Nietzsche K - Michigan

Michigan 7 Week Seniors Nietzsche 1
NIETZSCHE INDEX
notes................................................................................................................................................................................3
security 1nc 1/.................................................................................................................................................................4
non-security 1NC 1/........................................................................................................................................................8
LINKS
link: hegemony..............................................................................................................................................................10
link: war on terror.........................................................................................................................................................11
link: proliferation..........................................................................................................................................................13
link: cosmopolitanism...................................................................................................................................................14
link: democracy promotion...........................................................................................................................................17
link: international law...................................................................................................................................................18
link: human rights.........................................................................................................................................................19
link: social services.......................................................................................................................................................22
link: free speech............................................................................................................................................................24
link: levinas...................................................................................................................................................................25
link: ethics.....................................................................................................................................................................27
link: categorical imperative...........................................................................................................................................28
link: ethics of the other.................................................................................................................................................29
link: ngos.......................................................................................................................................................................32
link: christianity............................................................................................................................................................33
link: christianity............................................................................................................................................................34
at: perm.........................................................................................................................................................................35
IMPACTS
impact: meaning to life.................................................................................................................................................36
impact: totalitarianism..................................................................................................................................................38
impact (security): survival............................................................................................................................................39
impact (security): war...................................................................................................................................................40
impact (ethics): war.......................................................................................................................................................41
impact (ethics): meaning to life....................................................................................................................................43
impact (ethics): dehumanization...................................................................................................................................44
impact (ethics): turns case.............................................................................................................................................45
impact (rights) = extermination....................................................................................................................................46
ALT SOLVES
alt solves: realism..........................................................................................................................................................49
alt solves: ethics............................................................................................................................................................50
alt solves: respect for the other.....................................................................................................................................51
alt solves: value to life..................................................................................................................................................52
alt solves: intolerance....................................................................................................................................................53
alt solves: nihilism........................................................................................................................................................54
alt solves: democracy....................................................................................................................................................56
alt solves: new politics..................................................................................................................................................57
alt solves: new politics..................................................................................................................................................58
AT: BLOCKS
at: time frame outweighs...............................................................................................................................................59
at: non-verifiable...........................................................................................................................................................60
at: hegemony good impact turns...................................................................................................................................61
at: our ethics are universal............................................................................................................................................62
at: our ethics ae an act of self-overcoming...................................................................................................................63
at: nihilism/no meaning to life......................................................................................................................................64
at: attack on reason destroys democracy.......................................................................................................................65
at: nietzsche is an anarchist/does not apply to politics.................................................................................................66
at: nietzsche = violence.................................................................................................................................................69
at: nietzsche = patriarchy..............................................................................................................................................72
at: relativism..................................................................................................................................................................73
at: nazism/fascism.........................................................................................................................................................74
at: racism.......................................................................................................................................................................77
at: anti-semitism............................................................................................................................................................78
at: aristocratic/hierarchy................................................................................................................................................79
at: sadism......................................................................................................................................................................80
at: nietzsche = cruelty...................................................................................................................................................81
at: immoralism = holocaust...........................................................................................................................................82
at: alt is utopian.............................................................................................................................................................83
at: realism......................................................................................................................................................................84
at: utilitarianism............................................................................................................................................................85
at: empiricism................................................................................................................................................................87
at: wolin........................................................................................................................................................................88
at: but our ethic is universal..........................................................................................................................................89
AFFIRMATIVE
AFF: at: no value to life................................................................................................................................................90
AFF: cede the political links.........................................................................................................................................91
AFF: genocide disad.....................................................................................................................................................92
AFF: at: we don’t advocate the fascist part of neitzsche..............................................................................................96
AFF: anti-semetic..........................................................................................................................................................99
AFF: at: affirming difference alternative....................................................................................................................100
AFF: nietzsche racist...................................................................................................................................................101
AFF: at: nietzsche’s k of reason..................................................................................................................................102
NOTES
There are two basic 1NCs:
1) The Security version—best against teams primarily relying on hegemony, terrorism, economic collapse or
something similar as the advantage. The alternative to this version claims that accepting the world as
inevitably dangerous and accepting it as it is is life affirming and dodges the escalating war on difference
that we are trapped in now.
2) The Non-security version—this is best against teams that claim poverty or ethics advantages. You should
tailor the 1NC to include more specific links—we cut links to lots of the specific aff claims re: ethics. The
alternative with this version claims that a refusal of specific morals enables a more radically inclusive/less
dogmatic politics.
Most of the cards have more than one possible use—link cards are also perm AT:, many of the alt solves cards are
at: random indicts of Nietzsche or also serve as impacts etc.
You need to write your own 2NC/1NR blocks—it is the only way to be decent on a file. The file has all of the cards
that you will need. Here is a starting list of what you need to write:
2NC/1NR impact overview

AT: perm
AT: framework
AT: cede the political
AT: no agent of the alt
AT: aff outweighs/threats are real
AT: no ethics = genocide/holocaust/violence/other evil
AT: Nietzsche was a Nazi/fascist
AT: utilitarianism outweighs
AT: realism
AT: alternative utopian
AT: no specific political model in the alternative
SECURITY 1NC 1/
The world we live in is inevitably relativistic—mutually exclusive value systems mean that there will always
be war. When the mission of statehood is extended to include democracy promotion or cosmopolitanism it
escalates that warfare, as those who have embraced the liberal order feel justified in waging war on all
outsiders.
Rasch, 03 (Cultural Critique 54 (2003) 120-147, William Rasch is the Henry H. H. Remak Professor of Germanic
Studies at Indiana University, Human Rights as Geopolitics Carl Schmitt and the Legal Form of American
Supremacy).
In the past, we/they, neighbor/foreigner, friend/enemy polarities were inside/outside distinctions that produced a
plurality of worlds, separated by physical and cultural borders. When these worlds collided, it was not always a
pretty picture, but it was often possible to maintain the integrity of the we/they distinction, even to regulate it by
distinguishing between domestic and foreign affairs. If "they" differed, "we" did not always feel ourselves obliged to
make "them" into miniature versions of "us," to Christianize them, to civilize them, to make of them good liberals.
Things have changed. With a single-power global hegemony that is guided by a universalist ideology, all relations
have become, or threaten to become, domestic. The inner/outer distinction has been transformed into a morally and
legally determined acceptable/unacceptable one, and the power exists (or is thought to exist), both spiritually and
physically, to eliminate the unacceptable once and for all and make believers of everyone. The new imperative
states: the other shall be included. Delivered as a promise, it can only be received, by some, as an ominous threat. In
his The Conquest of America, Tzvetan Todorov approaches our relationship to the "other" by way of three
interlocking distinctions, namely, self/other, same/different, and equal/unequal. A simple superposition of all three
distinctions makes of the other someone who is different and therefore unequal. The problem we have been
discussing, however, comes to light when we make of the other someone who is equal because he is essentially the
same. This form of the universalist ideology is assimilationist. It denies the other by embracing him. Of the famous sixteenth-century defender of the
Indians, Bartolomé de Las Casas, Todorov writes, [his] declaration of the equality of men is made in the name of a specific religion, Christianity.... Hence, there is a potential danger of seeing not
only the Indians' human nature asserted but also their Christian "nature." "The natural laws and rules and rights of men," Las Casas said; but who decides what is natural with regard to laws and
rights? Is it not specifically the Christian religion? Since Christianity is universalist, it implies an essential non-difference on the part of all men. We see the danger of the identiWcation in this
text of Saint John Chrysostrom, quoted and defended at Valladolid: "Just as there is no natural difference in the creation of man, so there is no difference in the call to salvation of all men,
barbarous or wise, since God's grace can correct the minds of barbarians, so that they have a reasonable understanding." Once again we see that the term "human" is not descriptive, but
evaluative. To be truly human, one needs to be corrected. Regarding the relationship of difference and equality, Todorov concludes, "If it is [End Page 139] incontestable that the prejudice of
superiority is an obstacle in the road to knowledge, we must also admit that the prejudice of equality is a still greater one, for it consists in identifying the other purely and simply with one's own
Such identification is not only the essence of Christianity, but also of the doctrine of
'ego ideal' (or with oneself)" (1984, 165).
human rights preached by enthusiasts like Habermas and Rawls. And such identification means that the other is
stripped of his otherness and made to conform to the universal ideal of what it means to be human. And yet, despite
—indeed, because of—the all-encompassing embrace, the detested other is never allowed to leave the stage
altogether. Even as we seem on the verge of actualizing Kant's dream, as Habermas puts it, of "a cosmopolitan
order" that unites all peoples and abolishes war under the auspices of "the states of the First World" who "can afford to harmonize their national interests to a certain extent
with the norms that define the halfhearted cosmopolitan aspirations of the UN" (1998, 165, 184), it is still fascinating to see how the barbarians make their functionally necessary presence felt.
John Rawls, in his The Law of Peoples (1999), conveniently divides the world into well-ordered peoples and those who are not well ordered. Among the former are the "reasonable liberal
. Liberal peoples, who,
peoples" and the "decent hierarchical peoples" (4). Opposed to them are the "outlaw states" and other "burdened" peoples who are not worthy of respect
by virtue of their history, possess superior institutions, culture, and moral character (23-25), have not only the right
to deny non-well-ordered peoples respect, but the duty to extend what Vitoria called "brotherly correction" and
Habermas [called] "gentle compulsion" (Habermas 1997, 133). That is, Rawls believes that the "refusal to tolerate"
those states deemed to be outlaw states "is a consequence of liberalism and decency." Why? Because outlaw states
violate human rights. What are human rights? "What I call human rights," Rawls states, "are ... a proper subset of the
rights possessed by citizens in a liberal constitutional democratic regime, or of the rights of the members of a decent
hierarchical society" (Rawls 1999, 81). Because of their violation of these liberal rights, nonliberal, nondecent
societies do not even have the right "to protest their condemnation by the world society" (38), and decent peoples
have the right, if necessary, to wage just wars against them. Thus, liberal societies are not merely contingently
established and historically conditioned forms of organization; they become the universal standard against which
other societies are judged. Those found wanting are banished, as outlaws, from the civilized world. Ironically, one of
the signs of their outlaw status is their insistence on autonomy, on sovereignty.
SECURITY 1NC 2/
Those who refuse the offer of political salvation are labeled as subhuman because they have not converted to
the High Church of humanism. In this frame, war on difference becomes inevitable.
Supremacy).
As Schmitt says: Only with the concept of the human in the sense of absolute humanity does there appear as the
other side of this concept a specically new enemy, the inhuman. In the history of the nineteenth century, setting off the inhuman from the human is
followed by an even deeper split, the one between the superhuman and the subhuman. In the same way that the human creates the inhuman, so in the history of humanity the superhuman brings
about with a dialectical necessity the subhuman as its enemy twin. This "two-sided aspect of the ideal of humanity" (Schmitt 1988, Der Nomos der Erde, 72) is a theme Schmitt had already
liberal pluralism is
developed in his The Concept of the Political (1976) and his critiques of liberal pluralism (e.g., 1988, Positionen und Begriffe, 151-65). His complaint there is that
in fact not in the least pluralist but reveals itself to be an overriding monism, the monism of humanity. Thus, despite
the claims that pluralism allows for the individual's freedom from illegitimate constraint, Schmitt presses the point
home that political opposition to liberalism is itself deemed illegitimate. Indeed, liberal pluralism, in Schmitt's eyes,
reduces the political to the social and economic and thereby nullifies all truly political opposition by simply
excommunicating its opponents from the High Church of Humanity. After all, only an unregenerate barbarian could
fail to recognize the irrefutable benefits of the liberal order. Though he favorably opposes sixteenth-century Christianity to the eighteenth-century
Enlightenment, Schmitt has no interest in reestablishing the hegemony of the Roman Church. Rather, he is in search of conceptual weapons with which to fight the contemporary enemy. But it is
a failed search just as it is a failed contrast; for in Christianity, Schmitt finds not the other of humanism, but humanism's roots. In truth, what Schmitt calls humanism is but an intensification of
the aspirations of the Roman Church. Unlike the Judaism from which it sprang, Christianity is not a tribal or national religion, but a religion of universal pretensions. The distinction between
believer and nonbeliever is not a distinction between tribe and tribe or nation and nation; it is not a distinction between neighbor and foreigner or even one between finite and localizable friends
and enemies. Rather, ideally, in the Christian world, the negative pole of the distinction is to be fully and finally consumed without remainder. The differences between families, tribes, nations,
there is no room for opposition, neither within the City of God nor against it,
friends, and enemies are meant to disappear. In the final analysis
and the polis—call it Rome, call it Jerusalem—will encompass the entire world. That is precisely the purpose of its
civilizing power. What Schmitt calls humanism is but a more complete universalization of the same dynamic.
Christianity and humanism are both civilizing missions. In neither case can there be barbarians left outside the gates
because eventually there will be no outside of the gates and, thus, no more gates. To live in the city, the barbarians
must thoroughly give up their barbarian ways—their customs, their religion, their language. In the discourse that
equates the polis with humanity, to remain a barbarian is not to remain outside the city, but to be included in the city
as a moral and legal outlaw and thus to come under the city's moral and legal jurisdiction. That liberal America's civilizing mission is
an extension of Christian Europe's was clearly seen and approved of by James Brown Scott who during his life (1866-1943) had been professor of international law and foreign relations at
Georgetown; both director and secretary of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; president of three American and European societies of international law; editor and interpreter of
Vitoria, Suarez, and Grotius; active propagandist for the Allied cause during and after World War I; and loyal servant to President Woodrow Wilson. Scott recognized the link between the
conquest of the New World and the splintering of the old. The "discovery of America," he wrote in a volume devoted to Vitoria and Suarez, "gave birth to a modern law of nations, Spanish in
origin, lay in form, but Catholic in fact and capable of continued development under the control of that Christian morality of which all peoples, and [End Page 137] therefore all nations, are
beneficiaries" (Spanish Conception of International Law, 1934, 2). This birth of a new law out of the spirit of Christianity coincides with that religion's fragmentation, "broken by the
Reformation," as Scott puts it, and "replaced by an international community, today [1934] universal and embracing all peoples of all continents; the law applicable to members of the Christian
community was found to be applicable to non-Christians; and the law of nations, once confined to Christendom, has become international. Without ceasing to be Christian in fact, the law of
nations became laicized in form" (Spanish Origin of International Law, 1934, 1-2). In this way, Christianity survives its own secularization and the Greco-Christian West rises from its ashes,
rechristened simply as the entire world. The "international community," Scott writes, "is coextensive with humanity—no longer merely with Christianity;" it has become "the representative of the
the international community "possesses the inherent right to
common humanity rather than of the common religion binding the States." Therefore,
impose its will ... and to punish its violation, not because of a treaty, or a pact or a covenant, but because of an
international need" (283). If in the sixteenth century it was the Christian Church that determined the content of this international need, in the twentieth century and beyond it
must be the secularized "church" of "common humanity" that performs this all-important service. "Vitoria's idea," Scott reminds us, "was to treat the Indians as brothers and as equals, to help
them in their worldly affairs, to instruct them in spiritual matters and lead them to the altar by the persuasion of Christian life on the part of the missionary" (Spanish Conception of International
). Thus, with the secularization of the Christian mission comes also the secularization of the Christian
Law, 1934, 2
missionary, who still shows his brotherly love by exerting brotherly correction.
SECURITY 1NC 3/
Global liberal governance posits emergencies as in need of linear policy solutions. The word is hardly that
simple—there is a nonlinear economy of power and knowledge and dramatic material inequalities. The
result of their over-simplification is serial policy failure.
Dillon & Reid, 2000 (Michael and Julian, Lecturer at the University of Lancaster and Lecturer on International
Politics at University of London, Alternatives: Social Transformation and Humane Governance, Vol. 25 Ish. 1,
January-March).
Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome.
Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which
global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that
constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into
life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in
terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the
resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A
nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable
distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in
which life is variously (policy) problematized by it. In consequence, thinking and acting politically is displaced by
the institutional and epistemic rivalries that infuse its power/ knowledge networks, and by the local conditions of
application that govern the introduction of their policies. These now threaten to exhaust what "politics," locally as
well as globally, is about. It is here that the "emergence" characteristic of governance begins to make its appearance.
For it is increasingly recognized that there are no definitive policy solutions to objective, neat, discrete policy
problems. The "subjects" of policy increasingly also become a matter of definition as well, since the concept
population does not have a stable referent either and has itself also evolved in biophilosophical and biomolecular as
well as Foucauldian "biopower" ways.
SECURITY 1NC 4/
Disorder and insecurity are inevitable because we live in a dangerous world. Efforts to control this fear have
resulted in the deaths of millions and the creation of WMDs. The alternative is a negative gesture of
indifference—we must learn to live with the world as it is. Admitting that everything is dangerous will allow
us to break out of the death cycle.
Der Derian, (Political Science Professor, University of Massachusetts) 98 (James, On Security, ed: Lipschitz,
The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard, Decentering Security).
No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of
"security." In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently,
sovereign states, all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and
sovereign states. In its name, weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national
interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations, in its name
billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent
muted. We have inherited an ontotheology of security, that is, an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to
be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions
of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." Continues... 7 In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of "reflectivism," to warn off anyone
who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: "As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers `have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate
important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.' " 8 By the end of the essay, one is left with the suspicion that the rapid changes in world politics have triggered a
. What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and
"security crisis" in security studies that requires extensive theoretical damage control
instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is,
other than us ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten
meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple
meanings, and fluid identities. The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the "originary" form of
security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that
of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic
encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to make it
I am not in search of an "alternative security." An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that
clear that
"questioning is the piety of thought." Foucault, however, gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of
security: I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another
problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and
that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative . My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything
is dangerous, then we always have something to do. The hope is that in the interpretation of the most pressing
dangers of late modernity we might be able to construct a form of security based on the appreciation and articulation
rather than the normalization or extirpation of difference. Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's
interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning
or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of
fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. Originating in the
paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an
abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals
seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and
nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking
similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying
into a fearful sameness.
NON-SECURITY 1NC 1/
In the face of a crisis of suffering, we are presented with two options:

1) the world of the 1AC—a life-denying will to calculate the greatest good and manage the herd—dooming us
to mediocrity and hatred for the world. Or,
2) the alternative—we can accept that chaos and discord are inevitable, that preventing suffering is
impossible, and escape nihilism by affirming life as it is.
Owen and Ridley, 2000 (David Owen is Reader in Political Philosophy and Deputy Director of the Centre for Post-Analytic Philosophy at the University of Southampton. He is
the author of numerous books and articles in social and political philosophy with a focus on Nietzsche. Aaron Ridley is a professor of Philosophy at the School of Humanities at the University of
Southampton. He has also written multiple books about Nietzschean ethics. Why Nietzsche still? page 149-54)
The threat here is obvious: What is to be feared, what has a more calamitous effect than any other calamity, is that man should inspire not profound fear but profound nausea; also not great fear
but great pity. Suppose these two were one day to unite, they would inevitably beget one of the uncanniest monsters: the "last will" of man, his will to nothingness, nihilism. And a great deal
points to this union. (GM III:I4) So suicidal nihilism beckons. The one response to the situation that is absolutely ruled out is the one that has so far proved most successful at addressing
Nietzsche argues that two
problems of this sort, namely, adoption of the ascetic ideal, because the present crisis is caused by the self-destruction of that ideal. But
plausible responses to the crisis are nonetheless possible for modern man. Both of these involve the construction of
immanent ideals or goals: one response is represented by the type the Last Man, the other by the type the
Ubermensch. The first response recognizes the reality of suffering and our (post-ascetic) inability to accord
transcendental significance to it and concludes that the latter provides an overwhelming reason for abolishing the
former to whatever extent is possible. This has the effect of elevating the abolition of suffering into a quasi-transcendental goal and brings with it a new table of virtues,
on which prudence figures largest. In other words, this response takes the form of a rapport a soi characterized by a style of calculative
rationality directed toward the avoidance of suffering at any cost, for example, of utilititarianism and any
other account of human subjectivity that accords preeminence to maximizing preference satisfaction . In Thus Spoke
Zarathustra Nietzsche portrays this type as follows: "What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?" thus asks the Last Man and blinks. The earth has become
small, and upon it hops the Last Man, who makes everything small. His race is as inexterminable as the flea; the
Last Man lives longest. "We have discovered happiness," say the Last Men and blink. They have left the places where living was hard: for one needs warmth. One still loves
one's neighbor and rubs oneself against him: for one needs warmth. Sickness and mistrust count as sins with them: one should go about warily. He is a fool who still stumbles over stones or over
men! A little poison now and then: that produces pleasant dreams. And a lot of poison at last, for a pleasant death. They still work, for work is entertainment. But they take care the entertainment
does not exhaust them. Nobody grows rich or poor any more: both are too much of a burden. Who still wants to rule? Who obey? Both are too much of a burden. No herdsman and one herd.
Everyone wants the same thing, everyone is the same: whoever thinks otherwise goes voluntarily into the madhouse
"Formerly all the world was mad," say the most acute of them and blink. They are clever and know everything that has ever happened: so there is no end to their mockery. They still quarrel, but
they soon make up-otherwise indigestion would result. They have their little pleasure for the day and their little pleasure for the night: but they respect health. "We have discovered happiness,"
say the Last Men and blink. (Z: I "Prologue" 5) Nietzsche's hostility to this first form of response is evident. His general objection to
the Last Man is that the Last Man's ideal, like the ascetic ideal, is committed to the denial of chance and necessity as
integral features of human existence. Whereas the ascetic ideal denies chance and necessity per se so that, while suffering remains real, what is objectionable about it is
abolished, the Last Man's ideal is expressed as the practical imperative to abolish suffering, and hence, a fortiori, what is objectionable
about it – that is, our exposure to chance and necessity. This general objection has two specific dimensions. The first is that the Last Man's ideal is unrealizable,
insofar as human existence involves ineliminable sources of suffering- not least our consciousness that we come into being by chance and cease to
be by necessity. Thus the Last Man's ideal is predicated on a neglect of truthfulness. The second dimension of Nietzsche's objection is that pursuit of the Last Man's ideal
impoverishes and arbitrarily restricts our understanding of what we can be and, in doing so, forecloses our
future possibilities of becoming otherwise than we are. Thus the Last Man's ideal entails an atrophying of the capacities (for self-overcoming, etc.)
bequeathed by the ascetic ideal. Nietzsche brings these two dimensions together in Beyond Good and Evil: "You want, if possible – and there is no more insane 'if possible' – to abolish suffering.
The
... Well-being as you understand it – that is no goal, that seems to us an end, a state that soon makes man ridiculous and contemptible – that makes his destruction desirable" (BGE 225).
second response to the nihilistic threat posed by the selfdestruction of the ascetic ideal is definitive of the
Ubermensch type. This response recognizes both the reality and the ineliminability of suffering and concludes
that an affirmation of chance and necessity must therefore be built into the very conception of what it is for
something to function as a (postascetic) ideal. So this response, insofar as it cultivates an affirmation of chance and
necessity (i.e., amor fati), overcomes the (ascetic) hatred of or (modern) dissatisfaction with this-worldly existence.
Yet the success of this overcoming is conditional on the exercise and development of the very capacities and disposition that are the bequest of the ascetic ideal. The disposition to truthfulness is
a condition of recognizing the ineliminability of chance and necessity. But actually to recognize, let alone affirm, this awful fact about human existence requires the exercise of the capacities for
self-surveillance (so that one can monitor oneself for the symptoms of self-deception in the face of this fact), self-discipline (so that one can resist the understandable temptation to deceive
oneself about this fact), and self-overcoming (so that one can develop, in the face of this temptation, one's capacities for self-surveillance and self-discipline). Thus the ascetic ideal provides the
tools required to overcome the crisis precipitated by its own self-destruction. In other words, the Ubermensch's ideal simply is the exercise and cultivation of the capacities and the disposition
required to affirm the fact that chance and necessity are ineliminable. And because chance and necessity are ineliminable, and therefore require perpetually to be affirmed anew , such
exercise and cultivation must itself be perpetual, a process without the slightest prospect of an end.
CARD CONTINUES, NO TEXT DELETED…

NON-SECURITY 1NC 2/
OWEN & RIDLEY CONTINUE…
The contrast with the Last Man's ideal is stark. Whereas the latter offers a feeling of power to its devotees by
positing as realizable the unrealizable ideal of no more suffering-that is, of a fixed, final, completed state of being –
the Ubermensch’s ideal offers a feeling of power predicated only on the continual overcoming of the desire for any
such state. What the Last Man longs for, in other words., the Ubermensch distinguishes himself by unendingly and
truthfully refusing to want. It is of the first importance that the Ubermensch's ideal should represent a process as
inherently valuable, rather than a product (such as the Last Man's completed state of life without suffering).
There are two reasons for thinking this important. The first is the one mentioned above given that chance and
necessity are ineliminable features of living a life, a life oriented to the affirmation of this fact must recognize the
ineliminably processual character of such an affirmation, and hence the ineliminably processual character of an ideal
that serves rather than denies "the most fundamental prerequisites of life" (GM III:28). The other reason is that this ideal exhibits the form of
practical reasoning that Nietzsche's genealogy itself deploys. By contrast with, say, Kant's conception of practical reasoning, which centers on an opposition between the real and the ideal
(between the heteronomous and the autonomous), and denies "the most fundamental prerequisites of life," Nietzsche's conception involves a continual process of movement from the attained to
the attainable; and it is precisely this that the rapport a soi constitutive of the Ubermensch exhibits. Thus, while Kant offers a juridical conception of practical reasoning structured in terms of the
idea of law, Nietzsche offers a medical or therapeutic conception articulated through the idea of the type or exemplar. Which is to say, Nietzsche's genealogical investigation (at its best, i.e., its
most self-consistent) exemplifies precisely that commitment to the affirmation of life which it recommends, that is, to an Ubermenschlich rapport a soi. Process, not product; Dionysus, not
Apollo.
Social services are the embodiment of the ascetic ideal of that Last Man—they create an underclass that is
increasingly vulnerable to statist coercion.
Arnold 05 (Kathleen, Assistant Professor of political and feminist theory @ U. of Texas, San Antonio, “Asceticism
in Contemporary Political Theory: Marx, Weber, Nietzsche and Beyond,” Theory & Event, ProjectMUSE)
In conclusion, the prescription of asceticism while intended for the entire populace, has been aimed at the working
poor and welfare recipients as the exemplar of a group that is simultaneously being molded into good, docile citizens
while being punished for "excesses." Despite the gap between rich and poor, employment opportunities for women,
sexism, racism and the crisis in affordable housing, these groups are blamed for their poverty. The ascetic values
underlying policy and cultural solutions imply that the poor will achieve some sort of self-mastery and thus, fitness
for citizenship, if they only buckle down. Nevertheless, this espousal of asceticism is an attempt to master groups
falling under the rubric of the biological through eradicating or neutralizing difference and the power relation is one
of coercion more than independence or self-will. In this way, the dynamics of power in the liberal capitalist state
have allowed for the coexistence of seemingly contradictory power mechanisms, both democratic and non-
democratic. However, this seemingly paradoxical coexistence is an integral part of liberal capitalism: "bare life" is
crucial to political identity, power and the economy and elucidates the deployment of prerogative power in the
domestic arena. This (partial) intellectual history of ascetic ideas thus suggests how and why the moral imperatives
of welfare and the ascetic practices linked to workfare and work in the global economy do not signal the decreasing
importance of the state, much less sovereignty, in late modern politics. The purported disappearance of the nation-
state has been claimed on two fronts: in the context of the global economy first, and second, in the dismantling of
welfare and affirmative action programs. However, these developments do not demonstrate the absence of state but
rather, the increasing influence of economic logic in matters of sovereignty, both internal and external.129 Ascetic
ideas provide the crucial nexus between the deployment of prerogative, on the one hand, and the dictates of
capitalism, on the other. The increasing predominance of a capitalist and ascetic ethos thus brings politics to the
level of bare life and facilitates the greater influence of bio-power and disciplinary power, thus enabling the
suspension of law.
LINK: HEGEMONY
The affirmative’s search for security is rooted in fear—the quest to control difference creates enemies,
recycling the need for security.
Der Derian, 98 - Director of Watson Institute Global Security program – 1998 (James, former Rhodes Scholar, On
Security, “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard,” ed. Ronnie Lipschutz. ciaonet)
Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being.
His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional
identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield
new values for the future. 33 Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the
history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox.
In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the
terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking
security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and
identities calcifying into a fearful sameness. Since Nietzsche has suffered the greatest neglect in international theory, his reinterpretation of security will receive a more extensive treatment here.
One must begin with Nietzsche's idea of the will to power, which he clearly believed to be prior to and generative of all considerations of security. In Beyond Good and Evil , he emphatically
establishes the primacy of the will to power: "Physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks
above all to discharge its strength--life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the most frequent results." 34 The will to power, then, should not be confused with a Hobbesian
perpetual desire for power. It can, in its negative form, produce a reactive and resentful longing for only power, leading, in Nietzsche's view, to a triumph of nihilism. But Nietzsche refers to a
Conventions of
positive will to power, an active and affective force of becoming, from which values and meanings--including self-preservation--are produced which affirm life.
security act to suppress rather than confront the fears endemic to life, for ". . . life itself is essentially appropriation,
injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one's own forms,
incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation--but why should one always use those words in which
slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages." 35 Elsewhere Nietzsche establishes the pervasiveness of agonism in
life: "life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war." 36 But the denial of this permanent condition, the
effort to disguise it with a consensual rationality or to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this
suppression of fear. The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not
us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which
produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science ,
Nietzsche asks of the reader: "Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer
The
disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?" 37
fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and
rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces. The fear of
fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable. In short, the security
imperative produces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates
the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols : The causal instinct is thus conditional upon,
and excited by, the feeling of fear. The "why?" shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as
for a particular kind of cause --a cause that is comforting, liberating and relieving. . . . That which is new and strange
and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of
explanation, to serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation--that which most
quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual
explanations. 38 A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown
becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostility--recycling the desire for security.
LINK: WAR ON TERROR

The war on terror has gone far beyond protection of our borders and has taken on the impossible task of re-
making the world in our image. This is a blueprint for permanent, global war.
Der Derian 03 (Political Science Professor, University of Massachusetts
http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.library.emory.edu/journals/boundary/v030/30.3derian.html boundary 2 30.3 (2003) 19-27,
Decoding The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, James).
A war to rid the world of evil, and ending it on the hour, even one so chosen by the most powerful nation in the
world, is yet another tall order set by the NSS. The war is to be fought simultaneously on multiple fronts, aiming,
when possible, "to disrupt the financing of terrorism" and "to enlist the support of the international community,"
and, when necessary, to "not hesitate to act alone . . . to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively"
(6). The strategy for defense might start, but it does not stop, at our border. States that support terrorism will be
compelled "to accept their sovereign responsibilities"; "terrorism will be viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy,
or genocide"; and public diplomacy will be used "to promote the free flow of information and ideas" (6). And should the ghost of Vince Lombardi prove insufficient ("While we
recognize that our best defense is a good offense . . .) , then the war must be waged at home as well (". . . we are also strengthening America's homeland security to protect against and deter
attack" [6]). In most of the sections that follow, after all the early fist waving at terrorism and its supporters, the hand of the United States is opened to the international community that must be
constituted by a conflict in which "freedom and fear are at war," and "there will be no quick or easy end" (7). In these sections, the NSS seeks to "Work with Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts"
(section IV); "Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade" (section VI); "Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the
Infrastructure of Democracy" (Section VII); and "Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power" (Section VIII). But the document seems schizoid: after
The NSS might aim for peace, but it amounts to a
a prologue in which lines are drawn and ultimatums issued, the call for international dialogue rings hollow.
blueprint for a permanent war. Gone is any trace of the humility that presidential candidate Bush invoked in his
foreign policy addresses. In its place, hubris of an epic size obviates any historical or self-consciousness about the
costs of empire. What ends not predestined by America's righteousness are to be preempted by the sanctity of holy
war. The NSS leaves the world with two options: peace on U.S. terms, or the perpetual peace of the grave.
The war on terror is being framed as a holy war that justifies the use of violence anywhere in the globe.
Der Derian, 02 (http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.library.emory.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v005/5.4derderian.html
Theory and Event, 5:4 | © 2002 James Der Derian, Political Science Professor, University of Massachusetts).

If 9-11 is not wholly new, what is it? We have a better sense of what it is not than what it is: from the President and
Secretary of Defense and on down the food-chain of the national security hierarchy, we have heard that this will not
be a war of states against states; it will not be the Gulf War or Kosovo; and it will not be Vietnam or Mogadishu. And they're probably right -- certainly more right than
commentators from both the Right (it's Pearl Harbor) and Left (it's an anti-imperialist struggle) who have relied on sloppy ideological analogies to understand the event. In my view 9-11 is a
combination of new and old forms of conflict, including: the rhetoric of holy war from both sides; a virtual network war in the media and on the internet; a high-tech surveillance war overseas but
also in our airports, our cities, and even our homes; and a dirty war of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, using an air campaign and limited special operations to kill the leadership and to
. I call this new hybrid conflict, virtuous war. It has evolved from the battlefield
intimidate the supporters of al Qaeda and the Taliban
technologies of the Gulf War and the aerial campaigns of Bosnia and Kosovo; it draws on just war doctrine (when
possible) and holy war (when necessary); it clones the infowar of global surveillance and the networked war of
multiple media. In the name of the holy trinity of international order -- global free markets, democratic sovereign
states, and limited humanitarian interventions -- the U.S. has led the way in a revolution in military affairs (RMA)
which underlies virtuous war. At the heart as well as the muscle of this transformation is the technical capability and
ethical imperative to threaten and, if necessary, actualize violence from a distance -- but again, with minimal
casualties when possible. Using networked information, global surveillance, and virtual technologies to bring 'there'
here in near real-time and with near-verisimilitude, virtuous war emerged before 9-11.
LINK: WAR ON TERROR

