ISSUE: Whether or not Pascua is ineligible for probation in Criminal Case No.

18805 after pleading guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12,
Article II, RA 9165

RULING: It is clear from both Section 24, Article II of RA 9165 and the
provisions of the Probation Law that in applying for probation, what is essential
is not the offense charged but the offense to which the accused is ultimately
found guilty of.

in this regard, it is worth emphasizing that upon acceptance of plea bargain,

the accused is actually found guilty of the lesser offense subject of the plea.
According to jurisprudence, plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process
whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory
disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the
defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the
counts of a multi-count indictment in return of a lighter sentence than that for
the graver charge.

Thus, regardless of what the original charge was in the Information, the
judgment would be for the lesser offense to which the accused pled guilty. This
means that the penalty to be meted out, as well as all the attendant accessory
penalties, and other consequences under the law, including eligibility for
probation and parole, would be based on such lesser offense. Necessarily,
even if Pascua was originally charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA
9165 in Criminal Case No. 18805, he was ultimately convicted of the lower
offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of the same law. Since the foregoing
effectively removed Pascua’s case from the coverage of Section 24, Article II of
RA 9165, he should, at the very least, be allowed to apply for probation.
 RULE 117
MOTION TO QUASH
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner -versus- LINO
ALEJANDRO y PIMENTEL, Respondent. G.R No. 223099,
January 11, 2018, TIJAM, J,.

The 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of the accused against double jeopardy, thus:
Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 and 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure strictly adhere to
the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy and provide for the requisites in
order for double jeopardy to attach. For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements
must concur: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has
been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the
case was dismissed without his express consent.

FACTS:Accused-appellant was charged with two counts of rape, defined and

penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Republic Act No. 8369, of a 12-year old minor, AAA. Upon
arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty and trial ensued.
On July 26, 2011, the RTC promulgated a Decision acquitting the accused-
appellant. On the same day, however, the RTC recalled the said decision.

Accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that a judgment

of acquittal is immediately final and executory and can neither be withdrawn
nor modified, because to do so would place an accused-appellant in double
jeopardy.

RTC denied the motion and A Joint Decision dated July 26, 2011 was rendered
by the RTC, finding accused-appellant guilty of two counts of rape. Accused-
appellant appealed to the CA, but the CA dismissed the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellant will be held in double jeopardy due
to an err in court decision.

RULING: Yes. In our jurisdiction, the Court adhere to the finality-of-acquittal

doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and un appealable.

The 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of the accused against double
jeopardy, thus: Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 and 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure strictly adhere to the constitutional proscription against double
jeopardy and provide for the requisites in order for double jeopardy to attach.
For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur: (1) a valid
information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime
charged; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned
and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was
dismissed without his express consent.

Here, all the elements were present. There was a valid information for two counts
of rape over which the RTC had jurisdiction and to which the accused-appellant
entered a plea of not guilty. After the trial, a judgment of acquittal was thereafter
rendered. A judgment of acquittal was rendered based on the mistaken notion
that the private complainant failed to testify; allegedly because of the mix-up of
orders with a different case involving the same accused-appellant.

However, does not change the fact that a judgment of acquittal had
already been promulgated. Indeed, a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by
the trial or the appellate court, is final, un appealable, and immediately executory
upon its promulgation.

Accused-appellant Lino Alejandro y Pimentel is hereby ACQUITTED and is

ordered immediately RELEASED from custody, unless he is being held for another
lawful cause.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner -versus- JOEL
DOMINGO, Respondent. G.R. No. 204895, March 21,
2018, CAGUIOA, J.
A dismissal predicated on the right of the accused to speedy trial upon
his own motion or express consent, amounts to an acquittal which will
bar another prosecution of the accused for the same offense. This is an
exception to the rule that a dismissal, upon the motion or with the
express consent of the accused, will not be a bar to the subsequent
prosecution of the accused for the same offense as provided for in
Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.

FACTS: Three Informations two counts of the crime of Murder and one count of
Attempted Murder were filed against accused-appellant. The three cases were
originally raffled to Branch 15 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City. Pre-trial
conference ensued. There, it was agreed that the prosecution would present its
evidence in four settings of a joint trial. The prosecution failed to present a single
witness in each of those four settings. Thus, the Court in an Order dated February
7,2007 dismissed the cases and directed the release of the two accused. the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration, claiming that notices to
the prosecution witnesses had not been served because they constantly transferred
to other places due to persistent threats to their lives as a result of these cases. The
Court granted the Motion for Reconsideration, reasoning that "the State in the present
cases was deprived of its right to due process, for it was not given a fair opportunity to
present its witnesses.

