G.R. No.

171672 February 2, 2015

MARIETA DE CASTRO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The court should prescribe the correct penalties in complex crimes in strict observance
of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. In estafa through falsification of commercial
documents, the court should impose the penalty for the graver offense in the maximum
period. Otherwise, the penalty prescribed is invalid, and will not attain finality.

Antecedents

The petitioner, a bank teller of the BPI Family Savings Bank (BPI Family) at its branch in
Malibay, Pasay City, appeals the affirmance of her conviction for four counts of estafa
through falsification of a commercial document committed on separate occasions in
October and November 1993 by forging the signatures of bank depositors Amparo
Matuguina and Milagrosa Cornejo in withdrawal slips, thereby enabling herself to
withdraw a total of ₱65,000.00 and ₱2,000.00 from the respective savings accounts of
Matuguina and Cornejo.

The antecedent facts were summarized in the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA),1 as follows:

As culled from the evidence, Matuguina and Cornejo left their savings account
passbooks with the accused within the space of a week in October - November 1993
when they went to the bank's Malibay branch to transact on their accounts. Matuguina,
in particular, withdrew the sum of ₱500 on October 29 and left her passbook with the
accused upon the latter's instruction. She had to return two more times before the
branch manager Cynthia Zialcita sensed that something wrong was going on. Leaming
of Matuguina's problem, Zialcita told the accused to return the passbook to her on
November 8. On this day, the accused came up with the convenient excuse that she
had already returned the passbook. Skeptical, Zialcita reviewed Matuguina's account
and found three withdrawal slips dated October 19, 29 and November 4, 1993
containing signatures radically different from the specimen signatures of the depositor
and covering a total of ₱65,000. It was apparent that the accused had intervened in the
posting and verification of the slips because her initials were affixed thereto. Zialcita
instructed her assistant manager Benjamin Misa to pay a visit to Matuguina, a move
that led to the immediate exposure of the accused. Matuguina was aghast to see the
signatures in the slips and denied that the accused returned the passbook to her. When
she went back to the bank worried about the unauthorized withdrawals from her
account, she met with the accused in the presence of the bank manager. She insisted
that the signatures in the slips were not her, forcing the accused to admit that the
passbook was still with her and kept in her house.

Zialcita also summoned Juanita Ebora, the teller who posted and released the
November 4 withdrawal. When she was asked why she processed the transaction,
Ebora readily pointed to the accused as the person who gave to her the slip. Since she
saw the accused's initials on it attesting to having verified the signature of the depositor,
she presumed that the withdrawal was genuine. She posted and released the money to
the accused.

On the same day, November 8, Zialcita instructed Misa to visit another depositor,
Milagrosa Cornejo, whom they feared was also victimized by the accused. Their worst
expectations were confirmed. According to Cornejo, on November 3, she went to the
bank to deposit a check and because there were many people there at the time, she left
her passbook with the accused. She returned days later to get it back, but the accused
told her that she left it at home. Misa now showed to her a withdrawal slip dated
November 4, 1993 in which a signature purporting to be hers appeared. Cornejo denied
that it was her signature. As with the slips affecting Matuguina, the initials of the
accused were unquestionably affixed to the paper.

Zialcita reported her findings posthaste to her superiors. The accused initially denied the
claims against her but when she was asked to write her statement down, she confessed
to her guilt. She started crying and locked herself inside the bathroom. She came out
only when another superior Fed Cortez arrived to ask her some questions. Since then,
she executed three more statements in response to the investigation conducted by the
bank's internal auditors. She also gave a list of the depositors' accounts from which she
drew cash and which were listed methodically in her diary.

