A.

Institution of Criminal and Civil Actions

1.
G.R. No. 179814
WILFRED N. CHIOK vs. PEOPLE and RUFINA CHUA,
Chiok was acquitted for his criminal liabitly because his guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt but because there was finding that there
was indeed monetary transaction, there was an award of civil liability.
Appealed.
Upheld the acquittal but there was finding as to civil liability.
Accused argued double jeopardy and res judicata on the civil liability
because there was a bp22 case involving the same parties where he was
acquitted.
Whether or not there can be an appeal on the civil aspect of the case-
Yes.
Bp 22 and estafa can be availed of simultaneously subject only to the bar
on double recovery.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Chiok was charged with estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in an Information that reads:
That sometime in June, 1995 in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, received in trust from Rufina Chua the
amount of ₱9,563,900.00 for him to buy complainant shares of stocks,
under the express obligation on the part of the accused to deliver the
documents thereon or to return the whole amount if the purchase did
not materialize, but the accused once in possession of the said amount,
far from complying will his obligation as aforesaid, with intent to defraud
the complainant, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misapply, misappropriate and convert lo his own personal use and
benefit the said amount of ₱9,563,900.00, and despite repeated
demands failed and relused and still fails and refuses to return the said
amount or to account for the same, to the damage and prejudice of the
 complainant Rufina Chua in the aforementioned amount of
₱9,563,900.00.
2. Chiok pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued, with
both parties presenting their evidence in support of their respective claims and
defenses.
3. In his defense, Chiok denied that he enticed Chua to invest in the stock
market, or offered her the prospect of buying shares of stocks in bulk.
4. On cross-examination, however, Chiok admitted receiving "P7.9" million in
June 1995 and "₱1.6" million earlier.
5. In a Decision16 dated December 3, 1998, the RTC convicted Chiok of the crime
of estafa (RTC conviction). Its dispositive portion reads:
The accused is ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of
₱9,563,900.00 with interest at the legal rate to be computed from the date of
demand - October 25, 1995 until fully paid.
7. On July 19, 2007, the CA in a Special Division of Five (Former-Fourth Division)
rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside the Decision dated December 3,
1998 of the trial court, and acquitted Chiok for failure of the prosecution to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt (CA acquittal).
Hence, these consolidated petitions questioning the CA acquittal by way of a
petition for certiorari and mandamus, and the civil aspect of the case by way of
appeal by certiorari.
Issues
III. Whether or not Chiok is civilly liable to Chua for BP 22 and Estafa despite his
acquittal from the criminal aspect of the charges.
RULING: YES
DISCUSSION

III. Chiok is civilly liable to Chua in the amount of ₱9,563,900.00.

Chiok claims that the Joint Decision74 dated November 27, 2000 in the BP 22
case docketed as Criminal Case No. 44739 of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) San Juan, Manila - Branch 58, which absolved Chiok from civil liability,
is res judicata on this case. On the other hand, Chua. claims that the CA erred
when it ordered Chiok to pay only the amount of ₱9,500,000.00 when it was
shown by evidence that the amount should be ₱9,563,900.00.
We rule that Chiok is liable For the amount of ₱9,563,900.00.
In Castillo v. Salvador75 and several cases before it, we ruled that if the acquittal
is based on reasonable doubt, the accused is not automatically exempt from civil
liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In this regard,
preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the
term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence."
Preponderance of evidence is evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.76
While the CA acquitted Chiok on the ground that the prosecution's evidence on
his alleged misappropriation of Chua's money did not meet the quantum of proof
beyond reasonable doubt, we hold that the monetary transaction between Chua
and Chiok was proven by preponderance of evidence.
In Rodriguez v. Ponferrada,82 we explained that a civil action in a BP 22 case is
not a bar to a civil action in estafa case. In rejecting the theory of petitioner
therein that the civil action arising from the criminal case for violation of BP 22
precludes the institution of the corresponding civil action in the criminal case
for estafa pending before the RTC, we ruled that Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
expressly allows the institution of a civil action in the crimes of both estafa and
violation of BP 22, without need of election by the offended party. There is no
forum shopping because both remedies are simultaneously available to the
offended party. We explained that while every such act of issuing a bouncing
check involves only one civil liability for the offended party who has sustained
only a single injury, this single civil liability can be the subject of both civil actions
in the estafa case and the BP 22 case. However, there may only be one recovery
of the single civil liability.
We affirmed this in Rimando v. Aldaba,83 where we were confronted with the
similar issue of whether an accused's civil liability in the estafa case must be
upheld despite acquittal and exoneration from civil liability in BP 22 cases. We
held that both estafa and BP 22 cases can proceed to their final adjudication-
both as to their criminal and civil aspects—subject only to the prohibition on
double recovery.
Since the Rules itself allows for both remedies to be simultaneously availed of by
the offended party, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application here.
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2. AZ T. BERNARDO, SUBSTITUTED BY HEIRS, v. 
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by accused
petitioner Paz T. Bernardo (Bernardo) under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) August 31, 2007
decision1 and the March 14, 2008 resolution2 in CA-G.R. CR 28721,
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Paz T. Bernardo." The appellate
court affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 56, Makati City, finding Bernardo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of five (5) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P.
22).
The Factual Antecedents

In June 1991, Bernardo obtained a loan from the private complainant

Carmencita C. Bumanglag (Bumanglag) in the amount of P460,000.00
payable on or before its maturity on November 30, 1991. That loan
was evidenced by a promissory note Bernardo and her husband had
executed, whereby the couple solidarity bound themselves to pay
the loan with corresponding interest at 12% per annum
payable upon default.4 As additional security, Bernardo gave
Bumanglag the owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. (T-1034) 151841.

Prior to the loan's maturity, Bernardo took back the title from
Bumanglag to use as a collateral in another transaction. In place of the
title, Bernardo issued to Bumanglag the following five (5) Far East
Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) checks,5 posted on different dates in
June 1992, covering the loan's aggregate amount:
Check No. Amount Date
FEBTC No. 391033 Php 100,000.00 June 1, 1992
FEBTC No. 391034 Php 100,000.00 June 8, 1992
FEBTC No. 391035 Php 100,000.00 June 15, 1992
FEBTC No. 391036 Php 100,000.00 June 22, 1992
FEBTC No. 391037 Php 60,000.00 June 29, 1992

In September 1992, Bumanglag deposited these checks to

Bernardo's account but they were dishonored; the reason given
was "Account Closed." Bumanglag thus sent Bernardo a notice
informing her of the dishonor of the checks. The demand went
unheeded, prompting Bumanglag to initiate a criminal complaint
against Bernardo with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati for
five (5) counts of violation of B.P. 22.

The prosecution rested its case on September 21, 1994. Bernardo took
the witness stand only on May 9, 1996, to present her defense
evidence.

In her testimony, Bernardo argued that she could not be held

liable for violation of B.P. 22 because the questioned checks
were presented beyond the 90-day period provided under the
law. She also denied having received any notice of dishonor,
which she insisted was essential to prove the material element
of knowledge of insufficiency of funds.
RTC Ruling

On May 28, 2003, the RTC issued its ruling finding Bernardo guilty of
five counts of violation of B.P. 22. The RTC held that Bernardo failed to
substantiate her claim of payment. The RTC further ruled that it is not
the nonpayment of the obligation but the issuance of a worthless
check that B.P. 22 punishes.

CA Ruling

On appeal, the CA affirmed Bernardo's conviction but deleted the

penalty of imprisonment and in lieu thereof, imposed a P460,000.00
fine.9 The CA also retained the civil indemnity of P460,000.00 that the
lower court imposed, plus 12% interest from the time of the institution
of the criminal charges until full payment.10

In denying Bernardo's appeal, the CA noted that Bernardo failed to

adduce sufficient evidence of payment. The CA further held that the
90-day period within which to present a check under B.P. 22 is not an
element of the crime.

Bernardo moved for reconsideration but the CA denied her

motion;13 hence, the present petition.14
Subsequent Developments

On March 14, 2011, Bernardo's counsel informed the Court of the

petitioner's death on February 3, 2011.
Bernardo's heirs moved to reconsider our March 7, 2012 resolution.
They argued that Bernardo's death extinguished her civil
liability. In the alternative, they contended that any civil liability
should be settled in a separate civil case.
We denied the heirs' motion in our June 27, 2012 resolution. We
explained that Bernardo's civil liability survived her death as it
is based on contract. Moreover, we observed that it would be costly,
burdensome, and time-consuming to dismiss the present case and
require the Bumanglags to file a separate civil action.

ISSUE: W/N Bernardo’s death extinguished his civil liability in a

pending BP 22 cases.

The Court's Ruling: No

Bernardo's civil liability may be enforced in the present case despite

her death.

As a general rule, the death of an accused pending appeal

extinguishes her criminal liability and the corresponding civil liability
based solely on the offense (delict). The death amounts to an acquittal
of the accused based on the constitutionally mandated presumption of
innocence in her favor, which can be overcome only by a finding of
guilt - something that death prevents the court from making.35 In a
sense, death absolves the accused from any earthly
responsibility arising from the offense — a divine act that no
human court can reverse, qualify, much less disregard.36 The
intervention of death of the accused in any case is an injunction by
fate itself so that no criminal liability and the corresponding civil
liability arising from the offense should be imposed on him.37

The independent civil liabilities, however, survive death and an

action for recovery therefore may be generally pursued but only
by filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.38 This separate civil
action may be enforced against the estate of the accused.39

In B.P. 22 cases, the criminal action shall be deemed to include the

corresponding civil actions. Instead of instituting two separate cases,
only a single suit is filed and tried.40 This rule was enacted to help
declog court dockets, which had been packed with B.P. 22 because
creditors used the courts as collectors.
As a necessary consequence of this special rule, the civil
liabilities arising from the issuance of a worthless check are
deemed instituted in a case for violation of B.P. 22; the death of
Bernardo did not automatically extinguish the action. The
independent civil liability based on contract, which was deemed
instituted in the criminal action for B.P. 22, may still be
enforced against her estate in the present case.

XXXX
3. Standard Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Cuaresma, G.R. No. 200055, 10
September 2014

Case
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 and
Resolution,2 dated June 22, 2011 and January 16, 2012, respectively,
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 117785.

Antecedent facts:

On March 20, 2004, two vehicles, one driven by Jefferson Cham and
insured with petitioner Standard Insurance Co., Inc., and the other
owned by respondent Arnold Cuaresma and driven by respondent Jerry
B. Cuaresma, figured in an accident at North Avenue, Quezon City.3 
Consequently, the damage on the vehicle driven by Cham was
repaired, the cost of which was borne by petitioner (Standard
Insurance). Cham then executed a Release of Claim in favor of
petitioner subrogating the latter to all his rights to recover on all
claims, demands, and rights of action on account of the loss, damage,
or injury sustained as a consequfence of the accident from any person
liable thereto.4 Based on said document, petitioner, in its
letter5 dated April 15, 2004 addressed to respondents,
demanded the payment of the sum spent on repairing the
vehicle driven by Cham.

Meanwhile, on August 10, 2004, an Information 6 was filed with

the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City charging
Cham of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage
to Property docketed as Criminal Case No. 020256.
During the pendency thereof, on March 17, 2008, petitioner,
claiming that respondents collided with Cham's vehicle in a
reckless and imprudent manner, filed a Complaint7 for Sum of
Money with the MeTC of Manila against respondents, docketed
as Civil Case No. 184854, demanding payment of the sum of
P256,643.26 representing the cost of repairs on Cham's vehicle.

Respondents, however, were declared in default on December 12,

2008 for failure to file their responsive pleading to petitioner's
Complaint despite several opportunities granted by the MeTC of
Manila.8 As a result, petitioner was allowed to present its
evidence exparte.

Finding that petitioner sufficiently proved its claims by

preponderance of evidence, the MeTC ruled in favor of
petitioner in its Decision9 dated January 8, 2010

The RTC, however, reversed the ruling of the MeTC in its

Decision10 dated September 17, 2010. Contrary to the findings of
the MeTC, the RTC found that not only were there inconsistencies in
the evidence presented by petitioner as to its corporate identity as well
as the amount of the supposed cost of indemnification, but petitioner
also failed to sufficiently prove that the proximate cause of the
damage incurred by Cham's vehicle was respondents' fault or
negligence. In addition, on respondents' argument that the
instant case must be consolidated with the prior criminal suit
they filed against Cham, the RTC disagreed and ruled that
criminal and civil cases can proceed
independently.11cralawlawlibrary

On appeal, the CA likewise found that the evidence proffered by

petitioner is insufficient to support its averment of negligence.
Consequently, it affirmed the RTC's Decision and further denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution12 dated
January 16, 2012.

Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner committed forum shopping when it filed a

separate independent civil action.

HELD: No, petitioner, who is subrogated to the rights of Cham, the

accused in the criminal case instituted by respondents, cannot be
guilty of forum shopping for its separate civil action is expressly
allowed to proceed independently of the criminal action involved
herein; offended party" may bring such an action but the "offended
party" may not recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to
the offended party in the criminal action, not to the accused.

4. Heirs of Simon vs. Chan,

G.R. No. 157547, 23 February 2011
There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the
issuance of an unfunded check prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 (BP 22).
Antecedents:
1. On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) an information charging the late
Eduardo Simon (Simon) with a violation of BP 22, docketed as Criminal Case No.
275381 entitled People v. Eduardo Simon. The accusatory portion reads:
That sometime in December 1996 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or
draw and issue to Elvin Chan to apply on account or for value Landbank
Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 payable to cash in the
amount of ₱336,000.00 said accused well knowing that at the time of issue
she/he/they did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when
presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for Account Closed and
despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay
 said Elvin Chan the amount of the check or to make arrangement for full
payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
2. More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan
commenced in the MeTC in Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the
principal amount of ₱336,000.00, coupled with an application for a writ of
preliminary attachment (docketed as Civil Case No. 915-00).
3. On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary
attachment, which was implemented on August 17, 2000 through the sheriff
attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon.4
4. On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with
application to charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for damages,5 pertinently
averring:
xxx
On the ground of litis pendentia, that is, as a consequence of the pendency of
another action between the instant parties for the same cause before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10) entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon", docketed thereat as Criminal Case No. 275381-
CR, the instant action is dismissable under Section 1, (e), Rule 16, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, xxx
5. On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simon’s urgent motion to dismiss
with application to charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for damages, stating:
6. On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simon’s urgent motion
to dismiss with application to charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for
damages,7 dismissing the complaint of Chan.
On July 31, 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City upheld the
dismissal of Chan’s complaint.
On September 26, 2001, Chan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition
for review,10 challenging the propriety of the dismissal of his complaint on the
ground of litis pendentia.
On June 25, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,12 overturning
the RTC, viz:
"There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil
action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the
recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not
include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may be
prosecuted separately without a reservation".
Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioners submit that the CA erroneously
premised its decision on the assessment that the civil case was an independent
civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code.

