.

Se;

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

s;anbiganbapan
QUEZON CITY

THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE SB-II-CRM-0088

PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff, For: Violation of Section 3 (e)
of R.A. No. 3019
- versus-

JOEL TOLENTINO REYES,

ET AL., Present:
CABOTAJE-TANG, P.J.,
Accused. Chairperson,
FERNANDEZ, B. J. and
MORENO, R. J.

Promulgated on:

~O({c&vt ;)1, ~Olq

1[-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1[

RESOLUTION

CABOTAJE-TANG, P.J.:

For resolution is accused Joel Tolentino Reyes' Motion for

Reconsideration dated September 2,2019.1

In his motion, accused-movant Reyes prays for the

reconsideration of this Court's Resolution promulgated on August
22, -2019,2 denying his Motion to Release Accused After Service of
Minimum Penalty dated July 22, 2019.3 He argues that Section 5 of
A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC does not distinguish between an accused who
is detained pending trial and an accused who is detained after

pp. 665-679, Vol. I, Record ~

M;
2
pp. 650-656, Vol. Ill, Record
pp. 576-612, Vol. Ill, Record
RESOLUTION - 2 -
People vs. Joel Tolentino Reyes et al.,
SB-II-CRM -0088
x----------------------------------------------------x

conviction;+the applicability of this provision to those accused who

are detained after conviction is unequivocal, which is allegedly
evident from the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Heman v.
Sandiqanbauanp both Section 16 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
and Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 10389 mandate the release of
an accused who has been in custody for a period equal to the
minimum of the penalty for the offense charged." that these
provisions do not exclude an accused undergoing preventive
detention pending appeal;" the Court's exercise of discretion in
revoking the accused-movant's bail pending appeal in its Resolution
promulgated on January 17, 2018 is immaterial to his present
prayer for immediate release under Section 5 of A.M. No. 12-11-2-
SC;8the release of an accused under Section 5 of A.M. No. 12-11-2-
SC is mandatory and determined. only by a singular circumstance,
i.e., the accused's detention for a period at least equal to the
minimum of the penalty for the offense charged;" the release of an
accused from detention, regardless of whether before or after
conviction, is mandated once the period of accused's detention is
equal to the minimum of the penalty for the offense charged.w the
release of an accused who has served the minimum penalty does
not involve the exercise of discretion; 11 the application of Section 5
of A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC is not a matter raised in the accused-
movant's petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court; 12
and, the ascertainment of an accused's length of time actually
served is a matter within the competence of the Sandiganbayari.P

The prosecution filed its Opposition dated September 9,2019.14

It avers that the accused-movant's reliance on Section 5 of A.M. No.
12-11-2-SC is self-serving and misplaced as he interpreted the
same in "isolation and separate from the whole text and framework"
of A.M. Mo. 12-11-2-SC which deals with the rights of the accused
to bail and to speedy trial and not to those already serving

~
4
p. 2, Motion for Reconsideration; p. 666, Vol. Ill, Record
p. 3, id; p. 667, id
6

8
p. 5, id; p. 669, id
id
/1)
p. 6, id; p. 670, id
9
id
10
p. 6, id; p. 670, id
ir
p. 7, id; p. 671, id
12
p. 8, id; p. 672, id
13
id
14
pp. 684 - 690, Vol. III, Record
RESOLUTION - 3 -
People vs. Joel Tolentino Reyes et al.,
S8-11-CRM -0088
x----------------------------------------------------x

sentence.ts an examination of Section 16 of Rule 114 and Section 5

(b) of R.A. No. 10389 reveals that they deal with persons who have
not yet been convicted;16 the accused-movant deliberately
overlooked the wordings of Section 5 of R.A. No. 10389 which
pertain to release on recognizance before conviction; 17the case of
In Re: Correction/ Adjustment of Penalty Pursuant to Republic Act
10951, in Relation to Heman v. Sandiganbayan - Rolando
Elbanbuena y Marfil, Petitioner, is inapplicable as the crimes
charged in those cases were among those whose penalties were
amended by R.A. No. 10951; Reyes on the other hand, was
convicted of Violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, which is not
included in R.A. No. 10591;18 in view of the afore-mentioned
differences of the Elbanbuena and Heman cases, the
pronouncements of the Supreme Court made therein are
inapplicable to the present case;'? the Resolution promulgated on
August 22, 2019 by the Court already ruled on its lack of authority
in acting on Reyes' motion, and, in fact led Reyes to the proper body
tasked to determine and evaluate his GCTAand TASTM.2o

THE COURT'S RULING

After an assiduous consideration of the arguments raised in

the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused, together with
the opposition thereto of the prosecution, the Court finds the
subject motion for reconsideration devoid of merit.