The employment of the accused was ultimately terminated. The bank paid Matuguina
P.65,000, while Cornejo got her refund directly from the accused. In the course of her
testimony on the witness stand, the accused made these further admissions:

(a) She signed the withdrawal slips Exhibits B, C, D and H which contained the
fake signatures of Matuguina and Cornejo;

(b) She wrote and signed the confession letter Exhibit K; (c) She wrote the
answers to the questions of the branch cluster head Fred Cortez Exhibit L, and to
the auditors' questions in Exhibit M, N and O;

(d) Despite demand, she did not pay the bank.2

Judgment of the RTC

On July 13, 1998, the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City (RTC) rendered its judgment,3
finding the petitioner guilty as charged, and sentencing her to suffer as follows:

(a) In Criminal Case No. 94-5524, involving the withdrawal of ₱20,000.00 from
the account of Matuguina, the indeterminate sentence of two years, 11 months
and 10 days of prison correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and
20 days of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay BPI Family ₱20,000.00 and
the costs of suit;

(b) In Criminal Case No. 94-5525, involving the withdrawal of ₱2,000.00 from
Cornejo's account, the indeterminate sentence of three months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to one year and eight months of prision correccional, as maximum,
and to pay BPI Family ₱2,000.00 and the costs of suit;

(c) In Criminal Case No. 94-5526, involving the withdrawal of ₱10,000.00 from
the account of Matuguina, the indeterminate sentence of four months and 20
days of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, 11 months and 10 days of
prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay BPI Family ₱10,000.00 and the
costs of suit;

and

(d) In Criminal Case No. 94-5527, involving the withdrawal of ₱35,000 from
Matuguina's account, the indeterminate sentence of two years, 11 months and 10
days of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor, as
maximum, and to pay BPI Family ₱35,000.00 and the costs of suit.

Decision of the CA

On appeal, the petitioner contended in the CA that: (1) her conviction should be set
aside because the evidence presented against her had been obtained in violation of her
constitutional right against self-incrimination; (2) her rights to due process and to
counsel had been infringed; and (3) the evidence against her should be inadmissible for
being obtained by illegal or unconstitutional means rendering the evidence as the fruit of
the poisonous tree.
On August 18, 2005, the CA promulgated its decision 4 affirming the judgment of the
RTC, to wit:

In summary, we find no grounds to disturb the findings of the lower court, except the
provision of the dispositive portion in case 94-5525 requiring the accused to pay BPI
Family ₱2,000. This must be deleted because the accused had already paid the amount
to the depositor.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, with the
modification that the award of ₱2,000 to the complainant in case 94-5525 be deleted.

SO ORDERED.

Issues

In this appeal, the petitioner still insists that her conviction was invalid because her
constitutional rights against self-incrimination, to due process and to counsel were
denied. In behalf of the State, the Office of the Solicitor General counters that she could
invoke her rights to remain silent and to counsel only if she had been under custodial
investigation, which she was not; and that the acts of her counsel whom she had herself
engaged to represent her and whom she had the full authority to replace at any time
were binding against her.

Ruling of the Court

The appeal lacks merit.

We first note that the petitioner has accepted the findings of fact about the transactions
that gave rise to the accusations in court against her for four counts of estafa through
falsification of a commercial document. She raised no challenges against such findings
of fact here and in the CA, being content with limiting herself to the supposed denial of
her rights to due process and to counsel, and to the inadmissibility of the evidence
presented against her. In the CA, her main objection focused on the denial of her right
against self-incrimination and to counsel, which denial resulted, according to her, in the
invalidation of the evidence of her guilt.

Debunking the petitioner's challenges, the CA stressed that the rights against self-
incrimination and to counsel guaranteed under the Constitution applied only during the
custodial interrogation of a suspect. In her case, she was not subjected to any
investigation by the police or other law enforcement agents. Instead, she underwent an
administrative investigation as an employee of the BPI Family Savings Bank, the
investigation being conducted by her superiors. She was not coerced to give evidence
against herself, or to admit to any crime, but she simply broke down bank when
depositors Matuguina and Cornejo confronted her about her crimes. We quote with
approval the relevant portions of the decision of the CA, viz:

The accused comes to Us on appeal to nullify her conviction on the ground that the
evidence presented against her was obtained in violation of her constitutional right
against self-incrimination. She also contends that her rights to due process and counsel
were infringed. Without referring to its name, she enlists one of the most famous
metaphors of constitutional law to demonize and exclude what she believes were
evidence obtained against her by illegal or unconstitutional means - evidence
constituting the fruit of the poisonous tree. We hold, however, that in the particular
setting in which she was investigated, the revered constitutional rights of an accused to
counsel and against self-incrimination are not apposite.

