succeed the latter.
The extrajudicial settlement of the estate of
MENDOZA VS IAC
 SC: On July 1985 a Notice of Death was filed
informing this Court that respondent Buenaventura
Gabuya died on October 21, 1981 and that Severa
Fernandez likewise died on October 14, 1983.
RELEVANT FACTS OF ISSUE
 Buenaventura, Nicolasa and Teresa, all surnamed
Gabuya, are the legitimate children of the spouses
Evaristo Gabuya and Susana Sabandija, who died
intestate many years ago, the first in 1926 and the
second in 1912.
 Both Nicolasa and Teresa died single, the first in 1943
and the second in 1964.
 Modesta Gabuya is the illegitimate daughter of
Nicolasa.
 Lot Nos. 3506 and 3597 of the Cebu Cadastre were
some of the original properties left by the late Evaristo
Gabuya both located at Pardo, Cebu City, formerly
covered by Original Certificate [sic] of Title Nos. 6353
and 6597 in the name of Evaristo Gabuya and
containing 2,799 square meters and 2,992 square
meters, respectively.
 Atty. Elias S. Mendoza and Modesta Gabuya
respectively asked from Buenaventura Gabuya the
partition of the lots which they are co-owners of the
undivided one-half [1/2] portions; and that
Buenaventura refused to do so claiming that Modesta
Gabuya is not entitled to inherit from the estate of his
late father Evaristo Gabuya.
 Original petitioners Buenaventura Gabuya and
Severa Fernandez died October 21, 1981 and
October 14, 1983 respectively.
 Based on the notice of death filed on July 19, 1985,
they left no legal heirs except Modesta Gabuya.
ISSUES: Whether or not under the Civil Code of Spain, a
natural child without any judicial decree or deed of
acknowledgment in his favor by his natural parent may
succeed said natural parent under certain circumstances
HELD: NO
Under Art. 114 and 122 of the Civil Code of Spain, the law in
force at the time of the death in 1943 of Nicolasa Gabuya, the
mother of Modesta, full successional rights were granted only
to legitimate and legitimated children. Art. 134 states that
acknowledged natural children were given limited successional
rights in that they were entitled to inherit only from the
acknowledging parent, while illegitimate children who did not
possess the status of natural children had no successional
rights whatsoever. The latter were only entitled to support.
Adopted children become heirs of the adopting parents only if
the adopting parents had agreed to confer the adopted children
such rights in the deed of adoption, or had instituted them as
heirs in a will.
Recognition or acknowledgment of a natural child under said
Code must be made in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record, or in some other public document. In
the case at bar, the only document presented by Modesta
Gabuya to prove that she was recognized by her mother was
the certificate of birth and baptism signed by Rev. Fr. Filomeno
Singson, Assistant Parish Priest of Pardo, Cebu City, stating
therein that Modesta Gabuya is an illegitimate daughter of
Nicolasa Gabuya. However, Philippine jurisprudence is
consistent and uniform in ruling that the canonical certificate of
baptism is not sufficient to prove recognition.
The rationale for this ruling, enunciated in the case of Civ v.
Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434, is that while the baptismal certificate
in the parish records was a public document before the
effectivity of General Order No. 68 and Act 190, this certificate
did not constitute a sufficient act of acknowledgment, since the
latter must be executed by the child's father or mother, and the
parish priest cannot acknowledge in their stead.
That this petition must fail is a foregone conclusion. Modesta
Gabuya, not having been acknowledged in the manner
provided by law by her mother, Nicolasa, was not entitled to
Evaristo Gabuya is, therefore, null and void insofar as Modesta
Gabuya is concerned per Article 1105 of the New Civil Code
which states:
A partition which includes a person believed to be
an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such
person.
Since the ownership of the one-half [1/2] pro indiviso
portion of Lot No. 3597 never passed on to Modesta
Gabuya, it follows that the sale thereof to petitioners-
spouses Elias and Eustiquia Mendoza is likewise null and
void.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby denied. The
decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. Nos. 58815-
5881617-R, is affirmed in toto. Costs against petitioners.
