Zemplén - Conflicting Agendas Critical Thinking Versus Science Education in The International Baccalaureate Theory of Knowledge Course PDF

Science & Education (2007) 16: 167–196 Springer 2007
DOI 10.1007/s11191-006-6387-0
Conflicting Agendas: Critical Thinking

versus Science Education in the International
Baccalaureate Theory of Knowledge Course
GÁBOR Á. ZEMPLÉN

Max-Planck-Institut für Wissenschaftsgeschichte, Wilhelmstrasse 44, 10117 Berlin, Germany;
Budapest Univerisity of Technology and Economics (HAS, HPS Research Group), Stotzek U. 2.
St., 1025 Budapest, H-1111, Hungary (E-mails:gzemplen@mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de;
zemplen@hps.elte.hu)
Abstract. The article investigates the Theory of Knowledge course of the International
Baccalaureate Organization. After a short overview of the aims and objectives of the course,
the assessment criteria and a popular textbook are investigated. Shortcomings concerning the
treatment of the natural sciences are highlighted and the problem is generalised to courses or
curricula that aim to reconcile agendas focusing on critical thinking and philosophical analysis
on the one hand and traditional science subject-agendas on the other. The article argues that
these problems also surface in the actual teaching practice and their implications for the
curricula need to be taken more seriously. Three possible alternatives to overcome these
problems are outlined. The first is based on novel work in history and philosophy of science,
the second on general theories of argumentation, and the third on systematic exploration of
student interests and stakes.
Key words: critical thinking, theory of knowledge, philosophy of science, history of science,
argumentation, science education, pargma-dialectics, Otto Neurath, International Baccalau-
reate Organization
1. Theory of knowledge
In 1999, International Baccalaureate Organization (IBO)1 launched a new
course in Theory of Knowledge (TOK) in the diploma programme. The
short course description states that:
TOK is an interdisciplinary requirement intended to stimulate critical reflection on the
knowledge and experience gained inside and outside the classroom. The course challenges
students to question the bases of knowledge, to be aware of subjective and ideological
biases and to develop the ability to analyse evidence that is expressed in rational argument.
TOK is a key element in encouraging students to appreciate other cultural perspec-
tives. The course is unique to the IBO, which recommends at least 100 h of teaching
time spanning the programme’s two years.2
The course enables the teachers to partake in the development of students

in a number of ways that are only posed as desiderata in most curricula, but
168 GÁBOR Á. ZEMPLÉN
where the measures to implement these goals often lag behind the rhetoric.
The importance of the subject is guaranteed by putting it at the core of the
curriculum. Together with an individually researched project (written up as
the Extended Essay), and the partly extracurricular ‘Creativity, Action,
Service’, TOK is the only compulsory part of the curriculum (see Figure 1)3
At the same time, to lift pressure from content-based assessment, TOK
plays a minor role in the IB diploma. Together with the Extended Essay, a
maximum of three points can be achieved out of 45. This makes the class
less prone to becoming an ‘exam-preparation’ course, and leaves the teacher
more freedom in the choice of topics and approach.
I highlight benefits and problems of the TOK course below (the first
examinations took place in 2001) that are connected to science education.
After these, the second part of the article will generalise some of the prob-
lems and will offer tentative solutions.
2. TOK and science education

The TOK course explicitly tackles issues in the broader context of history
and philosophy of science (HPS), together with aspects of the Nature of
Figure 1. Structure of the IBO Diploma curriculum. IBO 2002.

CONFLICTING AGENDAS 169
Science (NOS) in a pronouncedly non-authoritarian and student-centred

approach. As science teachers generally show reluctance to treat NOS is-
sues and especially wider problems about science, like socioscientific issues
(SSI), the course provides a safe haven for such ideas without ‘sacrificing’
precious time from the other courses. At the same time, it facilitates and
encourages other teachers explicitly to increase the presence of TOK
relevant materials in the other courses.
TOK also provides opportunities to directly address values connected to
science. Most contemporary science teaching focuses on teaching (some of)
the content of science and not the methodology of science, or its develop-
ment, history, or effect on our society. Many science teachers ‘shy away’
from addressing values (Allchin 1999, p. 9). Even if it is recognised that sci-
ence is not value-free – a triviality for Mertonian or post-Mertonian sociol-
ogy of science –, most science educators see their work as at most
transmitting scientific (i.e. epistemic and/or Mertonian) values in science,
but no other ‘extrascientific’ values. Directly addressing ethical and moral
issues connected to the students’ ‘life-world’, TOK provides opportunities to
cross the science – society gap, as well as the student – school science gap.
TOK also remedies the general problem of treating the above-mentioned
issues as removed from the personal experience of the students, as the
course is built around the student knower(s). Figure 2 shows that the TOK
diagram humanises epistemic issues and focuses on connecting the various
areas of knowledge.
Basic to the course is the focus on critical thinking (CT) with respect to
the various sources of knowledge a student encounters. The second edition
of the programme description (March 2003) gives the nature of the subject
as following:4
The Theory of Knowledge (TOK) programme is central to the educational philosophy

of the International Baccalaureate. It challenges students and their teachers to reflect
critically on diverse ways of knowing and areas of knowledge, and to consider the role
which knowledge plays in a global society. It encourages students to become aware of
themselves as thinkers, to become aware of the complexity of knowledge, and to rec-
ognize the need to act responsibly in an increasingly interconnected world.
As a thoughtful and purposeful enquiry into different ways of knowing, and into dif-
ferent kinds of knowledge, the TOK programme is composed almost entirely of ques-
tions. The most central of these questions is ‘How do I, or how do we, know that a
given assertion is true, or a given judgement is well grounded?’ Assertions or judge-
ments of this sort are termed ‘knowledge claims’, while the difficulties that arise in
addressing these questions are the broad areas known as ‘problems of knowledge’.
The programme entails the application of this central question to many different, yet
interrelated, topics.
Questions are the very essence of TOK, both ageless questions on which thinkers have
been reflecting for centuries and new ones, often challenging to accepted belief, which
are posed by contemporary life. Engaging with students in a critical examination of
Figure 2. The TOK diagram. IBO 1999.
knowledge, teachers will foster an appreciation of the quest for knowledge, in particular
its importance, its complexities, and its human implications. A teacher may hope to
bring alive the questions in this guide for a new generation of knowers, and to encourage
them to gain and apply their own knowledge with greater awareness and responsibility.
This attitude is reflected in the more specific aims and objectives of the
course,5 and, as it stands, it is, to my knowledge, indeed one of the most
up-to-date attempts to incorporate critical thinking and reflexivity in the
curriculum.
Even though this might seem very much like the dream of many educa-
tors who argue for increased role of HPS, NOS, STS, SSI,6 CT elements in
curricula, I aim to pinpoint difficulties and dangers concerning the prac-
tical implementation of the course. While I discuss this school-type, this
specific curriculum, and only one of the generally used textbooks, I believe
that the problems I am pointing to are of a more general nature and
should facilitate discussion between the different parties involved. The
TOK course is ahead of many similar courses established or argued for in
the last few years in different national curricula, so the practical problems
of implementation can be, I believe, important for the other courses, too.
3. Assessing assessment
TOK is designed as a subject of ‘questions’, and the course guide consists
mainly of directed questions. At the end of the course, however, the
students are assessed, and failure to meet minimum demands means not
obtaining the diploma. What characterises this assessment?
Much in line with our general understanding of critical thinking and
reflexive, problem-generating processes (Fawkes et al. 2005), the grades are
not established by ‘multiple choice’ or other, quick-response tests. Both the
internal assessment and the externally graded essay leave the students
ample time for reflection and preparation to supply well worked-out and
thought-through arguments. The first is a short TOK-relevant presenta-
tion. The individual or small-group work amounts to 1/3 of the marks.
Descriptors penalise non-personalised approaches. The second is a home-
composed essay between 1200 and 1600 words on one of the annually
prescribed ten titles (2/3 of the marks), where about half of the questions
have direct relevance for NOS, HPS or SSI.
The external evaluation is generally robust – evaluators have their
‘personal equations’ and the results are checked and modified if needed.
Except for a few cases, the marking is predictable, and with a little help
most teachers of the subject can give fairly precise predicted grades.7
The specific descriptors, however, have been considered problematic.
When reading through the curriculum review reports of the subject,8 one
notices that much of the discussion is about finding better descriptors and
criteria for the evaluation process in general. Issues in the content are,
however, hardly discussed. In a preliminary questionnaire on the subject
(abstracted in the 2003 Curriculum review report) 232 teachers from the
247 (coming from 197 different schools worldwide) were happy with the
aims and objectives. 199 believed that the syllabus needed little or no
revision.
In spite of this general satisfaction among teachers and course develop-
ers, I believe, there are serious problems that the assessment faces. Below I
discuss what I believe to be three interconnected issues. The first I call the
‘framework-problem’, the second the problem of ‘black-boxing’ subjects,
and the third the ‘problem of critical thinking’. Only the third of these is
specific to CT-oriented courses in traditional curricula, while the first ap-
plies for student-centered courses. Nevertheless all three they point to
problems often left untreated in TOK-like courses.
Curricula-developers face a dilemma when attempting to provide human-
ised and student-centred courses that focus on CT and SSI. They either
create an extra-disciplinary framework or stay within an ‘academic’ disci-
plinary mould, but face the possibility that the specific agenda of any
chosen academic discipline will stand in the way of a question-based
approach to knowledge in at least certain areas. As far as I see, this prob-
lem has clearly been recognised by developers of the TOK course, and they
opted for the first possibility – unlike some similar courses.9 But with the
creation of this ‘extradisciplinary’ framework a ‘framework-problem’ arises