Accused Joel Domingo was rearrested. Thereafter, the prosecution presented its
evidence. The RTC convicted accused-appellant. The CA Decision affirmed the Joint
Judgment rendered by the RTC, which found accused-appellant Joel Domingo guilty of
two counts of the crime of Murder and one count of Attempted Murder

iISSUE: Whether or not the reconsideration by the RTC of its order of dismissal placed
the accused-appellant twice in jeopardy for the same offense
RULING: Yes. The Court cited the Salcedo v. Mendoza, (Salcedo), following the
established jurisprudence, a dismissal predicated on the right of the accused to
speedy trial upon his own motion or express consent, amounts to an acquittal
which will bar another prosecution of the accused for the same offense. This is an
exception to the rule that a dismissal, upon the motion or with the express consent
of the accused, will not be a bar to the subsequent prosecution of the accused for
the same offense as provided for in Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. The
moment the dismissal of a criminal case is predicated on the right of the accused
to speedy trial, even if it is upon his own motion or express consent, such dismissal
is equivalent to acquittal. And any attempt to prosecute the accused for the same
offense will violate the constitutional prohibition that "no person shall be twice put
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" (New Constitution, Article IV, Sec.
22). (Emphasis supplied)

The Court reiterates and applies Salcedo. The dismissal of the cases in the
February Order, predicated on the violation of the right of accused-appellant to a
speedy trial, amounted to an acquittal which bars another prosecution of accused-
appellant for the same offense. Thus, when the RTC reconsidered its February
Order in its June Order, the RTC placed accused-appellant twice in jeopardy for the
same offense and acted with grave abuse of discretion.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner -versus-
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND CAMILO LOYOLA
SABIO, Respondents.G.R. Nos. 228494-96,March 21,
2018, REYES, JR., J.

Generally, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory. The

prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal lest the constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy be violated. However, the rule admits of two exceptional grounds
that can be challenged in a certiorari proceeding under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court: (1) in a judgment of acquittal rendered with grave abuse of discretion by the
court; and (2) where the prosecution had been deprived of due process.

FACTS: Accused Camilo Loyola Sabio (“Sabio”) was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan
for the charges of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and two counts of malversation
of public funds, for the prosecution’s failure to adduce sufficient evidence to
establish the crimes charged.

The Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed Decision, acquitting Sabio from the
charges on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. The petitioner filed its motion for
reconsideration which was denied. Hence, the present petition for certiorari.

In assailing said acquittal, the prosecution moved for the instant Petition for
Certiorari, arguing that since Sandigan bayan’s acquittal was tainted with grave
abuse of discretion, accused right against double jeopardy is not violated.

ISSUE: Whether accused right against double jeopardy was violated when the
prosecution moved to file a Petition for Certiorari to assail his acquittal.
RULING: Yes, accused’s right against double jeopardy is violated in the absence of
any showing that the Sandigan bayan acted with grave abuse of discretion.

The constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy is enshrined in the

Bill of Rights under the 1987 Constitution. This right was further embodied in
Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure.

Generally, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory. The

prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal lest the constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy be violated. However, the rule admits of two exceptional grounds
that can be challenged in a certiorari proceeding under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court: (1) in a judgment of acquittal rendered with grave abuse of discretion by the
court; and (2) where the prosecution had been deprived of due process.

In this case, the prosecution was given adequate opportunity to present several
witnesses and all necessary documentary evidence to prove the guilt of Sabio.
However, Sandigan bayan warranted the acquittal of Sabio due to insufficiency of
evidence engendering reasonable doubt on whether Sabio committed the
offenses charged and the Court finds no indication that the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion when it gave a verdict of acquittal in favor of Sabio.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner -versus- DANTE
CUBAY y UGSALAN, Respondents. G.R. No. G.R. No.
224597, July 29, 2019, LAZARO-JAVIER, J.

Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that:
Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. - The failure of
the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the
complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or
failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any
objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b),
(g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.

FACTS: A case wherein Cubay was charged with 44 counts of rape. hat on or about the
7th day of September, 2007, in the evening, at XXX, province of Bukidnon, Philippines
particularly at the Special Education Dormitory (SPED) and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did thenand there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with [AAA], an 18 year-old who suffered a physical
defect (hearing impaired) against her will, to the damage and prejudice of [AAA] in
such amount as (may be) allowed by law.