The reason is elementary. These cherished rights are peculiarly rights in the context of
an official proceeding for the investigation and prosecution for crime. The right against
self-incrimination, when applied to a criminal trial, is contained in this terse injunction -
no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. In other words, he may
not be required to take the witness stand. He can sit mute throughout the proceedings.
His right to counsel is expressed in the same laconic style: he shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel. This means inversely that the criminal prosecution
cannot proceed without having a counsel by his side. These are the traditional rights of
the accused in a criminal case. They exist and may be invoked when he faces a formal
indictment and trial for a criminal offense. But since Miranda vs. Arizona 384 US 436,
the law has come to recognize that an accused needs the same protections even before
he is brought to trial. They arise at the very inception of the criminal process - when a
person is taken into custody to answer to a criminal offense. For what a person says or
does during custodial investigation will eventually be used as evidence against him at
the trial and, more often than not, will be the lynchpin of his eventual conviction. His trial
becomes a parody if he cannot enjoy from the start the right against self-incrimination
and to counsel. This is the logic behind what we now call as the Miranda doctrine.

The US Supreme Court in Miranda spells out in precise words the occasion for the
exercise of the new right and the protections that it calls for. The occasion is when an
individual is subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise
deprived of his freedom in a significant way. It is when custodial investigation is
underway that the certain procedural safeguards takes over - the person must be
warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he
says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of
an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior
to any questioning.

We must, therefore, be careful to note what the Miranda doctrine does not say. It was
never intended to hamper the traditional law-enforcement function to investigate crime
involving persons not under restraint. The general questioning of citizens in the fact-
finding process, as the US Supreme Court recognizes, which is not preceded by any
restraint on the freedom of the person investigated, is not affected by the holding, since
the compelling atmosphere inherent in in-custody interrogation is not present.

The holding in Miranda is explicitly considered the source of a provision in our 1987 bill
of rights that any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel, a provision identical in language and spirit to the earlier Section
20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. People vs. Caguioa 95 SCRA 2. As we can see,
they speak of the companion rights of a person under investigation to remain silent and
to counsel, to ensure which the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine had also to be
institutionalized by declaring that any confession or admission obtained in violation of
these rights is inadmissible. But to what extent must the rights to remain silent and to
counsel be enforced in an investigation for the commission of an offense? The answer
has been settled by rulings of our Supreme Court in Caguoia and in the much later case
of Navallo vs Sandiganbayan 234 SCRA 175 incorporating in toto the Miranda doctrine
into the above-cited provisions of our bill of rights. Thus, the right to remain silent and to
counsel can be invoked only in the context in which the Miranda doctrine applies - when
the official proceeding is conducted under the coercive atmosphere of a custodial
interrogation. There are no cases extending them to a non-coercive setting. In Navallo,
the Supreme Court said very clearly that the rights are invocable only when the accused
is under custodial investigation. A person undergoing a normal audit examination is not
under custodial investigation and, hence, the audit examiner may not be considered the
law enforcement officer contemplated by the rule.

By a fair analogy, the accused in the case before us may not be said to be under
custodial investigation. She was not even being investigated by any police or law
enforcement officer. She was under administrative investigation by her superiors in a
private firm and in purely voluntary manner. She was not restrained of her freedom in
any manner. She was free to stay or go. There was no evidence that she was forced or
pressured to say anything. It was an act of conscience that compelled her to speak, a
true mental and moral catharsis that religion and psychology recognize to have salutary
effects on the soul. In this setting, the invocation of the right to remain silent or to
counsel is simply irrelevant.