LIM VS. CA
G.R. No. L-39381 July 18, 1975
FACTS:
In 1962 Felisa Lim brought suit against Francisco Miguel
Romualdez Uy Chen Hong in the Court of First Instance of
Manila for (1) declaration of nullity of the affidavit Uy executed
in which he adjudicated to himself, as the only son and heir of
Susana Lim, a lot (120 square meters) with the house thereon
located at Tayabas St., Sta. Cruz, Manila; (2) cancellation of
the certificate of title issued in the name of Uy; and (3)
issuance of a new transfer certificate of title in her favor.
Both Uy and Felisa Lim claimed they inherited, to the exclusion
of each other, the property in question from Susana Lim. Felisa
Lim claims to be the natural daughter of Susana Lim. To
support her claim, she presented (1) her certificate of baptism,
which certificate states that Felisa Lim is the natural daughter
of Susana Lim; and (2) her marriage contract, which contract
states that Susana Lim gave consent to Felisa Lim's mother.
Felisa Lim also alleges continuous possession of the status of
a natural child.
On the other hand, Uy claimed to be the only son and heir of
Susana Lim. To support his claim, he presented, among
others, (1) his application for alien registration in the Bureau of
Immigration, which application names Susana Lim as Uy's
mother; (2) the order of the Bureau of Immigration cancelling
his alien registration, which order describes Uy as a Filipino
citizen by derivation from his mother Susana Lim; and (3) his
identification certificate issued by the Bureau of Immigration,
which certificate likewise describes Uy as a citizen of the
Philippines by derivation from his mother Susana Lim.
Felisa Lim assails the finding of the appellate court that she
"has no right to inherit from Susana Lim, even on the
assumption that she is her natural daughter, as she had not
been recognized by any of the means provided for by the New
Civil Code." Felisa Lim alleges that Susana Lim's consent to
her marriage, given pursuant to Act 3613 (The Marriage Law),
amounted to an admission and recognition on the part of
Susana Lim that she (Felisa) is her natural daughter. Felisa
Lim adds that the records in the office of the Local Civil
Registrar pertaining to her marriage license, "together with the
supporting papers which included the consent given by Susana
Lim, were destroyed during the liberation of the City of Manila."
However, that Susana Lim gave consent to her marriage,
Felisa Lim asserts, the marriage contract evinces. Felisa Lim
states that the marriage contract partakes of a public document
and thus fulfills the provisions of the old Civil Code (re
recognition "in some other public document") and the new Civil
Code (re recognition "in any authentic writing").
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage contract partakes of a public
document as contemplated by law.
RULING:
At the outset, it should be noted that Felisa Lim claims that her
recognition by Susana Lim as her (the latter's) natural child
took place in 1943. Since the recognition allegedly took place
during the effectivity of the Civil Code of 1889, such recognition
should be reckoned in accordance with the requisites
established by the said Civil Code. For, the law in force at the
time of the recognition governs the act of recognition.
Section 131 of the Civil Code of 1889 requires that the
recognition of a natural child "be made in the record of birth, in
a will, or in some other public document." Felisa Lim argues
that her marriage contract partakes of a public document.
According to article 1216 of the Civil Code of 1889, public
documents "are those authenticated by a notary or by a
competent public official, with the formalities required by law."
Thus, "there are two classes of public documents, those
executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by
notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by
reason of their office." "The public document pointed out in
Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may be
made belongs to the first class."  proof of a valid recognition
The marriage contract presented by Felisa Lim does not satisfy
the requirements of solemnity prescribed by article 131 of the
Civil Code of 1889. Such contract is not a written act with the
intervention of a notary; it is not an instrument executed in due
form before a notary and certified by him. The marriage
contract is a mere declaration by the contracting parties, in the
presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two
witnesses of legal age, that they take each other as husband
and wife, signed by signature or mark by the said contracting
parties and the said witnesses, and attested by the person
solemnizing the marriage. The marriage contract does not
possess the requisites of a public document of recognition. Be
it remembered that recognition, under the Civil Code of 1889,
"must be precise, express and solemn."  ordinarily be more careful about what he says
BAÑAS V. BAÑAS
134 SCRA 260
FACTS:
Plaintiffs alleged that late Raymundo Banas, was
acknowledged natural son of late BIBIANO Banas
therefore, by descent, they are entitled to decedent‘s
share
Defendants denied that Raymundo was the natural
son of late Bibiano, nor was he acknowledged by the
latter; use of surname Banas by Raymundo was
justified, Raymundo being Pedro‘s (Bibiano‘s brother)
son
Late Raymundo was a natural child, born 1894 of
Dolores and of unknown father. It was Bibiano who
shouldered raymundo‘s school expenses (in Beda)
until Raymundo became a teacher
In 1926, Raymundo married Trinidad, niece of
Bibiano‘s wife (Faustina); Trinidad lived with Bibiano‘s
family before the marriage and took care of the latter‘s
children
In Raymundo‘s marriage cert, name of father was
stated to be Bibiano. Pedro appeared as one of the
sponsors.
