Accurate Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles and

Nuclear Strategy*
ALBERT LANGER

Certain ’arms controllers’ defend SLBMs as ’ideally suited’ to deterrence. But superpower
nuclear strategy has nothing to do with deterrence. It concerns warfighting through counter-
force attacks on military targets. Soviet strategy especially emphasises the ’first strike’, yet
arms controllers have minimized Soviet capabilities and advocated appeasement.
Examination of technical weapons systems characteristics and their impact on nuclear war-
fighting tactics shows that accurate SLBMs are especially useful to whoever strikes first and
of little use to whoever is struck first. Their short range, speed, accuracy, flexibility and con-
cealment are ideally suited to surprise attack. In a first strike, they uniquely complement
bombers, ICBMs and reconnaissance systems to advantage the attacker, where otherwise ad-
vantage might lie with the defence. SLBMs are officially ’quick reaction’ and ’priority
strike’ forces for tactical and theatre targets, and will probably be the first ’strategic’ forces
used. But SLBM efficiency against hardened targets depends on completely vulnerable pre-
cision navigation systems like Omega, Loran C and satellites. Future developments like ma-
neuverable warheads will make accurate SLBMs even more useful in striking first, without
diminishing their extreme vulnerability when struck first. Even as ’reserve deterrents’, inac-
curate SLBMs are unlikely to survive longer than certain other forces. Thus arms controllers
have defended a classical ’destabilizing’ weapons system the principal first strike forces
—

on each side.
The arms race is a ’rational’ outcome of superpower contention for world domination and
preparations for world war. Opposition cannot centre on international arms control agree-
ments, but must mobilize people against the superpowers, and especially against the super-
power that talks peace while preparing for war. Ultimately man, not weapons, is decisive.
Western Europeans should get prepared to defend themselves.

1. nuclear Strategy arms expansion and this can be combatted

1.1 Introduction
As the superpowers step up their arms race
and rush headlong towards world war, dif-
ferent perspectives are emerging among ob-
servers. The ’arms controllers’ who write for
Scientific American, see the weapons them-
selves, ’military thinking’, the problem.
or as
According to them, exaggerated fears of the
Soviet Union are responsible for the US
*
This article is condensed from a longer manu-
For reasons of space, it appears without
script.
detailed references, and a section on alternative
means of navigation (doppler sonar, sound fixing
and ranging, bottom mapping, acoustic transpon-
ders etc.) and on anti-submarine warfare has been
deleted entirely. For detailed references on many
by US liberals rejecting claims of a Soviet
threat, and supporting appeasement as re-
gards the Soviet Union’s ‘legitimate de-
mands’ (for parity as a superpower equal
to the US). International arms control
agreements can eliminate ’misunderstand-
ings’ and prevent war.
This school extensively discusses the tech-
nical characteristics of nuclear weapons, to
partially obscure its political orientation de-
scribed above. They condemn US ’counter-
force’ programs as a threat to peace, while
actually supporting Polaris and Poseidon
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles
(SLBMS) ’deterrent’. They do not criti-
as a

of the points raised in this article, the interested
reader should consult Langer et al., 1976. A PRIO
paper ’More on Navigation and the Strategic
Role of SLBMs’ is planned, containing the rest of
this article and all references. In the meantime,
enquiries for particular references can be directed
to the author via PRIO.
cize the Soviet arms build up, which is even
more extensive than the US, nor the Soviet
strategic doctrine, which is even more clear-
ly orientated towards a ’blitzkrieg’ first
strike. They prefer to keep silent on these
facts, out of tactical considerations in their

Downloaded from jpr.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 12, 2016

42
dispute with the US ’hawks’, but by doing
they discredit themselves.
In this paper we take up a technical dis-
cussion of counterforce nuclear strategy and
the role of SLBMs, tao highlight just how in-
adequate the ’arms control’ perspective is,
even from their own, ’technical’, standpoint.
It emerges that in the name of ’arms con-
trol’, they have actually supported the main
counterforce nuclear strike forces on each
side, and those that are most oriented to-
wards a first strike role.
1.2 War is the Continuation of Politics
So as not to obscure our political orientation
behind technical arguments, we shall first
state our standpoint:
There are two imperialist superpowers,
who both want to dominate the world, and
there is only one world for them to domi-
nate. This makes clashes inevitable.
When such clashes reach the level of gen-
eral war, the object of each side is to impose
its will (for example in Western Europe), by
physically occupying territory with ground
troops. Ground forces, rather than nuclear
weapons are therefore decisive, and are still
the main object of military expenditures on
both sides.
Nuclear strikes can provide a major ad-
vantage in facilitating or frustrating a con-
ventional invasion by ground forces, al-
though they can hardly be decisive, especial-
ly against guerrilla resistance as in Vietnam.
US strategic doctrine for the defence of
its possessions in Western Europe relies
quite heavily on the threat of both theatre
and strategic nuclear strikes to defeat a con-
ventional Soviet invasion. Since Soviet con-
ventional forces in Europe are in many ways
superior to NATO forces, it is ’rational’ for
the US to threaten escalation to an all out
nuclear counterforce first strike, as a means
of deterring Soviet invasion. By the same
token, it is ’rational’ for the Soviet Union,
in threatening to invade Western Europe, to
also threaten a pre-emptive first strike
Downloaded from jpr.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 12, 2016
so against US strategic nuclear forces, thus
forestalling any such first strike, and assur-
ing the success of the invasion.
We assume that the arms race is not going
on just for the fun of it (the ’military indus-
trial and that the improve-
complex’ etc.)
ment of counterforce warfighting capabili-
ties is intended to have, and does have, a
real impact on the balance of power between
the two superpowers in their contention
with each other for world domination.
To force its opponent to give way, and to
avoid being forced to give way itself, each
superpower must have sufficient military
power to intimidate the other, and to avoid
being intimidated by the other.
If one side has the ability to successfully de-
prive the other of its capacity to continue
waging effective nuclear and conventional
warfare, by a series of counterforce ex-
changes, then under certain circumstances
the stronger side can force the weaker side
to give way.
While an actual nuclear war may be
limited to theatre forces or to restricted
strategic strikes, the purpose of such strikes
is to demonstrate the ability and willingness
to fight and win an all out counterforce ex-
change. If such an ability and willingness
does not exist, then no amount of ’demon-
stration’, ’threat’, ’warning’ etc. will create
it. The decisive characteristic of nuclear
force postures are therefore those relevant
to the outcome of an all out counterforce
war. When Schlesinger talks about needing
counterforce capabilities to avoid the Soviet
Union having a ’perceived advantage’, he
really means to avoid it having a real ad-
vantage. When he talks about limited coun-
terforce strikes (the capability for which has
existed for a very long time), he is really
talking about fighting and winning an all
out counterforce exchange.
It is no harder to imagine one side or the
other accenting defeat, after a counterforce
nuclear war which killed tens of millions
(like the last World War), than to imagine
domination over Europe being conceded to
the winner of a purely conventional war