The accused-movant's insistence on his entitlement to release

based on the provisions of Section 5 of A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC and
the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Heman is utterly
misplaced. It must be stressed that the "release after service of
minimum imposable penaltu" provided in Section 5 of the said
issuance is still in the nature of a grant of bail and NOT a separate
mode of liberty to a detention prisoner or convicted prisoner on the
ground of service of the minimum penalty imposable.
/?
15
p. 2, Opposition; p. 687, Vol. Ill, Record
;ii
16
id
17
id
18
pp. 2-3, Opposition; pp. 687-688, Vol. Ill, Record
19
p. 3, Opposition; p. 688, Vol. Ill, Record
20
id
RESOLUTION -4 -
People vs. Joel Tolentino Reyes et al.,
SB-II-CRM-0088
}{----------------------------------------------------}{

The recent case of People v. Cantlfo-Prospero'" is instructive.

In Prospero, several accused were convicted of the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public
Documents by the First Division of this Court in a Decision
promulgated on January 30, 2014. They were sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. While in detention, they filed a
motion for reconsideration of their conviction and to allow them to
post bail pending the resolution thereof. The First Division of this
Court denied their motions in view of Section 4, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Court and the case of Leviste v. Court of
Appeals. The said accused filed a petition with the Supreme Court
which included a prayer for their re-admission to bail. The Supreme
Court denied the same in its Resolution dated July 15, 2015 and
the motion for reconsideration thereof in its Resolution dated
November 9,2015.

On August 29,2017, Republic Act (R.A.)No. 10951 was signed

into law and took effect on September 13, 2017. Pertinently, Article
217 of the RPC, which defines and punishes the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds, was amended, and the penalties
applicable to the said accused were reduced.

Following the enactment of R.A. No. 10951, one of the accused

filed a motion for his provisional release and argued that he had
already served the minimum sentence of the new penalty
imposable. The other accused filed a similar motion and argued
that the grant of bail had since become discretionary from the
previously non-bailable nature of the offense.

In resolving the said motions, the Supreme Court held:

It was in Heman v. Sandiganbayan (Hernan) that the

Court first had the occasion to apply the provisions of R.A.
No. 10951 to one already serving sentence by final judgment.
The Court therein issued the followingdirective:

On a final note, judges, public prosecutors,

public attorneys, private counsels, and such other
officers of the law are hereby advised to similarly apply
the provisions of RA No. 10951 whenever it is, by
reason of justice and equity, called for by the facts of
each case. Hence, said recent legislation shall find

21
G.R. Nos. 212399 & 212874, Resolution dated November 26,2018 ~

}1
RESOLUTION - 5 -
People vs. Joel Tolentino Reyes et al.,
SB-II-CRM -0088
x----------------------------------------------------x

application in cases where the imposable penalties of

the affected crimes such as theft, qualified theft,
estafa, robbery with force upon things, malicious
mischief, malversation, and such other crimes, the
penalty of which is dependent upon the value of the
object in consideration thereof, have been reduced, as
in the case at hand, taking into consideration the
presence of existing circumstances attending its
commission. For as long as it is favorable to the
accused, said recent legislation shall find application
regardless of whether its effectivity comes after the
time when the judgment of conviction is rendered and
even if service of sentence has already begun. The
accused, in these applicable instances, shall be
entitled to the benefits of the new law warranting him
to serve a lesser sentence, or to his release, if he has
already begun serving his previous sentence, and said
service already accomplishes the term of the modified
sentence. In the latter case, moreover, the Court, in
the interest of justice and expediency, further directs
the appropriate filing of an action before the Court that
seeks the reopening of the case rather than an original
petition filed for a similar purpose.