The war on terror re-enforces two dangerous trends; first, it seeks to control that which is inherently chaotic
and uncontrollable, second, it fuels imperial suspension of democracy at home and abroad.
Brown, 05 (Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics, Wendy, Professor of Poli Sci, UC Berkeley).
There are two powers in our times whose main currency is fear: terrorism and empire. The principle of terrorism is
unpredictable violence; it is the opposite of systematic, visible, routine, or regularized domination. What renders
terrorist violence as power is its inevitable, anticipated, yet random arrival, its capacity to disrupt and destroy
everyday life any time and any place. Because terrorism has no regular time or place, we are made fearful less by
actual terrorist events than by the specter of terrorism, a specter that works through incalculability. This is the
fundamental absurdity of color-coded "terror alerts." Feigning an ability to measure and predict the moves of a
power form that mocks measurement and prediction, the alerts pretend in a way that convinces no one that we know
what will happen next, that we are in control when we are not, even as they no doubt increase the fearfulness of
those imagining themselves to be targets. The principle of fear at work in contemporary practices of empire is quite
different from that in terrorism and is related to the modem illegitimacy of empire vis-a-vis principles of democracy
and popular sovereignty. This illegitimacy means that empire today can be justified only through fear, by declaring a
perpetual state of emergency that would allow conventional democratic principles to be overridden. So modern
empire mobilizes human fear on a mass scale; it is above all parasitic on the fear incited by the specter of terrorism,
but it is also dependent on the fear related to the porousness of modern nation states and to the exposure of
vulnerable individuals and deracinated communities to the vicissitudes of global forces. Empire promises protection
from dangers that it rhetorically magnifies in order to secure itself, a magnification that intensifies our fear in the
dark. But while darkness today implies not only fear but also disorientation, the latter pertains to an arc of powers shaping the present that exceed a dialectic of empire and terror. We are
disoriented by the literal loss of trajectory following the collapse of historical metanarratives in a present that appears fraught with injustice and misery and not only apocalyptic danger. It has
become a commonplace to describe our time as pounded by undemocratic historical forces yet lacking a forward movement. This makes the weight of the present very heavy: all mass, no
velocity. Or, in the terms of the late modem speediness invoked earlier: all speed, no direction. If this heaviness mixed with speediness were analogized to a mental state, the diagnosis would be
. Depressive anxiety is a terrible state: you cannot
profound depressive anxiety, a disorder for which an astonishing number of persons today seek treatment
move because of the bleakness but you cannot rest because of the anxiety; you can neither seize life nor escape it,
neither live nor die. There may not be a better appellation for our condition, for the bleakness of a seemingly eternal
present with catastrophe limning its horizon. Permanent daylight, Nietzsche reminds us, is one with unbroken
darkness; the unbearability of both is time stopped, an endless present.'' Unbroken time is the time of eternity,
death's time.
LINK: PROLIFERATION
The effort to control proliferation has turned into an absolute battle between good and evil. It has become a
blank check for unlimited war designed to make the world fit our image of security.
From the perspective of the NSS, even before the shock of 9/11, the end of the Cold War augured not global peace
but a new world disorder. "New deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists" (13); and while
they might not possess the might of the Soviet Union, they have the asymmetrical advantages garnered by weapons
of mass destruction and the will to use them. Positing that traditional deterrence no longer works, the NSS presents
axiomatically the right to preemptively strike against these new enemies: "The greater the threat, the greater is the
risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack" (15). This is not a grand strategy; this is a blank
check, to take whatever actions, whenever deemed necessary, against whoever fits the terrorist profile. Facing "an
age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world's most destructive technologies," the NSS
sanctions a counterstrategy based on superior intelligence, ethics, and technological capability (15): "The reasons for
our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just" (16). In short, war will be virtuous. First auditioned
in the Balkans, and dress-rehearsed in Afghanistan, virtuous war took center stage in the invasion of Iraq. Virtuous
war projects a technological and ethical superiority in which computer simulation, media dissimulation, global
surveillance, and networked warfare combine to deter, discipline, and, if need be, destroy the enemy. Ethically
intentioned and virtually applied, drawing on the doctrines of just war when possible and holy war when necessary,
virtuous war is more than a felicitous oxymoron. After September 11, as the United States chose coercion over
diplomacy in its foreign policy, and deployed a rhetoric of total victory over absolute evil, virtuous war became the
ultimate means by which the United States intended to resecure its borders, assert its suzerainty, and secure the holy
trinity of international order: global capitalism (VI. Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free
Markets and Free Trade [17]); Western models of democracy (VII. Expand the Circle of Development by Opening
Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy [21]); a hegemonic "balance of power" (VIII. Develop
Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power [25]); and preventive interventions.
LINK: COSMOPOLITANISM
Cosmopolitanism fails. The liberal order will always require a scapegoat to destroy in the name of expanding
peace. Humanitarianism and genocide become indistinguishable.
Dillon & Reid ‘00 [Michael and Julian, Lecturer at the University of Lancaster and Lecturer on International
January-March ]
It is our contention, then, that the liberal peace of global governance has to be distinguished as a certain form of
liberal peace comprised in turn of a complex hybrid form of power. The varied use of the term governance signals
this. In its Kantian variants, it means the rule of law and endorses the proliferation of nongovernmental
organizations, associations, and groups at a global level with the ambition of establishing a global civil society. In its
technocratic-capitalist variants, it means deregulated processes and practices of enterprise management and
accountability. The liberal peace of global governance is therefore one in which the pacifying effects of Kantian
cosmopolitan law obeyed by sovereign states, combined with an extension of civil society, are heavily reliant also on the dissemination globally of practices that
are premised upon a conception of order and management that Foucault called governmental. As Foucault's early accounts of governmentality indicate, and as the extension and application of it
subsequently have also shown, the genealogy of global liberal governance is thus much more varied and diverse than its public claims to a Kantian heritage especially would imply. To say that it
is capitalist economically as much as it is liberal politically and corporately technocratic scientifically, and that this presents a powerful brew of social, political, economic, and military forces
. Neither capitalism, liberalism, nor science
that radically exceed the liberal account of both power and of politics, is to pose more questions than these phrases answer
are simply what they proclaim themselves to be, or what they were once said to be. Each has mutated locally and
globally in dramatic fashion as studies in the history of science, the history of economics, and the genealogy of
governance indicate. Neither are such dynamic enterprises effectively held to account through the application and
operation of the classic liberal distinctions between public-private, civil-military, national-international, scientific-
industrial, and knowledge-power. Rather, they are obscurely combined in the globally dynamic military-industrial-
scientific complexes of the so-called network societies and knowledge-based economies of contemporary liberal
societies that problematize the democratizing claims of global civil society as much as they do the pacifying effects
of cosmopolitan law. Together, these liberal complexes now comprise an extraordinary regime of power/knowledge
that has been disseminated as much globally as it has been intensified locally. It constitutes a regime of global power
that significantly exceeds the Kantian heritage ontologically as much as it does epistemologically. To the extent that it does so, that tradition is an increasingly
unreliable guide to global liberal governance's operation politically and economically. No longer exclusively or even primarily legislative in their form, the politics of the elite, the media, and
money also dominate civil institutions in ways that systematically undermine liberalism's standards of disinterestedness epistemologically, as much as they do its claim to effect representative
Liberal governance does not aspire to form a world government nor constrain itself by the
and accountable government politically.
juridical power of the international law, it is a militaristic body that will not give up its weapons, scapegoating others
in the name of its own continued existence.
Cosmopolitan liberalism is not actually more open because it can only be extended to others who have
already accepted liberal principles. States that resist the global order are treated as threats.
Brown, 06 (Wendy, Prof Poli Sci, UC Berkeley, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in an Age of Identity and Empire).
Liberal tolerance, which simultaneously affirms the value of autonomy and consecrates state secularism, is
understood as a virtue available only to the self regulating individual, as a political principle available only to
secular states, and as a good appropriately extended only to individuated subjects and regimes that promote such
individuation. Conversely, those captive to organicism and organicist practices are presumed neither to value
tolerance, to be capable of tolerance, nor to be entitled to tolerance. The governmentality of tolerance deploys the
formal legal autonomy of the subject and the formal secularism of the state as a threshold of the tolerable, marking
as intolerable whatever is regarded as a threat to such autonomy and secularism. Yet even as tolerance is mobilized to manage the
challenges to this logic posed by the eruptions of subnational identities in liberal polities occasioned by late modern transnational population flows, its invocation also functions as a sign of the
breakdown of this logic of liberal universalism. Tolerance arises as a way of negotiating “cultural,” “ethnic,” and “religious” differences that clash with the hegemonic “societal culture” within
which they exist. The conflict that emerges when those differences emerge or erupt into public life poses more than a policy problem- for example, whether Muslim girls in France can wear the
, the conflict itself exposes the nonuniversal
hijab to public schools, or whether female circumcision or bigamy can be practiced in North America. Rather
character of liberal legalism and public life: it exposes its cultural dimensions. This expose is managed by tolerance
discourse in one of two ways. Either the difference is designated as dangerous in its nonliberalism (hence not
tolerable) or as merely religious, ethnic, or cultural (hence not a candidate for a political claim). If it is nonliberal
political difference, it is intolerable; and if it is tolerated, it must be privatized, converted into an individually chosen
belief or practice with no political bearing. Tolerance thus functions as the supplement to a liberal secularism that
cannot sustain itself at this moment.
Cosmopolitanism is a cover or traditional power politics. States will never give up their military interests.
Moreover, cosmopolitanism creates a scapegoated outsider civilization that will be the object of ongoing
warfare.
January-March).
The liberal peace of global governance is therefore one in which the pacifying effects of Kantian cosmopolitan law
obeyed by sovereign states, combined with an extension of civil society, are heavily reliant also on the dissemination
globally of practices that are premised upon a conception of order and management that Foucault called
governmental. As Foucault's early accounts of governmentality indicate, and as the extension and application of it
subsequently have also shown, the genealogy of global liberal governance is thus much more varied and diverse
than its public claims to a Kantian heritage especially would imply. To say that it is capitalist economically as much
as it is liberal politically and corporately technocratic scientifically, and that this presents a powerful brew of social,
political, economic, and military forces that radically exceed the liberal account of both power and of politics, is to
pose more questions than these phrases answer. Neither capitalism, liberalism, nor science are simply what they
proclaim themselves to be, or what they were once said to be. Each has mutated locally and globally in dramatic
fashion as studies in the history of science, the history of economics, and the genealogy of governance indicate.
Neither are such dynamic enterprises effectively held to account through the application and operation of the classic
liberal distinctions between public-private, civil-military, national-international, scientific-industrial, and
knowledge-power. Rather, they are obscurely combined in the globally dynamic military-industrial-scientific
complexes of the so-called network societies and knowledge-based economies of contemporary liberal societies that
problematize the democratizing claims of global civil society as much as they do the pacifying effects of
cosmopolitan law. Together, these liberal complexes now comprise an extraordinary regime of power/knowledge
that has been disseminated as much globally as it has been intensified locally. It constitutes a regime of global power
that significantly exceeds the Kantian heritage ontologically as much as it does epistemologically. To the extent that it does so, that tradition is an increasingly unreliable guide to global liberal
governance's operation politically and economically. No longer exclusively or even primarily legislative in their form, the politics of the elite, the media, and money also dominate civil
institutions in ways that systematically undermine liberalism's standards of disinterestedness epistemologically, as much as they do its claim to effect representative and accountable government
. Liberal governance does not aspire to form a world government nor constrain itself by the juridical power of
politically
the international law, it is a militaristic body that will not give up its weapons, scapegoating others in the name of its
own continued existence.
Liberal peace is a cover for statist domination and militarism. No matter how much lip service is paid to
global goals, underlying military interests will overwhelm them.
January-March).
Just as governance is a specific feature of liberalism, so also liberal peace is therefore a specific form of liberal
governmental power. Hence the peace of global liberal governance differs from other forms of liberal peace
inasmuch as its liberalism differs from earlier and other forms of liberalism in respect, specifically, of the increasing
emphasis placed on its networks of global governance. It does not, for example, aspire to the ideal of world
government. It does not rely exclusively upon the juridical power of international law. Neither does it problematize
the foundational question of order by premising it exclusively on the sovereign power of states alone. It is also a
combative and heavily armed peace deeply reluctant to forgo its own military advantages in the cause of restraining
the dissemination of weapons of mass destruction or the effective control of the conventional-arms economy
globally.
Cosmopolitan peace is a myth—it enables the domination of all those considered insufficiently liberal.
That tolerance is preferable to violent civil conflict is inarguable. What this truism elides, however, is the discursive
function of tolerance in legitimating the often violent imperialism of international liberal governmentality conjoined
with neoliberal global political economy. The practice of tolerance does not simply anoint the superior or advanced
status of the tolerant. Withholding tolerance for designated practices, cultures and regimes does not simply mark
them as beyond the pale of civilization. The economy of this offering and this refusal also masks the cultural norms
of liberal democratic regimes and of the West by denying their status as cultural norms. What becomes clear when we consider together
the above-named thinkers is that the discourse of tolerance substantively brokers cultural value- valorizing the West, othering the rest-while feigning to do no more than distinguish civilization
from barbarism, protect the former from the latter, and extend the benefits of liberal thought and practices. Insofar as tolerance in its civilizational mode draws on a political-juridical discourse of
cultural neutrality, in which what is at stake is said to be rationality, individual autonomy, and the rule of law rather than the (despotic) rule of culture or religion, tolerance is crucial to
liberalism's denial of its imbrication with culture and the colonial projection of culture onto the native. It is crucial to liberalism's conceit of independence from culture, of neutrality with regard
to culture . . . a conceit that in turn shields liberal polities from charges of cultural supremacy and cultural imperialism. This was precisely the conceit that allowed George W. Bush to declare,
without recourse to the infelicitous language of "crusade," that "we have no intention of imposing our culture" on others while insisting on a set of liberal principles that others cannot brook
without risking being bombed (see chapter 6).
Cosmopolitanism is the perfect excuse for colonial domination---it cloaks the culturally specific Western
liberal subject as a universal neutral.
The native, the fanatic, the fundamentalist, and the bigot are what must be overcome by the society committed to
tolerance; from the perspective of the tolerant, these figures are premodern or at least have not been thoroughly
bathed in modernity, a formulation endlessly rehearsed by Thomas Friedman in his New York Times editorials on
Islam. This reminds us that it is not really Western civilization tout court but that identifications of modernity and, in
particular, liberalism with the West- indeed, the identification of liberalism as the telos of the west- that provides the
basis for Western civilizational supremacy. What wraps in a common leaf the native, the fanatic, the fundamentalist,
and the bigot- despite the fact that some may be religiously orthodox or members of an organicist society while
others may be radical libertarians- is a presumed existence in a narrow, homogenous, unquestioning, and
unenlightened universe, an existence that inherently generates hostility towards outsides, toward questioning, toward
difference. “Learning tolerance” thus involves divesting oneself of relentless partiality, absolutist identity, and
parochial attachments, a process understood as the effect of a larger, more cosmopolitan worldview and not as the
privilege of hegemony. It is noteworthy, too, that within this discourse the aim of learning tolerance is not to arrive
at equality or solidarity with others but, rather, to learn how to put up with others by weakening one’s own
connections to community and claims of identity- that is, by becoming a liberal pluralist and thereby joining those
who, according to Michael Ignatieff, an “live and let live” or “love others more by loving ourselves a little less”
Tolerance as the overcoming of the putative natural enmity among essentialized differences issues from education
and repression, which themselves presume the social contract and the weakening pf nationalist or other communal
identifications. Formulated this way, the valuation and practice of tolerance simultaneously confirm the superiority
of the West; depoliticize (by recasting as nativist enmity) the effects of domination, colonialism, and cold way
deformations of the Second and Third Worlds; and portray those living these effects as in need of the civilizing
project of the West.
LINK: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

The transition to liberal governance generates the very violence that they attempt to solve.
January-March).
The violent conflicts associated with such emerging political complexes are not simply the persistent recurrence, as
so many contemporary analysts are inclined to argue, of fixed and irresolvable historical hatreds. They are very
much a function of the ways in which societies in dissolution, since they are at the turbulent confluence of local and
global dynamics excited by the diverse military, political, and economic practices of global liberal governance itself,
are in consequence thereby subject to violent disorder and change. It is that change that engenders emerging political complexes. While radically
reformulating old identity myths and inventing new ones is a typical feature of such complexes, so giving the appearance of unchanging historical form, these are devices by which political and
economic forces are mobilized everywhere in the face of change. That is why they are also an active part of the political processes by which emerging political complexes coalesce. It is however
. These practices
quite simplistic to think of them as peculiar to those regions where complex emergencies are said to occur or the mere recurrence of unchanging historical truths there
are part of the common currency of political mobilization in the domain of liberal peace as well. It therefore seems
obvious that the radical and continuous transformation of societies that global liberal governance so assiduously
seeks must constitute a significant contribution to the very violence that it equally also deplores.
Democracy promotion is inherently undemocratic—citizens have very little influence over externally imposed
governments and are coerced into new social arrangements.
Odysseos—04 (Louiza, Ph.D, Professor of Politics and International Studies at the University of London, “Über
Die Linie? Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger on the Line(s) of Cosmopolitanism and the War on Terror,”
September, p. 15-16)
The second strand of cosmopolitanism is neo-liberal in its ideological location. As Peter Gowan notes, it ‘run[s] parallel to the discourse of globalization and rhetorically complement[s] it.’ It is a
cosmopolitanism that instantiates a rewriting of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, which were regarded as constitutive of the Westphalian order. Seen as conditional, they ‘can
be withdrawn should any states fail to meet the domestic or foreign standards laid down by the requirements of liberal governance.’ In the words of William Rasch, state sovereignty becomes
neo-liberal cosmopolitanism, which Gowan associates with US and
restricted by ‘the simple but uncontested sovereignty of liberalism itself’. This
its allies and their academic apologists, often betrays an ‘arbitrary attitude towards enforcing of universalist liberal
norms of individual rights’ despite its resting on the argument of a humanity that is ‘finally on the verge of being
unified in a single, just world order’. This arbitrariness often results in the imposition of incoherent domestic and
international requirements on states in the form of legal domestic arrangements that promote individualism and
liberal (i.e. good) governance, but also frequently in the form of social population control and consumerization.
Chantal Mouffe suggests that such policies might lead to an increasing detachment of citizens from their demos as a
result of the imposition of externally acceptable arrangements. This would leave liberal cosmopolitans in the
precarious position of losing their democratic rights of lawmaking. They would be left, at best, with their liberal
right of appealing to transnational courts to defend their individual rights when those have been violated. In all
probability, such a cosmopolitan democracy, if it were ever to be realized, would not be more than an empty name
disguising the actual disappearance of democratic forms of government and indicating the triumph of the liberal
form of governmental rationality that Foucault called “governmentality”.
LINK: INTERNATIONAL LAW

Internationalism will be co-opted by the forces of global market liberalization to create ‘modern’ societies.
The results are devastatingly violent for cultures as well as the environment.
January-March ]
The disorder of emerging political complexes is of course fueled by local factors. In a world that has always been
more or less interdependent, however, it would be grossly naive to think that local factors were ever permanently or
totally isolated historically from global developments.[2] Much less so now, then, in an age of virulent globalization.
Global liberal governance is not, of course, a neutral phenomenon, indifferent to local cultures, traditions, and
practices. Neither is it benignly disposed toward them. Rather, it has always been virulently disruptive of them and
aggressively related to them as much in moral as in economic and military terms. Much of the disorder that borders
the domain of liberal peace is clearly also a function, therefore--albeit a fiercely contested function--of its very own
normative, political, economic, and military agendas, dynamics, and practices, and of the reverberations these excite throughout the world. It seems
increasingly to be a function, specifically, of the way in which development is now ideologically embraced by all of the diverse institutions of liberal peace as an unrelenting project of
modernization.[3] The chief economist of the World Bank (Joseph Stiglitz) attacks the Washington Consensus on liberalization, stabilization, and privatization in the world economy, for
example, as too technical and too narrowly framed a development strategy. He espouses instead a new intensive as well as extensive policy committed to the unqualified and comprehensive
modernization and "transformation of traditional societies."[4] "Honesty, however requires me to add one more word. In calling for a transformation of societies, I have elided a central issue,"
?" The impact of modernization on modern as well as
Stiglitz had the candor to conclude, "transformation to what kind of society and for what ends
traditional societies is, of course, as violent as the impact on global resources and global ecology. The values,
practices, and investments that propel such development nonetheless, however, are precisely what protect it from
pursuing the key question, locally as well as globally, that Stiglitz posed in terms other than those that underwrite his
very problematization of it.
International law that ultimately relies on state power will not fundamentally change anything—military
advantage will be the guiding force.
January-March ]
Just as governance is a specific feature of liberalism, so also liberal peace is therefore a specific form of liberal
governmental power. Hence the peace of global liberal governance differs from other forms of liberal peace
inasmuch as its liberalism differs from earlier and other forms of liberalism in respect, specifically, of the increasing
emphasis placed on its networks of global governance. It does not, for example, aspire to the ideal of world
government. It does not rely exclusively upon the juridical power of international law. Neither does it problematize
the foundational question of order by premising it exclusively on the sovereign power of states alone. It is also a
combative and heavily armed peace deeply reluctant to forgo its own military advantages in the cause of restraining
the dissemination of weapons of mass destruction or the effective control of the conventional-arms economy
globally.
LINK: HUMAN RIGHTS

Human rights are a only cover for international violence that fails to protect individuals because
a) domestic repression is simply replaced by foreign domination, and
b) they are a negative protection that cannot promote social justice.
Brown, 04 (The South Atlantic Quarterly 103.2/3 (2004) 451-463 "The Most We Can Hope For . . .": Human Rights
and the Politics of Fatalism, Wendy Brown).
But in addition to Ignatieff's own transgressions of the boundaries he sets, there is this: it is in the nature of every
significant political project to ripple beyond the project's avowed target and action, for the simple reason that all
such projects are situated in political, historical, social, and economic contexts with which they dynamically engage.
No effective project produces only the consequences it aims to produce. Whatever their avowed purpose, then, do human rights only reduce
suffering? Do they (promise to) reduce it in a particular way that precludes or negates other possible ways? And if they reduce suffering, what kinds of subjects and political (or antipolitical)
cultures do they bring into being as they do so, what kinds do they transform or erode, and what kinds do they aver? What are the implications of human rights assuming center stage as an
international justice project, or as the progressive international justice project? Human rights activism is a moral-political project and if it displaces, competes with, refuses, or rejects other
political projects, including those also aimed at producing justice, then it is not merely a tactic but a particular form of political power carrying a particular image of justice, and it will behoove us
to inspect, evaluate, and judge it as such. Such considerations require us to depart both the terms of pragmatist minimalism and the terms of morality for a more complex encounter with the
, human rights activism refuses the political
powers of political context and political discourse than either set of terms can accommodate. For the most part
mantle on which I am insisting. Rather, it generally presents itself as something of an antipolitics—a pure defense of
the innocent and the powerless against power, a pure defense of the individual against immense and potentially cruel or despotic machineries of culture, state, war,
ethnic conflict, tribalism, patriarchy, and other mobilizations or instantiations of collective power against individuals. More precisely, human rights take their shape as a moral discourse centered
on pain and suffering rather than political discourse of comprehensive justice. Even as Ignatieff titles his first lecture "Human Rights as Politics" and recognizes that "human rights must accept
that it is a fighting creed and that its universal claims will be resisted" by whatever authority is its particular target, the politics he identifies are in the pragmatic effects of what he forthrightly
identifies as a moral order of things: "Human rights is the language that systematically embodies [the] intuition [that each individual is entitled to equal moral consideration], and to the degree
that this intuition gains influence over the conduct of individuals and states, we can say that we are making moral progress" (4). In addition to the explicit claim about moral equality,
international human rights are also premised on the immorality of politically induced suffering. Unlike constitutionally derived and nationally enforced highly specified rights in liberal
democratic orders, international human rights are cast in terms of the moral inviolability of "human dignity" and the deprivation or degradation of this dignity that they are understood to protect
against. Human rights, in Ignatieff's understanding, do not prescribe what is good or right but rather depend on agreement "about what is insufferably, inarguably wrong" (56): The universal
commitments implied by human rights can be compatible with a wide variety of ways of living only if the universalism implied is self-consciously minimalist. Human rights can command
universal assent only as a decidedly "thin" theory of what is right, a definition of the minimum conditions for any kind of life at all. Human rights is only a systematic agenda of "negative
liberty," a tool kit against oppression, a tool kit that individual agents must be free to use as they see fit within the broader frame of cultural and religious beliefs that they live by. (56, 57) But if
human rights are tendered as an antipolitical and expressly moral antidote to abusive political power, a defense against power and a protection against pain, deprivation, or suffering, we may still
ask what kind of politicization they set in motion against the powers they oppose. Do they stand for a different formulation of justice or do they stand in opposition to collective justice projects?
Whether they aim either to weaken national political sovereignty as they strengthen the moral standing of the individual or, to the contrary as Ignatieff argues, they underline the "necessity of
state order as a guarantee of rights," and hence ought actually to strengthen "overburdened states," what kind of justice project is this? Put another way, if human rights are proffered as a defense
against political power's ability to inflict pain, indignity, cruelty, and death, if they stand for political power's moral limit regardless of its internal organization or legitimacy, what is their political
positioning and effect in this work? As it turns out, Ignatieff does not, indeed cannot, limit his brief for human rights to their attenuation of suffering. Rather, he understands them as opening up
progressive political possibility that exceeds their purview. He claims, first, that "human rights matter because they help people to help themselves" and thus instantiate or develop agency where
it did not exist before (57). He claims, second, that rights as "civil and political freedoms are the necessary condition for the eventual attainment of social and economic security" (90). Third, he
claims that rights language creates the basis for [End Page 454] "conflict, deliberation, argument and contention," as it provides a "shared vocabulary from which our arguments can begin, and
the bare human minimum from which differing ideas of human flourishing can take root" (95). The first claim concerns the ontological logic of human rights; the second claim concerns the
historical logic of human rights; and the third claim concerns the political logic of human rights. Let us consider each briefly. "Human rights is a language of individual empowerment," Ignatieff
argues, and "when individuals have agency, they can protect themselves against injustice. Equally, when individuals have agency, they can define themselves what they wish to live and die for"
(57). In other words, human rights configure subjects as either able or entitled (it's not clear which for Ignatieff) to protect themselves from what they consider unjust and define for themselves
what their individual aims and ends are. As Ignatieff argues elsewhere, "Rights language has been central not simply to the protection, but also to the production of modern individuals," a
it is not at all clear that
production that he specifies as the process of becoming an individual—"the most universal aspiration behind all the forms of modernity on offer."3 But
human rights discourse actually secures the autonomy and agency Ignatieff promises; rather, this discourse offers a
form of protection for individuals that may trade one form of subjection for another, an intervention by an external
agent or set of institutions that promises to protect individuals from abusive state power in part by replacing that
power. (A recent and very literal case of such an exchange was, of course, the intervention in Iraq by the United States and Britain, commencing in spring 2003 and continuing through the
present, which carried the flag of human rights and which Ignatieff, in several major press venues, has at times defended as a human rights effort.4) While the replacement may or may not be a
Moreover, to the extent that
positive one from the standpoint of reducing suffering, it does not follow that it necessarily produces agency or "helps people to help themselves."
human rights are understood as the ability to protect oneself against injustice and define one's own ends in life, this
is a form of "empowerment" that fully equates empowerment with liberal individualism. As such, the promise of
rights to enable the individual's capacity to choose what one wishes to live and die for does not address the
historical, political, and economic constraints in which this choice occurs—agency is defined as choice within these
constraints and thus largely codifies these constraints. Finally, if rights promise a shield around individuals, the
"right [End Page 455] to choose the life they see fit to lead" (57), this shield constitutes a juridical limit on regimes
without empowering individuals as political actors; rather, it is an instance of what Isaiah Berlin called and Ignatieff
endorses as "negative liberty," the right to be let alone to do as one wishes (57).
LINK: HUMAN RIGHTS

Human rights act in opposition to projects for political transformation:
a) negative rights are atomizing, they do not create social solidarity
b) the historical record clearly demonstrates that rights foster oppressive governmentality.
Brown, 04 (The South Atlantic Quarterly 103.2/3 (2004) 451-463 "The Most We Can Hope For . . .": Human Rights
and the Politics of Fatalism, Wendy Brown).
Taken together, Ignatieff's three claims about the political possibilities set in motion by human rights—far from
representing the minimalism with which we began—are building blocks for an argument that this discourse can
inaugurate a different distribution of power and order of justice in nonliberal societies. If this were so, it would
constitute a new historical formation, a new chronology in history, in which rights would constitute the engine rather
than the outcome of a form of popular political power, the basis for democratic participation rather than the
containment of it, the place from which democracy starts rather than ends. Not only is this untried, this insistence
also conflicts with Ignatieff's own notion of rights as a form of protection from power and conflict as well as with
his corollary claim for tolerance as the ability to "live and let live."7 It collides with the rejection of politics—the
retreat from the problem of collective power—that the right to live as one wishes promises. Moreover, it introduces
an unresolved interval between the expressly moral and antipolitical discourse of human rights and a politicization
that this discourse is claimed to promise. Perhaps most importantly, it formulates political and social power as a
zero-sum game: rights against culture or the state become a measure of power taken away from them—what the
individual has, the institutions don't get. Few modern thinkers still subscribe to this formulation of power. Even
apart from the Foucauldian insight into the regulatory dimension of rights that challenges it—an insight into the
production of subjects and subjectification by juridical discourse—there is the patent empirical fact that Americans
have never had so many rights (even the lawyers can't keep track of them) and so little power to shape collective
justice and national aims. What we have learned in the last century: if rights secure the possibility of living without
fear of express state coercion, they do not thereby decrease the overall power and reach of the state nor do they
enhance the collective power of the citizenry to determine the contours and content of social, economic, and political
justice. This is above all because power does not only come in sovereign or juridical form and because rights are not
just defenses against social and political power but are, as an aspect of governmentality, a crucial aspect of power's
aperture. As such, they are not simply rules and defenses against power, but can themselves be tactics and vehicles
of governance and domination.
LINK: HUMAN RIGHTS

Tolerance for the other easily slips into an excuse for military aggression if the gesture is not reciprocated.
Tolerance as a political practice is always conferred by the dominant, it is always a certain expression of domination
even as it offers protection or incorporation to the less powerful, and tolerance as an individual virtue has a similar
asymmetrical structure. The ethical bearing of tolerance is high-minded, while the object of such high-mindedness is
inevitably figured as something more lowly. Even as the outlandish, wrongheaded, or literal outlaw is licensed or suffered through tolerance, the voice in which
tolerance is proffered contrasts starkly with the qualities attributed to its object. The pronouncement "I am a tolerant man" conjures seemliness, propriety, forbearance, magnanimity,
cosmopolitanism, universality, and the large view, while those for whom tolerance is required take their shape as improper, indecorous, urgent, narrow, particular, and often ungenerous or at least
lacking in perspective. Liberals who philosophize about tolerance almost always write about coping with what they cannot imagine themselves to be: they identify with the aristocrat holding his
nose in the agora, not with the stench. Historically and philosophically, tolerance is rarely argued for as an entitlement, a right, or a naturally egalitarian good in the ways that liberty generally is.
Rather, one pleads for tolerance as an incorporative practice that promises to keep the peace through such incorporation. And so the subterranean yearning of tolerance-for a universally practiced
moderation that does not exist, a humanity so civilized that it would not require the virtue of tolerance-sits uneasily with the normative aspect of tolerance that reaffirms the characterological
superiority of the tolerant over the tolerated. Attention to these rhetorical aspects of tolerance suggests that it is not simply asymmetrical across lines of power but carries caste, class, and
. The dual function of
civilizational airs with it in its work. This chapter scrutinizes that conveyance by considering the logic of tolerance as a civilizational discourse
civilizational discourse, marking in general what counts as "civilized" and conferring superiority on the West,
produces tolerance itself in two distinct, if intersecting, power functions: as part of what defines the superiority of
Western civilization, and as that which marks certain non-Western practices or regimes as intolerable. Together,
these operations of tolerance discourse in a civilizational frame legitimize liberal polities' illiberal treatment of
selected practices, peoples, and states. They sanction illiberal aggression toward what is marked as intolerable without tarring the "civilized" status of the aggressor.
Shortly after September 11th, George W. Bush asserted: "Those who hate all civilization and culture and progress . . . cannot be ignored, cannot be appeased. They must be fought. "Tolerance, a
beacon of civilization, is inappropriately extended to those outside civilization and opposed to civilization; violence, which tolerance represses, is the only means of dealing with this threat and is
thereby self-justifying. When this statement is paired with remarks in February 2002, in which Bush declared the United States to have a "historic opportunity to fight a war that will not only
3 it is not difficult to see how an
liberate people from the clutches of barbaric behavior but a war that can leave the world more peaceful in the years to come,"
opposition between civilization and barbarism, in which the cherished tolerance of the former meets its limits in the
latter (limits that also give the latter its identity), provides the mantle of civilization, progress, and peace as cover for
imperial militaristic adventures. If being beyond the pale of civilization is also to be what civilization cannot tolerate, then tolerance and civilization not only entail one
another but mutually define what is outside of both and together constitute a strand in an emerging transnational governmentality. To be uncivilized is to be intolerable is to be a barbarian, just as
This is how, even
to declare a particular practice intolerable is to stigmatize it as uncivilized. That which is inside civilization is tolerable and tolerant; that which is outside is neither.
amid plural definitions of civilization, the discourse of tolerance recenters the West as the standard for civilization,
and how tolerance operates simultaneously as a token of Western supremacy and a legitimating cloak for Western
domination.
Human rights promote a very limited definition of what counts as political action, and, hence, what it means
to be human. Those who resist are forced to conform.
There are two ways in which the discourse of a ‘universal humanity’ has a strong disciplining effect on peoples and
polities. The first, noted by a number of commentators, involves the political refutation of the tolerance witnessed in
the cultural or private sphere; in other words, politically, cosmopolitanism shows little tolerance for what it
designates as ‘intolerant’ politics, which is any politics that moves in opposition to its ideals, rendering political
opposition to it illegitimate. Cosmopolitan discourses are also defined by a claim to their own exception and
superiority. They naturalize the historical origins of liberal sciences which are no longer regarded as ‘contingently established and historically conditioned forms of organization’; rather,
they become the universal standard against which other societies are judged. Those found wanting banished, as outlaws, from which the civilized world. Ironically, one of the signs of their
The second disciplining effect of the discourse of humanity is seen in the
outlaw status is their insistence on autonomy, on sovereignty.
tendency to normalize diverse peoples through ‘individualization’. The paramount emphasis placed on legal
instruments such as human rights transforms diverse subjectivities into ‘rights-holders’. As Rasch argues ‘the other
is stripped of his otherness and made to conform to the universal ideal of what it means to be human’. The
international human rights regime, which cosmopolitanism champions as a pure expression of the centrality of the
individual and to which it is theoretically and ontologically committed, is the exportation of modern subjectivity
around the globe. The discourse of humanity expressed through human rights involves a transformation of the
human into the rights-holder: ‘[o]nce again we see that the term “human” is not descriptive, but evaluative. To be
truly human, one needs to be corrected.
LINK: SOCIAL SERVICES
Social services inherently create a vision of the poor as indebted, useless consumers.
Arnold 05 (Kathleen, Assistant Professor of political and feminist theory @ U. of Texas, San Antonio, “Asceticism
in Contemporary Political Theory: Marx, Weber, Nietzsche and Beyond,” Theory & Event, ProjectMUSE)
In the current political environment, ascetic demands and values are not only preached to the poor but imposed on
them in welfare/workfare laws and low wage and deregulation policies. Marx recognized the hypocrisy in these
demands that the poor save, for example, or abstain from alcohol or sex, or eat less when the wealthy often do not do
any of these things. To apply Nietzsche to Marx, it could be said that the asceticism preached to the poor is not a
will to power but characterized by ressentiment. In Nietzsche's words, those who promote asceticism (policy
makers, welfare caseworkers, editorial writers) say "no" to the poor -- what is outside, what is different, not itself,
the economic mainstream. That is, in the same way that Nietzsche conceives of the weak in society formulating an
ethos that is simply a reaction to the more powerful other, the response to the poor comes paradoxically124 from a
position of weakness or uncertainty. In part, this is because economic power is not always stable; the poor represent
a loss in what is conceived of as a zero sum game. A welfare recipient can represent "a purely receptive, expending,
and consuming agency, an apparently useless mouth."125 The resentment of the rich is based on feelings of Schuld,
debt and guilt that have been projected back onto the poor. Alternatively, the well-off view not only their work as a sign of grace but also their spending. In
contemporary times, stock market speculation, gambling, and investment in various properties can be viewed not as pure excess but a sacrifice, a contribution (and a manifestation of "self-
interest properly understood"). George W. Bush confirmed this after the attacks of September 11 th, 2001, when he urged all citizens to continue spending money and shopping.
LINK: SOCIAL SERVICES
Political solutions to inequality are rooted in a suicidal slave morality and nihilistic deference to the state.
Brown, 2000 (Wendy, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University and UC Berkeley Humanities
Fellow “Nietzsche for Politics” in “Why Nietzsche Still?” Edited by Alan Schrift, pg. 217)
If Nietzsche bears some ambivalence toward philosophy in the name of life, there is no such ambiguity in his open
hostility toward politics, where the latter encompasses moral doctrines such as equality, institutions such as the state
and political parties, politicians, righteous position taking, and policy making. Nietzsche's objections to moral
political doctrine, especially liberalism, include his notorious disdain for the rabble and for the "little men" whose
envious, petty, and poisonous nature he believes sap all strength from a culture. Nietzsche's critique of political
solutions to unfairness and injustice and their origins in resentment and revenge is distilled in his forthright claim,
"'Men are not equal' . ' . life wants to climb and overcome itself climbing" (2:2 "On the Tarantulas"). If liberal
doctrine thus inevitably partakes of slave morality, when this critique is compounded by Nietzsche's despisal of the
state-"coldest of all cold monsters ... where the slow suicide of all is called 'life'" -then all state-centered political
formations, whether socialist, democratic, or totalitarian, appear even more antagonistic than philosophy to "life"
and culture (2:r "On the New Idol"), "The better the state is established," Nietzsche polemicizes, "the fainter is
humanity." 25 Even these critiques do not plumb the depths of Nietzsche's hostility to politics, a hostility many have
termed aesthetic but that might be better understood as an intense anti-institutionalism rooted in his critique of slave
morality. "'The will to power' is so hated in democratic ages," he argues, "that their entire psychology seems directed
towards belittling and defaming it" (WP 751).In Twilight ofthe Idols, Nietzsche emphasizes the massified,
deindividualizing character of democratic institutions, the way in which they lose "man" in a regime putatively
designed to protect" everyman": "Equality" , .. belongs essentially to decline: the chasm between man and man,
class and class, the multiplicity of types, the will to be oneself, to stand out-that which I call pathos of distance-
characterizes every strong age. The tension, the range between the extremes is today growing less and less~ the
extremes themselves are finally obliterated to the point of similarity. (Tl "Skirmishes" 37)
LINK: FREE SPEECH

