REALISM

Author Reading Summary

Hans Six Principles of Political Politics is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.
Morgenthau Realism 1. Concept of interest is defined in terms of power. Good intention does not equate to
good policy; rational policy is good policy. Sharp distinction between what is desirable
and what is possible. Reality as an approximation to an ideal system of balance of
power.
2. The kind of interest determining political action depends upon the political and cultural
context within which foreign policy is formulated.
3. M significance of political action. Realism maintains that universal moral principles
must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place. States must
not let its moral disapprobation of the infringement of certain universal values get in
the way of successful political action.
4. Political realism does not identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the
moral laws that govern the universe. Nations are political entities pursuing their
respective interests defined in terms of power (self-interested)
5. Political realism is real.
Kenneth Waltz The Anarchic Structure of ● A system is composed of a structure and of interacting units
World Politics ● The structure is the system-wide component that makes it possible to think of the
system as a whole
● Structures may endure while personality, behavior, and interactions vary widely and
produce different outcomes.
● Structure defines the arrangement, or the ordering, of the parts of a system

1. Ordering principle Domestic systems are centralized and hierarchic

● International systems are decentralized and anarchic
● Formed by the coaction of self-regarding units
● Motive of survival
2. The Character of Units
● Units of international-political systems are not formally differentiated by the
functions they perform
● Anarchy entails relations of coordination among a system’s units, and that
implies their sameness
● The functions of states are similar, and distinctions among them arise
principally from their varied capabilities
● States are not the only international actors
● State sovereignty doesn’t mean possessing the free will to do as you wish, it
means that it decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and external
problems
● Seeking assistance from others which may limit its freedom by making
commitments to them

3. The Distribution of Capabilities

● Parts of a hierarchic system are related to one another in ways that are
determined both by their functional differentiation and by the extent of their
capabilities
● Power is estimated by comparing the capabilities of a number of units
● Distribution of capabilities is not a unit attribute, but rather a system-wide
concept

4. Violence at Home and Abroad

● State of nature is a state of war
● Difference between national and international politics lies in the different
modes of organization for using force
● An effective government has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force
● Legitimate: public agents are organized to prevent and to counter the private
use of force
● International system is a self help system
 5. Interdependence and Integration
● Integration: condition within nations
● Interdependence: condition among nations
● Units are free to specialize, pursue their own interests and preserving their security in
an organized realm
○ Free to specialize because they have no reason to fear the increased
interdependence that goes with specialization
● In anarchic realms, like units co-act
○ Units are functionally similar
○ Like units work to maintain a measure of independence
● In hierarchic realms, unlike units interact
○ Units are differentiated, tend to increase the extent of their specialization
○ Differentiated units become closely interdependent as their specialization
proceeds
● Limits to cooperation
○ In a self-help system, considerations of security subordinate economic gain to
political interest
○ A state worries about a division of possible gains that may favor others more
than itself
○ A state also worries lest it become dependent on others through cooperative
endeavors and exchanges of goods and services
○ States do not willingly place themselves in situations of increased dependence

6. Structures and Strategies

National interests are subordinate to international interests
· Given structural constraints, rational behavior does not lead to the wanted results
· Each country constrained to take care of itself, no one takes care of the system
· States have to do whatever they think necessary for their own preservation, since no one
can be relied on to do it for them
· Only remedy for a strong structural effect is a structural change

7. The Virtues of Anarchy

 To achieve their objectives and maintain their security, self- help is necessarily the principle
of action in an anarchic order
· A self-help situation is one of high risk
o States cannot entrust managerial powers to a central agency unless that agency is able to
protect its client states
o The more powerful the clients and the more the power of each of them appears as a
threat to the others, the greater the power lodged in the center must be
o The greater the power of the center, the stronger the incentive for states to engage in a
struggle to control it
· Force is used for one’s own interest
o The constant possibility that force will be used limits manipulations, moderates demands,
and serves as an incentive for the settlement of disputes

8. Anarchy and Hierarchy

Hierarchic elements within international structures limit and restrain the exercise of
sovereignty but only in ways strongly conditioned by the anarchy of the larger system
· Anarchy of that order strongly affects the likelihood of cooperation, the extent of arms
agreements, and the jurisdiction of international organizations

John Anarchy and the Struggle for · The international system is anarchic
Mearsheimer Power · Great powers possess offensive military capability, which gives them the wherewithal to
hurt and possibly destroy each other
· Great powers are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with
hegemony as their final goal
o Consider balance of power
o Weigh the costs and risks of offense against the likely benefits
· States pay close attention to how power is distributed among them, attempt to maximize
their power
· Look for opportunities to balance power
· State capability to threaten each other varies
o Key factor that drives fear levels up and down
o The more power a state possesses, the more fear it generates among its rivals
 · Security at the top of the hierarchy of goals
· Pursuit of non-security goals sometimes complement hunt for relative power
· Cooperation amongst states is sometimes difficult to achieve and always difficult to sustain
o Considerations about relative gains
o Concern about cheating, rival will gain a significant advantage
o No amount of cooperation can eliminate the dominating logic of security competition
· Balance-of-power logic causes great powers to form alliances and cooperate against
common enemies
· Genuine peace is not likely as long as the state system remains anarchic
Robert Jervis Offense, Defense, and the 1. Offense Defense Balance
Security Dilemma · Greatest impact on arms races
· Long-run stability
o If the defense has the advantage, arms race can be avoided
o One side’s increase in arms and security will be larger than the other’s decrease in
security
o If one side increases its arms, the other can bring its security back up to its previous level
by adding a smaller amount to its forces
o If the first side reacts to this change, its increase will also be smaller than the stimulus that
produced it
o A stable equilibrium will be reached
· Short-run stability
o If the offense has the advantage, a state’s reaction to international tension will increase
the chances of war
o Incentives for pre-emption and the “reciprocal fear of surprise attack” will be heightened
o No way for the state to increase its security without menacing, or even attacking, the other

2. Technology and Geography

· Two main factors that determine whether the offense or the defense has the advantage
· Buffer zones slow the attacker’s progress
· Oceans, large rivers, and mountain ranges allow defense against superior numbers
· Imitating geography, men have tried to create barriers
 o Treaties may provide for demilitarized zones on both sides of the border, although such
zones will rarely be deep enough to provide more than warning
o In ground warfare under some conditions, forts, trenches, and small groups of men in
prepared positions can hold off large numbers of attackers
· Nuclear weapons weapons – deterrence > defense
· Major variable that affects how strongly the security dilemma operates is whether weapons
and policies that protect the state also provide the capability for attack.
3. Offense Defense Differentiation
· Only the advantage of the defense can ameliorate the security dilemma
· Differentiation allows status-quo states to behave in ways that are clearly different from
those of aggressors
o Status-quo powers can identify each other, thus laying the foundations for cooperation
§ Conflicts growing out of the mistaken belief that the other side is expansionist will be less
frequent
o Status-quo states will obtain advance warning when others plan aggression
o If all states support the status quo, an obvious arms control agreement is a ban on
weapons that are useful for attacking

