Art. 363. Incriminating innocent person.

— Any person who, by any act not constituting perjury, shall directly
incriminate or impute to an innocent person the commission of a crime, shall be punished by arresto menor.

Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35

In the case of Yasona et al. vs. Rodencio and Jovencio (G.R. No. 156339, October 6, 2004), the Supreme Court through
then-Chief Justice Renato Antonio Corona said:

“In this jurisdiction, the term ‘malicious prosecution’ has been defined as an action for damages brought by one against
whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable
cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein.” To
constitute “malicious prosecution,” there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex
or humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and
groundless.

Villanueva vs. UCPB, G.R. No. 138291, March 7, 2000

For a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove the following: (1) the prosecution did occur, and the
defendant was himself the prosecutor or that he instigated its commencement; (2) the criminal action finally ended with
an acquittal; (3) in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (4) the prosecution was
impelled by legal malice — an improper a sinister motive. 11 Stripped of legal jargon, malicious prosecution means
persecution through the misuse or abuse of judicial processes; or the institution and pursuit of legal proceedings for the
purpose of harassing, annoying, vexing or injuring an innocent person.

In malicious prosecution, even if the act complained of does not constitute a crime, there can still be probable cause
behind the commission of a civil wrong. The gravamen of malicious prosecution is not the filing of a complaint based on
the wrong provision of law, but the deliberate initiation of an action with the knowledge that the charges were false and
groundless.

Martires vs. Cokieng, G.R. No. 150192, February 17, 2005

There is malicious prosecution when a person directly insinuates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of a
crime and the accused is compelled to defend himself in court. While generally associated with unfounded criminal
actions, the term has been expanded to include unfounded civil suits instituted just to vex and humiliate the defendant
despite the absence of a cause of action or probable cause.

To merit the award of damages in a case of malicious prosecution, the aggrieved party must prove: (1) that he has been
denounced or charged falsely of an offense by the defendant, (2) that the latter knows that the charge was false or lacks
probable case, (3) that the said defendant acted with malice, and, of course, (4) the damages he has suffered.26 The
elements of want of probable cause and malice must simultaneously exist; otherwise, the presence of probable cause
signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice. On these, there must be proof that the prosecution was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately knowing that the
charge was false and baseless to entitle the victim to damages.

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan and Pp, G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002

In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused in multiple conspiracies commonly involves two structures:
(1) the so-called "wheel" or "circle" conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group (the "hub") dealing individually
with two or more other persons or groups (the "spokes"); and (2) the "chain" conspiracy, usually involving the
distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive communication and cooperation in much the
same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer,
and then retailer and consumer.
As a general rule, conspiracy is not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only when the law fixes a penalty
for its commission such as in conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion and sedition. In contrast, under American criminal
law, the agreement or conspiracy itself is the gravamen of the offense. The essence of conspiracy is the combination of
two or more persons, by concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself
criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means. Its elements are: agreement to accomplish an illegal objective,
coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance of the illegal purpose; and requisite intent necessary to commit the
underlying substantive offense.

An indictment for conspiracy is sufficient where it alleges: (1) the agreement; (2) the offense-object toward which the
agreement was directed; and (3) the overt acts performed in furtherance of the agreement. To allege that the
defendants conspired is, at least, to state that they agreed to do the matters which are set forth as the substance of
their conspiracy. To allege a conspiracy is to allege an agreement. The gist of the crime of conspiracy is unlawful
agreement, and where conspiracy is charged, it is not necessary to set out the criminal object with as great a certainty as
is required in cases where such object is charged as a substantive offense.

The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only
as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar. There is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the
Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it
changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless
of the degree of their participation in the crime.49 The liability of the conspirators is collective and each participant will
be equally responsible for the acts of others,50 for the act of one is the act of all.51 In People v. Quitlong,52 we ruled on
how conspiracy as the mode of committing the offense should be alleged in the Information, viz:

“xxxx Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or objected to during trial, may
be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal
liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of the
nature and extent of his own participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the commission of the crime. Where
conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary
importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others (People v. Ilano, 313 SCRA 442). Verily, an accused must
know from the information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-
accused as well. xxx”

Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony
and forthwith to actually pursue it. Verily, the information must state that the accused have confederated to commit the
crime or that there has been a community of design, a unity of purpose or an agreement to commit the felony among
the accused. Such an allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of the words "conspired" or "confederated" or the
phrase "acting in conspiracy," must aptly appear in the information in the form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy.
In fine, the agreement to commit the crime, the unity of purpose or the community of design among the accused must
be conveyed such as either by the use of the term "conspire" or its derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic
facts constituting the conspiracy.

Quidet vs. Pp, G.R. No. 170289, April 8, 2010

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it. The essence of conspiracy is the unity of action and purpose. Its elements, like the physical acts
constituting the crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. When there is conspiracy, the act of one is the
act of all.

Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action and community of interests. However, in determining whether conspiracy exists, it
is not sufficient that the attack be joint and simultaneous for simultaneousness does not of itself demonstrate the
concurrence of will or unity of action and purpose which are the bases of the responsibility of the assailants. What is
determinative is proof establishing that the accused were animated by one and the same purpose.

There is no question that "a person may be convicted for the criminal act of another where, between them, there has
been conspiracy or unity of purpose and intention in the commission of the crime charged." It is, likewise, settled that
"to establish conspiracy, it is not necessary to prove previous agreement to commit a crime, if there is proof that the
malefactors have acted in consort and in pursuance of the same objective." Nevertheless, "the evidence to prove the
same must be positive and convincing. As a facile device by which an accused may be ensnared and kept within the
penal fold, conspiracy requires conclusive proof if we are to maintain in full strength the substance of the time-honored
principle in criminal law requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt before conviction."
Edwina Rimando vs. Pp, G.R. No. 229701, November 29, 2017

It bears stressing that conspiracy requires the same degree of proof required to establish the crime beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission without proof of cooperation or
agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it. Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be
inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, all taken together,
however, the evidence must be strong enough to show the community of criminal design. For conspiracy to exist, it is
essential that there must be a conscious design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is the product of intentionality on the
part of the cohorts.

It is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution to the
execution of the crime committed. The overt act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the
crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime
or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators. Hence, the mere presence of an accused at the
discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it, without any active participation in the same, is not enough for purposes
of conviction.

Mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission is not, by itself, sufficient to establish conspiracy.
To establish conspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act is
required. Nevertheless, mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation or agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, but that there must be intentional participation in
the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. In order to hold an accused liable as
co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he or she must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or in
furtherance of conspiracy.