there, without the losing side resorting to
nuclear weapons to stave off defeat.
Although ’arms control’ advocates argue
that any nuclear war would inevitably es-
calate to all out attacks on the civilian popu-
lations of both sides, the basis for these ar-
guments seems to be little more than a sub-
jective desire to make nuclear war un-
thinkable. Actual US strategic doctrine since
McNamara has been ’counterforce’ and
’city-avoiding’; the logic behind this atti-
tude seems obscure. All it has achieved is to
lull the public into a false security and give
credibility to US and Soviet ’declaratory
policy’ of ’deterrence’ and ’detente’ (as op-
posed to their real policy of all out arms
race and preparations for counterforce war-
fare).
Certainly nobody could imagine that a
nuclear war between the superpowers would
start off with all out attacks on cities. Yet
the ’arms control’ people, who profess to be
very worried about the possibility of nuclear
war breaking out, dismiss all talk of counter-
force warfare as absurd.
If there is a nuclear war, and if it does
escalate to involve cities, it will still start
off counterforce.
For these reasons we will discuss here the
role of SLBMs in counterforce warfare,
leaving aside the smokescreens about ’deter-
rence’.
1.3 First Strike
’Counterforce’ simply means directed against
military targets for the purpose of winning
a war, as opposed to being directed against
urban population centres as a ’deterrent’. It
does not necessarily imply a first strike.
However, we shall show that the primary
counterforce role of SLBMs is in a first
strike, because they are particularly useful
in this role (more so than ICBMs) and be-
cause the vulnerability of their navigation
systems limits their counterforce effective-
ness after an enemy first strike.
’First strike’ is often used in the sense of
a surprise attack so devastating as to disarm
Downloaded from jpr.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 12, 2016
43
the enemy completely and prevent him using
his ’deterrent’ to destroy the aggressors’
cities (or an ‘unacceptable’ number of
them). Here we simply mean a first major
attack on the enemy’s strategic forces, aimed
at disabling them as much as possible, which
may or may not be the first use of nuclear
weapons in a war.
A clear aim of both US and Soviet missile
developments is to give each individual war-
head as close as possible to a 10001o kill prob-
ability against the hardest target. We must
stress that it is not necessary for this near
100&dquo;/o objective to be achieved for a ,coun-
terforce first strike to be feasible.
Even with 1000/o kill probabilities it would
be impossible to wipe out all enemy ICBMs
at a single blow because of missile and war-
head unreliability. This can be compen-
sated for by attacking each target with sev-
eral different warheads, but even with 90fl/o
reliability and 4 independent attacks on
each target, some 1.60/0 survivors would be
expected. If we are talking about ’deter-
rence’ theories in which 1 or 2 surviving
missiles with multiple warheads would au-
tomatically be used to devastate half a
dozen or so major urban population centers,
then even the most overwhelmingly success-
ful ’first strike’ must ’fail’.
If they really believe their own concepts
of ’deterrence’, then it is hard to see what
the ’arms controllers’ are worried about. No
matter how devastating a surprise attack, it
could not possibly destroy all the vast num-
bers of nuclear weapons and delivery sys-
tems available to each side. Only a relatively
small number need survive to inflict ’unac-
ceptable’ damage to urban population cen-
ters. For example the US has more than 7000
tactical warheads scattered over Europe,
most of which are larger than the bomb used
on Hiroshima.
To destroy all American nuclear weapons
would require the military occupation of the
continental US as well as all overseas bases
and naval forces. Even then it might require
a rather prolonged search. Similarly for the
Soviet Union.
44
Even if such a military occupation and
search was successful, biological warfare
agents capable of killing many more people
than all the nuclear arsenals put together,
could still be preserved by underground
resistance forces for a very long time. Never-
theless, military victory is possible in nuclear
war, and a much less overwhelming ’first
strike’ can ‘suoceed’.
’Success’ simply means to compel the ene-
my to surrender (not necessarily uncondi-
tionally). If the enemy is disarmed to the
point where your reserve forces are superior
to his survivors, then he may be compelled
to surrender. If the enemy’s forces are re-
duced to a point where his counterattacks
will have less effect in reducing your re-
serves than in using up his, then there is no
point in his fighting on.
The loser would have the choice of launch-
ing a completely futile and suicidal attack
on its opponent’s cities, from an inferior
position, or accepting defeat. If accepting
defeat means no more than losing domina-
tion over the rest of the world to the enemy,
or even just losing Europe, and does not
even imply foreign occupation and loss of
sovereignty, the outcome of this choice is
obvious. Tens of millions of casualties and
humiliation would be preferred to hundreds
of millions and mutual annihilation. Even
if defeat means foreign military occupation,
’deterrence’ by counter city warfare is still
not credible. Nazi Germany and Imperial
Japan did not fight to the last man, and did
not threaten to massacre the civilian popu-
lations of the countries they were forced to
retreat from. Why whould the US and the
USSR?
It ought to be obvious that a countercity
deterrent can only deter attacks on cities in
the course of a counterforce nuclear war.
The threat to attack cities cannot credibly
deter attacks on military targets, because it
would be insane to actually carry out the
threat. No conceivable benefit could be ob-
tained by actually attacking enemy cities,
while the enemy still holds in reserve the
capacity to destroy your cities, and when
Downloaded from jpr.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 12, 2016
you need all available weapons to attack the
enemy military forces.
If this was not obvious before, it ought to
be obvious that US Defence Secretary
now
Schlesinger has openly affirmed it (and his
successor has not departed from this), and
has explicitly stated that the US would not
respond to limited Soviet attacks by coun-
tercity warfare, but by limited US attacks.
Thus the ’deterrent’ role of nuclear forces is
simply to police the bounds of nuclear war-
fare, rather than to make it unthinkable.
While attention is focussed on the per-
centage of ICBM silos that can be knocked
out in a single blow, it is not generally ap-
preciated that both sides have long had the
capacity to knock each other out in a
protacted series of blows. If attacks are
launched against all the enemy targets,
the results evaluated, and further attacks
launched against the survivors, this process
will eventually lead to the complete elimina-
tion of the enemy. If he is doing the same
thing to you at the same time, then you may
run out of missiles and bombers before he
does. Theoretically both sides could be re-
duced to a point where without adequate
target intelligence, they cannot launch fur-
ther missile strikes without using up more
of their own reserves than they destroy of
the enemy’s. This is made less likely with
the deployment of MIRV. At any rate, even
after one or other side can no longer attack
with missiles, the bomber forces should still
be able to keep going. The point is that so
long as neither side resorts to mutual sui-
cide, one side must run out of effective
counterforce military capability before the
other. The more, bigger, faster, and more
accurate the forces on one side, and the more
effective its command and control and tar-
get intelligence systems, the more likely it
is to be able to keep going longer than the
other side, and so emerge the victor. Also
the less ’collateral damage’ it is likely to
suffer (even though this may still be tens of
millions).
By winning a counterforce exchange, the
victor is in a position to use nuclear strikes