4. Offensive Arms for Status Quo Powers

· If the offense has a great advantage over the defense, protection through defensive forces
will be too expensive
· Status-quo states may need offensive weapons to regain territory lost in the opening stages
of war
· The state may feel that it must be prepared to take the offensive either because the other
side will make peace only if it loses territory or because the state has commitments to attack
if the other makes war on a third party
Stephen Walt Alliances: Balancing and Hypotheses on Balancing ​(states are more secure as aggressors face combined
Bandwagoning opposition)
1. General form: States facing an external threat will align with others to oppose the states
posing the threat.
2. The greater the threatening state’s aggregate power, the greater the tendency for others
to align against it.
3. The nearer a powerful state, the greater the tendency for those nearby to align against it.
Therefore, neighboring states are less likely to be allies than are states separated by at least
one other power.
4. The greater a state’s offensive capabilities, the greater the tendency for others to align
against it. Therefore, states with offensively oriented military capabilities are likely to provoke
other states to form defensive coalitions.
5. The more aggressive a state’s perceived intentions, the more likely others are to align
against that state.
6. Alliances formed during wartime will disintegrate when the enemy is defeated.

(Balancing occurs for two reasons:

● Survival falls at risk if potential hegemon becomes too powerful to be stopped
● Joining a weaker member increases new member’s influence within alliance as weaker state
requires greater assistance, as opposed to joining a stronger nation - new member has little
influence in coalition

Hypotheses on Bandwagoning ​(states are less secure - Successful aggressors attract

more allies hence emboldening them to defeat their opponents)

1. General form: States facing an external threat will ally with the most threatening power.
2. The greater a state’s aggregate capabilities, the greater the tendency for others to align
with it.
3. The nearer a powerful state, the greater the tendency for those nearby to align with it.
4. The greater a state’s offensive capabilities, the greater the tendency for others to align
with it.
5. The more aggressive a state’s perceived intentions, the less likely other states are to align
against it.
6. Alliances formed to oppose a threat will disintegrate when the threat becomes serious.

Hypotheses on the Conditions Favoring Balancing or Bandwagoning

1. Balancing is more common than bandwagoning.
2. The stronger the state, the greater its tendency to balance. Weak states will balance
against other weak states but may bandwagon when threatened by great powers.
 3. The greater the probability of allied support, the greater the tendency to balance. When
adequate allied support is certain, however, the tendency for free-riding or buck-passing
increases.
4. The more unalterably aggressive a state is perceived to be, the greater the tendency for
others to balance against it.
5. In wartime, the closer one side is to victory, the greater the tendency for others to
bandwagon with it.

Liberalism

Author Reading Summary

Robert Jervis Co-operation under the What inhibits cooperation among states? (The problems)
Security Dilemma
● Not possible for decision makers to bind themselves to the same path no matter how
committed they may be initially to status quo. Minds change, new leaders come to
power, values shift etc.
● States seek to control resources outside their territory in order to protect their own
possessions eg. Japan’s drive into China and SEA before WWII.
○ States may interfere pre-emptively in domestic politics of others in their
quest for security; establish buffer zones
● Security Dilemma: An increase in one state’s security which decreases the security of
others - driven by the fear of being exploited

“When fear of being exploited is low, security is easier to attain, and the relatively low level
of arms and passive foreign policy that a status quo power will be able to adopt is less likely
to threaten others.”

Subjective security demands (2 dimensions):

● States differ in how much security they desire - hence the price they are willing to
 pay in their security increment differs as well
○ The more states place their security above all, the more sensitive they would
be to minimal threats - translates to high demand for arms
○ Results in lower net advantage of exploiting other states, higher costs of arms
race
● Perception of threat differs across states

What makes cooperation more likely?

● Incentives to cooperate by increasing gains of mutual cooperation
○ Lower possible gains from exploiting others (a state can reduce the incentive
another state has in attacking it by not being a threat to the latter/providing
it with goods and services) - makes mutual collaboration more likely

● Decreasing the costs state incurs if it cooperates

○ Lower other’s incentives to defect by decreasing what it could gain by
exploiting the state
○ However if above is not achieved, cooperation ineffective in the short run.
One state may refuse to cooperate, other state may view it as aggressive in
long run
○ States committing to cooperation should reassure one another of their
willingness to cooperate, and absence of intention to defect out of fear of
exploitation
● Warped belief that an increase in military strength leads to greater security + lack of
sensitivity to the security dilemma - makes relationships between states more
conflict/war prone
○ Failure to understand dilemma where states invest in arms to preserve status
quo may alarm other states to arm, as they fear attack from first state
○ Failure to understand security dilemma by states may also remove restraint
on arms spending (money spent only on cost of arms), leading to other states
overestimating their security requirements - decreasing overall security
● Greater sensitivity to security dilemma leads to:
○ States treat aggressor as an insecure defender of the status quo
 ○ Less conflict-prone

Take note: Political climate often heavily impacted by the beliefs, geography and
commitments of regions/states (Pages 136-138)

Robert O. International (Also refer to Week 3 Slide 10)

Keohane institutions: Can Neoliberal institutionalism I:
interdependence work?
Important: “Only after UN was founded in 1945, and was backed with strong support by the
US and a multiplicity of specialized agencies performing different tasks - international
institutions began commanding substantial international attention.”

Definition: Rules agreed between states about how they should behave (nor norms of
behavior)
● [After 1945], even the most powerful states rely on increasingly on international
institutions
● 1960 - Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons led the efforts to prevent
dangerous spread of nuclear weapons
● NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) - most successful alliance in history,
highly institutionalized
● By 1960s - IMF had become centerpiece of efforts by major capitalist democracies to
regulate monetary affairs

Neoliberal institutionalism II: How do institutions cater to cooperation?