Issue:
whether or not Chan’s civil action to recover the amount
of the unfunded check (Civil Case No. 915-00) was an
independent civil action and can be filed separately with
BP 22 case.

RULING: NO. there is no independent civil action to recover

the value of a bouncing check issued in contravention of BP
22. This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,
effective December 1, 2000.
Chan’s separate civil action to recover the amount of the
check involved in the prosecution for the violation of BP 22
could not be independently maintained under both Supreme
Court Circular 57-97 and the aforequoted provisions of Rule
111 of the Rules of Court, notwithstanding the allegations of
fraud and deceit.

DISCUSSION:
There is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check
issued in contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, effective December 1, 2000, which relevantly provides:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - (a) When a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made
before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by
way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the
amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees therefor shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party
upon the filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for
actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the
accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the
subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file
such civil action separately shall be allowed.18

5. Heirs of Burgos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169711, 08

February 2010
This case is about the legal standing of the offended parties in a criminal case to
seek, in their personal capacities and without the Solicitor General’s intervention,
reversal of the trial court’s order granting bail to the accused on the ground of
absence of strong evidence of guilt.
The Facts and the Case
On January 7, 1992 a number of assailants attacked the household of Sarah
Marie Palma Burgos while all were asleep, killing Sarah and her uncle Erasmo
Palma (Erasmo). Another uncle, Victor Palma (Victor), and a friend, Benigno
Oquendo (Oquendo), survived the attack. The theory of the police was that a
land transaction gone sour between Sarah’s live-in partner, David So (David),
and respondent Johnny Co (Co) motivated the assault.
Four months after the incident, the police arrested Cresencio Aman (Aman) and
Romeo Martin (Martin) who executed confessions, allegedly admitting their part
in the attack. They pointed to two others who helped them, namely, Artemio
"Pong" Bergonia and Danilo Say, and to respondent Co who allegedly
masterminded the whole thing.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 51, tried the case against
Aman and Martin in Criminal Cases 92-104918-21. The three others remained at
large.
After trial, the RTC acquitted them both.
After 10 years or on September 5, 2002 respondent Co surrendered to the
National Bureau of Investigation. The prosecution charged him with two
counts of murder for the deaths of Sarah 1 and Erasmo2 and two counts of
frustrated murder committed against Oquendo3 and Victor.4 Upon
arraignment, Co pleaded not guilty to the charges.
On September 25, 2002 respondent Co filed a petition for admission to
bail.5 After hearing or on April 14, 2004, the RTC 6 granted bail on the ground that
the evidence of guilt of respondent Co was not strong.
This prompted the victim’s heirs to file a special civil action of certiorari with
prayer for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction 10 before
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 90028.
The CA dismissed the petition,11 however, for having been filed without
involving the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in violation of
jurisprudence12 and the law, specifically, Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV
of the Administrative Code.

The Issue
whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the special civil action of certiorari,
which questioned the RTC’s grant of bail to respondent Co, for having been filed
in the name of the offended parties and without the OSG’s intervention.
HELD: YES
The Court’s Ruling
As a general rule, the mandate or authority to represent the state lies only in the
OSG. Thus—
It is patent that the intent of the lawmaker was to give the designated
official, the Solicitor General, in this case, the unequivocal mandate to
appear for the government in legal proceedings. Spread out in the laws
creating the office is the discernible intent which may be gathered from the
term "shall" x x x.
xxxx
The Court is firmly convinced that considering the spirit and the letter of
the law, there can be no other logical interpretation of Sec. 35 of the
Administrative Code than that it is, indeed, mandatory upon the OSG to
"represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer.26
For the above reason, actions essentially involving the interest of the state, if not
initiated by the Solicitor General, are, as a rule,27 summarily dismissed.28
Here, the question of granting bail to the accused is but an aspect of the
criminal action, preventing him from eluding punishment in the event of
conviction. The grant of bail or its denial has no impact on the civil liability of the
accused that depends on conviction by final judgment. Here, respondent Co has
already been arraigned. Trial and judgment, with award for civil liability when
warranted, could proceed even in his absence.
In Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz,29 this Court allowed the offended party to
challenge before it the trial court’s order granting bail. But in that case, the trial
court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting
bail without conducting any hearing at all. Thus, to disallow the appeal on the
basis of lack of intervention of the OSG would "leave the private complainant
without any recourse to rectify the public injustice."30 It is not the case here. The
trial court took time to hear the parade of witnesses that the prosecution
presented before reaching the conclusion that the evidence of guilt of respondent
Co was not strong.

B. When Separate Civil Action is Suspended

1. Co vs. Muñoz, Jr.,
G.R. No. 181986, 04 December 2013
Petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to set aside the decision2 dated January
31, 2007 and resolution3 dated March 3, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 29355. The CA rulings reversed and set aside the
decision4 dated February 24, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Legaspi City, Branch 5, in Criminal Case Nos. 9704, 9705 and 9737, and
acquitted respondent Ludolfo P. Munoz, Jr. (Munoz) of three counts of libel.

Factual Antecedents
1. The case springs from the statements made by the respondent Muñoz against
the petitioner, Elizalde S. Co (Co), in several interviews with radio stations in
Legaspi City. Munoz, a contractor, was charged and arrested for perjury.
Suspecting that Co, a wealthy businessman, was behind the filing of suit, Munoz
made the following statements:
(a) Co influenced the Office of the City Prosecutor of Legaspi City to
expedite the issuance of warrant of arrest against Muñoz in connection with
the perjury case;
(b) Co manipulated the results of the government bidding involving the
Masarawag-San Francisco dredging project, and;
(c) Co received ₱2,000,000.00 from Muñoz on the condition that Co will sub-
contract the project to Muñoz, which condition Co did not comply with.5
2. Consequently, Co filed his complaint-affidavit which led to the filing of
three criminal informations for libel before the RTC.6
Notably, Co did not waive, institute or reserve his right to file a separate
civil action arising from Muñoz’s libelous remarks against him.7
3. In his defense,8 Muñoz countered that he revealed the anomalous
government bidding as a call of public duty; that in fact, he filed cases against
Co before the Ombudsman involving the anomalous dredging project.
4. In its decision, the RTC found Muñoz guilty of three counts of libel.
5. The CA reversed the RTC Ruling, and held that the subject matter of the
interviews was impressed with public interest and Muñoz’ statements were
protected as privileged communication under the first paragraph of Article 354 of
the RPC.12
6. Hence, the CA reversed the RTC decision and acquitted Muñoz of the libel
charges due to the prosecution’s failure to establish the existence of actual
malice.
The Petitioner’s Arguments
In the present petition, Co acknowledges that he may no longer appeal the
criminal aspect of the libel suits because that would violate Muñoz’ right against
double jeopardy. Hence, he claims damages only on the basis of Section 2,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court (ROC), which states that the extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. He avers
that this principle applies in general whether the civil action is instituted with or
separately from the criminal action.15
He also claims that the civil liability of an accused may be appealed in case of
acquittal.16
The Respondent’s Arguments
Muñoz argues that Co misunderstood Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC because,
as its title suggests, the provision presupposes the filing of a civil action
separately from the criminal action. Thus, when there is no reservation of the
right to separately institute the civil action arising from the offense, the extinction
of the criminal action extinguishes the civil action.
Since Co did not reserve his right to separately institute a civil action arising from
the offense, the dismissal of the criminal action bars him from filing the present
petition to enforce the civil liability.

The Issues
 1. whether a private party may appeal the judgment
of acquittal insofar as he seeks to enforce the
accused’s civil liability; and
The Court's Ruling: YES

The private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal

insofar as he seeks to enforce the accused’s civil
liability.
However, the respondent is not civilly liable because no
libel was committed.

DISCUSSION
The respondent is not civilly liable because no libel was committed.
The CA has acquitted Muñoz of libel because his statement is a privileged
communication. In libel, the existence of malice is essential as it is an element of
the crime.30
In light of the priviledge nature of Munoz’ statements and the failure of the
prosectionto prove malice in fact, there was no libel that was committed by
Munoz. Without the crime, no civil liability ex delicto may be claimed by Co That
can be pursued in the present petition. There is no act from which civil liability
may arise that exists.
XXX

2. Domingo vs. Colina, G.R. No. 173330, 17 June 2013

The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 and
Resolution2 dated August 12, 2005 and May 26, 2006, respectively, of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27090.

Facts:

1.In an Information dated March 8, 1999, herein petitioner was

charged before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Davao City,
with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22), to
wit:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

That on or about February 28, 1998 in the City of Davao, Philippines,

and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
mentioned accused, knowing fully well that he/she have (sic) no funds
and /or credit with the drawee bank, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously issued UCPB Check No. 0014924 dated February 28, 1998
in the amount of P175,000.00 in payment of an obligation in favor of
Merlinda Dy Colina; but when the said check was presented to the
drawee bank for encashment, the same was dishonored for the reason
"ACCOUNT CLOSED" and despite notice of dishonor and repeated
demands upon him/her to make good the check, he/she failed and
refused to make payment or to deposit the face amount of the check,
to the damage and prejudice of herein complainant in the aforesaid
amount.3

2. The case proceeded to trial.

3. After the prosecution rested its case, the defense filed a Demurrer
to Evidence.

4. On October 25, 2001, the MTCC issued an Order granting the

demurrer to evidence holding that:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Taking into consideration the observations of this court that the
evidence adduced in court by the prosecution in the records of this
case failed to prove element[s] nos. 2 and 3 of the crime of violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 charged against the accused Lucille
Domingo per information in this case,

5. The prosecution, through the private prosecutor, then filed a Motion

for Reconsideration to the Order of Dismissal and In The Alternative To
Reopen the Civil Aspect of the Case.5 The prosecution contended that
even assuming that petitioner did not receive valuable consideration
for her bounced check, she is nonetheless liable to respondent for the
face value of the check as an accommodation party and, that
petitioner's knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds in or credit with
the bank is presumed from the dishonor of her check.

6. On November 23, 2001, the MTCC issued another Order denying the
prosecution's Motion.

7. In deference to the desire of the prosecution, let it be stated herein

that the act from which the civil liability of the accused in favor
of the private complainant may arise, does not exist in this
case.

8. Respondent appealed the civil aspect of the case to the Regional

Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City.
9. On September 30, 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads, thus:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby MODIFIED,
ordering the accused-appellee [Lucille] Domingo to pay complainant
Melinda Colina the civil liability arising [out] of the offense charged in
the amount of P175,000.00, plus interest of 12% per annum counted
from the filing of the [complaint] and cost of suit.

10. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it.

11. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA.

12. On August 12, 2005, the CA rendered its assailed Decision

dismissing petitioner's petition for review and affirming the RTC
Decision in toto.

13. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied via the

questioned CA Resolution dated May 26, 2006.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari based on the
following Reasons/Arguments:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOTTHE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY

ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN UPHOLDING THAT THE RTC-BRANCH 16
OF DAVAO CITY HAS JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN AN APPEAL
INTERPOSED WHICH WAS VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 2, RULE 111 OF
THE RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WHEN THE TRIAL COURT
(MTCC-BRANCH 6 OF DAVAO CITY) HAD ALREADY RULED THAT
THE ACT FROM WHICH THE CIVIL LIABILITY MAY ARISE DID
NOT EXIST.

RULING: NO.

The petition lacks merit.

The last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of
the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be
deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the
criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist.9

Moreover, the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 120 of the same

Rules states that:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the
evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the
accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or
omission from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist.10

In the instant case, the Orders of the MTCC, dated October 25, 2001
and November 23, 2001, did not contain any such finding or
determination. The Court agrees with the CA that in acquitting
petitioner in its Order dated October 25, 2001, the MTCC did
not rule on the civil aspect of the case. While it subsequently
held in its November 23, 2001 Order that "the act from which
the civil liability of the accused in favor of the private
complainant may arise does not exist in this case," the MTCC,
nonetheless, failed to cite evidence, factual circumstances or
any discussion in its October 25, 2001 Decision which would
warrant such ruling. Instead, it simply concluded that since the
prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the offense
charged, then the act from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist. The MTCC held that its observations and ratiocinations
in its October 25, 2001 Order justified its conclusion. However, after a
careful review of the abovementioned Orders, the Court finds nothing
therein which the MTCC could have used as a reasonable ground to
arrive at its conclusion that the act or omission from which petitioner's
civil liability might arise did not exist.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.

The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated
August 12, 2005 and May 26, 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. CR No.
27090, are AFFIRMED.

3. Ching vs. Nicdao, G.R. No. 141181, 27 April 2007

Petition for review on certiorari filed by Samson Ching of the Decision1 dated
November 22, 1999 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055. The
assailed decision acquitted respondent Clarita Nicdao of eleven (11) counts of
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22, otherwise known as “The Bouncing
Checks Law.” The instant petition pertains and is limited to the civil aspect
of the case as it submits that notwithstanding respondent Nicdao’s acquittal,
she should be held liable to pay petitioner Ching the amounts of the
dishonored checks in the aggregate sum of ₱20,950,000.00.
Factual and Procedural Antecedents
1. On October 21, 1997, petitioner Ching, a Chinese national, instituted criminal
complaints for eleven (11) counts of violation of BP 22 against respondent
Nicdao. Consequently, eleven (11) Informations were filed with the First
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Province of
Bataan, which, except as to the amounts and check numbers, uniformly read as
follows:
The undersigned accuses Clarita S. Nicdao of a VIOLATION OF BATAS
PAMBANSA BILANG 22
2. At about the same time, fourteen (14) other criminal complaints, also for
violation of BP 22, were filed against respondent Nicdao by Emma Nuguid, said
to be the common law spouse of petitioner Ching. Allegedly fourteen (14) checks,
amounting to ₱1,150,000.00, were issued by respondent Nicdao to Nuguid but
were dishonored for lack of sufficient funds. The Informations were filed with the
same MCTC and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 9458 up to 9471.
3. At her arraignment, respondent Nicdao entered the plea of "not guilty" to
all the charges. A joint trial was then conducted for Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-
9443 and 9458-9471.
4. After due trial, on December 8, 1998, the MCTC rendered judgment in
Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443 convicting respondent Nicdao of eleven
(11) counts of violation of BP 22.
5. Incidentally, on January 11, 1999, the MCTC likewise rendered its judgment in
Criminal Cases Nos. 9458-9471 and convicted respondent Nicdao of the
fourteen (14) counts of violation of BP 22 filed against her by Nuguid.
6. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch
5, in separate Decisions both dated May 10, 1999, affirmed in toto the
decisions of the MCTC convicting respondent Nicdao of eleven (11) and
fourteen (14) counts of violation of BP 22 in Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443 and
9458-9471, respectively.
Respondent Nicdao forthwith filed with the CA separate petitions for review
of the two decisions of the RTC.
7. On November 22, 1999, the CA (13th Division) rendered the assailed
Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 acquitting respondent Nicdao of the
eleven (11) counts of violation of BP 22 filed against her by petitioner
Ching.

