Offences Against the Persons Act

Assault

Definition:

A person is guilty of assault if he intentionally or recklessly leads someone to apprehend the application to his body of immediate
unlawful force. (Venna)

Actusreus:

At first we are to consider whether the physical elements of assault can be established in the defendant’s case. Here, actusreus
requires the proof of three elements, causing apprehension, Immediacy, unlawful force.

Causing apprehension: The defendant must act in such a way that the victim apprehends that unlawful force is about to be used
against him. Thus, for the purpose of the offence defendant must cause the victim to apprehend unlawful personal violence. (R v
Lamb) Here, the defendant by mention what he did caused the victim such a violence against him.

However, in the following scenario, defendant by mention how defendant lacked the capacity provides that although he caused the
victim to apprehend unlawful personal violence against himself, but the defendant does not have the means to carry out the threat.
The case of Logdon v DPP provides that if even for once the victim apprehends such a violence it becomes irrelevant to consider
whether the defendant had the means to carry out that particular threat. Thus, even though the given fact illustrates such a pitfall
defendant shall still be liable.

As per the given facts, it cannot be established that the victim feared the threat of unlawful force since mention why he did not fear
as per the case of Savage and Parmenter to apprehend generally means to “expect”. Thus, this does not specifically require fear,
although the fear will normally be present. Thus, the apprehension of unlawful force would suffice.

Immediacy: The victim’s apprehension of unlawful force must be immediate. In the following scenario, it may be said that the
defendant by mention how defendant apprehended immediacy made/did not make the victim apprehend immediate unlawful
violence since mention hoe it can be or cannot be said to be immediate. (Although an immediacy cannot be established, as per the
case of R v Ireland immediacy would be taken in other words as “imminent”, thus, although immediacy cannot be established it can
be said that the fear was imminent i.e. the personal violence was ready to take place against the victim.) Here, the determination of
immediacy shall be left to the jury. (Smith v Woking)

Smith v Chief Superintendent: Thus, the victim was frightened on the basis that he did not know what defendant was going to do
next, but that it was likely to be of a violent nature. Thus, the fear of what defendant would do next was sufficiently immediate for
the purpose of the offence.

R v Constanza: Thus, the victim apprehended a fear of violence at some time not excluding the immediate future.

Unlawful force: The force or threat of force must be unlawful, so no offence is committed if defendant is acting in self-defence,
(Cousins) or if the show of force was done to affect a lawful arrest (s.3(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967) or the approach is
consented to. Here, the facts clearly show that no such action was taken which would make the force justified, providing that the
defendant caused the victim to apprehend unlawful force against himself.

Mensrea:

After establishing the actusreus of the offence, now we are to consider whether the defendant had the mensrea to commit an
assault.

The mensrea for assault is intention or recklessness as to causing the victim to apprehend immediate unlawful personal violence.
(Spratt)

Intention: Here, the facts clearly suggest that defendant intended to commit an assault since mention what he intended. providing
that the offence satisfies.
Recklessness: Here, since the facts does not specify any clear intention of the defendant to commit the assault. We are to discuss
whether the defendant was reckless as to his conduct. Reckless for the purpose must be established following the subjective test
confirmed in R v G. Thus, it may be said that the defendant is reckless since his conduct creates an obvious risk of unlawful personal
violence i.e. mention how he was reckless and recognising that there is some risk, he still goes on to take it. (Savage and Parmenter)
Thus, it may be construed that the offence satisfies.

Sentencing:

According to s.39 of Criminal Justice Act 1988, it is a summary offence and the person liable of assault has to give a fine of level 5 or
6 months’ imprisonment or both.

Battery

Definition:

Battery is any act by which defendant intentionally or recklessly, inflicts unlawful force upon victim. (Fagan v MPC)

Actusreus:

At first we are to consider whether the physical elements of battery can be established in the defendant’s case. Here, actusreus
requires the proof of three elements, force, necessity of direct contact, unlawful force.

Force: Force as per the offence of battery is not physical harm but unwanted interference with the person of the victim. Thus, in
battery, force simply means making physical contact with another. According to William Blackstone, “the law cannot draw the line
between different degree of violence, and therefore prohibits the first and lowest stage of it, every man’s person being sacred, and
no other having a right to meddle with it, in any slightest manner.”