Recall from slides - Alter payoffs, Increase transaction, Provide information and Establish
focal points
● Alter payoffs and Increase transaction -
○ Institutions create the capability for states to cooperate in mutually beneficial
ways by reducing the costs of making and enforcing agreements.
○ Rarely engage in centralized enforcement of agreements
○ Reinforce practices of reciprocity - provides governments with incentives to
 keep to their own commitments and ensure others do so as well
● Provide information -
○ Issue of uncertainty and credibility states worry about - deters them from
entering agreements
○ International institutions alleviate this woe by; promoting negotiations in
which transparency is encouraged; by dealing with a series of issues over
many years under similar rules
○ This encourages honesty to preserve its future reputation
○ By systematically monitoring compliance of governments with their stated
commitments, possibility of misinterpreting terms of agreement amongst
partners is reduced

● Shortcomings of international institutions:

○ International institutions are fundamentally insignificant because states
wield the only real power in world politics - evident from:
■ Failure of the League of Nations and UN in achieving collective
security against great powers
■ How major economic contributors exercise enormous influence in the
operation and decision making processes of international institutions
- WTO, IMF, World Bank.

○ Anarchy (Absence of a world government or effective international legal

system to which victims of injustice can appeal to) results in states favouring
relative gains over absolute gains
■ States seek to protect their personal power and status (preserve
relative power and status quo) over a mutually beneficial cooperation
if their partners are likely to benefit more than them
■ Examples from text: American Soviet arms race, Euro-American

○ Cooperation not harmonious, emerges out of discord, takes place through

tough bargaining
■ Bargaining could produce obstacles to achieving joint gains - how?
 ■ Different countries stake out tough bargaining positions before
binding to agreements - hinders possibility of deals that could
produce joint gains (Kyoto Protocol not being a global agreement)

○ Why some international institutions are more effective than others?

■ Due to variation in coherence of institutional policy or member’s
conformity with institutional rules, which is partially accounted for
according to degree of common interests and distribution of power
among members
■ Institutions with members that share similar social values and have
similar political systems - NATO/EU, tend to be stronger as compared
to -
■ Institutions with diverse membership without commitment to a deep
common interest such as Organisation for security and cooperation in
Europe - tend to be weaker
■ Character of domestic politics affect international institutions
■ Institutions that are heavily monopolised by stronger nation states
(eg. IMF) due to weighted voting, take more decisive action compared
to UN General Assembly, where influence is more diffused

● Democratic deficit: (Summary)

○ The problem:
■ Major international institutions are laying down rules that
governments must follow to attract foreign investment and generate
growth
■ Such institutions are managed by small number of technocrats and
supervised by high governmental officials, key negotiations are made
in secrecy

○ The solution:
■ Raise accountability: International institutions are responsible to
 governments, and governments are accountable to their own people -
international regulation needs to be supplemented by public opinion
so as to be more accountable
■ Expand chains of official responsibility:​ Seek to invigorate
transnational society with networks amongst individuals and
non-governmental organisations
■ Enhance transparency:​ International organizations ought to maintain
sufficient transparency for transnational networks of advocacy
groups, domestic legislators and democratic public to evaluate their
actions

Michael W. Doyle Kant, Liberal Legacies, (Summary)

and Foreign Affairs - Liberalism disrupts balance of power politics
- However, peaceful intent and restraint liberalism does manifest, announced the
possibility of world peace establishment

● Liberalism focuses on the importance of freedom of the individual

○ Moral freedom is important - right to be treated and treat others as ethical
subjects
○ Calls for freedom of arbitrary authority - “negative freedom”: includes
freedom of conscience, free press, free speech, equality under law and right to
hold/exchange property without fear or arbitrary seizure
○ Calls for “positive freedom”: social and economic rights such as equal
opportunity to education, healthcare, employment and necessary
participation/self-expression

● Political order marked by shared commitment to four essential institutions:

○ Citizens possess juridical equality + other fundamental civil rights such as
freedom of religions and press
○ State is subject to neither external authority of other states nor to internal
authority of special prerogatives
○ Economy rests on recognition of rights of private property including
 ownership of means of production
○ Economic decisions predominantly shaped by forces of supply and demand,
domestically and internationally

● In foreign affairs - (Main postulate of liberal international theory): ​States have the
right to be free from foreign intervention
○ Democratic states have the right to exercise political independence
○ Mutual respect for each others’ rights
○ Able to establish private international ties without state interference

● Circumstances that could lead to peace - Experience, geography, expectations of

cooperation and belief patterns
● Level of social determinants - relations between states with similar social structures
are more compatible hence less likely to engage in war (But feudal societies,
communist societies, socialist societies and fascist societies do not support this
conclusion)
● Level of interstate relations - regional attributes nor historical alliances or
friendships can account for the extensive liberal peace
○ Three types of interstate peace - empire, hegemon, equilibrium
● Peace cannot be merely attributed to effective international policing by predominant
hegemon
● Kant: Liberal states are as aggressive and as war prone as any other
government/society in their relation with non liberal states. Yet occassion of wars
among liberal states is low - why?
○ Domestic liberal constitutions helps ensure personal animosities amongst
government heads do not escalate
○ International law that reinforces a world of separate states to prevent global
despotism, yet attempts to integrate liberal states to come closer together
towards agreement on peace and understanding

○ Economic interdependence -
 ■ Cosmopolitan law - permits ‘spirit of commerce’ that leads to liberal
peace
■ Cosmopolitan ties a result of cooperative international division of
labour and free trade, according to comparative advantage
■ Each state’s economy is better off than it would be under autarky -
hence they make a conscious attempt at avoiding policies/challenging
another state’s security that would threaten their economic ties with
other states
■ Compels states to avert war and promote peace

Summary -
1. Liberal states are not free from the “Security dilemma” - an insecurity caused by
anarchy in the world political system
2. However, alliances of mutual strategic interest among states of similar liberal
character alleviate the effects of international anarchy
3. While alliances between liberal and non-liberal states remain fragile, political bond
of liberal rights and interests has been immensely effective for mutual
non-aggression

John J. The false promise of (Summary)

Mearsheimer international institutions ● Mearsheimer’s claim: Institutions have minimal influence on state behaviour

● Realist argument:​ Institutions are a reflection of international distribution of power

in the world. They have no independent effect on state behaviour as they are based
on self-interested calculations of great powers
○ Institutions are created and shaped by the most powerful states to maintain
their share of world power
○ Balance of power is the independent variable explaining war, institutions are
merely an intervening variable in the process
○ Case study:​ NATO prevented WWIII, helped West win Cold War. NATO
however, was a manifestation of the bipolar distribution of power in Europe
during the Cold war. Hence the balance of power was key in maintaining
 stability in Europe.

● Institutionalist argument​: Institutions can alter state behaviour by influencing state

preferences. They are independent variables which are key in promoting world peace
and pushing states away from war.