On arraignment he pleaded “guilty”. After trial, he was found guilty. Subsequently, the
sufficiency of the Information was called into question. It was contended that the
second element of rape, which is “that the offense is committed with force or
intimidation”, was not alleged in the Information. Being insufficient, the Information did
not charge an offense

iISSUE: Whether or not Cubay has waived the objections on the Information..

RULING: NO. Where the Information is insufficient, it cannot be the basis of any valid
conviction. As explained in Andaya v. People, “No matter how conclusive and
convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused cannot be convicted of any
offense unless it is charged in the information on which he is tried or is necessarily
included therein.”
In the case at bar, the Information conspicuously lack the second element of rape, i.e.
the accused employed force or intimidation, or that the victim was deprived of reason,
unconscious, under twelve (12) years of age, or was demented. In fine, the Information
do not validly charge the crime of rape or any offense at all. The same, for sure, cannot
be the basis of a valid judgment of conviction.

The court took in consideration of the rule that by his plea, an accused is deemed to
have waived all objections to the information. This rule, however, is correct only insofar
as formal objections to the pleadings are concerned. By express provision of Section 9,
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court and by established jurisprudence, the validity of the
Information vis-a-vis the essential issue of whether or not it sufficiently charges an
offense goes into the very foundation of jurisdiction, hence, may be raised and
addressed at any stage of the proceedings.

The Decision dated November 24, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CR-HC No.
01145-MIN is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one rendered ACQUITTING DANTE
CUBAY Y UGSALAN of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 08-05-3536 to 08-05-3579..
RULE 118
PRE- TRIAL
ANGELITO MAGNO V. PEOPLE PHILIPPINES, OF THE
REPRESENTED BY THEOFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR,
G.R. No. 230657, March 14, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a

speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be
considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the
defendant's assertion of his right; and (d) Prejudice to the defendant.

FACTS: A case wherein in an informan was filed before the RTC charging petitioner
with Multiple Frustrated Murder and Double Attempted Murder. The prosecution
moved to set the case for trial and started presenting one of its witnesses on March
29, 2005.

During the presentation of witnesses on September 1, 2006. Such presentation

continued all the way until June 7, 2007 when the prosecution requested to reset the
hearing to August 16, 2007 due to the handling prosecutor's illness.
However, it appears that from such postponement until around early 2010, no
hearings were conducted. petitioner moved for the continuation of the trial, the
hearing of which was set on April 22, 2010, which was further reset to September 2,
2010. Therefore, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of violation of his
right to speedy trial.

The RTC granted petitioner's motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of the
latter's right to speedy trial. It found that Crim. Case No. DU-10123 had already been
pending for thirteen (13) years and yet, remained unresolved. However, the SB set
aside the RTC ruling and, accordingly, ordered the reinstatement of Crim. Case No. DU-
10123.

iISSUE: Whether or not the SB correctly ascribed grave abuse on the part of the RTC
when the latter court found that petitioner's right to speedy trial has been violated
RULING: NO. The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of
the case against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding
criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays
in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable
dispatch in the trial of criminal cases.

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a)
length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant's assertion of his right;
and (d) Prejudice to the defendant

In this case the court found that the petitioner’s right to speedy trial had been violated.
For its long delay from the date of information until the order of the RTC dismissing
the case, unjustified delays, the petitioner’s assertions of his right, and clearly the
unjustified delays and lengthy delays clearly detriments the defendant.
Hence, the Court concludes that petitioner's right to speedy trial had been violated.

The Orders dated September 30, 2013 and November 28, 2014 of the Regional Trial
Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56 in Crim. Case No. DU-10123 are REINSTATED.
Accordingly, Crim. Case No. DU-10123 is DISMISSED on the ground of violation of the
accused's right to speedy trial, without prejudice to any civil action which the private
complainant/s may file against him.
 GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner, -versus- STANLEY
FERNANDEZ, FLORENTINO AMPIL, JR., AND
NOEL CABANGON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 219548, October 17, 2018, CARPIO, J.

An accused's right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is

guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14(2) of Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The right to speedy trial is deemed violated when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for
and secured.

FACTS: The Case arose from the death of Leonardo Villa. Because of his death, an
Amended Information charging 35 members of the Aquila with the crime of
Homicide was filed. 26 members were charged with homicide in a Criminal Case
No. C-38340(91), while 9 members were charged with homicide in a different
Criminal Case No. C-38340. The 26 members were jointly tried, while the trial
against the remaining 9 members was held in abeyance. The Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan City ordered for the issuance of warrants of arrest against five of the
nine members. All of the nine members entered a plea of not guilty.

RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. C-38340 against
Concepcion, upon finding that the failure of the prosecution to prosecute the
case for an unreasonable period of time violated his right to speedy trial.

On the other hand, the RTC denied the separate Motions to Dismiss filed by
Saruca, Escalona, and Adriano. RTC also denied the Motion to Dismiss filed by
Ramos. Upon denial of their motions to dismiss, Ramos, et al., appealed to the CA.
CA granted the appeal of Ramos, Saruca, Escalona, and Adriano and dismissed
Criminal Case No. C-38340 against them after finding that their right to speedy
trial was violated. Subsequently, Fernandez, Ampil, and Cabangon filed a Joint
Motion to Dismiss with the RTC. Since the filing of the Amended Information on
15 November 1991; the CA's Decision dismissing Criminal Case No. C-38340
should also apply to them because they are similarly situated.
RTC denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss filed by Fernandez, Ampil, and Cabangon. CA
reversed the RTC and dismissed Criminal Case No. C-38340 against Fernandez, Ampil,
and Cabangon. The CA held that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying the Joint Motion to Dismiss filed by Fernandez, Ampil, and Cabangon, because
it failed to recognize and uphold their constitutional right to speedy trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed grave, serious and reversible errors in
finding that the delay in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 38340 is of such nature
that violates the right of respondents to speedy trial.

HELD: No. An accused's right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is
guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The
right to speedy trial is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are
asked for and secured.

In the present petition, Villa insists that the right to speedy trial of Fernandez, Ampil,
and Cabangon was not violated because the reasons for the delay were attributable to
them, and they failed to timely invoke their right, unlike Ramos, Saruca, Escalona, and
Adriano. Contrary to Villa's assertion, the CA's ruling, as supported by the records,
reveals there was delay on the proceedings against Fernandez, Ampil, and Cabangon.
Contrary to Villa's contention that Fernandez, Ampil, and Cabangon failed to invoke
their right is not tenable since in the case of In Almeda v. Office of the Ombudsman,
the court held that petitioner's letter and manifestations seeking the immediate
resolution of her case cannot be considered late, and no waiver of her right to speedy
trial or acquiescence may be attached to the same, as she was not required as a rule
to follow up on her case; instead, it is the State's duty to expedite the same. Similarly,
in this case, the court HELD that Fernandez, Ampil, and Cabangon timely invoked and
did not waive their right to speedy trial.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 13 February 2015
and the Resolution dated 23 July 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
127891
RULE 119
TRIAL
 GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN, (FIRST
DIVISION), Respondents. G.R. No. 220598, April 18, 2017,
BERSAMIN, J.
The grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and
unappealable, to wit: The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one
at bar, is ''filed after tile prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is
granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution
and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a
dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused."
Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be
appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The
verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.

FACTS: On July 19, 2016, the Court promulgated its decision granting the
petitioner’s demurrer to evidence. The State has moved for the reconsideration of
the decision, submitting that the court's giving due course to a certiorari action
assailing an interlocutory order denying demurrer to evidence violates Rule 119,
Section 23 of the Rules of Court, which provides that an order denying the
demurrer to evidence shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before
judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not an interlocutory order denying demurrer to evidence

violates Rule 119, Section 23 of the Rules of Court

RULING: The Court stresses that the prohibition contained in Section 23, Rule
119 of the Rules of Court is not an insuperable obstacle to the review by the
Court of the denial of the demurrer to evidence through certiorari. It has had
many rulings to that effect in the past. For instance, in Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan,
the Court expressly ruled that the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy to
assail the denial of the demurrer to evidence that was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion or excess of jurisdiction, or oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an
interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the availability of another
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules
of Court expressly provides that "the order denying the motion for leave of court
to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by
appeal or by certiorari before judgment." It is not an insuperable obstacle to this
action, however, that the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners
was an interlocutory order that did not terminate the proceedings, and the
proper recourse of the demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case of
their conviction they may then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as
among the errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in
which the writ of certiorari may issue should not be limited, because to do so - x x
x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the
discretion of the court that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more
discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of our
superintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by all the
circumstances of each particular case 'as the ends of justice may require.' So it is
that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to
do substantial justice.

The grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final
and unappealable, to wit: The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the
one at bar, is ''filed after tile prosecution had rested its case," and when the same
is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt,
resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of
the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to
evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in
double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.
 JANET LIM NAPOLES, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD
DIVISION), Respondent.G.R. No. 224162, February 06, 2018, REYES,
JR. , J

In a demurrer to evidence, the accused imposes a challenge on the

sufficiency of the prosecution's entire evidence. This involves a
determination of whether the evidence presented by the prosecution
has established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Should the trial court find the prosecution's evidence insufficient in
this regard, the grant of the demurrer to evidence is equivalent to the
acquittal of the accused.
FACTS: Petitioner Janet Lim Napoles filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
Court's November 7, 2017 Decision, which upheld the Sandiganbayan's
Resolutions denying Napoles' application for bail, there being no grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
Sandiganbayan.

Napoles now invokes the ruling in Macapagal-Arroyo v. People. The Court in that
case reversed the Sandiganbayan's denial of the demurrer to evidence in the
plunder case against former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo based on the
prosecution's failure to specify the identity of the main plunderer, for whose
benefit the ill-gotten wealth was amassed, accumulated, and acquired. According
to Napoles, the ruling in Macapagal-Arroyo should have been applied to her case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Macapagal-Arroyo vs. People of the Philippines is

applicable to the case

RULING: No. The Court finds this argument unmeritorious.

The Court has previously discussed in the November 7, 2017 Decision that the
trial court is required to conduct a hearing on the petition for bail whenever the
accused is charged with a capital offense. While mandatory, the hearing may be
summary and the trial court may deny the bail application on the basis of
evidence less than that necessary to establish the guilt of an accused beyond
reasonable doubt. In this hearing, the trial court's inquiry is limited to whether
there is evident proof that the accused is guilty of the offense charged.
This standard of proof is clearly different from that applied in a demurrer to evidence,
which measures the prosecution's entire evidence against the required moral certainty
for the conviction of the accused.

The distinction between the required standards of proof precludes the application of
Macapagal-Arroyo to the present case. The Sandiganbayan's denial of the demurrer to
evidence in Macapagal-Arroyo was annulled based on the paucity of the evidence of
the prosecution, which failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that former President
GMA was the mastermind of the conspiracy to commit plunder. In other words, there
was a final determination of former President GMA's innocence of the crime charged.
This is not the case for Napoles. The issue that the Court resolved in its Decision was
whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Napoles'
application for bail. This involved a preliminary determination of her eligibility to
provisional liberty.

The resolution of this issue does not involve an inquiry as to whether there was proof
beyond reasonable doubt that Napoles, or her co-accused as the case may be, was
the main plunderer for whose benefit the ill-gotten wealth was amassed or
accumulated. It was sufficient that the denial of her bail application was based on
evidence establishing a great presumption of guilt on the part of Napoles.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. RANDOLPH S. TING AND
SALVACION I. GARCIA, Respondents. G.R. No. 221505, December 05,
2018, PERALTA, J.

A demurrer to evidence is filed after the prosecution has rested its

case and the trial court is required to evaluate whether the evidence
presented by the prosecution is sufficient enough to warrant the
conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If the court finds
that the evidence is not sufficient and grants the demurrer to
evidence, such dismissal of the case is one on the merits, which is
equivalent to the acquittal of the accused. Well-established is the rule
that the Court cannot review an order granting the demurrer to
evidence and acquitting the accused on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence because to do so will place the accused in double Jeopardy.

FACTS: City Mayor Randolph S. Ting, as representative of the City Government of

Tuguegarao, entered into a Contract of Sale with Dr. Anselmo D. Almazan, Angelo
A. Almazan, and Anselmo A. Almazan III for the purchase of two parcels of land. As
payment, City Treasurer Salvacion I. Garcia issued and released Treasury Warrant
No. 0001534514 dated April 30, 2004 in the sum of P8,486,027.00. On May 5,
2004, the City Government of Tuguegarao caused the registration of the sale and
the issuance of transfer certificate of titles in its name. Consequently, a complaint
was filed against respondents for violation of Section 261 (v) and (w) of the
Omnibus Election Code, but the same was eventually dismissed by the
Commission on Elections finding that since the issuance of the treasury warrant
was not for public works, no liability could arise therefrom. In Guzman v.
Commission on Elections, et al., however, the Court set aside the COMELEC's
resolution and ordered the filing of the appropriate criminal information against
respondents.