The accused makes a final argument against her conviction by contending that she did
not get effective legal representation from her former counsel who was already old and
feeble when the case was being heard. In fact, the records show, her counsel died
during the pendency of the case, an octogenarian at that. One can truly make a case
from one's lack of a competent and independent counsel, but we are not prepared to
say that the accused was so poorly represented that it affected her fundamental right to
due process. Except for the several postponements incurred by her counsel, there is
really no showing that he committed any serious blunder during the trial. We have read
the transcripts of the trial and failed to get this impression. The evidence against the
accused was simply too overwhelming. We may take note that once, the trial court
admonished the accused to replace her counsel due to his absences, but she did not.
She must live by that.5

Considering that the foregoing explanation by the CA was justly supported by the
records, and that her investigation as a bank employee by her employer did not come
under the coverage of the Constitutionally protected right against self-incrimination, right
to counsel and right to due process, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in
affirming the conviction of the petitioner by the RTC.

The guilt of the petitioner for four counts of estafa through falsification of a commercial
document was established beyond reasonable doubt. As a bank teller, she took
advantage of the bank depositors who had trusted in her enough to leave their
passbooks with her upon her instruction. Without their knowledge, however, she filled
out withdrawal slips that she signed, and misrepresented to her fellow bank employees
that the signatures had been verified in due course. Her misrepresentation to her co-
employees enabled her to receive the amounts stated in the withdrawal slips. She
thereby committed two crimes, namely: estafa, by defrauding BPI Family Savings, her
employer, in the various sums withdrawn from the bank accounts of Matuguina and
Cornejo; and falsification of a commercial document, by forging the signatures of
Matuguina and Cornejo in the withdrawal slips to make it appear that the depositor
concerned had signed the respective slips in order to enable her to withdraw the
amounts. Such offenses were complex crimes, because the estafa would not have been
consummated without the falsification of the withdrawal slips.

Nonetheless, there is a need to clarify the penalties imposable.

According to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,6 the penalty for a complex crime is
that corresponding to the most serious crime, the same to be applied in its maximum
period. Otherwise, the penalty will be void and ineffectual, and will not attain finality.

In the four criminal cases involved in this appeal, the falsification of commercial
documents is punished with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
(i.e., two years, four months and one day to six years) and a fine of ₱5,000.00. 7 In
contrast, the estafa is punished according to the value of the defraudation, as follows:
with the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period (i.e., four years, two months and one day to eight years) if the amount
of the fraud is over Pl2,000.00 but does not exceed ₱22,000.00, and if such amount
exceeds ₱22,000.00, the penalty is imposed in the maximum period, adding one year
for each additional Pl0,000.00, but the total shall not exceed 20 years, in which case the
penalty shall be termed pris ion mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be, in
connection with the accessory penalties that may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of the Revised Penal Code; with the penalty of prision correccional in
its minimum and medium periods (i.e., six months and one day to four years and two
months) if the amount of the fraud is over ₱6,000.00 but does not exceed ₱12,000.00;
with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period (i.e., four months and one day to two years and four months) if the
amount of the fraud is over ₱200.00 but does not exceed ₱6,000.00; and with the
penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (i.e., two months and one
day to six months) if the amount of the fraud does not exceed ₱200.00. 8

In Criminal Case No. 94-5524, estafa was the graver felony because the amount of the
fraud was ₱20,000.00; hence, the penalty for estafa is to be imposed in its maximum
period. However, the RTC and the CA fixed the indeterminate sentence of two years, 11
months and 10 days of prison correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and
20 days of prision mayor, as maximum. Such maximum of the indeterminate penalty
was short by one day, the maximum period of the penalty being six years, eight months
and 21 days to eight years. Thus, the indeterminate sentence is corrected to three years
of prison correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and 21 days of prision
mayor, as maximum.

