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Question: Francis Fukuyama cited the case of China in supporting his ‘end of history’ thesis
in 1989. Do the political and economic developments in the country over the last 2 decades or
so still support his theory? Why or why not.
Francis Fukuyama, in his ‘end of history’ thesis, stated how politically, Marxism had already
‘become virtually irrelevant as guides to policy’1, and that in the future, it was likely to
become obsolete. In addition to this, he stated how China was only paying lip service to
communism and hence it was only a matter of time before it changes to democracy, while
harsh crackdowns by the government were just processes it had to undergo in order to transit
to democracy. On the other hand, on the economic side, he stated how liberal democracy
needed to be adopted by a country before it could bring about wealth and progress. Lastly, he
1
Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. (New York: Free Press,
1992), p. 118
had predicted how China would end up transiting to democracy in the end as there would be
an increasing pressure and desire from the people for a truly democratic system. With regards
to what Fukuyama stated about China in his thesis, this essay would hence require a
comparison of the political and economic developments in China over the last two decades
with Fukuyama’s statements to evaluate if China’s developments had supported his theory.
However, this essay seeks to argue that the political and economic developments in China
have not supported his theory. This is because over the past two decades, the Chinese
Communist Party has strengthened their rule even more through authoritarian measures, and
shows that it has no intention of adopting the Western style of democracy. In addition to this,
China has managed to achieve stunning economic growth through their adoption of a
capitalistic economy, even without any sort of political liberalization. Though many may
argue how economic liberalization have contributed to rising protests, it is proven that only a
minority desires political liberalization, while the majority of protestors care only for
solutions to their economic problems. Hence, this shows how Fukuyama’s argument does not
hold true for the developments in China at all, as it is clearly seen how China’s ruling under
Political developments in China over the past two decades does not support Fukuyama’s
theory as it is seen how China still has no intention to adopt the western democratic system of
governance. Instead, China has only been growing stronger in trying to consolidate her one-
party authoritarian rule under the name of communism through various measures. Firstly, it
can be seen that for the past two decades, communism as a goal and as a way of governance
has never changed but is still enduring. 2 The Chinese Communist Party continue its
authoritarian one-party rule through not allowing any form of election or expression of public
opinion about its rule. From the late 2000s, the party published a list of political changes they
did not want, which included ‘no bicameral parliamentary systems…no constitutionalism,
and, most potent of all, no multi party systems.’3 Through this, the party makes it very clear
that no political space would be given for any democratic measures. Rather, it establishes
itself as the ultimate power that can make decisions concerning the country. This is because
the party leaders are worried that the introduction of any measure of political democracy can
cost them their monopoly on power.4 In addition to this, tight measures are used by the
Chinese Communist Party to repress any form of what it deems as a threat to its rule. Hence,
contrary to what Fukuyama stated in his argument, political crackdowns are not a procedure
China undertakes in its transition to democracy. Rather, they are used to consolidate China’s
authoritarian rule under a communist system. This is seen in the recent crackdowns on
political activism. After 2005, the increasing number of political crackdowns implemented
resulted in the intimidation and persecution of political activists and even civil rights
defenders5, such as Ai Wei Wei and Lu Xia Bo6, who were accused of committing political
crimes, which included charges of undermining or challenging the political authority of the
party and calling for secession and democracy. By 2006, there were 604 arrests made, which
2
Chün, Chao Kuo. "Leadership in the Chinese Communist Party." The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, Vol. 321, Contemporary China and the Chinese 321.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1030978, p. 2
3
Kerry Brown, A response to Francis Fukuyama’s ‘reflections on Chinese governance’, Journal of Chinese
Governance, (August 2016), p.393
4
Zheng, Yongnian. "Political Incrementalism: Political Lessons from China's 20 Years of Reform." Third
World Quarterly 20, no. 6 (1999): 1157-177. doi:10.1080/01436599913343,
pg 1160
5
Chen, Titus C. "China’s Reaction to the Coloured Revolutions: Adaptive Authoritarianism in Full Swing."
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2010. Accessed October 8, 2016. doi:10.2139/ssrn.1487597, p. 44
6
"China's Rights Defenders." Human Rights Watch. 2012. Accessed November 03, 2016.
https://www.hrw.org/chinas-rights-defenders.
was double the number in 2005.7 These statistics show how China does not tolerate any
person or movement that is seeking for political reform8 and does not hesitate to use harsh
measures eliminate anyone who might be successful in challenging its power. Furthermore,
the party seeks to consolidate its political rule and support through increasing their
intervention in the media. Between 2005 to 2006, book publishers, broadcasting channels, and
the newspapers were ordered to reject any ‘political viewpoints that were harmful to the
socialist political system’, and to only support the party. 9To make sure this was adhered to,
the party persecuted those who were uncooperative, and this led to the sacking of two editors
of the popular newspaper XinJingBao, for publishing essays critical of the government. 10
Therefore, all these examples show how Fukuyama’s statements about China does not hold.