to back up his physical occupation of terri-
tory with ground troops, while the loser is
not. This may (or may not) be sufficient to
decide the outcome of a war. It has nothing
to do with the fact that both sides would al-
ways retain the capability of destroying a
large part of the world with their surviving
nuclear weapons, or for that matter, through
germ warfare.
For obvious reasons, the side that strikes
first will gain a very major advantage by
doing so, whether or not this is the first use
of nuclear weapons in the conflict. But the
capacity to launch a successful first strike
has political importance quite apart from the
actual use of that capacity.
The greater the probability that one
superpower will emerge victorious (as dis-
tinct from unscathed) if it strikes first in an
all out counterforce war, the more cautious
the second superpower has to be in its deal-
ing with the first, and the less the second
can gain from waging or threatening con-
ventional war against the first.
Thus the arms race is not ’irrational’, but
perfectly consistent with the imperialist am-
bitions of the two superpowers. Each im-
provement in the ability of either side to
launch a successful first strike, or to keep
fighting after a first strike by its opponent,
adds a real increment to its real position in
the scramble for hegemony, or offsets such
a real increment on the other side. This is
not to say that the two superpowers count
up each other’s missiles and evaluate their
accuracies etc. every time they are involved
in a dispute. But in a real crisis situation, it
is important to know that one can or cannot
risk the possibility of the other side launch-
ing a first strike and that one can or cannot
credibly threaten to do so oneself. Obviously
it would have to be a very big crisis and a
great deal would have to be at stake, before
the ’collateral damage’ associated with ’vic-
tory’ could become ’acceptable’. But with
two superpowers, and only one world, such
crises are not improbable.
Accordingly it is perfectly logical for each
of the superpowers to strive for improve-
Downloaded from jpr.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 12, 2016
45
ments in their capacity to launch a first
strike, even when such improvements are
completely vulnerable to an enemy first
strike.
We shall show tat this is exactly what
they have been doing with the deployment
of SLBMs of greater and greater accuracy
and larger and larger numbers.
From the ’arms controllers’ perspective of
’deterrence’ and ’detente’ of course, such
developments are completely irrational. But
this simply means that these people are un-
able to explain the arms race, which never-
theless continues regardless of their objec-
tions. Since they cannot explain it, they can-
not oppose it either, but are reduced to just
deploring it.
2. Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles
2.1 First Strike Role
In a first strike, SLBMs can be used to at-
tack without warning, because they can be
fired from much closer to their targets than
can ICBMs, which therefore have a longer
flight time.
US Scenarios for a Soviet first strike, as
presented to Congressional hearings, assume
that Soviet SLBMs would be used to catch
the Strategic Air Command bombers on the
ground or in the air before they had got far
enough from their airfields to escape de-
struction. Presumably US plans for a first
strike against the Soviet Long Range Air
Force would make similar use of SLBMs.
Other important targets for either side would
include air defence fighter bases, surface to
air missiles and radars, so as to give subse-
quent bomber attacks a relatively easy
entry.
Manned bombers are still the most effec-
tive ’hard target killers’ on both sides be-
cause of their greater accuracy and payload
than ballistic missiles. In addition bombers
can carry out reconnaissance for repeated
attacks against surviving targets, even after
satellite reconnaissance systems have been
destroyed. Reconnaissance is crucial to the
success of a counterforce attack.
46
Thus SLBMs are important both in de-
stroying enemy bombers and in paving the
way for friendly bombers to get through. In
addition SLBMs can be used to strike a wide
variety of military targets such as bases,
command and control facilities, navigation
and communication stations and so on.
Whereas each ICBM launched reveals to
enemy reconnaissance that its particular silo
is now empty, and attacks should be con-
centrated on the remaining ones, the launch
of SLBMs gives no information away (as-
suming that all those on a particular sub-
marine are launched together.).
With real time satellite reconnaissance, a
capability is being developed to track in-
coming ICBMs, and launch missiles from the
silos they are aimed at, before the incoming
ICBM has arrived. This would not be fea-
sible against SLBMs with shorter flight
times (especially when depressed trajectories
are used for essentially zero warning time).’
Thus there may be situations in which
SLBMs of both sides are used to attack each
other’s land-based facilities (including navi-
gation and communications stations for
SLBMs, and satellite ground stations), while
ICBMs are held in reserve until the oppo-
nents ’eyes’ -
the reconnaissance systems
have been destroyed (or until the last pos-
sible moment when incoming warheads are
about to hit the ICBMs).
Each side may be restrained from using
its ICBMs against the other side’s ICBMs, for
fear of their targets having been launched
before they arrive, and may prefer to use
their SLBMs to ’flush out’ the enemy ICBMs,
as long as enemy real time satellite recon-
naissance is still functioning.
In general the short flight time of SLBMs
is a great advantage In a counterforce ex-
change, where the whole idea is to destroy
the enemy’s forces, including his reserves,
before he can destroy yours. But the princi-
pal advantage is to the side that strikes first,
since his bombers will already be in the
air, and his reconnaissance systems will sur-
vive longer than his opponents. Without
SLBMs, the advantage in a counterforce ex-
Downloaded from jpr.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 12, 2016
change could well lie with the side that
strikes second!
2.2 Tactical and Theatre Role
Because each submarine has its own geobal-
listic computer, SLBMs can be flexibly di-
rected against changing target systems such
as mobile taotical targets.
Several US Poseidon submarines, as well
as the British Polaris submarines, are as-
signed to the ’Quick Reaction Alert’ (QRA)
NATO theatre nuclear forces, with targets
in a ’Priority Strike Program’ (PSP) inte-
grated with the general US nuclear attack
plan -
the ’Strategic Integrated Operations
Plan’ (SIOP). According to Congressional
testimony, the US also estimates tat Soviet
SLBMs would be an important factor in
Warsaw Pact theatre nuclear forces attacking
Western Europe.
Thus SLBMs are likely to be among the
first (if not the very first) nuclear forces
used in a limited nuclear conflict. Certainly
they would be the first so-called ’strategic’
forces used, and one of their advantages is
that they provide an intermediate escalation
between the use of purely tactical theatre
forces and the use of long range forces based
-
in the homelands of the superpowers (which
would invite retaliation against those home-
lands).
This is the exact opposite picture to that
usually presented of SLBMs as an ’invul-
nerable deterrent’, held in reserve to deter
attacks on cities by threatening retaliation
in kind. SLBMs would be the first strategic
nuclear forces used the ’Quick Reaction’
-
and ’Priority Strike’ forces they would
-
not be held as a ’last resort’, but would be
the very ’first resort.’2
2.3 Soft Targets
Most of the counterforce strikes we have digs-
cussed so far do not require great missile
accuracy, since they are relatively ’soft’ tar-
gets. A CEP of 0.5 nautical mile, with a 50
kiloton warhead, should be more tan ade-
quate. The main problems are missile and
warhead unreliability, which necessitate mul-