that plagues any curriculum that aims to incorporate a student-centred
interdisciplinary course. Where is this problem the most obvious?
Providing a framework is an indispensable tool for implementing the
aims and objectives determined by the course developers and the relevant
stakeholders. But it also creates a specific vocabulary. The pervasiveness of
the terminology becomes apparent just by looking at the aims and objec-
tives of the TOK course – some of it cited above.10 A close look at the
assessment criteria (probably to be replaced by a slightly different set of
criteria in the coming years) reveal that a key element is the recognition
and understanding of relevant knowledge issues, and critical reflection on
different points of view, as well as connecting several ‘Ways of Knowing’
and ‘Areas of Knowledge’ (see also Figure 2). Even though the programme
description is based on questions – the evaluation has to formulate criteria
– and thereby creates a specific bias.
Thus a surprisingly easy way to gain a fairly good grade is ‘name-dropping’:
basically listing the expressions on the TOK diagram (Figure 2), embedded in
sentences that ‘show’ critical reflection on the recognition of the problematic
nature of gaining knowledge. This little trick can result in highly original and
inquisitive essays being graded below rather shallow work using a specific
terminology.11
Like any school subject, TOK promotes the use of a specific terminology.
The course description creates a vocabulary, and conforming to this vocabu-
lary benefits the student. If they master the vocabulary, their work is assessed
higher. The status of this vocabulary is, however, dubious, as it is not the
specific terminology of any discipline or academically accepted mode of
inquiry. It is justified through the pedagogical aims, the decision to create a
student-centered approach. All terminologies and subjects trivially indoctri-
nate by giving a framework, but here the framework was created to unite
various forms and modes of discourse in a student-centered way, and to
teach to ask ‘questions’. Indoctrinating with this framework is not acceptable
to the same extent as e.g. with an academically established discipline. One
problem of the specific frameworks suggested for TOK is that while several
styles of reasoning and ways of looking at the world are promoted by it,
other ones cannot be incorporated or even seem unintelligible. It would lead
too far to provide a detailed analysis, but this framework is ill-suited to
incorporate currently important and legitimate approaches: negating the
subject-object dichotomy (some of Bruno Latour’s works would be one
example from science studies), or action-based theories of perception. I see
no easy way of sidestepping this ‘framework’ problem, as the creation of a
student-centered approach is definitely beneficial, but recognising this poten-
tial pitfall and discussing the implications seems necessary.
This leads to the second mentioned problem, that of ‘black-boxing’ sub-

jects. To put it succinctly: operationalisation is not unproblematic. If one
accepts the aims and objectives of a subject, and considers the testing pro-
cedure successful, then it is easy to believe that one has the appropriate
means of evaluating the results of a specific educational goal. If one thinks
that one knows what a subject should teach, then, once a sufficiently reli-
able testing procedure is found, the subject can become ‘black-boxed’ in a
school-system. Like in other operationalised procedures, the assessment
will define to what extent the aims and objectives have been reached.
Reliability of the procedure can be measured and improved, but it
becomes increasingly complicated to see inside the black-box, and recon-
sider what the assessment assesses. Recent discussions in TOK have shifted
more and more towards finding better descriptors to assess essays, and the
fundamental question (is this the good way to assess what we want to
teach) has decreasing importance. This leads us to the third problem, the
general ‘problem of critical thinking’ in school curricula.
Critical thinking skills are important elements of liberal high school edu-
cation plans and for programs stressing the need for responsible citizen-
ship. But how much, exactly what, and when should be incorporated into
the curricula? It seems the more, the earlier, the better. Implementation,
however, runs into difficulties. Schools generally operate in a diffusion (or
deficit) model, are authoritative, and aim to restrict and channel critical
thinking – the actual politics is against the general policies. The cognitive
development of CT skills in students is little understood, just as general
human reasoning (whether it is represented propositionally or not, if it is
modular or not, how it is connected to language, to what extent concepts
are innate, etc.). Does assessment simply measure general cognitive devel-
opment? In this case is it fair to assess this ability?12 And is it fair to call it
a grade in ‘Theory of Knowledge’?
Some empirical studies hint that in case of subjects where a main objec-
tive is to improve critical thinking skills the ‘black-boxing’ can be espe-
cially dangerous, as the general aims expressed in course curricula simply
do not match the cognitive abilities of the students. The ‘Reflective
Judgment Model’, for example, suggests that the reasoning skills of high
school students do not display the ability to contrast evidence from
different sources, to explicate criteria for decision making, etc. (King &
Kitchener 1994). The implication for TOK might be rather grave. As
Dotger put it when discussing the relation of NOS and critical thinking:
‘In contrast to the NOS objectives for K-12 students, ... these skills devel-
op in most advanced graduate students. The implications ... are that the
expectation for the depth of understanding implied in the literature may
need to be reconsidered’ (Dotger 2005).13 Even if this specific empirical
work is questioned,14 a general problem is that the course does not

explicate what level and what sort of critical thinking is expected. This, and
the vagueness of how CT should be incorporated in the educational system
is what I refer to as the ‘problem of critical thinking’. This problem also
appears on the textbook level, and an example is given in the next section.
The TOK of the IBO is ahead of many other curricula. It allotted time
and incorporated goals and criteria for the assessment while in most na-
tional curricula similar courses are still being planned, prepared, or tested.
But it still fails to explicate clearly what is expected from the students. In
spite of the imposed (and academically not fully justified) framework of
TOK there are no clear guidelines concerning values and the course is
therefore too lax in the specific educational context. In this sense TOK is
underspecified. It is not explicit about the exact nature and applicability of
CT skills: exactly what is expected of the students and if there are con-
straints on the use of these skills or not.
The significance of this point for science education will be discussed in
the next two sections. As I will show in the close analysis of a textbook,
critical-thinking or philosophically oriented (in short TOK-like) subjects
are in deep conflict with some of the basic tenets of most school-science
curricula. I also argue that this problem surfaces whenever CT and science
subjects are incorporated in a curriculum without clear guidelines that
recognise these problems and reconcile the respective agendas. Drawing
attention to this conflict is one of the main aims of the article.
4. Analysis of a textbook for theory of knowledge