He had stated how communism as a political ideology was destined to wane and that it would
only be a matter of time before China would adopt the liberal democratic system. However,
developments in China have proven him completely wrong. China’s refusal to adopt any
political liberalization measures and the increasing elimination of any threats to its rule, along
with measures to consolidate its rule through the media, affirm how China would not be
transiting to democracy any time soon but would continue to be governed under communism.
Economic developments in China over the last two decades have also disproved Fukuyama’s
argument about China. This is because Fukuyama stated how a country first needed to adopt
7
Chen, Titus C. "China’s Reaction to the Coloured Revolutions: Adaptive Authoritarianism in Full Swing."
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2010. Accessed October 8, 2016. doi:10.2139/ssrn.1487597, p. 44
8
Zheng, Yongnian. "Political Incrementalism: Political Lessons from China's 20 Years of Reform." Third
World Quarterly 20, no. 6 (1999): 1157-177. doi:10.1080/01436599913343,
p. 1174
9
Chen, Titus C. "China’s Reaction to the Coloured Revolutions: Adaptive Authoritarianism in Full Swing."
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2010. Accessed October 8, 2016. doi:10.2139/ssrn.1487597, p. 40
10
Chen, Titus C. "China’s Reaction to the Coloured Revolutions: Adaptive Authoritarianism in Full Swing."
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2010. Accessed October 8, 2016. doi:10.2139/ssrn.1487597, p. 44
liberal democracy before wealth and progress could be brought about. However, China’s
economic system while having a communist authoritarian state at the same time, show how it
is possible to deliver wealth and progress in the economic realm without delivering progress
in the political realm. 12The adoption of economic liberalization is seen in the openness of the
China economy, where foreign investment is increasingly welcomed to develop its economy.
By the 2000s, foreign capital had control over 21 leading industrial companies in China. 13
Due to the investment of foreign capital, China has transformed into an export-oriented
country, and is now of the biggest exporter of computers and other technological goods. 14
This has led to China becoming the world’s second largest economy, with their growth in
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) being close to 10 percent for the past two decades. 15 China
has also adopted the price mechanism for their economy, hence State-Owned Enterprises in
China now ‘respond to market incentives and are profit-driven’, compared to the early 1990s
when they were still not liberalized. 16 However, as stated above, though the economy is
increasingly liberalized, the reason why the Chinese communist party is still able to sustain its
authoritarian rule under the name of communism is because the capitalism that the party
implements is very state-managed. Hence, the Chinese Communist Party, being the biggest
11
Kerry Brown, A response to Francis Fukuyama’s ‘reflections on Chinese governance’, Journal of Chinese
Governance, (August 2016), p. 403
12
Kerry Brown, A response to Francis Fukuyama’s ‘reflections on Chinese governance’, Journal of Chinese
Governance, (August 2016), p. 401
13
Lotta, Raymond. "Shifts And Faultlines In The World Economy And Great Power Rivalry: What Is
Happening And What It Might Mean." Countercurrents. August 5, 2008.
http://www.countercurrents.org/lotta050808.htm.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
Appel, Tiago Nasser. "Just How Capitalist Is China? - Scielo.br." SciELO Brazil. December 2014. Accessed
November 3, 2016. http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31572014000400009.
player in the market, continue to monopolistically control resources in the market.17 The party
continues to bring encourage growth in the economy through providing some public goods
such as education and investing in infrastructure, but not allowing the ‘provision of key public
goods’18, such as press freedom and political rights ‘that would allow potential challengers to
coordinate and mobilize.’19 Therefore, this explains the regime’s durability despite pressure
for political reform. By controlling the resources and benefits that capitalism brings to
society, the party effectively stymies any opportunity for political liberalization while
allowing for economic liberalization to happen under its watch. Another example to show
how capitalism in China is very state-managed was the establishment of the SASAC (State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission) in 2003. The SASAC was
established to ‘exercise ownership of state firms in every province’. This means that the
government still effectively owned all these enterprises and could therefore control how state
resources and public goods and services were to be allocated to the society20 so as to prevent
any provision of goods that could damage the party’s political legitimacy. All these examples
hence show how though China has obtained phenomenal economic success through
capitalistic economy tightly under its control, the party retains its monopoly on power,
without freedom’. 21
17
Gore, Lance L.P. The Chinese Communist Party and China's Capitalist Revolution: The Political Impact of
the Market. (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011), p. 21
18
Dimitrov, Martin K. Why Communism Did Not Collapse. 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2013),p. 198
19
Ibid.
