Case Digests

Rule 117 Motion to Quash

Section 7. Former Conviction or Acquittal, Double Jeopardy.

1. People v. Jugueta, Supra. (Murder and Double Jeopardy for the Co-accused upon
reinvestigation)
Facts
- Accused Jugueta, was charged for the crime of double murder and on a separate case,
multiple attempted murder together with Estores and San Miguel for the death of two
minors.
- The prosecution dismissed the case of attempted murder against Estores and San
Miguel upon finding no prima facie case against the two after a witness testified the
absence of the two at the crime scene.
- Jugueta, proffered alibi and denial as his defense against allegations against him.
- RTC found Jugueta guilty beyond reasonable doubt for double murder and multiple
attempted murder.
- CA affirmed the decision of RTC.
Issue
- Whether or not the two accused would be subjected to double jeopardy upon
reinvestigation.
Ruling
- No. Such reinvestigation would not subject Estores and San Miguel to double jeopardy
because the same only attaches if the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy
has attached before the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3)
a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. In turn, a first jeopardy attaches
only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d)
when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or
convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. In
this case, the case against Estores and San Miguel was dismissed before they were
arraigned. Thus, there can be no double jeopardy to speak of. Let true justice be served by
reinvestigating the real participation, if any, of Estores and San Miguel in the killing of
Mary Grace and Claudine Divina.
- The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 7698-G, and as proven
during trial, show that appellant is guilty of 2 counts of the crime of Murder and not Double
Murder, as the killing of the victims was not the result of a single act but of several acts of
appellant and his cohorts. In the same vein, appellant is also guilty of 4 counts of the crime
of Attempted Murder and not Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.
It bears stressing that the Information in this case failed to comply with the requirement in
Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court that an information must charge only
one offense.
- As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise,
the same is defective. The reason for the rule is stated in People of the Philippines and
AAA v. Court of Appeals, 21st Division, Mindanao Station, et al., thus:
The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or information is to give
the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to suffi
 ciently prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or more
charges which might confuse him in his defense. Non-compliance with this rule is a ground
for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he
enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.
However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move
for the quashal of the Informations, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the
same. Section 9 of Rule 117 provides that "[t]he failure of the accused to assert any ground
of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he
did not le a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a
waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a),
(b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule."

2. Chiok v. People, Supra. (Estafa and Acquitall on CA)

Facts
- Accused Chiok, was charged of a crime for estafa amounting to P9.5m on a pretense
that the money of Chua shall be invested in the stock market.
- Chiok pleaded not guilty for the crime charged during the arraignment.
- RTC found Chiok guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa.
- CA acquitted Chiok of the crime charged for failure of prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. As to the civil aspect, the CA found Chiok liable to Chua for
the amount of P9,500,000.00, the amount he admitted on record.
- Chua filed an MR but CA denied the motion on the ground of double jeopardy.
Issue
- Whether or not the case is an exception to the rule on finality of acquittal and the
doctrine of double jeopardy.

Ruling
- No. For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur: (1) a valid
information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime
charged; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and
had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed
without his express consent.
- In order to give life to the rule on double jeopardy, our rules on criminal proceedings
require that a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court,
is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation. This is
referred to as the " finality-of-acquittal" rule.
- Chua next asserts that certain exceptions to the rule on double jeopardy are present in
this case. Particularly, she submits that: (1) the appellate court's proceeding is a sham
or mock proceeding; (2) the People through the OSG, was deprived of the opportunity
to be heard and its "day in court"; and (3) the result is a null and void judgment of
acquittal. Chua cites the case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan to bolster her assertions.
- In this case, Chua presents a report submitted by Judge Elvira D.C. Panganiban
showing irregularities in the BP 22 case against Chiok, including the loss of TSN
containing an alleged offer of settlement by Chiok equivalent to his implied admission
 of guilt. We, however, do not see the same evils presented in Galman when the alleged
anomalies pointed out by Chua were in different case and when the main basis of the
acquittal is not on the credibility of the physical evidence but of the testimony of Chua
herself. Moreover, it is apparent from the CA acquittal that the appellate court
considered Chiok's offer of settlement in arriving at the decision, having included it in
its statement of facts. In essence, Chua is asking us to nullify the CA acquittal because
in her opinion, if the appellate court considered these pieces of evidence, it would have
convicted Chiok. These are purported errors of judgment or those involving
misappreciation of evidence which cannot be raised and be reviewed in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.

3. Morillo v. People, G.R. No. 198270. December 9, 2015. (BP 22 and dismissal)
Facts
- Respondent, Natividad, Malong, and Nanquil, introduced themselves as contractors
and purchased construction materials from petitioner, Morillo.
- After the petitioner delivered the construction materials amounting to P500k,
respondent paid P20k in cash and the remaining balance is paid through post dated
checks which was dishonored by the bank.
- ACP issued a resolution recommending that respondents be charged in court for
violation of BP 22.
- MeTC found respondent guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BP 22.
- RTC affirmed the ruling of MeTC.
- The Court of Appeals, in its January 18, 2011 Decision, reversed the lower courts'
rulings and dismissed the case without prejudice to its refiling in the proper venue