In Criminal Case No. 94-5525, involving ₱2,000.00, the estafa is punished with four
months and one day of arresto mayor in its maximum period to two years and four
months of prision correccional in its minimum period. The falsification of commercial
document is penalized with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
(i.e., two years, four months and one day to six years) and a fine of ₱5,000.00. The
latter offense is the graver felony, and its penalty is to be imposed in the maximum
period, which is from four years, nine months and 11 days to six years plus fine of
PS,000.00. The penalty next lower in degree is arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period (i.e., four months and one day to two years
and four months). Thus, the indeterminate sentence of three months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to one year and eight months of prision correccional, as maximum that
both the RTC and the CA fixed was erroneous. We rectify the error by prescribing in lieu
thereof the indeterminate sentence of two years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
four years, nine months and 11 days of prision correccional plus fine of PS,000.00, as
maximum.

In Criminal Case No. 94-5526, involving ₱10,000.00, the RTC and the CA imposed the
indeterminate sentence of four months and 20 days of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
two years, 11 months and 10 days of prision correccional, as maximum. However, the
penalty for the falsification of commercial documents is higher than that for the estafa.
To accord with Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for falsification of
commercial documents (i.e., prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
and a fine of ₱5,000.00) should be imposed in the maximum period. Accordingly, we
revise the indeterminate sentence so that its minimum is two years and four months of
prision correccional, and its maximum is five years of prision correccional plus fine of
₱5,000.00.

In Criminal Case No. 94-5527, where the amount of the fraud was ₱35,000.00, the
penalty for estafa (i.e., prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, or four years, two months and one day to eight years) is higher than
that for falsification of commercial documents. The indeterminate sentence of two years,
11 months and 10 days of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision
mayor, as maximum, was prescribed. Considering that the maximum period ranged
from six years, eight months and 21 days to eight years, the CA should have clarified
whether or not the maximum of eight years of prision mayor already included the
incremental penalty of one year for every ₱10,000.00 in excess of ₱22,000.00. Absent
the clarification, we can presume that the incremental penalty was not yet included.
Thus, in order to make the penalty clear and specific, the indeterminate sentence is
hereby fixed at four years of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight
months and 21 days of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one year incremental penalty.
In other words, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence is seven years, eight
months and 21 days of prision mayor.

The CA deleted the order for the restitution of the ₱2,000.00 involved in Criminal Case
No. 94-5525 on the ground that such amount had already been paid to the complainant,
Milagrosa Cornejo. There being no issue as to this, the Court affirms the deletion.

The Court adds that the petitioner is liable to BPI Family for interest of 6% per annum
on the remaining unpaid sums reckoned from the finality of this judgment. This liability
for interest is only fair and just.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals
on August 18, 2005, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS, to wit:
 (1) In Criminal Case No. 94-5524, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate
penalty of three years of prison correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight
months and 21 days of prision mayor, as maximum;

(2) In Criminal Case No. 94-5525, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate
penalty of two years of prision correccional, as minimum, to four years, nine
months and 11 days of prision correccional plus fine of ₱5,000.00, as maximum;

(3) In Criminal Case No. 94-5526, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate
penalty of two years and four months of prision correccional, as the minimum, to
five years of prision correccional plus fine of ₱5,000.00, as the maximum; and

(4) In Criminal Case No. 94-5527, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate
penalty of four years of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven years, eight
months and 21 days of prision mayor, as maximum.

The Court ORDERS the petitioner to pay to BPI Family Saving Bank interest of 6% per
annum on the aggregate amount of ₱65,000.00 to be reckoned from the finality of this
judgment until full payment.