● Institutions (Def):
○ Set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and
compete with each other
○ Prescribe acceptable forms of state behaviour, proscribe unacceptable state
behaviour
○ Rules negotiated by states which entail mutual acceptance of higher norms,
formalized in international agreements and embodied in organizations with
own personnel and budgets

● Realism’s 5 assumptions of international system: ​(Just know)

○ World is anarchic - states are independent political units with no central
authority governing them
○ States possess offensive military capabilities - dangerous
○ Constant state of inevitable uncertainty among states about one another’s
intentions
○ Survival is the basic motive driving states - states want to maintain their
sovereignty
○ States are rational actors - think strategically about how to survive in an
international system

● Realism and cooperation -

○ International relations - a state of relentless security competition, with a
constant impending possibility of war
○ Cooperation possible but limited/difficult to achieve. It is constrained by 2
factors - ​relative gains considerations​ and ​concern about cheating
 ○ Relative gains considerations -
■ States can focus on ​absolute gains​ (maximise their own profit with
little concern on how their behaviour affects other states) OR
■ States can focus on ​relative gains ​- comprises of individual gains and
how it affects other states
■ Cooperation is difficult when states are attuned to relative gains logic
rather than absolute gains logic - complicates cooperative efforts as
interests are divided

○ Concerns about cheating -

■ Instills reluctance among states when entering agreements due to fear
that other side will cheat on agreement to gain relative advantage
■ Balance of power logic - states form alliances and cooperate against
common enemies (eg. arms control agreements signed by
superpowers during Cold War)

● Liberal institutionalism -
○ Explains cooperation in cases where states with mutual interests are faced
with difficulty to cooperate due to threat of cheating - “Prisoner’s dilemma”
■ States want to cheat as they want to maximise their own gain; and
hope that other state pursues a cooperative strategy
■ Both states end up worse off due to mutual cheating
■ Hence to prevent being worse off, mutual collaboration among states
achieved by - states making short term sacrifices for long term gains.
■ “Prisoner’s dilemma” countered.
■ Institutions ​change​ states’ calculations of maximising their welfare
in the process of countering this cheating problem - instead of
changing crucial international norms (unlike Critical theory and
Collective security)
■ Conclusion: Institutions produce cooperation.

○ Ignores security issues but addresses why economic and environmental

 cooperation among states is more likely

● Mearsheimer’s attack on liberalism:

○ Mearsheimer challenges proponents of liberal institutionalism who suggest a
causal link between institutions and economic cooperation, and hence
connect cooperation with international stability. Military issues are not
accounted for.
○ Logical problem: (Summary)
■ Cheating is a major obstacle to cooperation, but so is the relative
gains concern
■ Liberal institutionalists focus exclusively on absolute gains, not
relative gains
■ Flaw in “prisoner’s dilemma” - only accounts for how opponent’s
strategy will affect own absolutely gains, but not how much one side
gains relative to the other

■ Problem 1​: Theory is only exclusive to economic realm, not military -

argued by liberal institutionalists. However, economic might often
translates to military might, which makes it harder to determine
absolute gains in solely the economic domain. Hence relative gains
concerns should be accounted for security reasons when looking at
economic and military domain.
■ Problem 2:​ Non realist/Non-security logics may explain why states
worry about relative gains - Strategic trade theory.
■ Problem 3:​ Even if “Prisoner’s dilemma” is solved, states would
continue to be wary of relative gains as gaps in gains can translate
into military advantage - concern of relative gains can impede
cooperation among states and hence should be accounted for.
● Available evidence to illustrate that relative gains concerns
mattered even in economic relations in Cold War, in OECD.
 ○ Empirical problem: (Summary)
■ Lack of evidence that suggests that cooperation would not have
occurred in the absence of institutions due to fear of cheating
■ States are concerned with relative gains in economic realm as well

■ Example 1: (By Keohane) International Energy Agency’s (IEA) role

during oil crisis 1974-1981. IEA had minimal success in its
cooperation efforts in 1980, during outbreak of Iran-Iraq war -
● Keohane’s analysis fails to show that fear of cheating hindered
cooperation.
● Impact of IEA on cooperation was limited as it involved
relations among advanced Western democracies where
prospects of cooperation were excellent.

■ Example 2: (Lisa Martin) European Community (in Falklands War)

allowed Britain to gain its allies cooperation in continuing their
economic sanctions against Argentina, by lowering transaction costs
and facilitating issue linkage.
● Britain’s efforts to maintain EC sanctions against Argentina
were not impeded by fears of possible cheating
● Britain did not face much difficulty convincing her allies -
neither side’s core interests threatened nor did they have to
make significant sacrifices to cooperate
● EC was not pivotal to the agreement, such cooperation could
have been fostered without the institution itself

Sebastian Rosato The Flawed Logic of 1. Democratic Peace Theory (def): the claim that democracies rarely fight one another
Democratic Peace Theory because they share common norms of let-and-live and domestic institutions that
constrain the recourse to war.
2. Second-Image theory
a. Normative logic:​ Comprises of two causal mechanisms - ​Norm
​ utual trust and respect
externalization​ and m
 i. Governed by the idea that norms mandate nonviolent conflict
resolution and negotiation
ii. Democratic leaders are committed to the norms - hence adhere to
norms in a committed fashion, which leads to sentiments of trust and
respect amongst states in the international arena in the event of a
conflict
iii. Respect - due to conviction that other states also adhere to same
norms
iv. Trust - due to expectation that other party to the dispute is likely to
respect a fellow democracy and will be forbidden from resorting to
force
b. Institutional logic:​ Democratic institutions and processes make leaders
accountable to a wide range of social groups that may, in a variety of
situations, oppose war. (Governed by idea of ​Accountability​)
i. Accountability:
1. Political elites want to remain in power + opposition parties
are ready to capitalise on unpopular policies + regular
opportunities available for democratic parties to remove
political elites who have failed to deliver
2. Freedom of speech that enables voters to fairly rate a
government’s performance
3. Hence - democratic leaders who are conscious of the
accountability only engage in large-scale violence if they
receive broad popular support for their actions.
ii. 5 causal mechanisms
1. Democracies unwilling to resort to force in the event of an
international crisis:
a. Public constraint​ - Reluctant as leaders respond to
public’s aversion to war
b. Group constraint​ - Democratic leaders carry out
wishes of anti-war groups
2. Democracies are slow to use force:
 a. Slow mobilization -​ democracies unable to mobilize
quickly as convincing public and anti-war groups is a
long and complex process
b. Surprise attack - ​(same as above) + surprise attacks
are preventable as mobilization takes place in a public
domain. Idea that democracies will have time to come
to a mutually acceptable agreement and negotiate
without fearing attack.

3. Democracies provide information that can avert wars

a. Information mechanism ​- democracies are likely to
be cautious of when to escalate a crisis or committing
to war as political elites are accountable for their
citizen’s welfare, and may be removed from office
should they fail to deliver properly + fear of the
opposition parties.

