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Perry Anderson and

Leon Trotsky on the
revolutionary betrayed
a
Michael Cox
a
Political Science Department , Queens
University , Belfast
Published online: 08 Nov 2007.

To cite this article: Michael Cox (1993) Perry Anderson and Leon Trotsky on the
revolutionary betrayed, Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory, 20:1, 151-163,
DOI: 10.1080/03017609308413361

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03017609308413361

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 Discussion
Perry Anderson
and Leon Trotsky
on The Revolutionary Betrayed
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Michael Cox
Introduction:
Perry Anderson and the New Left Review have played an important role
in initiating and forming discussions on the left over the past twenty years.
The increasingly less critical stance of the NLR to the USSR has been a
source of concern to those who wish to assist the formation of a democratic,
non-Stalinist tainted socialist movement Michael Cox takes Anderson to task
in this article for his apparent discovery that the USSR is "progressive" in
its foreign policy. (Ed)

Anderson and Trotsky

In his provocative discussion of Trotsky's analysis of the USSR, Perry
Anderson quite correctly finds much that is praiseworthy and good.1 Indeed,
he insists that Trotsky's contribution was quite unique. 'Trotsky's interpretation
of the historical meaning of Stalinism', he asserts boldly at the beginning
of his article, was, and presumably remains, 'the most developed theorization
of the phenomenon within the Marxist tradition'. According to Anderson,
Trotsky's analysis of Stalinism had three qualities: historical perspective;
sociological richness; and political balance. The first made it possible for Trotsky
to situate Stalinism. The second is shown by the fact that modern scholarship
has been unable to refute his findings. The third enabled him to avoid becoming
either a straightforward apologist or utterly dismissive of Soviet achievements
for he recognized that in spite of its negative degenerate features, the Soviet
Union remained a progressive historical formation. The USSR, to use a phrase,
was a "contradictory phenomenon", and Trotsky incorporated this reality into
his analysis and characterization of the Soviet system
Yet Anderson perceives a basic problem in Trotsky. Having correctly
understood the dual character of the USSR, he then failed to apply this insight
to his discussion of the USSR internationally. If the Soviet Union was a
contradictory system being both anti-capitalist and anti-working class — did
it not follow that this contradiction would be reflected in its relationship
with world capitalism? Here Anderson believes he has spotted a major problem
in Trotsky's thought. For while he was willing to recognize the dual nature
of the USSR, he was unwilling (or unable) to apply this idea to the Soviet
 152 CRITIQUE
Unions's external role. Hence, Trotsky's argument concerning the absolutely
counter-revolutionary part played by the USSR abroad, not only contradicted
his basic theory of the Stalinist system, but fails — according to Anderson
— to explain important historical developments since 1917 and the part played
by the USSR in bringing them about.
Anderson points to several examples of the USSR's objectively progressive
role, and the contribution it has made directly and indirectly to the struggle
for socialism in the 20th century. Perhaps most important, he insists, was
the part played by the Soviet Union in the defeat of Nazism and later colonialism.
He puts the case forcefully and without ambiguity: "The two major forms
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of historical progress registered within world capitalism in the past fifty years
— the defeat of fascism, the end of colonialism' were he maintains directly
'dependent on the presence and performance of the USSR'.2 However, that
is not all. The USSR has also weakened capitalism by overthrowing bourgeois
rule in one part of the world — Eastern Europe — and by giving support
to regimes and movements which negate it in others, especially in the Third
World. In short, the USSR has not proved to be purely counter-revolutionary.
It has, in its inevitably contradictory fashion, weakened capitalism as an
international system and by definition therefore has advanced the cause of
the working-class. However Trotsky — Anderson insists refused to admit
that the USSR could further the struggle and that Stalinism could spread
as a result. Yet, if he had remained true to his original view about the dual
contradictory character of the USSR, he could have explained why Stalinism
has proved able to advance the fight against the capitalist world system and
how the USSR, in spite of its 'colossal distortions', has proved to be 'persistently
anti-capitalist beyond its own frontiers'.
In formal terms there are certain points made by Anderson with which
it is impossible to disagree, particularly about the seminal nature of Trotsky's
work on Stalinism and why it has proved to be so influential since his death.
In his characteristically elegant manner he shows why Trotsky retains his
fascination for Marxists. Moreover, unlike orthodox Trotskyists, he is prepared
to engage with what he sees as the inconsistencies in Trotsky's thought. For
this at least, Anderson ought to be applauded. Yet while Anderson has posed
a number of problems for those in the orthodox Trotskyist tradition I would
argue that his own analysis is basically flawed.3 First, he is far too uncritical
of Trotsky's discussion of the USSR. Instead of exposing the underlying
ambiguities in Trotsky's theory of the Soviet Union, he seeks to preserve and
even celebrate their existence. More seriously, he not only ignores that which
is ambiguous in Trotsky, but more obviously that which is important and
analytically useful. For this reason Anderson fails to use Trotsky in order to
develop a theory of Soviet external relations. Secondly, while he is correct
to point to the obvious problems confronting Trotskyists who have argued
that the USSR is a status quo power in the world, he is himself unable to
provide a theory of Soviet foreign policy or an explanation of why Stalinism
has spread. Finally, although Anderson admits that the USSR has often held
back the struggle against world capitalism, in the end the main thrust of his
argument is to show the active, sometimes unconscious role it has played
 ANTI-ANDERSON 153
in weakening the market on a world scale. Hidden behind his nuances and
qualifications there is a clear message struggling to be heard. It reads — the
USSR is on the side of socialism, and in spite of its internal degeneration,
and often dubious international politics, it is still a revolutionary force in the
world which the left ought to defend. It is this which is perhaps the least
acceptable and most questionable part of Anderson's attempt to correct Trotsky.
Let us deal briefly with each of these points.
Orthodox Trotskyism
Anderson, it is obvious, is far too uncritical of Trotsky. It is all very well
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saying that Trotsky's analysis of Stalinism had historic perspective, sociological

