Participation

Parties to a Crime

Principal Offender:

The actual perpetrator in the commission of a crime is known as the principal offender. There may be more than one
principal offender.

Innocent agents:

A person who either commits the actusreus of an offence in absence of mensrea, or where the person lacks the capacity
to commit the offence is known as the innocent agent. The principal might sometimes act through an innocent agent.

Secondary Parties:

Aider: an aider provides assistance to the principal prior to or at the time of the offence.

Abettor: an abettor encourages, instigates or insights the principal at the time the offence is committed.

Counsellor: counsellor encourages the commission of the offence by the principal before he commits it.

Procurer: a procurer causes the offence to be committed e.g. spiking someone’s drink so that they drive fast.

Liability of Secondary Parties

Definition:

As per s.8 Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, whosoever shall aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of an
indictable offence is liable to be tried, indicted and punished as a principal offender.

s.47 magistrates’ and Courts Act 1980, makes provisions along similar lines for summary offences.

It might be argued that since the offence is required to be tried in the same way as a principal offender, then why the
offences need to be separated. This is due to the difference in the mensrea element between the primary and secondary
party to an offence.

Identification of the type of secondary party:

In order to consider whether defendant falls within the category of secondary offender, at first we are to consider under
which category defendant falls into.

Secondary Parties:

Aider: an aider provides assistance to the principal prior to or at the time of the offence.

Abettor: an abettor encourages, instigates or insights the principal at the time the offence is committed.

Counsellor: counsellor encourages the commission of the offence by the principal before he commits it.

Procurer: a procurer causes the offence to be committed e.g. spiking someone’s drink so that they drive fast.
Actusreus:

At first we are to consider the physical elements of the offence. This includes the proof that a principal offence was
committed and the secondary party provided some actual encouragement, assistance or advice.

Need for a principal offence: secondary liability will arise when the principal party commits the actusreus of the offence.
Such an offence might arise even if the principal offender is released from liability in some way, either by lack of
mensrea or obtaining any defence which is not available to the secondary offender. Here, the defendant committed the
physical elements of crime, (even though it is unlikely that principal offender would be liable for the offence given he
mention why he is not liable) (Cogan v Leak)

Need for actual advice, encouragement, assistance etc.: Further, it needs to be established that the accessory actually
gave advice, encouragement, assistance etc. so that the principal can commit the offence. Thus, a mere presence in the
scene is not in itself sufficient. (Clarkson) Here, the facts suggest that the defendant actually mention how he helped
(providing that he did more than just being present in the scene), satisfying the criteria.

Mensrea:

After proving the actusreus, the mensrea for the offence needs to be satisfied.

Intention to assist, encourage etc.: Here, the defendant only requires to intend to facilitate the principal offence, even if
defendant did not care whether the offence would be committed or hopes it will be committed. Such is the case in the
following scenario.

Knowledge of the circumstance or consequence required for the actusreus: Defendant must have knowledge of the
circumstances required for the actusreus. Here, the defendant is only required to know that the principal is going to
commit an offence of a particular type due to his assistance/encouragement/advice but does not need to know where
or when the offence would be committed. (Bainbridge) Furthermore, defendant does not need know that principal will
surely commit an offence through his assistance, but only an anticipation that the offence would be committed will
suffice to hold the defendant criminally liable. (DPP for Northern Ireland v Maxwell) (relate to the fact)

Joint Enterprise

Definition:

A joint enterprise is a shared common intention…each has the same intention as the other and each knows that the
other intends the same thing. (Peters and Parfitt)

Satisfying the Offence:

Here, as per the given facts parties by explain what they intended to do suggests that they shared a common purpose,
and made it clear to each other by explain how they made it clear to each other that they shared a common intention
i.e. mention what common intention they shared. (R v Jogee)

Exceeding the scope of joint enterprise:

As per the given facts it can be construed that the principal did more than the accomplice contemplated would be done.
Thus, we are now to consider whether the excess actions taken by the principal would make accomplice criminally liable
for the excess offence committed by the principal, or whether he would only be liable for what was originally agreed. In
the case of Anderson and Morris it was held that if two persons are engaged in a joint enterprise, one party would be
generally liable for the acts of the other party, given that the other party does not exceed then what was originally
agreed either expressly or impliedly by the parties.
Here, the facts provide that the accomplice (did not) expressly/impliedly agreed to the consequence of the offence,
since he (did not) knew that the explain what was agreed would/would not lead to the offence. (Thus, accomplice shall
be liable for the offence since he knew/foresaw that in the course of committing what was agreed to the other party
would/might carry out with the requisite intention an act which would lead to offence (Powell)) Here, the risk of
committing the offence by the principal was so/not remote that the accomplice dismissed it as altogether negligible.
(Powell)

Presence at the scene: Furthermore, it is not important for the accomplice to be present at the scene at the time of
commission of the Act, thus providing that defendant might still be liable. (Rook)

Weapon: Here, the facts suggest that the principal used a weapon at the time of committing the offence. Now it must be
considered whether the accomplice knew that a weapon was to be used by the principal and if so whether he knerw
that the p[articular weapon would be used by the principal offender. (Powell) As per the given facts the accomplice
knew/did not know about the defendant’s intention to use a weapon since mention how he knew or did not know.
(Thus, providing that he might not be liable since he was unaware of the dangers that would eventually be created by
the defendant through the use of weapon) Furthermore, it must be considered whether the accomplice knew that the
particular weapon will be used. Here, the accomplice knew/did not know that a weapon would be used (instead he
thought that a other weapon would be used, thus now the burden remains on jury to consider whether the weapon
used is more or equivalently dangerous compared to other weapon, (English) if so, the accomplice would be liable for
the offence. (Uddin))

Murder: If the principal commits murder, the accomplice shall only be liable if the murder is committed within the scope
of the joint enterprise. (Gilmour) Here, the facts suggest that the principal acted in excess of/ within the agreed ambit
between the parties since mention what he did, thus, the accomplice shall/shall not be liable for murder or
manslaughter.

Defence to murder: Here, even if the principal can establish that a defence of diminished responsibility or loss of self-
control it might not release the liability of accomplice given he could not plea a defence. Thus, the parties are entitled to
provide proof of any defence individually. (s.2(4) Homicide Act 1957)

Withdrawal from participation:

As per the given facts, the accomplice withdrawn himself from the agreement made with principle before/at the time
they committed the offence. Here, it needs to be considered whether the withdrawal was effectively communicated to
the other party. Here, the effectivity of the communication is a fact sensitive enquiry. An effective communication for
the circumstance of the accomplice would involve explicitly holding that he withdrew himself from the joint action. Such
a withdrawal is likely to be successful at a preparatory stage than in the course of committing the offence. (Beccera)
Here, the accomplice by mention how he communicated might be/ might not be seen to have made an effective
communication of his withdrawal, releasing him from the liability.

In the given circumstance, the violence used is spontaneous, rather than pre-planned, thus providing that there might
not be a requirement for communication of withdrawal. (Mitchell) However, in the case of Robinson it is suggested that
Mitchell is an exceptional case, and a communication shall even be required for spontaneous violence.

If an effective communication is not possible the accomplice might have to go to the police, however if such is possible
he shall not be entitled to seek any such help.