The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
JACKSON PADIERNOS y QUEJADA, G.R. No.181111 JACKIE ROXAS y GERMAN
and ROLANDO MESINA y JAVATE, Present: Petitioners, CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION, DEL CASTILLO, LEONEN,and * - versus - JARDELEZA, JJ. Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILI::.~f;~~~--------------~}--~~-~--~~~~---~~J.. x---------------------------
--------------- DECISION BRION, J.: Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari
filed by petitioners Jackson Padiemos y Quejada (Padiernos), Jackie Roxas y German
(Roxas) and Rolando Mesina y Javate (Mesina). The petitioners seek the reversal of the
Court of Appeals' (CA) decision 1 dated May 10, 2007 and resolution2 dated December
20, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR No. 28920. The assailed CA rulings affirmed with modification
the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 66, Baler, Aurora in Criminal
Case No. 3122. Designated as Additional Member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose C.
Mendoza, per Raffle dated August 17, 2015. 1 Penned by Associate Justice Celia C.
Librea-Leagogo, concurred in by Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., and Jose
C. Mendoza, rollo, p. 77. 2 Id. at 92. ~ rw Decision 2 G.R. No. 181111 The petitioners
were charged as accessories to the crime of illegal possession of lumber, in violation of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 or the Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines.
According to the Information, the petitioners took away the truck that carried the lumber
to prevent its use as evidence and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture. The
Information specifically states as follows: That at about 6:00 o’clock in the morning on
November 15, 2002, in Caragsacan, Dingalan, Aurora, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the aforesaid principals, confederating together and mutually helping
one another, did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully have in their
possession and control 818 pieces of lumber with a total volume of 10,253 board feet
and valued at 133,289.00 loaded on a ten-wheeler truck with Plate No. TFZ-747 and
owned by the accused Santiago Castillo y Cruz without any permit, license or
documents from the proper authority and that at about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon on
the following day, November 16, 2002, the aforesaid accessories, confederating
together and mutually helping one another, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously
and willfully take and carry away the aforementioned ten wheeler truck with Plate No.
TFZ-747 so it could not be used as evidence and avoid confiscation and forfeiture in
favor of the government as tool or instrument of the crime. [emphasis and italics
supplied] CONTRARY TO LAW. Accused Santiago Castillo (Santiago), Frederico
Castillo (Frederico), and Roger Mostera (Mostera) remain at large; accused Eddie
Gatdula (Gatdula) pleaded not guilty as principal to the crime; while petitioners
Padiernos, Mesina, and Roxas pleaded not guilty as accessories to the crime.
Prosecution’s evidence The presented evidence of the prosecution shows that on
November 15, 2002, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Officer
(DENRO) Felimon Balico (Balico) approached a truck loaded with lumber, which was
parked at a national highway in Dingalan, Aurora (Dingalan). 3 The truck bore the name
“JEROME” with Plate No. TFZ-747. Balico requested from the truck driver, Frederico,
and the truck helper, Mostera, the lumber’s supporting documents but they failed to
produce any. Balico reported the matter to SPO4 Ramil Gamboa (Gamboa) and SPO4
Romulo Derit. Thereafter, he proceeded to the DENR office to report the incident. Some
of the DENROs represented that the transportation of the seized lumber had the
required permit but they, too, failed to produce any supporting document. 3 Id. at 36.
Decision 3 G.R. No. 181111 The DENRO group – composed of Balico, Tarcila Vivero
(Vivero) and Rodolfo Tumagan (Tumagan) – and the policemen, Gamboa and Romulo
Derit, guarded the truck loaded with lumber.4 The DENRO group decided to transfer the
truck and the lumber to the police station at Poblacion. They transferred the lumber first
from November 15 to November 16, 2002, and left the truck at the national highway in
Dingalan, guarded by the DENROs and some police officers.5 On November 16, 2002,