A brave attempt to provide a textbook for the IB TOK course is (Alchin
2003a, 2003b). Other textbooks include (Woolman 2000; Tomkinson 2004),
but Alchin’s work is the most widely used and is generally applauded.15 I
will thus only investigate this book.
Already the introductory pages display tension. For Alchin a basic tenet
of the structuring of the book is the understanding that ‘if we are to make
Theory of Knowledge immediate and real to students, then it must be based
in concrete topics and examples with which they are familiar, with the
abstract principles arising out of these in an easy and natural way. ... It is
hoped that by the end of the course students will emerge with a solid under-
standing of the abstract concepts and a tool with which to make decisions
and shape interpretations of everyday experience’ (Alchin 2003a, p. 1).
Only two pages later, Alchin writes: ‘Far from constricting students, the
aim has been to liberate them by proposing a model, whose flaws, as well
as strengths, will generate debate and discussion.’ (Alchin 2003a, p. 3).
Are there constraints on reflexive and critical thinking? The first quote
suggests a positive answer – classroom debates and topics are instrumental
to teaching a specific terminology and use of concepts. On the other hand,
this model is admittedly flawed, which should further critical reflection
about the model and a possible rejection. But without a clearly explicated
and coherent curriculum and/or textbook there is a risk that one ends up
with constraints where there shouldn’t be any and with no constraints
where some should be in place. For the first the ‘framework problem’ can
serve as an example: certain elements of the terminology seem to be con-
strained, as the assessment criteria themselves use a specific terminology.
For the second a well-argued but openly anti-scientific essay should
(and might) earn a grade A in a subject, where a major aim of the subject-
developers is to integrate the course more with the other subjects – not the
least with the natural sciences.16
For the narrower focus of the article – the interaction of TOK and spe-
cific science subjects – this latter problem has very peculiar consequences.
The chapters with specific relevance to the treatment of natural sciences in
the textbook show that this tension is unresolved – from exercises in the
class to instructions to the teachers. First I point to some inconsistencies in
the discussion of ideas, followed by shortcomings of the whole approach
taken.17 Although generally the first type of criticism is treated to be more
devastating (as it gives an ‘internal’ critique), I actually intend to argue
that the second has more serious consequences.
To introduce the approach taken by the book, a few examples might
suffice. To familiarise students with the scientific process, a ‘scientific card
game’ is suggested by the teacher’s book, where students have to guess
according to which algorithm a teacher accepts or rejects a given card
shown to him. The aim is to come up with a ‘rule’, and it is demonstrated
that rules connected to the cards (e.g. Red, Black, Red...) are easier to dis-
cover than patterns connected to outside circumstances (offered by girl,
boy, girl...) Following this the notion of a paradigm is introduced, as the
group of assumptions made when trying to tackle the problem. At the
same time a general ‘naı̈ve’ model of scientific method is introduced based
on this pattern-recognition game. The strong Popperian tone is clearly
recognisable: ‘The most important point to stress is that, though problematic,
the acid test must be that of experiment: falsification allows us to weed out
theories which do not meet with the way nature actually works. This is
absolutely central to the natural sciences – we have a mechanism by which
we eliminate failures.’ (Alchin 2003a, p. 13). Is this another case of a text-
book writer with inadequate knowledge of NOS? The easy answer would
be: yes, and teaching teachers about NOS can ameliorate the problem. But
a more charitable reading – and later quotes will make evident that in
Alchin’s case this is supported – has wider reaching implications. This

highlights a general underlying problem in the structure of education
rather than blaming the individual textbook-writers as producing many
isolated and flawed attempts.
As at some other points Alchin seems to be cautious. He raises problems
with falsification: it ‘is never simple and never conclusive’, and it was ‘sup-
posed to avoid the problem of induction, [but] doesn’t solve [the] problem
... at all’ (Alchin 2003a, pp. 15–16). A well-known problem is that falsifica-
tionism does not describe scientific practice – already pointed out by Imre
Lakatos – and an example from another Hungarian philosopher in exile,
Michael Polanyi is even quoted in the book (Alchin 2003b, p. 22).
At the same time in an exercise for the students to decide which claims
are scientific and which are not (Alchin 2003b, p. 19), in 8 out of 12
sentences the testability is mentioned in the teacher’s book as the differen-
tia specifica (Alchin 2003a, p. 14). Also, the textbook abounds in citations
like: ‘This is the essence of scientific truth: it can never be proved experi-
mentally that a claim is correct, but it can be proved that it’s wrong’
(Alchin 2003b, p. 18), or ‘What is clear is that a scientific claim is a claim
that should lend itself to experiment’. (Alchin 2003b, p. 19)
While the Popperian undertone is pervasive in the chapter on Natural
Science, paradigms are treated as one of the key notions of the book. A
whole chapter deals with ‘Paradigms and Culture’. It introduces rather
muddled ‘grand-paradigms’, taken to be a ‘section ... crucial for any
student’ (Alchin 2003a, p. 79). Here a ‘Classical paradigm’ was (after
Copernicus!) replaced by an ‘Enlightenment paradigm’ that might give way
to a ‘Modern paradigm’, based on evolutionary theory and general scepticism
(‘There is no path to truth’) (Alchin 2003b, pp. 177–181).
This and other texts suggest some level of cultural relativism, but such
considerations seem suspended when ‘paradigms’ are investigated in
science: ‘So although Newton was ‘‘wrong’’ he was still quite ‘‘right’’. And
Einstein, though probably ‘‘wrong’’, is even ‘‘right-er’’’ (Alchin 2003a,
p. 18). This strangely cumulative view of science relegates talk about Kuhnian
paradigms to me to be mostly unintelligible. It is highly instructive to see
how these views clash when discussing specific episodes in the history of
science. In discussing the estimated age of the Universe, and in particular
the Big Bang paradigm which predicted a smaller value for it, Alchin
writes: ‘‘Most cosmologists still believe the theory – they just feel that they
need to modify it. In other words, they are refusing their paradigm to be
falsified. This may be reasonable, but it shows that falsification is not a
simple matter.’’ (Alchin 2003a, p. 16). The writer surely senses some of the
difficulty, as in a paragraph he writes: ‘Kuhn’s remark that ‘‘There is no
standard higher than the assent of the relevant community’’ seems to fly in
the face of the experimental tradition’ (Alchin 2003a, p. 16), but only
suggests some discussion-producing games as a remedy.
But why cite these inconsistencies from a specific textbook? Because
these views are crucial in deciding whether TOK can be presented as a
coherent body of knowledge, and if the TOK agenda can be reconciled
with traditional science subjects. One shouldn’t take such issues lightly.
The educational programme should be clear about what values and what
content is to be incorporated in the courses.
In the end, as far as the sciences are concerned, there is little doubt as to
which agenda gets the upper hand in the present case. After a page dis-
cussing Kuhnian notions, Alchin in a long paragraph warns the students
from being ‘carried away’. What he argues for is a curious concept of
scientific development that to my knowledge is not shared by any profes-
sionals in the field:
Although science is a human activity performed by a human community, it seems to
work most of the time. This is truer now than any time in the past. ...While conserva-
tivism was part and parcel of science a few centuries ago, many scientists would say
that things have moved on and that today difficult experimental data would not be ig-
nored. Early last century, it took Einstein less than fifteen years to win the world over
to his radically new ideas. Likewise, when Feynman proved previous theories wrong
and proposed new ones, they were accepted within years. Conversely, when ‘cold fu-
sion’ was proposed a few years back, experimenters all over the world immediately
took up the challenge (of course, the trillions of dollars that were available to the
finders of cold fusion may have had something to do with it). After a tumultuous few
months of conflicting results, the scientific community came to the conclusion that the
phenomenon of ‘cold fusion’ was simply an error or a hoax: the crucial results could
not be duplicated. ‘Cold fusion’ did not pass the stringent test of experiment. To over-
turn a theory now requires less time than it ever did before. But let us not forget that
scientists are humans (Alchin 2003b, p. 22).
Apart from the tenability of the position, I consider it to be problematic to

introduce views in a textbook in this way for a number of reasons. One is
that a textbook is not only a transmitter of knowledge, but also a trans-
mitter of a mode of inquiry, of questioning and of finding answers. As
Kuhnian exemplars they directly, if implicitly shape the students’ views. To
my knowledge none of the approaches to CT would treat such arguments
as ideal exemplars. The rhetorical technique of ‘hedging’ is evident here
and in a number of other arguments the book presents. These disclaimers
make statements made by the book hard to pin down (or falsify?). It is
trivially true that the weaker the conclusion of an argument is made, the
stronger the argument is to support the (weaker) conclusion. But to ‘state
whatever you want and at the end say that it is only part of the truth’ has
very little to do with critical thinking.18
Another difficulty connected to the ‘problem of critical thinking’ is even
graver. It is quite possible that this argument is about as sophisticated as
high-school students can get. This would do credit to Alchin’s pedagogical