FYI: (from readings) When is use of force by democracies justified?

1. In the event their self defence is threatened - democracies should only go to war
when “their safety and security are seriously endangered by the expansionist policies
of outlaw states” - Rawls
2. Humanitarian intervention - prevent blatant violation of human rights or bring
about conditions for liberal values to take root (Refer to page 588, quote by Beltz
1979, 90)

The flaws in normative logic (Rosato) - ​democracies do not reliably externalize their
domestic norms of conflict resolution​, or ​treat each other with trust and respect when
interests clash

1. Flawed Logic I:
a. Evidence​ - little available evidence to suggest that liberal states’ use of force
 was motivated by respect for human rights or that imperial conquest
promoted the development of human rights of non-europeans
i. Liberal democracies conquered non-european territories to create
buffer states against other empires/establish control over them
ii. European powers supported political elites and retained strict control
over their actions - underwriting unjust political systems + implement
external rule - all assumed under the “White man’s burden”

2. Flawed Logic II:​ “Democracies rarely fight each other because they trust and
respect one another, and they are able to do so because they know that their
democratic counterparts will act on the basis of democratic norms - that is they will
only fight in self-defence or to democratize others”
i. Norm externalization:​ Democracies failed to adopt their internal
norms of conflict resolution. ​Logic​ - democracies MUST externalize
democratic norms ---- only if they do so, trust and respect will prevail.
If they do not, peace may not be obtained.
ii. Liberal states have constantly violated liberal norms when deciding to
go to war

3. Flawed Logic III: ​“If democracies do not fight one another and autocrats do,
democrats should be more accountable than autocrats if​ accountabilit​y is the key
mechanism in explaining the separate peace between democracies.”
a. Little available evidence suggesting that democratic leaders experience
greater expected costs from fighting and losing costly wars and therefore,
held more accountable than their autocratic counterparts.

b. Public constraint​ unlikely to prevent democratic war proneness:

i. Costs of war borne by small subset of population who are unlikely to
speak out against a government that chooses to go to war, due to
limited incentives available in organizing dissent
ii. Public aversion to incur costs of war overwhelmed by nationalism -
citizens express willingness to fight/die for continued existence of
 their state
iii. Democratic leaders likely to lead by following public opinion - strong
nationalistic sentiments among people exploited and translated by
political elites into highly motivated armies and productive societies
in preparation for modern warfare
1. WWI - Kennedy deliberately encouraged subversion of
anti-war groups (same applied for Roosevelt administration)

c. Group constraint​ is problematic

(In summary - Not only are democratic governments able to resist the influence of
antiwar groups, they are subject to capture by pro-war groups)

i.Little evidence claiming that anti-war groups will capture democratic

policymaking process
1. More well organised liberal elites with a more powerful
incentive to avoid war - often defeated by more bellicose
actors such as the military
2. Foreign aggression prevails in domestic debates (Acc. to
historical records)
3. Eg. 3 out of 4 cases where the US goes to war in 19th century,
one of two major political parties was opposed to war yet
failed to avert it
ii. Autocracies do possess powerful incentives to avoid war, not
necessarily more war prone
1. Costs of engaging in modern warfare is simply too financially
draining - poses a threat to autocrat’s hold on power
2. Civilian control of military weaker in autocracies than
democracies - non military leaders in autocratic states thus
have a powerful incentive to maintain weaker military in fear
of domestic coups. Weak military vulnerable to foreign
aggression hence autocrats avoid waging war.
d. Slow mobilization​ - mechanism does not function as democratic leaders
 decide that protecting their national interests requires swift and decisive
action. Mobilization of diverse groups in democracies hence ​does not ​ slow
down decisions in using force.
i. Gulf War: Bush administration launched Operation Desert Shield and
Desert Storm without consulting Congress - decisions made
unilaterally
e. Surprise attack ​- Attacker’s regime type is unrelated to success of attack.
Attacks achieve surprise because defenders are poor at evaluating
information, not because attackers are democratic or autocratic.
i. Little historical support that claims democracies are less able to
conceal their impending actions
ii. Israel’s Six Day War (1967), Suez War (1965) planned with much
secrecy by Israel, France and Britain
f. Information​ - Purported informational properties of democratic institutions
unlikely to improve prospects of peace because:
i. Democratic processes and institutions are too transparent, hence
difficult for opposing states to interpret it
1. Too much information about their intentions revealed
2. Opponents unable to focus on appropriate information as too
much information is not perfect information
3. Prone to misinterpretation/confusion - May not always
promote peace

ii. Open domestic political competition does not ensure that states will
reveal their private information
1. In democracies, public and opposition rally to their
government’s side/persuaded to support administration
during crisis
2. “Democratic leaders rather lead than follow public opinion
during international crisis, by controlling the information
reaching the public and exploiting media.” - Democratic
governments especially adept in persuading voters.
 3. Democracies have taken action against opposition - escalating
further dispute
4. Eg. Truman waged war on Korea despite protests by senate
republicans, Bush administration went ahead with Gulf war
despite vehement opposition by several democrats in
1990-1991.

World War 1

Author Reading Summary

1. Third Image: Structural causes of war

Joseph S. Understanding Global - The rise of German power and increased rigidity in the international system
Nye, Jr. and Conflict and Cooperation: ● Germany transformed much of her economic wealth and industrial strength
David A. An Introduction to Theory into a massive naval armaments program. A strategic aim of Germany’s ‘Tirpitz
Welch and History Plan’ in 1911 was to build the second largest navy in the world and thereby
became the world’s dominant power → Alarmed the British who wanted to
contain Germany → Their response contributed to the second structural cause
of the war: Increasing rigidity in the alliance systems of Europe.
● Forming of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente → Lead to rising tensions
on both sides + accentuated the security dilemma felt on both sides
● Germany’s foreign policy also contributed to the loss of the balance of power in
Europe → Seen to be very vague and confusing and also antagonized the world
powers at the time

2. Second Image: Domestic causes of war

- Politics of Germany and Cult of the Offensive
● Germany’s efforts towards hegemony were an effort made by German elites to
 distract local Germans from the poor domestic integration of German society.
The ruling coalition of landed aristocrats and industrialists, also known as the
marriage of ‘Rye and Iron’ used expansionist policies to provide foreign
adventures instead of domestic reforms and hence emphasized a lot on the
need for expansionism → Put pressure on the international system and stoked
tensions
● Offensive military doctrines were popular à made Germany look good ; German
military especially biased against offensive​ ​→​ ​Leading up to 1914, all of the
great powers had offensive war plans and no defensive war plans e.g. Schlieffen
Plan.
● The problem with this is that this does not really explain the real reasons for
war as it only explained the reasons why they became enemies