accused Gatdula, Santiago, and petitioners Mesina, Roxas, and Padiernos arrived at
the place where the truck was being held in custody.6 Santiago, who claimed ownership
of the truck,7 agreed with the DENROs and the police officers to bring the truck to the
police station. Santiago gave the truck key to Mesina who volunteered to drive the truck;
while Padiernos asked Balico where the seized lumbers were.8 Mesina started the
engine and Roxas, Santiago, and Padiernos immediately got on board at the front of the
truck. The DENRO group also got on board at the back of the truck. SPO2 Renato
Mendoza (Mendoza) and his companion, PO1 John Fajardo (Fajardo) follow on a
motorcycle. Since the truck was then parked opposite the direction to the police station,
Balico thought that Mesina would maneuver the truck so that they could proceed to the
police station. To their surprise, Mesina increased the truck’s speed and headed
towards the direction of Nueva Ecija, leaving behind their two policemen escorts9 who
chased the truck and fired three warning shots.10 As the truck sped faster, Balico yelled
“Saklolo! Saklolo!” but the truck maintained its speed. SPO2 Mendoza corroborated this
testimony; he and Fajardo saw the three DENROs waving but could not hear what they
were saying. When the truck had exited Dingalan, SPO2 Mendoza and Fajardo decided
not to pursue the truck anymore and simply reported the incident to the Philippine Army
stationed at Brgy. Tanawan. The Philippine Army blocked the road with a 50-caliber
machine gun and flagged down the truck at Brgy. Bagting, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija.11 4
Id. at 34. 5 Id. at 36. 6 Id. at 33. 7 Id. at 34, 36, and 39. 8 Id. at 34 and 36. 9 Id. at 34. 10
Id. at 39. 11 Id. at 34. Decision 4 G.R. No. 181111 As the truck passengers alighted,
petitioner Padiernos uttered bad words to them, saying that they had no right to
apprehend the truck and the lumber.12 Police officers Gamboa, Joemar Balmores,
Sagudang, Fajardo, and Mendoza13 immediately proceeded to Brgy. Bagting where
they found the DENRO group, Padiernos, and Roxas. The DENROs and the policemen
proceeded back to Dingalan, with police officer Gamboa driving the truck to the police
station compound. Evidence for the defense Mesina testified that on November 16,
2002, he was watching television with his wife and children when his former employer,
Santiago, arrived and asked him to bring the latter’s truck to Cabanatuan City. He
refused Santiago’s request because he knew that the truck had been engaged in illegal
activities; particularly, the truck had been previously loaded with lumber that were
confiscated.14 Santiago insisted and assured him that he would take care of everything
and that there was really no problem with the truck. Mesina finally agreed and rode in
Santiago’s car. Santiago asked him to fetch Roxas to accompany them.15 Roxas was
resting in his house when Santiago and Mesina arrived. Santiago asked Roxas if he
could drive his truck to Cabanatuan City.16 Roxas refused because he had already
heard of the truck’s apprehension,17 but he finally relented after Santiago assured him
that there was no problem with the truck. They proceeded to Caragsacan, Dingalan
where the truck was parked.18 On cross-examination, Roxas testified that he knew very
well that the vehicle was a “hot” truck but he relied on Santiago’s claim that the problem
already been settled.19 On their way to Caragsacan, Dingalan, they saw Padiernos at
the waiting shed of Aplayang Malaki, Dingalan.20 According to Padiernos, he had been
waiting for a ride to Cabanatuan City from 12:30 to 1:30 p.m. but only Santiago’s group
came by.21 Padiernos hitched a ride with them after learning that they would bring
Santiago’s truck to Cabanatuan City.22 12 Id. 13 Id. at 39. 14 Id. at 42-44, testimony of
Mesina. 15 Id. 16 Id. at 41. 17 Id. at 42-44, testimony of Mesina. 18 Id. at 41-42,
testimony of Roxas. 19 Id. at 42. 20 Id. at 39- 43, testimonies of Padiernos, Roxas and
Mesina. 21 Id. at 39-40, testimony of Padiernos. 22 Id. at 42-44, testimony of Mesina.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 181111 Padiernos testified that he only learned where the truck
was parked when they reached Caragsacan.23 On reaching the place where the truck
was parked, they all alighted from the car and walked towards the back of the truck;
Padiernos crossed the street. Mesina saw Santiago talk to DENRO Tumagan and
