UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

Epistemic Reasoning and the Mental

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree Doctor in Philosophy

in Philosophy

by

Mikkel Gerken

2007
The dissertation of Mikkel Gerken is approved

David Dolinko

Mark Greenberg

David Kaplan

Tyler Burge, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2007

ii
The dissertation is dedicated to my family.

iii
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER I: EPISTEMIC WARRANT – A FIRST APPROXIMATION 8

I.i: GENERAL FEATURES OF EPISTMEMIC WARRANT 8

I.i.a: The Truth-Connection 8
I.i.b: The Epistemic Luck Condition 9
I.i.c: The Competence Condition 11
I.i.d: Doxastic and propositional warrant 12
I.i.e: Competence-oriented vs. deontological epistemology 14
Case of colorblind Pia 15
I.i.f: Internalism and externalism 16
I.i.g: General features of warrant: Concluding remarks 17

I.ii: WARRANT AND KNOWLEDGE 17

I.ii.a: Warrant, knowledge and epistemological methodology 17
I.ii.b: Inferential Gettier case 18
I.ii.c: Perceptual Gettier-style case 19
I.ii.d: The Gettier-style cases in perspective 19
Fake Barn Case 20
I.ii.e: The Gettier-style case vs. the knowledge cases 21
I.ii.f: Hallmarks of Gettier-style cases 23
I.ii.h: Concluding remarks on warrant and knowledge 23

I.iii: NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES VS. RELEVANT ALTERNATIVES 23

I.iii.a: Relevant alternatives vs. normal circumstances 24
I.iii.b: Basic similarities 25
I.iii.c: On normal circumstances 26

I.iv: EPISTEMIC WARRANT – CONCLUDING REMARKS 28

CHAPTER II: WARRANT, REASONING AND COMPETENCE 30

II.i: A FEW RESTRICTIONS 30

II.i.a: Restriction to warrant by purportedly deductive epistemic reasoning 30
I.ii.b: Restriction to empirical epistemic reasoning 32
II.i.e: Restriction to non-skeptical investigation 32
II.i.d: A note on terminology 32

iv
II.ii: REASONING AS A SOURCE OF WARRANT 33
II.ii.a: The truth-conduciveness of reasoning 33
II.ii.b: Reasoning as a non-basic source of warrant 34

II.iii: WARRANT AND REASONING: THE TRADITONAL CONCEPTION 35

II.iii.a: The ‘empirical robustness’ of purportedly deductive reasoning 35
II.iii.b: Towards an articulation of the traditional conception 37

II.iv: THE CLASSICAL BICONDITIONAL 40

II.iv.a: Motivation of (Validity Requirement) 40
II.iv.b: An alleged objection to (Validity Requirement) 42
II.iv.c: The Classical Biconditional in conclusion 43

II.v: EPISTEMIC REASONING AND COMPETENCE 43

II.v.a: Reasoning and competence 44

II.vi: THE CONFORMITY PROBLEM 45

II.vi.a: Articulating the conformity problem 46
II.vi.b: The nature of the conformity problem 47
II.vi.c: Concluding remarks on the conformity problem 48

II.vii: THE UNIVOCALITY-COMPETENCE 49

II.vii.a: Competence and concept possession 50
II.vii.b: The univocality-competence and the notion of univocality 51
II.vii.c: Univocality and type-identity 52
II.vii.d: Univocality and co-reference 53
II.vii.e: Varieties of univocal thinking 55

II.viii: THE FALLIBILITY OF THE UNIVOCALITY-COMPETENCE 56

II.viii.a: Varieties of univocality-competence failure 56
II.viii.b: Cases of univocality success and failure 60
II.viii.c: Concept triad 61
II.viii.d: Demonstrative triad 63
II.viii.e: Name triad 65
II.viii.f: Psychological equivocation vs. referential mistake 67
II.viii.g: Concluding remarks on the fallibility of the univocality-competence 69