Laws protecting free speech legitimate the state as the protector of the individual while real threats to dissent,
such as the corporate media are allowed to crush anything deemed un-American.
Even tolerance discourse concerned with free speech and dissent can be turned into a tactic of citizen subjection and
technology of increased state power in a crisis such as the current war on terrorism. Free speech is subverted through
a reversal of the state-citizen circuitry described above; this time, the state does the tolerating/protecting, while
turning civil society into the scene for intolerant vigilantism. The state promises to protect free speech and dissent,
while declaring at the same time that "if you're not for us, you're with the terrorists," thereby allying dissent with
support for the enemy. Dissent becomes equated seen, the limit condition of tolerance is fealty to the nation,
expressed through identification with and loyalty to the nation-state. Within the logic of "if you're not with us, you're
against us," dissenters are not eligible for tolerance; moreover, if they are giving "aid and comfort to the enemy,"
there is every reason not to tolerate them." So, even as they are formally protected by the state in their right to
dissent, when the equation of dissent with un-Americanness is taken up by corporations, the media, and other
powers in civil society, dissenters can be pulled from the airwaves, from the pages of magazines, from educational
forums, and occasionally from academic and other positions at what appears to be the behest of the citizenry, not the
orders of the state. The combination of popular and commercial power in constraining or filtering dissent (mainly by
limiting its venues) leaves the state appearing as a protector of free speech, even as it has provided the rationale for
curtailing it.
LINK: LEVINAS
Levinas gives absolute priority of ethics before politics—making ethics a universal obligation that becomes
the basis of human rights and the need to intervene all over the world.
Meister, 05 (Postmodern Culture, "Never Again": The Ethics of the Neighbor and the Logic of Genocide
15.2, Robert, Department of Politics, UC Santa Cruz).
Lévinas's point is that in ethics, unlike politics, we do not ask who came first and what we have already done to (or
for) each other. The distinctively ethical question is rather one of proximity--we are already here and so is the other,
cheek-by-jowl with us in the same place. The neighbor is the figure of the other toward whom our only relationship
is that of proximity. For Lévinas, the global movement to give ethics primacy over politics must be accompanied,
within ethics, by the effort to give primacy to the ethics of the neighbor--the local over the global. In this way, the global primacy of ethics
crystallizes around our horror of the inhuman act (the "gross" violation of human rights) rather than, for example, around the international distribution of wealth or the effects of global climate
change. Proximity is, thus, the marker that distinguishes an ethics of the neighbor as a basis for human rights from global concerns about injustice that might also be considered ethical.
Proximity is not itself a merely spatial concept--both space and time can be proximate or distant--but it is useful to think of the ethics of the neighbor as a spatializing discourse within ethics, as
distinct from a "temporalizing" discourse that subordinates ethics to political rhetorics associated with memory and identity (Boyarin, "Space" 20). The latter is held accountable for the atrocities
of the twentieth century because it suggests that the suffering of one's immediate neighbor can be justified through an historical narrative that links it to redeeming the suffering of someone else,
perhaps an ancestor or a comrade, to whom one claims an historical relationship that is "closer" than relations among neighbors. To regard proximity of place as the ethical foundation of politics
is to resist this tendency from the beginning, and thereby to set the stage for the fin-de-siècle project of transitional justice, which is both the alternative to human rights interventions and their
professed aim. Transitional justice assigns to historical enemies the task of living as neighbors in the same place. It employs techniques of reconciliation to create new and better relationships
between previously warring groups, but the imperative to reconcile is ultimately ethical in Lévinas's sense. That imperative is based on no relationship other than proximity and mutual
vulnerability--the ever-present possibility that they will murder each other. If the subjects of transitional justice fail to reconcile, and mass murders occur, these atrocities are liable to be
considered crimes against humanity that justify outside intervention. In the now-massive literature on transitional justice, gross violations of human rights are always assumed to be local,
. Even if the responders
occurring between neighbors who occupy common ground, and the responders are treated as third parties who intervene (or fail to do so) from afar
have an historical connection to the site of intervention, perhaps as one-time colonizers, they are considered to be
driven by ethics, as distinct from politics, in their willingness to respond on behalf of the world community that
should never again stand by while neighbors murder each other. It is implicit in this emerging conception that the
site of ethics is the space of the neighbor (or neighborhood) and that the site of politics is global. Global intervention in the local
can be justified in the name of universal human rights; but violence aimed at global causes of suffering (such as the Seattle riots against the WTO or the Chiapas rebellion against NAFTA) is not
seen as a form of humanitarian direct action on a par with bombing Belgrade or Baghdad. In the emergent global discourse on human rights, "Nothing essential to a person's human essence is
violated if he or she suffers as a consequence of military action or of market manipulation from beyond his own state when that is permitted by international law" (Asad, "Redeeming the
Any direct action
'Human'" 129). A perverse effect of the global "culture" of protecting local human rights is thus to take the global causes of human suffering off the political agenda.
taken against global forces runs the risk of being considered a violation of universal human rights (a violation such
as "terrorism") in the locality where it occurs.
Don’t let them claim that they only create an ethical obligation in a particular instance—Levinasian ethics
demand recognition of a universal duty—individual situations are only a proxy for this larger obligation.
Without belaboring the obvious tension suggested here between the message of Judaism, thus described, and political Zionism, it is clear that this quote privileges the position of the refugee over
. The space of the
the claims of both settler and native, and treats the territory as a place of refuge harboring potential neighbors for whom bad history is always yet to come
neighbor (the neighborhood) is no longer a "situation" for which we share attachments; it is here mystified as a pure
relationship of being in the presence of, and answerable to, another face. What makes this relationship
quintessentially ethical, according to Lévinas, is that the neighbor does not approach us first with the political
identify of friend or foe, and with the claim to be recognized accordingly. Rather, the neighbor's first demand is
placed upon us by pure proximity--not because we feel closer to our neighbor than to someone else, but because his
proximity makes us answer for our responsibility to the more distant stranger for whom he also substitutes (see
"Substitution"). In Lévinas's ethic of the neighbor, "The proximity of the neighbor--the peace of proximity--is the
responsibility of the ego for an other" ("Peace and Proximity" 167).
LINK: LEVINAS
Infinite obligation to the other fails in the face of two political realities:
1) It becomes an excuse for permanent war against those seen as violators of the ethical order, and
2) The example of the suicide bomber renders those ethics incoherent—who is saved by allowing the
determined suicide bomber to live?
It is, of course, possible to attack Lévinas using Carl Schmitt's argument against the discourse of humanitarian
intervention following the Treaty of Versailles: that it creates a casus belli against the forces of "inhumanity,"
especially when they claim to be pursuing historical justice in ways that disturb the peace by treating the "other" as
the "same" (Schmitt, The Concept of the Political 71). Suicide bombings would seem to be a paradigmatic example
of this: encountering the other as a disguised human bomb would suggest that fear of her and fear for her are not as
fundamentally distinct as Lévinas himself claims. When we rescue the suicide bomber are we saving her or
ourselves? And if we murder her instead, what becomes of us? Do we reveal ourselves, like those whom Lévinas
condemns, to be more afraid of dying than of killing? What does it mean for her to be equally unafraid of both? And
does her self-chosen death qualify her as a martyr or a monster, whether or not she succeeds in bringing innocent
others to their deaths along with her? In certain political "neighborhoods," Lévinas's concept of the ultimately
unknowable human face can be both ethical and awful in ways that reopen the possibility of a horrifying response.
The ethical temptation to treat suicide bombers as "inhumans" in human disguise applies a fortiori to the politics of
third-party intervention raised at the beginning of this essay: when neighbors kill neighbors, whom do we rescue and
whom do we attack? Is the third party in this situation just another neighbor?
The dark side of Levinasian ethics are their potential to justify terrible evil. For instance, absolutist political
obligations undergird genocide as much as they do political campaigns to end violence or poverty.
Schiff 03 – Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago – 2003 (Jacob, John Hopkins University
Press, “Politics Against Redemption: Rereading Levinas for Critical International Theory,” pg. 345-358,
http://ptw.uchicago.edu/schiff03.pdf)
Levinas’ account of redemption, mediated by his conversation with the Rabbis and Samuel, suggests that ideals of
purity and deliverance are not confined to religious or theological matters, but often penetrate political
conversations, and this is why I call politics that are animated by such ideals “redemptive politics”. Redemptive
politics work in the service of projects that most people would probably recognize as “good”--for instance, in calls
to end all war (UNOPI, 1965; Lipsky, 1971), genocide, hunger, poverty, homelessness, drug use, racism, and
violent crime. But redemptive politics also work in the service of projects that most people would probably
recognize as “bad”. For instance, redemptive politics seem to underpin genocide. During the Rwandan genocide,
Hutu extremists referred to Tutsis as inyenzi, or cockroaches, as pests that needed to be exterminated (Prunier,
1995). Similarly, Nazi ideology portrayed Jews as dirty, a plague infesting German stock. These depictions tied
genocidal campaigns to the achievement and maintenance of purity for a given identity, whether Rwandan or
German.6 Furthermore, many scholars have characterized genocidal projects in redemptive terms. Leo Kuper, for
instance, has highlighted scape-goating in genocides (1981: 43). In times of social and economic turmoil--say,
Germany in the 1930s--it is easy to blame prominent minority groups for social, economic, and political ills. That
which we cannot abide—military defeat, economic depression and so on—we may cast off by locating
responsibility for our condition elsewhere.7 Ronald Aronson (1982:144) has characterized genocide as “a kind of
ultimate denial of reality: a madness of those in power who are impotent to use that power effectively to change
reality, and who, lost in visions of omnipotence, instead seek to destroy it”. Finally, Robert Jay Lifton has argued
that genocide involves “a perception of collective illness, a vision of cure, and a series of motivations, experiences,
and requirements of perpetrators in their quest for that cure” (Lifton 1986, p. 467; in Fein, 1993, p.46). Scape-
goating, denial of reality, and metaphors of illness and cure all call up drives to purification that are symptomatic of
redemptive politics.
LINK: ETHICS
The notion that our personal ethical orientation is transformative is an overly simplistic substitute for real
politics and props up a Western concept of the individual.
The legal and political formalism of liberalism, in which most of what transpires in the spaces designated as cultural,
social, economic, and private is considered natural or personal (in any event, independent of power and political
life), is a profound achievement of depoliticization. Liberalism’s excessive freighting of the individual subject with
self- making, agency, and a relentless responsibility for itself also contributes to the personalization of political
contoured conflicts and inequalities. These tendencies eliminate from view various norms and social relations-
especially those pertaining to capital, race, gender, and sexuality- that construct and position subjects in liberal
democracies. In addition, the reduction of freedom to rights, and of equality to equal standing before the law,
eliminates from view many sources of subordination, marginalization, and inequality that organize liberal
democratic societies and fashion their subjects. Liberal ideology at its most generic, then, always already eschews
power and history in its articulation and comprehensions of the social and the subject. Individualism. The American
cultural emphasis on the importance of individual belief and behavior, and of individual heroism and failure, is also
relentlessly depoliticizing. An identification of belief, attitude, moral fiber, and individual will with the capacity to
make world history is the calling card of the biographical backstories and anecdotes that so often substitute for
political analyses and considerations of power in American popular culture. From Horatio Algers to demonized
welfare mothers, from Private Jessica Lynch to Private Lynndie England, from mythohistories to mythobiographies,
we are awash in the conceits that right attitudes produce justice, that willpower and tenacity produce success, and
that everything else is, at most, background, context, luck, or accidents of history. It is a child’s view of history and
politics: idealist, personal, and replete with heroes and villains, good values and bad.
LINK: CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE
The categorical imperative is utterly incompatible with Nietzsche’s ethics—individuals needs to decide their
own grounds for ethics.
Warren, 88 (Mark, Professor at the University of British Colombia, Nietzsche and Political Thought, MIT Press)
Nietzsehe's critique is based on Kant's failure to realize the immanent potential of his moral philosophy, a failure
that could, in Nietzsche's view, be traced to the very nature of Kant's project. Kant's intention was to provide a
rational foundation for Christian morality when Christian faith was being seriously eroded by the new sciences of
the Enlightenment. Thus it is hardly surprising that Nietzsche ultimately finds Kant's project impossible, and
consisting in the last analysis in a continuation of Christian Sittlichkeit. In Nietzsche's assessment, this continuity
shows up most clearly in Kant's categorical imperative, demanding as it does obedience to universalizable maxims
of behavior. He finds in Kant a residue of social oppression refracted into and maintained by Christian morality.
"The categorical imperative," he remarks in the Genealogy, "smells of cruelty." 58 Kant in effect undermined his
ideal of autonomy by defining it in terms of the categorical imperative and so detaching it from situated and
reflexive practices. In this way he carried the ideological effects of previous social morality into his attempt to
provide a rational basis for individual morality. According to Nietzsche, a workable equation between autonomy and
responsibility would require even these last remnants of Sittlichkeit to be overcome, "for 'autonomous' and 'moral'
[sittlich] are mutually exclusive." 59 While Kant holds that action in accordance with the categorical imperative
would produce freedom, Nietzsche holds that the capacity for moral responsibility requires freedom from all
residues ofSittlichkeit, the categorical imperative included. That Nietzsche would sever all conceptual relations between Sittlichkeit and autonomy does not,
however, mean that he dissociates them historically. Past beliefs and practices need not have been rational for them to have produced practices subsequently lending themselves to rational action
(chapter 3). And so it is with die Sittlichkeit der Sitte, the "morality of mores." Because Nietzsche, like Aristotle, Hegel, and Marx, takes human nature to be "cultivated" (ziichtet) over time, he
ascribes importance to the "morality of mores" for cultivating the kind of agent capable of responsible action, "notwithstanding the severity, tyranny, stupidity, and idiocy involved in it." 60
Owing to the "prehistoric labor" of the "morality of mores," it is now possible, Nietzsche thinks, to conceive of a morality that would lend itself to responsible, autonomous, individual practices.
Nietzsche's model of autonomy is his "sovereign individual." In two well-known sections of the Genealogy, he describes the sovereign individual as the "ripest fruit" ofthe "tremendous process"
Two' distinct qualities are present in the sovereign
offorging human nature into something "regular, calculable, necessary, even in his own image of himself." 61
individual: he represents a self-overcoming (Selbstaujhebung) of the morality of mores into moral responsibility;
and he represents the kind of individual who has the capacity to practice this morality by virtue of a fully developed
agency, providing the power that gives the "right to make promises." 62 For a morality to be truly responsible, one
must have the capacity to anticipate the consequences of one's actions, and in this way to "stand in security" of the
future.
LINK: ETHICS OF THE OTHER
Radical responsibility for the other is narcissistic and lends itself to political passivity—we feel that we have
fulfilled our duty simply by experiencing shame.
Murphy, 04 (Ann, Postdoctoral Fellow in the School of philosophy at the university of New South Wales, “The
Political Significance of Shame,” Borderlands E-Journal, volume 3 Number 1, 2004)
2. The insistence on the ahistorical nature of responsibility is particularly obvious when one takes note of Shame is
of interest as a political phenomenon to the degree that it signals cognisance of individual and collective
responsibility. Knowing this, one should take note of the dangerous dismissal of guilt and shame in contemporary politics by both the right and the left. The right’s attack on guilt has
frequently been couched in terms of the "bleeding heart liberal," whose attempts to be empathetic to others is condemned as a delusional and wrong-headed approach to issues of cultural
difference. In an attempt to publicly undermine the efficacy of social policies such as welfare, the right has persisted in labelling the advocates of such policies "bleeding hearts," whose rational
capacity for judgment has been clouded by their emotions. Allegedly, "bleeding hearts" cannot be trusted to rationally deliberate issues of politics. This line of argumentation is likely grounded in
the belief that we inherit from Kant, and those who work in his wake, that justice in its proper sense is to be rendered via the avenues of reason, and not those of the heart. In this context, shame
and guilt become problematic insofar as they hamper political rationality. 3. It would be disingenuous, however, to assign blame wholly to the political right. To be fair – and admittedly with a
few notable exceptions – the discourse on shame has arguably suffered equal abuse at the hands of the left. While there is no disputing the claim that the right has frequently coopted the discourse
on empathy in order to shirk certain social responsibilities, it is also the case that the left has demonstrated a marked reluctance to delve into the politics of collective guilt. Particularly
amidst a theoretical landscape – inherited from Levinas and Derrida – that privileges the stranger, the foreigner, and
the radically other, the worry surrounding guilt and shame is that there is something in the experience of these
emotions that is perhaps narcissistic, indulgent, and even patronizing. In short, the fear of addressing shame and
guilt is grounded in the worry that these emotions in the end only recuperate certain privileges. Shame and guilt are
self-regarding emotions, and so one worries that they may detract from the genuine consideration of others and that
at heart they are egoistic. Add to this the worry that guilt in and of its own right does not necessarily motivate
concrete action, and one sees why even those with progressive political agendas express reticence regarding the
issue of guilt, not simply in regard to the danger of appearing patronizing, but likewise out of suspicion regarding its
efficacy in motivating action.

The ethics of the obligation to the other fall flat in the face of real situations—respect for the other becomes
respect for those who are fundamentally like us.
Brown, 04 (Nicholas, University of Illinois at Chicago, Or, Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, Waiting for Something
to Happen, CR: The New Centennial Review 4.3 (2004) 289-319).
What guarantees the otherness of the other in the absence of the Absolutely Other? Nothing, which means it can
only be posited. What this implies, first of all, is that the ineffable other is a product of my own thought and
therefore not other at all. Second, we are compelled to ask: why this will to otherness? Once again, Badiou critiques the laicized, multiculturalist version of this ethics by staging
it. In its everyday form, without the support of the Altogether Other, the ethics of difference bifurcates as soon as it is put into play . Its attitude
towards any rigorously sustained difference is entirely different from the attitude it believes itself to have towards
difference-as-such. A rigorously sustained religious difference? Fundamentalism. Rigorously sustained political
difference? Extremism. Rigorously sustained cultural difference? Barbarism. "As a matter of fact, this celebrated
'other' is acceptable only if he is a good other—which is to say what, exactly, if not the same as us?”. The only
acceptable difference is one that also merely "accepts" difference. This restriction means that the discourse of the
other is effectively a discourse of the Same: a cosmopolitan fantasy of liberal-democratic, free-market society:
"nothing other than the identity of a wealthy—albeit visibly declining—'West'" (24).
Legal extensions of the ethics of tolerance expand the legitimacy and power of the state—for instance, the
government simultaneously called for tolerance of Muslim-Americans while using its power against them.
For tolerance discourse not only governs subjects, it not only quiets potential civic conflict or social unrest, it also
shores up the legitimacy of the state and in so doing shores up and expands state power. As we will see, both state
and nonstate deployments of tolerance serve important strengthening and legitimating functions for states suffering
from weakened sovereignty occasioned by globalization and crises of universalism related to exposed investments in
certain hegemonic powers, groups, and status categories . Tolerance discourse will also turn out to be paradoxically important in legitimating certain kinds of
state violence. So here is the corrective I would offer to Foucault's account: Although the state may be a minor apparatus of governmentality, although it is itself governmentalized and survives
only to the degree that it 1s governmentalized, the state remains the fulcrum of political legitimacy in late modern nations. …continues…s. A full account of governmentality, then, would attend
not only to the production, organization, and mobilization of subjects by a variety of powers but also to the problem of legitimizing these operations by the singularly accountable object in the
field of political power: the state. These two functions may be analytically separable, and at times they may appear at cross purposes, but they do not occur separately in practice; an account of
contemporary governance therefore must capture both. This is not to say that the state is the only source of governance, or even always the most important one; but where it is involved (and this
includes privatization schemes in which the state's connection with the enterprises to which it turns over certain functions is still visible), the question of legitimacy is immediately at issue. In this
the deployment of tolerance by the state is in part a response to a legitimacy deficit and, in
vein, I will be arguing that
particular, to its historically diminished capacity to embody universal representation. Tolerance discourse masks the
role of the state in reproducing the dominance of certain groups and norms, and it does so at a historical moment when popular sensitivity to
this role and this dominance is high, when those who have been historically excluded by norms of sex, race, ethnicity, and religion are vocal about such exclusion. State tolerance talk both
for example, in the context of the national security crisis precipitated by 9/11, the American
softens and deflects these tensions. So,
state not only guaranteed equality across ethnicity and subnationality, it also expressly called for civic tolerance of
what is conjured as threatening Americans in the post-9/11 period: "Middle Eastern types" in "our" midst. The state's guarantee of equality expresses
its powers to fulfill the social contract, while the state's call for tolerance seeks to incite a modality of citizen behavior that rejects stereotyping, prejudice, and above all vigilantism. Yet at the
same time that the state represents itself as securing social equality and rhetorically enjoins the citizenry from prejudice and persecution, the state engages in extralegal and persecutorial actions
From roundups of illegal aliens by the Immigration and Naturalization
toward the very group that it calls upon the citizenry to be tolerant toward.
Service (now Immigration and Customs Enforcement,-within the Department of Homeland Security) to detention
and deportation of one ethnic subcategory of illegal residents to racial profiling in airport security searches to police
and FBI interrogations that abrogate civil rights, the state has busily vilified and persecuted Arab Americans and
Arab foreign residents, constituting them as potential threats to national security and as a suspect, hence vulnerable
and tenuous, population. These apparently Janus-faced actions are not mere hypocrisy or subterfuge but are, rather,
precisely what tolerance-as both a subject-regulating and state-legitimating discourse-makes possible.

Their use of the law dooms their attempt at “hospitality”—including others within the law re-enforces the
superiority of the host.
Yegenoglu, 03 - professor of sociology at Middle East Technical University, Ankara – 2003 (Meyda, “Liberal
Multiculturalism and the Ethics of Hospitality in the Age of Globalization,” PMC 13.2, Muse)
The question of hospitality in Kant's writings pulls us into the domain of law, citizenship and the relation the state
has with its subjects. Universal hospitality here is only juridical and political. Cosmopolitan law is about
international agreement and refers to the condition of justice and law that is to be decided by nations. Hospitality is
treated as a question of rights, justice and obligation that is to be regulated by law.4 Resting on a juridical and
political definition, the Kantian formulation is based not on granting the right of residence but only the right of
temporary sojourn. As a juridical regulation, it concerns the rights of citizens of states that are to be regulated and
deliberated by a cosmopolitical constitution. As such, it suspends and conditions the immediate, infinite, and
unconditional welcoming of the other (87). Derrida directs our attention to the fact that conditional hospitality is
offered at the owner's place, home, nation, state, or city--that is, at a place where one is defined as the master and
where unconditional hospitality or unconditional trespassing of the door is not possible. The host, the non-guest, the
one who accepts, the one who offers hospitality, the one who welcomes, is the owner of a home and therefore is the
master of the home.5 As I mentioned above, Derrida directs our attention to the fact that in Kant's essay, hospitality
is framed as a question of law, an obligation, a duty, and a right: it refers to the welcoming of an alien/stranger other
as a non-enemy. The formulation of hospitality as a question of law weaves it with contradiction because the
welcoming of the other within the limits of law is possible on the condition that the host, the owner of the home, the
one who accepts, remains the master of the home and thereby retains his/her authority in that place.
The acceptance of the Other treats them as add-ons to the existing order and does not truly transform
relationships.
Yegenoglu, 03 - professor of sociology at Middle East Technical University, Ankara – 2003 (Meyda, “Liberal
Multiculturalism and the Ethics of Hospitality in the Age of Globalization,” PMC 13.2, Muse)
The increasing political presence of refugees and immigrants in post-Cold war Europe has generated considerable
debate about the nature of multicultural society. The demand for the recognition of cultural, racial, and ethnic
differences has come to occupy a central place in the forms of post-national politics emergent today. Yet, a closer
examination of the juridico-political regulations developed in response to these demands reveals a troubling
tendency: cultural/racial difference is translated into an understanding of cultural diversity that treats minorities, to
use David Bennett's term, as "add-ons" (5) to the existing nation form. Thus the question becomes whether such an
"additive model" (5) is capable of inducing a radical transformation in the concept of the sovereign position of the
national self. This essay addresses the limitations of this procedural multiculturalist valorization and argues that the
liberal imperative to tolerate and respect cultural difference is far from displacing the sovereignty of the host society
in question.
LINK: NGOS
NGOs carry out the political goals of the state. To the extent that they promote humanitarian liberalism, they
are promoting statist values, even though they claim to operate outside of power.
January-March).
In sum, bipolarity once allowed subscription to the liberal distinctions of civil/military, humanitarian/political, and
governmental/nongovernmental to effect a "humanitarian" position that eschewed the political realism of the
ideological conflict of the Cold War. Humanitarianism claimed then to be a space that was itself a kind of zone of
indistinction. That is to say, here relief was on offer irrespective of religious, political, or other distinctions. The
advent of global liberal governance now represents the official propagation, however, of such distinctions, together
with their allied governmental practices and institutions. These have become one of the principle means by which
global power currently circulates and operates. In doing so, global liberal governance quite literally threatens
nongovernmental and humanitarian agencies with recruitment into the very structures and practices of power against
which they previously defined themselves. Where once they practiced and enjoyed the space afforded by the claim
that they were without power--specifically, power politics--it is evident now that they are not. Major
nongovernmental humanitarian relief and development agencies are often also structured more like and operate
more like multinational corporations than voluntary workers. Their spokesmen and women act and sound like the
senior international diplomats and policymakers that they are. As humanitarian NGOs increasingly devote
themselves to the promotion of liberal governmental policies--for example those of transparency and
accountability--they, too, have to meet penetrating questions about the legitimacy, accountability, and transparency
of their own practices. Doing good, especially by insisting on following the Hippocratic injunction to do no harm--
the classic governmental maneuver of effecting power by denying one's own politicality--is a fiction now
increasingly difficult to sustain in the context of global liberal governance.
LINK: CHRISTIANITY
Their mission to non-believers re-enacts that Spanish conquest of the New World. Belief in a singular truth
that must be spread regardless of consequences for the non-believers is precisely what allowed for colonialist
genocide. They set a new limit on the very definition of what it means to be fully human—either you believe
or you are an enemy that becomes disposable.
Supremacy).
"To preach and announce the Gospel in the lands of the barbarians," Vitoria admonishes us, is not just a right; it is
also a Christian duty. "Brotherly correction is as much part of natural law as brotherly love; and since all those peoples are not merely in a state of sin, but presently in a state
beyond salvation, it is the business of Christians to correct and direct them. Indeed, they are clearly obliged to do so" (1991, 284). Though it is wrong to convert the barbarians forcibly—here, as
if the barbarians obstruct or
almost everywhere, Vitoria follows Aquinas—it is right and just to force them to listen, whether they accept the truth or not. Accordingly,
prevent the Spaniards in any way from exercising their Christian duty to spread the truth, then the Spaniards may
"take up arms and declare war on them, insofar as this provides the safety and opportunity needed to preach the
Gospel." They may even "lawfully conquer the territories of these people, deposing their old masters and setting up new ones and carrying out
all the things which are lawfully permitted in other just wars by the law of war, so long as they always observe reasonable limits and do not go further than necessary" (285-86). It was Vitoria's
sad and sincere belief that Spaniards had not observed "reasonable limits" and had, in fact, "gone beyond the permissible bounds of justice and religion," but their excesses neither cancelled their
). Christians had the right and the duty to travel wherever
rights to use force when necessary nor vitiated the legal and moral principles involved (286
they pleased, take the gold and other goods that they found to be unused and unclaimed, and preach their way of
life, by force if necessary, in order to bring the barbarians of the New World out of their self-imposed
immaturity and into civic adulthood as full members of the Christian community. Vitoria is careful to specify that the barbarians of the
Americas had nearly all of the same rights as the Spaniards, for instance, the right to travel to Spain and receive the full protection of Spanish law. But, for all of Vitoria's concern with reciprocity
—granting the Indians the same rights of travel and trade—he cannot grant them equal rights when it comes to religion. Here, as Schmitt is quick to point out, one finds Vitoria's, and
Christendom's, central and inescapable asymmetry. The ultimate justification for the Spanish conquests lies in Christ's command to the apostles to "teach all nations, baptizing them in the name
of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost: Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you ... even unto the end of the world" (Matthew 28:19-20). In more
secular terms, the Church's evangelical mission becomes Spain's "civilizing" mission, a mission for which, perhaps because of his lingering Catholicism and his adamant Eurocentrism, Schmitt
cannot help but have some sympathy. It is worth listening to what Schmitt has to say here at some length: However, that the result [of his investigations] still leads in the Wnal analysis to a
justiWcation of the Spanish conquest lies in the fact that Vitoria's objectivity and neutrality do indeed have their limits and in no [End Page 134] way extend so far as to ignore or deny the
distinction between believing Christians and non-Christians. On the contrary: the practical result is grounded completely in Vitoria's Christian conviction, which Wnds its real justiWcation in the
Christian mission. That non-Christians could demand the same right of free propagation of and intervention for their idolatry as the Christian Spaniards for their Christian mission—that really
does not occur to this Spanish monk. Here, then, is the limit both of his absolute neutrality and his general reciprocity and reversibility of concepts. Vitoria is perhaps an Erasmist, but he is not
representative of absolute humanity in the style of the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries; he is no Voltarian and no Rousseauist, no free thinker and no socialist.... For Vitoria, Christian Europe is
still the center of the world, historically and concretely located in Jerusalem and Rome. (1988, Der Nomos der Erde, 83, 84) Yes, this passage attests to the antiliberal prejudices of an
unregenerate Eurocentric conservative with a pronounced affect for the counterrevolutionary and Catholic South of Europe. It seems to resonate with the apologetic mid-twentieth-century
Spanish reception of Vitoria that wishes to justify the Spanish civilizing mission in the Americas. 8 But the contrast between Christianity and humanism is not just prejudice; it is also instructive,
because with it, Schmitt tries to grasp something both disturbing and elusive about the modern world—namely, the apparent fact that the liberal and humanitarian attempt to construct a world of
universal friendship produces, as if by internal necessity, ever new enemies. For Schmitt, the Christianity of Vitoria, of Salamanca, Spain, 1539, represents a concrete, spatially imaginable order,
centered (still) in Rome and, ultimately, Jerusalem. This, with its divine revelations, its Greek philosophy, and its Roman language and institutions, is the polis. This is civilization, and outside its
walls lie the barbarians. The humanism that Schmitt opposes is, in his words, a philosophy of absolute humanity. By virtue of its universality and abstract normativity, it has no localizable polis,
no clear distinction between what is inside and what is outside. Does humanity embrace all humans? Are there no gates to the city and thus no barbarians outside? If not, against whom or what
: Christianity distinguishes between believers and nonbelievers.
does it wage its wars? We can understand Schmitt's concerns in the following way
Since nonbelievers can become believers, they must be of the same category of being. To be human, then, is the
horizon within which the distinction between believers and nonbelievers is made. That is, humanity per se is not part
of the distinction, but is that which makes the distinction possible. However, once the term used to describe the
horizon of a distinction also becomes that distinction's positive pole, it needs its negative opposite. If humanity is
both the horizon and the positive pole of the distinction that that horizon enables, then the negative pole can only be
something that lies beyond that horizon, can only be something completely antithetical to horizon and positive pole
alike—can only, in other words, be inhuman. As Schmitt says: Only with the concept of the human in the sense of
absolute humanity does there appear as the other side of this concept a specically new enemy, the inhuman. In the
history of the nineteenth century, setting off the inhuman from the human is followed by an even deeper split, the
one between the superhuman and the subhuman. In the same way that the human creates the inhuman, so in the
history of humanity the superhuman brings about with a dialectical necessity the subhuman as its enemy twin.9
LINK: CHRISTIANITY
Belief in a singular Christian truth justifies war against difference. Any intervention is justified in the name
of delivering truth to savages. The Spanish Conquest of the New World, and the attendant genocide of
millions, was justified by delivering a Christian truth to all peoples.
Supremacy).
The Spanish conquest of the New World gave rise to two pressing and interconnected questions: what type of
humans (if humans they were) occupied this strange world, and what legal or moral justification was there for
Spanish dominion over them and their possessions? The answer to the first question, and thus implicitly to the
second, was simple, but needed further specification: they were barbarians. When the Greeks coined the word, they used it to distinguish the
foreign "other" from themselves. If at first it merely meant the foreigner as such, by the fourth century B.C. it marked the foreigner as inherently inferior. By virtue of such an asymmetrical
distinction between self and other, the qualities of the self are simply assumed, unstated, and silently equated with the norm, while the substandard properties of the other can be endlessly
enumerated. To be Greek was to be in an ethnically, politically, culturally, and linguistically defined closed community. All else was, and remained, outside, to be ignored or, if noticed, to be
. When the early Christian church took the term as their own to distinguish between believers and
dominated and used
nonbelievers, they divested it of its ethnic, linguistic, and geographic substance, for all humans had souls and all
humans had the potential of being included in the Kingdom of Christ. That is, the distinction between the self and
the other was no longer fixed, but fluid; the other could give up its otherness and become part of the larger and ever-
expanding self—could, in a word, assimilate itself to the dominant group. Universalization, however, has its price.
All peoples, not just Greeks, could now belong to an all-encompassing group, and by virtue of that possibility all
peoples could be part of something called "humanity," but because Christians are in possession of the one and only
Truth and because inclusion is now based on the choice to accept that one and only Truth, to refuse to join was
condemned as moral perversity. One was offered a choice, but rather than a neutral either/or, the alternatives were
labeled "right" and "wrong." Those who lived in vincible ignorance of Christ—those, in other words, who had heard
but rejected the good news of the Gospel—committed a mortal sin and would face eternal damnation. While still on
earth, such infidels could also be the targets of a "just war," a "crusade." Thus, though all peoples are
members of "humanity," some—the nonbelievers—are lesser members than others, possessing fewer rights
and deserving opprobrium.
Christianity demands cultural genocide of all those considered barbarians.

Supremacy).
The distinction between believer and nonbeliever is not a distinction between tribe and tribe or nation and nation; it
is not a distinction between neighbor and foreigner or even one between finite and localizable friends and enemies.
Rather, ideally, in the Christian world, the negative pole of the distinction is to be fully and finally consumed
without remainder. The differences between families, tribes, nations, friends, and enemies are meant to disappear. In
the final analysis there is no room for opposition, neither within the City of God nor against it, and the polis—call it
Rome, call it Jerusalem—will encompass the entire world. That is precisely the purpose of its civilizing power.
What Schmitt calls humanism is but a more complete universalization of the same dynamic. 11 Christianity and
humanism are both civilizing missions. In neither case can there be barbarians left outside the gates because
eventually there will be no outside of the gates and, thus, no more gates. To live in the city, the barbarians must
thoroughly give up their barbarian ways—their customs, their religion, their language . In the discourse that
equates the polis with humanity, to remain a barbarian is not to remain outside the city, but to be included in the city
as a moral and legal outlaw and thus to come under the city's moral and legal jurisdiction.
AT: PERM
The state cannot grant us freedoms—it can only make us into a homogenous herd. Real individuality must
maintain distance from institutions.
This appreciation of- not simply hierarchy—as culturally invigorating emerges in Nietzsche's characterization of
freedom as "the will to self-responsibility" that "preserves the distance which divides us" (Tl "Skirmishes" 3H).
Thus, like Foucault, Nietzsche's complaint against modern politics is that it excessively organizes and
institutionalizes human relations: it dissolves our separateness even as it fabricates us as "individuals"; it throws us
into proximity in a fashion that mutes our own capacity to express responsibility, creativity, and hence freedom, Like
Rousseau, Nietzsche regards mass social intercourse and the institutions that perpetuate it as the enemy of discerning
sensibility. In this regard, tolerance, one of democracy's proudest virtues, emerges as a symptom of its baseness. To
put up with men, to keep open house in one's heart-this is liberal, but no more than liberal. One knows hearts which
are capable of noble hospitality, which have curtained windows and closed shutters: they keep their best rooms
empty ... because they await guests with whom one does not have to "put up." (TI "Skirmishes" 25) In short,
Nietzsche regards political life, especially modern political life, as harboring values and spawning institutions
that displace and discourage individual and collective aspiration, creativity, distinction, and culture. The state
is "organized immorality," a "tremendous machine" that "overpowers the individual" and substitutes for it a
mechanical individualism in which all are reduced to units (WP 717,718). Parties arc for unthinking
followers-"whoever thinks much is not suitable as a party member: he soon thinks himself right through the party"
(HH 579). And political doctrines are mostly justifications of and for the weak against the strong but also of the
rational against the Dionysian, in either case issuing from ressentiment (Tl "Ancients" 4). While Nietzsche concedes
a potentially synergistic relation between politics and culture when the former itself partakes of "greatness"
(Periclean Athens is the ambivalent example to which he frequently recurs), politics is more often cast as the enemy
of culture.
IMPACT: MEANING TO LIFE

Believing in truth with a capital T is a nihilist embrace of a false version of reality. The only way to achieve
meaningful existence is to accept that violence and chaos are inevitable.
Scott—90 (Charles E., professor of Philosophy at Pennsylvania State University, “The Question of Ethics:
Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger,” Ed. John Sallis, p. 173-174)
One pathogenic aspect of our Western ethos that we have followed is the ascetic ideal. It is characterized by many
types of refusal and denial regarding the manner in which human life occurs, and on Nietzsche's account the ascetic
ideal reinforces this denial with a habitual insistence on the continuous presence of meaning in all dimensions of life
and being. In our ascetic withdrawal from life we join forces with hopelessness, suffering, death, and helplessness
by giving them meaning, in our appropriation of them, that far exceeds their occurrence and that subordinates them
within a scheme of meaning and hope. The rule governing the ascetic ideal is found in its incorporation and blind
expression of the hopelessness and meaninglessness that it is designed to overcome. This incorporation of what it is
constitutes the ideal's nihilism for Nietzsche: the affirmations within the ascetic ideal project their opposites and
produce a spiral of unwitting and inevitable violence in the spirituality that they create. The denial of life within the
boundaries of the ascetic ideal continuously reestablishes the power of the ideal. But when this movement is broken
by a self-overcoming like that in Nietzsche's genealogy of the ascetic ideal, the rule of the ascetic ideal is interrupted
and a possibility is opened for life-affirmations that do not suppress the most fearful occurrences involved in being
alive. The joyousness of life without the illusion of continuous meaning, the joyousness that Nietzsche found in early Greek culture, was lost, according to his reading, in the course of the
increasing cultural dominance of those whose nerve has failed before the disheartening flow of life. The ascetic ideal expresses this failure in its insistence on meaning and in its persistent
manufacture of hope out of illusions bred of the failure. Heidegger is perhaps at his most non-Nietzschean point when in his Rector's address he turns to the Greek division between the everyday
and the question of being. This is an ironic moment in Heidegger's thought: he traces the origins of his own move to separate the future of the German university from the German Volkstum,
(that is, from dominant popular culture) to the emergence of the separation of thought from everyday life in Greek culture. But this move is not associated with the joyousness that Nietzsche uses
as his reference in delimiting the ascetic ideal. According to Nietzsche's genealogy we have lost an earthly affirmation of life in the midst of the specific suffering of everyday existence.
Nietzsche countenances fully the brutality, the fateful shattering of hope, the disappointments that break people's lives, the individual and social tragedies. The debilitation of minds and bodies is
juxtaposed to people's savoring food and drink, enjoying sexual pleasure. It is juxtaposed to friendship, the energy of ambition, the struggle between competitors, the mixture of desperation and
. Nietzsche's move is toward affirmation in the midst of chaotic living when he speaks of
exhilaration in efforts of accomplishment
what is lost in the blind and self-deceived chaos of asceticism that is ordered by the illusion of continuous meaning.
In this affirmation one has an awareness, presumably a full awareness, of the otherness to human interest that
radically distresses us. People's attention is delimited by it. Rather than escape or turn away from it, people are
delimited by it in their relations with things. Rather than appropriate the suffering of life in ascetic self-denial,
human beings stand over against its otherness, its unthinkableness, its density. They need not attempt to embody it in
forms that seem to shape it to human and thinkable dimensions. They live in the inappropriable, meaningless dark
vacuity, with it and other to it, out of it and in it. They are angel and animal, Nietzsche said. Not to be lost, not to be
redeemed, not to be overcome, it is juxtaposed to a will to live, an affirmation with, and not in spite of, the chaos.
IMPACT: MEANING TO LIFE
Nietzsche’s nihilism is life-affirming—he asks us to say “yes” to the world as it is, giving meaning to our
imperfect existence.
Dienstag, 2004 (Joshua Foe, PhD. in polsci from Princeton, "Tragedy, Pessimism, Nietzsche," New Literary History
34:1, Johns Hopkins Literary Press, Project Muse)
Tragic art is the organization of a small portion of an otherwise meaningless world that gives purpose to an individual existence (WP 585). It is the attempt to impose a temporary form on the
inevitable transformation of the world. Since the world must acquire some particular forms in its metamorphoses, art is "repeating in miniature, as it were, the tendency of the whole" (WP 617)-
only now by an effort of will. Thus, art is not really an attempt to fight the pattern of existence, but rather to shape that pattern into something recognizable, "to realize in oneself the eternal joy of
becoming-that joy which also encompasses joy in destruction" (TI 110). When art assumes this shape, it becomes "the great seduction to life, the great stimulant to life" (WP 853). This is not to
say, however, that such art must be "uplifting" in the conventional sense. Since joy in destruction may be a stimulant to life, even depictions of the most miserable things may be included: "The
things they display are ugly: but that they display them comes from their pleasure in the ugly . . . How liberating is Dostoevsky!" (WP 821). If we can understand why an artist like Dostoyevsky,
why Nietzsche thinks pessimism can result in a
who knows that art is devoid of metaphysical value, would still want to write, then we can understand
creative pathos. Similarly, if we can see how tragedy, the "repetition in miniature" of worldly chaos, can represent
the liberating "joy of becoming," then we can get a sense for the political productivity of a pessimistic ethic. The normal
situation of an architect, I think, helps us to get some purchase on this: any sane architect must know that no building lasts forever. Built in opposition to nature but using the unstable materials of
nature (as, to some extent, every human structure must be), every edifice will be attacked by nature (by wind, by water, by gravity, and so forth) the moment it is completed. Whatever the
purpose for which it is initially designed, that purpose will someday be superseded. However beautiful it may seem when erected, it will someday, to another set of eyes, appear ugly. Yet,
knowing all this, architects pursue their craft. Knowing that the universe will ultimately not tolerate their work, they continue to organize a small portion of that same universe for local purposes.
The lack of an objective or metaphysical meaning for the work is no obstacle; indeed, architects often think of the generation of locally meaningful environments out of natural waste to be a
Dionysian pessimism, then, is an ethos of a similar kind, an art of living.22 In recommending it
particular goal, a spur to activity.
as a life-practice, Nietzsche is, in some sense, thereby recommending the practice of life. But since, as he was fond
of pointing out, there is really no perspective from which to view life as a whole (whether to deny or affirm it), such
an assent can only be a kind of gamble or risk-taking. It is an affirmation in the dark, an approval given in ignorance.
Above all, in keeping with the emphasis on the centrality of temporal experience, it is a decision to welcome the
unknown future and accept the unseen past, rather than clinging to a familiar present.23 While other pessimisms
(such as Schopenhauer's) also conclude that the universe has no order and human history no progress, Dionysian
pessimism is the one that can find something to like about this situation: "My new way to 'yes.' My new version of
pessimism as a voluntary quest for fearful and questionable aspects of beings. . . . A pessimist such as that could in
that way lead to a Dionysian yes-saying to the world as it is: as a wish for its absolute return and eternity: with
which a new ideal of philosophy and sensibility would be given" (KGW 8.2.121).
IMPACT: TOTALITARIANISM
Democracy and privacy are not a check against totalitarianism; they are agents of excessive power—the
tyranny of the majority forces herd values onto the individual.
Warren, 88 (Mark, Professor of Political Science at the University of British Colombia, Nietzsche and Political
Thought, pg. 220, MIT Press)
In these terms, one can understand Nietzsche's fear that the self might be regressively politicized in the wake of the
vacuum left by Christian-moral culture. Although he implicitly shared this fear with liberals, he did not see the
possibility ofa resolution within the terms of liberal theory. Here again Nietzsche's comments are suggestive:
liberals
have always opposed the encroachment of institutionalized politics (if not institutionalized economics) into the
"private" sphere of the self. They rightly fear totalitarianism in such instances. But liberals tend not to understand
why totalitarianism is possible, because they do not understand the historically conditional nature of individual
agency.25 They often make the fatal assumption that the individual provides a natural and unassailable cornerstone
of private life, sustained by family, church, and work place. Yet central aspects of this system of identities dissolve
in a cultural crisis. Nietzsche thought that for most the cultural crisis would lead to exposure of a "decadent" self, the
"private person." 26 The "private person" coincides with what he later called the "last man." 27 The "last man" of
the modern period is the result of a political culture that had mediated power relations between individuals through
external identities, such as those of God and country. With the loss of external guidance in the modern cultural
crisis, the last man's feeling of power is threatened. God is replaced by new kinds of religion, narcotic culture, and
identity with national heroes and the state. The existence of "last men" leaves a fertile field for invasion of the self
by the state or any other institutionalized power. Nietzsche's sensitivity to this weakness of liberal democratic
societies surely stemmed in part from the fact that liberal culture was never well established in Germany. For this
reason, he was able to understand its contingent nature in ways that those in well-established liberal cultures could
not. Even in Nietzsche's lifetime, processes of cultural breakdown coexisted with a rising German nationalism, a
nationalism expressed in the Reich and anti-Semitism. Although Nietzsche welcomed in principle the growth of
liberal institutions as a means for curbing state power, he took little comfort in their existence because he saw them
as vehicles for the ideals of an increasingly massified society.28 Thus, reflecting the German situation of his time,
Nietzsche emphasized not the pluralism of parliamentary processes but their relative ideological unity.
"Parliamentarianism that is, public permission to choose between five basic public opinions-flatters and wins the
favor of all those who would like to seem independent and individual, as if they fought for their opinions....
""however deviates from the five public opinions and stands apart will always have the whole herd against him." 29
"Liberalism," Nietzsche writes elsewhere, is "herd-animalization." 30The plausibility of Nietzsche's polemics
against the "herd" and its connections to liberal institutions can be found in his view-one already well-developed by
de Tocqueville and John Stuart Millthat parliamentary processes contain the danger of providing merely the formal
appearance of pluralism while functioning to legitimate the state as a guarantor of mass values. Should parliament
become the tool of the "herd"--and Nietzsche thought this imminent-it would surely use state power to impose
"herd" values on everyone. "Liberal institutions," he generalizes, "cease to be liberal as soon as they are attained: later on, there are no worse and no more thorough injurers of
freedom than liberal institutions." 31 He voiced similar concerns about leftist movements. Working at first through liberal institutions, the advocates of democracy on the left would wish to
politicize "everything" by defining general standards of existence; they would dictate that "everyone should live and work according to such standards." 32 Foreshadowing the objections of later
anarchists such as Emma Goldman against statist Marxists, Nietzsche believed that revolutionaries harbor a "reactionary" desire to reassert the power of the state over the individua1.
IMPACT (SECURITY): SURVIVAL
Imposing modernization comes at the cost of military aggression—risking cultural and ecological survival.
January-March).
The disorder of emerging political complexes is of course fueled by local factors. In a world that has always been
more or less interdependent, however, it would be grossly naive to think that local factors were ever permanently or
totally isolated historically from global developments. Much less so now, then, in an age of virulent globalization.
Global liberal governance is not, of course, a neutral phenomenon, indifferent to local cultures, traditions, and
practices. Neither is it benignly disposed toward them. Rather, it has always been virulently disruptive of them
and aggressively related to them as much in moral as in economic and military terms . Much of the disorder
that borders the domain of liberal peace is clearly also a function, therefore--albeit a fiercely contested function--of
its very own normative, political, economic, and military agendas, dynamics, and practices, and of the reverberations
these excite throughout the world. It seems increasingly to be a function, specifically, of the way in which
development is now ideologically embraced by all of the diverse institutions of liberal peace as an unrelenting
project of modernization. The chief economist of the World Bank (Joseph Stiglitz) attacks the Washington
Consensus on liberalization, stabilization, and privatization in the world economy, for example, as too technical and
too narrowly framed a development strategy. He espouses instead a new intensive as well as extensive policy
committed to the unqualified and comprehensive modernization and "transformation of traditional societies."[4]
"Honesty, however requires me to add one more word. In calling for a transformation of societies, I have elided a
central issue," Stiglitz had the candor to conclude, "transformation to what kind of society and for what ends?" The
impact of modernization on modern as well as traditional societies is, of course, as violent as the impact on global
resources and global ecology. The values, practices, and investments that propel such development nonetheless,
however, are precisely what protect it from pursuing the key question, locally as well as globally, that Stiglitz posed
in terms other than those that underwrite his very problematization of it.
IMPACT (SECURITY): WAR