Dec 1928, Raymundo and Pedro executed sworn
statements before an atty. Wherein Raymundo
declared that he was the natural son of Dolores and
came to know tha the his father was Pedro and he
realized that there had been an error in his marriage
cert; Pedro declared that he has a natural son named
Raymundo whom he recognized, and he asked for
the correction of the said certificate
June 30, 1930, Pedro Bañas wrote to "M.R.P. Juez
del Arzobispado de Manila" wherein he reiterated that
he had recognized his natural son born of Dolores
(who is insane), Raymundo; he requested for the
correction of his son‘s and grandsons‘ baptismal
certificate
July, 1930 Bibiano executed sworn statement stating
that Raymundo is Pedro‘s son
1954, Bibiano died; 1955, Raymundo wrote to Atty.
Faustino in which he complained about the alleged in
justice done to him by Bibiano‘s wife
June 24, 1955, Bibiano‘s heirs, the defendants, extra-
judicially settled his estate by means of a deed of
extra judicial settlement among themselves which
was notarized by Atty. Angel Vecino, brother of
Trinidad
November 7, 1955, the spouses Raymundo Bañas
and Trinidad executed a mortgage over their house
and lot in 1444 Kalimbas St., in favor of herein
defendant Angel V. Bañas
1962 Raymundo died; 1965, his heirs filed complaint
for partition and recovery of hereditary share
Trinidad said she discovered certain documents w/c
established Raymundo‘s filiation to Bibiano
1. hand written note addressed to Raymundo w/ salutation
―Su padre‖ from B. Banas
2) matriculation certs of Raymundo w/ Bibiano as father
3) report card w/ Bibiano as parent/guardian 4)
autobiographies of raymundo w/ alterations
ISSUE: WON RAYMUNDO WAS AN
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL SON OF BIBIANO
HELD: NO
 The note w/ ―su padre‖ unreliable, assuming it‘s
authentic, the same doesn‘t constitute a sufficient
 Formalities of voluntary recognition under Article 278
of the New Civil Code is that recognition shall be
express and made either in the record of birth, in a
will, in a statement in a court of record, or in any
authentic writing
 Note w/ ―su padre‖ is a mere indication of paternal
solicitude. The Filipinos are known for having very
close family ties. Extended families are a common
set-up among them, sometimes to the extent that
strangers are also considered as part of the family.
 the rule of incidental acknowledgment does not apply
to plaintiffs-appellants' note (w/ ―su padre‖) since it
is not a public document where a father would
 Even if the evidence presented by the plaintiffs-
appellants constitute a sufficient proof of a voluntary
recognition, still their complaint will not prosper since
it is evident that if there was acknowledgment on the
part of Bibiano, he had rectified or repudiated the
same by his sworn statement
 Considering that Raymundo was born in 1894, and
was already of majority age in 1915, long before
Bibiano's death in 1954, he should and could have
filed such action either under Article 135 of the Old
Civil Code, or Article 283 of the New Civil Code
Such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child is not
transmissible to the natural child's heirs; the right is purely a
personal one to the natural child
Aznar v. Garcia
Facts
Edward E. Christensen, an American citizen from California
and domiciled in the Philippines, left a will executed in the
Philippines in which he bequeathed Php 3,600.00 to Maria
Helen Christensen ("Helen") and the remainder of his estate to
his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen Daney. The laws of
California allows the testator to dispose of his estate in any
manner he pleases. However, California law also provides that
the personal property of a person is governed by the laws of
his domicile. The executor, Adolfo C. Aznar, drew a project of
partition in conformity with the will. Helen opposed the project
of partition arguing that Philippine laws govern the distribution
of the estate and manner proposed in the project deprived her
of her legitime.
Issue
Whether or not the succession is governed by Philippine laws.