richness, and political balance (whatever that means) but that hardly helps
us come to terms with Trotsky's highly ambiguous legacy.4 To praise Trotsky
for what many have seen as his flawed, albeit powerful analysis of the USSR,
evades this real problem. Anderson ignores the simple fact that in spite of
its many strengths, Trotsky's discussion of the USSR in the thirties leaves
many questions unanswered. Perhaps we shouldn't blame Trotsky. After all
he was working in isolation and was separated by thousands of miles from
events in the Soviet Union.5 Also what he was analysing was itself unique
and in flux. His work should therefore be regarded as unfinished, as he himself
admitted.6 There were thus good objective reasons why Trotsky's half-developed
(albeit frequently brilliant) ideas were bound to be limited. We should treat
them, as he did, as only first approximations. Unfortunately, this has not
been the case as the subsequent history of the Trotskyist movement and
Anderson's short piece show. Far from engaging with Trotsky, many, including
Anderson, have been content simply to repeat his formulae. This is why
the 'Russian question' has always been the Achilles Heel of Trotskyism.
Basically what Trotskyism has taken from Trotsky has been the following
propositions about the USSR. First, that in spite of its degeneration the Soviet
Union still remains a worker's state. Second, that although there is no democracy
in the USSR, planning exists. Third, that this new economic system, whatever
its shortcomings, is basically superior to capitalism because it is able to grow
more quickly and develop technology more rapidly than under the market.
Fourth, that the bureaucracy is — almost in spite of itself — bound to defend
state property in the Soviet Union. Finally, that for all these reasons, the
left has a duty to defend the USSR. There would be little point here in
the space of a short article to restate all the obvious objections to these
propositions, but the following questions need to be answered by those like
Anderson who would defend Trotsky's theory of Stalinism.
Obviously, how can one use the term 'worker's state' to characterise the
USSR, when the real workers are exploited by an elite which controls the
state apparatus in a society which grants the same workers even less rights
than in a bourgeois democracy? Further, how can we talk of planning in
the Marxist as opposed to the Stalinist and bourgeois sense — when there
is no democracy and I thus no possibility of the associated producers exercising
conscious control over the society.7 Moreover, if the USSR were superior
to the market (and "growth" can hardly be used as a measurement of Soviet
 154 CRITIQUE

economic superiority, especially now when there is no real growth), then

why is the USSR unable to compete economically with the West or come
out from behind the administrative shield provided by the monopoly on foreign
trade? Equally, if the bureaucracy was "bound to defend the property gains
of October", why has it been attempting to move the USSR and Eastern
Europe gradually back to the market over the past two decades? Indeed
what exactly are these gains and who actually benefits from the system? Finally,
while we could make a case for defending the USSR in the thirties when
Nazism threatened and the system may conceivably have been regenerated,
the case for "defending" the USSR today seems specious and dangerous:
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specious for it is never defined exactly what it is we are supposed to be