Collins v Wilcock: Here, the defendant used some form of physical contact i.e. mention what physical contact defendant made in
order to restrain the victim which shall amount to force. (Collins v Wilcock) Thus, the fundamental principle of Collins suggests that
any touching of another, however slight it may be may amount to battery. (Goff LJ’s Judgment)

Commonwealth v Cohen: Here, the facts suggests that the defendant spit on the victim this means that although this can construe
to an unlawful violence disrespecting the degree of harm caused, the issue arises is considering whether direct force was put on the
victim. And this shall be discussed gradually.

DPP v Smith: Here, the facts suggest that defendant cut victim’s hair. Here, the issue arises in considering whether the hair can fall
under the category of victim’s person, since it is a dead tissue. As suggested by Sir Igor Judge in the case of DPP v Smith, “individual’s
hair is relevant to his or her autonomy” thus, even if the hair constitutes of dead tissue it falls within the definition of “bodily” in the
phrase “actual bodily harm” satisfying the criteria.

Day: Here, it needs to be considered whether the act of defendant of touching victim’s clothes is a sufficient force exerted on the
victim. The case of Day suggests that contact with the clothes worn by a person amounts to a battery since, the person of victim
includes clothes on his back. (Furthermore it is not necessary that the victim should be able to feel the impact through his clothes. (R
v Thomas) This suggests that even though victim could not feel the impact defendant might still be liable.

Although, the defendant’s physical contact was not painful, but it does have to involve force. Thus, it is not battery to drug, poison or
gas someone, so the defendant shall not be liable for battery. Although, he might be charged under s.23 of the Offences Against the
Persons Act (OAPA) 1861.

Necessity of Direct Contact: It is not necessary for there to be direct contact between the defendant and the victim.

Scott v Shephard: Although, the case of Scott v Shephard has similar facts, in that case since the lit firework exchanged several
hands which lead to the court deciding that the force was not applied directly. However, the case was decided in 1773, and since
then the common law has made a great deal of reform. Thus, if the case is decided now, the defendant shall still be liable, although
he explain how he indirectly applied the force, thus he may be held liable for battery even in absence of direct force. (DPP v K)
R v Martin: Although, the facts suggest that defendant did not cause the victim any direct harm, he might sti8ll be liable since his
conduct mention his conduct caused the injuries to the victim. (R v Martin)

Mitchell: Here, although defendant did not directly applied force on victim but he did on another who eventually blew the force on
victim, defendant will still be liable for battery. (Mitchell)

DPP v K: Here, although the act of the defendant generated unlawful force on the victim the act of mention what defendant did was
done before a significant level of time before defendant was injured, defendant will still be liable. (DPP v K)

Haystead v Chief Constable of Derbyshire: Here, although the defendant asserted force on another which led the victim sustain
unlawful force, defendant will still be liable for battery.

Unlawful Force: The force or threat of force must be unlawful, so no offence is committed if defendant is acting in self-defence,
(Slingsby) or if the show of force was done to affect a lawful arrest (s.3(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967) or the contact is consented
to. Here, the facts clearly show that no such action was taken which would make the force justified, providing that the defendant
caused the victim unlawful force against himself.

Mensrea:

After establishing the actusreus of the offence, now we are to consider whether the defendant had the mensrea to commit battery.

The mensrea for battery is intention or recklessness as to causing the victim to the unlawful contact. (Spratt)

Intention: Here, the facts clearly suggest that defendant intended to commit a battery since mention what he intended. providing
that the offence satisfies.

Recklessness: Here, since the facts does not specify any clear intention of the defendant to commit the assault. We are to discuss
whether the defendant was reckless as to his conduct. Reckless for the purpose must be established following the subjective test
confirmed in R v G. Thus, it may be said that the defendant is reckless since his conduct creates an obvious risk of unlawful personal
violence i.e. mention how he was reckless and recognising that there is some risk, he still goes on to take it. (Savage and Parmenter)
Thus, it may be construed that the offence satisfies.

Sentencing:

According to s.39 of Criminal Justice Act 1988, it is a summary offence and the person liable of assault has to give a fine of level 5 or
6 months’ imprisonment or both.

Consent

Absence of the victim’s consent is one of the elements of common assault. Therefore, if the prosecution cannot prove that the force
applied was unconsented then there will be no case to answer. Here, the victim as per the facts consented/did not consent to the
force, which suggests that the force asserted was lawful/unlawful.