II.ix: CHARACTERIZING THE UNIVOCALITY-COMPETENCE 69

II.ix.a: Against attitudinal accounts 70
II.ix.b: Against higher-order attitudinal accounts 70
II.ix.c: Against symmetric first-order attitudinal accounts 72
II.ix.d: Against asymmetric first-order attitudinal accounts 74
II.ix.e: The attitudinal accounts in conclusion 77

II.x: INFERENTIAL PRESUPPOSITIONS 77

II.x.a: Inferential presuppositions 78

v
II.x.b: Inferential presuppositions and normative commitments 78
II.x.c: The form and content of inferential presuppositions 80
II.x.d: Presuppositions vs. attitudes 83
II.x.e: Concluding remarks on inferential presuppositions 85

II.xi: THE EPISTEMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF UNIVOCALITY 86

II.xi.a: The warrant for inferential presuppositions 86
II.xi.b: The epistemological significance of inferential presuppositions 88

II.xii: CONCLUDING REMARKS 89

CHAPTER III: ANTI-INDIVIDUALISM AND TWIN EARTH 90

III.i: ANTI-INDIVIDUALISM IN PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 91

III.i.a: Characterizing the individualism/anti-individualism dispute 91
III.i.b: Restriction to propositional attitudes 93

III.ii: TWIN EARTH 94

III.ii.a: The Twin Earth Scenario 95
III.ii.b: Twin Earth Arguments 95
III.ii.c: Variations of the Twin Earth Arguments 97

III.iii: TWIN EARTH: METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 100

III.iii.a: Dialectical considerations 100
III.iii.b: The possibility of Twin Earth 101
III.iii.c: The twins’ thoughts 103
III.iii.d: An individualist objection 103
III.iii.e: Concluding methodological remarks 104

III.iv: TOWARDS PRINCIPLES OF ATTITUDE INDIVIDUATION 105

III.iv.a: Twin Earth and the principles of attitude-individuation 105
III.iv.b: The Normal Environment 108

III.v: IN CONCLUSION: ANTI-INDIVIDUALISM AND RATIONALITY 110

CHAPTER IV: SLOW-SWITCH CASES AND THE INDIVIDUALIST

CHALLENGE 112

IV.i: THE SLOW SWITCH CASES 112

IV.i.a: Introducing the slow-switch cases 112
IV.i.b: Reasoning after a conceptual switch 114

IV.ii: THE EQUIVOCATION INTERPRETATION 115

IV.ii.a: Boghossian’s interpretation 115

vi
IV.ii.b: Compartmentalization of the mind 117
IV.ii.c: Explanation of the fallibility of the univocality-competence 117
IV.ii.d: What’s anti-individualism got to do with it? 119
IV.ii.e: Concluding remark on the basis of the equivocation account 120

IV.iii: ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTS OF THE SLOW-SWITCH CASE 121

IV.iii.a: The No-switch interpretation 121
IV.iii.b: The Deep-switch interpretation 123
IV.iii.c: The anaphoric memory interpretation 127
IV.iii.d: The amalgam interpretation 132
IV.iii.e: The various interpretations in conclusion 137

IV.iv: THE PROVISO OF EPISTMIC ABNORMALITY 137

IV.iv.a: The proviso of epistemic abnormality 138
IV.iv.b: A challenge to the proviso 138
IV.iv.c: In defense of the proviso of epistemic abnormality 140

III.v: THE SLOW-SWITCH CASE IN PERSPECTIVE 144

III.v.a: Specification required 144
III.v.b: Methodological liberalism 145
III.v.c: Anti-individualism and the equivocation interpretation 145

IV.vi: THE SLOW-SWITCH CASE AND THE INDIVIDUALIST ARGUMENTS 147

IV.iv.a: (Validity Failure) and (Valid 1) 148
IV.iv.b: (Transparency) and (Trans 1) 149

IV.v: THE ARGUMENT FROM TRANSPARANCY FAILURE 150

IV.v.a: The Argument from Transparency Failure 150
IV.v.b: Motivation of the premises (Trans 1)-Trans 3) 151
IV.v.c: An anti-individualist critique of (Trans 3) 153
IV.v.d: The Argument from Transparency Failure concluded 156