The West posits a culturally particular definition of what it means to be human. This necessarily creates its
opposite—the inhuman barbarian that refuses the liberal order. Only abandoning the quest for a universal
humanity can stop escalating wars.
Supremacy).
For Schmitt, to assume that one can derive morally correct political institutions from abstract, universal norms is to
put the cart before the horse. The truly important question remains: who decides? What political power representing
which political order defines terms like human rights and public reason, defines, in fact, what it means to be
properly human? What political power distinguishes between the decent and the indecent, between those who police
the world and those who are outlawed from it? Indeed, what political power decides what is and what is not
political? Habermas's contention that normative legality neutralizes the moral and the political and that therefore
Schmitt "suppresses" the "decisive point," namely, "the legal preconditions of an impartial judicial authority and a
neutral system of criminal punishment" (1998, 200), is enough to make even an incurable skeptic a bit nostalgic for
the old Frankfurt School distinction between affirmative and critical theory. One could observe, for instance, that the
"universality" of human rights has a very particular base. As Habermas says: Asiatic societies cannot participate in capitalistic modernization without taking
advantage of the achievements of an individualistic legal order. One cannot desire the one and reject the other. From the perspective of Asian countries, the question is not whether human rights,
as part of an individualistic legal order, are compatible with the transmission of one's own culture. Rather, the question is whether the traditional forms of political and societal integration can be
reasserted against—or must instead be adapted to—the hard-to-resist imperatives of an economic modernization that has won approval on the whole. (2001, 124) Thus, despite his emphasis on
procedure and the universality of his so-called discourse principle, the choice that confronts Asiatic societies or any other people is a choice between cultural identity and economic survival,
between, in other words, cultural and physical extermination. As Schmitt said, the old Christian and civilizing distinction between believers and nonbelievers (Gläubigern and Nicht-Gläubigern)
has become the modern, economic distinction between "creditors and debtors" (Gläubigern and Schuldnern). But while affirmative theorists like Habermas and Rawls are busy constructing the
ideological scaffolding that supports the structure of the status quo, what role is there for the "critical" theorist to play? Despite the sanguine hopes of Hardt and Negri (2000) that "Empire" will
all but spontaneously combust as a result of the irrepressible ur-desire of the multitude, can we seriously place our faith in some utopian grand alternative anymore, or in some revolutionary or
therapeutic result based on the truth of critique that would allow us all, in the end, to sing in the sunshine and laugh everyday? Do, in fact, such utopian fantasies not lead to the moralizing hubris
of a Rawls or a Habermas? 16 In short, it is one thing to recognize the concealed, particular interests that govern the discourse and politics of human rights and quite another to think seriously
about how things could be different, to imagine an international system that respected both the equality and the difference of states and/or peoples. Is it possible—and this is Todorov's question—
to value Vitoria's principle of the "free circulation of men, ideas, and goods" and still also "cherish another principle, that of self-determination and noninterference" (Todorov 1984, 177)? The
entire "Vitorian" tradition, from Scott to Habermas and Rawls, thinks not. Habermas, for instance, emphatically endorses the fact that "the erosion of the principle of nonintervention in recent
decades has been due primarily to the politics of human rights" (1998, 147), a "normative" achievement that is not so incidentally correlated with a positive, economic fact: "In view of the
subversive forces and imperatives of the world market and of the increasing density of worldwide networks of communication and commerce, the external sovereignty of states, however it may
opposition to this development is not merely anachronistic; it is illegitimate,
be grounded, is by now in any case an anachronism" (150). And
not to be tolerated. So, for those who sincerely believe in American institutional, cultural, and moral superiority, the
times could not be rosier. After all, when push comes to shove, "we" decide—not only about which societies are
decent and which ones are not, but also about which acts of violence are "terrorist" and which compose the "gentle
compulsion" of a "just war." What, however, are those "barbarians" who disagree with the new world order
supposed to do? With Agamben, they could wait for a "completely new politics" to come, but the contours of such a politics are unknown and will remain unknown until the time of its
arrival. And that time, much like the second coming of Christ, seems infinitely deferrable. While they wait for the Benjaminian "divine violence" to sweep away the residual effects of the
demonic rule of law (Benjamin 1996, 248-52), the barbarians might be tempted to entertain Schmitt's rather forlorn fantasy of an egalitarian balance of power. Yet if the old, inner-European
balance of power rested on an asymmetrical exclusion of the non-European world, it must be asked: what new exclusion will be necessary for a new balance, and is that new exclusion tolerable?
At the moment, there is no answer to [End Page 143] this question, only a precondition to an answer. If one wishes to entertain Todorov's challenge of thinking both equality and difference,
universal commerce of people and ideas as well as self-determination and nonintervention, then the concept of humanity must once again become the invisible and unsurpassable horizon of
. The word "human," to evoke one final distinction, must once again become descriptive of a
discourse, not its positive pole
"fact" and not a "value." Otherwise, whatever else it may be, the search for "human" rights will always also be the
negative image of the relentless search for the "inhuman" other.
IMPACT (ETHICS): WAR

An ethic of tolerance achieves its opposite. Liberal societies consider themselves tolerant insider states that
are justified in waging war on outsiders marked by intolerance.
The original project, then, was to be a consideration of the constructive and regulatory effects of tolerance as a
discourse of justice, citizenship, and community in late modern, multicultural liberal democracies, with a focus on
the United States. However, in the aftermath of September 11, political rhetorics of Islam, nationalism,
fundamentalism, culture, and civilization have reframed even domestic discourses of tolerance-the enemy of
tolerance is now the weaponized radical Islamicist state or terror cell rather than the neighborhood bigot-and have
certainly changed the cultural pitch of tolerance in the international sphere. While some of these changes have
simply brought to the surface long-present subterranean norms in liberal tolerance discourse, others have articulated
tolerance for genuinely new purposes. These include the legitimation of a new form of imperial state action in the
twenty-first century, a legitimation tethered to a constructed opposition between a cosmopolitan West and its
putatively fundamentalist Other. Tolerance thus emerges as part of a civilizational discourse that identifies both
tolerance and the tolerable with the West, marking nonliberal societies and practices as candidates for an intolerable
barbarism that is itself signaled by the putative intolerance ruling these societies. In the mid-nineteenth through midtwentieth centuries, the
West imagined itself as standing for civilization against primitivism, and in the cold war years for freedom against tyranny; now these two recent histories are merged in the warring figures of the
free, the tolerant, and the civilized on one side, and the fundamentalist, the intolerant, and the barbaric on the other. As it altered certain emphases in liberal discourse itself, so, too, did the post-
September 11 era alter the originally intended course of this study. The new era demanded that questions about tolerance as a domestic governmentality producing and regulating ethnic,
religious, racial, and sexual subjects be supplemented with questions about the operation of tolerance in and as a civilizational discourse distinguishing Occident from Orient, liberal from
nonliberal regimes, "free" from "unfree" peoples. Such questions include the following: If tolerance is a political principle used to mark an opposition between liberal and fundamentalist orders,
how might liberal tolerance discourse function not only to anoint Western superiority but also to legitimate Western cultural and political imperialism? That is, how might this discourse actually
promote Western supremacy and aggression even as it veils them in the modest dress of tolerance? How might tolerance, the very virtue that Samuel Huntington advocates for preempting a
worldwide clash of civilizations, operate as a key element in a civilizational discourse that codifies the superiority and legitimates the superordination of the West? What is the work of tolerance
discourse in a contemporary imperial liberal governmentality? What kind of subject is thought to be capable of tolerance? What sort of rationality and sociality is tolerance imagined to require
and what sorts are thought to inhibit it-in other words, what anthropological presuppositions does liberal tolerance entail and circulate? In the end, the effort to understand tolerance as a domestic
discourse of ethnic, racial, and sexual regulation, on the one hand, and as an international discourse of Western supremacy and imperialism on the other, did not have to remain permanently
forked. Contemporary domestic and global discourses of tolerance, while appearing at first blush to have relatively distinct objects and aims, are increasingly melded in encomiums to tolerance,
. The conceit of secularism under
such as those featured in the Simon Wiesenthal Museum of Tolerance discussed in chapter 4, and are also analytically interlinked
girding the promulgation of tolerance within multicultural liberal democracies not only legitimates their intolerance
of and aggression toward nonliberal states or transnational formations but also glosses the ways in which certain
cultures and religions are marked in advance as ineligible for tolerance while others are so hegemonic as to not even
register as cultures or religions; they are instead labeled "mainstream" or simply "American." In this way, tolerance
discourse in the United States, while posing as both a universal value and an impartial practice, designates certain
beliefs and practices as civilized and others as barbaric, both at home and abroad; it operates from a conceit of
neutrality that is actually thick with bourgeois Protestant norms. The moral autonomy of the individual at the heart of liberal tolerance discourse is also critical in drawing the line between
the tolerable and the intolerable, both domestically and globally, and thereby serves to sneak liberalism into a civilizational discourse that claims to be respectful of all cultures and religions,
many of which it would actually undermine by "liberalizing," and, conversely, to sneak civilizational discourse into liberalism. This is not to say that tolerance in civilizational discourse is
reducible to liberalism; in fact, it is strongly shaped by the legacy of the colonial settler native encounter as well as the postcolonial encounter between white and indigenous, colonized, or
expropriated peoples. This strain in the lexicon and ethos of tolerance, while not reducible to a liberal grammar and analytics, is nonetheless mediated by them and also constitutes an element in
Tolerance is thus a crucial analytic hinge between the constitution of abject
the constitutive outside of liberalism over the past three centuries
domestic subjects and barbarous global ones, between liberalism and the justification of its imperial and colonial
adventures. Put slightly differently, tolerance as a mode of late modern governmentality that iterates the normalcy of
the powerful and the deviance of the marginal responds to, links, and tames both unruly domestic identities or
affinities and nonliberal transnational forces that tacitly or explicitly challenge the universal standing of liberal
precepts. Tolerance regulates the presence of the Other both inside and outside the liberal democratic nation-state,
and often it forms a circuit between them that legitimates the most illiberal actions of the state by means of a term
consummately associated with liberalism.
IMPACT (ETHICS): WAR
The ethics of helping your neighbor are grounded in a spirit of resentment—leading to inevitable warfare
between opposing, dogmatic civilizations.
Johnston, 99 (Ian, Research Associate and Instructor at Vancouver Island University, "There's Nothing Nietzsche
Couldn't Teach Ya About the Raising of the Wrist" May, http://records.viu.ca/~johnstoi/introser/nietzs.htm)
Why is this insight so worrying? Well, one point is that dogmatists get aggressive. Soccer players and rugby players
who forget what Nietzsche is pointing out can start killing each other over questions which admit of no answer,
namely, questions about which group has the true game, which group has privileged access to the truth. Nietzsche
senses that dogmatism is going to lead to warfare, and he predicts that the twentieth century will see an unparalleled
extension of warfare in the name of competing dogmatic truths. Part of his project is to wake up the people who are
intelligent enough to respond to what he's talking about so that they can recognize the stupidity of killing each other
for an illusion which they mistake for some "truth." In addition to that, Nietzsche, like Mill (although in a very
different manner), is seriously concerned about the possibilities for human excellence in a culture where the herd
mentality is taking over, where Europe is developing into competing herds--a situation which is either sweeping up
the best and the brightest or is stifling them entirely. Nietzsche, like Mill and the ancient pre-Socratic Greeks to
whom he constantly refers, is an elitist. He wants the potential for individual human excellence to be liberated from
the harnesses of conformity and group competition and conventional morality. Otherwise, human beings are going
to become destructive, lazy, conforming herd animals, using technology to divert them from the greatest joys in life,
which come only from individual striving and creativity, activities which require one to release one's instincts
without keeping them eternally subjugated to an overpowering historical consciousness or a conventional morality
of good and evil. What makes this particularly a problem for Nietzsche is that he sees that a certain form of game is
gaining popularity: democratic volleyball. In this game, the rule book insists that all players be treated equally, that
there be no natural authority given to the best players or to those who best understand the nature of quality play.
Hence the mass of inferior players is taking over, the quality of the play is deteriorating, and there are fewer and
fewer good volleyball players. This process is being encouraged both by the traditional ethic of "help your
neighbour" (now often in a socialist uniform) and (as mentioned above) by modern science). As the mass of more
numerous inferior players takes over the sport, the mindless violence of their desires to attack other players and take
over their games increases, as does their hostility to those who are uniquely excellent (who may well need a mask to
prevent themselves being recognized). The hopes for any change in this development are not good. In fact, things
seem to be getting worse. For when Nietzsche looks at all these games going on he notices certain groups of people,
and the prospect is not totally reassuring.
IMPACT (ETHICS): MEANING TO LIFE
Their call to love thy neighbor is an assertion of the need to absorb difference in order to create a secure
order. Only the affirmation of difference and an acceptance of fear can lead to a meaningful existence.
Der Derian, 98 - Director of Watson Institute Global Security program – 1998 (James, former Rhodes Scholar, On
Security, “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard,” ed. Ronnie Lipschutz. ciaonet)
The establishment of the community is dependent upon, indeed it feeds upon, this fear of being left outside. As the
castle wall is replaced by written treaty, however, and distant gods by temporal sovereigns, the martial skills and
spiritual virtues of the noble warrior are slowly debased and dissimulated. The subject of the individual will to
power becomes the object of a collective resentment. The result? The fear of the external other is transvalued
into the "love of the neighbor" quoted in the opening of this section, and the perpetuation of community is assured
through the internalization and legitimation of a fear that lost its original source long ago. This powerful nexus of
fear, of external and internal otherness, generates the values which uphold the security imperative. Indeed, Nietzsche locates the
genealogy of even individual rights, such as freedom, in the calculus of maintaining security: - My rights - are that part of my power which others not merely conceded me, but which they wish
me to preserve. How do these others arrive at that? First: through their prudence and fear and caution: whether in that they expect something similar from us in return (protection of their rights);
or in that they consider that a struggle with us would be perilous or to no purpose; or in that they see in any diminution of our force a disadvantage to themselves, since we would then be unsuited
to forming an alliance with them in opposition to a hostile third power. Then : by donation and cession. 45 The point of Nietzsche's critical genealogy is to show that the perilous conditions that
created the security imperative--and the western metaphysics that perpetuate it--have diminished if not disappeared; yet, the fear of life persists: "Our century denies this perilousness, and does so
Nietzsche's worry is
with a good conscience: and yet it continues to drag along with it the old habits of Christian security, Christian enjoyment, recreation and evaluation." 46
that the collective reaction against older, more primal fears has created an even worse danger: the tyranny of the
herd, the lowering of man, the apathy of the last man which controls through conformity and rules through passivity.
The security of the sovereign, rational self and state comes at the cost of ambiguity, uncertainty, paradox--all that
makes a free life worthwhile. Nietzsche's lament for this lost life is captured at the end of Daybreak in a series of
rhetorical questions: Of future virtues--How comes it that the more comprehensible the world has grown the more
solemnities of every kind have decreased? Is it that fear was so much the basic element of that reverence which
overcame us in the presence of everything unknown and mysterious and taught us to fall down before the
incomprehensible and plead for mercy? And has the world not lost some of its charm for us because we have grown
less fearful? With the diminution of our fearfulness has our own dignity and solemnity, our own fearsomeness , not also diminished? 47 It is of course in Nietzsche's lament, in his
deepest pessimism for the last man, that one finds the celebration of the overman as both symptom and harbinger of a more free-spirited yet fearsome age. Dismissive of utopian engineering,
Nietzsche never suggests how he would restructure society; he looks forward only so far as to sight the emergence of "new philosophers" (such as himself?) who would restore a reverence for
fear and reevaluate the security imperative. Nietzsche does, however, go back to a pre-Christian, pre-Socratic era to find the exemplars for a new kind of security. In The Genealogy of Morals ,
he holds up Pericles as an example, for lauding the Athenians for their "rhathymia "--a term that incorporates the notion of "indifference to and contempt for security." 48 It is perhaps too much
to expect Nietzsche's message to resonate in late modern times, to expect, at the very time when conditions seem most uncertain and unpredictable, that people would treat fear as a stimulus for
Nietzsche would clearly see these as opportune times, when fear could be willfully
improvement rather than cause for retrenchment. Yet
asserted as a force for the affirmation of difference, rather than canalized into a cautious identity constructed from
the calculation of risks and benefits.
IMPACT (ETHICS): DEHUMANIZATION
The notion of acting to save the stranger takes otherness as natural and relies upon the categories of us/them.
This reduces subjects of protection to dehumanized subjects—lives to be saved, but stripped of political
agency.
Edkins, 03 (Jenny, International politics, University of Wales, Journal of Human Rights, v.2 n.2, June).
The debate broadly centers on establishing normative principles that help us decide at what point we should
intervene to help strangers. What are our responsibilities towards those who are not fellow citizens? Should we take
action to help them when to do so would mean intervening in the affairs of another sovereign state? How should we
do this so as to avoid inadvertently doing harm? These questions take for granted that the people we are concerned
to help are what we call ‘strangers’. The assumption is that ‘we’ and ‘they’ are already distinct, before there is any
relationship between us. The only question to be resolved is whether and how ‘we’ should help ‘them’ – and it is not
seen as problematic to look for general, ahistorical rules that will provide solutions to those questions. The sovereign
state system under which we live is one that is based on and produced by such distinctions: between domestic and
foreign, inside and outside, us and them, here and there (Walker 1993). To take for granted these distinctions is
already to frame the whole debate in a way that leads inexorably towards a solution supportive of state sovereignty.
This is why, far from challenging state sovereignty, humanitarianism often reinforces it (Campbell 1997). And I want to suggest that
this is the reason too why an increase in talk of normative criteria and the moral basis of humanitarianism is accompanied so closely by the incorporation of the independent
humanitarian movement in practices of governance: whether those of individual states or those of the interstate community is largely immaterial. Does this mean that all forms of
humanitarianism will in the end succumb to incorporation by the state? Is it possible to envisage a humanitarianism that restores the concept of neutrality and re-establishes an ‘autonomous
humanitarian space’ distinct from state politics, as Rieff suggests (Rieff 2002: 328)? To address this question we need to examine closely what Rieff has in mind here. The success of the
enterprise may well depend on the extent to which it can move away from the assumptions underlying contemporary humanitarianism identified above and develop an approach that does not rely
on the constitution of the subjects of its concern in a way that so closely imitates the production of subjects of the state. The concepts of neutrality and impartiality are often seen as part of an
attempt to render humanitarianism apolitical. As a result of the experience of ‘actually-existing humanitarianism’ over the past twenty-five years, it is now generally accepted that
humanitarian action cannot be separated from politics in the broad sense: it has political consequences. Rieff does not dispute this, and when he argues for a return to a neutral,
independent humanitarianism, I take it he means a humanitarianism that is not closely linked to the politics of the state rather than one that is apolitical. What are the implications of the call for
a neutrality of this sort? Is it possible? Can humanitarianism return to its ‘core values – solidarity, a fundamental sympathy for victims, and an antipathy for oppressors and exploiters’ (Rieff
2002: 334)? Neutrality can be read in different ways, some more conducive to state humanitarianism and others to the independent humanitarianism Rieff advocates. The concept of neutrality
can be seen as drawing on some notion of common humanity – a form of lowest common denominator that all human beings possess and to which humanitarians respond. The human rights
discourse relies on a similar concept of a basic humanity to which rights are attached. This approach is problematic, however. As Rieff points out, it emphasizes the innocence of victims.
’.Those that humanitarianism helps are ‘human beings in
Images of children are particularly potent in this discourse because of their guaranteed ‘innocence
the generic sense’, in a tale ‘devoid of historical context, geographical specificity’ and ‘any real personalization’
(Rieff 2002: 35). In other words they are treated as lives to be saved, lives with no political voice, or what Giorgio
Agamben calls ‘bare life’ (Agamben 1998). This notion of bare humanity risks complicity with state forms – in the
same way as the us/them distinction discussed above. Both the sovereign state and a humanitarianism based on the
concept of a common human essence produce (and depend on) a particular form of subject: one that is excluded
from politics. The narrative of human being as a common essence risks the same exclusionary practices that
produce the sovereignty of the nation-state, with its narratives of national identity, and produces the same
dehumanized and depoliticized subjects.
IMPACT (ETHICS): TURNS CASE

Ethics of acceptance end up displacing more important substantive political solutions, making conflicts
worse.
The retreat from more substantive visions of justice heralded by the promulgation of tolerance today is part of a
more general depoliticization of citizenship and power and retreat from political life itself. The cultivation of
tolerance as a political end implicitly constitutes a rejection of politics as a domain in which conflict can be
productively articulated and addressed, a domain in which citizens can be transformed by their participation, a
domain in which differences are understood as created and negotiated politically, indeed a domain in which
“difference” makes up much of the subject matter. To the contrary, as it casts the political and the social as places
where individuals with fixed identities, interests, and ideas chafe and bargain, tolerance discourse attempts to
remove from the political table as much of our putatively “natural” enmity as it can. This formulation undercuts the
cultivation both of shared citizen power and of a substantive public sphere devoted to the fashioning of democratic
political culture and community. Moreover, the retreat from a political encounter with difference exacerbates the
problem imagined to occasion it. The thinner that public life and citizens’ experience with power and difference
grows, the more citizens withdraw into private identities and a perception of fellow citizens as tools or obstacles to
their private aims, and the more we appear in need of tolerance as a solution to our differences- a solution that
intensifies our estrangements from one another and from public life as a filed of engagement with difference.
The ethical call for tolerance and acceptance of the other is depoliticizing—emotional appeals replace serious
investigation of the conditions that produced injustice in the first place.
Again, if tolerance is never innocent of power or normativity, this serves only to locate it solidly in the realm of the human and hence make it inappropriate for
conceptualizations of morality and virtue that fancy themselves independent of power and subjection. Of itself, however, this revaluation does not yet indicate what the specifically political
problematics of tolerance are. These are set not by the presence of power in the exercise of tolerance but, rather, by the historical, social, and cultural particulars of this presence in specific
deployments of tolerance as well as in discourses with which tolerance intersects, including those of equality, freedom, culture, enfranchisement, and Western civilization. Tolerance as such is
, the call for tolerance, the invocation of tolerance, and the attempt to instantiate tolerance are all signs
not the problem. Rather
of identity production and identity management in the context of orders of stratification or marginalization in which
the production, the management, and the context themselves are disavowed. In short, they are signs of a buried order
of politics. Part of the project of this book, then, is to analyze tolerance, especially in its recently resurgent form, as a strand of depoliticization in liberal democracies. Depoliticization
involves construing inequality, subordination, marginalization, and social conflict, which all require political analysis and political solutions, as personal and individual, on the one hand, or as
natural, religious, or cultural on the other. Tolerance works along both vectors of depoliticization-it personalizes and it naturalizes or culturalizes-and sometimes it intertwines them. Tolerance as
it is commonly used today tends to cast instances of inequality or social injury as matters of individual or group prejudice. And it tends to cast group conflict as rooted in ontologically natural
hostility toward essentialized religious, ethnic, or cultural difference. That is, tolerance discourse reduces conflict to an inherent friction among identities and makes religious, ethnic, and cultural
difference itself an inherent site of conflict, one that calls for and is attenuated by the practice of tolerance. As I will suggest momentarily, tolerance is hardly the cause of the naturalization of
political conflict and the ontologization of politically produced identity in liberal democracies, but it is facilitated by and abets these processes. Although depoliticization sometimes personalizes,
sometimes culturalizes, and sometimes naturalizes conflict, these tactical variations are tethered to a common mechanics, which is what makes it possible to speak of depoliticization as a
coherent phenomenon.13 Depoliticization involves removing a political phenomenon from comprehension of its historical emergence and from a recognition of the powers that produce and
contour it. No matter its particular form and mechanics, depoliticization always eschews power and history in the representation of its subject. When these two constitutive sources of social
relations and political conflict are elided, an ontological naturalness or essentialism almost inevitably takes up residence in our understandings and explanations. In the case at hand, an object of
tolerance analytically divested of constitution by history and power is identified as naturally and essentially different from the tolerating subject; in this difference, it appears as a natural
provocation to that which tolerates it. Moreover, not merely the parties to tolerance but the very scene of tolerance is naturalized, ontologized in its constitution as produced by the problem of
difference itself. When, for example, middle and high schoolers are urged to tolerate one another's race, ethnicity, culture, religion, or sexual orientation, there is no suggestion that the differences
at issue, or the identities through which these differences are negotiated, have been socially and historically constituted and are themselves the effect of power and hegemonic norms, or even of
. In addition to depoliticization as a
certain discourses about race, ethnicity, sexuality, and culture. Rather, difference itself is what students learn they must tolerate
mode of dispossessing the constitutive histories and powers organizing contemporary problems and contemporary
political subjects-that is, depoliticization of sources of political problems-there is a second and related meaning of
depoliticization with which this book is concerned: namely, that which substitutes emotional and personal
vocabularies for political ones in formulating solutions to political problems. When the ideal or practice of tolerance
is substituted for justice or equality, when sensitivity to or even respect for the other is substituted for justice for the
other, when historically induced suffering is reduced to "difference" or to a me- indium of "offense," when suffering
as such is reduced to a problem of personal feeling, then the field of political battle and political transformation is
replaced with an agenda of behavioral, attitudinal, and emotional practices. While such practices often have their
value, substituting a tolerant attitude or ethos for political redress of inequality or violent exclusions not only reifies
politically produced differences but reduces political action and justice projects to sensitivity training, or what
Richard Rorty has called an "improvement in manners."l5 A justice project is replaced with a therapeutic or
behavioral one.
IMPACT (RIGHTS) = EXTERMINATION

Human rights justify wars of extermination. Once the enemy is labeled as an enemy of abstract concepts,
such as “freedom”, they cease to be fully human and are targeted for annihilation.
Finally and most importantly, there is the relation of the concept of humanity to the other, and to war and violence.
In its historical location, the humanity concept had critical purchase against aristocratic prerogatives, but its
utilization by liberal discourses in the individualist tradition, Schmitt feared, could bring about new and
unimaginable modes of exclusion. Rasch explains: The humanism that Schmitt opposes is, in his words, a
philosophy of absolute humanity. By virtue of its universality and abstract normativity, it has no localizable polis, no
clear distinction between what is inside and what is outside. Does humanity embrace all humans? Are there no gates
to the city and thus no barbarians outside? If not, against whom or what does it wage its wars? ‘Humanity as such’
Schmitt noted ‘cannot wage war because it has no enemy, at least not on this planet’. As Ellen Kennedy notes,
humanity ‘is a polemical word that negates its opposite.’ In The Concept of the Political Schmitt argued that
humanity ‘excludes the concept of the enemy, because the enemy does not cease to be a human being’. In the
Nomos, however, it becomes apparent that, historically examined, the concept of humanity could not allow the
notion of justis hostis, of a ‘just enemy’, who is recognized as someone with whom one can make war but also
negotiate peace. Schmitt noted how only when ‘man appeared to be the embodiment of absolute humanity, did the
other side of this concept appear in the form of a new enemy: the inhuman’ (NE 104). It is worth quoting Rasch’s
account at length: We can understand Schmitt’s concerns in the following way: Christianity distinguishes between
believers and nonbelievers. Since nonbelievers can become believers, the must be of the same category of being. To
be human, then, is the horizon within which the distinction between believers and nonbelievers is made. That is,
humanity per se is not part of the distinction, but is that which makes the distinction possible. However, once the
term used to describe the horizon of a distinction also becomes that distinction’s positive pole, it needs its negative
opposite. If humanity is both the horizon and the positive pole of the distinction that that horizon enables, then the
negative pole can only be something that lies beyond that horizon, can only be something completely antithetical to
horizon and positive pole alike— can only, in other words, be inhuman. Without the concept of the just enemy
associated with the notion of nondiscriminatory war, the enemy had no value and could be exterminated. The
concept of humanity, furthermore, reintroduces substantive causes of war because it shutters the formal concept of
justis hostis, now designated substantively as an enemy of humanity as such. In Schmitt’s account of the League of
Nations in the Nomos, he highlights that compared to the kinds of wars that can be waged on behalf of humanity the
Interstate European wars from 1815 to 1914 in reality were regulate; they were bracketed by the neutral Great
Powers and were completely legal procedures in comparison with the modern and gratuitous police actions against
violatiors of peace, which can be dreadful acts of annihilation (NE 186). Enemies of humanity cannot be considered
‘just and equal’ enemies. Moreover, they cannot claim neutrality: one cannot remain neutral in the call to be for or
against humanity or its freedom; one cannot, similarly, claim a right to resist or defend oneself in the sense we
understand this right to have existed in the jus publicum Europeaum. As will examine below in the context of the
war on terror, this denial of the self-defense and resistance ‘can presage a dreadful nihilistic destruction of all law’
(NE 187).

Human rights stands in cooperation with conservative power—all those who oppose rights are labeled as
terrorists to be exterminated.
Meister 02 [Robert, Professor of Philosophy @ UC Santa Cruz, “Human Rights and the Politics of Victimhood,”
Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 16, Iss. 2, pg. 91, proquest]
The political effect of recent Human Rights Discourse is to marginalize as "terrorists" those on both sides of the old
conflict who are still willing to fight on. Terrorism-the remnant of twentieth-century "inhumanity"-is now the
phenomenon against which all civilized nations in the twenty-first century can agree to make "war." The main point,
today, of calling a movement or regime "terrorist" is to drain it of its twentieth-century political content and context.
Indeed, struggles for political and/or cultural autonomy that might recently have claimed the mantle of human rights
are now described (looking forward) as morally equivalent to crimes against humanity insofar as they engage in acts
of "terror" or are hesitant in condemning terrorism elsewhere. In its new proximity to power, the mainstream human
rights establishment speaks with increasing hostility toward movements that it might once have sought to
comprehend. As we begin this new century, Human Rights Discourse is in danger of devolving from an aspirational
ideal to an implicit compromise that allows the victims of past injustice a moral victory on the understanding that the
ongoing beneficiaries get to keep their gains without fear of terrorism. The movement aims, of course, to persuade
the passive supporters of the old order to abjure illegitimate means of counterrevolutionary politics-the repressive
and fraudulent techniques of power that they once condoned or ignored. Insofar as the aim is also to reconcile these passive supporters (including
many beneficiaries) with the victims of past injustice, it nevertheless advances the counterrevolutionary project by other means. The new culture of respect for human rights would, thus, reassure
the beneficiary that the (former) victim no longer poses this threat, and maybe never did. For the victim who was morally undamaged and/or subsequently "healed," the past would be truly over
once its horrors were acknowledged by national consensus. This sought-after consensus on the moral meaning of the past comes at the expense, however, of cutting off future claims that would
. In practice,
normally seem to follow from it. To put the point crudely, the cost of achieving a moral consensus that the past was evil is to reach a political consensus that the evil is past
this political consensus operates to constrain debate in societies that regard themselves as "recovering" from horrible
histories. It means that unreconciled victims who continue to demand redistribution at the expense of beneficiaries will be accused of undermining the consensus that the evil is past; it also
means that continuing beneficiaries who act on their fears that victims are still unreconciled will be accused of undermining the consensus that the past was evil by "blaming the victim.' Indeed,
the substantive meaning of evil itself has changed in the human rights culture that is widely believed to have superseded the Cold War. "Evil" is no longer widely understood to be a system of
social injustice that can have ongoing structural effects, even after the structure is dismantled. Rather, evil is described as a time that is past-or can be put in the past. The present way that born-
again adherents to human rights address surviving victims of past evil is to project a distinction between the "good" (undamaged) and "bad" (unreconciled or recalcitrant) members of the
. To the extent that the emergent human rights project aims to enlist the support of the good victims in
victimized groups
repressing the bad victims as terrorists (and/or criminals, depending on the type of judicial process they will
receive), it is, prima facie, a continuation, by other means, of the twentieth-century project of counterrevolution.

The politics of human rights justifies massive violence—the powerful can wage wars against the inhuman
masses laying outside the circle of rights holders.
Meister 02 [Robert, Professor of Philosophy @ UC Santa Cruz, “Human Rights and the Politics of Victimhood,”
Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 16, Iss. 2, pg. 91, proquest]
The anti-messianic message of the Human Rights Discourse is not entirely the program of peace and reconciliation
that it might seem to be on the surface. It is, also, a declaration of war against a new enemy. Carl Schmitt first
pointed this out in his criticism of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, outlawing war. "The solemn declaration of
outlawing war," he asserted, "does not abolish the friend-enemy distinction, but, on the contrary, opens new
possibilities by giving an international hostis declaration new content and new vigor."30 This criticism applied
equally, in Schmitt's view, to the human rights consensus expressed by the Treaty of Versailles, in 1919, which
established the League of Nations: When a state fights its political enemy in the name of humanity it...seeks to usurp
a universal concept against its military opponent ... in the same way that one can misuse peace, justice, progress, and
civilization in order to claim these as one's own and to deny the same to the enemy. Although Schmitt's own political agenda, which led to
a defense of Nazism, is ultimately despicable, he nevertheless provides a helpful guide to the ideological significance of Human Rights Discourse at a moment of U.S. military and economic
hegemony at the end of the Cold War. This move is, as he well understood, a way to create new political alliances by shifting enemies. The underlying intent of such an international consensus to
protect human rights is not to assert a selfconfident universality, but rather to represent what Schmitt called "a potential or actual alliance, that is, a coalition."32 In the present conjuncture, he is
worth quoting at length on this point: It is...erroneous to believe that a political position founded on economic superiority is "essentially unwarlike"... [It] will naturally attempt to sustain a
worldwide condition which enables it to apply and manage, unmolested, its economic means, e.g., terminating credit, embargoing raw materials, destroying the currencies of others, and so on.
Every attempt of a people to withdraw itself from the effects of such "peaceful methods" is considered by this imperialism as extraeconomic power.... Modern means of annihilation have been
the rhetorical demands that Human Rights
produced by enormous investments of capital and intelligence, surely to be used if necessary.33 Schmitt anticipated
Discourse would place on liberal politicians still fighting, as Woodrow Wilson did, "to make the world safe for
democracy"-but now in the name of a "world community" defending "humanity" as such. As he explains: For the
application of such means, a new and essentially pacifist vocabulary has been created. War is condemned but
executions, sanctions, punitive expeditions, pacifications, protection of treaties, international police, and measures to
assure peace remain. The adversary is thus no longer called an enemy but a disturber of peace and is thereby
designated to be an outlaw of humanity.... But this allegedly non-political... system cannot escape the logic of the
political.34 Schmitt's analysis, above, might be read today as a forecast: Although we are now able to fight wars
only on the condition that they are not described as such, these wars do not thereby "escape the logic of the
political." Schmitt's powerful critique of the depoliticizing project of what was, in his time, the precursor to Human
Rights Discourse went some way toward repoliticizing it, at least in Weimar Germany. Perhaps because of his own
dalliance in the politics of victimhood in its most pernicious form, Schmitt did not fully understand a deeper
implication of his own argument: that adopting a Human Rights Discourse gives survivors of past barbarity the
consciousness of victims. It is they, the newly vulnerable, who must now be protected from being violated by the
"inhuman." "Whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat;' Schmitt says. "To... invoke and monopolize such a term
probably has certain incalculable effects, such as denying the enemy the quality of being human and declaring him
to be an outlaw of humanity; and a war can thereby be driven to the most extreme inhumanity."35
ALT SOLVES: REALISM
Nietzsche is compatible with realism—it is the 1ACs quest for democracy and universal rights that is idealist.
What significance should we make of the fact that the shortest section of the NSS (barely a page and a half) is on the
"nonnegotiable demands of human dignity" and rights, including "free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice;
respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property" (3). Are these rights so self-
evident and inalienable that they do not warrant further clarification or justification? It would seem so: "History has not been kind to those
nations which ignored or flouted the rights and aspirations of their people" (3). And yet this universalist avowal of rights requires a selective if not outright denial of history. Where was the U.S.
support of freedom, justice, and religious and ethnic tolerance when it supported Saddam Hussein in his earlier war against Iran? When it provided intelligence, arms, and the precursors for
chemical weapons of mass destruction? When it abandoned the Shiites in the south and the Kurds in the north of Iraq after the first Gulf War? Most significant is that these rights are considered
"nonnegotiable," making war, if not the first, certainly more of a viable option when these rights are violated. In this regard, President Bush's NSS is a continuation rather than a repudiation of
President Clinton's National Security Strategy of the United States 1994–1995: Engagement and Enlargement. To be sure, Clinton's National Security Strategy places greater emphasis on
"preventive diplomacy" and multilateral intervention than Bush's preference for preemptive war and unilateralist predispositions. But the virtuous imperatives are in full evidence in the Clinton
strategy: "All of America's strategic interests—from promoting prosperity at home to checking global threats abroad before they threaten our territory—are served by enlarging the community of
democratic and free market nations. Thus, working with new democratic states to help preserve them as democracies committed to free markets and respect for human rights, is a key part of our
1
." It is hardly surprising, then, that many liberals, both within the government and the university,
national security strategy
supported the war against Iraq, and hardly unfair to question the extent to which Clinton and other moral
interventionists prepared the high ground for this war. As a microcosm, consider one of the most visible splits in the
ranks at top American universities, when such "moral" liberals as Joseph Nye, Michael Ignatieff, and Samantha
Power came out in support of the war, whereas such "amoral" realists as Stanley Hoffmann, Steve Walt, and John
Mearsheimer publicly opposed it. Nietzsche, who always detected the smell of the swamp in all talk of virtue, finds
in The Twilight of the Idols a "bestowing virtue" in the realist's "courage in the face of reality": "My recreation, my
preference, my cure from all Platonism has always been Thucydides. Thucydides, and perhaps the Principe of
Machiavelli, are related to me closely by their unconditional will not to deceive themselves and to see reason in
reality—not in ‘reason,' still less in ‘morality.' . . ." 2
ALT SOLVES: ETHICS

A refusal to close the question of ethics creates continual interrogation of values that has greater potential to
transform relationships of power.
Scott—90(Charles E., professor of Philosophy at Pennsylvania State University, “The Question of Ethics:
Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger,” Ed. John Sallis, p. 7-8)
In the question of ethics, the emphasis falls on a continuing process of thinking that diagnoses, criticizes; clarifies by
means of questions, destructures the components of meaning and power that silently shape our lives together, and
also questions the values and concepts that have rule-governing and axiomatic power in our culture. The emphasis
does not fall on the possible complete systematic accounts that prescribe definitive solutions to problems , 'right'
structures of value, originary or utopian visions of preferred types of personal identity. Thinking and writing, rather,
take place in the questionableness and the problems that arise in the constellations of belief, knowledge, and
evaluation that constitute us and set the parameters for what we may legitimately desire and the manners in which
we normally relate to people and things. The question of ethics does not arise outside of ethics, but from within it.
Its thought is disciplined by efforts to maintain questionableness, by learning how to ask questions in given settings,
and by finding its own heritage and its problems. Learning to name things anew, to become alert to exclusions and
to forgotten aspects in a people's history, to overhear what is usually drowned out by the predominant values, to
rethink what is ordinarily taken for granted, to find out how to hold itself in question: these are aspects of the
thought of the question of ethics. There is a subversiveness in such processes vis-à-vis the normal and ordinary, a
subversiveness not unlike that of poets and philosophers who are routinely excluded or silenced by totalitarian
regimes. But subversiveness is neither a goal nor an ideal for the question of ethics. Its goal is to rethink, rework,
rewrite, to listen again to the cultural inevitabilities that make us who we are and to affirm the transformative
process without sense of origin or teleology.
By removing absolute moral values, the alternative forces us to investigate ethics.