defending and against whom; dangerous because it makes those who would
defend the USSR into its effective apologists.
As Anderson is well aware of these obvious objections to Trotsky's analysis
of the USSR we can only assume that he finds them trivial, so trivial in
fact that he fails to mention them in his assessment of Trotsky's ideas. However,
it seems odd to say the least that Anderson simply by-passes forty years
of debate about Trotsky's analysis of Soviet society without mentioning these
points. All that is needed, he implies, is to study what the great man said
before 1940, absorb his theoretical insights, maintain his political balance,
and celebrate in the knowledge that Trotsky's account has been 'developed
rather than contradicted' by 'professional scholars' such as Nove (who thought
Stalin was — and the market is — necessary);8 Lane (who has little sympathy
for Trotsky's theory of the Soviet Union);9 Davies and Carr (whose ambivalence
about Stalin is well-known);10 and Hough (who was once regarded as a modern
American apologist).11 Apart from the fact that these scholars, whom he cites,
are not quite so neutral as he pretends, and that he ignores the work of
contemporary Marxists critical of the USSR, this approach is a recipe for
intellectual stagnation. It simply is not enough to take an unfinished theory
developed over forty years ago and add, or fit, the facts to it. Unfortunately,
this is what has passed for Marxist debate on the USSR for nearly a generation
which is one of the reasons why it has been so barren intellectually.
Of course, it might be objected that in a short piece Anderson could not
deal with these questions. However to discuss Trotsky's theory of the USSR
without even mentioning the obvious objections to it, is strange to say the
least, particularly in an article purporting to be a critical assessment of Trotsky's
work.
Indeed Anderson only makes the situation worse by praising what is in
fact most problematic about Trotsky's discussion of the USSR, namely its
supposedly dialectical character. Trotsky was able — or so it is inferred —
to distinguish between the different features of the system, praising that which
was good (presumably the economic base), and attacking that which was
not (its political superstructure). In fact it was precisely this sort of method
which led Trotsky, and has led Trotskyists, up the historical garden path.
If one reflects on the problem, if only for a moment, it becomes obvious
that with this approach one could say or justify anything. Apart from the
 ANTI-ANDERSON 155
fact that it is based on a ridiculously optimistic view of Soviet economic
achievements, this dualistic — rather than dialectical — approach is absurd
theoretically. How could the base and superstructure be so out of synchrony
one wonders? Surely, if as Trotsky argued, the superstructure was degenerate,
then logically there must have been an equally degenerate set of social and
economic relations? One couldn't exist without the other, unless of course
one wants to use the absurd Althusserian notion about the autonomy of the
superstructure. Yet Trotsky somehow managed to hold on to the view that
there was a progressive economic base in the USSR, even though it managed
to produce a horribly repressive political system.
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Moreover, to assert that the USSR had or has a progressive side tells us
nothing, for all systems in history have had a progressive dimension and
have achieved things. After all the Greeks produced a major culture, the
Egyptians built pyramids, and the Romans unified and advanced European
civilization, — yet all of these societies were slave-based. Even feudalism
constructed magnificent churches, and later colonialism brought backward
societies into contact with more advanced ones. Historically in fact, it could
be argued that the market has played, and in many ways still plays, a progressive
historic role. Indeed a stronger case could be made in Marxist terms for
defending capitalism rather than Russia. After all the former has a higher
level of productivity, has been able (unlike Stalinism) to develop an international
division of labour, and has created an economic foundation upon which some
type of democracy has been able to flourish — something which clearly
has not happened in the USSR or in any of the "worker's states".