After the pre-trial, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Evidence. But instead
of presenting their evidence, respondents filed a Motion for Leave to File a
Demurrer to Evidence and, subsequently, a Demurrer to Evidence. In an Order
dated December 16, 2013, the RTC granted the same and acquitted the
respondents.
In its petition, the OSG posits that it duly established beyond reasonable doubt that
respondents violated Section 261 (w)(b) of the Omnibus Election Code. As such, the
RTC had no clear legal and factual basis to grant City Mayor Ting's demurrer to
evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not RTC Is correct in granting the demurrer to evidence

RULING: The attending circumstances in the instant case depict a violation of Section
261 (w)(b) of the Omnibus Election Code. The subject Treasury Warrant No.
0001534514 was dated April 30, 2004, which date falls within the election ban period
beginning on March 26, 2004 and ending on the election day or May 10, 2004. As
such, it is deemed prima facie to have been drawn, made, accepted, and indorsed on
said date. On the basis of said presumption, it follows that the treasury warrant was
delivered to the Almazans, for delivery naturally precedes acceptance. Moreover, while
this presumption is disputable, respondents merely filed their Demurrer to Evidence
and presented no evidence to challenge the same.

Notwithstanding the aforementioned circumstances, however, the Court resolves to

deny the petition on the principle of double jeopardy. The Order of the RTC, on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence, is a judgment of acquittal. The OSG is, thus, barred
from appealing said order because to allow the same would violate the right of
respondents against double jeopardy.

The remedy from an order of dismissal granting a demurrer to evidence is reviewable

by the CA, but only through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In turn, if
the CA finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in granting the
demurrer, such finding is reviewable by the Court through a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
LENGTH AND REASON OF DELAY

In Barker, the US Supreme Court observed that: "The length of the delay is to some
extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively
prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the
balance. Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the
length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the
peculiar circumstances of the case.

As stated above, prior to this, the cases were pending with RTC Branch 15 for more
than a year and no pre-trial conference was being conducted, thus impelling accused-
appellant, who was incarcerated, to himself file a motion for the cases to be re-raffled.
The unreasonable delay of the prosecution needlessly prolonged the incarceration of
accused-appellant.

It is incumbent upon the State and the private complainants, where applicable, to
exert reasonable efforts to prosecute the case, especially in cases where the accused
is incarcerated. The Court understands that, there are instances of delay in the
ordinary course of the trial, but the delay here shows that the prosecution and the
private complainants failed to exert the reasonable efforts to even present any
evidence. The reason for their failure is likewise unsubstantiated.

The prosecution's failure to present a single piece of evidence in all the four trial dates
given to it was an unreasonable prolongation of the length of the trial. Further, the
reasons the prosecution offered for the failure to present its witnesses are not even
supported by any evidence other than the mere say-so of the public prosecutor. The
witnesses did not even present any affidavit or any proof of the threats to their lives
which prompted them to change their places of residence.
ASSERTION OF RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
In Barker, the US Supreme Court further explained the nature of the accused's right to
assert his right to speedy trial as closely related to the other factors; and the more
serious the deprivation, the more likely the accused will complain, thus:

We have already discussed the third factor, the defendant's responsibility to assert his
right. Whether and how a defendant asserts his right is closely related to the other
factors we have mentioned. The strength of his efforts will be affected by the length of
the delay, to some extent by the reason for the delay, and most particularly by the
personal prejudice, which is not always readily identifiable, that he experiences. The
more serious the deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to complain. The
defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right, then, is entitled to strong evidentiary
weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right. We
emphasize that failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove
that he was denied a speedy trial.

Here, on February 7, 2007, when the prosecution failed to present any evidence
during the four trial dates given to it, accused-appellant moved for the dismissal of the
cases, which was granted by the RTC. Accused1 appellant also raised this as an issue
on appeal with the CA. In fact, as early as August 2006, accused-appellant had already
raised his right to a speedy trial when he moved for the cases to be re-raffled because
of the delay in the conduct of the pre-trial conference.

Given the foregoing, the Court is of the considered belief that accused- appellant had
indeed asserted his right to a speedy trial.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner -versus- MARIA CRISTINA P.
SERGIO and JULIUS L. LACANILAO, Respondents. G.R No. 240053
October 9, 2019, HERNANDO, J.

Under Section 15, Rule 119 of the revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure, in order for the testimony of the prosecution witness be
taken before the court where the case is being heard, it must be
shown that the said prosecution witness is either: (a) too sick or infirm
to appear at the trial as directed by the order of the court, or; (b) has
to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning.