However, in the following situation, although the consent was present in certain situations the deliberate infliction of harm may be
termed as inherently unlawful, thus such a consent might not make it unlawful. Here, the facts suggest that victim, explain what
consent was made to the defendant.

Donovan: Although, the facts suggested that consent was available, the consent of the victim cannot render the unlawful act of
defendant lawful.

Olugboja: Here, the facts suggest that although the victim submits to the physical contact, he consented to this due to threat of
force, which might even amount to battery. (Olugboja)
Burell v Harmer: Although, the facts suggested that consent was available, apparent consent can be rendered ineffective in a
number of ways. In particular, the consent of those who do not understand exactly what they are consenting to. (Burell v Harmer)
As per the given fact, the victim is mention what is wrong with victim. Which suggests that such a consent remains ineffective.

Dica: Although, the facts suggested that consent was available, certain types of fraud may vitiate consent. Consent is not vitiated
simply because a person would not have agreed to the contract had they knew all the relevant facts. It is vitiated only if the nature
of the fraud prevented the victim from understanding what she was consenting to. Here, such may be the case because mention the
fraud.

Actual Bodily Harm

Definition:

s.47 of the Offences Against the Persons Act 1861 suggests that a person shall be convicted upon an indictment of any assault
occasioning actual bodily harm shall be liable. In other words, s.47 makes it an offence to commit common assault occasioning
actual bodily harm (ABH).

Actusreus:

At first we are to consider whether the physical elements of s.47 can be established in the defendant’s case. Here, actusreus
requires the proof of three elements, assault or battery, occasioning, ABH.

Assault or Battery: In order to convict a person for an offence under s.47 it is mandatory to prove that the accused has committed
assault or battery. (DPP v Little) Here, as per the given facts, it may be construed that defendant can be held liable for
assault/battery. (Now establish the elements of assault)

Occasioning: Occasioning basically means causing. (R v Roberts) Thus, the prosecution must prove an unbroken causal chain linking
the victim’s injury with the defendant’s assault. Thus, the test simply requires the proof that the victim’s actions were a factual and
legal cause of the common assault.

The factual cause will be the legal cause if it subsequently contributed to the resulting harm and if there was no novus actus
interveniens. Therefore, it may be said that the assault/battery committed by the defendant “caused” the victim ABH, since mention
why it caused the ABH.

Actual Bodily Harm: ABH as defined by Swift J in Donovan is “any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with the health and comfort of
the victim. Such hurt or injury need not be permanent, but must…. be more than merely transient and trifling.” Here, the hurt or
injury suffered by the victim may be taken as such since the defendant by mention what defendant did interfered with victim’s
comfort.

ABH however does not require injury to living tissue, as has been discussed above. (DPP v Smith)

Here, the defendant might argue that although he caused harm to the victim, this was not physical harm, but interference with
victim’s medical condition, such might also amount to ABH. (Burstow) (However, the facts suggest that the emotions which
encroached defendant i.e. mention the emotion is so trivial that the court might term it as wholly insignificant, providing that the
defendant might not be liable under s.47) Furthermore, if the Psychiatric injury is serious enough, defendant might be charged
under s.20.

If there is an impairment of victim’s sensory organs, i.e. loss of consciousness, then it may be considered as ABH. (T v DPP) Such is
the case in the give question.

Mensrea:

The proof of battery/assault is required to be satisfied in order to prove the mensrea for s.47. (R v Robert)

(Discuss the mensrea for battery/assault)

The fact that whether the defendant had any intention or was reckless as to causing ABH is not important, successfully satisfying the
offence. (Savage and Parmenter)
Sentencing:

In general, the maximum sentence is 5 years’ imprisonment, which might exceed to 7 years’ for racially aggravated ABH.

Intentional or Reckless Wounding or GBH

Definition:

s.20 of the OAPA 1861 states that whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously wound or inflict any GBH upon any other, either with
or without any weapon or instrument shall be guilty of an offence triable either way, and being convicted thereof shall be liable.

Actusreus:

Actusreus:

At first we are to consider whether the physical elements of s.20 can be established in the defendant’s case. Here, actusreus
requires the proof of either wounding or GBH.

Wounding: A wound requires an injury to the person by which the skin is broken. The skin contains two layers, the dermis and the
epidermis. Only an injury breaking both the layers accompanied by bleeding is a wound. (Moriarty v Brooks) Here, the facts suggest
that the defendant inflicted wound on the victim, satisfying the criteria.