tiple and follow up attacks on the
targets.
Most estimates consider that the US Posei-
don SLBM, for example, has up to 14 war-
heads, each of 50 kilotons, with a CEP of
around 0.25 nautical miles. With 41 ballistic
missile submarines, each having 16 missiles,
31 of these submarines having Poseidon,
and more than half .on continuous patrol
even when there is no alert, this force is
clearly more than adequate to destroy all
’soft’ targets in the Soviet Union, without
any assistance from ICBMs and bombers.
The Soviet Union has more submarines,
with more and larger missiles, although the
accuracy and numbers of warheads are re-
ported to be still inferior to the US model.
Clearly the Soviet SLBM forces are also
more than adequate tao destroy all ’soft’ tar-
gets in the US. Thus SLBMs comprise a very
major (in many respects the major) striking
power of each side.
The navigational requirements to provide
sufficient missile accuracy for soft targets
are not particularly stringent either. Al-
though US Poseidons may well have sub-
stantially greater accuracy than the 0.25 nau-
tical mile CEP previously quoted, for ’soft’
targets, it would not matter much if naviga-
tional errors introduced an accuracy degra-
dation of 0.5 nautical mile. Airfields and the
like are vulnerable to 50 kiloton explosions
even more than a mile away. The bomb
used on Hiroshima was only 14.
Thus celestial guidance alone would pro-
vide adequate navigational accuracy for
,soft’ targets -
provided the submarine
could be assured of obtaining a fix whenever
required. Poor weather, apart from the risks
of periscope exposure, makes celestial guid-
ance alone unacceptable. Even radio sextant
aimed at the sun and moon cannot be used
whenever required, and they are in any case
much less accurate than optical periscope
sextants, possibly jto an extent that would
require an unacceptable increase in the
number of warheads assigned to each target.
The selfcontained Ships Inertial Naviga-
tion System aboard a ballistic missile sub-
Downloaded from jpr.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 12, 2016
47
same marine could probably maintain sufficient
accuracy for a day or two, or even several
days, after receiving a fix. The longer the
time that elapsed, the less accurately the mis-
sile could be fired, but the degradation
would be reasonably slow and numbers of
warheads assigned to each target could be
traded off against elapsed time since a fix.
During peacetime, a submarine assigned
to only ’soft’ targets could maintain suffi-
cient navigational accuracy using only the
’Omega’ Very Low Frequency (VLF) radio-
navigation system or its Soviet equivalent
and never expose itself to the slightest pos-
sibility of detection by surfacing an antenna
or periscope. Once the Omega (and other
VLF) stations had been destroyed, the sub-
marine would have to expose itself occa-
sionally for a satellite or other radionaviga-
tional fix or a periscope fix, but this could
still be relatively infrequent, and would be
necessary in any case, to receive operational
messages.
By striking at the VLF navigation and
communication facilities, an enemy would
substantially increase the vulnerability of
missile submarines (from near zero to a
small but finite vulnerability), which would
certainly pay off if submarines aimed at
’soft’ targets were being held in reserve for
a long period during a nuclear or conven-
tional war. Such a strike would be very like-
ly for this purpose, since there is very little
else that can be done to increase the vul-
nerability of these submarines. But it would
be far from having decisive importance, as
the submarines would still be able tao operate
for a long time, with only an increased rate
of attrition, rather than substantially re-
duced effectiveness. Even when all man-
made navigation aids were destroyed, there
would always be some submarines able to
obtain a celestial fix.
The importance of Omega and its Soviet
counterpart in this context is simply that un-
til i.t is destroyed it permits ballistic missile
submarines ’aimed at ’sot’ targets to remain
submerged and virtually indetectable all of
the time. This alone, even if the submarines
48
were not also aimed at ’hard’ targets, would
be sufficient to make Omega and the other
VLF stations a certain target.
2.4 Hard Targets
Many of the most important and urgent
counterforce targets are ’hardened’ by being
buried deep underground and/or surrounded
with layers of concrete and steel. This ap-
plies to ICBM silos and their launch control
units, as well as the strategic command cen-
ters on both sides.
A ’direct hit’, within a few hundred me-
ters, is necessary to destroy hardened targets
using the sort off relatively low yield war-
heads on US missiles. Not much greater in-
accuracy can be tolerated using the bigger
warheads of Soviet missiles. Accuracy is
more important than yield in this context,
although the two do of course trade off
against each other.
The extreme accuracy required to deal
with these hardened targets imposes strin-
gent requirements on the guidance systems
of missiles and the navigation systems of
submarines.
However, some use could be made of
even relatively inaccurate SLBMs, to ’pin-
down’ enemy ICBMs so that they cannot be
launched until friendly ICBMs and manned
bombers arrive to finish them off. The ef-
fect of a thermonuclear explosion in the
vicinity of a missile silo creates conditions
in which the missile cannot be launched for
some time; it is thus ’pinned down’. Pos-
sibly two or more ICBMs or even an entire
flight of ICBMs could be pinned down by a
single SLBM warhead. This could be re-
peated continuously until friendly ICBMS,
manned bombers and cruise missiles arrived
to finish the job. If Electromagnetic Pulse
(EMP) effects alone were sufficient to pin
down an ICBM, then one warhead might
pin down an entire missile wing for a short
period.
Another factor is the potential for increas-
ing the effective ’kill probability’ of insuf-
fidently accurate warheads by means of
’patterned attacks.’. In a multiple warhead
Downloaded from jpr.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 12, 2016
missile, the individual warheads can be dis-
persed very relative to each other,
accurately
even if the whole cluster of warheads can
only be aimed relatively inaccurately (this
especially applies to the fixed offset for all
warheads fired from a given submarine, that
would result from submarine navigation er-
rors).
If several warheads are deliberately aimed
in a pattern around a target, rather than all
directly at it, the area subjected to an over-
pressure sufficient to destroy the target can
be made much larger, and the probability of
the target being included in this area despite
missile guidance and submarine navigation
errors, can be greatly increased. The overall
kill probability should be much greater than
is implied by the usual formula for several
warheads aimed independently at <the same
target-3
An important limitation on the use of both
’pin down’ effects and pattern attacks is so
called ’fratricide’. This refers to the possi-
bility of one warhead destroying or deflect-
ing another, which is aimed at the same tar-
get immediately afterwards. This effect im-
poses stringent limitations on the timing of
attacks.
Nevertheless, official US calculations on
the effects of a Soviet attack on Minuteman
assume that two warheads would be used
against each target. If this is feasible, then
there seems no obvious reason why a larger
number of warheads per target should not
be used in US attacks on Soviet targets and
in future MIRVed attacks, given the availa-
bility of more than two warheads per target.
The very large number of relatively small
warheads originally designed for US SLBM
forces suggests that these were intended to
be useful in the sort of general attacks on
large numbers of soft targets, plus pat-
terned attacks and repeated pin down at-
tacks that we have described. There are
more than four US SLBM warheads avail-
able to attack each Soviet ICBM silo, quite
apart from US ICBMs and bombers.
However US officials have repeatedly
stated that the accuracy of Poseidon has