skills and also partly explain the success of the book. But in this case isn’t
it misleading to mention CT in course curricula when this is the most we
can expect?19 There should be no harm in being honest about educational
goals – but in this case the aims and objectives or the course description
should specify what is to be expected from students. Of course none of
these scenarios necessitate the use of arguments as typified by the above
example – textbooks in any case should probably employ more sophisti-
cated arguments.
Furthermore, what if the students start to meddle with the view of
science portrayed by the book? The teacher should only welcome such
outbursts of the critical spirit – but at the same time he receives explicit
instructions from the teacher’s book. This, at one point suggests: ‘Point
out that other disciplines... are little closer to definite answers after thou-
sands of years of inquiry, but that science has performed astonishingly
well in just a few hundred years.’ (Alchin 2003a, p. 12). These quotes
nicely illustrate the usually unrecognised conflict of TOK-like subjects
and science courses. Are students allowed to say that science only found
answers by changing the questions – and that they do not find these
questions exciting, important, or worth pursuing? As another quotation
stresses: ‘We need to dispel the notion that scientists are bad and boring
middle-aged men in white coats and show that there is something won-
derful about science’ (Alchin 2003a, p. 17).20 The book highlights the
creativity of science – and with this reiterates what expert consensus, and
international science education documents state (McComas et al. 1998;
Zeidler et al. 2002, p. 345).21 Is this view necessarily reinforced by the
students’ own experience if some close relatives are scientists? Is this
really what they are to expect if they want to study sciences at the uni-
versity or do a PhD? Can they openly question these views, or should a
TOK teacher do everything to substitute one popular image of science
with another, positive one, conforming more to the authoritarian rhetoric
of education? And to do all this in a course, which is supposedly aimed
at fostering individual thinking?
5. Generalising the problem

If, among other aims, education has the mission of maintaining and rein-
vigorating democracy (as e.g. John Dewey envisioned), then it has to pro-
mote responsible citizenship, prevent indoctrination, and foster critical
thinking. Science is one of our social institutions, with scientists having
their own interests, agendas, and goals that might not necessarily benefit
all layers of a society. So responsible, independent citizenship means that
claims of science and of scientists – in legitimating their enterprise, its

knowledge-producing efficacy, and benefits, among other issues – must also
be critically investigated and evaluated. Present day scientific curricula are
generally not suited for this task. Developed mostly as providing resources
for the economy and research with a set of skills acknowledged as instru-
mental for these aims, the educational agendas for democracy, responsi-
ble citizenship, etc., cannot easily be grafted on present school-science
curricula.
At the same time national curricular efforts place an increasing demand
on addressing ‘nature of science’ (NOS), critical thinking (CT) and related
issues in the curricula (from Project 2061 to the 1996 National Science
Education Standards22).
As a result (and for a number of other reasons) more and more curric-
ula incorporate specific subjects or allocate extra time to focus on NOS,
SSI, STS, and CT issues to compensate for the shortcomings. The exis-
tence of these new subjects raises a number of questions: What is the con-
nection between them and traditional science subjects? Do they fruitfully
support each other or give rise to contradiction and confusion for the stu-
dents? Can and need the cooperation be extended and if yes, how? Are
they instrumental in purporting a unified view of the world to the students
by connecting various disciplines and modes of inquiry? Or do they rather
make evident the disunified nature of human knowledge?
These are significant and pressing questions. To limit the scope, I only
investigated one specific school-type, the International Baccalaureate
schools and the TOK classes. I have shown that in its present framework
TOK is either ‘compatible’ with the agendas of science-subjects, but has to
compromise on the CT element, or the CT aims are fully acknowledged
(and NOS and SSI questions are investigated this way), but science-subject
agendas cannot be fully supported.
This highlighted conflict is general but little appreciated. Even in aca-
demic discussions on science education, it is often left unrecognised.
Davson-Galle suggested a common framework to satisfy both the aims of
science education to train professional scientists and the liberal educational
agenda (Davson-Galle 2004). His solution, a normative epistemology and
focus on a ‘deductive skill’ nicely shows the conflict. Can the ‘deductive
skill’ of the ‘critical spirit’ be applied to science or the normative episte-
mology itself? It seems yes, and some of the ‘surrounding propositions
might well be false. Realising this possibility engenders a healthily critical
attitude (not to be confused with dismissive cynicism) about science.
(p. 513)’ The use of the same CT skills can thus be judged as ‘healthily
critical attitude’ but also as ‘dismissive cynicism’. This difference is, how-
ever, extra-logical and is the result of the evaluation of the aptness of CT
in specific cases. We can acquire intellectual tastes similar to our teachers,

but these are value-judgements and show where to use and where not to use
our critical thinking – e.g. where they clash with the authority of modern
(or school) science.
If reflexive thinking has to comply with the agendas of compulsory sci-
ence subjects, then this has problems for critical evaluation, since a basic
aim of the course is to point out that all knowledge-claims depend on
partly implicit assumptions, the acceptability of which is questionable.23
The dilemma seems to be either to compromise CT, or make science edu-
cational goals vulnerable.
As long as the question is to partially ‘humanise’ science within a science
curriculum the preference for some sort of ‘scientistic’ agenda is acceptable
or justified. So Donnelly, noting some problems similar to those outlined
in this paper can rightfully state, that: ‘It seems to me inescapable that the
first and most obvious educational purpose of science in education is to
teach pupils about the most authoritative knowledge we have of the world,
under its material aspect. The coherence and legitimacy of this purpose
must be acknowledged, both intellectually and politically, rather than
side-stepped or denied’ (Donnelly 2002, p. 149).
Science educators take a similar stance, but all too often their views are
not argued for in detail. To give just one example, after showing how
some modern guidelines for science educators open up the way to relativist
readings of science, Good and Shymansky nevertheless conclude: ‘The
many nuances and complexities become apparent as one studies the history
of science, but the essentially rational, progressive, universal nature of
science is the more accurate picture that science teachers should help stu-
dents understand’. (Good & Shymansky 2001, p. 183). How is this accu-
racy measured? Or is this just ‘desirable’ in disguise?
According to these views teachers and modern curricula should promote
scientistic agendas. And Alchin’s TOK book analysed above is no excep-
tion. As in most modern school-systems, natural science is treated as a
superior form of knowledge-production; from the point of view of the gen-
eral aims of school-education such suggestions cannot be objected to. But
one should be explicit: in these cases teaching about science is subordi-
nated to teaching science and the CT agenda is secondary to the populari-
sation of the scientific world-view.
But what if CT-skills and SSI and related issues are taken seriously –
i.e. separate subjects are created, teaching time allotted, etc.? To take
teaching about science seriously ‘has a range of implications’, as Donnelly
noted. Honestly educating about science would be nothing less ‘... than a
major shift in the foundations and character of the science curriculum.’
(Donnelly 2002, p. 147)
But this is exactly the scenario that more and more curricula face. As
science teachers show some aversion of ‘wasting’ time on these issues and
are generally not well prepared to teach about science, some boards (like
the IBO) develop specific courses to treat NOS, SSI, STS and CT issues.
Once an independent subject is created, however, subordination of critical
thinking to the scientistic agendas is not justified any longer. In the TOK
course and programme descriptions the ‘responsible citizenship’ and CT
skills are presented on their own right – in the course description it is not
subordinated to science-education. Nevertheless, the example I showed
(and no doubt others could be added) show that the potential clash be-
comes apparent on the textbook level and the actual teaching. The conflict
of the agendas, however, is not recognised explicitly, let alone treated. This
results in contradictions and serving interests that are removed from the
course description.
6. Non-clashing frameworks
I presented this sketchy analysis as an instance of a very general problem,
that ‘rears its ugly head’ whenever modern and liberal conceptions of edu-
cation are grafted onto a more traditional course structure. I used the term
potential clash of frameworks, as obviously I do not think that science
education and teaching critical thinking must necessarily be on a collision
course. But as the matter stands today, I believe that there is a general
conflict between the two agendas. Can these problems be resolved once
admitted that they exist? There are probably many such possibilities, and I
would consider any curriculum a solution which gives clear and coherent
guidelines that can be implemented. But at present I know of no such
curriculum – as paying lip service to conflicting interests is obviously not
solving but only temporarily covering up the problem.
I strongly believe that a satisfactory framework has to be ‘top down’. A
student-centred approach that takes cognitive development into account
needs to be developed where science and CT can both be taught within a
unified scheme and the three problems I highlighted earlier are treated.
The present article cannot offer this. But three possible solutions to the
‘problem of critical thinking’ will be outlined. These snippets might be
early steps in a field that attracted little research. They show how small,
medium, and large changes in curricula can all be instrumental to over-
come the problem.
The first approach grows out of recent work in history and philosophy
of science. It gives a richer appreciation of science for TOK-like subjects.
This opens the way to formulate softer but more tenable criteria for legiti-
mating science subjects and evading difficulties pointed to in the analysis
of Alchin’s book. The second approach tackles the issue from the point of
view of argumentation studies. It relies on a meta-theory of communica-
tion, argumentation and reasonableness that can be implemented both
when teaching critical thinking in general and in the scientific realm. This
would enable the peaceful coexistence of science subjects with TOK. The
third is a more radical approach implementing which would probably re-
quire wide-reaching changes in other parts of the educational model. This
approach is based on the specific situation of the students themselves.
These are not meant to be exclusive options or long-term solutions, and
common to all is the attempt to provide a ‘legitimate’ (i.e. academically ac-
cepted) and practically feasible approach to overcome the difficulty de-
scribed above. After the critical part of the article these constructive
suggestions are short descriptions based on classroom experience. They can
serve as the bases of small modules designed for 5–6 double-lessons, but
can also be seen as attempts to mark possible outlines for future course-
development.
7. The HPS alternative

