Relevance of Nuclear

Deterrence in the Era of

Hybrid Warfare

Affan Waheed
Foreign Service Academy

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Sequence of Presentation
• Introduction
• Problem Statement
• Methodology
• Literature Review
• A Primer on Deterrence
• Hybrid Warfare – Old wine in New Bottle
• Nuclear Deterrence in the Contemporary World
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
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Introduction
• A widespread agreement that the character of war is changing but little consensus as to
exactly how.

• Changing character of Warfare – Some pointers

• Total to limited;
• Technological vs Mechanical;
• Killing Time – Death of Distance;
• Rise of Global digital networks.

• Wars are no longer formally declared, these must be assumed as a perennial feature of
interstate relations.

• War today can be nonlinear, fourth-generation, next-generation, even contactless.

• A hybrid development zone bypassing the balance imposed by nuclear deterrence. 3

Problem Statement
• Development an understanding of the relevance of nuclear deterrence theory
in the age of hybrid warfare by evaluating the defining characteristics, if any,
of this unique relationship.

• Adumbrating the contemporary challenges posed to nuclear deterrence

theory

• Delineating possible changes to the existing deterrence model incorporating

the Cross Domain Deterrence (CDD) model as a defining method entailing
possible spectrums to thwart aggressive postures from an adversary.

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Methodology

• The paper is analytical in nature;

• Limited studies on the dialectical relationship of hybrid warfare and nuclear

deterrence;

• Militated against a conclusive verdict; however, a prudent response has been

developed in light of contemporary studies filling a gap in the literature.

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Literature Review
• Deterrence - An imagined construction
• deterrence is a psychological phenomenon (Kroenig 2012)
• Illusion of capability is more important than the capability itself (Multinational Capability Development
Campaign)

• Deterrence as Messaging
• a strategy to shape another’s perception of cost and benefits to dissuade threatening behavior

• The phenomenon gained new conceptualization after the creation of nuclear weapons
wherein it emerged as a strategy of coercion, intimidation, and deterrence (Schelling 2008).

• Classical 3Cs – Capability; Credibility, and Communication.

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Literature Review – Continued…

• Hybrid Warfare
• John Mccuen: spectrum wars with both physical and conceptual dimensions;

• NATO has defined hybrid warfare as “warfare . . . where a wide range of overt
and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures are employed in a
highly integrated design” (Ashraf 2017)

• Defining feature – combining kinetic variables with subversive efforts.

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Threat Perception – Hybrid Regime
•  Threats are a function of
• power
• geographic proximity
• offensive capability; and
• perceived intentions. (Stephen M. Walt)

• Hybrid warfare toolkit tinkers with the ‘perceived intentions’ of an adversary.

• Introduces new form of compellence, war by remote control, standoffs and

subversion.

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A Primer on Deterrence

• Nuclear deterrence is defined by two approaches:

1. Deterrence by ‘threat of denial’ - demonstrate to the aggressive actor that one could
absorb the attack with infinitesimal costs to the state (KerŠankas 2020), at the center
of this approach is the idea of building resilience in all potential target sectors.

2. Deterrence by ‘threat of punishment’ that incorporates imposition of costs on the

aggressor that are higher in contrast to the potential benefits of aggression which
curbs the hostile actor from pursuing any hostile action.

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Nuclear Deterrence: a historical analysis
• Categorized by four waves:
1. Development of nuclear weapons that ‘fundamentally altered the nature of war
[and] created a strategic revolution.’ Bernard Brodie writes “… thus far the
chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now
on its chief purpose must be to avert them.

2. Second wave of deterrence theory was marked by the excessive Cold War
competition. Notions such as war as a ‘bargaining process,’ ‘accidental nuclear
war,’ ‘escalation control,’ ‘credible deterrence, ‘Massive retaliation,’ and
‘Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).’ Dr. Oppenheimer commented: “two
scorpions in a bottle each capable of killing each other, but only at the risk of
his own life.” (Scott 2007).

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Continued…
3. The third phase characterized compromise since significant arms
development and the Cuban Crisis lay bare the unfathomable implications of
a nuclear war, this period deliberated over the resolution of escalatory
controls.

4. The post-Cold War period, the fourth wave of nuclear deterrence, brought in
new challenges and old realist security doctrines in conflict with each other.
Post 9/11 saw asymmetric warfare as a new challenge to the notion of
nuclear deterrence with additional constraints emerging from non-state
actors, insurgents, and minimization of collateral damage and escalation
control.