been and is being improved to provide a
good single shot hard target kill probability,
and the new Trident SLBM is officially de-
signated as a hard target killer.
It should be noted that apart from sub-
marine navigation, there is no inherent limi-
tation on the accuracy of SLBMs as com-
pared to ICBMs. The motion of the sub-
marine while the missile is being launched
is taken into account by the missile guidance
system in exactly the same way as the mo-
tion of the ICBM or SLBM in flight is taken
into account in continuously correcting the
missile’s course until rocket thrust is termi-
nated.
Indeed, for a given level of guidance tech-
nology (mainly the drift characteristics of
gyroscopes in the inertial system), and of
rocket technology generally (accurate thrust
termination etc.), SLBMs Should be able to
achieve a substantially greater accuracy than
ICBMs. This is because the shorter range
and flight times of SLBMs would result in
most sources of error building up less than
in comparable ICBMs. Only a few of the
less important error sources do not have in-
creasing effect with increasing range.
The Trident 1 missile is reported to have
a CEP comparable to Poseidon (although
actually it is probably much better still), at
a range of 4000 nautical miles.
Although the long range of Trident does
permit the submarine to be deployed over
larger areas, the main advantage is that it
increases the time each submarine is effec-
tively on station, and reduces the time spent
merely travelling to and from home base.
There is no reason to assume that the mis-
siles have to be fired from 4000 miles just
because they have that range. Fired from
2000 or 1000 miles from target. Trident 1
would, on the figures quoted, have some-
thing like two to four times the accuracy of
Poseidon. This increases kill probability
more than in proportion. Also the increased
size of Trident does not necessarily imply
that this would only be used to provide in-
creased range. Some missiles might have
great range, in others the range might be
Downloaded from jpr.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 12, 2016
49
traded off for more warheads and larger
yields and/or for increased speed.
Trident 2 is intended to be very much
more accurate again, as well as having still
greater range. Poseidon can also be fired
from much less than its maximum range
(2500 miles), giving accuracy corresponding-
ly greater than the figures usually quoted.
The original Polaris Al was considered to
have adequate target coverage with a range
of only 1000 miles.
The improved guidance technology being
developed for Trident and for Minuteman
III can certainly be retrofitted to the guid-
ance packages of existing Poseidon missiles.
Only a small part of the improvements in
accuracy involve changes in the overall
rocket design, apart from the guidance
package. For example it has even been pro-
posed to retrofit Minuteman III guidance
systems to the obsolete Titan missiles.
Although Trident 1 has not yet been de-
ployed and Trident 2 is still on the drawing
board, the Soviet Union has already de-
ployed SLBMs comparable to Trident 1 and
is in a state of advanced development of a
missile comparable to Trident 2. Accuracies
are said by US sources to be inferior to
those of US missiles, although it is difficult
to see how anyone could be certain of this,
or why the Soviet Union should not catch
up rapidly as it has with MIRV.
As missile guidance accuracy is improved,
the limiting factor becomes the submarine
navigation system. Accordingly major ef-
forts have been devoted to worldwide preci-
sion navigation systems suitable for subma-
rines.
3. Accuracy of SLBMS
3.1 Precision Navigation
Errors in determining the position of the
submarine are carried over more or less
directly into errors at the target. Thus if a
warhead is to land within a few hundred
metres of its target, then the submarine navi-
gation system must be substantially more ac-
curate than this. The more accurate the mis-
sile, the more accurate the submarine navi-
50
gation system has to be, to take full advan-
tage of it.
Thus any improvement in the naviga-
tional accuracy of one side’s submarines, is
an improvement in the counterforce caps-
bility of SLBMs, which increases their abili-
ty to destroy a larger proportion of the other
side’s hard targets, more quickly than with
ICBMs and bombers.
Even more critical than position, is the
orientation of the submarine. The direction
of the vertical, and bearing from true North,
have to be known to within a few seconds
of arc, and the track error resulting from
incorrect bearing is an increasing function
of the range to target (over typical SLBM
ranges).
Provided position is accurately known,
then the submarine’s SINS can provide data
on orientation by measuring the compo-
nents of acceleration due to gravity and the
rotation of the earth in each direction. Ac-
curate knowledge of local deflections in the
direction of the earth’s gravitational field
from the vertical, and of the shape of the
earth, is required. For this purpose detailed
geodetic and gravitational surveys over the
world’s oceans are being carried out.
Sufficiently precise bearings can be pro-
vided either by an optical celestial fix o~r a
satellite fix. Assuming !continuous position
fixes are available, the error in bearing from
North, or azimuth, can be contained, al-
though there will always be some residual
error due to the random drift of the vertical
gyro in SINS. The more accurate and con-
tinuous the position fixes, the more azimuth
errors can be contained and the less fre-
quently will a new azimuth fix be required.
In the coming US Trident 1 missile, ac-
curate measurement of azimuth will be pro-
vided by stellar guidance of the missile it-
self, once it has left the earth’s atmosphere.
Although the submarine cannot rely on
celestial navigation immediately before mis-
sible launch, as it is limited by the weather,
the missile is not limited in this way. Such
a system has already been tested on Soviet
missiles.
Downloaded from jpr.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 12, 2016
However, stellar guidance does not solve
the other important problem, position fix-
ing. Re-aligning the missile in flight relative
to the stars only determines which way the
missile is pointing. It cannot determine
where the missile is. For celestial navigation
a fix the earth’s horizon (or on the sun
on
or moon) is also required. Planetry trackers
and sun trackers cannot provide anything
like the precision required for position fixes
to within a few hundred meters. Using SINS
to provide a vertical reference before the
missile is launched is more or less the same
thing as relying on the accuracy of the sub-
marine’s position fix.
Thus both present and future generation
SLBMs require some means of precisely fix-
ing the position of the submarine before the
missile is launched. Such a position fix must
be available continuously, or at short enough
intervals for SINS to maintain adequate con-
tinuous accuracy in between external fixes.
It is not good enough, for example, for the
submarine to rely on taking a satellite fix
immediately before launching missiles, even
though thins would involve little additional
danger. If it relies on satellite fixes, then
these must be taken regularly so that mis-
siles can be launched at any time, whether
or not the satellite is available when the
order to launch is received. After all, the
order to launch may be a response to some
prior enemy action such as shooting down
or jamming the satellites. The same applies
to land based radio systems such as Loran-C
or Omega. The submarine must maintain an
accurate knowledge of its position con-
tinuously, not just immediately prior to
launch.
The advantage of Omega is precisely that
it allows the submarine to maintain this ac-
curate position fix .continuously while fully
submerged. Satellites, and to a lesser extent
Loran-C, require some exposure of the sub-
marine periodically, while by using Omega
to provide a continuous fix in between more
accurate updates, the frequency of such ex-
posures can be reduced and the overall ac-
curacy improved.

