 52-day limit to an “unauthorized” term of 60 days.
 Ms. Mendoza reported the matter to the BOM Villagracia. Villagracia discreetly
investigated the matter and found out that it was not only Ms. Petilla who was
given extensions to the “rolling due dates” but other IBMs as well.
 On the basis of the hearing, the alleged voluntary admissions of respondent, and
the findings of the auditor’s report, the petitioner formally dismissed the
respondent for breach of trust and confidence. The dismissal lead to respondent’s
filing of her Complaint for illegal dismissal, backwages and damages, with the
Labor Arbiter.

 Labor Arbiter: Ruled in favor of the respondent and ordered the payment of full
backwages, 13th month pay, separation pay and attorney's fees.
 NLRC: Affirmed the decision of LA.
 CA: Dismissed the Petition on the sole ground that factual issues are not proper
subjects for a special civil action of certiorari.

Issue:
3
  As per his computation, the total amount of the monetary award is
P6,030,456.59, representing his backwages and other benefits, including the
general increases which he should have earned during the period of his illegal
EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION (now known as EQUITABLE-PCI BANK) vs. RICARDO termination --- he theorized that he started with a monthly compensation of
SADAC, G.R. No. 164772             June 8, 2006 P12,500.00 in August 1981, when he was appointed as Vice President of
petitioner Bank’s Legal Department and later as its General Counsel in
Facts: December 1981. As of November 1989, when he was dismissed illegally, his
monthly compensation amounted to P29,365.00 or more than twice his original
 Ricardo Sadac was appointed Vice President of the Legal Department of petitioner
compensation. The difference, he posited, can be attributed to the annual salary
Bank effective 1 August 1981, and subsequently General Counsel thereof on 8
increases which he received equivalent to 15 percent (15%) of his monthly
December 1981.
salary; and therefore, salary increases should be deemed a component in the
 On June 1989, nine lawyers of petitioner Bank’s Legal Department, in a letter-
computation of backwages.
petition to the Chairman of the Board of Directors, accused respondent Sadac of
abusive conduct and ultimately, petitioned for a change in leadership of the Issue:
department.
 On the ground of lack of confidence in Sadac, under the rules of client and lawyer WON the computation of back wages shall include the general increases.
relationship, petitioner Bank instructed respondent Sadac to deliver all materials Held:
in his custody in all cases in which the latter was appearing as its counsel of
record. In reaction thereto, Sadac requested for a full hearing and formal No. Attention must be called to Article 279 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
investigation but the same remained unheeded. amended by Section 34 of Rep. Act No. 6715. The law provides as follows:
 On 9 November 1989, respondent Sadac filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with
ART. 279. Security of Tenure. – In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
damages against petitioner Bank and individual members of the Board of Directors
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this
thereof.
Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
 After learning of the filing of the complaint, petitioner Bank terminated the
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
services of respondent Sadac. Finally, on 10 August 1989, Sadac was removed
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the
from his office.
time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
(Emphasis supplied.)
 Labor Arbiter [1990]: Dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
Article 279 mandates that an employee’s full backwages shall be inclusive of allowances
 NLRC [1991]: Reversed and held that respondent was illegally dismissed and
and other benefits or their monetary equivalent. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of
ordered for his reinstatement or pay the separation pay should the
Appeals, we do not see that a salary increase can be interpreted as either an allowance
reinstatement become impossible.
or a benefit. Salary increases are not akin to allowances or benefits, and cannot be
 Petitioner Bank filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari assailing the NLRC
confused with either. The term "allowances" is sometimes used synonymously with
Resolution before the Supreme Court.
"emoluments," as indirect or contingent remuneration, which may or may not be earned,
 SC [1997]: Affirmed the decision of the NLRC and held that the existence of the
but which is sometimes in the nature of compensation, and sometimes in the nature of
employer-employee relationship had been duly established between petitioner
reimbursement.47 Allowances and benefits are granted to the employee apart or
Bank and respondent Sadac, bringing the case within the coverage of the Labor
separate from, and in addition to the wage or salary. In contrast, salary increases are
Code and not one of a client-lawyer relationship which it could terminate at any
amounts which are added to the employee’s salary as an increment thereto for varied
time the services of respondent Sadac.
reasons deemed appropriate by the employer. Salary increases are not separate grants
 As the decision of the SC became final and executory, respondent Sadac filed
by themselves but once granted, they are deemed part of the employee’s salary. To
with the Labor Arbiter a Motion for Execution.
4
extend the coverage of an allowance or a benefit to include salary increases would be to
strain both the imagination of the Court and the language of law. As aptly observed by
the NLRC, "to otherwise give the meaning other than what the law speaks for by itself,
will open the floodgates to various interpretations." 48 Indeed, if the intent were to
include salary increases as basis in the computation of backwages, the same should have
been explicitly stated in the same manner that the law used clear and unambiguous
terms in expressly providing for the inclusion of allowances and other benefits.

There was no lawful decree or order supporting his claim, such that his salary increases
can be made a component in the computation of backwages. What is evident is that
salary increases are a mere expectancy. They are, by its nature volatile and are
dependent on numerous variables, including the company’s fiscal situation and even the
employee’s future performance on the job, or the employee’s continued stay in a
position subject to management prerogative to transfer him to another position where
his services are needed. In short, there is no vested right to salary increases. That
respondent Sadac may have received salary increases in the past only proves fact of
receipt but does not establish a degree of assuredness that is inherent in backwages.
From the foregoing, the plain conclusion is that respondent Sadac’s computation of his
full backwages which includes his prospective salary increases cannot be permitted.

Respondent Sadac cannot take exception by arguing that jurisprudence speaks only of
wage and not salary, and therefore, the rule is inapplicable to him. It is respondent
Sadac’s stance that he was not paid at the wage rate nor was he engaged in some form of
manual or physical labor as he was hired as Vice President of petitioner Bank. He cites
Gaa v. Court of Appeals62 where the Court distinguished between wage and salary.