October 27, 2022 DETERRENCE AND STRATEGY

Andre Beaufre, “Deterrence and Strategy”. Translated by

R.H. Barry. New York: Praeger,1966.

Reviewed by: Saif Ul Haq

Submitted to: Dr. Muhammad Sadiq Raza
 October 27, 2022 DETERRENCE AND STRATEGY

Andre Beaufre was a well-known military strategist having a French origin. He joined
military academy in 1921, where he was trained under the command of Charles de Gualle.
Later on, Charles became the president of France. Andre served the French military and
defence department in various capacities. He has made rich contributions to the strategic
studies while reflecting thoroughly on the genesis of strategy in general as well as nuclear
strategy. Being an advocate of a nuclear weapon capable France, he theorized the rationale
for their acquisition primarily focusing on the operational and political aspects. Under
discussion book of Andre Beaufre, “Deterrence and Strategy”, reflects on the nature of the
concept of deterrence and its analysis in the bi-lateral as well as multi-lateral settings. Later
on, he discusses the military and strategic consequences of the deterrence.
Deterrence has remained as a dominant nuclear strategy throughout the cold war. At its root,
this strategy focuses on the preservation of the status-quo. In the operational sense, deterrence
aims to stop adversary from using the armed force with the help of a threat. The purpose of
deterrence is to achieve a psychological objective; convincing your adversary that if he takes
certain action, the damage incurred would offset the advantages of the initiative.
Psychological decision-making rests on two factors: issue at stake compared with the risk
incurred.
During the primitive times, lack of technological sophistication made decisive victories in the
battlefield highly probable. With the advent of nuclear weapons, their massive destruction
and range compelled military planners to employ the threat of usage of such weapons to
achieve operational as well as strategic objectives. In that sense the strategy of war
transformed to the strategy of potential threat for preventing wars. Acquisition of such lethal
weapons by great powers has made world more stable. Although peace and stability at the
nuclear level, has created incentives for the Low Intensity Conflicts (LIC).
Understanding the functioning of deterrence in the bi-lateral settings is imperative for
deducing the axioms governing the deterrence in the multi-lateral settings. For the sake of
observing the deterrence at the bi-lateral level, we will focus on the factors governing the
equilibrium or disequilibrium. In a mathematical sense deterrence operates when the risk is
greater than the issue at stake. Risk is defined as the state’s resources likely to be destroyed in
the case of enemy’s strike. Certainty of damage is the key for ensuring deterrence.
For the nuclear stability to prevail, the second-strike dialectics are of fundamental
importance. Greater the repository capacity of two states: the anticipated residual capacity
after absorbing the first strike, more stable will be the nuclear environment. The magnitude of
repository capacity is an integral factor in governing state choices during a crisis. For
instance, if a state has repository capacity of 90% vis a vis adversary, it can exert an effective
deterrent effect as compared to an actor who possesses merely a 15% capacity. Although
existence of 15% repository capacity is enough to ensure Mutual Assured Destruction
(MAD), unless the issue at stake is too important for the other actor, so that he is willing to
lose 15% of his assets.
For the smooth functioning of the nuclear deterrence credibility of the first strike must be
maintained at all the costs. For the above-said, three methods have been discussed: reflect
first strike as a rational act, ignore the irrational acts and rationalize the irrational decisions.
One has to reduce the enemy’s riposte to a morally and politically acceptable level with a
proclamation that authority has been delegated to fire the weapons in specific circumstances.
 October 27, 2022 DETERRENCE AND STRATEGY