20
"Socialism Today - China's Hybrid Economy." Socialism Today - China's Hybrid Economy. October 2008.
http://www.socialismtoday.org/122/hybrid.html, cited in Barry Naughton, “Growing out of the Plan: Chinese
Economic Reform, 1978-1993.”, Vol. 55, no. 1 (1996), p. 318
21
Stanley, Timothy, and Alexander Lee. "It's Still Not the End of History." Editorial. The Atlantic's Politics &
Policy Daily, September 1, 2014. September 1, 2014. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/09/its-
still-not-the-end-of-history-francis-fukuyama/379394/, p. 3
In spite of the arguments made above, many may argue that some political developments
that have happened in China over the last two decades show how Fukuyama’s arguments are
not entirely wrong. This is because the increase in protests may signal how China’s citizens
want democracy. However, evidence has been found to prove that Fukuyama’s argument
wrong, as there is actually no increasing democratizing trend in China. This is because the
idea of democracy; the idea of civil rights and liberty, is not being desired by the majority of
the population. Firstly, there has been very few signs of China’s citizens demanding for
democratization,22 as the ideology of democracy has yet to ‘acquire moral value in the
Chinese political culture’23. Hence, this means that democracy has not won over the hearts of
the people and is still not significant enough to them. Though there has been an increase in
protests after China took on a more capitalistic economic system, most of them were only
about ‘bread-and-butter issues’ and had little association with calls for democracy. This lack
of enthusiasm for democracy can be attributed to the responsiveness of the CCP towards
popular opinions and various demands by the society, hence quelling any calls for
democratization. 24 In addition to this, it has been observed that the Chinese are becoming
more practical. Compared to the 1990s, there has been very little pressure for the CCP to
undergo any sort of political reform. 25Hence, instead of being concerned with attaining
democracy for their country, they are more interested in capitalizing on the wealth of
opportunities brought about by China’s economic liberalization and preserving peace and
harmony in their country. 56% of Beijing residents in a survey conducted stated how they felt
that national peace and prosperity was most important for the country, compared to political
22
Stanley, Timothy, and Alexander Lee. "It's Still Not the End of History." Editorial. The Atlantic's Politics &
Policy Daily, September 1, 2014. September 1, 2014. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/09/its-
still-not-the-end-of-history-francis-fukuyama/379394/, p.138-139
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid
25
Zhao, Suisheng. China and Democracy: The Prospect for a Democratic China. (New York: Routledge,
2000), p. 12
democracy which was only desired by 5.8% of the citizens. 26 Furthermore, results from a
survey conducted on university students that asked them which was the most important issue
that needed to be addressed politically, showed that having a clean government was the most
important to them, while to have democratic ideals such as civil liberty and rights were the
least important, as it garnered only 6% of the votes. 27These results therefore reflect how
political liberalization are no longer desired in majority of the citizens, rather, with economic
liberalization, many citizens, especially students, prioritize commercial activities28 rather than
achieving political goals of democracy and freedom. Hence, they have made calls for
towards political liberation by the people, any sort of political reform leading to a transition
In conclusion, it can be seen that the political and economic developments that have shaped
China over the past two decades have not supported Fukuyama’s predictions made about her
in his ‘end of history’ thesis. Instead of what he predicted of communism waning as a political
system and China having to transit towards democracy, the Chinese Communist Party has
very strongly consolidated her authoritarian rule under the name of communism by
suppressing all calls and attempts that may threaten their hold on power. In addition to this,
they are seen to be only paying lip service to democracy, while firmly believing that the
western democratic system would never be suitable for China. Economic developments have
also shown the unique hybrid system China has developed for herself, by proving how a
capitalistic economy can be possible even without any sort of political liberalization.
26
Zhao, Suisheng. China and Democracy: The Prospect for a Democratic China. (New York: Routledge,
2000), p. 194
27
Zhao, Suisheng. China and Democracy: The Prospect for a Democratic China. (New York: Routledge,
2000), p. 217
28
Zhao, Suisheng. China and Democracy: The Prospect for a Democratic China. (New York: Routledge,
2000), p. 223
29
Ibid.
Furthermore, China is seen being even further from achieving democracy due to the people
increasingly changing their focus from wanting to achieve political liberalization to desiring
to achieve their own personal goals instead. Therefore, China’s unique case brings about some
hope that the ‘end of history’ has not yet come, as western liberal democracy is still not the
type of ideology some countries, especially China, see as the best for themselves.
Bibliography
Appel, Tiago Nasser. "Just How Capitalist Is China? - Scielo.br." SciELO Brazil.
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Barry Naughton, “Growing out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-1993.”.
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