FACTS: Mary Jane Veloso, Maria Cristina P. Sergio (Cristina), and Julius L.
Lacanilao (Julius) were friends and neighbors in Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Taking
advantage of her dire situation and susceptibility, Cristina and Julius offered Mary
Jane a job as a domestic helper in Malaysia. Cristina gave Mary Jane her plane
ticket as well as a luggage to bring on her trip. She then asked Cristina why the
luggage was heavy but the latter simply replied that because it was new. The
luggage was the same bag she used on her trip to Indonesia. It was only after she
was apprehended at the airport when Mary Jane realized that it contained
prohibited drugs.

The Philippine Government requested the Indonesian Government to suspend

the scheduled execution of Mary Jane. It informed the Indonesian Government
that the recruiters and traffickers of Mary Jane were already in police custody, and
her testimony is vital in the prosecution of Cristina and Julius.

The Indonesian authorities however imposed the following conditions relative to

the taking of Mary Jane's testimony, viz.:
(a) Mary Jane shall remain in detention in Yogyakarta, Indonesia;
(b) No cameras shall be allowed;
(c) The lawyers of the parties shall not be present; and
(d) The questions to be propounded to Mary Jane shall be in writing.
Thereafter, the State filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Take the Testimony of
Complainant Mary Jane Veloso by Deposition upon Written Interrogatories. It averred
that the taking of Mary Jane's testimony through the use of deposition upon written
interrogatories is allowed under Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court because she is
out of the country and will not be able to testify personally before the court due to
her imprisonment.

Cristina and Julius objected to the motion asserting that the deposition should be
made before and not during the trial. The depositions under Rules 23 and 25 of the
Rules of Court are not designed to replace the actual testimony of the witness in
open court and the use thereof is confined only in civil cases. Also, they argued that
such method of taking testimony will violate their right to confront the witness, Mary
Jane, or to meet her face to face as provided under Section 14(2) of the 1987
Constitution. Finally, they claimed that the prosecution's reliance on the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases and the Judicial Affidavit Rule was misplaced
because the affiants therein were still subject to cross-examination.

The RTC granted the motion. CA reversed the RTC.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court applies to criminal cases

2. Whether or not allowing deposition of Mary Jane violate the right of the accused to
confront the witnesses

RULING: 1. Yes. The extraordinary factual circumstance surrounding the case of

Mary Jane warrant the resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. Interestingly, nowhere
in the present Rules on Criminal Procedure does it state how a deposition, of a
prosecution witness who is at the same time convicted of a grave offense by final
judgment and imprisoned in a foreign jurisdiction, may be taken to perpetuate the
testimony of such witness. The Rules, in particular, are silent as to how to take a
testimony of a witness who is unable to testify in open court because he is
imprisoned in another country.

Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure.
Although the rule on deposition by written interrogatories is inscribed under the said
Rule, the Court holds that it may be applied suppletorily in criminal proceedings so
long as there is compelling reason.

Verily, in light of the unusual circumstances surrounding the instant case, the Court
sees no reason not to apply suppletorily the provisions of Rule 23 of the Rules on
Civil Procedure in the interest of substantial justice and fairness. Hence, the taking of
testimony of Mary Jane through a deposition by written interrogatories is in order.
Under Section 15, Rule 119 of the revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, in order
for the testimony of the prosecution witness be taken before the court where the
case is being heard, it must be shown that the said prosecution witness is either:
(a) too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the order of the court, or;
(b) has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning.

Surely, the case of Mary Jane does not fall under either category. Therefore, a
liberal interpretation of the Rules should be allowed. We should not silence Mary
Jane and deny her and the People of their right to due process by presenting
their case against the said accused. By the CA's belief that it was rendering justice
to the respondents, it totally forgot that it in effect impaired the rights of Mary
Jane as well as the People. By not allowing Mary Jane to testify through written
interrogatories, the Court of Appeals deprived her of the opportunity to prove her
innocence before the Indonesian authorities and for the Philippine Government
the chance to comply with the conditions set for the grant of reprieve to Mary
Jane.

2. No. The deposition by written interrogatories will not infringe the constitutional
right to confrontation of a witness of Cristina and Julius.
The right to confrontation is part of due process not only in criminal proceedings
but also in civil proceedings as well as in proceedings in administrative tribunals
with quasi-judicial powers. It has a two-fold purpose: (1) primarily, to afford the
accused an opportunity to test the testimony of the witness by cross-
examination; and (2) secondarily, to allow the judge to observe the deportment of
the witness.