Held
Yes. Philippine law governs.
Ratio
Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that the intrinsic validity of
testamentary dispositions are governed by the national law of
the decedent, in this case, California law. The provision in the
laws of California giving a testator absolute freedom in
disposing of his estate is the internal law which applies only to
persons domiciled within the said estate. On the other hand,
the provision in the laws of California stating that personal
property is governed by the laws of the domicile of its owner is
the conflict of laws rule that applies to persons not domicile in
the said state. Accordingly, the laws of the Philippines, in which
the testator is domiciled governs the succession and the
regime of legitimes must be respected.
Herrera v. Alba
G.R. No. 148220, 15 June 2005
FACTS:
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba
(respondent), represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed before
the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and
damages against petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed
his answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the
biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical
contact with respondent’s mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity
testing to abbreviate the proceedings. To support the motion,
respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos,
Ph.D. When she testified, Dr. Halos was an Associate
Professor at De La Salle University where she taught Cell
Biology. She was also head of the University of the Philippines
Natural Sciences Research Institute (UP-NSRI), a DNA
analysis laboratory. She was a former professor at the
University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where
she developed the Molecular Biology Program and taught
Molecular Biology. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the
process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test
had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.
Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it
has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that
DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-
incrimination.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DNA Paternity testing violates Herrera’s right
against self-incrimination.
RULING:
No. It is true that in 1997, the Supreme Court ruled in Pe Lim
vs CA that DNA testing is not yet recognized in the Philippines
and at the time when he questioned the order of the trial court,
the prevailing doctrine was the Pe Lim case; however, in 2002
there is already no question as to the acceptability of DNA test
results as admissible object evidence in Philippine courts. This
was the decisive ruling in the case of People vs Vallejo (2002).
It is also considered that the Vallejo Guidelines be considered
by the courts. The Vallejo Guidelines determines weight and
probative value of DNA test results.
The Vallejo Guidelines:
1. how the samples were collected;
2. how they were handled;
3. the possibility of contamination of the samples;
4. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples;
5. whether the proper standards and procedures were followed
in conducting the tests; and
6. the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In the matter of the adoption of Stephanie
Nathy Astorga Garcia. Honorato B.
Catindig, petitioner
 Facts: Honorato B. Catindig, filed a petition to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged
that Stephanie's middle name be changed to "Garcia," her
mother's surname, and that her surname be changed to
"Catindig." the trial court granted the petition for adoption.
Petitioner then filed for clarification and/or reconsideration
praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname
of her biological mother as her middle name. The trial court
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration as there is no law
or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname
of his biological mother as his middle name.
Issue: Whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of
her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently
adopted by her natural father.
Ruling: There is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child
adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle
name her mother's surname. The court finds no reason why
she should not be allowed to do so
FACTS:
Petitioner HonoratoCatindig filed a petition to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie, and that Stephanie has been using
her mother’s middle and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to her adopting parent. He prayed
that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia,
her mother’s surname, and that her surname Garcia be
changed to Catindig, his surname.
ISSUE:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father,
use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name?
RULING:
YES. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it
follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by
law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind,
including the right to bear surname of her father and her
mother. Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname as
her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. The
Adoption Act and the Family Code provide that
the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological
parent. Hence, Stephanie can assert her hereditary rights from
her natural mother in the future.
SOLINAP vs LOCSIN
Facts:
Eleven months after Juan “Jhonny” Locsin, Sr. died intestate
on December 11, 1990, respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed a
“Petition for Letters of Administration” praying that he be
appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the
deceased. He alleged that he is an acknowledged natural child
of the late Juan C. Locsin and that he is the only surviving legal
heir of the decedent.
January 10, 1992, the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of
Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester Jarantilla, claiming to
be the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to
respondent’s petition for letters of administration. They averred
that respondent is not a child or an acknowledged natural child
of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his lifetime never affixed
“Sr.” in his name.
January 5, 1993, another opposition to the petition was filed by
Lucy Salinop (sole heir of the late Maria Locsin Vda. De
Araneta, sister of the deceased), Manuel Locsin and the
successors of the late Lourdes C. Locsin alleging that
respondent’s clainm as a natural child is barred by prescription
or the statute of limitations.