Both History and Philosophy of Science (HPS) can and should be incorpo-
rated into curricula to provide a richer understanding of NOS, SSI, and re-
lated issues. The need to provide a theoretical framework for school
science which incorporates current philosophy of science (putting more
emphasis than previous work on the activity of scientists) and is didacti-
cally informed is becoming acknowledged (Izquierdo-Aymerich & Adúriz-
Bravo 2003).
But HPS is not a unified field today. These aggregates of ideas, theories
and agendas baffle the outsider – and rightly so. I separate the field into
two areas, one more ‘logical’, philosophical, the other more historical, as
these pose different problems for communicating NOS and SSI issues.
Philosophy of science is I think extremely hard to teach in high schools.
At present the general way to introduce the scientific method is through
simplistic ‘logical’ considerations. In Alchin’s case inductive rule-seeking
card-games, and familiar sentences are used to illustrate the scientific
method and deductive reasoning (in a separate chapter on Rationalism: the
use of reason). But philosophical notions on science that have proved fruit-
fully communicable to high school students appear to be inadequate to
describe scientific activity in a sufficiently detailed manner. Students can
learn about deduction, about falsification, etc. but this is not what scien-
tists do. Only simplistic, overgeneralising and possibly false notions are
easy to grasp with elementary logic, but then how can legitimating science-
teaching proceed along ‘philosophical’ lines?
Below I only investigate in more detail the often dreaded (and either
abused or denigrated) problem of underdetermination, and how it can be
connected to SSI. One can start to introduce the ideas of French conven-
tionalists using simplistic logical games. Poincaré and Duhem both argued
that logic in itself cannot determine theory choice. These games can be
rule-finding games that amuse the class, or historical work on the birth of
non-Euclidian geometries. Some of the exchange of letters between Bolyai
and Gauss are exciting – or an early paper of Carnap on the Flat Earth –
this could be connected to discussion on contemporary religious funda-
mentalism, etc.
A later class could introduce the well-known thesis of underdetermina-
tion – both Duhem’s and Quine’s version. It should be discussed why and
how this thesis has been used by critiques of the scientific enterprise. Once
the students seem to grasp the inescapable consequences of the thesis, they
can be confronted with a few relevant pages of Duhem (and possibly a
careful selection of quotes from Quine). What is truly interesting is that
neither Duhem nor Quine treated this problem as devastating. Duhem
considered the bon sens of the scientist as an unproblematic guide to the
scientist, while Quine maintained that pragmatic choices are rational in
these cases.24 Can we explain this? And if we have several explanations –
does it matter? And where?
After discussing in class the problem of how to get out of a forest once
lost, a homework could be to read a short and curious early text from
Otto Neurath, a leading figure of the Vienna Circle, on the lost wanderers
of Descartes (Neurath 1913; for the English collection of essays see
Neurath 1973, 1983). Neurath’s ideas have long been rediscovered by his-
torians of philosophy of science (Cartwright, Cat, Friedman, Richardson,
Uebel, Zolo and others), but the reappraisal of logical positivism in
education is still in progress (Matthews 2004).
Neurath is now acknowledged as a linking figure between Duhem and
Quine, and his Neurath-principle as an extension of Duhemian holism
(Haller 1982; Uebel 1997; Stöltzner 2001). The suggested early essay is
ideal to connect SSI issues and positivism in classroom-discussion. Neurath
raised strong objections against what he called pseudo-rationalism (at its
core a problem of dogmatism), the attitude that granted the edifice of
science an undeserved epistemic status: pseudo-foundations. At the same
time he explicitly argued for a politically engaged philosophy of science –
while being a positivist philosopher to the bone (Howard 2002). For him
the deserved status of science suffices to legitimate the scientific enterprise.
Science should not pretend to be value-free, when it is in fact not. Good
science is a liberator from dogmatism, but bad science can become just
what it is supposed to replace. For him, to recognise that science is not
value-free, and indeed is driven by values allows for a richer and nevertheless
positivist approach – especially if this positivism designates some of the logi-
cal empiricists’ work before their emigration to the United States (Holton
1992).25
A crucial – if simplified – notion is that for Neurath underdetermination
was good because it allowed values to play a role in opting for one of the
competing theories, and thus made progressive social action possible. This
approach to the issue of underdetermination can bring in SSI without
becoming anti-scientific. And given the prevalence of oversimplified
Popperian notions, Neuarth’s anti-foundationalist encyclopaedism – for
debates between the two see (Cat 1995) – can offer a refreshing starting
point for philosophy of science.
Another starting point for philosophy of science can be the works of
Michael Polányi, especially if issues of values, morality and and religion
are to be connected with science.26 Taking either Neurath or Polányi as
starting points, many of the (false) dichotomies that currently dominate
the teaching of Philosophy of Science can be disposed of.
Moving to the historical realm the picture looks rosier. Historical
accounts can be used to provide a richer understanding of the nature of
science, measurement, and instrumentation, as e.g. Heilbron suggested
(Heilbron 2002). Focus could and probably should be shifted from
(generally outdated) issues in philosophy of science, to the fruits of the
‘practical turn’ in the history of science. Work on the handling of error, on
scientific concept-formation and scientific controversies, on the study of
stabilising instruments, on experimental systems, and a richer view of
experiments (still too often discussed only in the context of theory-testing)
can help teach us more science, and help us understand science better.
Such an approach can yield a number of case studies that can easily be
incorporated into science-courses and/or TOK-like courses. (This also fits
well with one of the long-term aims of the IBO, to integrate TOK elements
into the specific science subjects).
Sweeping generalisations about method and simplified logical views are
hard to reconcile with students’ day to day work in the science classes. A
richer historical understanding of science can ameliorate a number of
problems and help to resolve tensions and bring teaching science and
teaching about science closer. And recent years have seen an increase in
case-studies that do just this job. But we must not forget that at present
attempts to incorporate historical materials into science education have
largely been ‘internalist’ approaches, and ‘externalist’, STS or SSK ori-
ented approaches rarely surface. (Solbes & Traver 2003). So while useful
for actual science courses and NOS-education, the more general SSI are
rarely addressed in the detailed case studies.
A possibility is to use ‘critical incidents’ in the classroom. Nott and

Wellington have convincingly argued that these events force the teacher to
embark upon an explication of the ‘scientific enterprise’ and can help
discussion of NOS related issues (Nott & Wellington 1998). This approach
seems to be an excellent tool to generate meaningful discussions in
preservice and inservice courses (Lederman et al. 1998). And I see no
obstacle to bring them into TOK-like classes. ‘Critical incidents’ specifi-
cally tackling SSI and not narrower NOS issues are possibly a better solu-
tion in this area than the search for historical examples and case studies.
8. The argumentative alternative

