Yulo, Brittany L.

August 14, 2021

FS – 301 Prosecutor Lourdes Philina B. Dumlao

Week 3: Digest
Institution of Criminal and Civil Actions
1. Chiok vs. People, G.R. Nos. 179814 and 180021, 07 December 2015
WILFRED N. CHIOK, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
RUFINA CHUA, RESPONDENTS.
RUFINA CHUA, PETITIONER, VS. WILFRED N. CHIOK, AND THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES (AS AN UNWILLING CO-PARTY PETITIONER),
RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 179814, G.R. No. 180021| 2015-12-07
FACTS
In June 1995 in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from Rufina
Chua the amount of P9,563,900.00 for him to buy complainant shares of stocks, under the
express obligation on the part of the accused to deliver the documents thereon or to return the
whole amount if the purchase did not materialize, but the accused once in possession of the said
amount, far from complying will his obligation as aforesaid, with intent to defraud the
complainant, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misapply, misappropriate
and convert lo his own personal use and benefit the said amount of P9,563,900.00, and despite
repeated demands failed and relused and still fails and refuses to return the said amount or to
account for the same, to the damage and prejudice of the complainant Rufina Chua in the
aforementioned amount of P9,563,900.00.
ISSUE
I. Whether or not Chiok is civilly liable to Chua.
RULING OF THE COURT
Chiok claims thai the Joint Decision[74] dated November 27, 2000 in the BP 22 case
docketed as Criminal Case No. 44739 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) San Juan, Manila
- Branch 58, which absolved Chiok from civil liability, is res judicata on this case. On the other
hand, Chua. claims that the CA erred when it ordered Chiok to pay only the amount of
P9,500,000.00 when it was shown by evidence that the amount should be P9,563,900.00.
We rule that Chiok is liable For the amount of P9,563,900.00.
In Castillo v. Salvador[75] and several cases before it, we ruled that if the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt, the accused is not automatically exempt from civil liability which
may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In this regard, preponderance of evidence is
the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to
be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible
evidence." Preponderance of evidence is evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
While the CA acquitted Chiok on the ground that the prosecution's evidence on his
alleged misappropriation of Chua's money did not meet the quantum of proof beyond reasonable
doubt, we hold that the monetary transaction between Chua and Chiok was proven by
preponderance of evidence.
Chua presented in evidence a bank deposit slip dated June 9, 1995 to Chiok's Far East
Bank, Annapolis account in the amount of P7,100,000.00. She also testified that she delivered to
him in cash the amount of P2,463,900.00. Chiok's admission that he issued the interbank checks
in the total amount of P9,563,900.00 to Chua, albeit claiming that it was "for safekeeping
purposes only" and to assure her that she will be paid back her investment, corroborates Chua's
evidence. In any event, as found by the appellate court, Chiok admitted that he received from
Chua the amount of "P7.9" million in June 1995 and for "P1.6" million at an earlier time. It is on
this basis that the CA found Chiok civilly liable in the amount of P9,500,000.00 only.
The court is not persuaded.
First, what the law requires is a notice of dishonor of the check to be given to the accused
after its dishonor. There is no showing dial this requirement was complied by the prosecution.
Second, the drawer must be given at least 5 banking days from such notice of dishonor within
which to pay the holder thereof the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for payment in
full by the drawee of such check. Indeed, there was no notice of dishonor established to have
been furnished the accused and therefore there is more reason that the accused was not given the
requisite 5-banking day to make good aforesaid cheeks. The 5-day notice serves to mitigate the
harshness of the law in its application by giving the drawer an opportunity to make good the bum
check. And, it cannot be said that accused was ever given that opportunity simply because the
prosecution failed to prove that accused was notified of the dishonor of the checks in suit.

