Essence

In philosophy, essence is the property or set of properties that make an entity or substance what it
fundamentally is, and which it has by necessity, and without which it loses its identity. Essence is contrasted
with accident: a property that the entity or substance has contingently, without which the substance can still
retain its identity. The concept originates rigorously with Aristotle (although it can also be found in Plato),[1]
who used the Greek expression to ti ên einai (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι,[2] literally meaning "the what it was to be" and
corresponding to the scholastic term quiddity) or sometimes the shorter phrase to ti esti (τὸ τί ἐστι,[3]
literally meaning "the what it is" and corresponding to the scholastic term haecceity) for the same idea. This
phrase presented such difficulties for its Latin translators that they coined the word essentia (English
"essence") to represent the whole expression. For Aristotle and his scholastic followers, the notion of
essence is closely linked to that of definition (ὁρισμός horismos).[4]

In the history of western thought, essence has often served as a vehicle for doctrines that tend to individuate
different forms of existence as well as different identity conditions for objects and properties; in this logical
meaning, the concept has given a strong theoretical and common-sense basis to the whole family of logical
theories based on the "possible worlds" analogy set up by Leibniz and developed in the intensional logic
from Carnap to Kripke, which was later challenged by "extensionalist" philosophers such as Quine.

Contents
Ontological status
Existentialism
In metaphysics
Marxism's essentialism
Buddhism
Hinduism
See also
Notes and references
External links

Ontological status
In his dialogues Plato suggests that concrete beings acquire their essence through their relations to
"Forms"—abstract universals logically or ontologically separate from the objects of sense perception. These
Forms are often put forth as the models or paradigms of which sensible things are "copies". When used in
this sense, the word form is often capitalized.[5] Sensible bodies are in constant flux and imperfect and
hence, by Plato's reckoning, less real than the Forms which are eternal, unchanging and complete. Typical
examples of Forms given by Plato are largeness, smallness, equality, unity, goodness, beauty and justice.

Aristotle moves the Forms of Plato to the nucleus of the individual thing, which is called ousia or substance.
Essence is the ti of the thing, the to ti en einai. Essence corresponds to the ousia's definition; essence is a
real and physical aspect of the ousia (Aristotle, Metaphysics, I).
According to nominalists (Roscelin of Compiègne, William of Ockham, Bernard of Chartres), universals
aren't concrete entities, just voice's sounds; there are only individuals: "nam cum habeat eorum sententia
nihil esse praeter individuum [...]" (Roscelin, De gener. et spec., 524). Universals are words that can to call
several individuals; for example the word "homo". Therefore, a universal is reduced to a sound's emission
(Roscelin, De generibus et speciebus).

John Locke distinguished between "real essences" and "nominal essences". Real essences are the thing(s)
that makes a thing a thing, whereas nominal essences are our conception of what makes a thing a thing.[6]

According to Edmund Husserl essence is ideal. However, ideal means that essence is an intentional object of
consciousness. Essence is interpreted as sense (E. Husserl, Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to
a phenomenological philosophy, paragraphs 3 and 4).

Existentialism
Existentialism was coined by Jean-Paul Sartre's endorsement of Martin Heidegger's statement that for
human beings "existence precedes essence." In as much as "essence" is a cornerstone of all metaphysical
philosophy and of Rationalism, Sartre's statement was a repudiation of the philosophical system that had
come before him (and, in particular, that of Husserl, Hegel, and Heidegger). Instead of "is-ness" generating
"actuality," he argued that existence and actuality come first, and the essence is derived afterward. For
Kierkegaard, it is the individual person who is the supreme moral entity, and the personal, subjective aspects
of human life that are the most important; also, for Kierkegaard all of this had religious implications.[7]

In metaphysics
"Essence," in metaphysics, is often synonymous with the soul, and some existentialists argue that
individuals gain their souls and spirits after they exist, that they develop their souls and spirits during their
lifetimes. For Kierkegaard, however, the emphasis was upon essence as "nature." For him, there is no such
thing as "human nature" that determines how a human will behave or what a human will be. First, he or she
exists, and then comes property. Jean-Paul Sartre's more materialist and skeptical existentialism furthered
this existentialist tenet by flatly refuting any metaphysical essence, any soul, and arguing instead that there
is merely existence, with attributes as essence.

Thus, in existentialist discourse, essence can refer to physical aspect or property to the ongoing being of a
person (the character or internally determined goals), or to the infinite inbound within the human (which can
be lost, can atrophy, or can be developed into an equal part with the finite), depending upon the type of
existentialist discourse.