Scott—89 (Charles E., professor of Philosophy at Pennsylvania State University, “On the Advantages and
Disadvantages of Ethics and Politics,” p. 95)
Without ultimate value, people and beings are heard in the ‘mere’ quality of their life struggles. Their hierarchies
and roles are at best conveniences in a given way of life. Without sanctity their anguish and happiness can be clearly
heard— not necessarily heard, but possibly heard— in the interruption of the inherited claims to ultimacy, claims
that suggest a staggered range of importance concerning who is anguished or happy. An absence of ultimate
importance levels us all, discloses us all without the sanctions of the many orders of our lives. In such an
interruption of ethics the ascetic ideal of Heidegger’s approach to being, this part of our Western ethos, is
momentarily suspended, and the question of ethics affects the beginning of steps that one might take toward
retrieving something in our tradition that has been lost. The lostness, our common lack of essence, not what has been
lost, affects us and provokes us to think in that moment.
ALT SOLVES: RESPECT FOR THE OTHER

Nietzschean politics treat the Other as a worthy opponent in democratic discourse. It creates a deeper respect
than appeals to equality.
Hatab, 02 (Prospects For A Democratic Agon: Why We Can Still Be Nietzscheans, Lawrence J. Hatab, The Journal
of Nietzsche Studies 24 (2002) 132-147, Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Old Dominion University).
I think that Nietzsche's attack on democracy ought to be challenged, but not by reasserting democratic traditions, but
by showing that much of Nietzsche's cultural and philosophical outlook is compatible with, even constitutive of,
much of democratic politics. So the distinction between cultural and political spheres allows us to challenge some of
Nietzsche's political vision; but overlaps between the spheres show that Nietzsche's authoritarianism is weakened by
his own philosophical orientation, and that democratic political life can exhibit certain creative, nonegalitarian, and
agonistic elements to a degree that may warrant calling it Nietzschean enough to support a democratic appropriation of Nietzsche (thus answering Appel's challenge). Assuming that
politics should not be restricted and reserved for an elite, but open to the participation of all citizens, can we retain a sense of respect and political rights in appropriating Nietzsche for
, Nietzschean conceptions of agonistics and nonfoundational openness can go a long way toward
democracy? I think so. In fact
articulating and defending democratic practices without the problems attaching to traditional principles of equality.
If political respect implies inclusiveness and an open regard for the rightful participation of others, an agonistic
model of politics can underwrite respect without the need for substantive conceptions of equality or even something
like "equal regard." I have already mentioned that agonistics can be seen as a fundamentally social phenomenon.
Since the self is formed in and through tensional relations with others, then any annulment of my Other would be an
annulment of myself. Radical agonistics, then, discounts the idea of sheer autonomy and self-constitution. Such a
tensional sociality can much more readily affirm the place of the Other in social relations than can modern models of subject-based
freedom. Moreover, the structure of an agon conceived as a contest can readily underwrite political principles of fairness. Not only do I need an Other to prompt my own achievement, but the
significance of any "victory" I might achieve demands an able opponent. As in athletics, defeating an incapable or incapacitated competitor winds up being meaningless. So I should not only will
the presence of others in an agon, I should also want that they be able adversaries, that they have opportunities and capacities to succeed in the contest. And I should be able to honor the winner
of a fair contest. Such is the logic of competition that contains a host of normative features, which might even include active provisions for helping people in political contests become more able
participants. 25 In addition, agonistic respect need not be associated with something like positive regard or equal worth, a dissociation that can go further in facing up to actual political conditions
and problematic connotations that can attach to liberal dispositions. Again allow me to quote my previous work. Democratic respect forbids exclusion, it demands inclusion; but respect for the
." Agonistic respect allows us to simultaneously
Other as other can avoid a vapid sense of "tolerance," a sloppy "relativism," or a misplaced spirit of "neutrality
affirm our beliefs and affirm our opponents as worthy competitors in public discourse. Here we can speak of respect
without ignoring the fact that politics involves perpetual disagreement, and we have an adequate answer to the question "Why should I respect a
view that I do not agree with?" In this way beliefs about what is best (aristos) can be coordinated with an openness to other beliefs and a willingness to accept the outcome of an open competition
among the full citizenry (demos). Democratic respect, therefore, is a dialogical mixture of affirmation and negation, a political bearing that entails giving all beliefs a hearing, refusing any belief
, we can combine 1) the historical tendency
an ultimate warrant, and perceiving one's own viewpoint as agonistically implicated with opposing viewpoints. In sum
of democratic movements to promote free expression, pluralism, and liberation from traditional constraints, and 2) a
Nietzschean perspectivism and agonistic respect, to arrive at a postmodern model of democracy that provides both a
nonfoundational openness and an atmosphere of civil political discourse.
Nietzsche’s concept of will to power can only manifest itself through social relations—it requires the presence
and engagement with the other.
How can we begin to apply the notion of agonistics to politics in general and democracy in particular? First of all,
contestation and competition can be seen as fundamental to self-development and as an intrinsically social
phenomenon. Agonistics helps us articulate the social and political ramifications of Nietzsche's concept of will to
power. As Nietzsche put it in an 1887 note, "will to power can manifest itself only against resistances; it seeks that
which resists it" (KSA 12, p.424). Power, therefore, is not simply an individual possession or a goal of action; it is
more a global, interactive conception. For Nietzsche, every advance in life is an overcoming of some obstacle or
counterforce, so that conflict is a mutual co-constitution of contending forces. Opposition generates development.
The human self is not formed in some internal sphere and then secondarily exposed to external relations and
conflicts. The self is constituted in and through what it opposes and what opposes it; in other words, the self is
formed through agonistic relations. Therefore, any annulment of one's Other would be an annulment of one's self in
this sense. Competition can be understood as a shared activity for the sake of fostering high achievement and self-
development, and therefore as an intrinsically social activity.
ALT SOLVES: VALUE TO LIFE

Suffering and loss are inevitable parts of a chaotic world—our alternative enables us to find meaning and
lead a joyful life despite crises.
Groff 04 – Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Bucknell University – 2004 (Peter S, Journal of Nietzsche Studies,
“Al-Kindi and Nietzsche on the Stoic Art of Banishing Sorrow,” Issue 28, Autumn 2004, pg. 139-173)
Nietzsche goes on to reflect on the lies and "deadly silence" with which the advocates of extirpation have tried to
hide the "over-rich happiness" [überreiche Glück] of passionate people, and concludes: "Is our life really painful and
burdensome enough to make it advantageous to exchange it for a Stoic way of life and petrification? We are not so
badly off that we have to be as badly off as Stoics" (GS 326). But Nietzsche is merely scratching the surface here,
for the more fundamental question is whether suffering is something that necessarily ought to be ameliorated. In an
earlier aphorism from the same book, Nietzsche ostensibly accepts the Stoics' doctrine of the inextricable bond between pleasure and pain, while at the same time drawing a radically different
conclusion: [W]hat if pleasure [Lust] and displeasure [Unlust] were so tied together that whoever wanted to have as much as possible of one must also have as much as possible of the other—that
whoever wanted to learn to "jubilate up to the heavens" would also have to be prepared for "depression unto death"? And that is how things may well be. At least the Stoics believed that this was
you have a
how things were, and they were consistent when they also desired as little pleasure as possible, in order to get as little displeasure as possible out of life.... To this day
choice: either as little displeasure as possible, painlessness in brief ... or as much displeasure as possible as the price
for the growth of an abundance of subtle pleasures [Lüsten] and joys [Freuden] that have rarely been relished yet. If
you decide for the former and desire to diminish and lower the level of human pain [Schmerzhaftigkeit], you also
have to diminish and lower the level of their capacity for joy. Nietzsche concludes this aphorism with a rumination on the power of science to promote
either goal: it can make us "colder, more like a statue, more Stoic," but it also has the "immense capacity for making new galaxies of joy flare up" (GS 12). To some extent, the Stoics function in
this passage as a foil for Nietzsche's imperative to experiment—or "live dangerously," as he famously puts it (GS 283)—and one is reminded of Nietzsche's reflections on the health of the soul,
where he poses the troubling question of the potential value of illness (GS 120). However, in spite of this we can already begin to see a more fundamental agreement between Nietzsche and the
Stoics that underlies their internecine dispute and indeed makes it possible in the first place. Nietzsche's claim that "much displeasure" is a prerequisite for our capacity to experience great joy
recalls his claim that suffering is a condition for the possibility of human greatness. Yet this assertion is not necessarily at odds with Stoic ethics, for whenever Nietzsche extols the virtues of
suffering (insofar as it makes us profound and contributes to the growth and intensification of power), his primary target is the morality of pity. And Nietzsche and the Stoics are actually in
accordance in their low estimation of the value of pity [Mitleid] (D 139).75 Thus in order to understand Nietzsche's Stoicism, it is crucial to distinguish between eliminating suffering and
banishing sorrow. Nietzsche explicitly rejects the former program, inasmuch as it makes us small, mediocre, and ignoble. However, while Nietzsche valorizes suffering, he by no means
. The essential Nietzschean orientation toward the world is not one of recoiling, sadness, or regret, but
advocates sorrow
rather one of affirmation, gaiety, cheerfulness, and joy. In order to make sense of this apparent tension in his
thought, we might provisionally think of suffering as a brute, inescapable fact of embodied existence, and sorrow as
one optional interpretation of that experience. In other words, sorrow and joy both have to do with one's
interpretation and evaluation of the meaning and value of suffering. The Stoic can no more eliminate suffering than
he can eliminate loss. As became clear in al-Kindī's epistle, loss is necessary and inevitable, but sorrow is not. In a
similar way, the Nietzschean "ideal" is to become strong and healthy enough joyfully to affirm the entirety of
existence—even its "accursed and loathsome aspects," including suffering (KSA 13.16[32], cf. EH P3). To attain
this standpoint, I suggest, is to banish sorrow.
ALT SOLVES: INTOLERANCE

Affirmation of difference enables a more robust conception of tolerance. We do not advocate a nihilistic
abandonment of values but the simple acceptance that others will have competing values.
Hatab, 02 (Lawrence J. Professor of Philosophy at Old Dominion Univrsity 2002 Prospects for a Democratic Agon
Why We can still be Nietzscheans: The Journal of Nietzsche p.MUSE)
In fact, Nietzschean conceptions of agonistics and nonfoundational openness can go a long way toward articulating
and defending democratic practices without the problems attaching to traditional principles of equality. If political respect
implies inclusiveness and an open regard for the rightful participation of others, an agonistic model of politics can underwrite respect without the need for substantive conceptions of equality or
even something like "equal regard." I have already mentioned that agonistics can be seen as a fundamentally social phenomenon. Since the self is formed in and through tensional relations with
others, then any annulment of my Other would be an annulment of myself. Radical agonistics, then, discounts the idea of sheer autonomy and self-constitution. Such a tensional sociality can
much more readily affirm the place of the Other in social relations than can modern models of subject-based freedom. Moreover, the structure of an agon conceived as a contest can readily
underwrite political principles of fairness. Not only do I need an Other to prompt my own achievement, but the significance of any "victory" I might achieve demands an able opponent. As in
athletics, defeating an incapable or incapacitated competitor winds up being meaningless. So I should not only will the presence of others in an agon, I should also want that they be able
adversaries, that they have opportunities and capacities to succeed in the contest. And I should be able to honor the winner of a fair contest. Such is the logic of competition that contains a host of
normative features, which might even include active provisions for helping people in political contests become more able participants. 25 In addition, agonistic respect need not be associated
with something like positive regard or equal worth, a dissociation that can go further in facing up to actual political conditions and problematic connotations that can attach to liberal
respect for the Other as other can avoid a
dispositions. Again allow me to quote my previous work. Democratic respect forbids exclusion, it demands inclusion; but
vapid sense of "tolerance," a sloppy "relativism," or a misplaced spirit of "neutrality." Agonistic respect allows us to
simultaneously affirm our beliefs and affirm our opponents as worthy competitors in public discourse. Here we can
speak of respect without ignoring the fact that politics involves perpetual disagreement, and we have an adequate
answer to the question "Why should I respect a view that I do not agree with?" In this way beliefs about what is best
(aristos) can be coordinated with an openness to other beliefs and a willingness to accept the outcome of an open
competition among the full citizenry (demos). Democratic respect, therefore, is a dialogical mixture of affirmation
and negation, a political bearing that entails giving all beliefs a hearing, refusing any belief an ultimate warrant, and
perceiving one's own viewpoint as agonistically implicated with opposing viewpoints. In sum, we can combine 1)
the historical tendency of democratic movements to promote free expression, pluralism, and liberation from
traditional constraints, and 2) a Nietzschean perspectivism and agonistic respect, to arrive at a postmodern model of
democracy that provides both a nonfoundational openness and an atmosphere of civil political discourse. 26 An
agonistic politics construed as competitive fairness can sustain a robust conception of political rights, not as
something "natural" possessed by an original self, but as an epiphenomenal, procedural notion conferred upon
citizens in order to sustain viable political practice. Constraints on speech, association, access, and so on, simply insure lopsided political contests. We can avoid
metaphysical models of rights and construe them as simply social and political phenomena: social in the sense of entailing reciprocal recognition and obligation; political in the sense of being
guaranteed and enforced by the state. We can even defend so-called positive rights, such as a right to an adequate education, as requisite for fair competition in political discourse. Rights
themselves can be understood as agonistic in that a right-holder has a claim against some treatment by others or for some provision that might be denied by others. In this way rights can be
construed as balancing power relations in social milieus, as a partial recession of one's own power on behalf of the power of others—which in fact is precisely how Nietzsche in an early work
described fairness and rights (D 112). And, as is well known, the array of rights often issues conflicts of different and differing rights, and political life must engage in the ongoing balancing act
of negotiating these tensions, a negotiation facilitated by precisely not defining rights as discrete entities inviolably possessed by an originating self. Beyond political rights, a broader conception
of rights, often designated as human rights as distinct from political practice, can also be defended by way of the kind of nonfoundational, negative sense of selfhood inspired by Nietzsche. For
Nietzsche, the self is a temporal openness infused with tragic limits, rather than some metaphysical essence, stable substance, or eternal entity. A via negativa can be utilized to account for rights
as stemming not from what we are but from what we are not. So much of abusive or exclusionary treatment is animated by confident designations and reductions as to "natures" having to do with
race, gender, class, role, character, and so on. [End Page 143] Nonfoundational challenges to "identity" may seem unsettling, but if we consider how identities figure in injustices, a good deal of
work can be done to reconfigure rights as based in resistance. It is difficult to find some positive condition that can
justify rights and do so without excluding or suppressing some other conditions. But a look at human history and
experience can more readily understand rights and freedom as emerging out of the irrepressible tendency of human
beings to resist and deny the adequacy of external attributions as to what or who they "are." It may be sufficient to
defend rights simply in terms of the human capacity to say No.
ALT SOLVES: NIHILISM
By embracing self-overcoming, we escape the nihilistic tendency to dwell on death and destruction. Nietzsche
calls upon us to embrace life by affirming its chaotic elements and create meaning despite inevitable
suffering.
Scott, 90 (Charles E., professor of Philosophy at Pennsylvania State University, “The Question of Ethics: Nietzsche,
Foucault, Heidegger,” Ed. John Sallis, p. 173-174)
One pathogenic aspect of our Western ethos that we have followed is the ascetic ideal. It is characterized by many
types of refusal and denial regarding the manner in which human life occurs, and on Nietzsche's account the ascetic
ideal reinforces this denial with a habitual insistence on the continuous presence of meaning in all dimensions of life
and being. In our ascetic withdrawal from life we join forces with hopelessness, suffering, death, and helplessness
by giving them meaning, in our appropriation of them, that far exceeds their occurrence and that subordinates them
within a scheme of meaning and hope. The rule governing the ascetic ideal is found in its incorporation and blind
expression of the hopelessness and meaninglessness that it is designed to overcome. This incorporation of what it is
constitutes the ideal's nihilism for Nietzsche: the affirmations within the ascetic ideal project their opposites and
produce a spiral of unwitting and inevitable violence in the spirituality that they create . The denial of life
within the boundaries of the ascetic ideal continuously reestablishes the power of the ideal. But when this
movement is broken by a self-overcoming like that in Nietzsche's genealogy of the ascetic ideal, the rule of the
ascetic ideal is interrupted and a possibility is opened for life-affirmations that do not suppress the most fearful
occurrences involved in being alive. The joyousness of life without the illusion of continuous meaning, the joyousness that Nietzsche found in early Greek culture, was
lost, according to his reading, in the course of the increasing cultural dominance of those whose nerve has failed before the disheartening flow of life. The ascetic ideal expresses this failure in its
insistence on meaning and in its persistent manufacture of hope out of illusions bred of the failure. Heidegger is perhaps at his most non-Nietzschean point when in his Rector's address he turns to
the Greek division between the everyday and the question of being. This is an ironic moment in Heidegger's thought: he traces the origins of his own move to separate the future of the German
university from the German Volkstum, (that is, from dominant popular culture) to the emergence of the separation of thought from everyday life in Greek culture. But this move is not associated
with the joyousness that Nietzsche uses as his reference in delimiting the ascetic ideal. According to Nietzsche's genealogy we have lost an earthly affirmation of life in the midst of the specific
suffering of everyday existence. Nietzsche countenances fully the brutality, the fateful shattering of hope, the disappointments that break people's lives, the individual and social tragedies. The
debilitation of minds and bodies is juxtaposed to people's savoring food and drink, enjoying sexual pleasure. It is juxtaposed to friendship, the energy of ambition, the struggle between
. Nietzsche's move is toward affirmation in the midst of chaotic
competitors, the mixture of desperation and exhilaration in efforts of accomplishment
living when he speaks of what is lost in the blind and self-deceived chaos of asceticism that is ordered by the illusion
of continuous meaning. In this affirmation one has an awareness, presumably a full awareness, of the otherness to
human interest that radically distresses us. People's attention is delimited by it. Rather than escape or turn away from
it, people are delimited by it in their relations with things. Rather than appropriate the suffering of life in ascetic self-
denial, human beings stand over against its otherness, its unthinkableness, its density. They need not attempt to
embody it in forms that seem to shape it to human and thinkable dimensions. They live in the inappropriable,
meaningless dark vacuity, with it and other to it, out of it and in it. They are angel and animal, Nietzsche said. Not to
be lost, not to be redeemed, not to be overcome, it is juxtaposed to a will to live, an affirmation with, and not in spite
of, the chaos.
ALT SOLVES: NIHILISM
Rejecting a quest for truth and asking “why not rather untruth? or uncertainty?” realizes the positive potential of the
death of God and avoids a slide into nihilism.
Saurette 96 (“'I Mistrust all Systematizers and Avoid Them': Nietzsche, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in
International Relations Theory”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 25 i. 1, March 1996
Paul)
The danger of the late-modern nihilistic Will to Truth is that this reactive 'will to negation', while yearning for a truthful
foundation, can only destroy and negate. Even anthropocentric recreations of authoritative Truth, such as faith in progress,
utilitarian happiness-for-everyone, socialist utopias, or Kant's secularised teleologies, cannot survive the scrutiny of this
nihilistic Will to Truth. As Michael Haar notes, [a]fter having killed God-i.e. after having recognized the nothingness of the
'true world'-and after having placed himself where God once was, Man continues to be haunted by his iconoclastic act: he
cannot venerate himself, and soon ends up by turning his impiety against himself and smashing this new idol.64 The radical
and untempered scepticism of scientific Will to Truth undermines the foundational meanings of the modern world and thus
threatens modern life with the prospect of unconditional nihilism. The Will to Truth must become 'conscious of itself as a
problem' if it is to avoid this fate.65 And with the historical stage of late modernity, we are able to explore the possibilities of
this self-overcoming of the Will to Truth. As Nietzsche states, '[w]e finally come to a complete stop before a still more basic
question. We ask about the value of this will. Suppose we want Truth: why not rather untruth? and uncertainty? even
ignorance?'66 In this question, Nietzsche at last sees the positive potential of the death of God. For while the danger of
nihilism is ever-present, Nietzsche suggests that the fact that' a new problem arises: that of the value of truth, allows us to
question the previously 'natural' belief that we must ground philosophical foundations in the notion of a dichotomised world
in which only ideal and 'true' values can structure and guide human interaction. Nietzsche forces the Will to Truth to 'draw its
most striking inference, its inference against itself... [and) pose the question "what is the meaning of all truth?"'68 In doing
so, he problematises the authority and the value of a dichotomised model of action structured unquestioningly by a
conception of normative Truth. Nietzsche's paradoxical charge is thus to overcome the Will to Truth and found a renewed
philosophical will to power, while simultaneously avoiding the abyss of modern nihilism. For us moderns, exposed without
the reassurance of God or Truth, 'it is a rendezvous, it seems, of questions and question marks' .69 Questions and Question
Marks: The Will to Truth of 'Anti-Foundationalism' If the self-overcoming of the Will to Order has undermined the
foundation from which pol itics-as-making emerged, and on which it is dependent, then it is clear that our normative
understanding of political action must be profoundly rearticulated. From this perspective, the central question before
normative IR theory in late modernity is to understand political action without the assurances of Truth or Reason, while
simultaneously avoiding the slide into decadent nihilism and scientific meaninglessness. Some might suggest, however, that
this is exactly the project of many of the 'dissident' scholars of IR. On the one hand, I agree that such a 'post-modern' ethic is
necessary, possible, and emergent in some of the critical literature. In fact, an inextricable component of much of this
scholarship is its self-consciously normative stance. Moreover, the frequent, if rarely elaborated, calls for tolerance,
difference, dialogue, otherness, thinking space, radicalised democracy, etc., clearly delineate at least several ethical
agendas.70
ALT SOLVES: DEMOCRACY
Abandoning the will to truth opens up the possibility of genuine democracy—accepting discord and uncertainty is
deeply liberating.
Paul)
In this context, plurality and natality cannot be realised, because individualisation becomes atomisation through autonomy,
which destroys any possibility of a simultaneous and comprehensive realisation of human universality. Arendt therefore
reconceptualises freedom not as the liberal utopia of absolute liberation, sovereignty, and autonomy, but rather as the process
of free spontaneity and creation through communal political interaction.90 In this sense, Arendt profoundly reconsiders
freedom and equality, and grounds them not as ideal goals, but rather as constitutive elements of the process of political
interaction. In doing so, she manages to revitalise the foundation for equality and freedom, while focusing on the importance
of the participatory process, not the ideal end, of political action. This is not to suggest that Arendt's work represents the 'next
stage' of IR theory. Rather, Arendt's importance is that she recognises both the necessity of foundation and the fact that the
self-overcoming of the Will to Truth/Order undermines the traditional conception of foundationalism. By offering a renewed
foundation-the importance of politics as a process through which to resolve the existential experience of plurality-without
grounding it in an untenable Will to Order/Truth, Arendt forwards an important and appropriate reconsideration of the
'political' which underlines the historicity of politics-as-making, while also offering a renewed model of the possibility of
politics. Fusing politics and philosophy by recognising the politics of philosophy as well as the potentially philosophical role
of politics, Arendt fulfils Nietzsche's call and affirms both the Death of God and the end of politics-as-making while avoiding
a decadent and nihilistic will to nothingness. The question is not, therefore, whether Arendt's foundation is 'true' and thus
represents the only response to late modernity. Rather, we must consider whether we could use this understanding to
reground and reconceptualise the normative possibilities of political action. For if Arendt and Nietzsche stress anything, it is
that the question of foundation no longer relies on the threadbare and familiar chorus of Truth. Instead, it must be open to the
harmony and discord of political debate. IR theory cannot ignore this historical context. Although the discipline has long
employed the claim to a 'discrete area of analysis' as a bulwark against unwanted 'meta-theoretical' criticism, this self-
imposed monasticism is not justifiable, IR theory can claim to profoundly contemplate normative questions only if we
reconsider and problematise the most basic assumptions and philosophical foundations of IR theory. For it is clear that the
Will to Order and its characterisation of politics-as-making is neither a natural nor neutral origin. To realise this is to assert
the historical importance and influence of any underpinning philosophy and to recognise the contemporary need for a
sustained reconsideration of the possibilities, and limitations, of political action. If I have turned to Arendt and Nietzsche as
guides in this endeavour, it is because they recognise that to live in late modernity, to live in a political realm with neither
authority nor the concomitant awareness that the source of authority transcends power and those who are in power, means to
be confronted anew, without the religious trust in a sacred beginning and without the protection of traditional and therefore
self evident standards of behaviour, by the elementary problems of human living together.91 This, above all else, is the
challenge and the potential of the Death of God.
ALT SOLVES: NEW POLITICS
Radically questioning ethics and values opens up space for new political possibilities.
Fellow “Nietzsche for Politics” in “Why Nietzsche Still?” Edited by Alan Schrift, pg. 209-211)
To pursue these possibilities, I want to consider first Nietzsche the genealogical "psychologist," the thinker who deploys speculative genealogies to probe the psychological production of values
such as justice, equality, or Christian morality. What is the significance of Nietzsche's diagnostic pose and genealogical approach for reconceiving a relation ship of theory to politics? How does
genealogy itself refigure the relation between the intellectual and the political? How does genealogy's crossing of philosophy and history open up the political present without it self taking the
"We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge," Nietzsche begins On the Genealogy of Morals,
place of politics?
"and with good reason. We have never sought ourselves" (GM PI). It is this ignorance that Nietzsche seeks to
redress with his genealogical tracings of the desires (not only the unmediated will to power but also its thwarted
forms-envy, resentment, jealousy, and revenge) that materialize into the moral and political formations of equality,
liberal justice, and the state. Unlike other genres of philosophical or historical criticism, including those delineated
in his own "Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life," genealogy permits an examination of our condition
that interrogates its very terms and construction. Genealogy reveals the terms by which we live by rupturing them,
by doing violence to their ordinary ordering and situation. In this, genealogy paradoxically aims to dislocate that
which is both its starting point and its object: the present. And in that dislocation, it also dislocates the conventions
of politics, morality, and epistemology constitutive of the present. Nietzsche's intentions with genealogy can also be figured as calling into question the familiar through a complex of
strategic reversals. Consider section 6 of the preface to On the Genealogy of Morals, which begins, This problem of the value of pity and of the morality of pity ... seems at first to be merely
whoever sticks with it and learns how to ask questions here will experience what I
something detached; an isolated question mark; but
experienced-a tremendous new prospect opens up for him, a new possibility comes over him like a vertigo, every
kind of mistrust, suspicion, fear leaps up, his belief in morality, in all morality, falters-finally a new demand
becomes audible. (GM P6) In this account of genealogical movement, Nietzsche reminds us that genealogy is, at
bottom, a form of artful questioning, a way of asking "what really happened there" about a commonplace. He reminds us too that when this
question truly grips the questioner, it disturbs a much larger nest of beliefs than that with which the genealogist begins. One might think here not only of Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals but of
Foucault's History of Sexuality and the way that each calls into question the structure and function of conventional beliefs and standard histories about their subject- and not only the beliefs and
. The questioning Nietzsche recommends is necessarily of a historical kind. specified in the next portion
histories themselves
of the passage quoted above: let us articulate this new demand [that has become audible by virtue of questioning the
value of the morality of pity]: we need a critique of moral values, the value of these values themselves must first be
called in question-and for that there is needed a knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in which they grew,
under which they evolved and changed (morality as consequence, as symptom, as mask, as tartufferie, as illness, as misunderstanding; but also morality as cause, as
remedy, as stimulant, as restraint, as poison), a knowledge of a kind that has never yet existed or even been desired. (GM P6; latter two emphases added) Calling into question a
commonplace (in this case the value of the morality of pity) produces a new political possibility (a critique of
morality as such), which in turn produces a need for a new kind of knowledge (a particular kind of history of
morality). A radical critique of moral values requires knowing the history of how they were occasioned, the
conditions under which they grew, changed, and took hold-precisely the history that must be buried by values
that naturalize themselves as universal and transhistorical. But there is something else highlighted by this
passage: the movement between knowledge and politics, between questioning and demand, consists of an
oscillation that does not collapse these terms into one another. Questioning produces an experience of vertigo; the
vertigo produces a demand; the demand requires new knowledge; Ind the new knowledge can materialize into a new
worldview. The questioning and the political demand incite each other, but the chain of incitation would be aborted if the movement
collapsed through direct politicization of knowledge or a reduction of politics to questioning. Nietzsche continues: One has taken the value of these "values" as given, as factual, as beyond all
question; one has hitherto never doubted or hesitated in the slightest degree in supposing "the good man" to be of greater value than "the evil man," of greater value in the sense of furthering the
advancement and prosperity of man in general. ... But what if the reverse were true? What if a symptom of regression were inherent in the "good," likewise a danger, a seduction, a poison, a
narcotic, through which the present was possibly living at the expense of the future? ... So that precisely morality would be to blame if the highest power and splendor actually possible to the
type man was never in fact attained? So that precisely morality was the danger of dangers? (GM P6)
ALT SOLVES: NEW POLITICS
Over-turning ethical absolutes is critical to personal and political transformation.

Fellow “Nietzsche for Politics” in “Why Nietzsche Still?” Edited by Alan Schrift, pg. 211-212)
Three different instances of genealogy's strategy of reversal emerge in this passage. Nietzsche reverses the givenness
of everyday values, upsetting their unchallengeable status in an effort to disclose the power this status carries and
covers. Whatever has been accepted "as factual, as beyond all question," shall now be posed as a question, as
a fiction, as utterly dubious because utterly contingent. But if reversals function as a form of questioning, they
also emerge as part of the answer to the question. Hence the morally good is made to appear regressive and
dangerous, rather than progressive and valuable, while morality itself appears as that which might inhibit rather than
foment or express the “power and splendor" of man. Finally, genealogy also conjures a reversal in the accepted
course of history-it challenges progressive accounts with intimations of regression, as in suggesting that the present
may be "living off the future" rather than paving that future. If Nietzsche in this preface articulates some of the critical workings III genealogy and
especially its refiguration of the relation between knowledge and politics, such moments of self-consciousness about this relation are relatively rare, Foucault renders much more explicit the aims
and effects of genealogy in this regard. He characterizes the project of genealogy he adapts from Nietzsche as one of discerning the political “ontology of the present." 10 Such discernment is
expressly contrasted with "an analytics of truth"-philosophical criticism-a contrast achieved largely through a postmetaphysical historical, but not historicist, orientation. A political ontology of
the present, which Foucault sometimes also describes in the terms of 'diagnosis,' "does not consist in a simple characterization of what we are but, instead-by following lines of fragility in the
1 A political ontology of the present, in short, requires that
present-in managing to grasp why and how that-which is might no longer be that-which-is." 1
form of questioning that unsettles the present's givenness, that is "made in accordance with these kinds of virtual
fracture which open up the space of freedom understood as a space of concrete freedom, i.e., of possible
transformation." 12 Foucault's endeavor of a "diagnosis" or "ontology" of the present entails reconfiguring both
the relationship of philosophy to history and the relation of philosophy and history to politics. The task of
philosophy becomes curiously historical: apprehending the nature of ourselves in the present, philosophy must
recognize us as historical beings and our time as a time in history. Conversely, history is subjected to philosophical
critique insofar as it must be divested of reason and direction at the same time that it is tethered to conventionally
philosophical questions: how can we know our time and ourselves when we cannot move beyond or outside of
them? While never fully resolvable, Foucault responds to this problem on genealogy's behalf: "Effective history
studies what is closest, but in all abrupt dispossession, so as to seize it at a distance."13
AT: TIME FRAME OUTWEIGHS

The refusal of immediate choice is precisely what gives the critique the power to force us to question the
nature of the political.
On the one hand, critical theory cannot let itself be bound by political exigency; indeed, it has something of an
obligation to refuse such exigency. While there are always decisive choices to be made in the political realm (whom
to vote for, what policies to support or oppose, what action to take or defer), these very delimitations of choice are
often themselves the material of critical theory. Here we might remind ourselves that prying apart immediate
political constraints from intellectual ones is one path to being "governed a little less" in Foucault's sense. Yet
allowing thinking its wildness beyond the immediate in order to reset the possibilities of the immediate is also how
this degoverning rearticulates critical theory and politics after disarticulating them; critical theory comes back to
politics offering a different sense of the times and a different sense of time. It is also important to remember that the
"immediate choices" are just that and often last no longer than a political season (exemplified by the fact that the
political conundrums with which this essay opened will be dated if not forgotten by the time this book is published).
Nor is the argument convincing that critical theory threatens the possibility of holding back the political dark. It is
difficult to name a single instance in which critical theory has killed off a progressive political project. Critical
theory is not what makes progressive political projects fail; at worst it might give them bad conscience, at best it
renews their imaginative reach and vigor.
The refusal to be guided by the crisis of the time is exactly what allows the critique to disrupt the political
order.
The rebuff of critical theory as untimely provides the core matter of the affirmative case for it. Critical theory is
essential in dark times not for the sake of sustaining utopian hopes, making flamboyant interventions, or staging
irreverent protests, but rather to contest the very senses of time invoked to declare critique untimely. If the charge of
untimeliness inevitably also fixes time, then disrupting this fixity is crucial to keeping the times from closing in on
us. It is a way of reclaiming the present from the conservative hold on it that is borne by the charge of untimeliness.
To insist on the value of untimely political critique is not, then, to refuse the problem of time or timing in politics
but rather to contest settled accounts of what time it is, what the times are, and what political tempo and temporality
we should hew to in political life. Untimeliness deployed as an effective intellectual and political strategy, far from
being a gesture of indifference to time, is a bid to reset time. Intellectual and political strategies of successful
untimeliness therefore depend on a close engagement with time in every sense of the word. They are concerned with
timing and tempo. They involve efforts to grasp the times by thinking against the times. They attempt, as Nietzsche
put it, to "overcome the present" by puncturing the present's "overvaluation of itself," an overcoming whose aim is
to breathe new possibility into the age. If our times are dark, what could be more important?
AT: NON-VERIFIABLE
Theory does not have to be verifiable: the power of critique is its ability to describe a new vision for the
future—it is an act of construction.
Theory is not simply different from description; rather, it is incommensurate with description. Theory is not simply
the opposite of application but carries the impossibility of application. As a meaning-making enterprise, theory
depicts a world that does not quite exist, that is not quite the world we inhabit. But this is theory's incomparable
value, not its failure. Theory does not simply decipher the meanings of the world but recodes and rearranges them in
order to reveal something about the meanings and incoherencies that we live with. To do this revelatory and
speculative work, theory must work to one side of direct referents, or at least it must disregard the conventional
meanings and locations of those referents. Theory violates the self representation of things in order to represent
those things and their relation-the world--differently. Thus, theory is never "accurate" or "wrong"; it is only more or
less illuminating, more or less provocative, more or less of an incitement to thought, imagination, desire,
possibilities for renewal. There is another reason that theory cannot be brought to the bar of truth or applicability.
Insofar as theory imbues contingent or unconscious events, phenomena, or formations with meaning and with
location in a world of theoretical meaning, theory is a sense-making enterprise of that which often makes no sense,
of that which may be inchoate, unsystematized, inarticulate. It gives presence to what may have a liminal,
evanescent, or ghostly existence. Thus theory has no kinship with the project of "accurate representation"; its value
lies instead in the production of a new representation, in the production of coherence and meaning that it does not
find lying on the ground but which, rather, it forthrightly fashions. Similarly theory does not simply articulate needs
or desires but argues for their existence and thus literally brings them into being. As theory interprets the world, it
fabricates that world (pace Marx! especially Marx!); as it names desire, it gives reason and voice to desire, and thus
fashions a new order of desire; as it codifies meaning, it composes meaning. Theory's most important political
offering is this opening of a breathing space between the world of common meanings and the world of alternative
ones, a space of potential renewal for thought, desire, and action.
AT: HEGEMONY GOOD IMPACT TURNS
No matter how many impact cards they read, hegemony is an impossible quest. The faster we face up to these
Nietzschean truths, the fewer lives will be sacrificed.
Ultimately, however, real-world transformations exceed the grasp of the NSS. The war in Iraq put on full display just how effective the military could be in attaining its planned goals. But what
falls outside the engineering and imaginary of the plan, what Edmund Burke called the "empire of circumstance," is in the driver's seat and beyond the cybernetic machinations of the NSS, as we
Many scholars saw the end of the Cold War as an occasion to debate the merits of a unipolar
see in the "peace" that followed.
future as well as to wax nostalgic over the stability of a bipolar past. These debates continued to be state-centric as well as materialist in their interpretation of how power works. By such
criteria, there was little doubt that the United States would emerge as the dominant military, economic, and, indeed, civilizational power. Even in Paul Wolfowitz's worst-case nightmares, it was
. But then came 9/11, and blueprints for a steady-state hegemony were
difficult to identify a potential "peer competitor" on the horizon
shredded. Asymmetrical power and fundamentalist resentment, force-multiplied by the mass media, prompted a
permanent state of emergency. After the first responders came a semiotic fix with a kick, The National Security
Strategy of the United States of America. But from the tragedy of 9/11 to the farce of war in Iraq, after the
multilateral hopes for a "safer and better world" were subverted by the unilateral nihilism of preventive war, the
syntax of order and the code of the simulacrum began to break down. We caught a glimpse of a heteropolar matrix,
in which actors radically different in identity and interests (states versus super-empowered individuals), using
technologies in revolutionary ways (civilian airliners to create kamikaze weapons of mass destruction, the Internet to
mobilize the largest antiwar demonstrations ever), were suddenly comparable in their capability to produce
improbable global effects. It might be small solace, but out of this deeply nihilistic moment might yet come a real
balance of power and truth, in which the Straussian reach of The National Security Strategy is foreshortened by a
Nietzschean grasp of reality.
The way that they frame their harms is not politically neutral. Their abhorrence of disorder is a product of
liberal governance itself—the end goal is to have all of humanity ordered, cleaned up, ready to be counted
and controlled.
January-March).
No political formulation is therefore innocent. None refers to a truth about the world that preexists that truth's entry
into the world through discourse. Every formula is instead a clue to a truth. Each is crafted in the context of a wider
discursive economy of meaning. Tug at the formula, the pull in the fabric begins to disclose the way in which it has been woven. The artefactual design of the truth it
proclaims then emerges. We are therefore dealing with something much more than a mere matter of geopolitical fact when encountering the vocabulary of complex emergency in the discourse of
global governance and liberal peace. We are not talking about a discrete class of unproblematic actions. Neither are we discussing certain forms of intractable conflicts. The formula complex
t an economy of
emergency does of course address certain kinds of violent disorder. That disorder is not our direct concern. Recall with Foucault and many other thinkers tha
meaning is no mere idealist speculation. It is a material political production integral to a specific political
economy of power. We do not therefore subscribe to the view championed, for example, by Adam Roberts that the
formula complex emergency is merely a way of giving a new name to an old problem.[12] We are talking instead
about a particular understanding of (inter)national politics that leads to such disorder being bracketed and
addressed in terms of complex emergency. For it is only in the context of a certain political rationality, in this
instance the global governance of liberal peace, that the formula occurs at all.[13] It is in relation to that political
rationality and its hybrid practices of power that the formula not only makes sense but also does certain kinds of
work. So-called humanitarian emergencies are always therefore profoundly political events concerned above all with
the responses to the advent of violent change induced by the constant interplay between the local and the global.
AT: OUR ETHICS ARE UNIVERSAL