Issue
- Whether or not respondent would be subjected to double jeopardy upon refiling of the
case in the proper venue.
Ruling
- No. First of all, the Court stresses that the appellate court's dismissal of the case is not
an acquittal of respondent. Basic is the rule that a dismissal of a case is different from
an acquittal of the accused therein. Except in a dismissal based on a Demurrer to
Evidence led by the accused, or for violation of the right of the accused to a speedy
trial, the dismissal of a criminal case against the accused will not result in his acquittal.
- Thus, when the appellate court herein dismissed the instant case on the ground that the
MeTC lacked jurisdiction over the offense charged, it did not decide the same on the
merits, let alone resolve the issue of respondent's guilt or innocence based on the
evidence proffered by the prosecution. The appellate court merely dismissed the case
on the erroneous reasoning that none of the elements of BP 22 was committed within
the lower court's jurisdiction, and not because of any finding that the evidence failed to
show respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, therefore, such dismissal did
not operate as an acquittal, which, as previously discussed, may be repudiated only by
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing a grave abuse or
discretion.
Rule 119 Trial
SECTION 17. Discharge of Accused to be State Witness.

1. Jimenez, Jr. v. People, G.R. Nos. 209195 & G.R. No. 209215. September 17, 2014.
Facts
- Montero (a former employee of the BSJ Company owned by the Jimenezes) executed
sworn statements confessing his participation in the killing of Ruby Rose Barrameda
(Ruby Rose), and naming petitioner Jimenez, Lope Jimenez (Lope, the petitioner J
imenez's younger brother), Lennard A. Descalso (Lennard) alias "Spyke," Robert
Ponce (Robert) alias "Obet," and Eric Fernandez (Eric), as his co-conspirators.
- The statements of Montero which provided the details on where the alleged steel casing
containing the body of Ruby Rose was dumped, led to the recovery of a cadaver,
encased in a drum and steel casing, near or practically at the place that Montero pointed
to.
- Through the state prosecutors, filed an Information before the RTC, charging Jimenez,
Lope, Lennard, Robert, Eric and Montero of murder for the killing of Ruby Rose.
- Montero filed a motion for his discharge pursuant to the witness protection program.
The prosecutor also filed for his discharge as a state witness for the prosecution.
Jimenez opposed both motions.
- RTC Ruling:
o Judge Almeyda denied both motions and ruled that, it failed to clearly show that
Montero was not the most guilty or, at best, the least guilty among the accused.
o Judge Docena, upon filing of MRs of both Montero and the prosec,
reconsidered and reversed the decision of Judge Almeyda and ruled that, that
the prosecution had presented clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence show
ing compliance w ith the requisites of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. the crime would have remained undiscovered and
unsolved had it not been for Montero's extrajudicial confession that narrated in
detail the manner of the abduction and subsequent murder of Ruby Rose.
- Court of Appeals Ruling:
o The CA held that Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his discretion in ordering
Montero's discharge to become a state witness because the prosecution had
complied with the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure.

Issue
Whether or not Judge Docena committed grave abuse of discretion when ordering
Montero to be discharge to become a state witness.

Ruling
- No.
- Rule 119, Section 17, Par (3):
o Absolute necessity exists for the testimony of an accused sought to be
discharged when he or she alone has knowledge of the crime. In more concrete
terms, necessity is not there when the testimony would simply corroborate or
otherwise strengthen the prosecution's evidence. In the present case, not one of
 the accused-conspirators, except Montero, was willing to testify on the alleged
murder of Ruby Rose and their participation in her killing. Hence, the CA was
correct in ruling that Judge Docena acted properly and in accordance with
jurisprudence in ruling that there was absolute necessity for the testimony of
Montero. He alone is available to provide direct evidence of the crime.
- Rule 119, Section 17, Par 5, (a)-(d):
o We emphasize at this point that to resolve a motion to discharge under Section
17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Rules only require
that that the testimony of the accused sought to be discharged be substantially
corroborated in its material points, not on all points. This rule is based on
jurisprudential line that in resolving a motion to discharge under Section 17,
Rule 119, a trial judge cannot be expected or required, at the start of the trial, to
inform himself with absolute certainty of everything that may develop in the
course of the trial with respect to the guilty participation of the accused. If that
were practicable or possible, there would be little need for the formality of a
trial.
o By jurisprudence, "most guilty" refers to the highest degree of culpability in
terms of participation in the commission of the offense and does not necessarily
mean the severity of the penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given
the same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered to have
lesser or the least guilt taking into account his degree of participation in the
commission of the offense. What the rule avoids is the possibility that the most
guilty would be set free while his co-accused who are less guilty in terms of
participation would be penalized.
o We agree with the People that Jimenez is estopped from raising the issue of lack
of hearing prior to the discharge of Montero as a state witness. Jimenez did not
raise this issue when Acting Judge Almeyda denied the motion to discharge.
This denial, of course, was favorable to Jimenez. If he found no reason to
complain then, why should we entertain his hearing-related complaint now?
o Thus, we ruled in People v. Pring that in requiring a hearing in support of the
discharge, the essential objective of the law is for the court to receive evidence
for or against the discharge, which evidence shall serve as the court's tangible
and concrete basis independently of the fiscal's or prosecution's persuasions
in granting or denying the motion for discharge. We emphasize, in saying
this, that actual hearing is not required provided that the parties have both
presented their sides on the merits of the motion.