True, Cristina and Julius have no opportunity to confront Mary Jane face to face in
light of the prevailing circumstance. However, the terms and conditions laid down
by the trial court ensure that they are given ample opportunity to cross-examine
Mary Jane by way of written interrogatories so as not to defeat the first purpose
of their constitutional right. To recall, the trial court requires Cristina and Julius,
through their counsel, to file their comment and may raise objections to the
proposed questions in the written interrogatories submitted by the prosecution.
The trial court judge shall promptly rule on the objections. Thereafter, only the
final questions would be asked by the Consul of the Philippines in Indonesia or
his designated representative. The answers of Mary Jane to the propounded
questions must be written verbatim, and a transcribed copy of the same would be
given to the counsel of the accused who would, in turn, submit their proposed
cross interrogatory questions to the prosecution.
Should the prosecution raised any objection thereto, the trial court judge must
promptly rule on the same, and the final cross interrogatory questions for the
deposition of Mary Jane will then be conducted. Mary Jane's answers in the cross
interrogatory shall likewise be taken in verbatim and a transcribed copy thereof
shall be given to the prosecution.

The second purpose of the constitutional right to confrontation has likewise been
upheld. As aptly stated in the terms and conditions for the taking of deposition,
the trial court judge will be present during the conduct of written interrogatories
on Mary Jane.

Indubitably, the constitutional rights of Cristina and Julius are equally

safeguarded. The parameters laid down by the trial court are sufficient in detail
ensuring that Mary Jane will give her testimony under oath to deter lying by the
threat of perjury charge. She is still subjected to cross-examination so as to
determine the presence of any falsehood in her testimony. Lastly, the guidelines
enable the trial court judge to observe her demeanor as a witness and assess her
credibility
 CECILIA RIVAC, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.G.R. No. 224673, January 22, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Section 24, Rule 119 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
governs the reopening of criminal cases for further trial. It states in
verbatim: "At any time before finality of the judgment of conviction,
the judge may, motu proprio or upon motion, with hearing in either
case, reopen the proceedings to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The
proceedings shall be terminated within thirty (30) days from the order
granting it.

FACTS: Cecilia Rivac was charged with the crime of Estafa. The prosecution
alleged Rivac went to the jewelry store owned by private complainant Asuncion C.
Farinas (Farinas) where she received from the latter several pieces of jewelry in
the aggregate amount of ₱439,500.00, which were meant for her to sell on
consignment basis. Fariñas and Rivac agreed that after seven (7) days, Rivac was
obligated to either remit the proceeds of the sold jewelry or return the unsold
jewelry to Fariñas should she fail to sell the same. However, despite the lapse of
the aforesaid period, Rivac failed to perform what was incumbent upon her.
During arraignment, Rivac pleaded "not guilty" and maintained that her liability is
only civil, and not criminal, in nature. The RTC convicted the accused of the crime
charged.

After the promulgation of the aforesaid Judgment and before it lapsed into
finality, Rivac moved to reopen proceedings on the ground that she intends to
present the testimonies of Fariñas and a certain Atty. Ma. Valenie Blando to prove
the true nature of her transaction with Fariñas. The RTCpartly granted the motion
insofar as Fariñas's testimony was concerned, as the apparent revision of her
recollection of events could not have been anticipated during the course of the
trial. Consequently, the Court retook Fariñas's testimony, where she "clarified"
that she now remembered that the consignment document never became
effective or enforceable as she did not allow Rivac to take the jewelry because she
has yet to pay her outstanding loan obligation plus interest effective or
enforceable as she did not allow Rivac to take the jewelry because she has yet to
pay her outstanding loan obligation plus interest.

g.
The RTC affirmed its assailed judgement and considered Farifias's testimony was
in the nature of a recantation, which is looked upon with disfavor by the courts.

The CA upheld Rivac's conviction and held that the RTC erred in allowing the
reopening of the case, since it had already promulgated its ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reopening of the case proper.

RULING: Section 24, Rule 119 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
governs the reopening of criminal cases for further trial. It states in verbatim: "At
any time before finality of the judgment of conviction, the judge may, motu
proprio or upon motion, with hearing in either case, reopen the proceedings to
avoid a miscarriage of justice. The proceedings shall be terminated within thirty
(30) days from the order granting it

To reiterate, a motion to reopen may be filed even after the promulgation of a

judgment and before the same lapses into finality, and the only guiding
parameter is to "avoid the miscarriage of justice." As such, the RTC correctly
allowed the reopening of proceedings to receive Fariñas's subsequent testimony
in order to shed light on the true nature of her transaction with Rivac, and
potentially, determine whether or not the latter is indeed criminally liable