Trotsky's Main Theses

However, perhaps the greatest problem with Anderson, is not just that
he treats Trotsky uncritically, but that he makes no reference at all to Trotsky's
main argument, which was not that the USSR was a worker's state that
Marxists must defend for eternity, but that in the particular form it had assumed
in the thirties it would not be able to persist. This is why he maintained
that the USSR was at a far higher level of contradiction than capitalism
and should only be regarded as a transitory regime.12 As he insisted repeatedly
throughout the thirties, the system would have to change if it was to last.
It would either have to move forward to socialism — which assumed revolution
in the West — or back to capitalism.13 The USSR could thus only be seen
as a temporary phenomenon, for not only was it surrounded on all sides
by a more advanced capitalism, but it had a far lower level of labour productivity
than its Western adversary. Therefore, unless the USSR broke out of its isolation,
and at the same time underwent fundamental internal change, it would either
break down, or degenerate to the point where Marxists would have to rethink
their whole conception of the era in general and of what they thought about
the Soviet Union in particular.14 It was not simply socialism in one country
which was impossible — so too was Stalinism according to Trotsky.
Events did not turn out the way Trotsky had hoped. The USSR emerged
triumphant and in some ways stronger from the war. Revolution did not
 156 CRITIQUE
break out in the West. Nor did Stalinism change fundamentally — even
with the death of Stalin. Many therefore assumed that Trotsky had been
proved wrong and forgot (or rejected) his underlying argument about the
unviable character of the system. To many his thesis seemed absurd. After
all hadn't the war and the Soviet Union's post-war recovery proved that
the USSR was fundamentally strong? Indeed didn't even bourgeois economists
admit that in terms of growth there had never been anything like the USSR?
In this way Trotsky's essential argument was deposited in the dustbin of
intellectual history to be ignored by both his critics and supporters.15
Of course if the left had looked a little deeper and penetrated behind the
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cover of crude growth rates they would have seen that things were not quite
as they appeared. The Soviet system may have produced quantitative
development, but it also produced immense waste. The growth rates simply
obscured the fact that the economy was highly inefficient. Those who eulogized
Soviet economic growth in the 30's (the 'grandeur of industrialization' as
Anderson prefers to call it) also invariably forgot to mention that it was
only made possible by the superexploitation of the masses16 and later of Eastern
Europe. Furthermore, this primitive accumulation not only presupposed the
Soviet Union's huge natural and human resources, but also the creation of
a totalitarian police state to keep the system stable.17 Finally, the Soviet elite
had to isolate its own population totally from the West and manipulate a
series of war scares in order to make sure that domestic discipline was
guaranteed. The system was able to persist and grow, but only by taking
what amounted to a series of emergency measures — measures which were
very much an index of the high level of contradiction assumed by.Trotsky.
Unfortunately, this problem was never explored by his followers, who managed
to turn his work into a dull static parody of the original while ignoring those
ideas which had real potential for development.
However, the failure to develop what was intellectually fruitful in Trotsky
not only meant that his followers were unable to explain certain key features
of the Soviet system — most notably its repressive unstable character —
but also its relationship with world capitalism. For if the USSR was weak,
as Trotsky's theory obviously implied, then this was bound to be reflected
in its external relations. Concretely, if we accept Trotsky's argument that the
USSR was a transitory (and by implication insecure) system, then I would
suggest that we might not only explain many of its internal features, but
also why it has not been a status quo power as well. By building upon
the arguments implicit in Trotsky's theory of the transition — rather than
making a number of apparently clever but basically absurd statements about
the dual character of the USSR, which manages to be revolutionary yet counter-
revolutionary, progressive but also reactionary, and all at the same time
according to Anderson — then we might begin to solve the genuine problem
which Anderson has at least recognized.
The USSR and World Capitalism
Anderson it should be recalled argues that the USSR has been consistent
in its opposition to capitalism, because it remains a non-market system it
 ANTI-ANDERSON 157

must oppose and be opposed by capitalism on a global scale.18 Let us first

examine this argument and then go on to explain, in the light of our earlier
discussion, why the USSR comes into conflict with the West.
There are at least three obvious objections that can be raised against
Andersons's argument. First, we can simply point to the various struggles and
revolutions the USSR has betrayed. The argument may seem terribly jejeune
in certain sophisticated circles. Many have even argued that this approach
is far too subjective or simply a substitute for serious objective analysis. Perhaps
so, but the fact remains — as even Anderson admits — that the USSR has
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opposed all independent revolutionary initiatives since the twenties. If we accept

this then it seems absurd and inconsistent to suggest that the USSR has been
persistent in its opposition to capitalism as a world system. Second, we could
ask him, quite genuinely and seriously, to look at the standard Soviet textbooks
on their own foreign policy which have a lot to say about peace, coexistence,
mutually beneficial economic relations, national sovereignty, anti-monopoly
alliances and nationalist struggles in the Third World, but hardly anything
about overthrowing capitalism. Third, we could point out that if the USSR
was a major threat to world capitalism, this would be reflected in American
foreign policy. Yet, if we look beyond official statements about the 'threat'
(which has a specific role to play in the organization and legitimization of
post-war capitalism), we discover something which Anderson's argument simply
cannot explain: America prefers to keep the USSR 'in play' rather than eliminate
it. Better, the State Department argues, to have a bipolar world order with
a weak unattractive USSR as the main competitor.19 Why eliminate Russia?
It is the best argument for the market; the most important source of intercapitalist
unity; and the reason for Germany — and Europe's — continuing division.
That is the official US line, although it is often obscured by their political
rhetoric. This doesn't mean of course that the USSR is not a problem for
the West, or that occasionally arguments about rollback are not voiced in
America. It simply suggests that the post-war capitalist order, with America
at its head, has come to accept and even depend upon the maintenance of
Soviet power — something which would be unthinkable if the USSR were
a serious anti-capitalist force in the world as Anderson seems to believe.20

However, as Anderson correctly points out, the situation is contradictory.