2. Bernardo vs. People, G.R. No. 182210, 05 October 2015

PAZ T. BERNARDO, SUBSTITUTED BY HEIRS, MAPALAD G. BERNARDO, EMILIE
B. KO, MARILOU B. VALDEZ, EDWIN T. BERNARDO AND GERVY B. SANTOS,
PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 182210 | 2015-10-05
FACTS
In June 1991, Bernardo obtained a loan from the private complainant Carmencita C.
Bumanglag (Bumanglag) in the amount of P460,000.00 payable on or before its maturity on
November 30, 1991. That loan was evidenced by a promissory note Bernardo and her husband
had executed, whereby the couple solidarity bound themselves to pay the loan with
corresponding interest at 12% per annum payable upon default.[4] As additional security,
Bernardo gave Bumanglag the owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. (T-
1034) 151841.
Prior to the loan's maturity, Bernardo took back the title from Bumanglag to use as a
collateral in another transaction. In place of the title, Bernardo issued to Bumanglag the
following five (5) Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) checks, posted on different dates
in June 1992, covering the loan's aggregate amount
In September 1992, Bumanglag deposited these checks to Bernardo's account but they
were dishonored; the reason given was "Account Closed." Bumanglag thus sent Bernardo a
notice informing her of the dishonor of the checks. The demand went unheeded, prompting
Bumanglag to initiate a criminal complaint against Bernardo with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati for five (5) counts of violation of B.P. 22.
After the requisite preliminary investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati
City found probable cause to indict Bernardo for the offenses charged. Bernardo entered a not
guilty plea on arraignment.
The prosecution rested its case on September 21, 1994. Bernardo took the witness stand
only on May 9, 1996, to present her defense evidence.
In her testimony, Bernardo argued that she could not be held liable for violation of B.P.
22 because the questioned checks were presented beyond the 90-day period provided under the
law. She also denied having received any notice of dishonor, which she insisted was essential to
prove the material element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds.
In any case, she maintained that the checks were never meant to be presented as she had
always paid her loans in cash, which she claimed to have done in the aggregate amount of
P717,000.00. According to Bernardo, although Bumanglag returned to her the title to the
property after payment, Bumanglag never bothered to issue her receipts. Bumanglag did not
return the checks either.
Following Bernardo's cross-examination, the RTC reset the hearing for redirect
examination to September 4, 1996.[6] That hearing, however, was again reset to April 3, 1997, in
view of the absence of Bernardo's counsel. When Bernardo and her counsel again failed to
appear during the April 3, 1997 hearing, and in view of the numerous previous postponements
the defense had asked for, the RTC considered her right to present additional evidence waived.
Bernardo moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied her motion. The RTC, however,
gave her ten (10) days within which to submit her formal offer of evidence, which she failed to
do. As a result, the RTC declared that Bernardo had waived her right to submit her formal offer
of evidence.
ISSUE
I. Whether or not Bernardo’s death extinguished her civil liability.
RULING OF THE COURT
Bernardo's civil liability may be enforced in the present case despite her death.
As a general rule, the death of an accused pending appeal extinguishes her criminal
liability and the corresponding civil liability based solely on the offense (delict). The death
amounts to an acquittal of the accused based on the constitutionally mandated presumption of...
innocence in her favor, which can be overcome only by a finding of guilt - something that death
prevents the court from making.[35] In a sense, death absolves the accused from any earthly
responsibility arising from the offense — a divine act... that no human court can reverse, qualify,
much less disregard.
The independent civil liabilities, however, survive death and an action for recovery
therefore may be generally pursued but only by filing a separate civil action... the focal issue in
the present petition is no longer Bernardo's criminal liability for violation of B.P. 22 but her civil
liability,... which is principally based on contract and the corresponding damage Bumanglag
suffered due to Bernardo's failure to pay. Under these circumstances, Bernardo's B.P. 22 defense
(that the checks were presented beyond the 90-day pe... we find that Bernardo's claim of payment
was nothing more than an allegation unsupported by adequate proof. If indeed there had been
payment, she should have redeemed or taken back the checks and the promissory note, in the
ordinary course of... business.
Bumanglag's... possession of the promissory note, coupled with the dishonored checks,
strongly buttresses her claim that Bernardo's obligation had not been extinguishe
We thus find that the weight of evidence preponderates in favor of Bumanglag's position
that Bernardo has not yet settled her obligation.