3. First image: Role of the individuals

- Russia:
● Served by incompetent foreign and defense ministers, hence the leadership of
Russia was very inadequate → Russia did not think/consider consequences of
war before barging into it
- Germany:
● Kaiser Wilhelm II did not control policy and also was a weak man who cared
too much about increasing Germany’s hard power than caring about keeping
the balance of power in Europe
- Crazy ideas that the leaders had:
● ​The idea that states would die if they did not grow territorially → Hence war
was seen as the best solution to survival

4. Deep causes, intermediate causes, precipitating causes

- Deep causes: Changes in the balance of power and certain aspects of domestic political
systems
● Such as rise of German strength, creation of the two alliances, rise of
nationalism, German domestic politics
- Intermediate causes: Germany’s foreign policy, rise in complacency about peace and
 personal idiosyncrasies of the leaders
- Precipitating causes: Assassination of Franz Ferdinand → Caused tensions to rise to
such a point that war was now inevitable

5. The three different wars that could have occurred

- A simple local war
- A one-front war that could be limited to just the Eastern front between Russia and
Germany
- A two-front war without Britain and between Germany and Austria & France and
Russia → And the possibility that Germany could have won without the intervention of
Britain

World War 2

Author: Reading: Summary:

Joseph S. Nye, Understanding Global 1. The Idea of Collective Security:

Jr. and David Conflict and Cooperation:
A. Welch An Introduction to Theory
and History, Pg. 116-142
- Making aggression illegal and outlawing offensive war
- Deter aggressions by forming a coalition of non-aggressive states
- All states should mutually agree to punish the one aggressor if one state committed
aggression
- Creation of the League of nations failed badly with the Manchurian Incident and the
Ethiopian Debacle:
● Manchurian incident: Showed that the states in League of Nations not willing
to go against a nation in which they were dependent upon → Proved that the
procedures of the LON were too slow and ineffective → they lost credibility as a
result
● Ethiopian debacle: In 1935, when Italy invaded Ethiopia, member states only
applied some specific sanctions against Italy that did not really affect them,
 but still allowed them to steel, coal, oil; diplomatic relations were not broken;
and Britain also did not close the Suez Canal to them → Showed how the
European balance of power was seen to be more important to the great powers
rather than the collective-security doctrine in Africa

2. First Image: Individual causes of war

- Hitler’s skill, audacity and bellicose nature made him unafraid to take risks for war +
he often overruled his conservative general's’ recommendations but was only set on
war
3. Second image: Domestic causes of war
- The harsh Versailles treaty stirred up intense nationalism in the people and coupled
with Britain’s and USA’s absence from the European BOP until very much later meant
that Germany was undeterred to pursue the expansionist ambitions
- Class differences/clashes:
● ​US and Britain emboldened Hitler à Because domestic societies of both of
them Coalitions did not allow them to ally with Communist Russia due to class
conflict à which caused Germany to seize the opportunity to do so
- Effects of the Great Depression:
● Great Depression caused the other countries to focus more on their internal
affairs rather than on external problems like maintaining the BOP and
containing the rising power of Germany
● Worsened the internal problems in Germany and caused huge discontentment
in Germany due to the huge unemployment problem → Allowed for a Nazi
takeover to occur
- US Policy of Isolationism
● Roosevelt not able to overcome domestic policies of isolationism which
prevented him from allying with others to contain the rising power of Germany

4. Third Image: Structural Causes

- ​Buck-passing: No country wanted to be the one responsible for wanting to deal with
Germany à USA and GB being offshore balancers and were not as committed as they
should have been
 - A power vacuum in EE as well with the downfall of Poland à It moved to an
offense-dominant world due to the success of German’s offensive operations in France
and due to the use of air-power
- ​Appeasement was seen to be the best form of defense then to keep any offensive
powers in check when in actuality it was not enough

5. Three levels of analysis applied to the Pacific war:

- Role of the individual: Expansionist generals and admirals who wanted to increase
Japan’s regional dominance and actively sought an expanded war
- Domestic causes: Increase in militarism of Japan’s government that allowed it to have
much more expansionist ambitions while USA became even more isolated in the
1930s-40s and did not balance against them; domestic chaos in Nationalistic China
making it vulnerable to Japanese invasion
- Systemic level: Treaty of Versailles had left Japan’s ambitions in China unsatisfied and
the economic problems Japan faced in 1930s brought about difficulties for Japan to
gather the raw materials it needed by trade alone → they had to resort to war.

The Cold War

Author Reading Summary

Joseph S. Nye, Understanding Global 1. Difference between deterrence and containment:

Jr. and David Conflict and Cooperation:
A. Welch An Introduction to Theory
and History, Pg. 146-167
- Deterrence:
● Depended on maintenance of large nuclear arsenals and extension of BOP
logic
● The superpowers had tried to maintain peace more by dissuading an attack by
threatening to retaliate powerfully if the other side ever attacked them →
Often aggravated tensions on both sides
- Containment:
● Was a strategy that was being practiced by the US → A specific policy of USSR
 with US allies and US bases and of promoting a liberal political and economic
world order outside the sphere of influence held by the USSR
● Used a combination of soft power and hard power resources
2. Traditionalist, revisionist, post-revisionist explanations of the Cold War
- Traditionalists blamed everything on the USSR e.g. their expansionist policies,
Stalin’s dream of wanting to take over the world. Hence it was seen that US had no
choice but to implement policies to prevent their takeover of their world.
- Revisionist: Believed that the CW was caused more by American than Soviet
expansionism
- Post-revisionists: Argue that not one specific side was to blame for the Cold War →
Rather it was inevitable because of the bipolar structure of the Cold War Balance of
powers → Both of them drawn into power Vacuum in Europe and hence inevitable
that they would face off with each other