The USSR has facilitated the overthrow of capital in some parts of the world
and Stalinism has proved capable of taking power under certain conditions.
There is little point denying this; the problem however is to explain it. Anderson
suggests somewhat vaguely that it is the dual nature of Stalinism which is
the main reason. I would suggest a very different cause of the USSR's opposition
to the West. It is not the USSR's essentially anti-capitalist nature, but its
basically unviable character which forces it to pursue a strategy which brings
it into conflict with the western bourgeoisie. It is, in short, the historic failure
of the Soviet elite to establish a mode of production which can compete
or even coexist with capitalism in any genuine sense that creates the antagonism
with the West. This is what we could, and should, derive from a reading
 755 CRITIQUE

of Trotsky's theory of Stalinism, not a series of ambiguous assertions about

its dual nature which explains nothing — and in Anderson's hands —
everything.
Understanding the failure of Stalinism as a system is therefore the point
of departure for any serious discussion of Soviet relations with world capitalism.
Because the Soviet experiment has not been able to achieve any of its stated
objectives it is in a peculiarly vulnerable position at home and abroad. As
long as it continues with its flawed economic system which has not caught
up with and cannot overtake the West the Soviet elite will always have to
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take what amounts to extraordinary external (as well as internal) measures

to remain in being. It is not just the bureaucracy which is insecure, but the
whole system. This has produced an ambivalent relation with world capitalism.
On the one hand, Soviet weakness has forced it to seek accommodation with
the West. This is the real meaning of peaceful co-existence. On the other
hand, the same weakness has pushed it into opposition with the world capitalist
system in OTder to reduce the attraction and the pressure which the latter
can exert against the Soviet social order. This is why Soviet foreign policy
is complex and often seems inconsistent to its left wing supporters and plainly
duplicitous to its right wing enemies. However, there is no real inconsistency
involved as long as we recall the underlying dilemma facing the weak Soviet
system. It is this which produces both its search for a long term deal with
the world bourgeoisie, but at the same time forces it to exploit contradiction
within the world system.21 This is why the USSR cannot be characterized
simply as a status quo power, and why it supports some but by no means
all forces opposed to the status quo. Given its insecurity it must relate to
the West in ways which appear to the naive as being progressive and to the
right as being a threat.
Historically, Soviet weakness has thus forced it to seek external support
in its struggle to survive in a sea of world capitalism. Straightforward survival,
rather than persistent anti-capitalism, brings it into opposition with the West.
In this way we can then explain its links with the Communist parties, its
need to maintain a stable cordon sanitaire in Eastern Europe, and why it
supports anti-imperialist struggles. They are all forms of forward defence utilized
by the Soviet elite to help secure its continued reproduction and that of the
nonviable system over which it rules. The first places direct pressure upon
the Western bourgeoisie — without seeking to overthrow it.23 The second
weakens the pressure which the West can place upon the USSR.24 The third
gives the USSR allies and bargaining counters in its struggle against the West.25
Finally, while it should be remembered that the main Soviet goal is to weaken
world capitalism rather than destroy it, under certain conditions the USSR
will give support to movements and regimes actually opposed to the market
— but only so long as they remain under Soviet control or are essentially
similar in structure to the USSR. If they challenge Soviet hegemony in any
way the USSR will oppose them. No doubt if Cuba and Vietnam were genuinely
independent, or examples of socialist democracy, the USSR would withdraw
support. However, as long as they remain dependent, and do not seriously
 ANTI-ANDERSON 159
oppose the USSR the latter will back them for the same reason that it supports
all those forces which weaken the West without challenging the Soviet Union
and its many allies.26
However, the left should not forget that even when the USSR fights the
West its opposition is in no way related to the primary socialist purpose
which is the emancipation of the working class. The very regimes it has
chosen to establish or support are not surprisingly similar if not identical
to itself or are forced to become like it. I have little doubt that if a genuine
and independent revolutionary movement emerged outside the USSR — and
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in Western Europe rather than in some backward distant Third World country
— the USSR and its supporters would move to undermine it as rapidly
as possible. What happened in Spain in 1936, and France in 1968, is perhaps
the best argument against those who suggest that the USSR is seriously opposed
to capitalism. Supporting nationalist movements in Africa, subsidizing
dependent non-democratic systems like Cuba or Vietnam, or maintaining
fraternal links with mildly critical CP's is one thing - giving support to genuine
socialist movements of self-emancipation is quite another.
Of course, it might be argued that even if Anderson does not provide us
with a genuine theory of Soviet foreign policy he at least recognizes that it
has played a broadly progressive role. The main enemies of capitalism and
imperialism — for whatever reason — have been weakened as a result of
the Soviet Union's presence and we mustn't lose sight of the fact. Moreover
(and how often have we heard this argument) it is all we've got and we
must therefore be balanced in our criticism of it. Frankly, I think these arguments
are misconceived and are misleading and shortsighted: Misleading, because
they ignore the fact that the so-called 'socialist' regimes which have been
established in the world are so repressive and inefficient that their main historic
function has been to serve as warnings to the rest of humanity not to go
down the same dangerous path;27 shortsighted, because they must lead those
who put forward such arguments to grossly underestimate the negative role
which Stalinism has had upon the general struggle for socialism in the 20th
century — not just because it has betrayed, but because it has provided the
bourgeoisie with the key argument against socialism on a world-wide scale.28
This is the main reason why the left is in decline today, when, given the
nature of the world crisis, it should be on the rise. It is this tragic impasse
which Anderson's discussion of the USSR simply cannot explain. For this,
if for no other reason, his analysis of the international role of Stalinism must
be rejected.
Conclusion
The left has responded in several ways to the overthrow of the market
in different parts of the world in the 20th century. Some have insisted that
nothing new has happened and that there has only been a series of state
capitalist happenings. At the other end of the scale we find those who believe
that in spite of it all 'we' are winning and 'they' are losing. From Petrograd
to Peking, from East Berlin to Pyongyang, socialism, it is argued, is on the
 160 CRITIQUE