3. Standard Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Cuaresma, G.R. No. 200055, 10 September 2014
STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. ARNOLD CUARESMA AND
JERRY B. CUARESMA, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 200055 | 2014-09-10
FACTS
On March 20, 2004, two vehicles, one driven by Jefferson Cham and insured with petitioner
Standard Insurance Co., Inc., and the other owned by respondent Arnold Cuaresma and driven by
respondent Jerry B. Cuaresma, figured in an accident at North Avenue, Quezon City.3
Consequently, the damage on the vehicle driven by Cham was repaired, the cost of which was
borne by petitioner. Cham then executed a Release of Claim in favor of petitioner subrogating
the latter to all his rights to recover on all claims, demands, and rights of action on account of the
loss, damage, or injury sustained as a consequence of the accident from any person liable
thereto.4 Based on said document, petitioner, in its letter5 dated April 15, 2004 addressed to
respondents, demanded the payment of the sum spent on repairing the vehicle driven by Cham.
ISSUE
I. Whether or not the court of appeals erred in affirming the conclusions of the regional trial
court that petitioner's evidence, specifically the testimony of its assured, Jefferson Cham
and its assistant vice-president for claims, Cleto D. Obello, jr., As well as the traffic
accident report, are insufficient to prove its claims by the required quantum of evidence.
RULING OF THE COURT
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an independent
civil action for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly
states that the "offended party" may bring such an action but the "offended party" may not
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly,
Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the criminal action, not to the accused.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated in the 2000 Rules
precisely to address the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero. Under this provision, the accused is barred
from filing a counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint in the criminal case. However,
the same provision states that "any cause of action which could have been the subject (of the
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint) may be litigated in a separate civil action."
The present Rule 111 mandates the accused to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action
which shall proceed independently of the criminal action, even as the civil action of the offended
party is litigated in the criminal action.
On the basis of the foregoing decision, therefore, petitioner, who is subrogated to the
rights of Cham, the accused in the criminal case instituted by respondents, cannot be guilty of
forum shopping for its separate civil action is expressly allowed to proceed independently of the
criminal action involved herein.
It must be noted, however, that notwithstanding the allowance of the instant petition to
proceed independently of the criminal action, the claims of petitioner cannot be sustained in the
absence of satisfactory evidence proving its right thereto.
In civil cases, basic is the rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving
them by a preponderance of evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not
upon the weakness of the defense offered by his opponent. This principle equally holds true,
even if the defendant had not been given the opportunity to present evidence because of a default
order.
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on
either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the
evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." It is evidence which is more convincing
to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.19 The reason for
this is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. Mere
allegations, therefore, cannot be deemed as evidence.
To prove the allegations in its complaint, herein petitioner presented testimonies of its
assured and its Assistant Vice-President, the Traffic Accident Investigation Report, and
documents evidencing the assured's insurance policy with petitioner as well as the payment of
repair expenses. As aptly ruled by the RTC and the CA, however, the evidence presented by
petitioner failed to preponderantly establish negligence on the part of the respondents.
While petitioner may have proven the fact of its payment of the expenses for the repair of
Cham's vehicle through the testimony of its Assistant Vice-President and other supporting
receipts and documents, it fell short in proving that the damage caused on said vehicle was due to
the fault of the respondents.

4. Heirs of Simon vs. Chan, G.R. No. 157547, 23 February 2011

HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON, Petitioners, vs. ELVIN CHAN AND THE COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 157547 | 2011-02-23
FACTS
A criminal case was filed in the MeTC charging the late Eduardo Simon with a violation
of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) for issuing to Elvin Chan Landbank Check No. 0007280 dated
December 26, 1996 payable to cash in the amount of P336,000. However, upon presentment of
the check with the bank, the same was dishonored because the account of Simon is already
closed.
More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, Elvin Chan commenced in the MeTC a
civil action for the collection of the principal amount of P336,000 coupled with an application
for a writ of preliminary attachment. The MeTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment, which
was implemented through the sheriff attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon.
Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of litis pendentia,
citing the pending criminal case between the same parties for the same cause.
Chan opposes the motion on the theory that the case falls under Art. 33 of the Civil Code
as it is based on fraud, therefore, may be prosecuted independently of the criminal action.
The MeTC granted Simon's urgent motion to dismiss citing litis pendentia. The court
further stated that assuming the case correctly falls under Art 33 of the Civil Code, still prior
reservation is required by the Rules of Court.
The RTC sustained the MeTC’s dismissal. However, the Court of Appeals overturned the
lower courts. The CA reasoned that the reservation and waiver refers only to the recovery of the
civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil liability
under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act
or omission which may be prosecuted separately without a reservation.
ISSUE
I. Whether or not Chan's civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check (Civil
Case No. 915-00) was an independent civil action.
RULING OF THE COURT
Propriety of filing a separate civil action based on BP 22
Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party,
and also to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification
for the losses
Upon filing of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22, the civil action for the recovery
of the amount of the checks was also impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for
violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. The reservation to
file a separate civil action is no longer needed.
This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective December 1, 2000, which
relevantly provides
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. –
xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be
allowed.
xxx
 Generally, no filing fees are required for criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of
the civil action in complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment of docket
fees upon the filing of the complaint.
This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as
creditors actually use the courts as collectors. It is also expected to expedite the disposition of
these cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only
a single suit shall be filed and tried.
The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed
ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil and
criminal cases.
Retroactive Application of Procedural Laws
The provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced the
civil case on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is axiomatic that the retroactive
application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel adversely
affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no
vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws.
Any new rules may validly be made to apply to cases pending at the time of their
promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of procedure,
except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require a
lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the commission of the
offenses, because such retroactivity would be unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the
Constitution
Moreover, the application of the rule would not be precluded by the violation of any
assumed vested right, because the new rule was adopted from Supreme Court Circular 57-97 that
took effect on November 1, 1997.
Prosecution for Estafa vs BP 22
Although the Court has ruled that the issuance of a bouncing check may result in two
separate and distinct crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22, the procedures for the recovery of
the civil liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes are different and non-interchangeable.
In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may opt to reserve his right to file a separate
civil action, or may institute an independent action based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the
Civil Code.
In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the Court has adopted a policy to
prohibit the reservation or institution of a separate civil action to claim the civil liability arising
from the issuance of the bouncing check.
Dismissal on the ground of litis pendentia
All the elements of litis pendentia are attendant in the present case. For litis pendentia to
be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of the following requisites is
necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of parties or at least such as represent the same
interest in both actions; (b) there must be identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
reliefs being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that
the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res judicata in respect of the other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of the
existence of the third becomes nil.