Here, the victim suffered a burn/was scratched, which would not fall within the category of wound, although blood showing is
sufficient to make a scab. (McLoughlin)

The requirement that both layers of the skin be broken means that an internal rupture or broken bone will not be a wound for the
purpose of s.20, even if it is accompanied by bruising. (C v Eisenhower)

The rupture of the cheek or the urethra resulting in bleeding is wounding. This is because, the internal membrane ruptured takes the
form of a skin. (Waltham)

Grievous Bodily Harm: GBH is really serious harm or injury. (DPP v Smith) According to the case of R v Ireland, Burstow Psychiatric
injury may amount to GBH. Transmission of sexually transmitted diseases can be considered as GBH. (R v Dica)

According to the case of R v Bollom, the jury is entitled to consider the characteristics of the victim such as age, gender, physical
strength etc., as well as the extent and nature of the injury, in order to decide whether the injury would be wounding or GBH.

Dispute Between Wounding and Causing:

Until recently “inflict” was thought to be narrower than “cause”. Inflicting GBH invokes the vision of some form of application of
force which delivers the harm, just as a knife or gun delivers a wound. Over the years, the definition of infliction has radically
changed.

Although in Clarence it was held that, there should be some form of direct contact between perpetrator and victim which delivered
the harm to the victim, in the case of Wilson, the requirement for direct contact was not the same. Here, there was no requirement
for direct contact between the parties. It was enough that the harm was sustained as a result of the victim receiving physical blow or
contact of some kind. Either, by way of an assault or by doing something intentionally, which although is not a direct application of
force, is a direct result of the force applied to the body of the victim, so that he suffers GBH. This was later in the case of Burstow
held as, harm could be inflicted in the absence of application of force. Thus, there is no difference between inflicting harm and
causing harm.

Mensrea:

The mensrea for s.20 is malice i.e. intention or subjective recklessness. This means that the defendant foresaw some physical harm
(Mowatt) but was not necessary to foresee that degree of harm actually sustained, i.e. mention the actual harm. This was upheld in
Parmenter.

Sentencing:
In general, the maximum sentence is 5 years’ imprisonment, which might exceed to 7 years’ for racially aggravated ABH.

Intentional Wounding or GBH

Definition:

It is an offence under s.18 OAPA 1861 if someone unlawfully and maliciously by any means whatsoever wound or cause GBH to any
person, with intent to do some GBH or resist lawful arrest.

Actusreus:

(Same as s.20)

Mensrea:

The wounding or causing of GBH must be accompanied by an intention matching or exceeding the simple causing of injury. Thus, in
s.18 mensrea exceeds the actusreus i.e. intention is more than action. In other words, if defendant wounds victim but not seriously
the prosecution would fail on a s.18 charge unless they can prove that this level of injury was intended.

Here, as per the facts it may be satisfied that defendant intentionally inflicted the harm to victim, since mention his intention.
However, the final determination lies in the hands of jury. Here, the jury need not be provided a Woollin Direction but should simply
be asked to determine whether on the basis of all the evidence, defendant not only intended to do what he did, but intended to
cause victim really serious harm.

Unlike the case of Banton, a jury which is not convinced that the defendant had the necessary intention to cause GBH can bring
alternative verdict under s.20. (Mandair)

Sentencing:

The maximum punishment is life imprisonment.

Exceptions

In certain situations, deliberate infliction of harm may be subject to consent, such as in surgery, tattooing or body alteration.
Therefore, the defendant in the following situation the act might have been successfully consented by the victim, since,

surgeries are capable of being consented to, provided that the victim is well informed of what the doctor is required to do.

Re J (Prohibited steps order: circumcision provides that in case of a minor both the parents are required to consent to the surgery.

as per Brown, tattooing, ear piercing and other forms of body piercing and body alteration may also be consented to if reasonable.

as per Wilson, branding by the defendant on his partner, victim might be subject to consent, if such is done for purpose of
adornment rather than simply to cause injury.

boxing attract a special privilege provided the fight is not informal. However, wrestling and martial arts might not have a consensual
deliberation of harm as the point of the activity unless the level of injury sustained by victim is reasonable at the time of sports.

contact sports bear some risk of injury which may be recognised as justified.

“bumps” may be construed by the defendant as has been impliedly or expressly consented by the defendant to its participation.

consent to harms committed during sexual relationship may be an effective consent, unless it is deliberately inflicted for their own
sake. (Brown)