IV.vi: THE VALIDITY ARGUMENT 157

IV.vi.a: The Validity Argument 158
IV.vi.b: The relation between the two individualist arguments 158
IV.vi.c: Motivation of (Valid 0)-(Valid 3) 160

IV.vii: CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE INDIVIDUALIST CHALLENGE 163

CHAPTER V: AN ANTI-INDIVIDUALIST RESPONSE 165

V.i: LAY OF THE LAND 165

V.i.a: Responses to The Validity Argument 165

V.ii: CRITIQUE OF (Valid 3) 167

vii
V.ii.a: Preliminary Critique of (Valid 3) 168
V.ii.b: Individualist responses to the preliminary critique of (Valid 3) 170
V.ii.c: The status of (Valid 3) and (Validity Requirement) 171

V.iii: PRESUPPOSITION FAILURE – A COMPARATIVE INTERLUDE 171

V.iii.a: Presupposition failure and the slow-switch case 172
V.iii.b: Campbell 172
V.iii.c: Brown 174
V.iii.d: Burge (and Burge vs. Campbell) 177
V.iii.e: Campbell again 180
V.iii.f: Concluding remarks on the comparative interlude 182

V.iv: TOWARDS A FALSE PRESUPPOSITION ACCOUNT 182

V.iv.a: Peter’s inferential presuppositions 182
V.iv.b: The epistemic significance of Peter’s inferential presuppositions 183

V.v: SLOW-SWITCHES AND EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY 185

V.v.a: Warranted false inferential presuppositions 185
V.v.b Reasoning and warranted false inferential presuppositions 187
V.v.c: Defense of (Valid 2) from the above conclusions 189

V.vi: DIRECT DEFENSES OF (Valid 2) 191

V.vi.a: Reasoning competencies and validity-conduciveness 192
V.vi.b: Enter Pedro 194
V.vi.c: Enter Gettier 195
V.vi.d: An underlying similarity 198
V.vi.e: Concluding remarks on (Valid 2) 200

V.vii: OBJECTIONS TO THE ACCOUNT 200

V.vii.a: The charge of deontologism 201
V.vii.b: Response to the charge of deontologism 201
Case of Pete 202
V.vii.c: An anti-individualist objection to (Valid 2) 203
V.vii.d: Answering the anti-individualist challenge 207

V.viii: CONCLUDING REMARKS 208

CHAPTER IV: TOWARDS PRINCIPLES OF EPISTEMIC REASONING 210

VI.i: THE ROLE OF VALIDITY IN EPISTEMIC REASONING 210

VI.i.a: Validity vs. Legitimacy 211

VI.ii: SAFE BELIEF VS. SAFE COMPETENCE 211

VI.ii.a: Traditional conceptions of safety and their problems 211
VI.ii.b: Towards a revised safety principle 214

viii
VI.ii.c: Reasoning competencies – again 215

VI.iii: SAFETY AND LEGITIMACY 220

VI.iii.a: Epistemic legitimacy 220

VI.iv: EPISTEMICALLY NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES 223

VI.iv.a: Normal circumstances vs. relevant alternatives 223
VI.iv.b: What circumstances are epistemically abnormal? 224
VI.iv.c: Epistemic normality and the normal environment 225
VI.iv.d: General epistemic normality vs. p-relevant epistemic normality 226
VI.iv.e: General epistemic normality and the normal environment 229
VI.iv.f: Epistemically normal circumstances in perspective 231

VI.v: CONCLUDING REMARK 232

LITERATURE 234

ix
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The mind-epistemology interface is an area of philosophy which is uncharted in many places.

The area is moreover far too treacherous to be explored without good help. Fortunately, I

have been graced with the best of help.

My greatest philosophical debt is unquestionably to Tyler Burge who has guided and

criticized my explorations since I began graduate school in 2001. Anyone who is moderately

familiar with the Burgean corpus will recognize that my debt to him is both substantive and

methodological. Being continuously subjected to Tyler’s painstakingly high standards has

helped shape me as a philosopher. While my general practice is to note specific

acknowledgements in footnotes, I have not attempted to note each contribution from Tyler. It

would have rendered the number of footnotes unacceptable.