The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr., (brother of the
deceased) also entered its appearance in the estate
proceedings, joining the earlier oppositors. This was followed
by an appearance and opposition dated January 26, 1993 of
Ester Locsin Jarantilla (another sister of Juan C. Locsin),
Likewise stating that there is no filial relationship between
herein respondent and the deceased.
To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child
of the deceased respondent submitted a machine copy of his
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the bound volume of
birth records in the Office of the Local Clerk Registrar of Iloilo
City. It contains the information that respondent’s father is Juan
C. Locsin stated therein as evidenced by his signatures. To
prove the existence and authenticity of Certificate of Live Birth
No. 477 from which Exhibit was machine copied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Juan C. Locsin Jr is an interested party and is
qualified to be granted letters of Administration.
DECISION:
No, Juan C. Locsin is not an interested person within the
meaning of Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court
entitled to the issuance of letters of administration since he
failed to prove his filiation with the late Juan C. Locsin, Sr.,
(Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 is spurious).
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the
persons preferred who are entitled to the issuance of letters of
administration. Upon the other hand, Section 2 of the Rule 79
provides that a petition for letters of administration must be
filed by an interested person.
An “interested party”, in estate proceedings, is one who would
be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a
claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The deceased,
Juan C. Locsin, was not survived by a spouse. In his petition
for issuance of letters of administration, respondent alleged
that he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased,
implying that he is an interested person in the estate and is
considered as next of kin. But has respondent established that
he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased. The
petition is denied.
ALBERTO V. CA
FACTS:
Sweethearts Aurora Reniva and Governor Juan M.
Alberto had a daughter, Ma. Theresa Alberto. Juan married
Yolanda Reyes after Alberto’s birth.
On Theresa’s 14th birthday, the governor was on his
way to visit her. He was assassinated and died intestate.
Juan’s widow Yolanda petitioned for the
administration of his estate and was appointed administratrix.
 Theresa motioned to intervene as oppositor and re-
open the proceedings, praying that she be declared as having
acquired the status of a natural child, and thus being entitled to
share in Juan’s estate.
The trial court decided in her favor and compelled
Juan’s heirs and estate to recognize her as a natural daughter.
However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision.
ISSUES
May recognition of the child be ordered upon the
estate and heirs of the deceased parent, based on evidence
that the child has been in continuous possession of natural
status?
RATIO
Yes. The Court granted the petition, which reversed
the Court of Appeals’ ruling and affirmed that of the trial court.
The following was established by the trial court, and
was deemed to have sufficiently proven that Juan recognized
Theresa as his daughter:
Theresa used “Alberto” as her surname in all her
school records, and Juan was known to be her father
by the school personnel.
Juan paid for Theresa’s education.
She was recognized as Juan’s daughter by his
relatives and friends, and was regarded as a niece by
Juan’s siblings and a cousin by their children.
He proudly relayed to his friends the high grades on
her report card.
Juan would have visited her on her birthday in her
school, if not for his death.
Theresa and her mother were present in the
Philippine General Hospital when Juan died, and Fr.
Arcilla, Juan’s first cousin, held Theresa’s hand,
asking the guard to make way for her and saying she
was Juan’s daughter.
The acts not only of Juan but also of his relatives demonstrate
that the recognition of Theresa’s status was made not only by
Juan but by his relatives as well.
Since there were no legal impediments between Juan
and Theresa’s mother Aurora, they could have validly married.
As a natural child, Theresa occupies the highest in the
hierarchy of illegitimate children.
Thus, the present petition was found to be covered by
Art. 235 of the Civil Code:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may
be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents,
except in the
following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child,
in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration
of four years from the attainment of his majority.
Juan died on Sept. 18, 1967—Therese’s 14th birthday.
Therese would reach 21 on Sept. 18, 1974, and
would still have until Sept. 18, 1978 to file the action for
recognition. Since the action was filed on Sept. 15, 1978, it
was within the deadline.
BALUYOT vs. BALUYOT
186 SCRA 506
FACTS:
Petitioners Victoria and Ma Flordeliza  Baluyot filed a petition
for intervention in Special Proceedings No. entitled “Intestate
Estate of Deceased Enrique Baluyut,’. The petition alleged that
petitioners have a legal interest in the estate of the deceased
Enrique M. Baluyut being the illegitimate children of the
deceased, begotten out of wedlock by said deceased and
petitioners’ mother and guardian ad litem Norma Urbano. They
were conceived and born at the time when Norma Urbano
cohabited with the deceased while the latter was already
married to Felicidad S. Baluyut and that they were in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of children
of the deceased during his lifetime by having supported and
maintained them.
