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A bare reading of Section 34(3) read with the proviso makes it abundantly clear
that the application for setting aside the award will have to be made within
three months. The period can further be extended, on sufficient cause being
shown, by another period of thirty days but not thereafter.
Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, provides that when any special statute
prescribes certain period of limitation as well as provision for extension upto
specified time limit, on sufficient cause being shown, then the period of
limitation prescribed under the special law shall prevail and to that extent the
provisions of the Limitation Act shall stand excluded. The provisions of Section
5 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable because of the provisions of
Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act.1
36. Enforcement.—Where the time for making an application to set aside the
arbitral award under section 34 has expired, or such application having been
made, it has been refused, the award shall be enforced under the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) in the same manner as if it were a decree of the
Court.
1
Union of India v. Popular construction co. 2001 (45) ALR 531 (SC). CASE NOTE- Limitation - time barred -
Sections 5 and 34 of Limitation Act, 1963 - application challenging award on ground of limitation - appeal
against Order dismissing application - time limit prescribed under Section 34 to challenge an award is absolute
and unextendable by Court under Section 5 - provisions of Section 5 not applicable to application challenging
award - appeal dismissed.
5 Extension of prescribed period in certain cases. —Any appeal or any
application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the
prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he
had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application
within such period. Explanation.— The fact that the appellant or the applicant
was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining
or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the
meaning of this section.