One problem that separates science courses and NOS, SSI, and CT-focused
subjects is that science is taught in a non- or pseudo-argumentative way.
School science has to conform to scientists’ science to some extent – but as
to its content matter, it generally focuses on non-controversial and well-
established knowledge. Nevertheless science is an active process, and a hu-
man activity where argumentation is crucial and has a central role to play
in the production of knowledge. But is it possible to use a general theory
of argumentation which can help both CT and science education? This
would be all the more important as more and more people think that the
current omission of argumentation ‘is a problem that needs to be seriously
addressed’ (Driver et al. 2000, p. 309).
But which theory of argumentation is to be taught? At present high
school (or for that matter undergraduate) textbooks usually fail to give
acceptable frameworks. I have serious doubts whether a patchwork of
formal logic, fallacy-typologies and bits of rhetoric – fairly typical of the
textbook approach – can do the job. The book analysed here finely
shows some of the difficulties, as it fails to integrate CT and argumenta-
tion-elements in a general framework. When discussing fallacies (Alchin
2003b, pp. 87–89) the book basically remains in the bounds of the
‘standard treatment’ of fallacies, much criticised since (Hamblin 1970).27
Again, this attitude to CT is not a specific fault of this book but more
or less standard practice. Science education texts offer no better alterna-
tive, as still the most commonly used model is Toulmin’s: a field-dependent
model based on legal reasoning (Toulmin 1958). The model has a number
of advantages and appears simple on the surface – this explains its use.
But if the aim is not just analysis but evaluation as well, the model gives
no guidelines. Also, while the arguer is socially situated (he can be asked
to give backings, etc.), the listener is ‘actively passive’ – can ask questions,
but not argue – not typical of scientific discourse, where normally different
standpoints are adopted by the different parties.
This quibble about argumentation becomes crucial once it is conceded

that no methodological recipe of scientific activity can be given to students.
We need a context-sensitive approach to argumentation that still maintains
some general norms. And equally important, we need a notion of rational-
ity and of reasonableness. This rules out exclusive reliance on formal logic
since it is not context sensitive. It also rules out the exclusive use of
rhetoric, traditionally defined as ‘the faculty of observing in any given case
the available means of persuasion’ (Aristoteles 1984, p. 2155, Rhet. I.2.1
1355b26–27). A generally acceptable theory of argumentation, however,
should include both logical insight and rhetorical considerations. It
should, if possible, incorporate fallacy-typologies and also be field indepen-
dent. Again, a number of alternatives are open. I will only outline one
theoretical framework and a possibility to incorporate that into the
classroom.
The so-called ‘pragma-dialectical’ approach investigates to what extent
the argumentative discourse contributes to the resolution of debates
(Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004). It is based on general pragmatical consid-
erations incorporated into a dialectical analysis. The model has normative
dimensions, and arguments are treated as series of speech acts (Eemeren &
Grootendorst 1984). Specific criteria are introduced that guide the recon-
struction and analysis of the arguments in a way that optimally supports
the evaluation. The model incorporates traditional fallacy-typologies into a
unified procedural model (Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992), and recent
attempts have been made to incorporate rhetorical insights as well (Eemeren
& Houtlosser 2002). The basic tenets of the model are outlined in a recent
textbook (Eemeren et al. 2002). The textbook is short, concise, and shows
that it is possible to reorganise insights from both formal and informal
logic and fallacy-typologies into a coherent system of critical discussion
without increasing the teaching load.
In contrast to rhetoric, which is primarily audience-oriented, putting
stress on conventions used in the process of persuasion in a specific situa-
tion this approach is resolution-oriented. While rhetorical analyses of
science have rather caused stir than resolved existing problems – see
debates over whether rhetoric is epistemic, and ‘Big Rhetoric’ (Scott 1967;
Schiappa 2001; Harpine 2004) –, such a ‘normative pragmatic’ model is
more closely connected to our notion of ‘rational debate’, and is thus
reconcilable with how scientists themselves see scientific controversies.
A module in TOK could start with the Greek roots of dialectics, intro-
duce sophists and philosophers, the cultural setting, the need for argumen-
tation: an Athenian culture where both our democratic and scientific roots
are recognisable (and probably interconnected). Here SSI and science still
go hand in hand as the most important areas where reasoned opinion is
needed and asked for. Though not easy, I find parts of Plato’s Euthydemus
(e.g. 293B–297B) an exciting and funny reading for students – both to
highlight that there are rules for continuing these discussions, and for
certain patterns that emerge. Finding the rules of ancient dialectics can be
used to find rules of other discourse – the children’s interaction with
teachers, peers, parents (patterns of quarrels), etc. They can set rules and
do mock debates – after which they can try to create a model that would
best suit the pursuit of truth. Their ambiguous attitude to authority
becomes evident at this point. After this one can introduce the basic sim-
plified model of pragma-dialectics, discuss fallacies as derailments. Formal
logic can be alluded to, but is not necessary, and can be fleshed out when
discussing mathematics or the rather problematic inductive/deductive
models of science.
9. Focus on self-interest and boundaries

Most science education still operates in a diffusion (or deficit) model,
where knowledge produced in an academic environment reaches the recipi-
ents (students) via the teachers, situated in various educational institutions.
This model of and approach to teaching has a number of – by now mostly
recognised – problems.
Teachers are usually trained as transmitters or diffusers of knowledge.
But in the extreme acceleration of development of the various fields
directly relevant to teaching any scientific subject they often fail to ‘keep
up’ with the constantly and more and more rapidly changing knowledge-
field. Especially if not only developments in the specific subdisciplines, but
also in general methodology and pedagogy, as well as cognitive science or
even ethics are considered – let alone NOS and SSI issues. As teachers
cease to be the main and necessarily privileged sources of knowledge, and
as students have access to various knowledge-claims outside the schools
(e.g. the internet), the role of teaching stuff as transmitters seem less justifi-
able. At the same time job markets as well as education schemes demand a
new set of skills: active and life-long learning, the ability to cooperate with
others, etc., and there is a shift in focus from content learning to ‘skilled
access, use, and development of knowledge’ (Kozleski 2004, p. 185) This
access requires skills of evaluation of knowledge-claims and reasoned
decisions.
So a possible alternative to pursue is to exploit the situation: in areas
like NOS and especially SSI, where the teacher received little formal
training or has little expertise the students can try to develop and reason
for decisions that are in their self-interests.28
Instead of looking at the educational institutions as transmitting knowl-

edge to the ‘empty-headed’ students, in this view students are treated as
participants in a wide network of social groups. With their specific status
in the society, this group has specific interest. For them science can be a
sector of modern society offering job-opportunities, but at the same time
restricting some traditional practices. This enterprise in its present form
can help them live longer, but also, together with the technological and
industrial development, endanger their health and well-being. Far from
being passive recipients, they can participate in the co-production of
knowledge – a range of activities exist for students to contribute to
‘science’ from a very early age. They can take part in public actions
against uncontrolled implementations of specific discoveries – in short they
are actors in a large social network.
Their interests might not fit current agendas: but if they can reason
about it, and form an opinion based on arguments, then one of the
main goals of liberal education has been reached. These students can be-
come active and reasonable participants in the social processes of debate
and decision making in SSI. And, surely, science is very important for
many. Just as science needs and depends on the ‘Nachwuchs’, the gener-
ation of future potential scientists, so do millions of young people see in
science a potential for better living, good jobs, respect, and intellectual
satisfaction. At the same time we have to be clear that science, as it is
currently pursued will not be desirable or even acceptable for many. Not
all layers benefit the same from scientific progress, and the distribution
of the risks created by modern technoscience is by no means ‘fair’ or
democratic.
This alternative is the most radical of the three, but there are advanta-
ges. One is that it connects appreciation of social institutions and science
to a very specific position that the students have qua students. And this is
a temporary category. Women usually remain women, and men, men, but
most students at some point in their careers cease to be students in a legal
sense (many feminist manifestos can be rewritten with ‘student’ standing
for ‘women’ – a potential source of fun in the classroom). With the help of
their teachers students can attempt to map ‘practices of power’, and the
specific ways social institutions (like schools) create and maintain specific
social relations. They can critically investigate conceptual frameworks and
at the same time realise that their status as students is temporary, and by
shifting their social status, they will also have a different perspective on
these issues. This solution not only approximates Mannheim’s ideal of the
development of intellectuals, but also promotes life-long learning and
responsible citizenship.
10. Epilogue
This paper was born out of frustration. As a historian of science and
teacher of argumentation (and originally a science teacher) I accepted part
time teaching in a high-school curriculum that to my knowledge used one
of the best frameworks to transmit ideas about the history, philosophy,
and sociology of science. It provided rare opportunities that so few of the
dedicated educators have, who argue for a greater role for HPS in Science
Education (see e.g. Matthews 1994). I nevertheless continuously ran into
difficulties when implementing course aims and objectives. Using a very
specific and local example, my aim in this article was to point to a specific
and mostly overlooked tension existing between TOK-like courses fostering
critical and responsible thinking and the general agenda of specific science
subjects.29 The aim was to highlight that such an educational enterprise
entails deep conceptual and theoretical difficulties.
In spite of the burdens I believe that the IBO has taken a step in the
right direction by starting the TOK course. This is the road ahead – but
there might be more boulders to lift than heretofore recognised. Scientists
and educators that need to do this job come from largely different cul-
tures. The different approaches need to be reconciled. Recently Gerald
Holton has suggested ways to bring together historians of science and
science educators (Holton 2003). What I aimed to show is that even if
these two agendas can be fruitfully reconciled, this by no means implies
that central aims of CT, TOK, or SSI focused courses as well as responsi-
ble citizenship-agendas will be satisfied.
I believe that the problems that I tried to point to are existing and grave
– and they can probably only be solved by rethinking much of the aims of
education and the role of science education within it. As makeshift solu-
tions I have outlined three possible ways of developing modules that might
solve the ‘problem of critical thinking’ and contribute to approximate the
practice of teaching science and the general modes of teaching about sci-
ence. I have raised but not answered the ‘framework’-problem and the
problem of ‘black-boxing’, as these are even broader issues. I am not a
theoretician of education, and the suggestions with which I closed the anal-
ysis are rather tentative. They all stem from a commitment to a frame-
work: either Neurath’s anti-foundationalist and pluralist positivism, or a
general theory of argumentation that investigates how differences of opin-
ion are (or can be) resolved, or a politically motivated approach to
self-interest and negotiation in the social realm.
To decrease the tension in the curriculum some general framework has
to be worked out and implemented in these courses in my view. A way is
to be found where humanising agendas, responsible citizenship, etc. can be
reconciled with science subjects without compromises on any side. This is
not a bargaining situation – as that would seriously question the legitimacy