ISSUE:
W/N Nicdao is civilly liable despite her acquittal in the criminal aspect of the case

RULING: YES
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Notwithstanding respondent Nicdao’s acquittal, petitioner Ching is entitled to
appeal the civil aspect of the case within the reglementary period
It is axiomatic that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable."34 Under the pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court, the civil
action is generally impliedly instituted with the criminal action. At the time of
petitioner Ching’s filing of the Informations against respondent Nicdao, Section
1,35 Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, quoted earlier, provided in part:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his
right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal
Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
xxxx
As a corollary to the above rule, an acquittal does not necessarily carry with it the
extinguishment of the civil liability of the accused. Section 2(b) 36 of the same
Rule, also quoted earlier, provided in part:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the
civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
It is also relevant to mention that judgments of acquittal are required to state
"whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the
accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either
case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist."37
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt,
the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may
be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground.

C. When Civil Action May Proceed Independently

1. Lim vs. Kou Co Ping, G.R. Nos. 175256 and 179160, 23
August 2012
Is it forum shopping for a private complainant to pursue a civil complaint for
specific performance and damages, while appealing the judgment on the civil
aspect of a criminal case for esta4fa? No.
Before the Court are consolidated Petitions for Review assailing the separate
Decisions of the Second and Seventeenth Divisions of the Court of Appeals (CA)
on the above issue.
Factual Antecedents
1. An Information for Estafa through Misappropriation or Conversion was filed
against Co before Branch 154 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City
2.The private complainant, Lily Lim, participated in the criminal proceedings to
prove her damages. She prayed for Co to return her money amounting to ₱
2,380,800.00, foregone profits, and legal interest, and for an award of moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees.13
3. On November 19, 2003, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 154, rendered its
Order14 acquitting Co of the estafa charge for insufficiency of evidence.
Insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned, however, set this case for
the reception of his evidence on the matter on December 11, 2003 at 8:30
o’clock [sic] in the morning.
4. After the trial on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the Pasig City RTC
also relieved Co of civil liability to Lim in its December 1, 2004 Order.
5. On March 14, 2005, Lim filed her notice of appeal 21 on the civil aspect of
the criminal case. Her appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 and
raffled to the Second Division of the CA.

The civil action for specific performance

6. On April 19, 2005, Lim filed a complaint for specific performance and damages
before Branch 21 of the RTC of Manila against Co and all other parties to the
withdrawal authorities, Tigerbilt, Fil-Cement Center, FRCC, Southeast Asia
Cement, and La Farge Corporation.

Motions to dismiss both actions

7. Co filed motions to dismiss the said civil case24 and Lim’s appeal in the civil
aspect of the estafa case or CA-G.R. CV No. 85138. 25 He maintained that the
two actions raise the same issue, which is Co’s liability to Lim for her inability
to withdraw the bags of cement,26 and should be dismissed on the ground of lis
pendens and forum shopping.
8. The appellate court (Second Division) favorably resolved Co’s motion and
dismissed Lim’s appeal from the civil aspect of the estafa case. In its
Resolution dated October 20, 2005, the CA Second Division held that the
parties, causes of action, and reliefs prayed for in Lim’s appeal and in her
civil complaint are identical. Both actions seek the same relief, which is the
payment of the value of the 37,200 bags of cement. 27 Thus, the CA Second
Division dismissed Lim’s appeal for forum shopping.28 The CA denied29 Lim’s
motion for reconsideration.30
9.Lim filed the instant petition for review, which was docketed as G.R. No.
175256.
Ruling of the Manila Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 05-112396
10. Meanwhile, the Manila RTC denied Co’s Motion to Dismiss in an
Order31 dated December 6, 2005. The Manila RTC held that there was no forum
shopping because the causes of action invoked in the two cases are different. It
observed that the civil complaint before it is based on an obligation arising from
contract and quasi-delict, whereas the civil liability involved in the appeal of the
criminal case arose from a felony.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Seventeenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No.
93395
11. The CA Seventeenth Division denied Co’s petition and remanded the civil
complaint to the trial court for further proceedings. The CA Seventeenth Division
agreed with the Manila RTC that the elements of litis pendentia and forum
shopping are not met in the two proceedings because they do not share the
same cause of action.34

Issue
Did Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific performance
and damages during the pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of the
criminal case for estafa?

Our Ruling: No
A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise
to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender51 - (1) civil liability ex
delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code,52 and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability
that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. The independent
civil liability may be based on "an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony," as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as
for breach of contract or for tort53 ). It may also be based on an act or omission
that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the
criminal action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code ("in cases of
defamation, fraud and physical injuries").
On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal
action and may be pursued independently, as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of
the Civil Code, which state that:
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act
or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter. (Emphasis supplied.)
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought
by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities,
jurisprudence holds that the offended party may pursue the two types of civil
liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the rules on forum
shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata.
XXX
FACTS:
FR Cement Corporation (FRCC) issued several withdrawal authorities for the
account of cement dealers and traders, Fil-Cement and Tigerbilt (FCCT).
FCCT then sold the withdrawal authorities covering 50,000 bags of cement to
respondent Co for the amount of P3.15 million or P63.00 per bag.
Co then sold the same withdrawal authorities to petitioner Lily Lim for the alleged
amount of P3.2 million or P64.00 per bag.
Lim, using the withdrawal authorities, withdrew 2,800 bags of cement from FRCC.
He then sold some of the withdrawal authorities covering 10,000 bags back to
respondent Co. (Remaining: 37,200 bags)
Sometime within the same year, FRCC no longer allowed Lim to withdraw the
remaining 37,200 bags covered by the withdrawal authorities. According to Co
and the manager of FCCT, the plant implemented a price increase and would only
release the goods once Lim paid for the price difference or agreed to receive a
lesser quantity of cement. Lim objected and maintained that the withdrawal
authorities were not subject to price fluctuations.
Because of this, Lim filed an information for Estafa through Misappropriation or
Conversion before the RTC of Pasig City. The criminal case was dismissed. The
civil liability was subsequently dismissed as well after the reception of the
evidence.
Lim appealed the dismissal of the civil liability before the CA. While the appeal
before the CA was pending, she filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages before the RTC of Manila. The complaint asserted two causes of action:
breach of contract and abuse of rights.
In his defense, Co maintained that the two causes of action raise the same issue,
which was Co’s liability to Lim for her inability to withdraw the bags of cement,
and SHOULD BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUNDS OF LIS PENDENS AND
FORUM SHOPPING.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lim committed forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific
performance and damages during the pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect
of Estafa.
HELD:
Lim did not commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific performance
and damages during the pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of Estafa.
A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two
separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender:  (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is,
civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code,− and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may be pursued
independently of the criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability may be based
on “an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony,” as
provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort). It may
also be based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated
independently from the criminal action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil
Code (“in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries”).
The filing of the collection case after the dismissal of the estafa cases against the
offender did not amount to forum-shopping. The essence of forum shopping is
the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action,
either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Although
the cases filed by the offended party arose from the same act or omission of the
offender, they are, however, based on different causes of action. The criminal
cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil action for collection is
anchored on culpa contractual.
Moreover, there can be no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law
expressly allows the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed
independently of the criminal action.

2. Casupanan vs. Laroya, G.R. No. 145391, 26 August 2002

The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Resolution 1 dated
December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari and the
Resolution2 dated August 24, 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration, both
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special Civil
Action No. 17-C (99).

The Facts
1. Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya ("Laroya" for
brevity) and the other owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo ("Capitulo" for
brevity) and driven by petitioner Avelino Casupanan ("Casupanan" for brevity),
figured in an accident. As a result, two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court ("MCTC" for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case
against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property, docketed as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the other hand,
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.
2. When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary
investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to
dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the
pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion in the Order of
March 26, 1999 and dismissed the civil case.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999 dismissing the
petition for certiorari for lack of merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the order of
dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and
therefore the proper remedy should have been an appeal.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas RTC
denied the same in the Resolution of August 24, 2000.
Hence, this petition.

The Issue
whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can
validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-
delict against the private complainant in the criminal case.

The Court’s Ruling: Yes

Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which the MCTC
dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping, constitutes a counterclaim in the
criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo argue that if the accused in a criminal
case has a counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file the
counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time. They contend that an
action on quasi-delict is different from an action resulting from the crime of
reckless imprudence, and an accused in a criminal case can be an aggrieved
party in a civil case arising from the same incident. They maintain that under
Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed independently
of the criminal action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not the only one
who filed the independent civil action based on quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the
owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a party in the criminal case.
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally defective as it does not
state the real antecedents. Laroya further alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo
forfeited their right to question the order of dismissal when they failed to avail of
the proper remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there is no question of law to be
resolved as the order of dismissal is already final and a petition for certiorari is
not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.
In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition raises the legal
question of whether there is forum-shopping since they filed only one action - the
independent civil action for quasi-delict against Laroya.
Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to
secure a favorable judgment.8 Forum-shopping is present when in the two or
more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights of action and reliefs
sought.9 However, there is no forum-shopping in the instant case because the
law and the rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action which can
proceed independently of the criminal action.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property based on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed
the civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although
these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different
causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under
the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana
actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. These articles on
culpa aquiliana read:
"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant."
Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by
preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered damage because of the fault or
negligence of another. Either the private complainant or the accused can file a
separate civil action under these articles. There is nothing in the law or rules that
state only the private complainant in a criminal case may invoke these articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure ("2000 Rules" for brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate his
counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:
 "SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a) x x x.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the
accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been
the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action." (Emphasis
supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his
counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the
accused files such separate civil action.
Filing of a separate civil action
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure ("1985 Rules" for
brevity), as amended in 1988, allowed the filing of a separate civil action
independently of the criminal action provided the offended party reserved the
right to file such civil action. Unless the offended party reserved the civil action
before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, all civil actions
arising from the same act or omission were deemed "impliedly instituted" in the
criminal case. These civil actions referred to the recovery of civil liability ex-
delicto, the recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and the recovery of damages
for violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human Relations.
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict under the
1985 Rules, the offended party had to reserve in the criminal action the right to
bring such action. Otherwise, such civil action was deemed "impliedly instituted"
in the criminal action. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules provided as follows:
"Section 1. – Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action
is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised
Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of
the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of,
or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately
waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be
made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under
 circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to
make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act
or omission of the accused.
x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil action, if
reserved in the criminal action, could not be filed until after final judgment was
rendered in the criminal action. If the separate civil action was filed before the
commencement of the criminal action, the civil action, if still pending, was
suspended upon the filing of the criminal action until final judgment was rendered
in the criminal action. This rule applied only to the separate civil action filed to
recover liability ex-delicto. The rule did not apply to independent civil actions
based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, which could proceed
independently regardless of the filing of the criminal action.
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules continues this
procedure, to wit:
"SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. – After the criminal action
has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be
instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been
instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be
found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until
final judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before
judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon
motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the
court trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence
already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically
reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the
prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party
in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The
consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of
prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose
proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.
x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the
separate civil action, filed to recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the
filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of the present Rule 111 also prohibits the
filing, after commencement of the criminal action, of a separate civil action to
recover damages ex-delicto.
When civil action may proceed independently
The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are not the
offended parties in the criminal case, can file a separate civil action against the
offended party in the criminal case. Section 3, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules
provides as follows:
"SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985
Rules, expressly allows the "offended party" to bring an independent civil action
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of the
present Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however,
may the "offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action."
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an
independent civil action for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the
present Rule 111 expressly states that the "offended party" may bring such an
action but the "offended party" may not recover damages twice for the same act
or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers
to the offended party in the criminal action, not to the accused.
Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in Cabaero vs.
Cantos12 where the Court held that the accused therein could validly institute a
separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the
criminal case. In Cabaero, the accused in the criminal case filed his Answer with
Counterclaim for malicious prosecution. At that time the Court noted the
"absence of clear-cut rules governing the prosecution on impliedly instituted civil
actions and the necessary consequences and implications thereof." Thus,
the Court ruled that the trial court should confine itself to the criminal aspect of
the case and disregard any counterclaim for civil liability. The Court further ruled
that the accused may file a separate civil case against the offended party "after
the criminal case is terminated and/or in accordance with the new Rules which
may be promulgated." The Court explained that a cross-claim, counterclaim or
third-party complaint on the civil aspect will only unnecessarily complicate the
proceedings and delay the resolution of the criminal case.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated in the 2000
Rules precisely to address the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero. Under this
provision, the accused is barred from filing a counterclaim, cross-claim or third-
party complaint in the criminal case. However, the same provision states that
"any cause of action which could have been the subject (of the counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party complaint) may be litigated in a separate civil action."
The present Rule 111 mandates the accused to file his counterclaim in a
separate civil actiosn which shall proceed independently of the criminal action,
even as the civil action of the offended party is litigated in the criminal action.
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal
action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation.
The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of
the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The
suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action
arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the
commencement of the criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or
omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil
liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-
delict - without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can
proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement or
prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict.
The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the offended party will
have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In some instances, the
accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against his
employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or
omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in
paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the
counterclaim of the accused "may be litigated in a separate civil action." This
is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any
counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The
accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the
offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict,
the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until the civil
action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article
2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this
remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused from
filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his
counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to
the courts, and equal protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and
Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089
on the ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.

XXX
 
● The offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or
omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil
liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-
delict - without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases
can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The
commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the
civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended party
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.

● The accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or
omission he is accused of in the criminal case. 