Morals are not a priori, they have different meanings depended up on the context and so the quest for
transcendence is illusory.
Turnali, 03 (The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 26 (2003) 55-63, Nietzsche and the Later Wittgenstein: An Offense
to the Quest for Another World, Aydan Turanli, Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Istanbul
Technical University).
Nietzsche questions idealization in ethics: On the Genealogy of Morals is designed to show that concepts regarding
moral issues cannot be analyzed in a vacuum and this attitude is actually the product of thinking that there can be an
external standpoint in analyzing concepts. Nietzsche criticizes Plato's attempt to define the perfect man through
concepts such as "good," "wise," "just," and "dialectician." According to him, this is to define "individuum in itself."
It is the "denaturalization of moral values" (WP II 430) and to remove a plant from all soil. Moral values are
naturalized through Nietzsche's conceptual analysis: he gives the genealogy of the concepts "good" and "evil" to
show that there are no moral values such as good-in-itself and morality-in-itself over and above the actual uses of
"good" and "evil." "Good" and "bad" are not defined by our a priori knowledge of them. In order to show this he
appeals to descriptions of historical processes in which these concepts have been used. The origin of evil does not lie
behind this world. Rather than searching for the origin behind this world, we should, Nietzsche suggests, ask "under what conditions did man invent the value judgements good and
evil" (GM III Preface). Nietzsche's depiction of the master-slave morality presumes that the relation between the concepts "good" and "bad" depends on a class relation, the relation between the
ruling class and the lower class. "Good" was imposed upon the lower class by the upper or ruling class (GM I 2). "Good" was always associated with the upper class, with Aryans, fair-haired,
noble, spiritually distinct, and pure. "Bad" was identified with working class, common, inferior, and poor. Historically, they were correlated with race and class. While previously concepts or
values such as "good," "noble," "happy," and "powerful" were under the monopoly of aristocrats, with the influence of the Slave Revolt of Jews and Christians this changed. "Good" became
associated with the poor, powerless, sick, ugly, and truly blessed (GM I 6). Hence, in almost all nations, the values "good," and "bad" were inculcated, or imposed upon the lower class by the
. Nietzsche's analyses of moral values show that there is no a priori necessity for
ruling class, the class that possesses power
associating the word "good" with unegoistic actions (GM I 2). There is no meaning-in-itself determining the
meaning of the concepts "good" and "bad" once and for all. Other concepts concerning moral values such as "guilt,"
"obligation," or "justice" are also analyzed in historical perspective in the Genealogy. They too, like other moral
concepts, are seen within the perspective of class relationships, power relationships, purchase and sale relationships,
and exchange relationships of creditor and debtor. Nietzsche's conviction that there is no one characteristic defining
moral values stems from his complete rejection of the traditional Platonic understanding. For him, the whole history
of a thing, or a custom, is a chain of reinterpretations rather than progress toward a goal (GM II 12). With this step Nietzsche rejects traditional teleological
explanations and this paves the way for accepting the fluidity of meanings. The concept of "punishment," for example, has many meanings (GM II 13). The conclusions Nietzsche draws from the
analysis of the concept "punishment" show the great similarities between his views and those of Wittgenstein. Nietzsche says, "the history of punishment up to now in general, the history of its
use for a variety of purposes, finally crystallizes in a kind of unity which is difficult to dissolve back into its elements, difficult to analyse and, this has to be stressed, is absolutely undefinable"
(ibid.). He says further that "all concepts in which an entire process is semiotically concentrated defy definition; only something which has no history can be defined" (ibid.). He also stresses that
there cannot be one element defining a concept, because although in some cases one element becomes predominant, in other cases other elements may become important. So the definition of
"punishment" per se cannot be given because it is totally dependent on history, context, and uses in actual cases. This is very similar to Wittgenstein's concept of "family resemblance."
Wittgenstein too points out that concepts have meaning only in the flux of life and most concepts of daily life cannot be defined by a single characteristic. There is no quality of [End Page 59] a
concept corresponding to the actual features of the world in our immediate environment. Hence, the intrinsic definition of concepts cannot be given. Despite this, Wittgenstein and Nietzsche
differ with respect to the methodology of conceptual analysis. Nietzsche goes to the origins of concepts. He gives the genealogy of concepts. According to him, concepts can only have meaning
when seen from a historical perspective. He appeals to history, and shows in what ways concepts were used under different circumstances. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, by showing
connections between concepts, tries to get us to see that most of our concepts elude clear-cut definition. While criticizing Frege's view that a concept should have definite boundaries, he says,
"Stand roughly there" is also enough to describe a concept (PI §71). To define the concept "game," we give examples and we intend them to be taken in a particular way. There is nothing
common to all types of games. There is rather "a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail" (PI §66).
Wittgenstein does not appeal to history; he does not give us the origin of concepts. He suggests that we look and see how concepts are used in daily life, and what relation they have to other
concepts in order to show us that there is no uniformity in their usage. The point of similarity, on the other hand, is that both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein reject categories and a prioricity.
According to Nietzsche, the-meaning-in-itself, like other concepts of traditional metaphysics such as "unity," "truth," "purpose," "totality," "permanence," "doer," "atom," and "the thing-in-
). Nothing in the world actually corresponds to
itself," is "only the seduction of language (and the fundamental errors of reason petrified within it)" (GM I 13
these concepts. They are, for Nietzsche, subjective categories of the human mind having no objective existence. …
Nietzsche's rejection of traditional metaphysics finds its culmination in his remark "God is dead." For Nietzsche,
"God is dead" can be interpreted as saying that there is no realm of transcendent reality, no supersensible world, no
absolute values. Presupposing that there are two different realms, one an immutable, absolute realm of universal
essences, is to degrade the world in which we live into a world of illusion. It is to deny reality, the world of senses,
of change, and opposition. With the devaluation of the highest values, Nietzsche abandons the idea that there are two
worlds having an unequal ontological rank: the true and transcendent world of ideas and the inferior world of senses.
The only world we have is the world of sensations, change, and contradiction.
AT: OUR ETHICS AE AN ACT OF SELF-OVERCOMING
The notion that our individual ethical orientation can be transformative is a simplistic substitute for real
politics that props up a Western concept of the all-powerful individual.
The legal and political formalism of liberalism, in which most of what transpires in the spaces designated as cultural,
social, economic, and private is considered natural or personal (in any event, independent of power and political
life), is a profound achievement of depoliticization. Liberalism’s excessive freighting of the individual subject with
self- making, agency, and a relentless responsibility for itself also contributes to the personalization of political
contoured conflicts and inequalities. These tendencies eliminate from view various norms and social relations-
especially those pertaining to capital, race, gender, and sexuality- that construct and position subjects in liberal
democracies. In addition, the reduction of freedom to rights, and of equality to equal standing before the law,
eliminates from view many sources of subordination, marginalization, and inequality that organize liberal
democratic societies and fashion their subjects. Liberal ideology at its most generic, then, always already eschews
power and history in its articulation and comprehensions of the social and the subject. Individualism. The American
cultural emphasis on the importance of individual belief and behavior, and of individual heroism and failure, is also
relentlessly depoliticizing. An identification of belief, attitude, moral fiber, and individual will with the capacity to
make world history is the calling card of the biographical backstories and anecdotes that so often substitute for
political analyses and considerations of power in American popular culture. From Horatio Algers to demonized
welfare mothers, from Private Jessica Lynch to Private Lynndie England, from mythohistories to mythobiographies,
we are awash in the conceits that right attitudes produce justice, that willpower and tenacity produce success, and
that everything else is, at most, background, context, luck, or accidents of history. It is a child’s view of history and
politics: idealist, personal, and replete with heroes and villains, good values and bad.
AT: NIHILISM/NO MEANING TO LIFE

The refusal of transcendent values forces us to deal creatively with the world as it is—we are responsible for
shaping what we have, not waiting for an impossible utopia of absolutes.
Turnali, 03 (The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 26 (2003) 55-63, Nietzsche and the Later Wittgenstein: An Offense
to the Quest for Another World, Aydan Turanli, Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Istanbul
Technical University).
The craving for absolutely general specifications results in doing metaphysics. Unlike Wittgenstein, Nietzsche
provides an account of how this craving arises. The creation of the two worlds such as apparent and real world,
conditioned and unconditioned world, being and becoming is the creation of the ressentiment of metaphysicians.
Nietzsche says, "to imagine another, more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one
suffer: the ressentiment of metaphysicians against actuality is here creative" (WP III 579). Escaping from this world
because there is grief in it results in asceticism. Paying respect to the ascetic ideal is longing for the world that is
pure and denaturalized. Craving for frictionless surfaces, for a transcendental, pure, true, ideal, perfect world, is the
result of the ressentiment of metaphysicans who suffer in this world. Metaphysicians do not affirm this world as it is,
and this paves the way for many explanatory theories in philosophy. In criticizing a philosopher who pays homage
to the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche says, "he wants to escape from torture" (GM III 6). The traditional philosopher or the
ascetic priest continues to repeat, "'My kingdom is not of this world'" (GM III 10). This is a longing for another
world in which one does not suffer. It is to escape from this world; to create another illusory, fictitious, false world.
This longing for "the truth" of a world in which one does not suffer is the desire for a world of constancy. It is
supposed that contradiction, change, and deception are the causes of suffering; in other words, the senses deceive; it
is from the senses that all misfortunes come; reason corrects the errors; therefore reason is the road to the constant.
In sum, this world is an error; the world as it ought to be exists. This will to truth, this quest for another world, this
desire for the world as it ought to be, is the result of unproductive thinking. It is unproductive because it is the result
of avoiding the creation of the world as it ought to be. According to Nietzsche, the will to truth is "the impotence of
the will to create" (WP III 585). Metaphysicians end up with the creation of the "true" world in contrast to the actual, changeable, deceptive, self-contradictory world. They try to
discover the true, transcendental world that is already there rather than creating a world for themselves. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the transcendental world is the "denaturalized world"
(WP III 586). The way out of the circle created by the ressentiment of metaphysicians is the will to life rather than the will to truth. The will to truth can be overcome only through a Dionysian
relationship to existence. This is the way to a new philosophy, which in Wittgenstein's terms aims "to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" (PI §309).
AT: ATTACK ON REASON DESTROYS DEMOCRACY

Nietzsche’s attack on reason supports democracy—resistance to transcendent values is critical to check
tyranny.
Many democratic theorists insist that politics must be grounded in secure principles, which themselves are
incontestable, so as to rule out anti-democratic voices from having their day and possibly undermining democratic
procedures or results. A radically agonistic, open conception of democracy that simply invites any and all parties to
compete for favor seems utterly decisionist, with no justification beyond its contingent enactment. But from a
historical perspective, despite metaphysical pretenses in some quarters, democratic foundings have in fact emerged
out of the "abyss" of conventions and decisional moments. 28 And with the prospect of a constitutional convention in our system, it is evident from a
performative standpoint that any results are actually possible in a democracy, even anti-democratic outcomes (not likely, but surely possible). The "tragedy" is that democracy could die at its own
hands. Foundationalists would call such an outcome contradictory, but a tragic conception would see it as a possibility intrinsic to the openness of democratic practice. Can there be more than a
simply negative register in such a tragic conception? I think so. Just as, for Nietzsche, the tragic allows us to be sensitized and energized for the fragile meanings of existence, thus enhancing life ,
a tragic politics could wean us from false comforts in foundations and open us to the urgent finite conditions of
political life in an enhanced way. And even if one conceded the existence of foundational self-evident political
principles, would the force of such principles by themselves necessarily be able to prevent non-democratic
outcomes? If not, the force of such principles [End Page 144] would be restricted to the solace of intellectual
rectitude that can comfort theorists while the walls are coming down. The nonexistence of foundational guarantees
surely does not prevent one from living and fighting for democratic ideals. What is to be said of someone who, in the absence of a guarantee,
would hesitate to act or be obstructed from acting or see action as tainted or less than authentic? Nietzsche would take this as weakness. The most profound element in Nietzsche's conceptions of
will to power, agonistics, and eternal recurrence, in my view, can be put in the following way. For Nietzsche, to act in the world is always to act in the midst of otherness, of resistances or
. To affirm one's Other as necessarily constitutive of oneself is not only to
obstacles. Hence to dream of action without otherness is to annul action
affirm the full field of action (which is the sense of eternal recurrence), but also to affirm action as action, that is to
say, a real move in life amidst real resistances, as opposed to the fantasy of self-sufficient, fully free, uncontested occurrences born in Western conceptions of
divine perfection and continued in various philosophical models of demonstrative certainty and theoretical governance. The irony of a tragically open, agonistic politics is that it need not "infect"
. And as radically open, an agonistic politics has the virtue of
political life but in fact spur it toward the existential environment of it enactment
precluding the silencing of any voice, something especially important when even purportedly democratic
dispositions are comfortable with exclusions (frustrated by citizens who will not come around to being impartial
enough, rational enough, secular enough, deliberative enough, communal enough, virtuous enough, and so on),
thereby becoming susceptible to the most ironic and insidious form of tyranny done in democracy's name.
Nietzsche does not call for domination or an end to democracy. A better reading uses Nietzsche to reveal
power relations.
The seven chapters of Appel's book provide a vivid and fair reading of Nietzsche's texts that exhibit a forceful call for aristocraticism based on rank, domination, and exploitation, which should
Appel's position, however, depends upon an
be an embarrassing obstacle to embracing Nietzsche in the service of egalitarian political movements.
unnuanced reading of Nietzsche's motifs of domination and power, which is at least a risky proposition with a
thinker as elusive and complicated as Nietzsche. The genealogical narrative of master and slave morality need not be
read as a call for domination of the weak by the strong, but as an unmasking of the power plays of the weak and as
an ambiguous blending of master and slave forces in cultural production, taken as a "spiritualization" of erstwhile
natural forces of power. While we might never be sure of the meaning of Nietzsche's rich and elusive texts, this
should not blind us to the seeming aristocraticism in much of Nietzsche's writings. We should admit that such
elitism is alive in the texts, and in this respect Appel is right. Yet the complexity of the texts should alert us against
both easy dismissals and selective embraces of Nietzsche when it comes to the question of democracy.
AT: NIETZSCHE IS AN ANARCHIST/DOES NOT APPLY TO POLITICS
Nietzsche’s thought is highly applicable to institutional governance—they are over stating his anarchic
tendencies.
Before exploring these questions and confronting Nietzsche's attitude toward democracy, it is important to set the
stage by considering the matter of institutions, without which political philosophy could very likely not get off the
ground. Modern societies, at least, cannot function without institutions and the coercive force of law. Appel, like
many interpreters, construes Nietzsche's "political" thought as advancing more an "aesthetic" activity than
institutional governance (NCD, p.160ff). Supposedly Nietzsche envisions an elite who compete with each other for
creative results in isolation from the mass public; indeed the elite simply use the masses as material for their creative
work, without regard for the fate or welfare of the general citizenry. Appel maintains that such a political aesthetics
is problematic because it is incompatible with the maintenance of stable institutions. And Nietzsche is also supposed
to eschew the rule of law in favor of the hubris of self-policing (NCD, p.165). If this were true, one would be hard
pressed to find Nietzsche relevant for any political philosophy, much less a democratic one. It is a mistake,
however, to read Nietzsche in simple terms as being against institutions and the rule of law on behalf of self-
creation. First of all, even Nietzsche's early celebration of the Dionysian should not be taken as an anti- or extra-
political gesture. In BT 21, Nietzsche insists that the Apollonian has coequal status with the Dionysian, and the
former is specifically connected with the political order, which is needed to temper the Dionysian impulse toward
"ecstatic brooding" and "orgiastic self-annihilation." Those who read Nietzsche as resisting "normalization" and
"discipline" (this includes most postmodern readings and Appel's as well 13 ), are not on very firm ground either.
For one thing, Nietzschean creative freedom is selective and most people should be ruled by normative orders,
because universal unrestricted freedom would cause havoc. 14 Moreover, even selective creative freedom is not an
abandonment of order and constraint. Creativity breaks free of existing structures, but only to establish new ones.
Shaping new forms requires formative powers prepared by disciplined skills and activated by refined instruments of
production. Accordingly, creativity is a kind of "dancing in chains" (WS 140). 15 Creative freedom, then, is not an
abandonment of constraint, but a disruption of structure that still needs structure to prepare and execute departures
from the norm.
Nietzsche does not call for the destruction of the state—just an end to slave morality within the law.
Those who take Nietzsche to be diagnosing social institutions as descendants of slave morality should take note of
GM II,11, where Nietzsche offers some interesting reflections on justice and law. He indicates that the global
economy of nature is surely not a function of justice; yet workable conceptions of justice and injustice are
established by the historical force of human law. Nietzsche does not indict such forces as slavish infirmities. Legal
arrangements are "exceptional conditions" that modulate natural forces of power in social directions, and that are not
an elimination of conflict but an instrument in channeling the continuing conflict of different power complexes.
Surprisingly, Nietzsche attributes the historical emergence of law not to reactive resentment but to active, worldly
forces that check and redirect the "senseless raging of revenge," and that are able to reconfigure offenses as more
"impersonal" violations of legal provisions rather than sheer personal injuries. Here Nietzsche analyzes the law in a
way analogous to his account of the Greek agon and its healthy sublimation of natural impulses for destruction. A
legal system is a life-promoting cultural force that refashions natural energies in less savage and more productive
directions. Finally, those who read Nietzsche as an anti-institutional transgressor and creator should heed TI ("Skirmishes of an Untimely Man," 39), where Nietzsche clearly diagnoses a
repudiation of institutions as a form of decadence. Because of our modern faith in a foundational individual freedom, we no longer have the instincts for forming and sustaining the traditions and
modes of authority that healthy institutions require. The whole of the West no longer possesses the instincts out of which institutions grow, out of which a future grows: perhaps nothing
antagonizes its "modern spirit" so much. One lives for the day, one lives very fast, one lives very irresponsibly: precisely this is called "freedom." That which makes an institution an institution is
despised, hated, repudiated: one fears the danger of a new slavery the moment the word "authority" is even spoken out loud. That is how far decadence has advanced in the value-instincts of our
, a Nietzschean emphasis on power
politicians, of our political parties: instinctively they prefer what disintegrates, what hastens the end. In the light of these remarks
and agonistics offers significant advantages for political philosophy. In some respects we are freed from the modern
project of "justifying" the force of social institutions because of a stipulated freedom from constraint in the "state of
nature."
Nietzsche is not an anarchist—laws based on competition, such as separation of powers or the adversarial
legal system, fit within the will to power.
Forces of law need not be seen as alien to the self, but as modulations of a ubiquitous array of forces within which
human beings can locate relative spheres of freedom. And an agonistic conception of political activity need not be
taken as a corruption or degradation of an idealized order of political principles or social virtues. Our own tradition
of the separation of powers and an adversarial legal system can be taken as a baseline conception of the nature,
function, and proper operation of government offices and judicial practice. The founders of the Constitution
inherited from Montesquieu the idea that a division of powers is the best check on tyranny. In other words, tyranny
is avoided not by some project of harmony, but by multiplying the number of power sites in a government and
affirming their competition through mutual self-assertion and mistrust. 16 Our common law tradition is agonistic in both conception and practice.
Most procedural rules are built around the idea of coequal competition in open court before a jury who will decide the outcome, where the judge in most respects plays the role of an impartial
both notions of separation of
referee. And the presumption of innocence is fundamentally meant to contest the government's power to prosecute and punish. 17 I think that
powers and legal adversarialism are compatible with Nietzsche's analysis of the law noted previously—that a legal
order is not a means of preventing struggle, but "a means in the struggle between power-complexes" (GM II,11).
Nietzsche is politically empowering—his radical acceptance of the world as it is opens us up to new, more
democratic alternatives.
34:1, Johns Hopkins Literary Press, Project Muse
Like Nietzsche, then, Steiner derives tragedy from pessimism and accounts for the decline of tragedy by reference to
the triumph of optimism. But what follows from this account, it should now be clear, need not be a reactionary
aesthetics or politics. Whatever Steiner's intent (which I do not pursue here, though I think it has often been
oversimplified), Nietzsche's "Dionysian pessimism" is the source of his most radical claims, claims that have, most
recently, appealed to a series of radically democratic political theorists. Tracy Strong describes Nietzsche's politics
as a "politics of transfiguration," and it is this theme of self-shaping and self-transformation against a tragic
background which is the key link between Nietzsche and such figures as Camus, Arendt, Foucault, and William
Connolly. Each of these writers has found in Nietzsche a portrait of energetic individuality that can be supportive of
democracy while remaining distinct from the liberal assumptions that are often assumed to be a necessary
complement to democratic theory. Nietzsche's pessimism does not require elitism, and it does not recommend
passivity. Instead, as these twentieth-century inheritors of Nietzsche have seen, it sanctions a process of identity-
renovation based not on an assumption of the self's natural integrity but, to the contrary, on an acknowledgment of
its fundamental instability and perishability. While acknowledging limits to the human condition, this is a politics of
possibility more radical than most. It makes little sense, therefore, to link pessimism (or pessimism-cum-tragedy)
with conservative politics. The pessimistic spirit is a restless one, unlikely to be enamored of the status quo.
AT: NIETZSCHE = VIOLENCE

Violence is not the result of conflicting values; it is the result of the drive to abolish those differences.
Acceptance that there are mutually exclusive viewpoints will result in genuinely democratic politics.
Hatab, 02 (Lawrence J. Professor of Philosophy at Old Dominion University 2002 Prospects for a Democratic Agon
Why We can still be Nietzscheans: The Journal of Nietzsche p.MUSE)
A radical agonistics rules out violence, because violence is actually an impulse to eliminate conflict by annihilating
or incapacitating an opponent, bringing the agon to an end. 11 In a later work Nietzsche discusses the
"spiritualization of hostility (Feindschaft)," wherein one must affirm both the presence and the power of one's
opponents as implicated in one's own posture (TI "Morality as Antinature," 3). And in this passage Nietzsche
specifically applies such a notion to the political realm. What this implies is that the category of the social need not
be confined to something like peace or harmony. Agonistic relations, therefore, do not connote a deterioration of a
social disposition and can thus be extended to political relations. How can democracy in general terms be
understood as an agonistic activity? Allow me to quote from my previous work. Political judgments are not
preordained or dictated; outcomes depend upon a contest of speeches where one view wins and other views lose in a
tabulation of votes; since the results are binding and backed by the coercive power of the government, democratic
elections and procedures establish temporary control and subordination—which, however, can always be altered or
reversed because of the succession of periodic political contests. . . . Democratic elections allow for, and depend
upon, peaceful exchanges and transitions of power. . . . [L]anguage is the weapon in democratic contests.
A refusal of absolutist ethical systems enables a deeper transformation of our orientation towards violence.
Scott—90 (Charles E., professor of Philosophy at Pennsylvania State University, “The Question of Ethics:
Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger,” Ed. John Sallis, p. 6)
The self-overcoming recoil in these readings of our tradition defines also the movement of my own discourse
regarding them. The question of ethical thinking takes place in this process. It is a process that maintains the
question rather than the values that have governed our traditional senses of rightness. In this process the violence
and oppressive anxieties that are constitutive of the values by which we have organized our thought and lives
become apparent. As ethical thinking recoils with the oppositions and resistances that constitute it, different ways
of thinking emerge and different thoughts develop in which our ethical, pathogenic violence and anxiety are more
difficult to overlook. The anxiety that accompanies the transformation of thinking confronts the suppressive anxiety
in our ethical heritage that has resisted transformation. The consequent lightness of mind that develops in the
discourse that we shall consider, while giving less customary satisfaction, produces questions, criticism, and
uncertainty in those regions of conviction that harbor those inevitabilities of suffering that are closely connected to
the ways we go about maximizing our well-being. The continual deferral of ethical certainty allows a decomposition
to take place in the aggregates of value and sensibility that are opposed to a self-overcoming genealogical
investigation of the heritage.
Respectful competition ensures an end to violence and allows for growth of democracy.
In the light of Nietzsche's appropriation of the two forms of Eris, it is necessary to distinguish between agonistic
conflict and sheer violence. A radical agonistics rules out violence, because violence is actually an impulse to
eliminate conflict by annihilating or incapacitating an opponent, bringing the agon to an end. In a later work
Nietzsche discusses the "spiritualization of hostility (Feindschaft)," wherein one must affirm both the presence and
the power of one's opponents as implicated in one's own posture (TI "Morality as Antinature," 3). And in this
passage Nietzsche specifically applies such a notion to the political realm. What this implies is that the category of
the social need not be confined to something like peace or harmony. Agonistic relations, therefore, do not connote a
deterioration of a social disposition and can thus be extended to political relations. How can democracy in general
terms be understood as an agonistic activity? Allow me to quote from my previous work. Political judgments are not
preordained or dictated; outcomes depend upon a contest of speeches where one view wins and other views lose in a
tabulation of votes; since the results are binding and backed by the coercive power of the government, democratic
elections and procedures establish temporary control and subordination—which, however, can always be altered or
reversed because of the succession of periodic political contests. . . . Democratic elections allow for, and depend
upon, peaceful exchanges and transitions of power. . . . [L]anguage is the weapon in democratic contests. The
binding results, however, produce tangible effects of gain and loss that make political exchanges more than just talk
or a game. . . . The urgency of such political contests is that losers must yield to, and live under, the policies of the
winner; we notice, therefore, specific configurations of power, of domination and submission in democratic politics.
Self-overcoming discourages physical violence—it is a sign of weakness.

Robertson, 09 (Simon, “Nietzsche's Ethical Revaluation,” The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Issue 37, pp. 66-90)
Sometimes Nietzsche countenances a noble person treating others as a mere means (contrary to central moral tenets
[ SE 6; BGE 258, 273; WP 962]). Yet he also suggests that “many actions called immoral ought to be avoided and
resisted” ( D 103); that hurting others “is a sign that we are still lacking power” ( GS 13); and that “when an
exceptional human being handles the mediocre more gently than he does himself or his equals, this is not merely
politeness of the heart—it is simply his duty ” ( A 57; cf. BGE 260). The question is how such apparently conflicting
strands might be reconciled. The beginnings of an approach might appeal to Nietzsche’s notion of self-sufficiency:
the more self-sufficiently one achieves one’s goals (e.g., without using or hurting others as means), the more
excellent one is. Even so, doing so (though signaling lack of power) may sometimes be necessary. We might thereby
understand self-sufficiency as (a formal condition) partially constitutive of what it is to be an excellent individual, in
turn yielding a (defeasible) constraint on conduct: Nietzsche’s higher men have good reason not to hurt others, since
doing so stains their character by showing them suboptimally self-sufficient and thus less excellent (see also Z :II
“The Pitiful”). Much more needs to be said here; but it indicates a direction by which to avoid the abhorrent
conclusions some passages initially imply.
AT: NIETZSCHE = PATRIARCHY
Despite some of Nietzsche’s absurdist statements about women, his radical affirmation of difference
undermines patriarchy.
Bergoffen—89 (Debra B., professor of Philosophy and Women’s Studies at George Mason University, “On the
Advantage and Disadvantage of Nietzsche for Women,” The Question of the Other: Essays in Contemporary
Continental Philosophy, ed. Charles E. Scott and Arleen B. Dallery, p. 87)
As the temporality of the Ubermensch, the eternal recurrence offers a structuring of time that is at once infinite and plural. It is a temporal vision that embraces the polytheism of the world
emerging in the wake of God's death, and delights in the entanglement of all things emerging in the beyond of good and evil. In this, my feminist-perspective interpretation of the eternal
recurrence, I am suggesting that the fluidity of the eternal return offers a vision of male and female which breaks the boundaries of traditional Western categories. In his choice of the term
Ubermensch, in his admonition to get beyond good and evil, where evil is characterized as an attack on and aversion to otherness, and in his inversion of the traditional understandings of the
Nietzsche encourages us to articulate new meanings of masculine and feminine. Sexual
male as active and female as passive, 14
differentiation cannot designate the alienation of otherness to one who stands beyond good and evil; it cannot be an
invitation to domination to one who rejects all pretensions of masterful expertise; and it cannot be the ground of a
patriarchal hierarchy of values to one who allows his Zarathustra to invoke images of mothering as he dances his
Yea-saying songs. 15 What sexual differentiation can be is suggested by the structuring of time Nietzsche called the
eternal recurrence, where otherness and forms of differentiation are entangled and affirmed without being
annihilated or devalued. VI. Where does this leave us? With a few insights and some intriguing possibilities. A
general insight is that Nietzsche's transvaluation of values is also and necessarily a decompartmentalizing of values
according to the patriarchal designated spheres of male and female. Transvaluation is a genealogical project that invokes the erotic without
allowing the erotic to be sexualized in accordance with dominant male significations. A more specific insight concerns the relationship between patriarchy, historical temporality, and nihilism.
Within the Western system of patriarchy, time is bifurcated into male and female spheres of otherness. Though the malefemale couple is recognized as a couple, it is dichotomized into a she
who displays reproductive energy in giving birth and a he who displays creative energy in social, political, and historical activity . Nietzsche's eternal recurrence offers
an alternative vision of the couple. Here the reproductive and productive are freed from their enclosure in the sexually designated private and public domains. Creation
, what
and re-creation, transcendence and immanence, male and female are intimately and complexly complicitous. On this feminist reading of Nietzsche's eternal recurrence
patriarchy designates as disjoined male and female modes of temporalization is a nihilistic figuring of time intent
on subverting an attentiveness to the ways in which the otherness of male and female must intercept and inhabit
each other if life is to be affirmed. In this reading, the eternal recurrence's nonteleological joyful affirmation of life
is aligned with the affirmation of feminine pleasure insofar as it is independent of all reproductive functions or
goals. It is linked to what Spivak calls the double vision that affirms the feminine as it undoes sexism. This feminist reading
does not come from nowhere. It is historically situated and reflects, I believe, the current state of feminist studies. While earlier feminist thought attempted to discard the sex-biased roles of
patriar chal society by declaring the equality of women, current feminist work dis tinguishes between the notions of equality and equal status. Whether it argues for a rejection of male values
It is this affirmation of otherness within
or demands that the feminine be rec ognized as an other of equal standing, today's feminists insist on their otherness.
feminism that sets the stage for a receptivity to Nietzsche and opens the way for a heterosexual androgynous reading
of the eternal recurrence.
AT: RELATIVISM
Radical questioning of values opens up space for new politics—it is an effective interrogation of the
increasingly untenable notions of the will to truth and order.
Saurette, 96 (Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Volume 25, Number 1, 1 March 1996 , pp. 1-28(28),
Paul, Professor of Political Studies, University of Ottawa, “I Mistrust All Systematizers And Avoid Them':
Nietzsche, Arendt And The Crisis Of The Will To Order In International Relations Theory”).
Let us articulate this new demand: We need a critique of moral values, the values of these values themselves must
first be called in question-and for that there is needed a knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in which
they grew, under which they evolved and changed.2 What would it mean to question the value of moral values? A
collapse into relativistic amoralism? Or worse, a rejection of the very notion of ethical action, thus ensuring the rule
of the strong over the weak? Or could this path explore our normative foundation, so as to revitalize human
interaction; to question traditional and 'natural' limits placed on normative theory, so as to expand the possibilities of
political action? Perhaps it is necessary to philosophize with a hammer, so as to hear the hollow ring of those ancient
idols and go beyond them. For those standards which continue to masquerade as nature, while covertly structuring
the limits of our modern imagination, are among those least 'natural', least benign, and perhaps, least appropriate to
late modernity. To articulate this demand in International Relations (IR) theory is to assert the historicity of its
normative framework and to suggest that to evaluate truly the normative value of particular standards of political
action, the constructed nature of the foundational terms of debate must be exposed, and their utility reconsidered.
Specifically, it is to recognize that while the conventional opposition of Realism against Cosmopolitan Idealism
highlights significant differences, it conceals the more important fact that both accept as natural the philosophical
foundation of the Will to Truth/Order. This unquestioned philosophical substructure, however, is neither 'natural' nor
neutral terrain. Rather, I would suggest that this foundation sets profound limits on the horizon of normative theory
by establishing as 'natural' an intellectual framework which severely circumscribes the very definition, and thus the
normative potential, of politics.
AT: NAZISM/FASCISM
Dogmatism is the ultimate tyranny.
Strong, 08 (Tracy B., Prof at UC San Diego “Nietzsche and the Political” Journal of Nietzsche Studies,
Spring/Autumn)
Tyranny thus arises for Nietzsche from the failure to remember that we live in worlds that we have made: tyranny is
thus a forgetting of human agency, one might say. 9 Much as in the famous passage about “truth” as a “worn out metaphor,” as an “illusion of which one has forgotten
what it really is” (“On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense,” KGW III.2, 369), there is thus a kind of built-in amnesia about tyranny, an amnesia that accompanies all acts of volition. The
point here, however, has to do with what tyranny means : it is, in essence, taking as accomplished the world that one has defined and forgetting that the world in which one lives is one that one
“will to truth is— will to power ” ( BGE 211). It follows from this,
has made. It is for this reason that Nietzsche can write in BGE that the
however, that Nietzsche does not, and cannot, simply assume that one can at one’s leisure forego this process. Why
not? The most noteworthy characteristics of the tyrant are his (her?) belief in his own understanding of the world as
simply and finally true and his failure to question that belief. The knowledge that the world in which one lives is
one’s own world means that that world has no more validity than one has oneself: this can induce modesty or
megalomania, but it is not a matter of a mitigating Humean skepticism.
Nietzsche’s criticism of democracy ultimately serves to strengthen it—it is essential to question underlying
assumptions if we are to maintain an open system.
Conventional ways of locating Nietzsche's politics include examining the convergence of his thought with Nazi
doctrine; his reduction of all demands for justice to envy; his misogyny and racism; his heroic ethic and esteem for
ancient Athenian culture; his opprobrium toward the masses, democracy, socialism, liberalism, and especially the
sacred cow of modernity, political equality. Nietzsche has been variously characterized as antipolitical, apolitical,
and engaged in a "politics of transfiguration" (Strong). He has been cast as deadly to politics; as a "haunt" or
“conscience" to political thought and political life; as providing the ethos for a liberal ironism (Rorty), for a recovery
of moral-political responsibility (Honig), and for an agonistic liberal radicalism (Connolly); and as a "way out" of
Marxism, phenomenology, and existentialism in the twentieth century (Foucault). Most politically sympathetic
treatments of Nietzsche try to draw a politics out of his thought, even as they recognize that there is much in
Nietzsche that cannot be redeemed for democratic practice. But what if we conceive Nietzsche's thought instead as a
knife to a raiment that is the cover for the ideals and practices constitutive of political life? What if Nietzsche's
thought does not guide but only exposes and challenges, functioning to strengthen democratic culture by disturbing
and provoking it? Affirming Foucault's Nietzschean dictum, that "knowledge is made for cutting," perhaps
Nietzschean critiques and genealogies can cut into politics, productively interrupting, violating, or disturbing
political formations rather than being applied to, merged, or identified with them. The importance of this work
would seem to be especially great for democratic politics, if what I have been suggesting through Spinoza is true,
that democracy inevitably attaches to undemocratic elements and is also inhospitable to theory, including the
theoretical self-consciousness required to grasp and redress the Spinozist point about democracy's hollow center.
AT: NAZISM/FASCISM
The caricature of Nietzsche as a Nazi ignores his powerful critiques of nationalism, anti-Semitism, and
fascism.
Millen, 97 – Professor of Religion at Wittenberg University – 1997 (Rochelle L. Millen,
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/modern_judaism/v017/17.1br_santaniello.html Review: Nietzsche, God, and The Jews:
His Critique of Judeo-Christianity in Relation to the Nazi Myth).
In a 1983 article entitled "The Nazi Appropriation of Nietzsche," Rudolf Kuenzli 2 expresses astonishment as to how
long the denazification of Nietzsche has taken. He suggests, correctly, I believe, that to strip away the caricature of
Nietzsche as a "mad Nazi" is to be compelled to confront Nietzsche's critiques both of democracy and of
Christianity. It is to face his antifascism and to investigate the significant statements Nietzsche makes about the
nature of German culture and its contempt for European Jewry. It is to denude our culture of its defense mechanisms and stand at the edge of the abyss. Perhaps this is why so
many years have elapsed before a book like this could be written. Nietzsche views Christianity as both antinatural and antihistorical. In the tradition of Ludwig Feuerbach, 3 Nietzsche claims that
humans project both our highest creative attributes and our most sinister qualities onto a divine being, thereby diminishing ourselves and failing to recognize the possibility toward evil that is part
of human nature. "What?" Nietzsche exclaims, "A love encapsulated in if-clauses attributed to an almighty god? A love that has not even mastered the feelings of honor and vindictiveness"? 4
According to Nietzsche, Christianity falsifies history by interpreting all history prior to Jesus as a foreshadowing of Christ's coming. Christianity falsifies the future with the notion of eternal life,
considered by Nietzsche to be the false worship of the self, and it falsifies reality itself by interpreting God as static and unchanging in an almost Aristotelian fashion (p. 48). Life, however, is an
s Nietzsche's critique
unending process of becoming; it is movement and creativity; change in order to preserve life, not meekness and submission to gain salvation in death. Thu
of Christianity--which was most strongly a critique of Christian-dominated European culture--compels us, according
to Santaniello, to view Nietzsche on his own terms and in his own political context, stripped of the veneer later
painted on by his sister Elizabeth. In his critique of Christianity, Nietzsche is concerned with several issues: the Christian concept of morality; eschatology; and the
implications of the figure of Christ the Redeemer for the Christian believer's notion of self. Similarly, Nietzsche both directly and indirectly tackles the ramifications of the Lutheran state-church,
the phenomenon of nationalism, and Christianity's central role in the increasingly virulent anti-Semitism of his time. The vitality of human creativity requires not the timidity, pity, and humility
Protestant teachers
praised as Christian values, but courage, [End Page 104] honesty, and genuine searchings that lead toward the flourishing of life, not the glorification of death.
in Germany, Nietzsche claims, confuse morality with obedience and cause in the masses a slow atrophying of the
natural instinct toward spirituality and the religious life.
Nazism was a deliberate and massive distortion of Nietzsche.