Marxism's essentialism
Karl Marx was a follower of Hegel's thought, and he, too, developed a philosophy in reaction to his master.
In his early work, Marx used Aristotelian style teleology and derived a concept of humanity's essential
nature. Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 describe a theory of alienation based on
human existence being completely different from human essence. Marx said human nature was social, and
that humanity had the distinct essence of free activity and conscious thought.

Some scholars, such as Philip Kain, have argued that Marx abandoned the idea of a human essence, but
many other scholars point to Marx's continued discussion of these ideas despite the decline of terms such as
essence and alienation in his later work.
Buddhism
Within the Madhyamaka school of Mahayana Buddhism, Candrakirti identifies the self as:

an essence of things that does not depend on others; it is an intrinsic nature. The non-existence
of that is selflessness.

— Bodhisattvayogacaryācatuḥśatakaṭikā 256.1.7[8]

Buddhapālita adds, while commenting on Nagārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā,

What is the reality of things just as it is? It is the absence of essence. Unskilled persons whose
eye of intelligence is obscured by the darkness of delusion conceive of an essence of things and
then generate attachment and hostility with regard to them.

— Buddhapālita-mula-madhyamaka-vrtti, P5242, 73.5.6-74.1.2[8]

For the Madhyamaka Buddhists, 'Emptiness' (also known as Anatta or Anatman) is the strong assertion that
all phenomena are empty of any essence, and that anti-essentialism lies at the root of Buddhist praxis and it
is the innate belief in essence that is considered to be an afflictive obscuration which serves as the root of all
suffering. However, the Madhyamaka also rejects the tenets of Idealism, Materialism or Nihilism; instead,
the ideas of truth or existence, along with any assertions that depend upon them are limited to their function
within the contexts and conventions that assert them, possibly somewhat akin to Relativism or Pragmatism.
For the Madhyamaka, replacement paradoxes such as Ship of Theseus are answered by stating that the Ship
of Theseus remains so (within the conventions that assert it) until it ceases to function as the Ship of
Theseus.

In Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika Chapter XV examines essence itself.

Hinduism
In understanding any individual personality, a distinction is made between one's Swadharma (essence) and
Swabhava (mental habits and conditionings of ego personality). Svabhava is the nature of a person, which is
a result of his or her samskaras (impressions created in the mind due to one's interaction with the external
world). These samskaras create habits and mental models and those become our nature. While there is
another kind of svabhava that is a pure internal quality — smarana — we are here focusing only on the
svabhava that was created due to samskaras (because to discover the pure, internal svabhava and smarana,
one should become aware of one's samskaras and take control over them). Dharma is derived from the root
dhr "to hold." It is that which holds an entity together. That is, Dharma is that which gives integrity to an
entity and holds the core quality and identity (essence), form and function of that entity. Dharma is also
defined as righteousness and duty. To do one's dharma is to be righteous, to do one's dharma is to do one's
duty (express one's essence).[9]

See also
Avicenna
Essentialism
Hypokeimenon
Modal logic
 Phenomenon
Physical ontology
Smarana
Theory of forms
Transubstantiation

Notes and references

1. "The Internet Classics Archive | Euthyphro by Plato" (http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/euthyfro.htm
l). classics.mit.edu. Retrieved 12 June 2018.
2. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1029b
3. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1030a
4. S. Marc Cohen, "Aristotle's Metaphysics" (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metaphysic
s/), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed 20 April 2008.
5. "Chapter 28: Form" of The Great Ideas: A Synopticon of Great Books of the Western World
(Vol. II). Encyclopædia Britannica (1952), p. 526-542. This source states that Form or Idea get
capitalized according to this convention when they refer "to that which is separate from the
characteristics of material things and from the ideas in our mind."
6. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/real-essence/
7. The Story of Philosophy, Bryan Magee, Dorling Kindersley Lond. 1998, ISBN 0-7513-0590-1
8. Translations from "The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path of Enlightenment", Vol. 3 by
Tsong-Kha-Pa, Snow Lion Publications ISBN 1-55939-166-9
9. Prasadkaipa.com (http://www.prasadkaipa.com/blog/archives/2005/07/svabhava_and_sv.php)

External links
Maurice De Wulf: "Nominalism, Realism, Conceptualism." (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/1
1090c.htm), in: The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 11. New York: Robert Appleton Company,
1911.
Robertson, Teresa; Atkins, Philip. "Essential vs. Accidental Properties" (https://plato.stanford.e
du/entries/essential-accidental/). In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy.

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