5. Heirs of Burgos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169711, 08 February 2010
HEIRS OF SARAH MARIE PALMA BURGOS, Petitioners, versus COURT OF
APPEALS and JOHNNY CO y YU, Respondents
G.R. No. 169711 | 2010-02-08
FACTS
On January 7, 1992 a number of assailants attacked the household of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos
while all were asleep, killing Sarah and her uncle Erasmo Palma (Erasmo). Another uncle, Victor
Palma (Victor), and a friend, Benigno Oquendo (Oquendo), survived the attack. The theory of
the police was that a land transaction gone sour between Sarah's live-in partner, David So
(David), and respondent Johnny Co (Co) motivated the assault.
Four months after the incident, the police arrested Cresencio Aman (Aman) and Romeo Martin
(Martin) who executed confessions, allegedly admitting their part in the attack. They pointed to
two others who helped them, namely, Artemio "Pong" Bergonia and Danilo Say, and to
respondent Co who allegedly masterminded the whole thing. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 51, tried the case against Aman and Martin in Criminal Cases 92-104918-21.
The three others remained at large. After trial, the RTC acquitted them both.
After 10 years or on September 5, 2002 respondent Co surrendered to the National Bureau of
Investigation. The prosecution charged him with two counts of murder for the deaths of Sarah
and Erasmo and two counts of frustrated murder committed against Oquendo and Victor. Upon
arraignment, Co pleaded not guilty to the charges.
On September 25, 2002 respondent Co filed a petition for admission to bail. After hearing or on
April 14, 2004, the RTC granted bail on the ground that the evidence of guilt of respondent Co
was not strong.
ISSUE
I. Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the special civil action of certiorari, which
questioned the RTC's grant of bail to respondent Co, for having been filed in the name of
the offended parties and without the OSG's intervention.
RULING OF THE COURT
Generally, a criminal case has two aspects, the civil and the criminal. The civil aspect is
borne of the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.
The civil action, in which the offended party is the plaintiff and the accused is the
defendant, is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
The law allows the merger of the criminal and the civil actions to avoid multiplicity of
suits. Thus, when the state succeeds in prosecuting the offense, the offended party benefits from
such result and is able to collect the damages awarded to him.
But, when the trial court acquits the accused or dismisses the case on the ground of lack
of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the civil action is not
automatically extinguished since liability under such an action can be determined based on mere
preponderance of evidence. The offended party may peel off from the terminated criminal action
and appeal from the implied dismissal of his claim for civil liability.
The purpose of a criminal action, in its purest sense, is to determine the penal liability of
the accused for having outraged the state with his crime and, if he be found guilty, to punish him
for it. In this sense, the parties to the action are the People of the Philippines and the accused.
The offended party is regarded merely as a witness for the state. Also in this wise, only the state,
through its appellate counsel, the OSG, has the sole right and authority to institute proceedings
before the CA or the Supreme Court.
As a general rule, the mandate or authority to represent the state lies only in the OSG.
It is patent that the intent of the lawmaker was to give the designated official, the
Solicitor General, in this case, the unequivocal mandate to appear for the government in legal
proceedings. Spread out in the laws creating the office is the discernible intent which may be
gathered from the term "shall" x x x.