Felicidad S. Baluyut, widow of Enrique and appointed
administratrix of his estate, opposed the petition for
intervention
ISSUE:
Were the petitioners voluntarily recognized by the late Enrique
M. Baluyut as his illegitimate spurious children?
 
HELD:
There are two modes of acknowledgment provided in the New
Civil Code; one, by the voluntary recognition by the putative
parent made in the record of birth, a statement before the court
of record, or in any authentic writing (Art. 278, New Civil Code)
and two, by compulsory recognition under Article 283 of the
same law.
There is no evidence as required by Article 278 which proves
that the petitioners were recognized by the deceased during
his lifetime as his spurious children. The petitioners’ records of
birth, although in the name of Enrique Baluyut, were not signed
by the latter. There was neither authentic writing presented nor
any statement in a court of record which would prove that the
petitioners were recognized by the deceased.
In order to prove the continuous possession of the status of a
natural child, the acts must be of such a nature that they
reveal, not only the conviction of paternity, but also the
apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all
relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but
continuously’
The grounds relied upon by petitioners were the alleged
possession by the petitioners of the status of recognized
illegitimate spurious children and that they were conceived at
the time when their mother cohabited with the deceased. The
evidence presented by petitioners failed to satisfy the high
standard of proof required for the success of their action for
compulsory recognition.
DIAZ vs IAC
Facts:
It is undisputed:
1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the
only legitimate child of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and
Petronila Asuncion;
2) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of
Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero;
3) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his
parents;
4) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973
and Simona Santero in 1976;
5) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by
his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children
to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor
children with Felixberta Pacursa.
Issue:
Who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero —
her niece Felisa Pamuti-Jardin or her grandchildren (the
natural children of Pablo Santero)?
Held:
Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article
992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not
commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be the sole
legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero.
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is
not defined by it. In accordance therefore with the canons of
statutory interpretation, it should be understood to have a
general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general
one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the law
does not make a distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi
lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera debemus.
The term relatives in “Article 992 of New Civil Code” in more
restrictive sense than it is used and intended; is not warranted
by any rule of interpretation. Besides, when the law intends to
use the term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term
with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the
New Civil Code.
Diaz vs IAC (1990)
Facts:
Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the
only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and
Petronila Asuncion; that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out
of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who
died during infancy; that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the
widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero;
that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents
Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; that
Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and
Simona Santero in 1976; that Pablo Santero, at the time of his
death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six
minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma
Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.
Issue: who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero — her niece Felisa Pamuti-Jardin or her grandchildren
(the natural children of Pablo Santero)?
Ruling:
Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943
of the old Civil Code (Civil Code of Spain) by Articles 990 and
992 of the new Civil Code (Civil Code of the Philippines)
constitute a substantial and not merely a formal change, which
grants illegitimate children certain successional rights. A
careful evaluation of the New Civil Code provisions, especially
Articles 902, 982, 989, and 990, claimed by petitioners to have
conferred illegitimate children the right to represent their
parents in the inheritance of their legitimate grandparents,
would in point of fact reveal that such right to this time does not
exist.
Article 982 is inapplicable to instant case because Article 992
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother. It may not be amiss to state that Article 982 is
the general rule and Article 992 the exception. Articles 902,
989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights
of  illegitimate  children, which rights are transmitted to their
descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these
illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of
representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever
manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to
be represented are themselves illegitimate.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron
curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said illegitimate
child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the
legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed
to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the
legitimate family; and the family is in turn, hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of
the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived;
the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the
product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life;
the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding
further ground of resentment.
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that
the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word
"relative" is broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the
person spoken of. (Comment, p. 139 Rollo citing p. 2862
Bouvier's Law Dictionary vol. 11, Third Revision, Eight Edition)
The record reveals that from the commencement of this case
the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the
late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin
and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo
Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions
of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did
not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be the
sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
The word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a
statute it embraces not only collateral relatives but also all the
kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates
that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense — which
as already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar.