Facts: 

Two vehicles, one driven by Laroya and the other owned by Capitulo and driven
by Casupanan, figured in an accident. Laroya filed a criminal case against
Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage toproperty. On the other
hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary
investigation stage. Laroya filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground
of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC
granted the motion and dismiss the civil case. Casupanan and Capitulo, filed a
motion for reconsideration. They insisted that the civil case is a separate civil
action which can proceed independently of the criminal case. The MR was
denied. Hence, they filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the RTC.

The RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order
which disposes of the case and therefore the proper remedy should have been
an appeal. It further held that a special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute
for a lost appeal. Finally, it declared that even on the premise that the MCTC
erred in dismissing the civil case, such error is a pure error of judgment and not
an abuse of discretion. 

Issues:

1. Was the petition for certiorari a proper remedy?

2. Whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can

validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-
delict against the private complainant in the criminal case. Was there a forum-
shopping?
Held:

1. Yes. The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of
forum-shopping under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The
MCTC did not state in its order of dismissal that the dismissal was with
prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is without
prejudice to refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly states
it is with prejudice. Absent a declaration that the dismissal is with prejudice, the
same is deemed without prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs dismissal, being silent on
the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice.

Section 1 of Rule 41 provides that an order dismissing an action without

prejudice is not appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special
civil action under Rule 65. Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly states that where the
judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. Clearly, the Capas RTCs order
dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the proper remedy is an
ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
2. The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the
same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively,
to secure a favorable judgment. Forum-shopping is present when in the two or
more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights of action and reliefs
sought. However, there is no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law
and the rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action which can
proceed independently of the criminal action.

Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property based on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed
the civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although
these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different
causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under
the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana
actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code.

Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by

preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered damage because of the fault or
negligence of another. Either the private complainant or the accused can file a
separate civil action under these articles. There is nothing in the law or rules that
state only the private complainant in a criminal case may invoke these articles.

Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal

Procedure (2000 Rules for brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate his
counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x x.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the

accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the
subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)

Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his
counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the
accused files such separate civil action.
Conclusion

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal
action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation.
The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of
the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The
suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action
arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the
commencement of the criminal action.

Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission.
The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is
deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict - without violating
the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and
independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal
action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that
the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission
of the defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a
second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be insolvent,
necessitating the filing of another case against his employer or guardians.

Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or
omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in
paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the
counterclaim of the accused may be litigated in a separate civil action. This is
only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any
counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case.
The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against
the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-
delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until
the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.

Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article
2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this
remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused
from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his
counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to
the courts, and equal protection of the law.

Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and
Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on
the ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.  (Casupanan vs. Laroya, G.R. No.
145391, August 26, 2002)

3. Cabuago vs. People, G.R. Nos. 163879 and 165805, 30

July 2014
Independent civil action can proceed independently.
Separat3e civil action. Died during the pendency of appeal.
CASE
Before this Court are appeals via Rule 45 from the Decision 1 dated June 4, 2004
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27293, affirming the Decision 2 dated
February 28,2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), convicting appellant Dr.
Antonio P. Cabugao (Dr. Cabugao) and Dr. Clenio Ynzon (Dr. Ynzon) of the
crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide.
FACTS:
On June 14, 2000, at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, ten (10)-year old Rodolfo
F. Palma, Jr. (JR) complained of abdominal pain to his mother, Rosario Palma.
At 5 o’clock that same afternoon, Palma's mother and father, Atty. Rodolfo
Palma Sr., brought JR to the clinic of accused Dr. Cabugao. Dr. Cabugao, a
general practitioner, specializing in family medicine gave medicines for the pain
and told Palma's parents to call him up if his stomach pains continue. Due to
persistent abdominal pains, at 4:30 in the early morning of June 15, 2000, they
returned to Dr. Cabugao, who advised them to bring JR to the Nazareth General
Hospital in Dagupan City, for confinement. JR was admitted at the said hospital
at 5:30 in the morning.5
2 On February 28, 2003, in convicting both the accused, the trial court found the
following circumstances as sufficient basis to conclude that accused were indeed
negligent in the performance of their duties:
3. On June 4, 2004, in affirming the accused' conviction, the Court of Appeals
gave similar observations, to wit:
The foregoing expert testimony clearly revealed such want of reasonable skill
and care on the part of JR's attending physicians, appellants Dr. Cabugao and
Dr. Ynzon
4. Thus, these appeals brought beforethis Court raising the following arguments:

ISSUE:
whether or not the death of Dr. Ynzon extinguished his civil
liability
RULING: NO
AS TO CIVIL LIABILITY
While this case is pending appeal, counsel for petitioner Dr. Ynzon informed the
Court that the latter died on December 23, 2011 due to "multiorgan failure" as
evidenced by a copy of death certificate.33 Thus, the effect of death, pending
appeal of his conviction of petitioner Dr. Ynzon with regard to his criminal and
pecuniary liabilities should be in accordance to People v. Bayotas,34 wherein the
Court laid down the rules in case the accused dies prior to final judgment:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
than delict.
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an
action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either againstthe executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to
file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of
the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription.35
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused Dr. Ynzon
pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability. However, the
recovery of civil liability subsists as the same is not based on delict but by
contract and the reckless imprudence he was guilty of under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code.1âwphi1 For this reason, a separate civil action
may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of
the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same
is based,36 and in accordance with Section 4, Rule 111 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, we quote:
Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. – The death of the accused after
arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the
civil liability arising from the delict. However, the independent civil action
instituted under section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce
liability arising from other sources of obligation may be continued against the
estate or legal representative of the accused after proper substitution or against
said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may besubstituted for
the deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator
and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to
appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the
manner especially provided in these rules for prosecuting claims against the
estate of the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without
prejudice to any civil action the offended party may file against the estate of the
deceased. (Emphases ours)
In sum, upon the extinction of the criminal liability and the offended party desires
to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, the party may
file a separate civil action based on the other sources of obligation in accordance
with Section 4, Rule 111.37 If the same act or omission complained of arises from
quasi-delict,as in this case, a separate civil action must be filed against the
executor or administrator of the estate of the accused, pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:38
Section 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or
administrator. — No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debtor
interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but to
recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to
enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal, may be commenced against him. (Emphases ours)
Conversely, if the offended party desires to recover damages from the same act
or omission complained of arising from contract, the filing of a separate civil
action must be filed against the estate, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred;
exceptions. — All claims for money against the decent, arising from contract,
express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims
for funeral expenses and expense for the last sickness of the decedent, and
judgment for money against the decent, must be filed within the time limited in
the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth
as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring
against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator commencesan action,
or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the
debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead
of presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual
claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if final judgment is
rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be
considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim had been
presented directly beforethe court in the administration proceedings. Claims not
yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner DR. ANTONIO P. CABUGAO is
hereby ACQUITTEDof the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide.
Due to the death of accused Dr. Clenio Ynzon prior to the disposition of this
case, his criminal liability is extinguished; however, his civil liability subsists. A
separate civil action may be filed either against the executor/administrator, or the
estateof Dr. Ynzon, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same
are based.
SO ORDERED.
XXX

D. Effect of Death on Civil Actions

1. People vs. Lipata murder, G.R. No. 200302, 20 April 2016
The Case
G.R. No. 200302 is an appeal 1 assailing the Decision2 promulgated on 31 May
2011 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04461. The CA
affirmed the Decision3 dated 23 March 2010 of Branch 85 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. Q-05-136584. The RTC found
appellant Gerry Lipata y Ortiza (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The RTC also ordered appellant to pay damages to the heirs of
Rolando Cueno (Cueno).4
The Facts
1. Appellant was charged with the crime of Murder in an Information which reads
as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of September, 2005, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating with two (2) other
persons whose true names, identities and definite whereabouts have not as
yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and
with evident premeditation and treachery, and taking advantage of superior
strength, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one RONALDO
CUENO Y BONIFACIO, by then and there stabbing him repeatedly with
bladed weapons, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal stab wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs
of Ronaldo Cueno y Bonifacio.
2. Appellant was arraigned on 11 October 2005, and entered a plea of not guilty
to the charge. Pre-trial conference was terminated on 26 October 2005, and trial
on the merits ensued.
3. Appellant was convicted of the charges against him, viz:
The accused is hereby adjudged to pay the heirs of Rolando Cueno the following
amounts:
(a) Php 50,000.00 representing civil indemnity ex delicto of the accused;
(b) Php 120,550.00 representing the actual damages incurred by the heirs of
Rolando Cueno, incident to his death plus 12% interest per annum
computed from 6 September 2005 until fully paid;
(c) Php 50,000.00 as moral damages for the mental and emotional anguish
suffered by the heirs arising from the death of Rolando Cueno; and
(d) Php 25,000[.00] as exemplary damages.
4. The accused shall be credited with the full period of his preventive
imprisonment, subject to the conditions imposed under Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.
5. Appellant, through the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), filed a notice of
appeal9 on 6 April 2010. The RTC granted appellant’s notice in an Order 10 dated
19 April 2010.
6. The CA dismissed appellant’s appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC.
The CA agreed with the RTC’s ruling that appellant’s claim of defense of a
relative must fail.
7. Appellant died while in detention pending his appeal.
8. In view of appellant’s death prior to the promulgation of the CA’s
decision, this Court issued a Resolution dated 25 September 2013 which
ordered the PAO "(1) to SUBSTITUTE the legal representatives of the estate
of the deceased appellant as party; and (2) to COMMENT on the civil liability
of appellant within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution."21
The PAO filed its Manifestation with Comment on the Civil Liability of the
Deceased Appellant on 29 November 2013, viz:
9. Considering that the civil liability in the instant case arose from and is based
solely on the act complained of, i.e. murder, the same does not survive the death
of the deceased appellant.
10. This being so, it is respectfully submitted that the necessity to substitute the
legal representatives of the estate of the deceased as party does not arise.23
11. On 9 July 2014, this Court issued a Resolution which declared that "the
[PAO] shall continue as the legal representative of the estate of the deceased
[appellant] for purposes of representing the estate in the civil aspect of this case.

ISSUE: W/N the death of the accused pending his appeal

extinguished his civil liability.
HELD: YES

The Court’s Ruling

The promulgation of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure in 2000 provided
for the effect of the death of the accused after arraignment and during the
pendency of the criminal action to reflect our ruling in Bayotas:
Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. — The death of the accused after
arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the
civil liability arising from the delict. However, the independent civil action
instituted under Section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce
liability arising from other sources of obligation may be continued against the
estate or legal representative of the accused after proper substitution or against
said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may be substituted for
the deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator
and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to
appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.1âwphi1
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the
manner especially provided in these rules for prosecuting claims against the
estate of the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without
prejudice to any civil action the offended party may file against the estate of the
deceased.
Contrary to the PAO’s Manifestation with Comment on the Civil Liability of the
Deceased Appellant,31 Cueno died because of appellant’s fault. Appellant caused
damage to Cueno through deliberate acts.32 Appellant’s civil liability ex quasi
delicto may now be pursued because appellant’s death on 13 February
2011, before the promulgation of final judgment, extinguished both his
criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto.
Despite the recognition of the survival of the civil liability for claims under Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, as well as from sources of obligation other
than delict in both jurisprudence and the Rules, and our subsequent designation
of the PAO as the "legal representative of the estate of the deceased [appellant]
for purposes of representing the estate in the civil aspect of this case," 33 the
current Rules, pursuant to our pronouncement in
Bayotas,34 require the private offended party, or his heirs, in this case, to
institute a separate civil action to pursue their claims against the estate of
the deceased appellant. The independent civil actions in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176, as well as claims from sources of obligation other than delict, are not
deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the
offended party even without reservation.35 The separate civil action proceeds
independently of the criminal proceedings and requires only a preponderance of
evidence.36 The civil action which may thereafter be instituted against the estate
or legal representatives of the decedent is taken from the new provisions of
Section 16 of Rule 337 in relation to the rules for prosecuting claims against his
estate in Rules 86 and 87.38
Upon examination of the submitted pleadings, we found that there was no
separate civil case instituted prior to the criminal case. Neither was there
any reservation for filing a separate civil case for the cause of action
arising from quasi-delict. Under the present Rules, the heirs of Cueno should
file a separate civil case in order to obtain financial retribution for their
loss. The lack of a separate civil case for the cause of action arising from
quasi-delict leads us to the conclusion that, a decade after Cueno’s death,
his heirs cannot recover even a centavo from the amounts awarded by the
CA.
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Decision promulgated on 31 May 2011 by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04461. The criminal and civil
liabilities ex delicto of appellant Gerry Lipata y Ortiza are
declared EXTINGUISHED by his death prior to final judgment.
XXX
CASE 2016-0033: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GERRY LIPATA y
ORTIZA (G.R. No. 200302, 20 APRIL 2016, CARPIO, J.) (SUBJECT/S: CIVIL
LIABILITY/IES IN MURDER CASES WHERE ACCUSED DIES PRIOR TO FINAL
JUDGMENT) (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. LIPATA)
 
DISPOSITIVE:
 
“WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Decision promulgated on 31 May 2011 by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04461. The criminal and
civil liabilities ex delicto of appellant Gerry Lipata y Ortiza are declared
EXTINGUISHED by his death prior to final judgment.
 
Let a copy, of this Decision be forwarded to the Committee on the
Revision of the Rules of Court.
 
SO ORDERED.”
 
 
SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:
 
We summarized our ruling in Bayotas as follows:
 
 1.Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes
his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.
As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, “the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and
only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the
offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.”
 
2.Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the
death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law b)
Contracts c) Quasi-contracts d) x x x e) Quasi-delicts
 
3.Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an
action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing
 a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action
may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the
estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon
which the same is based as explained above.
 
4.Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his
right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where
during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the privateoffended party instituted together therewith the
civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability
is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that
should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible deprivation of
right by prescription.30 (Emphases supplied)
 5. Cabugao vs. People, Supra.