From 1891 onward, Elisabeth, Nietzsche's sister, compiled (and then published) what she claimed were the
previously unpublished notes of her famous brother. In fact, until her death in 1935, Elisabeth was responsible for
feeding to the leading ideologues of what became National Socialism--including Houston Stewart Chamberlain,
Dietrich Eckhart, Joseph Goebbels, Alfred Rosenberg, and Hitler himself--presumed statements of Nietzsche's
professed love of Christianity, allegiance to Aryan racial supremacy, and (after 1923) loyalty to the Nazi Party.
These are clearly antithetical to Nietzsche's critiques of Christianity, anti-Semitism, and Wagnerism. Under
Elisabeth's control, the Nietzsche Archive in Weimar became a propaganda tool for fascist politics and National
Socialism. As Santaniello confirms, Nietzsche never wrote a book entitled The Will to Power; it was, rather, a
compilation of distorted statements of Nietzsche's put together by Elisabeth herself in 1901, a year after Nietzsche's death. One might speculate that Elisabeth needed to
justify her own powerful anti-Semitic leanings, and in true Freudian style, could not do it in a better fashion than by deliberately twisting her brother's thought. Thus she could cover up
Nietzsche's violent break with her mentor, Richard Wagner, in 1876 and with herself in 1884; she could appropriate his genius for her purposes, camouflaging her own shallowness,
. In truth, Elisabeth's false representations of Nietzsche's philosophy represent the very aspects of
complacency, and racism
Christianity and German culture that Nietzsche so deeply despised. This is especially evident in her skewed two-volume biography of her
brother,The Life of Nietzsche (much of which was written between 1895-1904) and its later popular adaptations,The Young Nietzsche andThe Lonely Nietzsche (1912-1915). By the time of
Elisabeth's death in 1925, Nietzsche's appropriation by the Nazis was complete, and he was continually depicted as a well known anti-Semite of long standing. In the light of her meticulous
biographical and psychological analysis in Part 1 and textual analyses in Part 2, Santaniello is concerned to emphasize the "crucial fact that Nietzsche was a staunch opponent of antisemitism and
the Nazis'
that his extremely rare position during his time did not win for him many popularity contests" (p. 150). This is significant in that Santaniello unequivocally demonstrates that
deliberate manipulations of the Nietzsche corpus were based not on their misunderstanding but rather on their astute
comprehension of his work. They understood only too well that Nietzsche defended the Jews and defied many of the
precursors of National Socialism: the Wagners, Ernest Renan, Chamberlain, Gobineau, Stöcker, and the Forsters, his
own sister and brother-in-law. By adapting and distorting Nietzsche's works, the Nazis effectively silenced his voice.
AT: NAZISM/FASCISM
Nietzsche explicitly rejects the herd mentality and demands that people consider their actions in terms of
individual moral judgment—this is incompatible nationalism.
In criticizing the herd morality of Christianity, Nietzsche's concern is the complacency, the lack of rationality, the
predominance of the follower instinct that led to a tradition he viewed as bankrupt. Christian morality entraps one in
a sense of guilt and sinfulness, precluding the flourishing of true human creativity. Nietzsche also uses the figure of
Jesus to support his claim that works, not faith, are the way of the Christian life. Jesus's legacy was his behavior, an
existential disposition rather than a set of beliefs. Thus Nietzsche's reading of Jewish (i.e., biblical) theology leads to
his holding Judaism responsible for the slave morality characteristic of Christian society, yet simultaneously and
paradoxically he admires Jewish culture. The centrality of doctrine in Christianity has another negative implication.
By definition, it leads not only to repressed individuals and a herd morality, but also to religious bigotry. Christianity
for Nietzsche, Santaniello explains, has "degenerated into German nationalism with a streak of vengeance" (p. 56).
Thus part of Nietzsche's critique of Christianity is political: democracy, socialism, and Christianity encourage mass
conformity and project their discontent on the Jews. Nietzsche disparages German nationalism, the Lutheran state-
church, and the notion of the Volk, all of which--like Christian doctrine itself--preclude the development of healthy
cultures.
The desire to create an ordered word is an authoritarian move—it requires obedience, violence and a denial
of plurality to be achieved.
Saurette, 96 (Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Volume 25, Number 1, 1 March 1996 , pp. 1-28(28),
Paul, Professor of Political Studies, University of Ottawa, “I Mistrust All Systematizers And Avoid Them':
Nietzsche, Arendt And The Crisis Of The Will To Order In International Relations Theory”).
It has always been a great temptation, for men of action no less than for men of thought, to find a substitute for
action in the hope that the realm of human affairs may escape the haphazardness and moral irresponsibility inherent
in a plurality of agents.25 This exasperation almost invariably led to attempts to abolish the plurality of the public
realm by replacing human interaction with the absolute control of rulership. This conversion, however,
fundamentally transforms the understanding of politics by replacing the notion that to be human is to exist within a
plurality and act 'freely', with the idea that 'men can lawfully and politically live together only when some are
entitled to command and others forced to obey'. Arendt contends that this rule-based conception of political action
assumed a hegemonic and 'natural' status only when the philosophical transformation of Western civilisation created
an intellectual framework which necessitated interpreting politics as rulership. From this perspective, the importance
of Arendt's thought is that she reveals the way in which the Will to Order/Truth has created the parameters of the
modern understanding of politics. According to Arendt, our modern notion of politics is an inevitable consequence
of the Platonic Will to Truth/Order. After Plato's Republic, politics could no longer be conceived of as the freedom
to act with equals, but could be conceptuaIised only as the ordering of society according to the world of forms. With
this paradigmatic substitution of making for acting, homo faber becomes the model political actor, and the realm of
human affairs can be interpreted only in terms of work. Further, through this transformation, the concepts of
mastery, control, and violence are inextricably imposed onto the realm of politics.
AT: RACISM
Nietzschean politics fit well within democratic values of competition between ideas, not stratification based on
biology.
Appel concedes that a political agon can be healthy and prevent the establishment of entrenched, permanent
hierarchies (NCD, p.162). But he poses an important question, which is in the spirit of French neo-liberal critics of
Nietzschean politics: Might not a radical agon all the way down in political life "debunk" important democratic
"verities" such as universal suffrage, equal respect, and human rights? This is indeed a pressing question that many
postmodern writers have not addressed adequately. Yet Appel, like many critics of postmodernism, simply assumes
the truth and necessity of these traditional democratic notions, without much articulation of how agonistics threatens
these notions, and without any defense of the viability of these notions in the wake of Nietzschean genealogical
criticisms. Such criticisms have been effectively advanced by Foucauldian appropriations of Nietzsche that reveal
how modern "reason" cannot help being caught up in what it presumes to overcome—namely regimes of power—
and consequently cannot help producing exclusionary effects and constraints that belie the modern rhetoric of
emancipation. Nietzsche's genealogical critique of liberal democratic ideals, I think, is important and still relevant
for political philosophy. The question at hand turns on two possibilities: Does the critique presume a refutation of
these ideals or does it open up the possibility of redescribing these ideals in quasi-Nietzschean terms? Appel
presumes the former possibility, I take up the latter, while agreeing that most postmodern appropriations of
Nietzsche have not done much to address either possibility. We cannot assume the truth of universal suffrage,
equality, and human rights by ignoring Nietzsche's trenchant attacks. My strategy has been to redescribe democratic
ideals in the light of Nietzschean suspicions of their traditional warrants. Universal suffrage, equality, respect, and
political rights can be defended by way of a postmodern via negativa that simply rules out grounds for exclusion
rather than postulates conditions that warrant inclusion. Nietzschean perspectivism, metaphysical suspicion, and
agonistics simply destabilize politics and prevent even ostensibly democratic propensities from instigating
exclusions or closed conceptions of political practice. In what follows I will briefly address two questions: How can
a Nietzschean agonistics be extended to the body politic so as to be viably democratic? How can agonistics
redescribe respect and political rights without the baggage of traditional egalitarianism so forcefully assailed by
Nietzsche? Appel does indicate that his appraisal of political Nietzscheanism is not meant to discredit Nietzsche but
to invite democrats to face Nietzsche's challenge and defend democratic ideals (NCD, p.167). He admits that
Nietzsche forces us to ask: Why equality? Equality of what? (NCD, p.169). We cannot dismiss Nietzsche's
aristocraticism as irrelevant, uninteresting, or trivial (NCD, p.170). The strategy of my work has been to take up this
challenge, not by reiterating or renewing defenses of egalitarianism but by trying to show that democracy need not
be committed to traditional egalitarian rhetoric and so can approach a Nietzschean comfort with social stratification
in ways that Nietzsche did not expect or think through. Appel is right in calling to account selective appropriations
of Nietzsche by postmodern democrats who ignore or sidestep his elitism. Few writers who celebrate difference and
democratic openness in Nietzsche's name have embraced his affirmation of excellence. There is difference and then
there is difference. Excellence is a form of difference that implies gradations and judgments concerning superior and
inferior, better and worse performances. Many have embraced a Nietzschean openness to difference on behalf of a
generalized liberation of diverse life styles and modes of self-creation. 19 Such a generalized emancipation,
however, would repulse Nietzsche. He was interested in fostering special individuals and high achievements. I
wonder whether certain postmodern celebrations of difference conceal a kind of egalitarianism in their avoidance or
suppression of Nietzsche's clear comfort with social stratification. And it is important, in my view, to sustain a sense
of excellence that is vital for both democratic politics and cultural production. 20 Excellence and democracy are
compatible as long as excellence is understood in a contextual and performative sense, rather than a substantive
sense of permanent, pervasive, or essential superiority.
AT: ANTI-SEMITISM
Nietzsche’s philosophy contains tools to fight against anti-Semitism.
Yovel 02 Hans Jonas Professor of Philosophy (Yirmiyahu, Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism?: On the Uses and
Abuses of a Philosophy, “Nietzsche contra Wagner on the Jews” ed. by Jacob Golomb, Robert Solomon Wistrich)
But even without considering psychology, there are sufficient philosophical grounds for Nietzsche's active adoption
of anti-anti-Semitism. The anti-Semitic movement contained and heightened most of the decadent elements in
modern culture that Nietzsche's philosophy set out to combat: 1. Anti-Semitism as a mass movement was seen by
Nietzsche as vulgar, ideological, a new form of "slave morality" representative of the herd. 2. Anti-Semitism was a
popular neurosis, affecting weak people who lacked existential power and self-confidence. 3. Anti-Semitism,
especially in Germany, served to reinforce the Second Reich and the cult of the state, which Nietzsche, "the last
Unpolitical German," had denounced as "the New Idol." 4. Anti-Semitism was also a lubricant of German
nationalism, which the mature Nietzsche opposed most insistently (though he did so "from the right"). 5. Anti-
Semitism also depended on racism, which Nietzsche's philosophy rejected as a value distinction among groups,
though he did use race as a descriptive category. Nietzsche favored the mixing of races within the new Europe he
envisaged. 6. At the root of anti-Semitism lay a common genealogical structure of fear, insecurity, existential
weakness, and, above all, ressentiment the malignant rancor against the mentally powerful and self-affirming, as
well as the hatred toward the other as a precondition for self esteem. The ardor of the anti-Semite conceals his or her
deep insecurity: he does not start with the celebratory affirmation of his own being, but with the negation of the
other by which alone the anti- Semite proves able to reaffirm his own self-which he does in an overblown, empty,
and arrogant manner. Nietzsche's four negations - those of nationalism, racism, anti-Semitism, and the cult of the
state-also explain why he was bound to have opposed fascism and Nazism, although these ideologies successfully
manipulated his philosophy for their devious purposes.
AT: ARISTOCRATIC/HIERARCHY
A celebration of excellence is not anti-democratic as long as it is worthy praise based on the context—
Nietzsche’s celebration of aristocratic vales are not about biology.
We can still be "democratic" in opening opportunity to all to prove themselves, without assuming fixed or protected
locations of excellence. Yet we can be "aristocratic" in apportioning appropriate judgments of superiority and
inferiority, depending on the context, and thus we can avoid what Nietzsche took to be the most insidious feature of
egalitarianism, resentment in the face of excellence. We can also borrow from Nietzsche's denial of a substantial self
on behalf of a pluralized sphere of actions (see BGE 19-21) in order to keep the contextual apportionment of
excellence open both between and within selves, so as not to slip into any essentialist aristocratic confidences about
superior selves per se. 22 What is helpful to democratic political philosophy in appropriating a Nietzschean comfort
with stratification is that we are no longer bedeviled by puzzles surrounding so-called "democratic elitism."
Whenever democratic practice has exhibited unequal distributions of power, authority, function, or influence, it has
seemed to be incompatible with democratic ideals because equality has usually been the baseline principle defining
democratic life. But as long as opportunities are open in a democratic society, a meritocratic, contextual
apportionment of different roles and performances need not seem undemocratic. Such phenomena as representative
government, executive and judicial powers, opinion leaders, and expertise can be understood as appropriate
arrangements in political practice.
AT: SADISM
Our argument is not an endorsement of sadism but a joyful affirmation of the chaotic nature of the world
--we must accept the inevitability of suffering or retreat from life.
The Dionysian is "the triumphant Yes to life beyond death and change; true life as collective continuation of life
through procreation" (TI 109). But this can come only at the cost of suffering, as the price to be paid for continuous
rebirth: "In the teaching of the mysteries, pain is sanctified: the 'pains of childbirth' sanctify pain in general-all
becoming and growing, all that guarantees the future, postulates pain. . . . All this is contained in the word
Dionysus" (TI 109). The Dionysian is not simply sexuality (Nietzsche is not Freud); rather, the repression of
sexuality represents the repression of the "fearful and questionable" as such. (Likewise, Creek tragedies are not
simply sexual conflicts, though such conflicts are often at the core of them.) Accepting the necessity of pain in a life
of growth and change, setting aside the goal of happines as the ultimate aim of a human life, is what the Dionysian
"yes" requires. To truly embrace becoming at the expense of being means to take pleasure in the suffering that
accompanies the demise of whatever is. "The joy of Being is only possible as the joy of appearance[.] The joy of
becoming is only possible in the destruction of the actuality of 'Beings,' the beautiful visions, in the pessimistic
annihilation of illusions. [I]n the destruction also of beautiful illusions, Dionysian joy appears as its climax" (KGW
8.1.114). The Dionysian "yes" is not a matter of taking a sadistic pleasure in the suffering of others. Rather, it is a
decision to value the future over the present. To be glad that ours is a world of becoming, rather than being, means
to be glad that things are always changing, that the future is always coming and the present always passing away. It
means detachment from whatever exists at present-something that will inevitably appear as callousness towards
others: "Dionysian wisdom. Joy in the destruction of the most noble and at the sight of its progressive ruin: in reality
joy in what is coming and lies in the future, which triumphs over existing things, however good" (WP 417). This is
what Nietzsche had in mind by such phrases as "amor fati" or eternal recurrence. Not the idea that we must relive
the past again and again, but rather that this pattern of destruction and creation is unalterable and must be borne.
And it cannot be withstood by means of faith in progress. We must learn to hope in the absence of an expectation of
progress. If this sounds almost nonsensical to the modern ear, perhaps it is because we have been told for so long
that progress is the rational thing to hope for. While no element of our life is unalterable, suffering is the unalterable
price to be paid for changing it. It is this condition that we have no choice but to accept as a whole or to reject
through the hypocrisy of optimism.25 In a famous note, Nietzsche embodies the two choices as "Dionysus and the
Crucified": "The problem is that of the meaning of suffering: whether a Christian meaning or a tragic meaning." We
can surely struggle to alter those elements of life within our purview, but we will still be faced with the larger
question where we cannot pick and choose. One alternative is to reject life, and its afflictions, as a whole: "The god
on the cross is a curse on life, a signpost to seek redemption from life." The other is to embrace life, with all the
suffering entailed, both for ourselves and for others: "Dionysus cut to pieces is a promise of life: it will be eternally
reborn and return again from destruction" (WP 1052). If one accepts the pessimistic assessment of the world as a
place of chaos and dissonance, one faces the choice of retreating from it wholesale or embracing it and trying to "let
a harmony sound forth from every conflict" (WP 852).
AT: NIETZSCHE = CRUELTY
The alternative dodges the trap of resentment created by moral absolutes and creates an ethic of generosity.
Schoeman, 07 (Marinus, Professor of Philosophy at University of Pretoria, South Africa, "Generosity as a central
virtue in Nietzsche's ethics," South African Journal of Philosophy, April, http://cogprints.org/5466/1/Schoeman.pdf)
For Nietzsche the truly virtuous, noble human beings are those solitary individuals who have attained a state of self-
satisfaction or contentedness. This does not mean, however, that one becomes uncritical towards oneself, nor does it
imply an attitude of passivity and indifference10 (this would simply be symptomatic of nihilism). Rather, it
means that one no longer plays the morality game, i.e. one is no longer driven by feelings of resentment and self-
loathing. Hence, one no longer hankers after some transcendent power that can somehow give meaning to one's
supposedly ‘corrupt’ and miserable existence. To be virtuous, in the Nietzschean sense, does not allow any feelings
of aversion to life and its vicissitudes. On the contrary, it means a total affirmation of life. It points to a kind of
existence beyond ressentiment, i.e. an existence characterized by generosity and magnanimity.
AT: IMMORALISM = HOLOCAUST
Nietzsche’s immoralism did not facilitate the holocaust—fascist leaders played on traditional values and had
to ignore Nietzsche’s core teachings.
Golomb and Wistrich, 01 (Jacob, Robert S., Professors of Philosophy at Hebrew University of Jerusalem,
Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism? P. 14)
But what of Nietzsche's famous immoralism and rejection of traditional Judeo-Christian values? What of his
Lebensphilosophie and thoughts about regeneration that at times seemed to envisage the "breeding" of a new elite
that would eliminate all the decadent elements within European culture? Did the Nazis not draw some inspiration
from his shattering of all moral taboos, his radical, experimental style of thinking, and his apocalyptic visions of the
future? Certainly, there were National Socialists who tried to integrate Nietzsche into the straitjacket of their
ideology and exploited his dangerous notion of degeneration. But without its biological racism and anti-Semitism,
the Nazi worldview had no real cohesion and Nietzsche was as fierce a critic of these aberrations as one can
imagine. Moreover, his so-called immoralism, with its questioning of all dogmas and established values, was hardly
the basis on which fascist, Nazi, or other totalitarian regimes consolidated their support. On the contrary, such
regimes, however radical their intentions, were careful to appeal to conventional morality and nationalist feelings in
order to broaden their following, just as they often paid lip service to democratic values in order better to destroy
them. Nietzsche's skeptical outlook, with its love of ambivalence, ambiguity, and paradox, was far removed from
such manipulations, which he could only have despised and abhorred. Certainly, Nietzsche was a disturbing thinker
whose ideas will always remain open to a diversity of interpretations. He was no admirer of modernity or of the
liberal vision of progress, nor was he a "humanist" in the conventional sense of that term. His work lacked a
concrete social anchor and his solution to the problem of nihilism led to a cul-de-sac. But to hold Nietzsche
responsible, even indirectly, for Auschwitz, is surely to turn things on their head. No other thinker of his time saw as
deeply into the pathologies of fin de siecle German and European culture, or grasped so acutely from within, the
sickness at the heart of anti-Semitism in the Christian West.
AT: ALT IS UTOPIAN
The 1AC is utopian and anti-democratic, not the K. Accepting Nietzsche’s pessimism liberates us from the
meta-narrative of modernity and opens us up to new possibilities.
The politics of pessimism and tragedy, then, even on an account that insists on some traditional boundaries of genre,
are not at all those of reaction or elitism. Indeed, democratic politics require the tragic viewpoint if they are to
liberate themselves from the dubious optimistic meta-narratives of modernity. It is this element of Nietzsche's
outlook, I would argue, that has so appealed to the contemporary democratic theorists whose work I have hastily
described. Pessimism insists on an equality of (tragic) condition; on the ubiquity of flux and eros that frame this
condition; on the possibilities and dangers that follow from this; and on the uniqueness of every individual. It does
chasten politics in that it discourages utopianism; it discounts the belief either in the perfectibility of the species or
of our political conditions. But to claim that it deflates our political energies in general is to mistake utopianism for
the whole of politics. I have argued, on the contrary, that tragic pessimism liberates us by replacing the pseudo-
natural boundaries of self and history with the terrifying limitless horizon of time-bound existence.
AT: REALISM
Realism is circular—it begins with the assumption that the state is the only means of bringing about security
and then proves that very point with a series of self-serving definitions.
Saurette 96 (Paul, “'I Mistrust all Systematizers and Avoid Them': Nietzsche, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to
Order in International Relations Theory”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 25 i. 1, March 1996)
Realism The notion that Realism is a highly normative perspective is contentious statement in contemporary IR
theory,.16 Although no longer a Morgenthau postulates the existence of 'objective' laws of politics, this is only
possible through a series of normative manoeuvres which take the state as the ultimate realisation of political
interaction. By accepting that human nature is characterised by a lust for power which creates danger for individual
(and later state) survival, Morgenthau follows an essentially Hobbesian conception of the justification of domestic
politics.37 The establishment of civil society through the rule of law and centralised state power is viewed as a
necessary result of human nature. As such, Morgenthau accepts the state as a self-evident goal, because only its
hierarchical rule can tame 'natural' conflict and ensure survival and security. This normative bias is also betrayed in
the work of Kenneth Waltz, his strenuous claim to objectivity notwithstanding. In fact, Waltz's claim to objectivity
is conspicuous for the fact that it implicitly privileges the status quo (the state) by default. Waltz's theory of anarchy,
however, also seems to suggest a more assertive moral framework. Insofar as he views anarchy as a uniform
consequence of the existence of autonomous units,J8 it seems clear that Waltz merely adopts his own reading of
Rousseau's state of nature to justify the normative primacy of the state. In other words, Waltz justifies the moral
legitimacy of the state simply by assuming that it is the only effective form of civil society that can mitigate the
logic of anarchy by ensuring hierarchical control. Waltz thus replaces Morgenthau 's embarrassing assumptions
about power with the sanitised notion of structural self-interest, while continuing to justify the state in terms of
hierarchical security. In both cases, the domestic order is privileged because 'progress and perfection', or at least the
mitigation of the state of nature, is assumed to be possible only through control and rule. This conception appears
coherent only because non-order, understood as the lack of hierarchical rule, is a priori defined as a state of
nature/conflict. It is only by a perfectly circular tautology, then, that realism manages to privilege the state. Once
anarchy is defined as dangerous, politics can be conceptualised only as a process of fabrication through which a
secure community is forged by rule and control. Moreover, once security/community is understood in these terms,
the logic can only circulate back and reinforce the understanding of political action as mastery and control over
human affairs through the authority or violence of rulership. When considering international relations, then, it is
completely consistent for realism to label 'the international' as anarchic and thus dangerous because it is beyond
control. Yet, because realism has previously defined non-order as inherently dangerous to survival, the drive for
state security compels the attempt to impose order on the international realm. In a sense, the international must seem
both political (a space in need of hierarchical control) and apolitical (a space beyond hierarchical control). This
dichotomy leads to the double strategy of realism as (1) the attempt to impose order on the international through
'reasoned foreign policy' and power, while (2) retreating into the normative value of the state, and its circular
normative justification of domestic order and state survival.
AT: UTILITARIANISM
The quest for utility based on supposed scientific truth about the world is utterly nihilistic—we need to
wrestle with why we are on such a quest before blindly committing to that path.
Paul)
The very logic of the Will to Order, 'Christian morality itself, the concept of truthfulness taken more and more strictly' ,56
leads to the dawn of its self overcoming. Science is one of the latest phases of its [Will to Truth] evolution, one of its terminal
forms and inner consequences-it is the awe-inspiring catastrophe of two thousand years of training in truthfulness that finally
forbids itself the lie involved in belief in God! 57 By challenging the truthfulness of God, the scientific Will to Truth
undermines the very dichotomy between the Real World and the Apparent World. Science, however, is not an overcoming of
the Will to Truth, but merely the most complete, empty, and nihilistic ascetic ideal. It refutes 'faith' but retains an
unquestioned belief in itself. Although science claims to follow no authority, its 'unconditional will to truth is faith in the
ascetic ideal itself, even if as an unconscious imperative... it is the faith in a metaphysical value, the absolute value of truth' .
58 The scientific Will to Truth is both the most advanced and the most dangerous manifestation of the Will to Order/Truth,
because in spite of its disavowal of the Christian dichotomised world, it retains a belief in Truth without attaching any value
or meaning to existence.59 With the rise of science, then, the sole virtue of the Christian Will to Truth/Order, the' faith in the
dignity and uniqueness of man, in his irreplaceability in the great chain of being, [becomes] a thing of the past. Man has
become an animal, literally and without reservation or qualification'.6O The radical scepticism of science is the 'suicidal
nihilism' of the late-modern age, 'affirming as little as it denies'." It is the process by which all such 'transcendent' grounds are
dissolved in a corrosive scepticism: the true world becomes a fable. The central value of our culture-truth-drives us towards
ceaseless unmasking. The irony, as Tracy Strong observes, is that this discovery does not liberate us from the sense that we
must have truth in order to have meaning, that meaning is somehow inextricably tied to truth or the universal. We continue to
search for what we know does not exist, confirming our growing sense of meaninglessness; worse, we come to be at home in
this exhaustion of meaning.62 Ironically, then, Nietzsche suggests that it is precisely the nihilism of scientific faith which
pushes man 'onto an inclined plane-now he is slipping faster and faster away from the centre into-what? into nothingness?
into a penetrating sense of nothingness' .63 The danger of the late-modern nihilistic Will to Truth is that this reactive 'will to
negation', while yearning for a truthful foundation, can only destroy and negate. Even anthropocentric recreations of
authoritative Truth, such as faith in progress, utilitarian happiness-for-everyone, socialist utopias, or Kant's secularised
teleologies, cannot survive the scrutiny of this nihilistic Will to Truth. As Michael Haar notes, [a]fter having killed God-i.e.
after having recognized the nothingness of the 'true world'-and after having placed himself where God once was, Man
continues to be haunted by his iconoclastic act: he cannot venerate himself, and soon ends up by turning his impiety against
himself and smashing this new idol.64 The radical and untempered scepticism of scientific Will to Truth undermines the
foundational meanings of the modern world and thus threatens modern life with the prospect of unconditional nihilism.
AT: UTILITARIANISM
Utilitarianism is simply a re-working of Judeo-Christian morality – it prioritizes the herd over the individual.
Warren, 88 (Mark, Professor at the University of British Colombia, Nietzsche and Political Thought, MIT Press)
If Nietzsche is not interested in ethical rules so much as in the conceptions of agency they presuppose, one would
think that he would have been well-disposed toward the utilitarian attempt to evaluate practices in terms of their
benefits for the self. After all, utilitarianism breaks down the Christian polarity between the demands of the self and
what is good, between morality and life. But one finds little praise of utilitarianism in Nietzsche's writings. Part of
the reason is that utilitarianism embeds a metaphysics of moral agency in its concept of the "ego," and it is this
metaphysics that is expanded into notions of general welfare. Nietzsche's argument is that the utilitarian self is not
given as a fact, but must itself be explained as the result of a specific historical organization of power. Utilitarianism
in effect takes over and simply reevaluates the Christian "false dogmatism regarding the 'ego': it is taken in the
atomistic sense, in a false antithesis to the 'nonego'; at the same time, pried out of becoming, as something that has
being." 38 This is why "the 'welfare of the individual' is just as imaginary as the 'welfare of the species': the former
is not sacrificed to the latter; [the] species viewed from a distance is just as transient as the individual." 39
Nietzsche's point, as we saw in chapter 2, is that the powers, capabilities, and needs of agents become something
"individual" through an incorporation of historical experiences, culture, and language. Insofar as moral judgments
attribute selfhood to individuals, they as much constitute individuals as they flow from them. What utilitarianism
really does, then, is read interests of general welfare ("the happiness of Rngland," as Nietzsche puts it) onto the
individual. In this way, it usurps the good of the individual into the good of society -precisely the opposite of what
its proponents intend.
AT: EMPIRICISM
Blind faith in empiricism ignores the social and political context in which truths are created. Nietzschean
skepticism is a necessary corrective.
Welshon 09 (Rex, Professor of Philosophy at University of Colorado, "Saying Yes to Reality: Skepticism,
Antirealism, and Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Epistemology," The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Issue 37, Spring, p.
32)
The perspectival nature of justification helps us understand Nietzsche's ambivalent attitude toward the science of his
day (for additional analyses of Nietzsche's relation to science, see, among others, Clark 1990; Cox 1998; Moore
2002; Richardson 2004; Schacht 1983). It is certainly true that science is preferable to many other perspectives—
religion and morality in particular—but Nietzsche has a number of complaints about science that entail that it cannot
be uniquely privileged over every other kind of knowledge. One criticism is directed against scientists themselves,
focusing on their character flaws. Scientists myopically root around in their specialties, digging "quietly under their
molehills" (D 41), blissfully uncritical about the value of their work and never connecting it to the larger personal
and social contexts in which it occurs. This trait distinguishes scientists from philosophers, for whom nothing is
impersonal (BGE 6). A second, more serious complaint is that scientists are ascetics. The ascetic ideal is a kind of
self-mortifying decadence. Nietzsche argues in GM that the unquestioned faith in the value of truth found in science
makes truth a stand-in divinity for God after he has died. Truth becomes the object to which all sacrifices must be
made; hence, scientists are humble in the face of the truth, and by suppressing their desires in order to devote their
lives to their research, their labs, and their books, they live a life of chastity and poverty, reminiscent of priests. Thus
is the practice of science a practical asceticism. Nietzsche also complains about science itself. It is, for example,
mistakenly governed by a set of mechanistic principles that are false (see, for example, GS 373). Now, to the extent
that science reduces to mechanism, to that extent this criticism is sound. However, one might think that since
mechanism was more widespread in the nineteenth century than it is now, this criticism is not as relevant now as
then. But this glib response misses Nietzsche's more trenchant objection, which is to reductionism in science, the
view that we can identify fundamental categories and explain everything in terms of them (see especially Cox 1998).
If anything, reductionism in science has accelerated since the nineteenth century. If you doubt it, simply review the
last hundred years of psychology. Until the so-called cognitive revolution in the 1960s, the most widespread
theoretical framework in psychology was reductionist behaviorism, according to which the domain of psychology
was exhausted by observable behavior. Behaviorism was in turn replaced by computationalism, according to which
all cognition was a kind of computation. Computationalism is now also thought by most to be false, since computers
are qualitative zombies and we are not. There is something that our psychology has—phenomenological character to
our experiences—that computers lack. But we still have not learned the Nietzschean lesson, for there are now two
new reductionist trends in psychology: cognitive neuroscience, according to which a psychological phenomenon is
reducible to neural activity, and evolutionary psychology, according to which a psychological phenomenon is
reducible to survival value. Again, Nietzsche's larger point that science is routinely blinkered and self-interested
seems to be forgotten again and again.
AT: WOLIN
Wolin has an overly simplistic read of Nietzsche and fails to support his claims.
Rorty 04 (Richard, Former Professor Emeritus @ Stanford U., June 14, 2004, “A Review: The Seduction of
Unreason,” [http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/wolin.htm])
Wolin has an easy time showing that fans of Nietzsche and Heidegger have said stupid and irresponsible things
about democracy. But he does not do much to show that the stupidities follow from their philosophies, nor that those
philosophies are untenable. To do the latter, he would have to argue in defense of specific philosophical claims--
those that constitute what he thinks of as democracy’s "normative resources." He leaves it pretty vague what a
"normative resource" might be, and how such resources are put to use in political deliberation. Postmodernism,
Wolin says, is "the rejection of the intellectual and cultural assumptions of modernity in the name of ’will to power’
(Nietzsche), ’sovereignty’ (Bataille), an ’other beginning’ (Heidegger), ’différance’ (Derrida) or a ’different
economy of bodies and pleasures’ (Foucault)." So one expects him to enumerate "the intellectual and cultural
assumptions of modernity" and show why they should not be rejected. But Wolin seems to assume that his readers
already know what these assumptions are, and are disposed to take rejection of them as a reductio ad absurdum of a
philosopher’s outlook. Sometimes, however, he goes out on a philosophical limb, as when he says that Derrida’s
"criticism of the modern natural law tradition--the normative basis of the contemporary democratic societies"--
leaves us with a "’political existentialism,’ in which, given the ’groundless’ nature of moral and political choice, one
political ’decision’ seems almost as good as another." In such passages as these, Wolin endorses the old Platonic
argument to the effect that if there is nothing "out there" (the Platonic forms, the will of God, natural law) that
makes our moral judgments true, there is no point in forming such judgments at all.
Wolin is only able to indict philosophers via guilt by association—he pays little attention to the actual
arguments made.
Rorty 04 (Richard, Former Professor Emeritus @ Stanford U., June 14, 2004, “A Review: The Seduction of
Unreason,” [http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/wolin.htm])
Wolin is very good at digging up the dirt on famous European thinkers. He does a fine job of describing how their
doctrines were put to use by different bad guys at different times--how, for example, "a critique of reason,
democracy and humanism that originated on the German Right during the 1920s was internalized by the French
Left." That is an admirable summary of one of the strangest turns in twentieth-century European intellectual life.
But, though he protests that his book is "not an exercise in guilt-by-association," that description is actually pretty
close to the mark. Wolin neglects the question of why the figures he discusses held the views they did in favor of an
account of the uses to which they were put. Wolin thinks, rightly, that if you understand the sociopolitical contexts
in which a philosophical view was formulated, and the factors that account for its reception, you will be in a better
position to decide whether to adopt it. Still, the best sort of intellectual history is the kind that pays equal attention to
the company a philosophical doctrine keeps and to the arguments deployed in its defense.
AT: BUT OUR ETHIC IS UNIVERSAL
Conflict about ethics proves that there are no universal norms.

Franke 2000 (Mark F.N., Instructor of International Studies at the University of Northern British Columbia,
"Refusing an Ethical Approach to World Politics in Favour of Political Ethics," European Journal of International
Relations 6(3) p. 310)
The grounds that propel International Relations and, consequently, the general concern of international ethics
themselves, though, are surely not of an ethical character per se. International Relations and the considerations of
ethics made possible within that vision respond primarily to the notion that there is no natural structure or code upon
which actions and judgments in human relations may be legitimately justified in any final sense. No person or group
of persons has view to any thing like what one might call the universal conditions of humanity. Each is limited to
particular perspectives and cultural mappings of how a human universe may appear if local understandings could be
extended globally. It is for this reason that persons are said to be naturally in a state of war with each other. 5 In
trying to orient themselves to one another and the things that come of interest to them via experience and reports of
the experiences of others, humans run inevitably into a cartographic crisis with one another, a crisis regarding how
each ought to orient her and himself to others. Even prior to any kind of base power struggle that Realists may
attribute to them, people come into a conflict of ideas and representations of what the world of experience might be.
The multiple images that different humans may project or adopt in trying to understand the potential range of their
respective interests and movements share no natural grounds in common. There is no one place, life or vision in
which all humans commonly partake. The world of humans is therefore anarchical. But it is not so because of a
selfish nature identically reproduced in each individual, as the metaphysicists of Realism/Idealism proclaim. Rather
this ‘world’ is anarchical due to the fact that there is never actually a single world to which all ideas of human life
may be justifiably created from this variety of views. Instead, humans, by the fact of being particular and finite
beings unable to see all things and enjoy all possible lives at once, give rise to unlimited numbers and kinds of
principles upon which unending worlds may be founded and demanded. Only one universally applicable social fact
must then be said to confront each and every possible person, that an ethics is not available by nature. There are at
least no grounds upon which such an ethics may be assumed possible.
AFF: AT: NO VALUE TO LIFE
Securing life is a prerequisite to determining value.

Schwartz, 02 (Lisa, Medical Ethics, http://www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdf)
The second assertion made by supporters of the quality of life as a criterion for decision- making is closely related
to the first, but with an added dimension. This assertion suggests that the determination of the value of the quality
of a given life is a subjective determi-nation to be made by the person experiencing that life. The important addition
here is that the decision is a personal one that, ideally, ought not to be made externally by another person but
internally by the individual involved. Katherine Lewis made this decision for herself based on a comparison
between two stages of her life. So did James Brady. Without this element, decisions based on quality of life
criteria lack salient information and the patients concerned cannot give informed consent. Patients must be given
the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they think their lives are worth living or not. To ignore or
overlook patients’ judgement in this matter is to violate their autonomy and their freedom to decide for themselves
on the basis of relevant information about their future, and comparative consideration of their past. As the
deontological position puts it so well, to do so is to violate the imperative that we must treat persons as rational
and as ends in themselves.
Turn--elevating other values over extinction destroys the value to life and makes extinction certain—their
representation that they know the absolute truth of the value to life makes it easier to end it
Schell, 82 (Jonathan, writer for the New Yorker and nuclear weapons expert, The Fate of the Earth)
For the generations that now have to decide whether or not to risk the future of the species, the implication of our
species’ unique place in the order of things is that while things in the life of mankind have worth, we must never
raise that worth above the life of mankind and above our respect for that life’s existence. To do this would be to
make of our highest ideals so many swords with which to destroy ourselves. To sum up the worth of our species by
reference to some particular standard, goal, or ideology, no matter how elevated or noble it might be, would be to
prepare the way for extinction by closing down in thought and feeling the open-ended possibilities for human
development which extinction would close down in fact. There is only one circumstance in which it might be
possible to sum up the life and achievement of the species, and that circumstance would be that it had already died,
but then, of course, there would be no one left to do the summing up. Only a generation that believed itself to be in
possession of final, absolute truth could ever conclude that it had reason to put an end to human life, and only
generations that recognized the limits to their own wisdom and virtue would be likely to subordinate their interests
and dreams to the as yet unformed interests and undreamed dreams of the future generations, and let human life go
on.
AFF: CEDE THE POLITICAL LINKS

Nietzsche’s affirmation of chaos is willful abandonment of all reason—we become mere pawns of fate,
reduced to silence.
Wolin, 06 (The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism,
Richard Wolin, Professor of History and Comparative Literature at the Graduate Center, City University).
Once Nietzsche realized the illusory character of all language and human ends, silence became the only viable and
honest response. Recourse to "consciousness" and "reason" would only falsify this profound realization. The "vicious circle"
Klossowski alludes to in his title expresses this dilemma. The act of turning the eternal return into a "doctrine" risks falsifying it, risks translating an unfathomable insight into the hackneyed
terms of linguistic convention or "culture." The theory of eternal recurrence embodies a new "lucidity"; yet, paradoxically, this lucidity must remain inexpressible. For if such a lucidity is
impossible, what the doctrine of the vicious Circle tends to demonstrate is that "belief" in the Return, adherence to the non-sense of life, in itself implies an otherwise impracticable lucidity. We
cannot renounce language, nor our intentions, nor our willing; but we could evaluate this willing and these intentions in a different manner than we have hitherto evaluated them-namely, as
. The vicious circle expresses the fundamental paradox of the human condition: "the only
subject to the "law" of the vicious Circle
way we can overcome our servitude is by knowing we are not free.” We cannot escape the essential determinism of
all being. Nevertheless, insight into this condition permits a measure of tragic superiority for a spiritual elite, the
"lucid few." The anti-intellectual implications of Klossowski's "parody" of Nietzsche are stunning. They are
tantamount to a willful abandonment of reason, history, and freedom.
Nietzsche’s radical skepticism is nihilistic because to give up on the rules of logic is to abandon critical
thinking.
Comte- Sponville 91 (Andre, Professor of Philosophy at the Sorbonne. “The Brute, the Sophist, and the Aesthete
“Art in the Service of Illusion”, Why We are Not Nietzscheans).
But Nietzsche cannot then escape from the aporia of logical nihilism: if there is no truth, the proposition that states
that there is no truth is not true. We must therefore conclude either that there is a truth (in which case the proposition
"there is no truth" is false, and Nietzsche is mistaken), or that we cannot think at all any more (since the proposition
"there is no truth" is simultaneously true and false, which violates the principle of noncontradiction, or neither true
nor false, which transgresses the principle of the excluded third). In a word: we have either to save logic and give up Nietzsche or to save Nietzsche
and give up on logic. The genealogists may ask us: "Why are you so attached to logic?" We have our reasons, to which I will come back. But we also have to return the question to them: and you,
why are you so little attached to it? Nietzsche claims that attachment to logic is a sign of weakness, that it betrays a plebian or Jewish origin (WP, 431 ff.; GS, 348, 370). Should we then conclude
that every illogicality is a sign of aristocratic or Aryan force? Or would this conclusion be itself too logical? Too plebeian? Too Jewish? Or are logic and genealogy legitimate only when corning
from Nietzschean pens? But let's leave that aside. Another, more solid objection that could be made against me is that the aporia I have just evoked (the self contradiction of logical nihilism) is
that of any radical skepticism, and that I can't take Nietzsche to task for it more than I would Pyrrhon, Montaigne, or Hume, whom I nevertheless profess to admire.
AFF: GENOCIDE DISAD

The trans-valuation of values will result in one of two things: a moral philosophy similar to the aff or an
immoral alternative that would allow for rape, racism, cruelty etc.
If I had no morality, as I so haughtily claimed, then in the name of what did I condemn rape or forbid it to myself?
In the name of what could I decide what was wrong or not? In the name of what, for instance, fight against racism,
injustice, or barbarity? In the name of what should I even prefer sincerity to mendacity or sweetness to cruelty? For
a time I tried to answer: "In the name of an ethic." But this kind of purely verbal solution is satisfactory only for a
while. This ethic still had to be thought out, and the strange fact accounted for that a supposedly amoral ethic most
often corresponds quite well, and this on all the serious problems, to what any honest man would call morality. So I
took up my Spinoza again, and what I saw there is that there is no Spinozist immoralism, or rather only a theoretical immoralism, and that . . . but let's get back to Nietzsche. There is a
Nietzschean immoralism, not only theoretical but practical, and the more I got to know it, the more I found it-I barely dare to write the word, so much does it go without saying, and so much will
. The more I got to know this immoralism, the more I found it immoral. Simply, stupidly,
it make our great wits smile
inadmissibly immoral.
Modern technologies, such as WMDs, means that we can no longer afford to live beyond good and evil,
ethical norms are a necessary check on apocalypse.
Fasching, 93 - professor in USF's religious studies department – 1993 (Darrell, The Ethical Challenge of Auschwitz
and Hiroshima : Apocalypse or Utopia?, Pg. 28)
Our modern technological civilization offers us seemingly infinite utopian opportunities to recreate ourselves (e.g.,
genetic engineering, behavioral engineering) and our societies (social engineering) and our world (chemical
engineering, atomic engineering). But having transcended all limits and all norms, we seem bereft of a normative
vision to govern the use of our utopian techniques. This normlessness threatens us with demonic self-destruction. It
is this dark side of technical civilization that was revealed to us not only at Auschwitz and but also at Hiroshima.
Auschwitz represents a severe challenge to the religious traditions of the West: to Christians, because of the complicity of Christianity in the anti-Judaic path that led to Auschwitz renders its
theological categories ethically suspect; to Jews, because their victim status presses faith in the God of history and in humanity to the breaking point. But the path to Auschwitz, and from
Auschwitz to Hiroshima, represents a challenge, equally severe, for the scientific and technical, secular culture of the Enlightenment. We do not seem to have fared any better under a secular
ethic than we did under a religious one. Indeed we have fared worse. Genocide it seems is a unique product of the modern secular world and its technically competent barbarians. Auschwitz
stands for a demonic period in modern Western civilization in which the religious, political and technological developments converged to create a society whose primary purpose was the most
. The Nazi vision of the
efficient organization of that entire society for the purpose of exterminating all persons who were regarded as aliens and strangers—especially the Jews
pure Aryan society represents a utopian vision of demonic proportions—a vision that inspired an apocalyptic
revolutionary program of genocide. It reveals at once both a time of "The Death of God" in the Nietzschean sense
and yet the resurgence of religion, that is, a demonic religiosity that creates a new public order in which all pluralism
is eliminated from the public square and in which virtually nothing is sacred—not even human life. The period of
the Holocaust stands as prophetic warning to a technological civilization that has no other norm than the will to
power. If Auschwitz embodies the demonic use of technology against targeted populations to commit genocide,
Hiroshima and Nagasaki represent the last such use of technology. For with the coming of Nuclear warfare,
technology has outstripped human intentionality so that if the bomb is ever used again, genocide will be transformed
into collective suicide or omnicide—the destruction of all life. Having enemies is a luxury no community on the face
of the earth can any longer afford
AFF: GENOCIDE DISAD

Nietzsche advocated exterminating those who he thought of as weak and establishing a master race
How might one translate the conviction that hierarchy is beneficial and equality symptomatic of weakness-beliefs
Nietzsche held-into the terms of a consistent political ethos? This was the dilemma confronting Nietzsche as a political philosopher, and the solution he
found was an endorsement of "great politics." His belief in the necessity of hierarchy had profound political implications, which found
expression in his conviction that the "well-being of the majority and the well-being of the few are opposite
viewpoints of value." If one were passionately committed to greatness , as was Nietzsche, one couldn't shy away from
drawing the necessary conclusions, harsh as they might seem from a humanitarian point of view. Nietzsche, of course, was
anything but timorous in this regard. As he observes in Schopenhauer as Educator, A People is a detour of nature to get six or seven great men." And in the notes for The Will to Power, he
flirts seriously with the idea of a "master race": From now on there will be more favorable preconditions for more
comprehensive forms of dominion, whose like has never yet existed. . . . The possibility has been established for the production of international
racial unions whose task wd be to rear a master race, the future "masters of the earth-a new, tremendous aristocracy, based on the severest
self-legislation, in which the will of philosophical men of power and artist tyrants will be made to endure for
millennia . In Ecce Homo Nietzsche openly speculates on what a "successful" realization of his doctrines ("my attempt to assassinate two millennia of antinature and human disfiguration")
might mean. The scenario he envisions cannot but make one shudder: "That higher Party of Life which would take the
greatest of all tasks into its hands, the higher breeding of humanity, including the merciless extermination [Vernichtung]
of everything degenerate and parasitical, would make possible again that excess of life on earth from which the Dionysian state will grow again."
AFF: GENOCIDE DISAD