of any of the approaches – but rather an exercise in fitting pieces together:
we have to find existing, legitimate (academically accepted but not neces-
sarily undisputed) and implementable ways of looking at the sciences, at
CT, SSI, etc. that can be fit together. Disclaimers, hedging, listing contra-
dictory general truths seem to me to miss the point.30 This strategy within
a science course would hardly get approval – yet is often the predominant
way of talking about science.
One insight forming the structure and content of the book analysed here
is that ‘we need to take a limited approach to critical and philosophical
thinking in any educational contexts’ (Alchin 2003a, p. 1). And one can
only agree – but to guide teachers and textbook-writers curricula-develop-
ers have to be explicit, consistent and clear about the educational goals –
and possibly suggest which limited approaches are suited for the task.
Acknowledgments
I thank Art Stinner and Michael Matthews for encouraging my work. I
received helpful comments and ideas from Jenny Beckman, Thomas
Dohmen, Judit Gervain, Jenny Marie, Istvan Poór, and Katrin Solhdju.
The study is based on work in the Karinthy Frigyes Dual Language High
School, Budapest, Hungary. The research was supported by the Max
Planck Institute for History of Science in Berlin, the OTKA T 037575
grant, and a Békésy postdoctoral fellowship. I appreciate the support from
the IBO: comments from Pat Adams and the friendly responses from Nick
Alchin.
Notes
1
The IBO was founded in 1968, and has around 1,595 schools (August 2005) in 121 countries (more
than 1300 teach the Diploma Programme to approximately 200,000 students).
2
http://www.ibo.org/ibo/index.cfm/en/ibo/programmes/prg_dip/prg_dip_cv.
3
http://occ.ibo.org/ibis/documents/dp/drq/tok/d0tokxxgui01053e.pdf All retrievals cited active as late
as 11/7/2005.
4
First published April 1999, and reprinted with minor corrections October 2000. http://occ.ibo.org/
ibis/documents/dp/drq/tok/d0tokxxgui01053e.pdf:
5
ibid.
6
While there are clear differences between these, an analytic separation seemed unnecessary in the
article, but see (Zeidler et al. 2005).
7
A note is in order here. A number of teachers, mostly coming from scientific background, would
probably protest. Personally and talking to more ‘philosophically’ oriented teachers, I do not share
their views. Nevertheless, regardless of the discussions, there is a fairly elaborate scheme to guarantee
cohesive marking.
8
See http://occ.ibo.org/ibis/documents/dp/drq/tok/d_0_tokxx_crr_0502_1_e.pdf and http://occ.ibo.org/
ibis/documents/dp/drq/tok/d0tokxxcrr03021e.pdf.
9
The new EDEXCEL AS level ‘Perspectives on Science’ nicely contrasts TOK by remaining within a
scientistic framework (Edexcel Level 3 as GCE in History and Philosophy and Ethics (Perspectives on
Science) 2004 – Nov Draft). One rationale for the specification is to ‘enable students to think critically
about the nature of science and its contribution to current world views’ (p. 4). But 80% of the assess-
ment is on a 6000 word report with a prescribed, strictly ‘scientific’ structure, and other narrative struc-
tures are penalised by the assessment criteria. This, together with other elements (like the restriction of
topic areas, etc.) make the course pronouncedly more ‘scientistic’ and less student-centred than TOK.
10
The objectives state: ‘Having followed the Theory of Knowledge (TOK) course, candidates should
be able to:
• demonstrate an understanding of the strengths and limitations of the various Ways of Knowing
and of the methods used in the different Areas of Knowledge demonstrate a capacity to reason
critically
• make connections between and across Ways of Knowing and Areas of Knowledge
• make connections between personal experience and different Ways of Knowing and Areas of
Knowledge
• demonstrate an understanding of knowledge at work in the world
• identify values underlying judgements and knowledge claims pertinent to local and global issues
• demonstrate an understanding that personal views, judgements and beliefs may influence their
own knowledge claims and those of others
• use oral and written language to formulate and communicate ideas clearly.’
11
As Hugh Mitchell, one of the few dissatisfied teachers phrased it: ‘Getting high grades is no problem:
take Reuben Abel’s Man is the Measure as your starting point, throw in a few references to the canon of
western philosophical thought (no matter if the student is based in India or Africa), add a dash of count-
erclaims (usually in the penultimate paragraph) and BINGO!–it’s a certain B and a possible A, especially
if the teacher spends two years rehearsing the relevant techniques.’ http://www.adastranet.net/forum/40/
mitchell40.htm.
12
To take another example: if solving chemical calculation-problems is directly linked to short term
memory span, then is it fair to test it and give grades based on this in chemistry? Are we certain that
the tests we use to assess CT skills are not like this?
13
I thank Sharon Dotger for the very fruitful discussion at the 2005 IHPSTconference. Her point con-
cerning NOS is obviously also a problem for courses on CT – and for the TOK course of the IBO as
well.
14
The cited study relies heavily on the work of Jean Piaget and Kurt Fisher, but a number of Piage-
tian assumptions have been questioned in recent years in cognitive science. Also, this study differenti-
ates reflective thinking and critical thinking, but these differences are not significant for the argument
of the present paper.
15
This is the general impression one gets when looking at the numerous comments made by TOK teach-
ers (see the online curriculum centre at http://occ.ibo.org/ibis/occ/fusetalk2/forum/), but also from an on-
line review of three textbooks by Tim Waples: http://www.adastranet.net/forum/48/waples48.htm. An-
other review by George Spanos stresses that Alchin ‘has, in fact, provided a wealth of ‘‘content’’ within a
well-organized structure that can serve as the primary text of a TOK course’. http://www.adastranet.net/
forum/48/spanos48.htm.
16
Teaching criticism is a double-edged weapon. In liberal teaching the freedom to formed reasoned
opinion is a main task of the educational system. Critical thinking and argumentation developed in
Ancient Greece, where holding to ‘party-lines’’ was not compulsory. The danger lurking behind this
approach (in a way also exemplified by tragedy of the Weimar Republic) is of course that while tyrants
need no argument, but one can have arguments why it is good to have a tyrant. Here I can cite as an
example one of our earlier students, who received a lower grade for a well-argued but ‘‘fundamentalist’
essay than would be accredited simply in case the merit of the argumentation were considered. The
point is: if e.g. democratic values play a role in the assessment, then they should be explicated, and if
they are not explicated, they should not play a role in the assessment.
17
While this is not the main aim of the article, some historical facts are simply not tenable. Forgetting
Ludwik Fleck (but possibly even Goethe, Merton, and others) Alchin writes that ‘Kuhn stresses, for
the first time, the social nature of science’ (Alchin 2003b, p. 21, 26). The book compares the statement
that ‘The earth is flat’ (held by some ‘scientists’) with the round-earth conception. While this is not
strictly a mistake, one of the most common ‘pseudo examples’ used in essays by the students is that un-
til the time of Copernicus the earth was thought to be flat. A textbook could do much help in dissolv-
ing such myths. For more, see (Russell 1997). Some notions also seem to be misapplied ‘In short, the
deepest underlying rules of all natural sciences ultimately reduce to physics. ... We’re not saying that by
knowing everything about physics we will also know everything about biology. ... when a subject is re-
duced to physics is (sic!) does not mean that we have found out everything about that subject’ (Alchin
2003b, p. 24). Some are historically unsupported: ‘The work of Copernicus met violent opposition from
the Catholic Church, and both he and his successors, Kepler and Galileo, were persecuted for this dis-
covery.’ (Alchin 2003b, p. 178).
18
This kind of argumentation has been adopted by a number of our students (the book was available
in the library and used extensively for composing essays).
19
An important literature on critical thinking is the Critical Thinking Dispositions Inventory. It
highlights seven dispositions as developed by (Facione & Facione 1992). These dispositions are:
inquisitiveness, systematicity, analyticity, truth-seeking, open-mindedness, self-confidence (trust in one’s
own reasoning processes), and the existence of creative tendencies. The forerunner of this study is the
‘Delphi Report’ (Facione 1990). A shortened version is available under http://www.insightassess-
ment.com/pdf_files/DEXadobe.PDF. The report has the following consensus statement regarding critical
thinking: ‘We understand critical thinking to be purposeful, self-regulatory judgment which results in
interpretation, analysis, evaluation, and inference, as well as explanation of the evidential, conceptual,
methodological, criteriological, or contextual considerations upon which that judgment is based. CT is
essential as a tool of inquiry. As such, CT is a liberating force in education and a powerful resource in
one’s personal and civic life. While not synonymous with good thinking, CT is a pervasive and self-recti-
fying human phenomenon. The ideal critical thinker is habitually inquisitive, well-
informed, trustful of reason, open-minded, flexible, fairminded in evaluation, honest in facing personal
biases, prudent in making judgments, willing to reconsider, clear about issues, orderly in complex mat-
ters, diligent in seeking relevant information, reasonable in the selection of criteria, focused in inquiry,
and persistent in seeking results which are as precise as the subject and the circumstances of inquiry per-
mit. Thus, educating good critical thinkers means working toward this ideal. It combines developing CT
skills with nurturing those dispositions which consistently yield useful insights and which are the basis of
a rational and democratic society.’ (p. 2). For other possible starting points for CT see the works of R.
H. Ennis, or Benjamin Bloom. I do not discuss the rather serious debate over CT in general (for some
criticism of existing practices see (Bailin 2002)). But the proposed pragma-dialectical approach is a nor-
mative and field-independent model, not positing mental processes or specific procedures but only
describing the ideal (necessary) pragmatical environment for critical debate and resolution of differences
of opinion. It is applicable iff there is a difference of opinions, and has the potential to evaluate the
speech acts as to how and to what extent they contributed to a resolution of the difference of opinion.
20
Contrast this with: ‘The type of communication designed to bring about an awestruck admiration
for the mysterious men in white coats is not what we need for the challenges of the twenty-first century’
(Gregory & Miller 2001, p. 71).
21
The view Alchin portrays about science is not atypical. Science education documents, expert panels,
etc. support a similar ‘cautiosly but decidedly favourable’ view. The lists ‘what is science like’ are sur-
prisingly alike. But a widespread view need not be coherent. In some cases it might not even be true ta-
ken non-trivially (e.g. that scientists are creative). I fear that such an unqualified list does not bring us
closer to understanding what science is.
22
That the study of some of these documents show implicit tension of the different agendas has been
discussed in e.g. (Good & Shymansky 2001).
23
Because of the ‘problem of critical thinking’ discussed above, we might not expect students to accept
fallibility but still acknowledge differences between claims to knowledge. The conflict is not restricted to
the educational context. Premature discoveries – for an essay review of recent work see (Bauer 2003) –
show cases where critical inquiry can be at odds with consensus of experts. ‘Outsider’ analysis can give
results that do not coincide with the ‘insider’ view.
24
In a famous answer to Grünbaum’s charge that, taken nontrivially, the Duhem-Quine thesis is false,
Quine admitted ‘I would say that the thesis as I have used it is probably trivial. I haven’t advanced it
as an interesting thesis as such. ... I am not concerned even to avoid the trivial extreme of sustaining a
law by changing a meaning.’ (Harding 1976, p. 132).
25
I mention the work of Neurath as it is anti-foundationalist and non-reductive within a positivistic
framework (Zolo 1990; Cartwright et al. 1996; Stadler 1997). His arguments, however, resemble that of
some contemporaries who, like John Dupré, argue for the disunity of the science. For a review of
recent work see (Galison & Stump 1996).
26
On detailed appraisal of Polanyi’s work the relevant publications of Tradition and Discovery,
Appraisal, and Polanyiana, the journals of the American, English, and Hungarian respective societies
give ample material. In Science and Education Jacobs wrote a concise introduction (Jacobs 2000).
27
It cannot demarcate arguments from attempts at persuasion: ‘Leaving editorials and political
speeches aside, the adverts are always full of (often implicit) fallacies. ... Then there is the soap powder
endorsed by the man in the white coat (presumably a scientist) with its appeal to authority. How about
the insurance adverts, which are appeals to unpalatable consequences? Of course, loaded language and
appeals to common practice are everywhere. (We might include the beautiful images and music in TV
and cinema adverts under loaded language)’ (Alchin 2003a, pp. 44–45). This view does not take into
consideration the principle of charity (aiming for the strongest possible reconstruction of an argument),
and treats elements of communication (e.g. music and imagery) as aiming to be argumentative, but fail-
ing to comply with norms of argumentation. Not only is it questionable whether such elements have
ever been conceived as argumentative or ever treated by viewers as elements of arguments, this concept
of fallacies relies on structural description, and not functional definition.
28
I owe a lot to Jenny Beckman, with whom I could discuss some of the issues outlined in this section.
Her work on Swedish amateurs in biology highlighted the possibility of incorporating previously unac-
knowledged groups into the network of knowledge production. See also recent studies on boundary ob-
jects.
29
I believe that the example is symptomatic, but more could be gathered ad nauseam: (Smith &
Scharmann 1999, p. 496) bring the example of James Robinson’s The Nature of Science and Science Teach-
ing (1968), which proposed 85 propositions that the students were to believe on the nature of science.
30
Some candidates for describing science in the most useless way: ‘Scientific knowledge while durable
has a tentative character. The history of science reveals both an evolutionary and revolutionary character.
Scientific ideas are affected by their social and historical milieu.’ (McComas et al. 2000, pp. 6–7).
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Science & Education (2007) 16: 167–196 Springer 2007