In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the

accused Dr. Ynzon pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability. However, the recovery of
civil liability subsists as the same is not based on delict but
by contract and the reckless imprudence he was guilty of
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.1âwphi1 For
this reason, a separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which
the same is based,36 and in accordance with Section 4, Rule
111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, we quote:
Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. – The death of the
accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the
criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from
the delict. However, the independent civil action instituted
under section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted
to enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation
may be continued against the estate or legal representative
of the accused after proper substitution or against said
estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may
besubstituted for the deceased without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court
may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or
representatives to appear and be substituted within a
period of thirty (30) days from notice.
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party
shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in
these rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of the
deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be
dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the offended
party may file against the estate of the deceased.
(Emphases ours)
In sum, upon the extinction of the criminal liability and the
offended party desires to recover damages from the same
act or omission complained of, the party may file a separate
civil action based on the other sources of obligation in
accordance with Section 4, Rule 111.37 If the same act or
omission complained of arises from quasi-delict,as in this
case, a separate civil action must be filed against the
executor or administrator of the estate of the accused,
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:

XXX

2.Asilo, Jr. vs. People, G.R. Nos. 159017-18 and 159059, 09

March 2011
At bench are appeals by certiorari1 from the Decision2 of the Fourth Division of
the Sandiganbayan; (1) finding Demetrio T. Comendador3 (Mayor Comendador)
and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr.4 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 3019; (2) dismissing the cases against accused Alberto S.
Angeles;5 (3) ordering the defendants Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna,
Demetrio T. Comendador and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. to pay the plaintiffs now
respondents Visitacion C. Bombasi (Visitacion) and Cesar C. Bombasi damages;
and (4) dismissing the cases against the spouses Alida and Teddy Coroza6 and
Benita and Isagani Coronado.7
The factual antecedents of the case are:
1. Mayor Comendador, et. Al. caused the demolition of the market stall of the
Spouses Bombasi which was under a existing lease contract with the
municipality of Nagcarlan.
2.On 19 August 1994, Visitacion, together with her husband Cesar Bombasi
(Spouses Bombasi) filed with the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Laguna
a Civil Case19 for damages with preliminary injunction against the Municipality of
Nagcarlan, Laguna, Mayor Demetrio T. Comendador, Paulino S. Asilo, Jr., and
Alberto S. Angeles. The complaint was soon after amended to include the
Spouses Benita and Isagani Coronado and Spouses Alida and Teddy Coroza as
formal defendants because they were then the occupants of the contested area.
The spouses prayed for the following disposition:
4. ORDERING defendants to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the
following –
(a) ₱437,900.00 for loss of building/store and other items therein;
(b) ₱200,000.00 for exemplary damages;
(c) ₱200,000.00 for moral damages;
(d) ₱30,.00 for attorney’s fees and ₱700.00 for every attendance of
counsel in court.
3. Spouses Bombasi, thereafter, filed a criminal complaint21 against Mayor
Comendador, Asilo and Angeles for violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019 otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" before the
Office of the Ombudsman. On 22 February 1996, an Information 22 against Mayor
Comendador, Asilo and Angeles was filed
4. Upon their arraignments, all the accused entered their separate pleas of "Not
Guilty."
5. On 4 March 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution ordering the
consolidation of Civil Case No. SP-4064 (94)23 with Criminal Case No. 23267
pending before the Third Division pursuant to Section 4, Presidential Decree No.
1606, which pertinently reads:
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the
criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall at all times be
simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the same
proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of
the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of
the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action
separately from the criminal action shall be recognized; Provided, however,
that where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment
therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with
the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred
to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court as the case may be, for
consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the
separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned.24
6. During the pendency of the case, Alberto S. Angeles died on 16
November 1997. Accordingly, the counsel of Angeles filed a motion to drop
accused Angeles. On 22 September 1999, the Third Division of Sandiganbayan
issued an Order25 DISMISSING the case against Angeles. The germane portion
of the Order reads:
7. In view of the submission of the death certificate of accused/defendant Alberto
S. Angeles, and there being no objection on the part of the Public Prosecutor,
cases against deceased accused/defendant Angeles only, are hereby
DISMISSED.
8. The death of Mayor Comendador followed on 17 September 2002. As a
result, the counsel of the late Mayor filed on 3 March 2003 a Manifestation before
the Sandiganbayan informing the court of the fact of Mayor Comendador’s death.
9. On 28 April 2003, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the accused
Demetrio T. Comendador and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act. No. 3019 as amended, and in the
absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, said accused are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
6 years and 2 months imprisonment as minimum to 10 years and 1 day as
maximum.
The order of the court dated September 22, 1999 dismissing the cases against
the accused Alberto S. Angeles, who died on November 16, 1997 is hereby
reiterated.
11. In Civil Case No. 4064, defendants Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna,
Demetrio T. Comendador and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. are hereby ordered
jointly and severally to pay plaintiff P437,900.00 as actual damages for the
destruction of the store; P100,000.00 as moral damages; P30,000.00 as
attorney’s fees, and to pay the cost of the suit. The prayer for exemplary
damages is denied as the court found no aggravating circumstances in the
commission of the crime.
12. The counsel for the late Mayor also filed its Motion for
Reconsideration30 on 12 May 2003 alleging that the death of the late Mayor
had totally extinguished both his criminal and civil liability. The
Sandiganbayan on its Resolution31 granted the Motion insofar as the
extinction of the criminal liability is concerned and denied the extinction of
the civil liability holding that the civil action is an independent civil action.
Hence, these Petitions for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N the extinction of the criminal liability due to the death of the accused
extinguished the civil liability.

RULING: NO.
We agree with the prosecution.
Death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the case could have
extinguished the civil liability if the same arose directly from the crime
committed. However, in this case, the civil liability is based on another
source of obligation, the law on human relations.49 The pertinent articles
follow:
Art. 31 of the Civil Code states:
When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently
of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
And, Art. 32(6) states:
Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
xxxx
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or
omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to
commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for
other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of
evidence.
As held in Aberca v. Ver:
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision [Art. 32 of the New
Civil Code] is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms
enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate
those sacred rights with impunity. x x x.50
Indeed, the basic facts of this case point squarely to the applicability of the law
on human relations. First, the complaint for civil liability was filed way AHEAD of
the information on the Anti-Graft Law. And, the complaint for damages
specifically invoked defendant Mayor Comendador’s violation of plaintiff’s right to
due process. Thus:
xxxx
In causing or doing the forcible demolition of the store in question, the
individual natural defendants did not only act with grave abuse of authority
but usurped a power which belongs to our courts of justice; such
actuations were done with malice or in bad faith and constitute an invasion
of the property rights of plaintiff(s) without due process of law.
Comendador, are hereby declared solidarily liable to the Spouses Bombasi
for temperate damages in the amount of ₱200,000.00 and moral damages in
the amount of ₱100,000.00.
XXX

4. People vs. Bayot, G.R. No. 200030, 18 April 2012

This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 9 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00269 affirming with modification the Decision 2 dated
31 July 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan City, Negros
Occidental, 6th Judicial Region, Branch 61, in Criminal Case No. 98-2025,
finding herein appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina (appellant) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, committed against AAA,3 thus,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellate
court increased the award of indemnity from ₱40,000.00 to ₱50,000.00. It also
ordered appellant to pay AAA moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00.
FACTS:
1. Appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina was charged with Rape in an
Information4 dated 29 December 1997
2. On arraignment, appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the crime charged.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
3. In its 31 July 2000 Decision, the RTC convicted appellant of the crime of
rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
pay AAA the amount of ₱40,000.00 as indemnity with costs.
4. Nonetheless, the Public Attorney’s Office still appealed, on behalf of appellant,
the aforesaid Court of Appeals Decision to this Court via a Notice of
Appeal13 dated 31 May 2006, which was given due course by the Court of
Appeals per Resolution14 dated 19 January 2007.
5. CA affirmed with modification the Decision of the RTC.
6. During the pendency of the appeal, the accused died.
ISSUE:
W/N the death of the accused during the pendency of this appeal extinguished
his civil liability.
RULING: YES
DISCUSSION:
Appellant’s death on 4 December 2004, during the pendency of his appeal
before the Court of Appeals, extinguished not only his criminal liability for the
crime of rape committed against AAA, but also his civil liability solely arising from
or based on said crime.15
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, specifically provides the
effect of death of the accused on his criminal, as well as civil, liability. It reads
thus:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment; [Emphasis supplied].
Applying the foregoing provision, this Court, in People v. Bayotas,16 which was
cited in a catena of cases,17 had laid down the following guidelines:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined
by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly
arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
[the] accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation
other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other
sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x x x x x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an
action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
 either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to
file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with [the] provisions of Article
1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible privation of right by prescription.18
From the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal
of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the civil
liability ex delicto. The rationale, therefore, is that the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is
ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.19
Evidently, as this Court has pronounced in People v. Olaco and People v.
Paniterce,20 it is already unnecessary to rule on appellant’s appeal. Appellant’s
appeal was still pending and no final judgment had been rendered against him at
the time of his death. Thus, whether or not appellant was guilty of the crime
charged had become irrelevant because even assuming that appellant did incur
criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto, these were totally extinguished by his
death, following the provisions of Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and
this Court’s ruling in People v. Bayotas.
SO ORDERED.
XXX

E. Judgment in Civil Action Not A Bar to Criminal Action

1. Madarang vs. CA, G.R. No. 143044, 14 July 2005
Replevin
Civil action for replevin was dismissed of falsifying the deed of sale;
whether or not res judicata in the falsification case?
Acquittal in a civil case is not a bar to criminal case
Independent civil action
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
which seeks the reversal of the Decision,1 dated April 18, 2000, of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 58038, dismissing petitioners’ petition
for certiorari.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
1.On February 11, 1994, private respondent Janice Young-Chua and her
husband, Eduardo Chan-Chua, filed a complaint for replevin and damages
against petitioners William Madarang and Evans Kho in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-19266 and raffled to
Branch 84 (RTC, Branch 84).
2. The complaint alleged that private respondent is the owner of a 1990 dark gray
Kia Pride car, evidenced by Certificate of Registration No. 08605800 2 dated May
31, 1991; and that on January 29, 1994, petitioners, through force and
intimidation, took possession of the subject car by virtue of a falsified Deed
of Sale dated December 3, 1993 allegedly executed by private respondent
in favor of petitioner Madarang.3
3. On May 12, 1994, upon complaint of private respondent, petitioner
Madarang was charged with Falsification of Public Document in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (MeTC) which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 94-24930 and raffled to Branch 32.4 
4. On the same date, petitioners were charged with Grave Coercion in the
same MeTC which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-24931, also raffled to
Branch 32.5 The cases were consolidated and jointly tried.
5. On August 8, 1996, a Motion to Suspend Criminal Proceedings on the
ground of prejudicial question was filed by petitioner Madarang in the
MeTC, claiming that the issues presented in the replevin case pending in RTC,
Branch 84 are intimately related to the issues pending before the MeTC, the
resolution of which would necessarily determine the guilt of the accused in the
criminal case for falsification.6
6. On October 1, 1996, the MeTC denied petitioner Madarang’s motion to
suspend proceedings on the ground that the decision in the civil case for
replevin will not be determinative of the guilt of the accused in the criminal charge
for falsification.7
7. On March 7, 1997, RTC, Branch 84 dismissed the complaint for replevin
upon finding that the deed of sale is genuine and that private respondent
voluntarily surrendered possession of the car to the petitioners.8 Private
respondent filed a timely appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
57597.
8. On June 13, 1997, petitioner Madarang filed a Motion to Dismiss the
falsification case on the ground that the decision dismissing the replevin
suit in RTC, Branch 84 involving the same parties absolved him of criminal
liability in the falsification case.9 
9. On January 22, 1998, the MeTC granted the Motion to Dismiss of
petitioner Madarang.10 
10. On February 27, 1998, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the
prosecution on the ground that the dismissal was unwarranted since the decision
dismissing the replevin suit in RTC, Branch 84 is not yet final and executory, as it
is pending appeal before the CA and the accused deliberately omitted to send
the private prosecutor a copy of said Motion to Dismiss.11 
11. On July 27, 1998, the MeTC recalled the dismissal of the case for
falsification.12
12. Petitioners filed a Second Omnibus Motion to Quash Criminal Case Nos. 94-
24930 and 94-24931 on the ground that the findings of RTC, Branch 84 that the
signature of private respondent in the deed of sale is not falsified and that private
respondent voluntarily surrendered possession of the car to the petitioners bar
the prosecution for falsification and grave coercion. Petitioners alleged that the
findings of the RTC are binding and must be given due respect by the MeTC
notwithstanding the appeal taken by private respondent.13
13. On March 26, 1999, the MeTC denied petitioners’ motion to quash, ruling
that the decision rendered by the RTC, Branch 84 in the replevin case
cannot absolve petitioners of the charges in the criminal cases as said
decision has not attained finality since it is pending appeal before the CA;
and that petitioners waived any grounds of a Motion to Quash pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.15
14. On October 8, 1999, the RTC, Branch 77 dismissed petitioners’ petition
for certiorari upon holding that: res judicata cannot be invoked considering that
the Decision dated March 7, 1997 of RTC, Branch 84 in the replevin case is not
yet a final and executory judgment, being on appeal; in any event, a final
judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil liability is
not a bar to criminal action; the issues of falsification and coercion were not
made the subject of a full-dressed hearing in the replevin case; and, the motion
to quash was filed only after their arraignment in violation of the well-settled
doctrine that a motion to quash may be filed only before the accused has entered
his plea to the accusatory pleading.17
15. Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which,
on April 18, 2000, was dismissed. In dismissing the petition, the CA held that
the writ of certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an
information is denied. It further held that the People of the Philippines was not
impleaded as a respondent in the case nor was the Office of the Solicitor General
furnished a copy of the petition when the Informations were filed in the name of
the People of the Philippines and necessarily it is the party interested in
sustaining the proceedings in the court.20
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following
grounds:
ISSUE:
W/N the issue in the replevin case is a prejudicial question to the falsification of
documents case.
HELD: NO.

Fourth. Section 4, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court

explicitly recognizes that "a final judgment rendered in a
civil action absolving the defendant from civil liability is
no bar to a criminal action." 26
Fifth. Article 3327 of the Civil Code provides that in cases involving alleged
fraudulent acts, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. It is clear, therefore, that the civil
case for replevin may proceed independently of the criminal cases for
falsification and grave coercion, especially because while both cases are
based on the same facts, the quantum of proof required for holding the parties
liable therein differs.28
All told, the petitioners failed to show why the actions of the MeTC, RTC and the
CA which have passed upon the same issue should be reversed. We are thus
convinced that the CA committed no reversible error in its challenged Decision.
XXX

F. Suspension by Reason of Prejudicial Question

1. Ty-de Zuzuarregui vs. Villarosa, et al., G.R. No. 183788, 05
April 2010
This is a petition for review on certiorari [1] under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Resolutions dated
August 23, 2007 [2] and July 14, 2008 [3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 98978. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner seeking the reversal of the
November 16, 2006 and March 9, 2007 Orders [4] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 66, which found that there was no
prejudicial question to warrant the suspension of the criminal actions
against petitioner.