David Kaplan has had a significant impact on my approach to any philosophical topic

– indeed to doing philosophy and to being a philosopher. It was David who got me into

UCLA’s graduate program and I have continued to learn from him ever since. I remain

grateful for this and for his philosophical and personal advice over the years.

For bureaucratic reasons, Andrew Hsu is not an official member of my dissertation

committee. He is, however, a de facto member. Since I came to UCLA in 2000, I have

benefited from Andrew’s sound advice and subtle guidance.

Over the years I have benefited from conversations and correspondence about

dissertation material with Paul Boghossian, Jessica Brown, Tony Brueckner, Martin Davies,

Thomas Geisnæs, Sanford Goldberg, Mark Greenberg (who also served on the committee),

Lars Gundersen, Jesper Kallestrup, Chris Kelp, Klemens Kappel, Krista Lawlor, Matt

Lockard, Peter Ludlow, Nikolaj Jang Pedersen, Duncan Pritchard, Anders Schoubye, Luca

x
Struble and Dennis Whitcomb. These people have furthered my take on these matters

considerably or helped me avoid mistakes. For that I owe them thanks.

I want to gratefully acknowledge correspondence and discussion about related topics

with Joseph Almog, Berit Brogaard, John Carriero, Ben Chan, Erin Eaker, Erica Gielow,

Pamela Hieronymi, Vincent Hendricks, Brad Majors, Ram Neta, Nikolaj Nottelmann, Sarah

Sawyer, Scott Soames, Andreas Stokke and Elia Zardini.

I am grateful to Anna Laven, Arlecia Powell-Halley and Betty Wilson for much

administrative help over the years; and to David Dolinko for serving on the committee.

Much of the material has been presented in various places including several NAMICONA

workshops, UCLA’s Albritton Society, the UCLA epistemology workshop, which I co-

founded and ran with Nikolaj Jang Pedersen, and the Danish Epistemology Network, which I

initiated and organized with Klemens Kappel.

Related material has been presented at University of Aberdeen, UC Berkeley,

University of Miami, Stanford University, and University of Sterling. These occasions helped

me improve on material that I hadn’t thought thoroughly through. The remaining mistakes,

mishaps and misunderstandings I owe to my own imperfections.

Julie Brummer provided valuable proofreading of the entire dissertation and invaluable love

and support during the entire time it took to write it. My gratitude to her is not expressible in

writing.

xi
 VITA

July, 3, 1976 Born, Århus, Denmark

2001 BA, Philosophy, University of Copenhagen

2003 MA, Philosophy, University of California, Los Angeles

2004 MA, Philosophy, University of Copenhagen

PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS

Gerken, Mikkel. 2007: “A False Dilemma for Anti-Individualism.” American

Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 44, No. 4, pp. 329-342.

Gerken, Mikkel. 2008: “Is Internalism about Knowledge Consistent with Content
Externalism?” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel (in press)

Gerken, Mikkel. 2003: “Lycan’s Simple Argument – A Subtlefication.” PHIS 2nd Graduate
Student Conference. University of Copenhagen. (Invited), Dec 6th.

Gerken, Mikkel. 2004: “If you can’t WAM ‘em, WACK ‘em.” NAMICONA workshop on
Contextualism. Hotel Kolding Fjord. (Invited), Jul. 1st.

Gerken, Mikkel. 2004: “A Dilemma for Mentalist Theories of Justification.” NAMICONA

Workshop on Reduction and Conceptual Analysis. Hotel Kolding Fjord.
(Invited), Sep. 3rd.

Gerken, Mikkel. 2005: “Testing the Case for Contextualism.” Albritton Society. UCLA
(Invited), Feb. 11th.

Gerken, Mikkel. 2006: “Testing the Case for Contextualism.” Miami 3rd Annual Graduate
Student Conference in Epistemology. University of Miami. (Refereed), Jan.
19th.