3. Levels of analysis for the causes of the cold War

- Individual (First image): Stalin and Truman had very opposite personalities and
hence the reflection of their personalities saw events as unnecessarily bigger than
what they actually were which actually escalated the CW for quite a bit BUT there are
limitations: The Cold War lasted longer than these two men; hence it should not be
only blamed on their personalities
- Domestic level (Second image): Two very different types of states existed hence the
way they run their countries was very different and they could not see eye to eye on
issues à Communist VS Capitalist BUT there are limitations: non-democracies and
non-communist states have been supported since the CW and cooperation could still
exist
- Systematic (Third Image): Bipolarity created a rivalry that would soon be the basis of
the Cold War because there was only two sides against each other BUT there are
limitations as this does not explain the variation of hostility between two sides
John Lewis The Long Peace: Elements of
Gaddis Stability in the Postwar
International System
Main points:
1. Alliances are the product of insecurity and therefore the US and USSR would
continue maintaining alliances with other countries in the world.
2. Classical liberalism asserts how economic interdependence would have made the
Cold war less likely between the 2 superpowers because nations who have come to
rely on one another for vital commodities cannot afford it → US and USSR are not
economically dependent upon one another in any critical way
3. A hot war is also seen to be unlikely even on the side of the USSR → The domestic
structures of the Soviet state, no matter how geared they have been to picture the rest
of the world in the worst possible light, have not been seen as likely to produce a war
4. The development of nuclear weapons has had a stabilizing effect on the postwar
international system by controlling the level of escalation on both sides that can lead
to war.
5. Working within the world order and preserving world peace is seen to be more
important for both US and USSR rather than ideological differences between them.
6. Both sides sometimes do not approve of each other’s actions or ideologies, but at the
same time, they will never seriously attempt to undo their opponents’ control in the
parts of the world but will choose to tolerate it for the fear of war/confrontation.
7. The two sides will never try to undermine the other side by destroying the leadership
of the other side, but, has curiously enough, even expressed a sense of frustration,
even regret whenever they see the difficulties their rival was undergoing.

Post-Cold War World

Author Reading Summary

Barry R. Posen Competing Visions for U.S. 1. Neo-isolationism

and Andrew L. Grand Strategy - It is a constricted view of U.S. national interests that renders internationalism not
Ross only unnecessary but counterproductive.
 - They argue that it is unnecessary for US to intervene in world affairs to continue
establishing their status as a world power because USA’s possession of nuclear
weapons make it very hard for any power to win a traditional military victory over the
US + the other great powers will continue to balance against each other to prevent a
hegemon to rise up hence there is no need to worry
- They also argue how the US is not responsible for, and cannot afford the costs of,
maintaining world order. Not only so, if the US stopped meddling in the affairs of the
Middle East, the terrorists would not find any ore reason to target the US and its
citizens, hence making US safer as well.
- Critique on this foreign policy:
● That without a proper US presence in international affairs, aspiring regional
hegemons would use the chance to dominate the world affairs and states
without the assurance of US security would have to look for their own military
power and lead to local arms competitions → Disorder in world order

2. Selective engagement
- Selective engagement endeavors to ensure peace among powers that have substantial
industrial and military potential-the great powers.
- Selective engagement argues that the US should only engage itself in issues abroad
where the consequences are the most serious in affecting world peace.
- Selective engagement advocates are worried about nuclear proliferation in some
countries, like Pakistan especially and hence view the Nuclear Non- proliferation
Treaty (NPT)as an instrument to permit countries who have neither the wealth to
support nuclear forces, nor the political insecurity or ambition to need or want them,
to find a​ ​refuge from a race that they would rather not run. They also want to
convince countries like India, Israel, Pakistan and Ukraine to surrender their nuclear
capabilities and join the NPT.
- Selective engagement also expects the US to ignore much of the trouble that is likely
to occur in the world even though American prestige might suffer.

3. Cooperative security
- Advocates of this policy prefer to act collectively through international institutions as
 much as possible and presume that democracies will find it easier to work together in
cooperative security regimes than would states with less progressive domestic
polities.
- The cooperative security enterprise represents an effort to overcome the
shortcomings of traditional collective security.2’For both, aggression anywhere, and
by anyone, cannot be allowed to stand.
- Hence they feel that offensive military capabilities should only be held by a few
countries in the world, while peace-loving states would adopt defensive military
postures and an international military division of labor. The few ”rogue states” left
after all this arms control and institution-building can either be intimidated by the
threat of high technology warfare or decisively defeated in short order.
- They also see the need for a standing international organization to exist with
substantial domestic and international legitimacy to coordinate actions between
states and create peace.
- Critique against this:
● The need to build general multilateral credibility to deter a series of new and
different potential aggressors is very difficult.
● Democracies are problematic partners in a cooperative security protect in a
crucial respect because the publics must first be persuaded to go to war →
takes up a lot of time.
● Cooperative security places a heavy burden on arms control and will cause
them to have to respond to acts of aggression much more than they would
predict and want.
4. Primacy
- Advocates of primary feel that the US should strive to be the most powerful in the
international system.
- Therefore, both world order and national security require that the United States
maintain the primacy with which it emerged from the Cold War. The collapse of
bipolarity cannot be permitted to allow the emergence of multipolarity; Unipolarity is
seen to be the best.
- This requires huge increase in the level of defense spending.
- Critique:
 ● Some states will definitely try to balance against the US because they would
not to permanently remain in a position of military inferiority.

● American insistence on hegemonic leadership can engender resistance that

may undermine the long-term effectiveness of any alliances that the United
States may wish to exploit should challengers actually emerge.

● Pursuit of primacy will always lead to the constant risk of the overstretch of
the American economy.

John J. Imperial by Design Main points:

Mearsheimer - It is argued that the root cause of USA’s troubles today is due to the Clinton
administration pursuing global dominance and global hegemony immediately after
the Cold War, and how US feels that it has the rights to interfere with the internal
affairs of other countries.
- America has greatly exaggerated the terrorist threat’s severity and failed to
understand why Al-Qaeda is so enraged at the US → Leading them to formulate
policies that make the situation even worse.
- Policies that have generated most anti-Americanism in the Middle East =
Washington’s support for Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians; the presence of
American troops in Saudi Arabia after the 1991 Gulf War; U.S. support for repressive
regimes in countries like Egypt; American sanctions on Baghdad after the First Gulf
War, which are estimated to have caused the deaths of about five hundred thousand
Iraqi civilians; and the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq.
- The reason why US has succeeded in exporting democracy to some states is because
these states already possess some qualities already that made it more suitable to
democracy: (1) High levels of ethnic and religious homogeneity (2) Reasonably high
levels of prosperity (3)Some experience with democracy → Countries without these
qualities would find it hard to establish proper democracy
 - Hence offshore balancing is recommended where US should only maintain a lower
profile and only rely on diplomacy and economic statecraft, not military force, to
protect its interests in areas of little strategic importance.
- Offshore balancing seen to be the best strategy in dealing with al-Qaeda, nuclear
proliferators like North Korea and the potential threat from China.