The facts:

1.Sometime in August 2000, Rosemary Torres Ty-Rasekhi

(Rosemary), the sister of petitioner's late father Alexander
Torres Ty, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration of the estate of her mother, Bella Torres (Bella),
before the RTC of Pasig City. [5] Petitioner initially
opposed [6] Rosemary's petition, but they eventually reached an
amicable settlement and entered into a compromise agreement
which they submitted to the RTC for approval. [7] In a
Decision [8] dated November 19, 2002, the RTC approved the
compromise agreement.

2. Subsequently, two (2) of Rosemary's alleged siblings, Peter

Torres Ty (Peter) and Catherine Torres Ty-Chavez (Catherine),
filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition to Annul Judgment
Approving Compromise Agreement, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
87222. [9] Peter and Catherine claimed that they are also biological
children of the late Bella, and are entitled to participate in the
settlement of the latter's estate. Later, private respondent Fannie
Torres-Ty (Fannie), who likewise claimed to be a biological child of the
late Bella and therefore also entitled to inherit from her, filed a
petition-in-intervention in the action for annulment of judgment. [10]

3. Peter, Catherine, and Fannie alleged that upon the death of Bella,
they held a number of discussions pertaining to the settlement of the
latter's estate. Rosemary, their elder sister, promised to take care of
the processing of papers so that the estate may be divided among
them in the manner provided by law. However, in subsequent
discussions, Rosemary made known to them her intention to get a
disproportionately larger share of the estate, but they did not agree.
No agreement was reached and as far as they know, no progress was
made towards the settlement of Bella's estate. They were not aware
that Rosemary had filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration and that a judgment by compromise agreement was
rendered by the RTC of Pasig City. Rosemary had falsely averred that
aside from herself, petitioner, who was her niece, was the only other
heir of Bella. In petitioner's opposition, it was likewise averred that
petitioner and Rosemary were the only heirs of Bella. The subsequent
compromise agreement contained similar averments, and it was not
disclosed that Peter, Catherine, and Fannie were also Bella's heirs. It
was only sometime in June 2004 that they came to know of the
decision by compromise agreement of the Pasig City RTC.

4. Petitioner and Rosemary filed their answers [11] to the petition for

annulment of judgment and the petition-in-intervention. They raised
similar defenses. They denied that Peter, Catherine, and Fannie were
heirs of Bella for, as far as they knew, the three (3) were literally
purchased from third persons who represented to Bella and the latter's
common-law husband, Alejandro Ty, that they were abandoned
children. Bella and Alejandro took pity on the three (3) and brought
them up as their own. This was known within the family circle, but was
not disclosed to Peter, Catherine, and Fannie in order to protect them
from the stigma of knowing they were unwanted children. However,
Alejandro and Bella did not legally adopt them; hence, they were
never conferred the rights of legitimate children.

6. While the action for annulment of judgment was pending

before the Court of Appeals, Fannie filed a complaint [12] for
falsification and perjury against petitioner and Rosemary.
Fannie alleged that petitioner and Rosemary falsely and maliciously
stated in the pertinent pleadings filed before the RTC of Pasig City that
the late Bella had only two (2) heirs, namely the two (2) of them.
7. Petitioner and Rosemary forthwith filed a joint motion to
suspend the preliminary investigation on the ground of a
pending prejudicial question before the Court of
Appeals. [13] They argued that the issue of whether Peter,
Catherine, and Fannie are related to Bella and therefore legal
heirs of the latter was pending before the Court of Appeals. The
investigating prosecutor denied the joint motion and found probable
cause against petitioner and Rosemary for two (2) counts each of
falsification of public documents. [14] 
8. The prosecutor held that the issue before the Court of Appeals is the
validity of the compromise agreement which is not determinative of
the criminal case which involves the liability of petitioner and
Rosemary for falsification, allegedly for willfully making the false
statements in the opposition to the petition for letters of
administration and in the subsequent compromise agreement filed
before the RTC of Pasig City.

9. On December 20, 2005, three (3) informations [15] against petitioner

and Rosemary were thus filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
of Makati City, Branch 61.

10. Petitioner filed a petition for review [16] with the Department of

Justice (DOJ) and a motion to defer proceedings [17] before the MeTC
on the ground of the pending appeal before the DOJ. Also, petitioner
and Rosemary filed with the MeTC separate motions to suspend
proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question. [18] However,
petitioner's appeal was dismissed by the DOJ, [19] while her motions
before the MeTC were denied by the said court. [20] The MeTC agreed
with the prosecutor that the issue before the Court of Appeals in the
action for annulment of judgment is the validity of the compromise
agreement while the criminal case involves their liability for
falsification of public documents. The MeTC also denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration. [21]

11. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and

prohibition [22] with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 66. In an
Order [23] dated November 16, 2006, the RTC denied the petition on
the ground that there was no prejudicial question; hence, the MeTC
did not act with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's
motion to suspend proceedings. The RTC held that there was no
prejudicial question as the quantum of evidence in the civil action for
annulment of judgment differs from the quantum of evidence required
in the criminal action for falsification of public documents. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration [24] was also denied by the RTC in its
Order [25] dated March 9, 2007.

12. Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition

before the Court of Appeals assailing the RTC's orders. In its August
23, 2007 Resolution, [26] the appellate court dismissed the petition on
the ground that the certification of non-forum shopping was signed
only by petitioner's counsel and not by petitioner herself. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was also denied in the July 14, 2008
Resolution [27] of the Court of Appeals.

Hence, the present recourse.

ISSUE:
W/N there was a prejudicial question the civil case that must be
resolve before the criminal proceeding may proceed.

RULING: YES

The petition is meritorious.

Under Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as

amended, a criminal action may be suspended upon the
pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action, to wit:
SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for
suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a
prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the
prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When
the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to
suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before
the prosecution rests.

For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend a criminal action, it

must appear not only that said civil case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based,
but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. [42] The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial
question is to avoid two (2) conflicting decisions.

Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case

as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final
resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must be present:
(1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which
the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try
said question must be lodged in another tribunal. [43]

If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the
criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on
the same facts, or there is no necessity "that the civil case be
determined first before taking up the criminal case," the civil case does
not involve a prejudicial question. [44] Neither is there a prejudicial
question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law,
proceed independently of each other. [45]

A perusal of the allegations in the petition to annul judgment

shows that CA-G.R. SP No. 87222 pending before the Court of
Appeals is principally for the determination of the validity of
the compromise agreement which did not include Peter,
Catherine, and Fannie as heirs of Bella. Peter, Catherine, and
Fannie presented evidence to prove that they are also
biological children of Bella and Alejandro. On the other hand,
Criminal Case Nos. 343812 to 343814 before the MeTC involve
the determination of whether petitioner committed falsification
of public documents in executing pleadings containing
untruthful statements that she and Rosemary were the only
legal heirs of Bella.

It is evident that the result of the civil case will determine the
innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal cases for
falsification of public documents. The criminal cases arose out
of the claim of Peter, Catherine, and Fannie that they are also
the legal heirs of Bella. If it is finally adjudged in the civil case that
they are not biological children of the late Bella and consequently not
entitled to a share in her estate as heirs, there is no more basis to
proceed with the criminal cases against petitioner who could not have
committed falsification in her pleadings filed before the RTC of Pasig
City, the truth of her statements regarding the filiation of Peter,
Catherine and Fannie having been judicially settled.
XXX
 G. Elements of Prejudicial Question
1. People vs. Arambulo, Jr., G.R. No. 186597, 17 June 2015

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to annul the Decision1 and

Resolution2 dated 5 February 2008 and 27 February 2009, respectively
of the Court of Appeals, Seventeenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 86353
which effectively suspended the criminal proceedings in Criminal Case
No. C-62784, an estafa case against respondents before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 121, Caloocan City.

FACTS:

1. Records show that respondent Victoria R. Arambulo (Victoria),

Emerenciana R. Gungab, Reynaldo Reyes (Reynaldo), Domingo Reyes
(Domingo), Rodrigo Reyes and Oscar Reyes (Oscar) are the heirs of
Spouses Pedro C. Reyes and Anastacia Reyes.

2. Anaped Estate Inc. (Anaped) was incorporated as part of the estate

planning or as conduit to hold the properties of the estate of Pedro
Reyes for and in behalf of his heirs.

3. Jose Buban (Buban), as Vice-President and General Manager

of Anaped Estate Inc. (Anaped), filed a complaint
for estafa against Victoria and her husband Miguel Arambulo,
Jr. (Miguel) before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan
City. He alleged that Victoria failed to remit the rentals
collected from the time the ownership of the commercial
apartments was transferred to Anaped.

4. On 24 April 2001, Assistant City Prosecutor Alvin A. Almora

recommended the filing of an Information against respondents. On 1
June 2001, respondents were charged with estafa 

5. On 14 April 2003, respondents filed a Motion to Suspend

Proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question in view of
the pendency of two intra-corporate cases pending before the
RTC of Quezon City and Makati City. SEC Case No. 05-97-5659 is a
petition filed by Victoria’s brother Oscar for accounting of all corporate
funds and assets of Anaped, annulment of sale, injunction,
receivership and damages.4 SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 is a petition
filed by Victoria and her brothers Reynaldo and Domingo questioning
the authority of their elder sibling Rodrigo Reyes and Emerenciana R.
Gungab, as well as the Anaped Board of Directors and officers,
including private complainant Buban to act for and in behalf of the
corporation.5chanrobleslaw

7. In their motion to suspend proceedings, respondents asserted

that the resolution of the SEC cases in their favor particularly
the issues of whether of the group of Rodrigo and Buban are
the lawful representatives of the corporation and whether they
are duly authorized to make a demand for remittance would
necessarily result in their acquittal in the criminal case.

8. On 28 August 2003, the trial court, through Presiding Judge

Adoracion G. Angeles, granted the motion for suspension of the
proceedings. The trial court reasoned that the issue in the SEC
cases, i.e., who between the groups has the right to act for and in
behalf of the corporation, has a direct link to the issue of the
culpability of the accused for estafa,
9. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner,
the trial court issued an Order dated 19 February 2004 setting
aside its 28 August 2003 Order and setting the case for pre-
trial. The trial court noted that respondents failed to file an opposition
to the motion for reconsideration.

10. Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion praying that they be

allowed to file their Comment/Opposition to the motion for
reconsideration and that the pre-trial be held in abeyance.
Respondents claimed that the Order of the trial court to file
comment/opposition was served on respondents themselves and not
on their counsel.

11. On 23 June 2004, the trial court denied respondents’

Omnibus Motion. The trial court stressed that even if the order was
served upon respondents and not upon their counsel, records show
that a copy of the motion for reconsideration was served by registered
mail upon counsel. Thus, the trial court stated that respondents’
counsel was well aware of the existence of the motion for
reconsideration, thus he could have taken the initiative to file his
comment thereto without waiting for any directive from the court.
12. Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals asserting that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion when it denied them the opportunity
to file their comment; when it ruled that respondents’ counsel
should have filed the comment as he was furnished a copy of the
motion for reconsideration; and when it granted petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

13. On 5 February 2008, the Court of Appeals granted the

petition. The dispositive portion reads:c
hanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of the respondent Judge dated
February 19, 2004 and July 23, 2004 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and she is hereby enjoined from hearing the Criminal Case
No. C-62784 until the termination of the SEC Case No. 03-99-
6259. The August 28, 2003 Order of the respondent Judge is
hereby REINSTATED.7
14. Preliminarily, on the procedural question, the Court of Appeals
pointed out that respondents were given the opportunity to present
their side in their motion to suspend proceedings. The appellate court
treated respondents’ arguments in said motion as their
Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioner. That is correct.

The appellate court ruled that in SEC Case No. 03-99-

6259:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

[T]he issue is the legality of the election of Anaped Board of

Directors, as well as the authority of its officers, which
include private complainant Jose Buban, to act for and in
behalf of the corporation. Clearly, it involves facts that are
intimately related to those upon which the criminal case is
based. The resolution of the issues raised in this intra-corporate
dispute will ultimately determine the guilt or innocence of
[respondents] in the crime of estafa initiated by Jose Buban. It
must be remembered that one of the elements of the crime
of estafa with abuse of confidence under paragraph 1 (b) of Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code is a demand made by the offended
party to the offender. A valid demand must therefore be made by
an offended party to the offender.8
15. The appellate court added that since respondents are challenging
the authority of Buban, then the validity of Buban’s demand to turn
over or remit the rentals is put in question. The appellate court
concluded that if the supposed authority of Buban is found to
be defective, it is as if no demand was ever made, hence the
prosecution for estafa cannot prosper.

16. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a

Resolution dated 27 February 2009.

In this petition for review on certiorari

ISSUE: whether the Court of Appeals erred in

declaring that there exists a prejudicial question
which calls for the suspension of the criminal
proceedings before the trial court.

RULING: YES
As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals, SEC Case No. 05-97-5659
does not present a prejudicial question to the criminal case for estafa.
It is an action for accounting of all corporate funds and assets of
Anaped, annulment of sale, injunction, receivership and damages.
Even if said case will be decided against respondents, they will not be
adjudged free from criminal liability.IT WILL NOT AFFECT THEIR
GUILT
It also does not automatically follow that an accounting of corporate
funds and properties and annulment of fictitious sale of corporate
assets would result in the conviction of respondents in the estafa case.

With respect to SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, however, we affirm the

Court of Appeals’ finding that a prejudicial question exists. The
Complaint in SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 prays for the nullification of
the election of Anaped directors and officers, including Buban.
Essentially, the issue is the authority of the aforesaid officers to act for
and behalf of the corporation.

On the other hand, the issue in the criminal case pertains to whether
respondents committed estafa. Under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of
the RPC, the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as
follows: (1) that the money, goods or other personal property is
received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
and (4) that there is demand by the offended party to the
offender.11chanrobleslaw

The elements of demand and misappropriation bear relevance

to the validity or invalidity of the authority of Anaped directors
and officers.