move. There is yet a third group, amongst whom I would include Anderson,
Mandel and the Trotskyist movement as a whole, who seem to reject both
these positions but somehow still believe the world is nearer to socialism
today than it was in 1917. They occupy the ambiguous high ground from
which they survey history with more objectivity or so they think.29 In fact,
they are much closer to the second group than they would care to admit.
Herein lies the great tragedy of the Trotskyist heritage and the great problem
with Trotsky, who provided the left with a basic critical foundation for
understanding the Utopian and reactionary nature of socialism in one country,
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but then did not break completely and totally from Stalinism. This is why
he remained ambiguous in everything which he wrote in the thirties and
why so many apparently anti-Stalinists like Anderson, (and before him
Deutscher), have ended up writing critical apologetics of the system.30
The left in effect has to come to terms with the enormity of the defeat
it has suffered, not just in the past five years, or even since the war, but
since the twenties and thirties. One of the consequences of that defeat was
fascism. Another was the Cold War which provided the basis for renewed
accumulation in the post-war period. A third has been the failure of the
left to respond in any serious way to the present world crisis. It is not surprising
therefore that many socialists faced with this reality have looked for some
form of political compensation to mask the defeats they have suffered and
the marginalization they have experienced for nearly two generations. Before
the sixties most of them looked to the USSR. The crisis of Stalinism and
events in the former colonies then made some look for comfort in the Third
World. For a short period a few even looked to China. Now many, it would
appear, are drifting back toward the Soviet fold, after having left it in the
revolutionary heat of the late sixties. This may be understandable given the
present situation but it is something which the left must guard against. The
new toughness in US foreign policy in the Third World and towards the
USSR should not mislead them into defending the USSR and becoming yet
again its critical supporters from afar.31 Major changes are taking place in
the Soviet block as a result of continuing economic decline which will open
up new political situations. It would be theoretically illogical and politically
disastrous therefore if the left ended up once again in the situation of defending
so-called 'worker's states' especially now when these systems are in terminal
decline. In the end the left must choose and not prevaricate while legitimizing
its ambivalence with talk — like Anderson's — of the dual nature of the
USSR.32