Another, less intractable, navigation prob-
lem is the accurate measurement of the sub-
marine’s velocity during missile launch. A
very small error in the submarine’s velocity
measurement will produce a much greater
error in the missile trajectory. The subma-
rine’s electromagnetic log will only measure
speed through the water, and even the dop-
pler sonar will be measuring speed relative
to currents 1 or 2000 feet below the sub-
marine, if it is used in deep ocean areas.
Continuous position fixing as provided by
Omega produces more accurate ’velocity-
damping’ of SINS than if only discrete regu-
lar position fixes were available,. The very
good relative accuracy of Omega is much
more important in this context than its com-
paratively poor absolute accuracy.
3.2 Maneuverable Warheads
Another future development is the Maneu-
verable Re-entry Vehicle (MaRV), which is
planned for Trident 2 and similar Soviet
SLBMs. Although MaRV is advertized in the
US as primarily to enable dodging away
from ABM defences, this appears to be
largely a smokescreen to de-emphasize a
program that will greatly increase missile
accuracy. After all, effective ABM defences
are not a real threat, while MaRV is a very
real program.
The only important source of missile er-
ror that is not reduced by the shorter range
of SLBMs as compared with ICBMs, is that
due to the unpredictable deflection of the
warhead on re-entering the earth’s atmo-
sphere where it is subject to aerodynamic
forces that depend on local weather condi-
tions etc. The main counter to this has been
very high speed re-entry with the use of
ablative materials in the re-entry vehicle
nose cone to prevent the warhead itself be-
ing destroyed by the excessive heat gene-
rated. There is still some inaccuracy due to
the nose cone material burning off unevenly
and various other factors. This limits the
margin by which SLBM accuracy can be
made superior to ICBMs. Also, ICBMs do
re-enter at greater speed than SLBMs.
Downloaded from jpr.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 12, 2016
51
An aspect of Trident 1 and 2 which has
not been emphasized is that ’long range’
can be translated into either lofted or de-
pressed trajectories, as well as greater pay-
loads, at a shortei, but still adequate range.
A lofted trajectory, with a heavier payload,
will re-enter with a higher ballistic coeffi-
cient and thus suffer less deflection, than a
minimum energy trajectory designed to
achieve maximum range. On the other hand,
a depressed trajectory, also at shorter range,
would be less accurate but would provide
even less warning in an attack on strategic
bomber bases and ICBM silos before they
can take off. Presumably some sort of ’mix’
of submarines operating at various ranges
with various trajectories would be used to
achieve an optimum sequence of attacks on
the full range of targets, in coordination
with the later strikes by ICBMs and bombers,
so as to minimize warning and maximize
bo Mi the direct destruction and pin-down ef-
fects, while preserving the operational flexi-
bility of the submarines. Because SLBMs can
attack from almost any direction, using a
variety of trajectories, while ICBMs are lim-
ited to the direct route between the US and
USSR, this mobility of SLBMs permits a
much better optimization of the attack se-
quence and greatly complicates any attempt
at defence.
The relationships and interactions be-
tween different arms of the strategic nuclear
forces and different units within those arms,
their opposing targets, and the conventional
military forces that would be involved both
before and after a strategic nuclear ex-
change, is extremely complex. Nuclear war-
fare is not just a matter of pushing a button.
Comparisons of strategic postures based
simply on the numbers and characteristics of
individual weapons are for this reason com-
pletely misleading.
With the Trident 2 MaRV the problem of
deflection on re-entry would be solved by
a separate inertnal guidance unit on each
warhead, to correct for any unpredicted de-
flections and actively guide ;the maneuver-
able warhead back onto its proper course.
52
This, and not the ability to ’dodge’ ABM
defences, is the real advantage of MaRV. It
also explains why greater attention is being
devoted to MaRV for SLBMs than for
ICBMs. Although the same technology ap-
plies to both, a greater improvement will be
obtained from SLBM MaRV, because the re-
entry error is a greater proportion of the
total error in SLBMs.
Because of the relatively short time for
which a MaRV inertial guidance unit would
have to operate, its accuracy requirements
are not stringent and the errors due to re-
entry can essentially be eliminated. This
leaves only the errors in the initial trajec-
tory which depend on the main missile guid-
ance system and the submarine navigation
system (apart from accurate geodesy and
gravity field mapping).
MaRV also permits elimination of errors
induced in thrust termination and warhead
separation, although these may already be
minimal anyway.
It should be emphasized that the improved
accuracy of MaRV does not make the re-
quirements for submarine navigation less
stringent, but rather more stringent. The
warhead has no independent means of de-
termining its position and cannot ’home in’
on the target. Any errors in submarine navi-
gation will still be translated directly into
errors at the target just as before. But be-
cause the inherent accuracy of the missile is
improved, less error in the submarine navi-
gation can be tolerated without an unaccept-
able degradation in the (now higher) overall
kill probability.
3.3 Terminal Homing
On this point there is some confusion be-
tween the current development of MaRV for
Trident 2, and a further US Advanced Bal-
listic Re-Entry Systems project (ABRES) for
a terminally homing MaRV.
The latter is only a research project, with
no active development, and no prospects of
deployment for many years. The idea is for
the missile warhead to actively home in on
Downloaded from jpr.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 12, 2016
the target by such pattern recognition tech-
niques terrain contour matching (TER-
as
COM), radio reflectivity measurements, or
radar area correlation (RADAC).
TERCOM involves measuring variations in
the height of the terrain en route to the star-
get by means of radar or laser beams, and
comparing these results with a previously
stored map of the terrain. This technique is
being developed, and appears quite feasible
for subsonic cruise missiles, but there are
enormous problems in adapting the technol-
ogy to a ballistic missile that is not flying
over the terrain towards its target, but plum-
meting down on top of it at something like
fifty times the speed of sound and sur-
rounded by a layer of ionized air that blacks
out radio and radar signals.
One approach would be for a MaRV war-
head to be maneuvered out of its ballistic
trajectory entirely, after re-entering the
atmosphere, and finish off with a horizontal
flight to its target, while operating its termi-
nal homing systems. This, however, would
mean transforming a virtually invulnerable
ballistic missile into something comparable
to a cruise missile, that would be vulnerable
to all kinds of anti-aircraft defences, and es-
pecially vulnerable to point defences around
the target.
Cruise missiles with TERCOM could be
much more accurate than ballistic missiles,
and would not be dependent on submarine
navigation systems. But manned bombers
are also much more accurate, and cruise mis-
siles are just as slow as manned bombers.
For these reasons the US military considers
cruise missiles as merely a cheap supplement
to the manned bombers, with the advantage
of long term survivability. They do not con-
sider them to be a fourth arm of ;the striate-
gic forces or as rivalling ballistic missiles in
determining the outcome of a nuclear war.
There seems no obvious advantage to giving
ballistic missiles similar characteristics to
cruise missiles, when cruise missiles are very
much cheaper.
Another difficulty with terminal homing
is the possibility of jamming or spoofing the

system by fairly simple means such as cam-
ouflage or smokescreens. This is merely a
drawback for cruise missiles, which detracts
from their cheapness and accuracy. It is not
fatal because the long flight paths provide
an opportunity for recognizing terrain that
is some distance from the target and has not
been camouflaged, and in any case, cruise
missiles may come into play after jamming
facilities etc. have already been destroyed.
But it could be more fatal for ballistic mis-
siles that would be used early and would
have to find recognizable terrain compara-
tively close to their targets.
Whether or not terminal homing may be
developed for ballistic missiles in the future,
it is not currently being developed for any
SLBM now on the drawing boards, and does
not affect the need for precision submarine
navigation.
3.4 Satellite Guidance
Another approach is to provide a missile or
its warheads with their own receivers for a
satellite navigation system such as the US
Global Positioning System (GPS or NAV-
STAR).s
GPS is technologically feasible and will
no doubt be fitted to ballistic missiles, be-
cause it will provide greater accuracy than
can be achieved by any other means. But this
does not solve the submarine navigation
problem, because any satellite system, like
all the other submarine navigation systems,
is completely vulnerable. GPS is handy to
have, because it will improve the efficiency
of the very first rounds in a surprise attack.
But it will not last longer than that, and it
may well have been destroyed prior to, or
simultaneously with, the outbreak of nuclear
war (even assuming that it is as jam-proof
as the US hopes). The missiles still need to
have completely independent self-contained
inertial navigation systems to fall back on,
and these still rely on the submarine’s navi-
gation system for updating.
As long as the submarine continuously up-
dates SINS using external precision naviga-
tion aids such as satellites, Loran-C and
Downloaded from jpr.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 12, 2016
53
Omega, it will be able to launch missiles ac-
curately for a short period after all such aids
have been destroyed. While satellites might
be attacked earlier, the destruction of land
based navigation stations would presumably
signal the outbreak of full scale nuclear ex-
changes. Thus at least the initiator of a
major counterforce exchange could rely on
the accuracy of his SLBMs for the first
rounds.
But if the submarine did not continuously
maintain an accurate position fix, and relied
on the missile orientating itself through sat-
ellite guidance, it could not launch missiles
accurately at all, once the satellite system
had been disrupted.
Thus the impact of satellite guidance for
missiles is not to reduce the dependence on
submarine navigation, but to still further ag-
gravate the tendencies to use SLBMs as early
as possible to secure the maximum advan-
tage from their use.
3.5 Vulnerability of SLBM
If an acceptable and invulnerable system of
terminal homing or radio guidance for mis-
siles was developed, then of course the im-
portance of submarine navigation would be
greatly reduced. At present, however, noth-
ing being developed promises sufficient in-
vulnerability, and no SLBMs are now being
planned that could operate against hardened
counterforce targets without the benefit of
precision submarine navigation.
For the f oreseeable future then, the effi-
ciency of SLBMs against hard targets will
be determined by the accuracy of those navi-
gation systems, and their vulnerability in
this role will be determined by the length of
the time that the submarine can determine
its position to within a few hundred metres
using SINS, after external navigation has
been lost.
Once external navigation has been lost for
a period, the submarine will be unable to
launch effective attacks on hard targets. The
length of this period is difficult to determine
and depends on many factors. But it would
probably be more than an hour and less than
54
a day. If communications are also cut off
during this period, as is very likely, or if no
orders to strike can be given, then the sub-
marine ceases to be a factor in the initial
counterforce exchange. The VLF stations
which permit continous reception while ful-
ly submerged, would certainly be destroyed
and could be used only in the first strike.
However, the submarine and its missiles
would still exist, and would remain almost
as effective against soft targets as before.
Communications would certainly be re-es-
tablished eventually as there are so many
different links that could be used. If preci-
sion navigation could be re-established as
well, then the submarine would again be-
come effeotive against hard targets.
This may not be of enormous value, since
the most crucial nuclear exchanges would al-
ready be over. There is little point in
knocking out all the enemy’s missile silos
a day or two after the missiles have been
launched. Even being out of the war for the
first couple of hours may make a subsequent
return irrelevant due to lack of target intel-
ligence. Certainly the SLBM’s advantage of
a short flight time would be wasted, so the
investment would have been better spent on
mobile ICBMs, which would be much less
vulnerable.
Nevertheless, having a large body of sur-
viving missiles capable of attacking any des-
ignated target obviously does no harm to the
possessor. It is thus worth examining what
measures a submarine can take to recover
from loss of navigation-6
In this context, certain acoustic navigation
systems which are unsuitable for ,continuous
use become relevant. One method is identi-
fication of bottom features by side scan
sonar. Another is beacons or transponders in
known positions. We do not have space to
go into the various aspects here. Suffice to
say that these methods provide only a very
second best back up to the primary system
based on radionavigation aids. They are bet-
ter than nothing, and for that reason will
indeed be used, but nevertheless the coun-
terforce capability of SLBMs against hard-
Downloaded from jpr.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 12, 2016
ened targets will be very drastically reduced
very quickly after an attack on their pri-
mary navigation and communications sys-
tems.
Attacking hard targets from submarines
requires global all weather position fixing
to within a few hundred metres and orien-
tation to within a few seconds of arc. This is
an extraordinary technological achievement
made possible by the deployment of certain
precision radionavigation systems such as
the Transit satellite, Omega and Loran-C
(all of which have Soviet equivalents). The
US openly proclaims that Transit is an in-
tegral part of the SLBM weapons system
and is spending large sums on a ’Transit
Improvement Program’ to reduce the satel-
lites’ vulnerability to Soviet attack. If the
submarines could fulfill their operational re-
quirements without Transit, just as well as
they can with it, then all this would be un-
necessary.
Thus not only do SLBMs have important
advantages when used together with other
nuclear forces in a first strike (to the point
where a first strike against bomber bases
and ICBM silos could be unfeasible without
them because of the long warning times of
other forces). But their counterforce capa-
bility against hard targets is so vulnerable
as to be of little use in anything other than
a first strike. The forces required to destroy
this capability are negligible in comparison
to what is involved in attack on more than
1000 ICBM silos and bomber bases, while
the collateral damage and provocation re-
sulting from attacks on navigation and com-
munications stations is also comparatively
small. The time required to incapacitate the
SLBMs as hard target weapons is also prob-
ably less than that required to demolish an
equivalent number of ICBMs through re-
peated attacks with reconnaissance.
Thus a limited strike directed against
SLBM navigation and communications star-
tions (and also satellite reconnaissance) may
be a very attractive option in certain situa-
tions just short of all out counterforce war.
Indeed the possibility of a limited Soviet