In Omictin v. Court of Appeals,12 we held that since the alleged

offended party is the corporation, the validity of the demand for the
delivery rests upon the authority of the person making such a demand
on the company’s behalf. If the supposed authority of the person
making the demand is found to be defective, it is as if no demand was
ever made, hence the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper. The Court
added that mere failure to return the thing received for administration
or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver or return
the same or deliver the value thereof to the owner could only give rise
to a civil action and does not constitute the crime
of estafa.13chanrobleslaw

It is true that the accused may be convicted of the felony under Article
315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code if the prosecution
proves misappropriation or conversion by the accused of the money or
property subject of the Information. In a prosecution for estafa,
demand is not necessary where there is evidence of misappropriation
or conversion.14 The phrase, “to misappropriate to one’s own use” has
been said to include “not only conversion to one’s personal advantage,
but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without
right.”15 In this case, the resolution of the issue of misappropriation by
respondents depends upon the result of SEC Case No. 03-99-6259. If
it is ruled in the SEC case that the present Anaped directors and
officers were not validly elected, then respondent Victoria may have
every right to refuse remittance of rental to Buban. Hence, the
essential element of misappropriation in estafa may be absent in this
case.
In this connection, we find important the fact, noted by the CA,
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

It appears from the record of the case that Victoria Arambulo for
the last twenty (20) years had been tasked with the management
and collection of rentals of the real properties the Reyes siblings
inherited from their parents, Ana and Pedro Reyes.16
As earlier mentioned, SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 is a petition filed
by Victoria and her brothers Domingo and Reynaldo questioning
the very authority of their elder siblings Rodrigo and Emerenciana,
as well as the Anaped Board of Directors and Officers, including
Buban to act for and in behalf of the corporation. We find this issue
consonant with the provisions of the Corporation Code which
provides in Section 23 that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sec. 23. The Board of Directors or Trustees. - Unless otherwise

provided in this Code, the corporate powers of all corporations formed
under this Code shall be exercised, all business conducted and all
property of such corporations controlled and held by the board of
directors or trustees to be elected from among the holders of stocks,
or where there is no stock, from among the members of the
corporation, who shall hold office for one (1) year and until their
successors are elected and qualified.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In Valle Verde Country Club, Inc. v. Africa,17 we said

that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The underlying policy of the Corporation Code is that the business

and  affairs of the corporation must be governed by a board of
directors whose  members have stood for election, and who have
actually been elected by the stockholders, on an annual basis.
Only in that way can the directors’ continued  accountability to
shareholders, and the legitimacy of their decisions that bind the 
corporation’s stockholders, be assured. The shareholder vote is
critical to the theory that legitimizes the exercise of power by the
directors or officers over properties that they do not
own.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

From the foregoing, it is clear that, should respondents herein prevail

in SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, then Buban, who does not own either by
himself or in behalf of Anaped which is the owner, the property
heretofore managed by Victoria, cannot demand remittance of the
rentals on the property and Victoria does not have the obligation to
turn over the rentals to Buban.

Verily, the result of SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 will determine the
innocence or guilt of respondents in the criminal case for estafa.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of

the Court of Appeals dated 5 February 2008 and 27 February 2009
enjoining the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121 from
hearing Criminal Case No. C-62784 until the termination of SEC Case
No. 03-99-6259, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
San Miguel Properties, Inc. v. Perez, G.R. No. 166836, 04
September 2013
The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought by the
buyer of residential subdivision lots in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) to compel the seller to deliver the transfer certificates of title
(TCTs) of the fully paid lots is properly considered a ground to suspend a
criminal prosecution for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No.
9571 on the ground of a prejudicial question. The administrative determination
is a logical antecedent of the resolution of the criminal charges based on non-
delivery of the TCTs.

Antecedents
Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel Properties), a domestic
corporation engaged in the real estate business, purchased in 1992, 1993 and
April 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF Homes), then represented by Atty.
Florencio B. Orendain (Orendain) as its duly authorized rehabilitation receiver
appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),2 130 residential
lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes Parañaque, containing a total area of
44,345 square meters for the aggregate price of ₱106,248,000.00.
The transactions were embodied in three separate deeds of sale.3 The TCTs
covering the lots bought under the first and second deeds were fully delivered to
San Miguel Properties, but 20 TCTs covering 20 of the 41 parcels of land with
a total area of 15,565 square meters purchased under the third deed of sale,
executed in April 1993 and for which San Miguel Properties paid the full
price of ₱39,122,627.00, were not delivered to San Miguel Properties.
On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs
for parcels of land purchased under the third deed of sale because Atty.
Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the
transactions after being meanwhile replaced as receiver by FBO Network
Management, Inc. on May 17, 1989 pursuant to an order from the SEC.4
BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. Thus, on
August 15, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City (OCP Las Piñas) charging
respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in
violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of Presidential Decree
No. 957 (I.S. No. 00-2256).5
At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific
performance in the HLURB (HLURB Case No. REM-082400-11183),6 praying
to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor.
In their joint counter-affidavit submitted in I.S. No. 00-2256,7 respondent directors
and officers of BF Homes refuted San Miguel Properties’ assertions by
contending that: (a) San Miguel Properties’ claim was not legally demandable
because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to sell the 130 lots in 1992 and
1993 due to his having been replaced as BF Homes’ rehabilitation receiver by
the SEC on May 17, 1989; (b) the deeds of sale conveying the lots were irregular
for being undated and unnotarized; (c) the claim should have been brought to the
SEC because BF Homes was under receivership; (d) in receivership cases, it
was essential to suspend all claims against a distressed corporation in
order to enable the receiver to effectively exercise its powers free from
judicial and extra-judicial interference that could unduly hinder the rescue
of the distressed company; and (e) the lots involved were under custodia legis
in view of the pending receivership proceedings, necessarily stripping the OCP
Las Piñas of the jurisdiction to proceed in the action.
On October 10, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a motion to suspend
proceedings in the OCP Las Piñas, 8 citing the pendency of BF Homes’
receivership case in the SEC. In its comment/opposition, BF Homes opposed
the motion to suspend. In the meantime, however, the SEC terminated BF
Homes’ receivership on September 12, 2000, prompting San Miguel Properties
to file on October 27, 2000 a reply to BF Homes’ comment/opposition coupled
with a motion to withdraw the sought suspension of proceedings due to the
intervening termination of the receivership.9
On October 23, 2000, the OCP Las Piñas rendered its
resolution,10 dismissing San Miguel Properties’ criminal complaint for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground that no action could
be filed by or against a receiver without leave from the SEC that had
appointed him; that the implementation of the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 957 exclusively pertained under the jurisdiction of the HLURB; that there
existed a prejudicial question necessitating the suspension of the criminal action
until after the issue on the liability of the distressed BF Homes was first
determined by the SEC en banc or by the HLURB; and that no prior resort to
administrative jurisdiction had been made; that there appeared to be no probable
cause to indict respondents for not being the actual signatories in the three
deeds of sale.
On February 20, 2001, the OCP Las Piñas denied San Miguel Properties’
motion for reconsideration filed on November 28, 2000, holding that BF
Homes’ directors and officers could not be held liable for the non-delivery
of the TCTs under Presidential Decree No. 957 without a definite ruling on
the legality of Atty. Orendain’s actions; and that the criminal liability would
attach only after BF Homes did not comply with a directive of the HLURB
directing it to deliver the titles.11
San Miguel Properties appealed the resolutions of the OCP Las Piñas to the
Department of Justice (DOJ), but the DOJ Secretary denied the appeal on
October 15, 2001.
The said ruling simply means that unless and until the HLURB rules on the
validity of the transactions involving the lands in question with specific reference
to the capacity of Atty. Orendain to bind BF Homes in the said transactions, there
is as yet no basis to charge criminally respondents for non-delivery of the subject
land titles. In other words, complainant cannot invoke the penal provision of
PD 957 until such time that the HLURB shall have ruled and decided on the
validity of the transactions involving the lots in question.
Undaunted, San Miguel Properties elevated the DOJ’s resolutions to the CA on
certiorari and mandamus (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 73008), contending that respondent
DOJ Secretary had acted with grave abuse in denying their appeal and in
refusing to charge the directors and officers of BF Homes with the violation of
Presidential Decree No. 957. San Miguel Properties submitted the issue of
whether or not HLURB Case No. REM-082400-11183 presented a prejudicial
question that called for the suspension of the criminal action for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 957.
In its assailed decision promulgated on February 24, 2004 in C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 73008,14 the CA dismissed San Miguel Properties’ petition, holding and
ruling as follows:
From the foregoing, the conclusion that may be drawn is that the rule on
prejudicial question generally applies to civil and criminal actions only.
However, an exception to this rule is provided in Quiambao vs. Osorio cited by
the respondents. In this case, an issue in an administrative case was
considered a prejudicial question to the resolution of a civil case which,
consequently, warranted the suspension of the latter until after termination
of the administrative proceedings.
Quiambao vs. Osorio is not the only instance when the Supreme Court relaxed
the application of the rule on prejudicial question.
In Tamin vs. CA involving two (2) civil actions, the Highest Court similarly applied
the rule on prejudicial question when it directed petitioner therein to put up a
bond for just compensation should the demolition of private respondents’ building
proved to be illegal as a result of a pending cadastral suit in another tribunal.
City of Pasig vs. COMELEC is yet another exception where a civil action
involving a boundary dispute was considered a prejudicial question which must
be resolved prior to an administrative proceeding for the holding of a plebiscite
on the affected areas.
In fact, in Vidad vs. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, it was ruled that in the
interest of good order, courts can suspend action in one case pending
determination of another case closely interrelated or interlinked with it.
It thus appears that public respondent did not act with grave abuse of
discretion x x x when he applied the rule on prejudicial question to the
instant proceedings considering that the issue on the validity of the sale
transactions x x x by x x x Orendain in behalf of BF Homes, Inc., is closely
intertwined with the purported criminal culpability of private respondents,
as officers/directors of BF Homes, Inc., arising from their failure to deliver
the titles of the parcels of land included in the questioned conveyance.
All told, to sustain the petitioner’s theory that the result of the HLURB
proceedings is not determinative of the criminal liability of private respondents
under PD 957 would be to espouse an absurdity. If we were to assume that the
HLURB finds BFHI under no obligation to delve the subject titles, it would be
highly irregular and contrary to the ends of justice to pursue a criminal
case against private respondents for the non-delivery of certificates of title
which they are not under any legal obligation to turn over in the first place.
(Bold emphasis supplied)
The CA denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration on January 18,
2005.16

Issues
ISSUE: whether the HLURB administrative case
brought to compel the delivery of the TCTs could be a
reason to suspend the proceedings on the criminal
complaint for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential
Decree No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question.

Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.
1. Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an
administrative agency, raises a prejudicial question BF Homes’ posture
that the administrative case for specific performance in the HLURB posed a
prejudicial question that must first be determined before the criminal case
for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 could be resolved
is correct.
Conformably with the foregoing, the action for specific performance in the
HLURB would determine whether or not San Miguel Properties was legally
entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the criminal
action would decide whether or not BF Homes’ directors and officers were
criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former must
obviously precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel
Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty.
Orendain did not have the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his
receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal
liability for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 would
evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal case.
Worthy to note at this juncture is that a prejudicial question need not conclusively
resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is enough for the prejudicial
question to simply test the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order
to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a
prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the
essential elements of the crime have been adequately alleged in the information,
considering that the Prosecution has not yet presented a single piece of evidence
on the indictment or may not have rested its case. A challenge to the allegations
in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on
the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.30
XXXX

2. Spouses Gabitano vs. San Miguel Corp., G.R. No.

188767, 24 July 2013

For review on certiorari are the Decision dated 11 March 2008 and Resolution
dated 16 July 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88431 which
reversed the Resolutions issued by the Secretary of Justice, suspending the
preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 01-4205 on the ground of prejudicial
question.

FACTS:
1. Petitioner Spouses Argovan Gaditano (Argovan) and Florida Gadiano
(Florida), who were engaged in the business of buying and selling beer and
softdrinks products, purchased beer products from San Miguel Corporation
(SMC) in the amount of ₱285, 504.00 on 7 April 2000.
2. Petitioners paid through a check signed by Florida and drawn against
Argovan’s Asia Trust Bank Current Account. When said check was presented for
payment on 13 April 2000, the check was dishonored for having been drawn
against insufficient funds. Despite three (3) written demands,1 petitioner failed to
make good of the check.
3. This prompted SMC to file a criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 and estafa against petitioners, docketed as I.S. No. 01-4205 with the
Office of the Prosecutor in Quezon City on 14 March 2001.
4. In their Counter-Affidavit, petitioners maintained that their checking account
was funded under an automatic transfer arrangement, whereby funds from their
joint savings account with AsiaTrust Bank were automatically transferred to their
checking account with said bank whenever a check they issued was presented
for payment.
5. On 23 October 2000, petitioners filed an action for specific performance
and damages against AsiaTrust Bank, Guevarra, SMC and Fatima, docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-00-42386. Petitioners alleged that AsiaTrust Bank and
Guevarra unlawfully garnished and debited their bank accounts; that their
obligation to SMC had been extinguished by payment; and that Fatima
issued a forged check.
6. Petitioners assert that the issues they have raised in the civil action
constitute a bar to the prosecution of the criminal case for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa.
7. On 29 January 2002, the Office of the Prosecutor recommended that the
criminal proceedings be suspended pending resolution of Civil Case No. Q-00-
42386. SMC thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration before the Office of the
Prosecutor but it was denied for lack of merit on 19 September 2002.
8. SMC filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a petition for review
challenging the Resolutions of the Office of the Prosecutor. In a Resolution dated
3 June 2004, the DOJ dismissed the petition. SMC filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the DOJ Secretary denied in a Resolution dated 15
December 2004.
9. Undaunted, SMC went up to the Court of Appeals by filling a petition for
certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 88431. On 11 March 2008, the Court of
Appeals rendered a Decision granting the petition.
The Court of Appeals drew a distinction between the civil case which is an action
for specific performance and damages involving petitioners’ joint savings
account, and the criminal case which is an action for estafa/violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 involving Argovan’s current account. The Court of Appeals
belied the claim of petitioners about an automatic fund transfer arrangement from
petitioners’ joint savings account to Argovan’s current account.
By petition for review, petitioners assail the ruling of the Court of Appeals on the
following grounds:
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS NO
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION BELOW BECAUSE TWO DIFFERENT BANK
ACCOUNTS ARE INVOLVED IN THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the DOJ abused its discretion
when it affirmed the prosecutor’s suspension of the criminal investigation
due to the existence of an alleged prejudicial question.
The issue in the criminal case is whether the petitioner is guilty of estafa and
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, while in the civil case, it is whether
AsiaTrust Bank had lawfully garnished the ₱378,000.00 from petitioners’ savings
account.
The subject of the civil case is the garnishment by AsiaTrust Bank of petitioner’s
savings account. Based on petitioners’ account, they deposited the check given
to them by Fatima in their savings account. The amount of said check was
initially credited to petitioners’ savings account but the Fatima check was later on
dishonored because there was an alleged alteration in the name of the payee. As
a result, the bank debited the amount of the check from petitioners’ savings
account. Now, petitioners seek to persuade us that had it not been for the
unlawful garnishment, the funds in their savings account would have been
sufficient to cover a check they issued in favor of SMC.
The material facts surrounding the civil case bear no relation to the criminal
investigation being conducted by the prosecutor. The prejudicial question in the
civil case involves the dishonor of another check. SMC is not privy to the nature
of the alleged materially altered check leading to its dishonor and the eventual
garnishment of petitioners’ savings account. The source of the funds of
petitioners’ savings account is no longer SMC’s concern. The matter is between
petitioners and Asia Trust Bank. On the other hand, the issue in the preliminary
investigation is whether petitioners issued a bad check to SMC for the payment
of beer products.
The gravamen of the offense punished by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is the act of
making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment.13 Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punishes the mere act of
issuing a worthless check. The law did not look either at the actual ownership of
the check or of the account against which it was made, drawn, or issued, or at
the intention of the drawee, maker or issuer.14 The thrust of the law is to prohibit
the making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation.15
Even if the trial court in the civil case declares Asia Trust Bank liable for
the unlawful garnishment of petitioners’ savings account, petitioners
cannot be automatically adjudged free from criminal liability for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, because the mere issuance of worthless checks
with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in
itself the offense.16
Furthermore, three notices of dishonor were sent to petitioners, who then, should
have immediately funded the check. When they did not, their liabilities under the
bouncing checks law attached. Such liability cannot be affected by the alleged
prejudicial question because their failure to fund the check upon notice of
dishonour is itself the offense.
In the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal
Code, deceit and damage are additional and essential elements of the offense. It
is the fraud or deceit employed by the accused in issuing a worthless check that
is penalized.17 A prima facie presumption of deceit arises when a check is
dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds.18 Records show that a notice
of dishonor as well as demands for payment, were sent to petitioners. The
presumption of deceit applies, and petitioners must overcome this
presumption through substantial evidence. These issues may only be
threshed out in a criminal investigation which must proceed independently
of the civil case.
Based on the foregoing, we rule that the resolution or the issue raised in
the civil action is not determinative or the guilt or innocence of the accused
in the criminal investigation against them. There is no necessity that the
civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal complaints.
XXX