The World Shape of violence today Main points:

Bank - Instead of world wars occurring and disrupting peace, organized violence is now on
the rise and is a problem that many countries face.
- Definition: The organized violence that disrupts governance and compromises
development also includes local violence involving militias or between ethnic groups,
gang violence, local resource-related violence and violence linked to trafficking
(particularly drug trafficking), and violence associated with global ideological
struggles. This violence is often recurrent, with many countries now experiencing
repeated cycles of civil conflict and criminal violence.
- Example: ‘Several Central American countries that ended civil wars are now
experiencing more violent deaths from criminal activity than during their civil wars.
Since 1999, homicide rates have increased in El Salvador (+101 percent), Guatemala
(+91 percent), and Honduras (+63 percent) as criminal networks linked to drug
trafficking have become more active. All these countries suffered civil wars or
political instability in the 1980s and 1990s. While El Salvador and Guatemala signed
peace accords in the 1990s that avoided a return to civil war, both now face levels of
violent organized crime equally disruptive to development.’
CONSTRUCTIVISM

Author Reading Summary

Alexander Anarchy Is What ·​ ​Distribution of power depends on intersubjective understanding expectation of self and others
Wendt States Make of It ·​ ​Actors acquire identity by participating in collective meanings – identities are relational

·​ ​Identities are the basis of interests

·​ ​An institution is a relatively stable set of identities and interests – ‘coercive social facts’

·​ ​Institutionalization is a process of internalizing new identities and interests

·​ ​Identities and collective cognitions are ‘mutually constitutive’

·​ ​Process of identity formation under anarchy is primarily concerned with security

o​ ​Competitive security system, negative identification – realist power politics,

relative gains
o​ ​Individualistic security system, indifferent identification – neoliberal power
politics, absolute gains, collective action
o​ ​Cooperative security system, positive identification – constructivist power
politics, individual security is everyone’s concern, power politics in terms of
shared norms
·​ ​Intersubjectively constituted structure of identities and interests in the system (Waltz)
·​ ​Actions depends on the probabilities we assign, social threats are constructed
 ·​ T​ he first social act creates expectations, mechanism of reinforcement eventually creates stable

concepts of self and others – intersubjective meaning is created

·​ ​Identities and interests are relation specific
·​ ​Intersubjective knowledge that constitutes competitive identities and interests is constructed
everyday by processes of ‘social will formation

Ted Hopf The Promise of ​Actors and structures are mutually constituted (equivalent)
Constructivism in ·​ ​Structure is a set of relatively unchangeable constraints on the behavior of states
International ·​ ​Meaningful behavior/action is only possible within an intersubjective social context
Relations Theory ·​ ​Actors develop their relations with, and understandings of, others through norms and
practices

​Anarchy as an imagined community

·​ ​Anarchy has multiple meanings for different actors based on their own communities of
intersubjective understandings and practices
·​ ​Continuum of anarchies possible

​Identities and interests in world politics

·​ ​Interests as a central variable
·​ ​Identities are necessary in order to ensure a minimal level of order and predictability
·​ ​Durable expectations between states require intersubjective identities that are sufficiently
stable to ensure predictable patterns of behavior
·​ ​Identity of a state implies its preferences and consequent actions
·​ ​States understand others according to the identity it attributes to them
·​ ​Identities of states are a variable – depend on historical, cultural, political and social
context
 ·​ ​Interests imply choices
·​ ​Missing interests are produced absences that are the understandable product of social
practices and structure
·​ ​States have more agency (not unconstrained)
o​ ​Choices are rigorously constrained by webs of understanding of practices,
identities, and interests of others actors

​The power of practice

·​ ​Both material and discursive power necessary for understanding world affairs
o​ ​Power of knowledge, ideas, culture, ideology, and language (discourse)
·​ ​Power of social practices lies in their capacity to reproduce intersubjective meanings that
constitute social structures and actors
·​ ​Social practices greatly reduce uncertainty among actors within a socially constructed
community
·​ ​Social practices have the power to reproduce entire communities
·​ ​State actions in foreign policy are constrained and empowered by prevailing social practices
at home and abroad

​Change in world politics

·​ ​Politics of identity as a continual contest for control over the power necessary to produce
meaning in a social group
·​ ​Social change is both possible and difficult

Conventional constructivists
​Discover identities and associated reproductive social practices, offer an account of how identities

imply certain actions

 ​Cognitive account for identity

Critical theorists
​Surface identities to elaborate on how people come to believe in a single version of naturalized

truth
​Claims an interest in change, capacity to foster change

​Form of alienation that drives need for identity

​Rooted in assumptions of power

o​ ​Power exercised in every social exchange, dominant actor present

​All social relations are hierarchical (similar to realists)

Alternative constructivist responses

​Balance of threat

·​ ​Threat perception
·​ ​Distribution of power unable to account for alliances formed after WW2
·​ ​State identities of US, Soviet Union, Western Europe rooted in domestic socio-cultural
milieus produced understandings of one another based on differences in identity and
practices
o​ ​US established an anti-communist identity when they balanced Russia

​Security dilemma
·​ ​By providing meaning, identities reduce uncertainty
·​ ​States understand each other differently
·​ ​Uncertainty as a variable rather than a constant

​Neoliberal cooperation
·​ ​Shared assumption that cooperation is possible under anarchy
 ·​ D​ istribution of identities and interest of relevant states account for whether cooperation is

possible
·​ ​Institutions persist even if underlying power and interests have shifted

​The democratic peace

·​ ​Democracies do not fight each other because of their intersubjective accounts of each
other and socio-interactional practices that accompany those accounts

Constructivist Puzzles/promises
​Rejects mainstream presumption that world politics is homogenous and universally valid

generalizations can come out of theorizing it

​Nationalism, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, religion and race as varieties of identity which is central

to how understanding of social phenomena is generated

​Identities have more meaning than a mere label

o​ ​Offer states mutual understanding of motives, interests, probable actions, attitudes

and role in political contexts
o​ ​E.g. Failure of deterrence against Iraq in Kuwait (1990)
§​ ​Saudi Arabia seen as ‘Arab’ rather than ‘sovereign’
§​ ​Implied that Riyadh would never allow US forces to deploy on Arab territory
§​ ​Understanding of SA as ‘sovereign’ would have anticipated SA balancing against
Iraqi actions in Kuwait and US military intervention – lead to deterrence
​Expectation of multiple identities for actors rests on an openness to local historical context

​Hypothesizing differences among states allows for more movement beyond binary

characterisations
​Return culture and domestic politics to international relations theory

o​ ​Identity politics at home constrain and enable state identity and interests
o​ ​E.g. Accounts of colonialism and imperialism must move beyond material power
§​ ​British colonization – masculine, dominant
§​ ​Indian culture – feminine, subordinate
 §​ ​Cannot be understood without investing in social practices that accompanies it
o​ ​State’s assumed need to construct national identity at home to legitimize the state’s
identity abroad

Constructivist problems
​Constructivism viewed as an approach not a theory

​Theoretical under-specification

o​ ​Does not specify the existence/nature of identities, norms, practices and social
structures
o​ ​Merely specifies how these aspects are theoretically located vis a vis each other