Nietzsche’s celebration of cruelty, violence, and authoritarianism are cornerstones of his philosophy.
Wolin, 06 - Professor of History and Comparative Literature at City University (Richard, The Seduction of Unreason: The
Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism).
Ironically, whereas an earlier generation of critics took Nietzsche's philosophy to task for its repugnant political
message, the postmodern approach is fond of celebrating his apoliticism. But no special interpretive talent is needed
to see that the remarks just quoted, far from being "apolitical," are fraught with political directives and implications.
The postmodernists exaggerate Nietzsche's status as an aesthete and systematically downplay the components of his work that are politically consequential. Nietzsche was, admittedly, an
Instead,
unrelenting critic of contemporary European politics, which in his estimation wreaked of mediocrity and conformity. But that hardly makes him an apolitical thinker.
Nietzsche's unabashed embrace of hierarchy, violence, and the virility of the "warrior type," combined with his
visceral distaste for the values of altruism and political egalitarianism, suggests that his doctrines foreshadowed
nolm volens some of the more unsavory dimensions of twentieth-century Machtpolitik cum total war. Any serious
attempt to reassess Nietzsche's philosophical legacy must ultimately confront the distasteful character of his moral
and political views. Conversely, any discussion of Nietzsche that focused exclusively on this aspect of his thought would be extremely limited. Nietzsche's influence on modern
thought and literature has been incalculable. Writers as diverse as Rillre, Yeats, Valery, D. H. Lawrence, and George Bernard Shaw embraced his teachings. In Doctor Faustus Thomas Mann
used Nietzsche as the model for the composer Adrian Leverkiihn. For a period of five years during the late 1930s Martin Heidegger lectured exclusively on Nietzsche. Perhaps the writer
Gottfried Benn said it best when in the late 1940s he observed to a friend, "Really, you know, [Nietzsche] has anticipated and formulated everything, absolutely everything we poke around in-
what else have we done these last fifty years but trot out and vulgarize his gigantic thoughts and suffering." His stylistic brilliance aside, no other writer articulated the spiritual disorientation of
fin-de-siecle Europe as consummately as Nietzsche. As a cultural analyst, a diagnostician of European moral collapse, his acumen was unparalleled. A self-described "good European," he sensed,
in a manner that was almost uncanny, the abyss toward which Europe was uncontrollably heading. Who could deny the preternatural clairvoyance of the following prophetic claim from Ecce
Homo: When the truth enters into a fight with the lies of millennia, we shall have upheavals, a convulsion of earthquakes, the like of which has never been dreamed of. . . . The concept of politics
will have merged entirely with a war of spirits; all power structures of the old society will have been exploded.. . There will be wars the like of which have never yet been on earth. It is only
beginning with me that the earth knows great politic. No one gave voice to the dilemmas of European nihilism with as much force and clarity as Nietzsche. He realized that the religious, moral,
and political values that had been the mainstay of the old Europe were moribund and that the new values destined to supplant them had not yet arisen. Nietzsche viewed himself as the midwife of
these new values. But he was also aware that he was a man ahead of his time. As a prophet of nihilism, Nietzsche recognized that Europe had lost its moral compass, that it was ethically adrift. In
the opening sections of The Will to Power, he offered a succinct definition of nihilism, "The highest values devaluate themselves. The aim is lacking; 'why?' finds no answer." With the advent of
the modern age, condemned to labor in the shadow of Zarathustra's chilling proclamation concerning the death of God, Europe had seemingly begun an irreversible course of existential
meaninglessness . In Nietzsche's view, its only salvation lay with the birth of the Superman. As Nietzsche proclaims in The Will to Power: In
opposition to the dwarfing and adaptation of man to a specialized utility, a reverse movement is needed-the production of a synthetic, summarizing, justifying man for whose existence the
transformation of mankind into a machine is a precondition, as a base on which he can invent his higher form of being. . . . A dominating race can grow up only out of terrible and violent
beginnings. Where are the barbarians of the twentieth century? The answer to Nietzsche's provocative question would soon materialize. Was Nietzsche really apolitical? Though he mercilessly
, he was also a tireless advocate of "great politics," a veritable leitmotif of his later
criticized the dominant political movements of his day
writings. For Nietzsche, cultural and political greatness were necessary corollaries. Not only was he an enthusiast of
Homer, Goethe, and Wagner; he was also a profound admirer of Julius Caesar, Cesare Borgia, and Napoleon. In many
respects, his reflections on "great politics" were as coherent and systematic as his musings on cultural and philosophical themes. "The time for petty politics is over," Nietzsche confidently
announces in Beyond Good and Evil; "the very next century will bring the fight for the dominion of the earth-the compulsion to great politics." Here, too, Nietzsche's orientation was shaped by
his training in the classics. Surveying the world of antiquity, the West's unsurpassed cultural pinnacle, he concluded that a hierarchical organization of society and politics was entirely natural. He
subscribed to his University of Base1 colleague Jacob Burckhardt's opinion that the rise of democracy had precipitated Athens' downfall. One of the most felicitous descriptions of his political
orientation was provided by his Danish admirer, Georg Brandes, who spoke of Nietzsche's "aristocratic radicalism"-a characterization that Nietzsche M y approved of. Aristocracy means "rule of
the best." In Nietzsche's view, it was only natural that "the best-the strongest and most powerful natures-should rule-and
rule ruthlessly. As he remarks in The Genealogy of Morals, "To expect that strength will not manifest itself as strength, as the desire to overcome, to appropriate, to have
enemies . . . is every bit as absurd as to expect that weakness will manifest itself as strength. . . . No act of violence, rape, exploitation, destruction, is
intrinsically 'unjust,' since life itself is violent, rapacious, exploitative, and destructive." Only the Judeo-Christian "slave revolt" in
ethics had dared to assume otherwise, insidiously turning the tables on the masters by declaring that strength was evil and weakness good. Nietzsche viewed democracy as
merely the political corollary of the pusillanimous Christian view that all persons were equal in the eyes of God.
AFF: GENOCIDE DISAD

If there is no truth, then there is no means of resisting lies—we would be powerless in the face of holocaust
denial or conviction of an innocent person at trial. Truth and morality go hand in hand.
Comte- Sponville 91 (Andre, Professor of Philosophy at the Sorbonne. “The Brute, the Sophist, and the Aesthete “Art in the
Service of Illusion”, Why We are Not Nietzscheans).
If there is no truth, how are you going to resist lies? What would be the sense of asking, for instance, whether Dreyfus was really guilty or who really set the
Reichstag on fire? If there is no knowledge, how will you fight obscurantism and ignorance? If there are no facts but only
interpretations, what objections will you make to the revisionists who maintain that the gas chambers are not,
precisely, a fact, only a point of view, a mere hypothesis, a mere interpretation by certain historians connected to the Jewish lobby? It may be objected that that was not Nietzsche's
point of view. Certainly, those were not his examples. As for his point of view, I wouldn't know. In The Antichrist, after having praised Pontius Pilate's attitude ("One Jew more or less-what does
it matter?"), Nietzsche adds: The noble scorn of a Roman, confronted with an impudent abuse of the word "truth," has enriched the New Testament with the only saying that has value one which
?". Indeed, any judge can say that when he needs to condemn an innocent man. But
is its criticism, even its annihilation: "What is truth
can we accept that? Should we accept it? And how do we prevent it, if there are neither facts nor truths? In aphorism
of Beyond Good and Evil, after having announced, you will recall, that the falseness of a judgment was not for him
an objection against that judgment since the only thing that counts is its vital utility, Nietzsche concludes: To
recognize untruth as a condition of life-that certainly means resisting accustomed value feelings in a dangerous way;
and a philosophy that risks this would by that token alone place itself beyond good and evil. Logic and morality go
together.
Nietzsche’s embracing of disorder necessitates an abandonment of traditional morality and justifies mass
murder.
White, 90 (Alan, online book, Within Nietzsche’s Labyrinth, Professor of Philosophy, Williams College,
http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/awhite/WNL%20web/beauty_and_goodness.htm).
to Nietzsche an insistence that the

Nietzsche exhorts us to live beautifully; on this point, Nehamas and I agree. A second point of our agreement is in attributing
assessment of a specific life's beauty is a matter, primarily, for the individual living that life. From these teachings
a serious problem emerges: if beauty is the criterion for goodness, and if there are no universal criteria for beauty,
is there anything to prevent the mass murderer and the child molester on the one hand, or the couch potato on the
other, from viewing their lives as beautiful, and thus as good -- even as ideal? This question leads me to one of Nehamas's central concerns: "Nietzsche
is clearly much more concerned with the question of how one's actions are to fit together into a coherent, self-sustaining, well-motivated whole than he is with the quality of those actions them-
selves" (166); for this reason, "the uncomfortable feeling persists that someone might achieve Nietzsche's ideal life and still be nothing short of repugnant" (167). This uncomfortable feeling
arises, for Nehamas, from the teaching that life is literature. According to Nehamas's Nietzsche, "one should not take one's misdeeds seriously for long, [because] virtue does not depend on
what one does but on whether what one does is an expression of one's whole self, of one's 'own will.'" This position makes sense, Nehamas adds, because "these are exactly the considerations
that are relevant to the evaluation of literary characters" (166). Continues... Nietzsche rejects the notion that there are human obligations deriving from a different world; yet he is not one of
Marcel's fools. Nehamas stresses, and I stress, that Nietzsche does not want to take the position of encouraging sadists and egotists. Unbridled egotism, he insists, would lead only to "universal
wars of annihilation" (BT:15). His position is made yet more explicit in a passage quoted above, but worth repeating: I deny morality as I deny alchemy, that is, I deny their premises: but I do
not deny that there have been alchemists who believed in these premises and acted in accordance with them. -- I also deny immorality: not that countless people feel themselves to be immoral,
but that there is any true reason so to feel. It goes without saying that I do not deny -- unless I am a fool -- that many actions called immoral ought to be avoided and resisted, or that many
called moral ought to be done and encouraged -- but I think the one should be encouraged and the other avoided for other reasons than hitherto. (D:103) Nietzsche does not want to deny "that
many actions called immoral ought to be avoided and resisted, and that many called moral ought to be done and encouraged"; he agrees with Marcel that only fools could think otherwise. Yet
he rejects other-worldly sources of obligation; how then can he answer Marcel's questions? What is to be said, or done, to the mass murderer and the child molester, or to the couch potato?
Nehamas responds to this question on Nietzsche's behalf, but his response strikes me as in part inaccurate and in part dangerous, and thus, on the whole, unacceptable. In responding, Nehamas
first suggests that Nietzsche severely restricts the audience to whom he addresses his transvaluative teachings: Exemplifying the very attitude that prompts him to reject unconditional codes,
Nietzsche does not reject them unconditionally. His demand is only that philosophers, and not all people, "take their stand beyond good and evil and leave the illusion of moral judgment
beneath them" (TIVII:1) Here, Nehamas suggests that only philosophers -- who, he seems to assume, are not "fools" of the sort Marcel and Nietzsche are worried about -- are to recognize that
moral judgment is illusory. In this central respect, Nehamas's Nietzsche seems to remain a Platonist: he tells noble lies to the masses in order to keep them in line, reserving the truth for the
intellectually privileged few. No doubt, Nietzsche does restrict the scope of some of his teachings; he has Zarathustra announce, for example, "It is a disgrace [Schmach] to pray! Not for
everyone, but for you and me and whoever else has his conscience in his head. For you it is a disgrace to pray" (ZIII:8.2; 227.27-29). I grant in addition that Nietzsche points philosophers
beyond dogmatic morality; he agrees with Marcel that nothing on this earth obliges us to be thoughtful or kind. Yet even in the passage Nehamas cites, Nietzsche does not present his teachings
to philosophers alone. And if we distinguish more generally between esoteric and exoteric strains inNietzsche's teachings, then his immoralism, his apparent advocacy of
violence and oppression, must certainly be included among his teachings for the many. Continues... As long as the illusion of moral
judgment holds sway, Nietzsche's question cannot be my guiding question, for as long as that illusion holds, Zarathustra's minotaur rules: good for all, evil for all. A post-moral
world, one wherein the minotaur was silenced, would be one in which each of us could determine his or her own
good; that would have to be a world within which diversity would be encouraged rather than inhibited. But that, it might seem, would entail a new form of
moral dogmatism, one with the paradoxical form, "the good for all is that there be no 'good for all'"? How could
Nietzsche defend such a perspective, or such affirmation, as one appropriate for everyone?
AFF: AT: WE DON’T ADVOCATE THE FASCIST PART OF NEITZSCHE

It is impossible to separate Nietzsche’s celebration of cruelty, violence, and hierarchy from his other concepts
—they are utterly central to his philosophy.
Nietzsche was an apostle of cultural grandeur, but he was also a dogged defender of power, cruelty and the warrior
ethos as personified by several of history's more sanguinary tyrants: Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, and
Napoleon. The problem for interpreters who seek to aestheticize (and thereby, as it were, anesthetize) Nietzsche's
doctrines is that, as the following quote from the Nachlass shows, in his mind conquest and cultural flourishing
went hand in hand: "The new philosopher can arise only in conjunction with a ruling caste, as its highest
spiritualization. Great Politics, rule of the earth, are at hand." Of course Nietzsche was anything but a systematic
thinker, and the result has been the predictable hermeneutic feeding frenzy that has always surrounded his work.
Nevertheless, "will to power" and "great politics" were mainstays of his later thought. Any attempt to interpretively
brush these concepts aside risks distorting Nietzsche's central philosophical intentions.
Nietzsche’s writing was instrumental in Nazism. Their argument that his “great politics” was only a
metaphor ignores the fact that he did help to inspire one of the worst phases in human history and that other
authors cannot be appropriated in that way.
After all, the National Socialists viewed the doctrine of "total war" and the unprecedented genocide and carnage it
had unleashed in quintessentially Nietzschean terms: as a Gotzendiimmmng or "twilight of the idols," a macabre
aesthetic spectacle of the first order. Documentary evidence corroborates the extent to which the SS (Schutz Staffel)
adopted as its credo-and thereby found ideological inspiration to carry out the "Final Solution"-Nietzsche's
admonitions to "live dangerously" and to practice "self-overcoming." As French fascist Marcel Deat remarked at the
height of World War 11, "Nietzsche's idea of the selection of 'good Europeans' is now being realized on the
battlefield, by the LFV and the Waffen SS. An aristocracy, a knighthood is being created by the war which will be
the hard, pure nucleus of the Europe of the future." The Nazis found Nietzsche's self-understanding as a "good
European" eminently serviceable for their bellicose, imperialist ends: as an ideological justification for continental
political hegemony. The Third Reich's ideology planners considered only three books fit for inclusion at the
Tannenberg Memorial commemorating Germany's World War I triumph over Russia: Mein Kampf Alfred
Rosenberg's Myth of the Twentieth Century, and Nietzsche's Zarathtra. Although the Nazis also tried to render
German poets such as Goethe and Schiller serviceable for their cause, their attachment to the traditional ideals of
European humanism represented a formidable hurdle. In Nietzsche's case, however, no such obstacles existed. As Steven
Aschheim observes in The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany: Here was a German thinker with what appeared to be genuinely thematic and tonal links, who was able to provide the Nazis with a
higher philosophical pedigree and a rationale for central tenets of their weltanschauung. As Franz Neumann noted in 1943, Nietzsche "provided National Socialism with an intellectual father who
." Was it
had greatness and wit, whose style was beautiful and not abominable, who was able to articulate the resentment against both monopoly capitalism and the rising proletariat
really so far-fetched, as Nietzsche's defenders have claimed, that a thinker who celebrated Machtpolitik, flaunted the
annihilation of the weak, toyed with the idea of a Master Race, and despised the Jews for having introduced a
cowardly "slave morality" into the heretofore aristocratic discourse of European culture-was it really so far-fetched
that such a thinker would become the Nazis' court philosopher? Reflecting on Nietzsche's fascination with breeding,
extermination, and conquest-all in the name of a "racial hygiene" designed to produce superior Beings-the historian
Ernst Nolte speculates that the scope and extent of the wars envisioned by the philosopher might well have
surpassed anything Hitler and company were capable of enacting: What Nietzsche had in mind was a "pure" civil war. Yet when one thinks the idea
through to its logical conclusion, what needs to be annihilated [vernichtet] is the entire tendency of human development since the end of classical antiquity . . .: Christian priests, vulgar
. If "annihilation" [Vernichtung] is
champions of the Enlightenment, democrats, socialists, together with the shepherds and herds of the weak and degenerate
understood literally, then the result would be a mass murder in comparison with which the Nazis' "Final Solution"
seems microscopic.
AFF: AT: WE DON’T ADVOCATE THE FASCIST PART OF NIETZSCHE

We concede that there are anti-authoritarian readings of Nietzsche but the alternative will be
misappropriated as an excuse for violence.
Golomb and Wistrich (Professors at the Hebrew University), 02 (Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism?
On the Uses and Abuses of a Philosophy, http://www.pupress.princeton.edu/chapters/i7403.html).
Nietzsche was clearly an elitist who believed in the right to rule of a "good and healthy aristocracy," one that would,
if necessary, be ready to sacrifice untold numbers of human beings. He sometimes wrote as if nations primarily
existed for the sake of producing a few "great men," who could not be expected to show consideration for "normal
humanity." Not suprisingly, in the light of the cruel century that has just ended, one is bound to regard such
statements with grave misgivings. From Mussolini and Hitler to Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot, and Saddam Hussein, the last
eighty years have been riddled with so-called political geniuses imagining that they were "beyond good and evil"
and free of any moral constraints. One has to ask if there is not something in Nietzsche's philosophy with its
uninhibited cultivation of a heroic individualism and the will to power, which may have tended to favor the fascist
ethos. Musssolini, for example, raised the Nietzschean formulation "live dangerously" (vivi pericolosamente) to the
status of a fascist slogan. His reading of Nietzsche was one factor in converting him from Marxism to a philosophy of sacrifice and warlike deeds in defense of the fatherland. In
this mutation, Mussolini was preceded by Gabriele d'Annunzio, whose passage from aestheticism to the political activism of a new, more virile and warlike age, was (as Mario Sznajder points
out in his essay) greatly influenced by Nietzsche. Equally, there were other representatives of the First World War generation, like the radical German nationalist writer, Ernst Jünger, who would
find in Nietzsche's writings a legitimization of the warrior ethos (as David Ohana makes clear). There have also been Marxist critics like George Lukács, who saw in Nietzsche's philosophy
nothing more than an ideological apologia for the rapacious plunder of German capitalist imperialism and a particularly destructive form of irrationalism. Lukács insisted both on the reactionary
coherence of Nietzsche's "system" and on the "barren chaos" of his arbitrary language, singling him out as one of the most dangerous "intellectual class-enemies" of socialism. Lukács's own
miserable record as an apologist (for the crimes of Stalinism), gave his one-sided reading of Nietzsche (which equated hostility to egalitarian socialism with fascist imperialism) transparently
propagandist coloring, yet it is an interpretation that had considerable influence in its day. Many commentators have raised the question as to whether the vulgar exploitation of Nietzsche by
While almost any philosophy can be propagandistically abused (as Hans
fascists, militarists, and Nazis could indeed be altogether arbitrary.
Sluga has shown, Kant was a particular favorite among academic philosophers of the Third Reich!), Nietzsche's
pathos, his imaginative excesses as well as his image as a prophetseer and creator of myths, seems especially
conducive to such abuse by fascists. The radical manner in which Nietzsche thrust himself against the boundaries of conventional (Judeo-Christian) morality and
dramatically proclaimed that God (meaning the bourgeois Christian faith of the nineteenth century) was dead, undoubtedly appealed to something in Nazism that wished to transgress and
totalitarianism of the twentieth century (of both the Right and Left) presupposed a breakdown
transcend all existing taboos. The
of all authority and moral norms, of which Nietzsche was indeed a clear-sighted prophet, precisely because he had
diagnosed nihilism as the central problem of his society--that of fin de si`ecle Europe.
AFF: AT: WE DON’T ADVOCATE THE FASCIST PART OF NIETZSCHE

Even if every argument that they make about Nietzsche resisting fascism is right, the fact remains that his
anti-democratic rants fueled one of the worst regimes in history.
We have to stop here for a moment to rule out some false trails and one false conclusion. We know that the Nazis
often claimed to be inspired by Nietzsche and that, for example, Hitler made a gift to Mussolini of a luxury edition
(that the former had had printed in 1935 of our author's Complete Works. Such facts, and others one could cite,
prove nothing. It is doubtful that Hitler ever read Nietzsche, or read more anyway than scattered quotes. And that
Nietzsche is in no way suspect of Nazism is a certainty to which both chronology and the reading of the texts are
enough to lead us. But the disciples are a little hasty when they conclude that therefore there is no problem and that
anyone would definitely have to be ill intentioned to see the least relation between Nietzsche and Hitler. Without,
obviously, being one of Nazism's causes, or even one of its real sources, Nietzsche belongs nevertheless to the same
spiritual world-antidemocratic, anti-Jewish, antirationalist German thought that will also produce Nazism, and that
fact explains to some extent the Nietzschean pretentions of this or that Nazi as well as the Nazi strayings of this or
that Nietzschean without in any way authorizing them. "A doctrine," Jankirlirvitch said about Nazism, "in which
Heidegger immediately found himself and which so visibly carries Nietzsche's mark." In both cases, that's going too
far. Maybe. But it would not be going far enough-in both cases-to attribute to chance or to misunderstanding the
monstrous proximity that made of Heidegger a Nazi and seemed, though erroneously, to give the Nazis Nietzsche's
blessing. "The porks will wallow in my doctrine" the latter had foreseen, and that, indeed, is what happened. But
why? We can hardly imagine the Nazis laying claim to Kant or Husserl in the same way, and every doctrine, we
may say, has the porks it deserves. "There will be wars the like of which have never yet been seen on earth,"
Nietzsche also announced, bragging about it. "It is only beginning with me that the earth knows great politics. It is
of course clear that there is a great deal of derision in these swaggering. But a philosopher turns prophet at his own
risk. Whose fault is it if, now that history has gone on further down the road, we have the choice only between the
ridiculous and the odious?
AFF: ANTI-SEMETIC
Nietzsche rejection of values in favor of accepting disorder has fueled Nazism. Our argument is not that his
writing was explicitly anti-Semetic, but the history of misappropriation proves that the alternative is
politically undesirable.
Golomb and Wistrich 02 (Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism? (Professors at the Hebrew University),
On the Uses and Abuses of a Philosophy, http://www.pupress.princeton.edu/chapters/i7403.html).
At first sight, this sharp rejection of anti-Semitism might seem a good enough reason to answer negatively and
decisively the question concerning Nietzsche's responsibility for Nazism. Certainly, a thinker who held a high
opinion of Jewish qualities, looked to them as a spearhead for his own free-thinking Dionysian "revaluation of all
values," and sought their full integration into European society could hardly be blamed for the Nazi Holocaust. On
the other hand, in his sweeping rejection of Judeo-Christian values (as they were mirrored in German Protestantism)
Nietzsche constantly referred to their origin in the sublime "vengefulness" of Israel and its alleged exploitation of
so-called movements of "decadence" (like early Christianity, liberalism, and socialism) to ensure its own self-
preservation and survival (Menahem Brinker). Even though Nietzsche's prime target was clearly Christianity--which
he also blamed for the suffering of the Jews--the source of the infection ultimately lay in that fateful transvaluation
of values initiated by priestly Judaism two millennia ago. It was a selective reading of this Nietzschean indictment of
Judeo-Christianity that led the late Jacob Talmon, an Israeli historian, some forty years ago to see in Nietzsche a
major intellectual signpost on the road to Auschwitz. Moreover, even when describing the "Judaization" of the
world in terms that mixed admiration with disapprobation, Nietzsche seemed inadvertently to be feeding the myth of
Jewish power, so beloved of Christian and racist anti-Semites. Though his intentions were profoundly hostile to anti-
Semitism, this provocative technique was undoubtedly a dangerous game to play. While it would be senseless to
hold Nietzsche responsible for such distortions, one can find troubling echoes of a vulgarized and debased
Nietzscheanism in the later diatribes of Hitler, Himmler, Bormann, and Rosenberg against Judeo-Christianity.
AFF: AT: AFFIRMING DIFFERENCE ALTERNATIVE

Their theory should be rejected because of dismal empirical results—the politics of difference have justified
racial separatism while modernism has mobilized egalitarian social movements.
Paradoxically, whereas a visceral rejection of political modernity (rights of man, rule of law, constitutionalism) was
once standard fare among counterrevolutionary thinkers, it has now become fashionable among advocates of the
cultural left. Postmodernists equate democracy with "soft totalitarianism." They argue that by privileging public
reason and the common good, liberal democracy effectively suppresses otherness and difference. Of course, one
could very easily make the converse argument: historically speaking, democracy and rule of law have proved the
best guarantors of cultural diversity and political pluralism. During the 1980s the debate on "difference" would take
an insidious turn as the European New Right, led by France's Jean-Marie Le Pen, embraced the "right to difference"
as a justification for racial separatism. The shock of recognition resulting from Le Pen's electoral successes pushed
the European left firmly back into the democratic republican camp. Although Derrida has recently professed a sly
interest in a nebulous "democracy to come" ("democratic a venir/avenir"), what he might have in mind by this
metapolitical decree-long on rhetoric and short on empirical substance-is anybody's guess. By denying the basic
emancipatory potentials of democracy, by downplaying the significant differences between it and its totalitarian
anathesis, the postmodern left has openly consigned itself to the political margins. For, whatever their empirical
failings, states predicated on rule of law contain a basic capacity for internal political change fundamentally absent
from illiberal political regimes. Over the last forty years, the qualified successes of the women's, antiwar, ecological,
civil, and gay rights movements have testified to this political rule of thumb.
Affirmation of differences utterly incompatible with the compromises needed for democracy—
authoritarianism is the only government that can control a populace that no longer believes in pluralism.
Taguieff, 91 (Pierre-André, director of research at CNRS (in an Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris The
“Traditionalist Paradigm- Horror of Modernity and Antiliberalism” Why We are Not Nietzscheans).
One cannot be a Nietzschean the way one can be a Kantian, a Hegelian, or a Marxist. Positions and analyses count less than the manner, or the style, which is led by the power to destroy and the
capacity to assert with absoluteness. The destructive aim is directed first of all against pluralist/liberal democracy, the object of supreme detestation. Then it is turned against the socialist utopias
After the devastating demystification that is effected by
that intend to fully realize the virtual possibilities of modern egalitarian democracy.
Nietzsche's philosophy, from the moment we attempt to follow it in its ultimate consequences on the political
terrain, no expectations become possible that could be fulfilled within the limits of modern democracy. Nothing
remains but the exalted call for the "coup de force" and the dream of a redemptive dictatorship. Various generations
of Nietzscheanizing aesthetes and pious interpreters have made an effort not to see this terrible logical conclusion, to
hide or mask it. It is time to recognize that Nietzsche's pluralism, his hyperrelativistic perspectivism, is, far from
being consonant with the regulated pluralism implied by liberal democracy, its total negation. Radical relativism is
for Nietzsche but a destructive weapon intended to completely disqualify the value systems and the beliefs of the
modern world. Nietzsche does not call for us to settle down comfortably into skeptical doubt, cultural relativism, or
doxic pluralism. The "hardness" that his thinking requires, at least in its prophetic mood, is of the kind implied by
the assertion of irreducible differences or of hierarchical distances that are also destinies. Do we need to insist on the incompatibility of
such an absoluteness of hierarchical difference with the foundational egalitarian requirements of the modern democratic sphere? To be convinced of this, we need to read in their entirety, without
evading the letter of the text through this or that angelic reconstruction, fragments as explicit as the following one, of which there are plenty: One of the tendencies of evolution is, necessarily,
The
that which levels humanity . . . The other tendency, my tendency, on the contrary tends to accentuate differences, widen distances, suppress equality, and create monsters of power.
absolute affirmation of difference, the total negation of equality, the cult of hierarchies based on nature: these are the
paths that lead to the heroic road, which lead us to the straight road thought out by the "immoralist." It is the only
road pointed to by the radical, sovereign negations-the "no of the yes"-uttered against the modern world by the
philosopher of the Will to Power. They hardly need to be added to.
AFF: NIETZSCHE RACIST

Nietzsche is explicitly racist—he praises Aryans and calls others degenerates. They will say that it is only a
metaphor but that flies in the face of his repeated emphasis on biological determinism.
Nietzsche's thinking is racist in its essence through its conjunction (under cover of heredity) of elitism with
biologism. "One pays a price for being the child of one's parents," Nietzsche wrote in The Gay Science (348), but he is more precise in Beyond Good and Evil (§ 264): "It is simply not
possible that a human being should not have the qualities and preferences of his parents and ancestors in his body, whatever appearances may suggest to the contrary. This is the problem of race.
." For Nietzsche, because of that every human activity depends
If one knows something about the parents, an inference about the child is permissible
on what he calls "blood" (Geblut), and even philosophy doesn't escape from this: For every high world one must be
born; or to speak more clearly, one must be cultivated for it: a right to philosophy-taking that word in its great sense-
one has only by virtue of one's origins; one's ancestors, one's "blood" decide here, too. Many generations must have labored to prepare
the origin of the philosopher; every one of his virtues must have been acquired, nurtured, inherited, and digested singly. (BGE, 21 3) The same illumination is, as we might have supposed, also
valid for the general history of humanity. In The Genealogy of Morals (I, 4, j), after having noted that the "veritable method to follow" was the genealogical one, Nietzsche writes: In the
Latinmalus (which I place next to Greek melas) could indicate the common man as the dark one, especially as the black-haired one ("hic niger est -"), as the pre-Aryan dweller of the Italian soil
which distinguished itself most clearly through his color from blonds who became their masters, namely the Aryan conquering race. And then he adds this remark (whose status in a philosophy
And he gravely asks himself: Who can say whether modern
book leads one to wonder): "The Celts, by the way, were definitely a blond race."
democracy, even more modern anarchism and especially that inclination for "commune," for the most primitive
form of society, which is now shared by all the socialists of Europe, does not signify in the main a tremendous
counterattack-and that the conqueror and master race, the Aryan, is not succumbing physiologically, too? (GM, I, 5)
And he drives the nail in the wall: "These carriers of the most humiliating and vengeance-seeking instincts, the
descendants of all European and non-European slavery, especially of the pre-Aryan people-they represent mankind's
regression! These 'instruments of culture' are a shame for human beings, and a cause for suspicion, a
counterargument against 'culture' in general!" (GM, I, 11). And he praises, on the contrary, "the blond beast at the bottom
of all the predominant races," all the "jubilant monsters, who perhaps came out of a terrible sequence of murders, burnings, rapes, tortures with high spirits and tranquility of soul, as if it had all
been a case of student high jinks; convinced that the poets would now have something to sing and to praise for a long time" (ibid.)! And, perhaps influenced by Gobineau, whom he greatly
admired. At heart in these predominant races we cannot mistake the beast of prey, the blond beast who lusts after booty and victory . . . The deep, icy mistrust the German brings forth when he
comes to power, even today, is an echo of the indelible outrage with which Europe looked on the rage of the blond Germanic beast for hundreds of years31 All of these texts, and many others one
could quote, justify my title, or at least its first qualifier. Not of course that Nietzsche was a brute as an individual (the poor man didn't have the means!); but he is the philosopher-and the only
.
one to my knowledge (for though Machiavelli legitimizes immorality politically, he doesn't thereby condemn morality as such)-who justifies brutes and consciously makes models out of them
At this point it will be said-the Nietzscheans will say that these texts should not be taken literally, that they have but
a metaphorical meaning, that the "force" they extol is of an intellectual kind, and finally that (as Heidegger is
supposed to have demonstrated!) there is in Nietzsche no biologism, and that therefore the "races" he evokes are not
really races. …Continues… To want to absolve Nietzsche of his barbaric or racist remarks on the pretext that, in his
case (and contrary, it is specified, to what we see in Mein Kampf or among the theoreticians of national socialism),
it is metaphysics is to be mistaken from beginning to end about the status of Nietzschean metaphysics, which, far
from escaping from the body's vital order (and therefore from biologism), is but one of its expressions (a
"symptom"), neither the most dignified nor the most important one, and one, most of all, that remains de facto and
de jure dependent on the body. This is put clearly in one of the posthumously published notes: All our religions and philosophies are the symptoms of our bodily state: that
Christianity achieved victory was the result of a generalized feeling of listlessness and of a mixture of races (that is, of conflict and disarray in the organism). (Kroner, XIII, § 600) Thus we must
take "the body and physiology [as] the starting point" (WP, $492); consider "all that is 'conscious' . . . only of secondary importance" (Kroner, XIII, $ 382), and consequently revise "our beliefs
and our very principle of evaluation" and only hold on to the intellect (das Geistige) as "the body's sign language" (ibid.; see also WP, $ 707, 676). This is where Nietzsche is closest to
), if the soul is only the symptom of the body
materialism-and where the materialist must therefore be the most vigilant. If "in man there is material" (BGE, 225
and if this symptomatology is itself, as Nietzsche never ceases to repeat, biologically determined, how can we not
proceed from physical differences (those that result from heredity) to intellectual differences-and what is that called
if not racism? The most radical materialisms escape, or can escape, from this by subordinating life to something other than itself, from a point of view either theoretical (the true is not a
symptom) or physical (matter is neither racist nor racial), or practical (it is not morality which must subordinate itself to life; it is life, in human beings, which must subordinate itself to morality:
even if the notion of race were biologically pertinent, racism would still be morally damnable). Racism is, in a word, a hermeneutics of the epidermis (that is its theoretical error) that mistakes
heredity for a morality (that is its practical flaw). It is a barbarous and superficial materialism. I can't draw out the analysis of all this to the extent the topic demands. But it will already be
understood at this point that, rejecting as he does both idealism (which is a nonsense for the body) and, in the end, materialism itself (because, he makes clear, "I do not believe in 'matter'"), 44
Nietzsche can only fall into vitalism (in a large sense: he doesn't believe in the existence of any kind of vital principle either) or, if you prefer, into biologism. That is his ontology, what separates
him from materialism: "Being-we have no idea of it apart from the idea of 'living.'-How can anything dead 'be'?"45 But "the organic was not generated" (Kroner, XIII, $ 560). Organic life is
essentially will to power, as Nietzsche hammers on repeatedly, and will to power is, as we know, the basis of reality.
AFF: AT: NIETZSCHE’S K OF REASON

Nietzschean critiques of reason are deeply disempowering—universalism has empirically been successful in
the fight against social injustice.
Nietzsche certainly was a radical critic of reason. He wished to show that the modern West, by emphatically opting
for the values of instrumental rationalism, had systematically precluded other, more distinguished value options.
Nietzsche forcefully sought to demonstrate the opportunity costs of-the one-sidedness and partiality of, as well as
the losses entailed by-"cultural rationalization" (Max Weber). He once lamented that the modern West suffered from
a 'hypertrophy of the intellect," to the detriment of other venerable and worthy human faculties-and on this point
who would disagree? Yet in the rush to radicalize Nietzsche, to enlist his services in a series of bitter, internecine
intellectual disputes, the Gallic reception willfully suppressed the subtleties and nuances of his position. In French
hands Nietzsche was transformed from a principled critic of reason into a devout foe of the same. Beginning with
Socrates and culminating with the Enlightenment, the critical employment of reason highlighted the tension between
the claims of reason and the unreasonable character of existing social institutions. As such, reason's claims were
always inimical to illegitimate social authority. Reason sought to illuminate the cleft between unjustifiable claims to
authority and its own more general, "universal" standpoint. If, as later historians contended, the collapse of the
ancien regime was a foregone conclusion, its demise had been precipitated by the labor of criticism undertaken by
lumieres and philosophes, the so-called party of reason.
Rejection of all reason is mental suicide and risks repeating the worst politics of the 20 th century.
Wolin 98 (Richard, Distinguished Professor of History @ City U. of New York Graduate Center, “The anti-
American revolution,” The New Republic, Washington, Aug 17-Aug 24, 1998, Vol. 219, Iss. 7/8; pg. 35-42)
In the postmodernist demonology, it is the Enlightenment that bears direct historical responsibility for the Gulag and
Auschwitz. In the eyes of these convinced misologists, or enemies of reason, modern totalitarianism is merely the
upshot of the universalizing impetus of Enlightenment reason. Or, as Foucault once observed, "reason is torture."
According to the "politics of difference," moreover, reason is little more than the ideological window-dressing for
Eurocentrism and its horrors. These wild claims are historically inaccurate. They are also self-defeating: if we
abandon rational argument, we have little left to rely on but the "right of the strongest" or "identity politics."
(National Socialism was a monumentally monstrous instance of "identity politics.") And they are also self
contradictory. For the enemies of reason can only advance their position through force of the better argument; that
is, by giving reasons that aim to convince others. To criticize reason's failings is one thing. To reject it in its entirety
is not antirationalism but antiintellectualism, or mental suicide.
AFF: AT: NIETZSCHE’S K OF REASON
Truth does not enable domination—the idea that anyone can be wrong is radically democratic.
Boyer 91 (Alain, Professor at University of Paris IV [Sorbonne]. “Hierarchy and Truth”, Why We are Not
Nietzscheans).
A second, no less serious error consists in suspecting the Idea of absolute Truth of all sorts of authoritarian and
liberticide effects. A pragmatist and relativist conception would be better suited to our tolerant and pluralist
democratic epoch. Nonsense. That truth is, properly speaking, inhuman, meaning that it in no wise depends on
human desire or will-any more than the existence of oil under the soil of Saudi Arabia depends on the desires it
brings about-does not in and of itself have any dogmatic effects, quite the contrary. It is this inhumanity which
permits the assertion that anyone, me, you, all of us perhaps are wrong, because we have not arrived at a truth that
does not depend on our means for getting to it. Truth is not an epistemological concept.

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Michigan 7 Week Seniors Nietzsche 1

security 1nc 1/.................................................................................................................................................................4

non-security 1NC 1/........................................................................................................................................................8

2NC/1NR impact overview

In the face of a crisis of suffering, we are presented with two options:

CARD CONTINUES, NO TEXT DELETED…

OWEN & RIDLEY CONTINUE…

LINK: WAR ON TERROR

LINK: WAR ON TERROR

LINK: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

LINK: INTERNATIONAL LAW

LINK: HUMAN RIGHTS

LINK: HUMAN RIGHTS

LINK: HUMAN RIGHTS

LINK: SOCIAL SERVICES

LINK: SOCIAL SERVICES

LINK: FREE SPEECH

LINK: CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

LINK: ETHICS OF THE OTHER

LINK: ETHICS OF THE OTHER

LINK: ETHICS OF THE OTHER

Christianity demands cultural genocide of all those considered barbarians.

IMPACT: MEANING TO LIFE

IMPACT: MEANING TO LIFE

IMPACT (SECURITY): SURVIVAL

IMPACT (SECURITY): WAR

IMPACT (ETHICS): WAR

IMPACT (ETHICS): WAR

IMPACT (ETHICS): MEANING TO LIFE

IMPACT (ETHICS): DEHUMANIZATION

IMPACT (ETHICS): TURNS CASE

IMPACT (RIGHTS) = EXTERMINATION

IMPACT (RIGHTS) = EXTERMINATION

IMPACT (RIGHTS) = EXTERMINATION

ALT SOLVES: REALISM

ALT SOLVES: ETHICS

By removing absolute moral values, the alternative forces us to investigate ethics.

ALT SOLVES: RESPECT FOR THE OTHER

ALT SOLVES: VALUE TO LIFE

ALT SOLVES: INTOLERANCE

ALT SOLVES: NIHILISM

ALT SOLVES: NIHILISM

ALT SOLVES: DEMOCRACY

ALT SOLVES: NEW POLITICS

ALT SOLVES: NEW POLITICS

Over-turning ethical absolutes is critical to personal and political transformation.

AT: TIME FRAME OUTWEIGHS

AT: HEGEMONY GOOD IMPACT TURNS

AT: OUR ETHICS ARE UNIVERSAL

AT: OUR ETHICS AE AN ACT OF SELF-OVERCOMING

AT: NIHILISM/NO MEANING TO LIFE

AT: ATTACK ON REASON DESTROYS DEMOCRACY

AT: NIETZSCHE IS AN ANARCHIST/DOES NOT APPLY TO POLITICS

AT: NIETZSCHE IS AN ANARCHIST/DOES NOT APPLY TO POLITICS

AT: NIETZSCHE IS AN ANARCHIST/DOES NOT APPLY TO POLITICS

AT: NIETZSCHE = VIOLENCE

AT: NIETZSCHE = VIOLENCE

AT: NIETZSCHE = VIOLENCE

Self-overcoming discourages physical violence—it is a sign of weakness.

AT: NIETZSCHE = PATRIARCHY

Nazism was a deliberate and massive distortion of Nietzsche.

AT: NIETZSCHE = CRUELTY

AT: IMMORALISM = HOLOCAUST

AT: ALT IS UTOPIAN