In the light of the foregoing, We conclude that until Article 992
is suppressed or at least amended to clarify the term "relatives"
there is no other alternative but to apply the law literally. Thus,
We hereby reiterate the decision of June 17, 1987 and
declare Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole heir to the
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, to the
exclusion of petitioners.
Grande v. Antonio
GR. No. 206248, 18 February 2004
FACTS:
Respondent [the father] filed a petition for judicial approval of
recognition of the filiation of the two children with the prayer for
the correction or change of the surname of the minors from
Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged
before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But
he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority,
parental custody, and an official declaration of his children’s
surname as Antonio citing the “best interest of the child”.
Respondent’s petition was granted by RTC and modified by
the CA. In CA’s decision, it reversed the granting of the
custody of the two children to the respondent but affirmed the
surname change to of the same to Antonio. Aggrieved, wife
filed petition for certiorari in SC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the father can exercise parental authority and
consequently, custody, over his illegitimate children upon his
recognition of their filiation.
Wether or not the father has the right to compel the use of his
surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of
their filiation.
RULING:
On the first issue, no, petitioner cannot exercise custody over
the children.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on
the mother; hence, respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring.
Since parental authority is given to the mother, then custody
over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is
shown to be unfit.
Respondent Antonio failed to prove that petitioner Grande
committed any act that adversely affected the welfare of the
children or rendered her unsuitable to raise the minors; she
cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over their
children.
On the second issue, the answer is still a no.
An acknowledged illegitimate child isunder no compulsion to
use the surname of his illegitimate father.
Even if IRR of RA 9255 provides that a surname change “shall”
be necessary upon recognition of paternity, it is of no moment.
The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of “may” in Art.
176 rendering the use of an illegitimate father’s surname
discretionary governand illegitimate children are given the
choice on the surnames by which they will be known. Case is
remanded to lower court to determine the choice of said
children.
Rodriguez v CA
FACTS: On October 15, 1986, an action for compulsory
recognition and support was brought before court, by
respondent Alarito (Clarito) Agbulos against Bienvenido
Rodriguez, petitioner herein At the trial, the plaintiff presented
his mother, Felicitas Agbulos Haber, as first witness. In the
course of her direct examination, she was asked by counsel to
reveal the identity of the plaintiff's father but the defendant's
counsel raised a timely objection which the court sustained.
The petitioner now comes to this court questioning the act of
the lower court in sustaining the objection Contentions:
Petitioner: Felicitas Agbulos Haber should not be allowed to
reveal the name of the father of private respondent because
such revelation was prohibited by Article 280 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines. Said Article provided: "When the father or
the mother makes the recognition separately, he or she shall
not reveal the name of the person with whom he or she had
the child; neither shall he or she state any circumstance
whereby the other party may be indentified." Respondent:
Navarro v. Bacalla: the testimony of the mother of the plaintiff
in said case, could be used to established his paternity
ISSUE: Was the Lower Court correct in sustaining the
objection?
HELD:
Yes. REASON 1: Private respondent cannot invoke our
decision in Navarro v. Bacalla, 15 SCRA 114 (1965). While we
ruled in Navarro that the testimony of the mother of the plaintiff
in said case, could be used to established his paternity, such
testimony was admitted during the trial without objection and
the defendant accepted the finding of the trial court that he was
the father of the plaintiff. Rule: the testimony of the mother may
be used to prove paternity IF the father does not object. In the
case at bench, petitioner timely objected to the calling of the
mother of private respondent to the witness stand to name
petitioner as the father of said respondent. REASON2: No
similar prohibition found in Article 280 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines has been replicated in the present Family Code.
This undoubtedly discloses the intention of the legislative
authority to uphold the Code Commission's stand to liberalize
the rule on the investigation of the paternity of illegitimate
children. Articles 276, 277, 278, 279 and 280 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines were repealed by the Family Code, which
now allows the establishment of illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same evidence as legitimate children (Art.
175). Under Article 172 of the Family Code, filiation of
legitimate children is by any of the following: SEE CODAL
Bernabe vs. Alejo
G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002
Facts: Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with
his secretary, Carolina Alejo. The son was born and was
named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal died as well as his legitimate
wife, leaving Ernestina Bernabe the sole surviving heir.