Gerken, Mikkel. 2006: “Against Modal Rationalism.” Berkeley-Stanford-Davis Graduate

Student Conference in Philosophy. Stanford University. (Refereed), Apr 8th.

xii
Gerken, Mikkel. 2006: “Is Epistemic Internalism Compatible with Externalism about
Attitudes?” UC Berkeley Epistemology Workshop. (Invited), Apr 21st.

Gerken, Mikkel. 2006: “A Transcendental Argument for Externalism about Attitudes.”

Albritton Society. UCLA (Invited), May 12th.

Gerken, Mikkel. 2006: “Comments on Berit Brogaard’s ‘The Trivial Argument Against
Value Monism’.” Stirling University Conference on Epistemic Value
(Invited), Aug 19th.

Gerken, Mikkel. 2006: “A False Dilemma for Anti-Individualism.” Danish Epistemology

Network, University of Copenhagen. (Invited), Nov 3rd.

Gerken, Mikkel. 2007: “Comments on Brian Kim’s ‘The Function and Context-Sensitivity of
Knowledge Attributions’.” 2nd Annual USC/UCLA Graduate Student
Conference in Philosophy. (Invited), Feb 24th.

Gerken, Mikkel. 2007: “Testing the Case for Contextualism.” Linguistics in

Epistemology Conference, University of Aberdeen (Refereed), May 13th.

Gerken, Mikkel. 2007: “Conceptual Equivocation and Warrant by Reasoning.” Southern

California Epistemology Workshop. UCLA (Invited), Oct 13th.

xiii
 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Epistemic Reasoning and the Mental

by

Mikkel Gerken

Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy

University of California, Los Angeles, 2007

Professor Tyler Burge, Chair

Epistemic warrant by purportedly deductive reasoning is investigated assuming that the

attitudes operative in reasoning are individuated anti-individualistically. I consider a much

discussed “slow-switch” Twin Earth thought-experiment. It involves a reasoner, Peter, who is

unknowingly switched from Earth to an indiscriminable but distinct environment, Twin

Earth. Given anti-individualism and certain auxiliary assumptions, A, it is argued that in

certain slow-switch circumstances, C, the switched reasoner may come to reason invalidly by

equivocating concepts that figure in the reasoning. The following pro-individualist argument

is based on this interpretation of the slow-switch case:

(Valid 0): Peter is in circumstances, C, and auxiliary assumptions, A, hold.

(Valid 1): If Peter is in circumstances, C, and auxiliary assumptions, A, hold, (then if the

attitudes operative in Peter’s reasoning, R, are anti-individualistically

individuated, then R is not valid).

(Valid 2): Peter’s reasoning, R, generates warrant for the conclusion beliefs.

xiv
(Valid 3): Peter’s reasoning, R, generates warrant for the conclusion beliefs only if

the reasoning, R, is valid.

(Valid 4) So, the attitudes operative in Peter’s reasoning, R, are not anti-

individualistically individuated.

It is argued that if Peter is in circumstances, C, then he is in epistemically abnormal

circumstances. Given this assumption, it is argued that (Valid 0)-(Valid 2) may be upheld at

the expense of (Valid 3): Peter may generate warrant for his conclusion-belief by invalid

purportedly deductive reasoning. The epistemic status of the Peter’s conclusion-belief is akin

to the epistemic status of beliefs in Gettier-style cases. The belief remains warranted but it

does not amount to knowledge. (Valid 3) is an instance of a principle labeled (Validity

Requirement). This is the left-to-right direction of the thesis labeled The Classical

Biconditional, (CB):

(CB) S’s (purportedly deductive) reasoning, R, from warranted premise-belief provides

(conditional) warrant for S’s belief in its conclusion iff R is valid

If Peter generates warrant by purportedly deductive invalid reasoning, (Valid 3) and, hence,

(Validity Requirement), are false. It is discussed how to revise (Validity Requirement) as to

reflect that warrant by purportedly deductive reasoning is not as epistemically robust to

changes in empirical circumstances as traditionally assumed.

xv