Indeed, when exceptional circumstances exist,

such as the passage of the instant amendatory law
imposing penalties more lenient and favorable to the
accused, the Court shall not hesitate to direct the
reopening of a final and immutable judgment, the
objective of which is to correct not so much the
findings of guilt but the applicable penalties to be
imposed.

Henceforth: (1) the Directors of the National

Penitentiary and Correctional Institution for Women
are here by ordered to determine if there are accused
serving final sentences similarly situated as the
accused in this particular case and if there are, to
coordinate and communicate with the Public
Attorney's Office and the latter, to represent and file
the necessary pleading before this Court in behalf of
these convicted accused in light of this Court's
pronouncement; (2) For those cases where the accused
are undergoing preventive imprisonment, either the
cases against them are non-bailable or cannot put up
the bail in view of the penalties imposable under the
old law, their respective counsels are hereby ordered to
file the necessary pleading before the proper courts,
whether undergoing trial in the RTC or undergoing

C/;til
RESOLUTION - 6 -
People vs. Joel Tolentino Reyes et al.,
SB-II-CRM-0088
x----------------------------------------------------x

appeal in the appellate courts and apply for bail, for

their provisional liberty; (3) For those cases where the
accused are undergoing preventive
imprisonment pending trial or appeal, their respective
counsels are here by ordered to file the necessary
pleading if the accused have already served
the minimum sentence of the crime charged against
them based on the penalties imposable under the new
law, R.A. No. 10951, for their immediate release in
accordance with A.M. No. 12-11-2-SCor
the Guidelines for Decongesting Holding Jails by
Enforcing the Rights of Accused Persons to Bail
and to Speedy Trial; and (4) Lastly, all courts,
including appellate courts, are hereby ordered to give
priority to those cases covered by R.A. No. 10951 to
avoid any prolonged imprisonment.

Here, the Subject Motions, while preceding Heman,

proceed from the same animus, that is, to accord to accused
and convicts alike the full benefit of R.A. No. 10951 as if it
were the law prevailing at the time their penalties were
meted. To this end, the Court shall now apply the provisions
of R.A. No. 10951 in determining whether petitioner Alzate
and Accused-Appellants may be allowed provisional release
on bail.

xxx xxx xxx

The provision is clear: after conviction by the trial
court of an offense not punishable by either (i) death,
(ii) reclusion perpetua, or (Hi) life imprisonment,
admission to bail is subject to the discretion of the court.
Further, in cases where the penalty imposed is imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years, as in the instant case, bail shall be
denied only upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to
the accused, that any of the foregoing circumstances is
present. The plain import of the provision is that the
prosecution carries the burden of proving through evidence
any circumstance that tends to prejudice the accused's
appearance before the court.

xxx xxx xxx

The Court notes that petitioner Alzate and Accused-

Appellants have exhibited behavior indicating respect for
criminal processes. Throughout their trial, they faithfully
parti."ipated in meeting the allegations against them ~ )1)/
RESOLUTION - 7 -
People vs. Joel Tolentino Reyes et al.,
SB-II-CRM -0088
x----------------------------------------------------x

their continuous plea for temporary liberty at the SB level.

Even more, upon their conviction by the SB, petitioner Alzate
and accused-appellant Abiso immediately requested to be
allowed to post a cash bond double the amount of their
original bail bond, if only to reduce even further their
likelihood of flight. Indeed, the Court cannot find any
indication in the records of a desire to flee as, in fact,
petitioner Alzate even filed a certificate of candidacy for the
position of Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for the
May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections. The same can be
said about Accused-Appellants who have not shown any
behavior showing intent or a propensity to flee; both accused-
appellants Abiso and Desedilla are already sixty-five (65)
years old and disease-stricken, while accused-appellant
Canillo-Prospero has maintained a good record and
reputation while remaining productive during her
incarceration.