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Hybrid Warfare – Old wine in new bottle
• Hybrid warfare an ‘amalgamation of at least two elements, or more, to
produce a unique effect’ (Johnson 2018). The questions begin what is
being combined in hybrid warfare.
• This school contends that hybrid warfare is a useful idea but it is not novel (W.
Murray 2012)

• The second school asseverates the novelty of hybrid warfare and

contends that a unique response/ resolve is needed to counter this threat.
• “wars that incorporate a range of different modes of warfare, including
conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including
indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder” (Hoffman 2007)

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Continued…
• Defining characteristics of Hybrid warfare:
1. A simultaneous utilization of conventional and unconventional forces at the strategic, operational,
and tactical level; and
2. use of non-military tools, such as electronic or cyber operations, information campaigns, and
economic pressure for any requisite objectives.

• These unique traits make hybrid warfare an idiosyncratic aggression method that can be
incorporated by states as well as non-state actors.

• Hybrid warfare and other manifestations such as asymmetric warfare, compound warfare,
Fourth Generation warfare, unrestricted warfare, and low-intensity conflict. These terms
are oftentimes proffered as synonyms to the notion of hybrid warfare so to understand the
varying complexity and concomitant challenges arising from it.

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Nuclear Deterrence in the Contemporary
World
• Three specific challenges to nuclear deterrence models in the contemporary world
1. Impact of emerging technologies;
2. Blurring of lines between conventional and nuclear weapons; and
3. Evolving idea of deterrence.

• Observance of fifth wave of Deterrence;

• What are the parts of a hybrid threat?

• Absence of coercible vulnerabilities;
• disaggregated non-state actors, and their attendant disheveled processes; and
• challenge of attribution

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Continued…

• Despite the rise of limited warfare/proxy wars or involvement of non-state

actors, the underlying deterrence element still prevails despite the changing
notion of actors and warfare ideals.
• Russian annexation of Crimea.

• The dearth of nuclear playbooks to tackle such response plus the restriction of
attribution of aggression also hinders the classical notion of deterrence.

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Is nuclear deterrence still relevant?
• Despite the multiplicity of actors in hybrid warfare and the issue of
attribution, states are investing a considerable amount in cyber domains and
technological avenues to bolster their ability to identify cyber threats.
• states can identify the motivations behind any aggressive action through pragmatic
analysis. This idea stipulates that for deterrence to work, perfect attribution in a
hybrid war is not necessary to establish.

• Proportionality in response is still possible.

• Research in Europe and the US shows efforts are being made to develop a ‘diverse
pool of cross-domain options.’ Initiatives such as “the cyber diplomacy toolbox” and
“Cyber Deterrence Initiative” are some of the tools which are under consideration.

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Is nuclear deterrence still relevant?
• Signaling is a foundational element in deterrence theory.
• In Hybrid warfare signaling becomes difficult as communicating hybrid capabilities is difficult in
contrast to possession of complex ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads; and secondly, it is difficult
to qualify and quantify the effect of hybrid capabilities that might spur decision-makers into action.

• Remedy: constant ‘interaction’ with an adversary stipulating what the state signals its
capabilities, what sort of conduct it deems desirable, and what shall be the response in
case of a hybrid threat.

• For signaling to succeed it has to be carried out at the political, strategic, and tactical
levels. Henceforth, signaling hybrid deterrence requires a synchronized response
encapsulating nuclear element as well as hybrid elements.

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Is nuclear deterrence still relevant?
• Cross domain deterrence model
• the administration of threats in a single domain to counter threats in another domain
• based on a resilience approach;
• A comprehensive program in relation to hybrid warfare whereby states correlate
resilience and deterrence.
• Provides a state with the ability to absorb, adopt, and recover from any hybrid threats
and continue to maintain nuclear deterrence option to limit the onslaught of war and
keep it solely in cyber or information domain.

• Successful implementation of CDD strategy requires consideration that not all

hybrid threats can be deterred: meaning prioritization becomes instrumental in
dissuading an enemy.
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Is nuclear deterrence still relevant?
• The next change to deterrence would be the incorporation of forward looking
elements and tailored to respected actors. Nuclear deterrence would continue to hold
its significance in the wider context of war; however, new areas and themes would
continue to be added to the notion of deterrence to counter the capabilities regime of
hybrid warfare.

• The most important element for nuclear deterrence, in the wake of hybrid warfare,
would be resilience building, threat anticipation, and consistent crisis management.

• The role of nuclear deterrence would continue since hybrid threats and warfare,
above certain thresholds, would fillip the threat to use nuclear weapons in any of its
manifestation: strategic or tactical.

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Conclusion
Nuclear deterrence under hybrid warfare regime would
continue to evolve through military modernization of existing
triad structures and reliance on CDD toolkit. This evolution in
nuclear deterrence is bound to address the core facets of
deterrence theory i.e. signaling, attribution, and
proportionality. Furthermore, state’s investments in new
information communication technology (ICT), development
of hypersonic weaponse, dual-capable air crafts and sea-
launched cruise missile would necessatitate utilization of CDD
with concomitant dependence on nuclear triad capabilities.
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THANK YOU

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