SPS GADITANO V SAN MIGUEL G.R. No. 188767

FACTS

Petitioners purchased products from San Miguel Corporation (SMC) which was
paid through a check. When said check was presented for payment, it was
dishonored for having insufficient funds. SMC gave written demands, however
petitioner failed to make good of the check. Thus, prompted SMC to file a
criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa against
petitioners. Petitioners claimed that on 7 April 2000, the date when they issued
the check to SMC, their account had an enough balance to pay the SMC.

However, Guevarra, who was the Bank Manager of AsiaTrust Bank, said that the
check which was issued by Fatima – who had borrowed a sum of money and
paid her the check, was not cleared. Thus, AsiaTrust Bank credited the money
from their account without any court order. Consequently, the check issued by
petitioners to SMC was dishonored due to insufficient funds.

Petitioners filed an action for specific performance and damages against

AsiaTrust Bank and Guevarra. They contended that AsiaTrust Bank and
Guevarra unlawfully debited their bank accounts and that their obligation to SMC
had been extinguished by payment 

Issue

Is there a prejudicial question which exists to warrant the suspension of the

criminal proceedings?

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SC Rulings

No, there was no prejudicial question which exists to warrant the suspension of
the criminal proceedings

In the case at bar, the issue that was raised in the civil action is whether Asia
Trust Bank had lawfully credited the said amount from petitioners’ savings
account, is not determinative on the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal investigation against them, in which whether the petitioner is guilty of
estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. 

The prejudicial question in the civil case involves the dishonor of another check
and even if the trial court in the civil case declares Asia Trust Bank liable for the
unlawful garnishment of petitioners’ savings account, petitioners cannot be
automatically adjudged free from criminal liability for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, because the mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself the offense, which was
proved when the SMC gave notices of dishonor to the petitioners however, they
did not complied, thus, their liabilities under the bouncing checks law attached.
Such liability cannot be affected by the alleged prejudicial question because their
failure to fund the check upon notice of dishonor is itself the offense.
 3. Pimentel vs. Pimentel, G.R. No. 172060, 13
September 2010
Frustrated parricide
And declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity

The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals, promulgated on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals’ decision:
1. On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private
respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R.
Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC
Quezon City).
2. On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-
trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel
v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the
Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
3. On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the
proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of
a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between
the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil
Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him
before the RTC Quezon City.
4. The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005 3 holding that
the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The
RTC Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the
injuries sustained by respondent and whether the case could be tried even if the
validity of petitioner’s marriage with respondent is in question.
5. In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
The Court of Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide,
the issue is whether the offender commenced the commission of the crime
of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of
execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for
annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court of
Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would
be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide
had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required
for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the
crime, the marriage is still subsisting.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of
Appeals’ decision.

The Issue
whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide
against petitioner.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Civil Case Must be Instituted
Before the Criminal Case
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure6 provides:
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing
of the criminal action. In this case, the Information7 for Frustrated Parricide was
dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as
per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC Quezon City set
Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005.
Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February
2005.8 Respondent’s petition9 in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November
2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment
was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the
requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the
criminal action.
Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question
in Criminal Case for Parricide
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would
warrant the suspension of the criminal action.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the
crime of parricide,12 which punishes any person "who shall kill his father, mother,
or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or
descendants, or his spouse."13 The relationship between the offender and the
victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder14 or homicide.15 However,
the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to
the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship
between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is
whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was
charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts
of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s
will.16 At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case
the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the
alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage.
In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled,
petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission
of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.1avvphi1
XXX
Facts:
Respondent filed a criminal case against his husband Petitioner of parricide.
During the pendency of the case, respondent instituted a civil action of
nullity of her marriage with the petitioner on the ground of Psychological
Incapacity. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings
before the RTC on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question.
Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the
victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case would have a
bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC. RTC and CA
denied the motion of the petitioner finding that there was no Prejudicial
Question. Hence this case.

Issue:
Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for
frustrated parricide against petitioner

Held:
No, The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the
filing of the criminal action. In this case, the Information for Frustrated
Parricide was filed before the Civil Case was instituted. Clearly, the civil case
for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated
parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules
on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed
subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that
would warrant the suspension of the criminal action.

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the
crime of parricide, which punishes any person “who shall kill his father,
mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants
or descendants, or his spouse.” The relationship between the offender and
the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder or homicide.
However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately
related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the
relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the accused.

5. Dreamwork Construction, Inc. vs. Janiola, G.R. No.

184861, 30 June 2009
BP 22
ANULLMENT OF CONTRACT
The Facts
1.On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion,
and Vice-President for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a
Complaint Affidavit dated October 5, 2004 4 for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City.
2. On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband,
instituted a civil complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint dated
August 20065 for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement
between the parties, as well as for damages. The case was filed with the RTC,
Branch 197 in Las Piñas City and docketed as Civil Case No. LP-06-0197.
Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal cases before the MTC, were issued
in consideration of the construction agreement.
3. Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings dated July 24, 20076 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging
that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or
intimately related such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
4. Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in
an undated Comment/Opposition to Accused’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings
based on Prejudicial Question7 on the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial
question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing
checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether
private respondent violated BP 22;
5. Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16, 2007, granting the
Motion to Suspend Proceedings, and reasoned that:
Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the
nullification of the checks issued as the same are without
consideration, then the instant criminal cases for alleged violation of
BP 22 must be dismissed. The belated filing of the civil case by the
herein accused did not detract from the correctness of her cause,
since a motion for suspension of a criminal action may be filed at any
time before the prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule 111, Revised Rules of
Court).8

6. Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a Petition dated May 13, 2008.
Thereafter, the RTC issued the assailed decision dated August 26, 2008,
denying the petition. On the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question,
the RTC ruled:
Additionally, it must be stressed that the requirement of a "previously" filed civil
case is intended merely to obviate delays in the conduct of the criminal
proceedings. Incidentally, no clear evidence of any intent to delay by private
respondent was shown. The criminal proceedings are still in their initial stages
when the civil action was instituted. And, the fact that the civil action was filed
after the criminal action was instituted does not render the issues in the
civil action any less prejudicial in character.10
Hence, we have this petition under Rule 45.

The Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
PERCEIVING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE
INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER RULED TO SUSPEND
PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF
"PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" IN CIVIL CASE NO. LP-06-0197.11

The Court’s Ruling

This petition must be granted.
The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the
Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist

Private respondent argues that the phrase "before any

criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" must
be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question exists when
the civil action is filed either before the institution of the
criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal action.
Private respondent concludes that there is an apparent conflict in the provisions
of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to
have presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case preceded the
filing of the civil case.
It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant case indicate
that the filing of the civil action and the subsequent move to suspend the criminal
proceedings by reason of the presence of a prejudicial question were a mere
afterthought and instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.
In Sabandal v. Tongco,18 we found no prejudicial question existed involving a civil
action for specific performance, overpayment, and damages, and a criminal
complaint for BP 22, as the resolution of the civil action would not determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In resolving the case, we
said:
Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the filing
of the civil case was a ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal cases.
Petitioner filed the civil case three years after the institution of the criminal
charges against him. Apparently, the civil action was instituted as an afterthought
to delay the proceedings in the criminal cases.19
Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the
criminal complaint and from the time that private respondent allegedly
withdrew its equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth noting that the civil
case was instituted more than two and a half (2 ½) years from the time that
private respondent allegedly stopped construction of the proposed building for no
valid reason. More importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the
construction agreement for lack of consideration was filed more than three (3)
years from the execution of the construction agreement.
Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the cases
involved here show that the filing of the civil action was a mere afterthought on
the part of private respondent and interposed for delay. And as correctly argued
by petitioner, it is this scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
seeks to prevent. Thus, private respondent’s positions cannot be left to stand.
The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not
Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action
In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action,
there is, still, no prejudicial question to speak of that would justify the suspension
of the proceedings in the criminal case.
Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as provided
in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules, is absent in this case. Thus, such rule cannot
apply to the present controversy.
Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction agreement
between the parties is declared null and void for want of consideration, the
checks issued in consideration of such contract would become mere scraps of
paper and cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution.
We find for petitioner.
It must be remembered that the elements of the crime punishable under BP 22
are as follows:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or
for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue
there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
 (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.20
Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the
issuance of the check/s or that the checks were issued for valuable consideration
does not make up the elements of the crime. Thus, this Court has held in a
long line of cases21 that the agreement surrounding the issuance of
dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22. In
Mejia v. People,22 we ruled:
It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance
of a bad check. The purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and
conditions relating to its issuance, or any agreement surrounding such issuance
are irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner. To determine the
reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their
issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and
commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring havoc in trade
and in banking communities. The clear intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to
make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.
Lee v. Court of Appeals23 is even more poignant. In that case, we ruled that the
issue of lack of valuable consideration for the issuance of checks which were
later on dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a
prosecution for violation of BP 22, to wit:

FACTS:

On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion,

and Vice-President for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a
Complaint Affidavit dated October 5, 2004 for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Piñas City.

The case was docketed as I.S. No. 04-2526-33. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a
criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent with the
MTC on February 2, 2005 entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.

On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a

civil complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 2006 for the
rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as
for damages. The case was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Piñas City.
Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in
consideration of the construction agreement.
Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings dated July 24, 2007, alleging that the civil and criminal cases
involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such that in the resolution
of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined. In other words, private respondent claimed that the
civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases.

Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in an

undated Comment/Opposition to Accused’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings
based on Prejudicial Question on the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial
question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing
checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether
private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that “the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action”; thus, this element is missing
in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the court a quo seriously erred in not perceiving grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the inferior court, when the latter ruled to suspend
proceedings in the criminal case on the basis of “prejudicial question” in the said
civil case.

RULING:

This petition must be granted. It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a

“change in phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a
legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it originally
had.”

In the instant case, the phrase, “previously instituted,” was inserted to qualify the
nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the
criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of
“subsequent” directly before the term criminal action.

There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the
relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must precede the
criminal action. Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that “a
statute should be construed not only to be consistent with itself but also to
harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete,
coherent and intelligible system.”

This principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare et concordare leges

legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute must be so construed
and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence.

H. Criminal and Civil Prosecution of B.P. 22

OCA Circular No. 57-97
COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBA YAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURTS. MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS. ALL
MEM13ERS OF TI-IE GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION SERVICE, AND ALL MEMBERS OF TilE
INTEGRATED 13AR OF THE PIIILIPPINES SUBJECT: RULES AND GUIDELINES IN TilE FILING
AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL CASES UNDER BATAS Pt\MBANSA BLG. 22 Any pro VIS
Ion 0 r I a w 0 r R u l e s 0 r C 0 u r t tot he COil t r a r y notwithstanding, the following
rules and guidelines shall henceforth be observed in the ·filing and prosecution of all
criminal cases under Bu t a s Pum b u n s a Big. 22 which penalizes the making or
drawing and issuance of a check without funds or credit: I. The criminal action for
violation of Uatas I'ambansa Big. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the
corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be
allowed or recognized. 2. Upon the filing of the aforesaid JOint criminal and civil actions,
the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based ~lpOIl the a m o u n t of the
check in v o l v c d , which shall be considered as the actual damages c l a im c d , in u c c
o r d a n c c with the schedule of filing fees in Sc c t io n 7(a) and Sc c t io n 8«\), Rule' 41
of the Rules of Court, as last a m c n d c d by Ad m in is t r n t iv c Circular No. 11-l.J4
effective August', '994. Where the offended party further seeks to enforce against the
accused civil liability by way of liquidated. moral, nominal, t c m p c r a t c or c x c m p l a
r y damages, he shall pay the corresponding filing fees therefor based on the amounts
thereof as alleged either ill his c o m p l a in t or in the information. If not so alleged but
a n y of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the amount of such fees
s h a ll constitute a first lien on the judgment. lU~ S H.. N A R V A S A Clli~f Justice