1. Perry Anderson. 'Trotsky's Interpretation of Stalinism', New Left Review, 139, May-June
1983, pp.49-58.
2. The Soviet contribution to the defeat of Germany after 1941 is obvious. However, Anderson
might have mentioned the fact that Soviet policies — in Germany before 1933, in Spain
in 1937, and in the shape of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939 — actually contributed to
the consolidation and spread of Nazism in Europe. He should have also specified what
indispensable role the USSR played in the overthrow of European colonial rule during
 ANTI-ANDERSON 161
and after World War II — especially as Stalin was utterly indifferent to and even opposed
to anti-colonial nationalism!
3. Phil Hearse in his critique of Anderson is correct politically but makes two mistakes. First,
unlike Anderson, he doesn't even try to explain why the USSR comes into opposition
with the world market Second, like Anderson he treats Trotsky uncritically. See his 'Perry
Anderson on Stalinism", International November-December, 1983, pp.31-34. In his
contribution Chris Arthur makes the somewhat understated criticism that Anderson is
'overgenerous to the Soviet bureaucracy.' However he seems to agree with Anderson that
there is something worth defending in the USSR, and like Hearse, fails to examine Trotsky's
thought critically. See his remarks in International, January-February 1984.
4. All serious Marxist discussion about the USSR however inevitably has to begin with Trotsky
and deal with his contribution. This point is demonstrated forcibly by Antonio Carlo in
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his useful survey The Socio-Economic Nature of the USSR' Telos 21 Fall 1974, pp.2-
86.
5. Writing of Trotsky in the mid-thirties Victor Serge later observed: "Although he was still
at the height of his intellectual powers, what he wrote towards the end did not approach
his earlier work in quality. People often forget that intelligence does not exist in a vacuum."
V Serve and N S Trotsky, The Life and Death of Leon Trotsky (London: Wildwood,
1975) p.4.
6. Trotsky wrote: 'In our analysis, we have above all avoided doing violence to dynamic
social formations which have had no precedent and have no analogies. The scientific task,
as well as the political, is not to give a finished definition to an unfinished process.' The
Revolution Betrayed (New York 1970) p.255-256.
7. The crucial distinction between bureaucratic organization of the Soviet economy and planning
proper is made by H H Ticktin in an easily understandable form in his debate with W
Brus. See 'Is Market Socialism Possible or Necessary?' Critique 14, 1981, esp. pp. 13-
21, 35-39.
8. A. Nove, Was Stalin Really Necessary? (London Allen and Unwin, 1964). It is in his
most recent book that Nove mounts a spirited and lucid attack on socialism under the
rather humorous title: The Economics of Feasible Socialism (George Allen & Unwin, 1983).
9. Politics and Society in the USSR (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson; 1972) pp.182-183.
Lane's functionalism of necessity gives his work an uncritical character.
14. Anderson — and orthodox Trotskyists —.would be well advised to study what Trotsky
said towards the end of his life in the polemic with Shachtman and Rizzi. Trotsky rejected
their pessimistic thesis but was honest enough to admit that if the war did not destroy
Stalinism and capitalist rule in the West, Marxists would have to draw some radical
conclusions: first, about the capacity of the working class to become a ruling class and
second about the character of the USSR. If there were no change Trotsky wrote that
'it would be necessary in retrospect to establish that in its fundamental traits the present
USSR was the precursor of a new exploiting regime on an international scale.' Trotsky
of course hoped that Stalinist Russia — which he called a 'totalitarian bureaucratic society'
— was an 'abhorrent relapse.' However he admitted that if it remained in being the Stalin
regime would inevitably become a 'new' type of 'exploiting society' with the 'bureaucracy'
as 'a new exploiting class.' Trotsky was quite unambiguous. If nothing fundamentally changed
as a result of war he would rethink his whole position which obviously was not final
or fixed. See his The USSR in War" which can be found in In Defence of Marxism,
(New York, 1942). Even the pretentious and dull Baruch Knei-Paz has pointed out that
Trotsky had always assumed that Stalinism was a temporary phenomenon, something which
was obvious in his last writings on Russia: 'It was almost as if Trotsky were suspending
final theoretical judgement on these issues until events themselves decided one way or
another.' See his The Social and Political Thought of Leon Trotsky (Oxford University
Press, 1978) p.423.
15. In his magnum opus on Marxist economic theory Mandel speaks of bureaucratic
mismanagement of the economy etc. but completely fails to integrate Trotsky's thesis about
the transitional nature of the USSR into his discussion on the Soviet economy. See his
Marxist Economic Theory (London: Merlin, 1974) pp.548-604.
 162 CRITIQUE