More importantly, the Court observes that petitioner

Alzate and Accused-Appellants are now entitled to the benefit
of Act No. 4103, or the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL)- a
benefit that they had been previously deprived of -
considering that the imposable penalty is now prisiori
mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which ranges
from six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Thus,
applying Section 1 of the ISL, the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC. In this case,
the minimum term would therefore be anywhere within the
range of prisiori correccional in its medium to maximum
periods, that is, within two (2)years, four (4) months, and one
(1) day to six (6) years - assuming arguendo that their
conviction is affirmed.

In this regard, the Court observes that petitioner Alzate

and Accused-Appellants were placed in confinement
beginning January 30, 2014. Hence, to date, they have been
deprived of liberty for four (4) years and ten (10) months, or
close to five (5)years already. It would therefore appear that
petitioner Alzate and Accused-Appellants have already
served the minimum and medium of the minimum term
of the indeterminate sentence (i.e., two [2] years, four [4]
months, and one [1] day to four [4] years, eight [8] months
and twenty [20] days). Moreover, even if the Court were to
impose the maximum of the mfnfmum term (i.e., four [4]

Z7A()/
RESOLUTION -8 -
People vs. Joe1 Tolentino Reyes et al.,
SB-II-CRM-0088
x----------------------------------------------------x

years, eight [8] months and twenty-one [21] days to six [6]
years), that would mean that they are merely one (1) year
away from being eligible for parole, in accordance with
Section 1 of the ISL. This is significant because if they have
practically served the majority of the minimum term,
then it is highly unlikely that they would now attempt to
evade their sentence and thereby risk losing the benefits
of the time that they had already served in confinement.

At this juncture, the Court reiterates that the right to

bail emanates from the accused's right to be presumed
innocent. Thus, in cases of bail pending appeal, the
purpose of the same is for the accused to avoid the
potential hardships of prison, while at the same time
prevent his flight from custody and to ensure the
protection of the community from potential danger. As
discussed above, the Court sees no real risk of flight of
petitioner Alzate and Accused-Appellants. Neither does the
Court perceive a risk of repetition of the crime involved
considering that the same was allegedly committed at the
time they were still public officers.

Thus, in view of the foregoing and in light of the

beneficial application of R.A. No. 10951, the Court finds
it proper to grant petitioner Alzate and Accused-
Appellants provisional liberty pending resolution of the
instant appeal. Anent the amount of the bail bond,
considering that the original bond recommended by the
prosecution is Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,OOO.OO),
the Court
finds an amount double the same to be the just and
equitable bond under the circumstances.w

The foregoing disquisition of the Supreme Court manifestly

shows that its pronouncement in Heman as regards A.M. No. 12-
11-2-SC are all in the context of a grant of bail. Indeed, the period
of detention of the accused in Prospero was only utilized as a
factor in determining their eligibility for bail pending appeal.
Moreover, the High Court expressly recognized that the
service of the minimum term only entitles the accused to be
eligible for parole and not an immediate release as the
a used-movant so insis~

22 Emphasis 0
mber 26, 2018
RESOLUTION -9 -
People vs. Joel Tolentino Reyes et al.,
SB-II-CRM-0088
x----------------------------------------------------x

In contrast to Prospero, the present case is attended by facts

and circumstances upon which the Court based its denial of bail
pending appeal of the accused-movant, This was already
exhaustively discussed in .the Court's Resolution promulgated on
January 17,2018. More importantly, the said issue was among
those included by the accused-movant in his petition for
review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. It bears
reiterating that any issue bearing thereon must be lodged with
the High Court for its appropriate resolution.

At any rate, assuming arquendo that the accused-movant

should now be released pursuant to Section 5 of A.M. No. 12-11-2-
SC, the Court is powerless to do so given that the judgment of his
conviction is now under review by the Supreme Court.

All told, the Court sees no reason to reconsider its Resolution

promulgated on August 22, 2019 denying accused-movant's Motion
to Release Accused After Service of Minimum Penalty.

WHEREFORE, accused-movant Joel Tolentino Reyes' Motion

for Reconsideration dated September 2 2016 is DENIED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.

Quezon City, Metro Manila

WE CONCUR:

ITO R. FERNANDEZ • ~•••~~O

sociate Justice °ateJ,/