Conﬂicting Agendas: Critical Thinking

GÁBOR Á. ZEMPLÉN

The course enables the teachers to partake in the development of students

2. TOK and science education

Figure 1. Structure of the IBO Diploma curriculum. IBO 2002.

Science (NOS) in a pronouncedly non-authoritarian and student-centred

The Theory of Knowledge (TOK) programme is central to the educational philosophy

Figure 2. The TOK diagram. IBO 1999.

creation of this ‘extradisciplinary’ framework a ‘framework-problem’ arises

This leads to the second mentioned problem, that of ‘black-boxing’ sub-

work is questioned,14 a general problem is that the course does not

4. Analysis of a textbook for theory of knowledge

Alchin’s case this is supported – has wider reaching implications. This

Apart from the tenability of the position, I consider it to be problematic to

high-school students can get. This would do credit to Alchin’s pedagogical

5. Generalising the problem

claims of science and of scientists – in legitimating their enterprise, its

in speciﬁc cases. We can acquire intellectual tastes similar to our teachers,

7. The HPS alternative

A possibility is to use ‘critical incidents’ in the classroom. Nott and

8. The argumentative alternative

This quibble about argumentation becomes crucial once it is conceded

9. Focus on self-interest and boundaries

Instead of looking at the educational institutions as transmitting knowl-

not a bargaining situation – as that would seriously question the legitimacy

Woolman, M.: 2000, Ways of Knowing, IBID Press, Victoria, Australia.

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