16. Trotsky often gave the impression that what was being achieved in the USSR was not
the result of exploitation but of planning. See the unfortunate Erst chapter entitled 'what
has been achieved' in The Revolution Betrayed pp. 5-20.
17. Not surprisingly once the Soviet elite could no longer use force as an economic motor,
exploit Eastern Europe to its advantage, and call upon huge reserves of labour, Soviet
economic growth began to falter dramatically.
18. The argument that there must of necessity be a fundamental antagonism between social
systems forms the basis of Fred Halliday's theory of the Cold War. Halliday admits that
his 'book drew heavily on the ideas and advice of NLR editorial members.' The Making
of the Second Cold War (Verso: 1983)p.i.
19. As even the unmentionable Sir John Hackett has argued: 'We have to make do with
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the Soviet regime, barbarian, brutal and based on butchery as it is, because a world in
which there are two superpower blocs in abrasive but more or less stable equilibrium
is likely to be a safer world than if one of them collapses.' The Soldier's Cautionary
Tale', Observer Supplement, 4 July 1982.
20. On the importance of the USSR in helping to maintain capitalist equilibrium since 1947
see my 'Western Capitalism and the Cold War System' in M Shaw ed. War, State and
Society (London: Macmillan, 1984) pp.136-194.
21. This contradiction was clear throughout the seventies when the USSR sought the advantages
of detente with the West but then tried to exploit the West's problems in the Third World.
In that respect the USSR was as much to 'blame' for the breakdown of detente as the
United States in spite of Jonathan Steele's argument to the contrary. See his World power:
Soviet Foreign Policy Under Brezhnev & Andropov (London: Michael Joseph 1983)
22. When the right argues that there is a Soviet threat the left responds either by pointing
to US military superiority, or by showing how that threat' has been manipulated to secure
US hegemony, legitimise rearmament, or justify interventions in the Third World. This
is all perfectly true standing outside of and in its own limited and qualified way in opposition
to the world market, it does pose a problem — a fact which goes unrecognized by many
revisionists including Noam Chomsky in his Towards A New Cold War (Sinclair Brown,
1982).
23. This position is reflected in Soviet propaganda advice to the CP's who are constantly
warned of the twin dangers of ultra-leftism i.e.: being revolutionary, and social democratic
opportunism i.e.: becoming incorporated. As comrade Suslov pointed out, Lenin remorselessly
and heroically 'waged an uncompromising struggle against Right and "Left" opportunism
...' Leninism And The World Revolutionary Working-Class Movement (Moscow 1971) p.19.
24. Significantly Stalin only finally decided to Sovietize and isolate Eastern Europe in 1947
and 1948 — the years which marked the beginning of the reconstruction of Western Europe
capitalist democracy. His great fear was not the military prowess of the West but the
attractive power of a successful market upon his own sphere of influence. la fact we
could argue that whereas the Marshall Plan posed a real threat to Soviet hegemony, the
formation of a military pact — in the shape of NATO — helped legitimize it This why
G F Kennan supported Marshall Aid but was sceptical about NATO. Because he wanted
to see a Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe and a long term change in the Soviet
system he opposed all tough line military policies. Not surprisingly he criticized Truman
and today attacks Reagan — and for the same reason. See his recent The Nuclear Delusion
(Hamish Hamilton, 1983)
25. The USSR has always made it clear that the struggle in the Third World is anti-imperialist
— not anti-capitalist — and that their main goal is to ensure the unity of the forces
of socialism i.e. the USSR, and those of the national liberation movements against the
West See the unusually interesting: The Comintern and the East ed R A Ulyanovsky
(Moscow 1979)
26. Milovan Djilas made the point that Stalin did not necessarily oppose Communists taking
power as long as the USSR was able to control the regimes which emerged. See his
Conversations with Stalin (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1963) pp.68-103.
27. Even Z. Brzezinski was prepared to concede that Stalinism had played the historic role
of vitiating the appeal of communism, especially in the West the area originally seen
 ANTI-ANDERSON 163
by Marx as ripest for historical transformation.' See Between Two Ages. America's Role
in the Technocratic Era (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970) p. 138.
28. We hardly have to admire Jimmy Reid or endorse his back-stabbing approach to the
miners dispute to appreciate that there is a lot of truth in his basic argument The Tories
and the right-wing parties in Western Europe have managed to equate socialism with
the Soviet system of government I'm concerned that fear and dread of an East European
regime is the major obstacle to the advance of socialist ideas in Britain. The Labour movement,
must therefore define its policies and concept of socialism in terms which unmistakeably
safeguard and expand individual and collective freedom. This is meaningless unless we
demonstrate an absolute commitment to democratic rights ... It is this which the British
Labour movement has failed to do in the case of the miners in the current dispute.' See
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'The damage Scargill has done to the Left Observer, 16 September 1984, p.8.
29. See Hillel Ticktin's exposure of this ambiguity in his The Ambiguities of Ernest Mandel'
Critique, 12, Autumn-Winter 1979-80, pp.127-138.
30. Deutscher, who did so much to educate a political generation with his biography of Trotsky
has been justly accused of providing a Marxist apologia for Stalinism. His influence on
the New Left Review and Anderson has been self-evident from the early days. In many
ways Anderson's tortured logic about the USSR abroad and why it still represents a force
for progress is simply a form of Deutcherism writ large onto a world canvas. For two
devastating and brilliant critiques of Deutscher see Julius Jacobson 'Isaac Deutscher: The
Anatomy of an Apologist' in J Jacobson ed Soviet Communism and Socialist Vision (New
Brunswick: Transaction Books 1972) pp.86-162 and Max Shachtman 'Isaac Deutscher's
"Stalin" in M Shachtman ed. The Bureaucratic Revolution: The Rise of The Stalinist State
(New York: The Donald Press, 1962) pp.225-244. Significantly Anderson refers to Deutscher's
writings as the greatest historical work on the fate of the Revolution' op.cit p.55
31. It is clear that because America is the active leader in the arms race many within the
peace movement for instance are less critical and even uncritical of the Soviet Union.
If the anti-nuclear movement attacks NATO alone this is quite acceptable to the Soviet
elite. However those who criticize the Cold War system as a whole are not regarded
favourably. For this reason E.P. Thompson is seen as a bete noir in the East and by Communists
active in the peace movement in the West. Unfortunately, Thompson has not worked
out his ideas on what a new Europe 'without the superpowers' would look like.
32. Nor should they argue, like Anderson, that if one fails to defend the USSR as a worker's
state one invariably ends up on the 'other side'. This approach is not only dishonest it
constitutes a form of blackmail which makes it impossible for the left to discuss the USSR
in a way not already defined and determined by the Soviet elite or the Western bourgeoisie.
See Anderson's comments op.cit.p.55.