strike against US VLF communications has
even been mentioned by Schlesinger as a
scenario for his ’surgical strikes’. This may
be even more attractive for a smaller coun-
try attacked by one of the superpowers and
wishing to inflict the maximum damage at
minimum provocation and with the hope of
encouraging, assisting and forcing the other
superpower to come in on its side. By di-
minishing the aggressor’s first strike poten-
tial and increasing that of its opponent,
such a strike would probably be the most
effective response a smaller country could
make, since any other use of its nuclear
weapons would certainly meet with a much
more devastating response from the aggres-
sor than any advantage that could be
gained. The intention need not to be to pro-
voke nuclear war between the superpowers,
but merely to make it easier for the friendly
superpower to extend conventional assist-
ance without fear of a first strike by the ag-
gressor.
We are dealing then with a more or less
classical ’destabilizing’, ’first strike’ weap-
ons system. Certainly the vast expenditure
on SLBMs capable of attacking hard targets
could not be justified by their residual capa-
bility for responding to a first strike with
counterforce attacks on the forces kept
in reserve. Communications problems alone
make mobile (and even fixed) ICBMs and
bombers a much more economic proposition
for this role (which requires efficient corm-
munications to indicate which targets are
still active after an enemy first strike).
It is indeed curious that the ’arms control-
lers’ should describe this classical ’first
strike’ weapons system as an ’ideal deter-
rent’. Do they perhaps think that the obso-
lete Polaris Al type missiles are still in
service?
Actually, even as a ’deterrent’, the invul-
nerability claimed for SLBMs is something
of a myth.
Even though ballistic missile submarines
can remain at sea for months, they cannot
do so forever. If one side achieves effective
military superiority in a counterforce ex-
Downloaded from jpr.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 12, 2016
55
change, and destroys the other side’s capa-
bility to maintain naval forces and project
military power overseas, then eventually it
will track down and destroy the other side’s
reserve ballistic missile submarines as well.
The last World War lasted five years, so
hidden missiles and biological warfare agents
would seem more important as a long term
deterrent than SLBMs.
All that has really been proved is that a
fair proportion of submarines would sur-
vive any sudden surprise attack, and would
be in a position to retaliate immediately
afterwards. Once we reject the theory that
surviving submarines would be immediately
ordered to initiate Doomsday out of sheer
spite, their ’invulnerability’ in any other role
becomes questionable. Anti-submarine war-
fare is extremely efficient nowadays, and it
might only be days rather than months be-
fore they were destroyed.
4. Conclusions
If neither side had any intention of ever
striking first then there would not be much
point in the arms race between them. In-
deed, the popular explanation for the arms
race seems to be that it is fundamentally ir-
rational a product of
-
the unjustified sus-
picions each side has of the other. This is a
very convenient theory for the warmongers,
since it implies that they are only wasting
money, rather than actively preparing for
war.
In fact both sides quite clearly do have
intentions to strike first when necessary
and possible. The United States has already
used two nuclear weapons against a non-
nuclear adversary. The Soviet Union, like
fascist powers before it, has a military doc-
trine clearly oriented towards ‘bli=tzkrieg’
strategies. Soviet pronouncements in mili-
tary literature on the use of nuclear weapons
always emphasize the importance of seizing
the initiative, catching the enemy off guard,
’destroying the aggressor’s forces before
they can be used for aggression’ and so forth
-
in short, striking first. (In non-military
56
literature of course, they only talk about
’detente’!)
Of the nuclear powers only China de-
cleared that at no ,time and under no cir-
cumstances will it ever be the first to use nu-
clear weapons. It would be a very simple
matter for the United States or the Soviet
Union to make such a declaration. Having
made it they need not necessarily keep it.
But neither of the superpowers, despite
frequent challenges, has made even a purely
hypocritical declaration along these lines. If
they made such a declaration it would re-
duce their ability to threaten to strike first,
and hence reduce their strength as super-
powers. The Soviet Union could not wave
its rockets at China, or intimidate Western
European countries into falling in line with
it so readily. The United States dares not
rely on arming the peoples of Western
Europe to repel a Soviet invasion, so it ex-
plicitly declares its intention to use nuclear
weapons against a conventional attack.
Being a superpower is incompatible with
promising never to be a nuclear aggressor.
This open and explicit stand of each su-
perpower reserving the right to initiate a
nuclear war (and not just to ’retaliate’)
makes a complete mockery of ’deterrence’.
Yet advocates of arms control still insist on
confusing the public with arguments based
on ’deterrence’. They try to prove that each
new weapon system deployed is ’unneces-
sary’ or the total number produced ’exces-
sive’ from the point of view of ’deterrence’.
Quite absurd and pathetic attempts are made
to ’prove’ that the Soviet arms build up poses
no threat to the United States, when it mani-
festly does. The superpowers are ’urged’ to
’trust each other more’ when they have al-
ready proved, both to each other and to the
rest of us, that they are both totally un-
trustworthy. They are ’advised’ not to build
’unnecessary’ forces when they quite clearly
do need these forces for the war they are
preparing. It is rather like advising Hitler
that he didn’t need so many Panzer divi-
sions -
actually he needed more - when
the situation was that the world did not need
Downloaded from jpr.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 12, 2016
Hitler. Under the cover of seemingly ’scien-
tific’ arguments about the technical charac-
teristics of various weapons in particular
strategic roles, ’arms control’ advocates have
gone so far as to apologize for the SLBM
forces of the two superpowers, and actually
praise them as a contribution to ’stability’.
They have ended up defending, in the name
of peace, the main nuclear first strike forces
on each side.
They have made excuses for Soviet war
preparations and given ’advice’ to the US
leaders, instead of mobilizing the people to
fight against the war that is brewing.
In highlighting the aggressive ’first strike’
role of SLBMs and explaining something
about counterforce nuclear strategy, we hope
to have shown the need for a different per-
spective on the arms race.
Although we have discussed weapons char-
acteristics and first strikes, we do not believe
that these things decide the outcome of wars.
All history shows that it is man and not
weapons that are decisive. According to
Mao Tsetung in 1970, Indo-China proved
that ’A weak nation can def eat a strong, a
small nation can defeat a big. The people
of a small country can certainly defeat ag-
gression by big countries, if only they dare
to rise in struggle, take up arms and grasp
in their own hands the destiny of their
country.’
Hitler was much better armed than his op-
ponents and he launched a successful first
strike that conquered almost the whole of
Europe. Nevertheless 1) he had to go around,
not through, chose countries like Sweden and
Switzerland that independently and self-
reliantly built up their own defences without
being tied to the ’great powers’, and 2) he
lost the war in the end. The lessons for
Western Europe today should be clear.
NOTES
1. Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicles (MaRV)
may offset this in the future since it would be
impossible to predict a warhead’s target merely
by tracking it before re-entry (indeed, it might
even be possible to pre-program a MaRV war-