Furthermore, a declaration should be made that first strike is no more than a warning shot and
there is no need to retaliate with the full capacity. McNamara also believed in the efficacy of
the warning shots.
Increasing stability at the nuclear level, creates instability at the lower levels. This Idea was
advocated by the Glen Snyder’s famous “stability-instability” paradox. Usually, the idea of
counter-value targeting: engaging city targets is enough to manifest effective nuclear
deterrent. Although few states go for the counter-force targeting to create instability at the
nuclear level. Counter-force is highly destabilizing in multitudes. It is near to impossible to
effectively engage all hard military targets accounting for the dispersion. Secondly, the ratio
of number of weapons fired and number of weapons to be destroyed becomes untenable.
As per understanding of various academics and practitioners, deterrence operates at the three
levels: nuclear (strategic), conventional and sub-conventional. At the nuclear level,
possession of high yield strategic nuclear weapons by two states ensures the MAD. At the
conventional level, deterrent effect emanates from a rich mix of conventional and low yield
nuclear weapons. Sub-conventional level comprises of more insidious methods like guerrilla
warfare, information warfare and cyber operations. To deter at the sub-conventional level,
strategy must be operated at a total level comprising of various military and non-military
tools.
Now we will move towards understanding the multi-lateral settings and how it impacts a
deterrence equation vis a vis three parties. For that sake, let's take a third party who is aligned
to any one of the two great nuclear powers. Deterrence in multi-lateral settings is a more
complex phenomenon and it is dependent on three factors: how aligned the allies are, whether
the issue at stake is substantial or marginal for the great power and riposte capacity of the
third party. In general existence of a third nuclear party restricts the space at the strategic and
the operational level for the two principal nuclear actors.
Mr. McNamara has remained sceptical about the existence of an independent and small
nuclear force and he quotes three reasons: ineffectiveness, uselessness and dangerous. In
multi-lateral arrangements, the concept of collective security loses its utility when issue at
stake becomes substantial for the third party; however the principal actor takes it as a
marginal one. In that scenario, the great power will not pledge the employment of nuclear
weapons for safeguarding the interests of the third party; however a limited conventional
action may be pursued.
The concept of nuclear umbrella or the extended deterrence is developed for understanding
the functioning of deterrence dynamics in the multi-lateral environment. In the case of
extended deterrence, divergence of nuclear doctrines and varied responses in different
contingencies complicates the very process. Existence of a third party instils interdependence
among the nuclear actors; however, this interdependence is so ambiguous and complex that
nuclear signalling is rendered ineffective. In order to ensure effective functioning of the
extended deterrence, there is a need to establish combined command and control, coherent
nuclear doctrines and multi-lateral forces.
American strategists have frequently highlighted the “Nth Power Problem”. As per their
understanding the existence of independent and coordinated nuclear forces adds stabilization
to the international environment. However, they defined those powers as “reasonable
 October 27, 2022 DETERRENCE AND STRATEGY

powers”. Reasonable powers are those nation having liberal democracies as their modus
oprendi. States pursuing authoritarian and autocratic regimes might manifest the problem of
madman.
For the operational planning, understanding the military consequences of the nuclear
deterrence is vital. Under the nuclear umbrella, two kinds of conflict are discussed. Firstly,
the types of the conflict that must be avoided at all the costs. It is recommended that forces
must prepare strategies for the avoidance of these improbable conflicts: general and local
war. Secondly, the type of conflicts that will not give rise to nuclear hazards. All these
limited types of conflicts including guerrilla warfare, semi hot war and limited conventional
war must be fought in the marginal zones.
If there are no prospects of a nuclear exchange at all, the credibility of the nuclear deterrence
will diminish. In order to bridge the gap between unthinkable nuclear wars and probable
conventional wars, there is an idea of the sub-limited nuclear warfare. Among the advocates
of limited nuclear warfare, two schools of thoughts emerge: Herman Kahn and Kissinger.
Kahn is an advocate of launching strategic warning shots that are psychological in its nature.
Kissinger speaks about engaging the tactical targets to destroy the ingress of the adversary
forces. The essence of these strikes is to inculcate the fear of escalation to strengthen our
deterrent values and to release the pressure from the conventional forces.
It is high time to analyse the operational factors that will impact the deterrence outcomes in
various contingencies. The factors include: strength of nuclear fire power, relative
capabilities of the armed forces, geographical limits to the conflict and ability to do
protracted warfare. Operational preparedness is tantamount to the effective functioning of the
deterrence at the various levels of the intensity. For the spasm strike, your riposte capacity
must be highly survivable for lending credence to it. Below the level of spasm strike, one
should be prepared to have an effective command and control for demonstrations ranging
from counter city action to manoeuvres purely psychological in its nature. Towards the end
of spectrum, usage of tactical nuclear weapons and the delegation of command to the
commanders operating in the specific theatres are essential for debunking enemy’s limited or
shallow conventional manoeuvres.
Existence of nuclear deterrence at the strategic level has ruled out the feasibility of total or
an all-out war. The main objective of the nuclear strategy is to avoid the total war, as
proposed by Bernard Brodie. At the level of total strategy, solidification of alliances during
the cold war instilled stability. However, In the post-cold war era demise of bi-polarity and
the emergence of new challengers like China vis a vis US has induced instability in the
system especially at the level of Indirect strategy. Indirect strategy carries provisions for more
insidious manoeuvres like LIC’s, information warfare, and psychological operations.
Gen. Andre Beaufre has written a detailed and all-encompassing book discussing at length
the deterrence dynamics at the various levels. He has examined a variety of situations and
operational factors that might impact the deterrence outcomes. His textbook findings have
enlightened many practitioners and academics. Even in the nuclear second age, his hypothesis
is substantiated by the empirical evidence reflecting the state practices. The frequent
employment of disruptive technologies like Artificial Intelligence (AI), precision munitions
and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) defences, has negatively impacted the deterrence stability.
 October 27, 2022 DETERRENCE AND STRATEGY

However, constructive and meaningful engagement by practitioners and academics will

provide fresh perspectives to strengthen nuclear non usage.