Carolina, in behalf of her son, filed a complaint praying that
Adrian be declared an acknowledged child of the deceased
and also be given the share of Bernabe’s estate. RTC
dismissed the complaint and that the death of the putative
father had barred the action. CA ruled that Adrian be allowed
to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe.
Petitioner Ernestina averred CA’s ruling to be of error due to
RTC’s ruling based on Article 175.
Issue: Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file
a case against petitioner for recognition and partition with
accounting after the putative father’s death in the absence of
any written acknowledgment of paternity by the latter.
Ruling: SC ruled in affirmative. an action for the recognition of
an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the
alleged parent. The FC makes no distinction on whether the
former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative
parent is given by the new Code a chance to dispute the claim,
considering that “illegitimate children are usually begotten and
raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware
of their existence. The putative parent should thus be given the
opportunity to affirm or deny the child’s filiation, and this, he or
she cannot do if he or she is already dead.”
Abadilla vs Tabiliran 249 SCRA 447
FACTS: Complaint filed by Ma Blyth B. Abadilla, a Clerk of
Court assigned at the sala of respondent Judge Jose Tabiliran
Respondent charged with gross immorality, deceitful conduct
and corruption unbecoming of a judge Complainant‘s
allegations: respondent had scandalously and publicly
cohabited with a certain Priscilla Baybayan during the
existence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela
that respondent shamefacedly contracted marriage with said
Priscilla that respondent falsely represented himself as
―single‖ in the marriage contract and dispense with the
requirements of a marriage contract by invoking cohabitation
for 5 years Earlier: wife filed a complaint for abandonment of
family home and living with a certain Leonora Pillarion with
whom he had a son Charge of Deceitful Conduct: Complainant
claims that respondent caused to be registered as legitimate
his three illegitimate children with Priscilla by falsely executing
separate affidavits Other charge: Corruption Respondent:
Declared that his cohabitation with Priscilla is not and was
neither bigamous nor immoral because he started living with
her only after his 1st wife had already left and abandoned the
family home in 1966 Since then, 1st wife‘s whereabouts is not
known and respondent has had no news of her being alive
Further avers that 25 years had already elapsed since the
disappearance of his 1st wife when he married Priscilla in 1986
Judge Angeles found respondent guilty only on 2 counts of
corruption FC 178,FC 180 FC 180-181 DOJ Opinion No. 106
Series of 1991
ISSUES: WON Tabilaran is guilty of deceitful conduct
HELD: YES Children were born in 1970, 1971 and 1975 and
prior to the marriage of respondent to Priscilla, which was in
1986 As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that,
despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these 3 children
cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate
since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid
marriage between respondent and his first wife, Teresita
Applicable Provision  Art. 269 of NCC: Only natural children
can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents
who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not
disqualified by any impediment o marry each other, are natural.
Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include
those born of adulterous relations
Reasons:
1. The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed
2. It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of
successional rights;
3. There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social
mores change;
4. It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to
adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity of marriage
5. It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry
many years after the birth of the child. It is clear, therefore, that
no legal provision, whether old or new, can give refuge to the
deceitful actuations of the respondent.
LAHOM VS SIBULO
FACTS:
Isabelita Lahom, the petitioner, together with her husband,
adopted Isabelita’s nephew and brought him up as their own
because they do not have children. In 1972, the trial court
granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil
Registrar to change the name of the child from Jose Melvin
Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom.
Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of
adoption, in which she averred that, despite her pleas and that
of her husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname
Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and
activities.  
Thus, those events revealing Jose’s callous indifference,
ingratitude and lack of care and concern prompted Lahom to
file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree
of adoption previously issued way back in 1972.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption may still be revoked or
rescinded by an adopter.
HELD:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at
the time of the commencement of the action. The controversy
should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time
the petition was filed.
Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 also
known as the Domestic Adoption Act went into effect. The new
statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a
decree of adoption (Section 19 of Article VI).
When Lahom filed said petition there was already a new law on
adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as the Domestic
Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was
provided that: “Adoption, being in the interest of the child, shall
not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However the
adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in
Article 919 of the Civil Code” (Section 19).
But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of
adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of
certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child,
like denying his legitime, and by will and testament, may
expressly exclude him from having a share in the disposable
portion of his estate.