head with several alternative targets and have a
simple coded message ordering it to switch to one
of the secondary targets if the primary target has
been destroyed or launched, according to recon-
naissance received at HQ while the missile is in
flight).
2. In this context it is interesting to note US
speculations about ’barely nuclear warfare’, in
which a small scale ’accidental’ or ’unauthorized’
strike is used to signal willingness to escalate,
without compelling the enemy to treat it as a
deliberate nuclear attack and retaliate all out. By
the same token, an unprovoked first strike can be
’justified’ by the need to follow up such an ’acci-
dental’ or ’unauthorized’ strike, since ’the enemy
will not believe us and is going to retaliate any-
way’. As the first use of nuclear weapons, or the
first use of ’strategic’ weapons, would be such a
grave step, one may reasonably expect that the
side doing it would try to avoid responsibility.
SLBMs are more plausible in this role since they
are launched from independent units not located
in the homelands of the superpowers (they can
even be used to ’provoke’ a strike by simulating
an attack from the other side).
Evidence that the US at least, has earmarked
SLBMs for this sort of role is provided by the
publicity given to fail-safe ’Permissive Action
Links’ installed in ICBMs and other nuclear
forces. There is no technical difficulty about fit-
ting combination locks so that warheads simply
cannot be detonated without the code to release
the firing mechanism having been provided from
the National Command Authority. These are well
advertized as being fitted to all US strategic
weapons except SLBMs. SLBMs are also sup-
posed never to be launched without release by the
National Command Authority, but here the pro-
cedures described are simply that the message
must be verified by the submarine captain, exe-
cutive officer and weapons officer, who each have
to press an independent trigger. Th ecombination
is supposed to be locked in a safe within another
safe aboard the submarine. Obviously this proce-
dure could in theory be circumvented by a con-
spiracy aboard the submarine, while the techni-
cally simpler procedure of transmitting the com-
bination lock code in the radio message autho-
rizing use of the weapons, could not be. No doubt
the foolproof method is the one actually used,
whether the submarine officers know it or not, but
the fact that the non-foolproof system is ad-
vertized, suggests that contingency plans for an
’accident’ do exist.
3. In general the errors in launching a ballistic
missile are likely to produce a greater effect
along the direction from launcher to target
(’range miss’) than at right angles to this direc-
tion (’track miss’). Simply aiming one warhead
Downloaded from jpr.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 12, 2016
57
directly at the target, one slightly beyond it and
one to fall short of it, should provide a substan-
tialimprovement. On the other hand, submarine
navigation errors are likely to add more to track
miss than to range miss (because of the impor-
tance of errors in the submarines bearing from
true North). Warheads from the same or different
missiles aimed to the left and right of the target
would take care of this effect.
These techniques are well known from World
War II bombing and torpedo launching, but their
implications do not seem to be generally appre-
ciated in calculations of ballistic missile MIRV
kill probabilities, which use a single overall
figure for ’CEP’, and assume independent attacks.
(Quite apart from the limitations of the ’cookie-
cutter’ damage function and other assumptions
often made, and the complete uncertainty regard-
ing silo hardness, missile accuracy and reliability
and so forth.)
4. Until the Soviet Union deploys MIRV fully,
it would have insufficient missiles to deliver more
than two warheads to each of the 1000 US Min-
uteman silos.
5. The existing Transit satellite navigation sys-
tem is unsuitable for this purpose, both because it
is only available at discrete intervals an hour or
so apart, and because it is very difficult to use at
high speeds (relying on a doppler measurement
of relative velocity). The continuous fixes obtain-
able from GPS will also be convenient for bal-
listic missile submarines because they will be
able to take their satellite fixes at any time,
rather than waiting until a satellite happens to
be overhead. But this is not essential. The main
advantage of GPS is its continuous availability
to missiles and aircraft, and also its very precise
measurements of velocity and orientation, as well
as position.
6. Back-up navigation systems have to be just
as accurate as the primary ones (i.e. for hard tar-
soft targets are adequately provided for
gets &mdash;
by celestial navigation), and they have to be less
vulnerable. But they do not need to be as con-
venient to use without exposure, because the sub-
marine has already lost the advantage of being
continuously on the alert ready to fire its missiles.
We are talking about a second best situation, in
which the submarine is merely eventually able to
fire its missiles. Thus the risks inherent in expos-
ing the submarine at regular intervals are no
longer citical. The danger is only that the sub-
marine will be destroyed before it can launch.
REFERENCE
Langer, Albert; Owen Wilkes and Nils Petter
Gleditsch, 1976. The Military Functions of
Omega and Loran-C. Oslo: PRIO.
58

ABBREVIATIONS MARV - maneuverable reentry vehicle

Two articles in this issue, like most articles MIRV -

multiple independently
on military strategy, abound with abbrevia- targeted reentry vehicle
tions. Here follows a list of those abbrevia- MT -

megaton (equivalent of TNT)

tions in the Ball and Larger articles which Navdac -

Navigation Data
are used more than once. Accumulation Computer
NNSS -

Navy Navigation Satellite

ABM -

anti ballistic missile System

CEP -
circular error probable QRA -

Quick Reaction Alert

ELF -

extremely low frequency RMS -

root mean square
(radio waves) SIOP -

Strategic Integrated
FBM -
fleet ballistic missile Operations Plan
FY -
fiscal year SLBM -
submarine-launched
GPS -
Global Positioning System ballistic missile
ICBM -
intercontinental ballistic TERCOM - terrain computer matching
missile VLF -

very low frequency

KT -
kiloton (equivalent of TNT) (radio waves)
LF -
low frequency (radio waves)

Downloaded from jpr.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 12, 2016