several other persons for about 25 to 30 minutes.24 Thereafter, Santiago handed the
truck keys to Mesina.25 Padiernos seated himself in the front cab of the truck with
Santiago and Roxas, while Mesina took the driver’s seat.26 Mesina drove the car
towards Cabanatuan City upon Santiago’s instruction.27 The petitioners unanimously
testified that they did not hear people shouting or tapping on the truck to stop them.28
They also did not notice any motorcycle following them as the truck’s side mirrors were
broken. They did not reach Cabanatuan City because the Philippine Army flagged them
down.29 After the incident, Padiernos boarded a jeepney bound for Cabanatuan City
while Roxas and Mesina boarded a jeepney bound for Dingalan.30 The RTC’s ruling
The RTC convicted petitioners Padiernos, Mesina and Roxas as accessories to the
crime of violation of P.D. 705.31 The RTC ruled that the petitioners had a common
design to take away the truck that earlier had been used in violating P.D. No. 705 or the
Forestry Reform Code.32 The RTC found that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses were categorical, straightforward, and consistent; they had no improper
motive to testify falsely against the petitioners.33 Thus, the RTC disregarded the
petitioners’ defense that they did not intentionally take away the truck.34 The RTC also
found that the petitioners’ testimonies and admissions established their prior knowledge
that the truck had been previously 23 Id. at 40. 24 Id. at 39-43, testimonies of
Padiernos, Roxas and Mesina. 25 Id. at 40 and 43. 26 Id. at 39-43, testimonies of
Padiernos, Roxas and Mesina. 27 Id. at. 43. 28 Id. at 39-43, testimonies of Padiernos,
Roxas and Mesina. 29 Id. at 40, 42, and 43. 30 Id. at 42. 31 Id. at 131-132. 32 Id. at 130
and 132. 33 Id. at 127. 34 Id. Decision 6 G.R. No. 181111 confiscated for illegal
transport of forest products. This explains the reluctance of Mesina and Roxas to go
with Santiago in getting the truck.35 The RTC further ruled that Padiernos’ defense of
denial fails in view of Balico’s testimony that Padiernos gave the DENROs a “tongue-
lashing” as they had no right to apprehend the truck and its cargo.36 Padiernos’
knowledge of the status of the truck is also undeniable as he admitted his familiarity with
the townsfolk of Dingalan and its rampant problem of illegal transport of forest products.
The RTC concluded that the incident and the personalities involved could not have
escaped Padiernos’ notice, yet he still went with them to get the truck.37 Finally, the
RTC disregarded the petitioners’ claim that they did not hear the policemen’s warning
shots and the DENROs’ shouts because of the noisy engine and the defective windows
of the truck. The RTC had observed during its ocular inspection of the truck that both
windows were in order and sounds outside could be clearly heard even with a running
engine.38 The CA’s ruling The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision and adopted its factual
findings, but modified the penalty imposed on the petitioners.39 The CA considered the
subject truck as an “instrument” in the commission of the offense, within the meaning of
Article 19, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). While the lumber had already
been unloaded and placed in police custody, the truck still served as the essential link to
the discovery of the loaded undocumented lumber. Similarly, its presentation as
evidence is material in proving the commission of the offense of violation of P.D. 705, as
amended.40 The CA added that since the petitioners’ violation of P.D. 705 is mala
prohibita, their intent, motive, or knowledge need not be shown. Nevertheless, their
defense of denial must fail in view of the evidence on record and their own admissions
that they were aware of the truck’s involvement in an illegal activity at the time that they
drove it towards Nueva Ecija.41 The prosecution had also clearly established
Padiernos’s close association with Santiago, Roxas, and Mesina. Padiernos previously
facilitated Santiago’s application for mayor’s permit as a lumber dealer; 35 Id. at 128. 36
Id. at 129. 37 Id. 38 Id. at 130. 39 Id. at 75. 40 Id. at 60. 41 Id. at. 68. Decision 7 G.R.
No. 181111 Roxas is a family friend of Padiernos and his father is Padiernos’s driver,
while Mesina and Padiernos’ are long-time acquaintances.42 The Parties’ Arguments
The petitioners argue that they could not be held liable as accessories for violation of
P.D. 705 because the DENROs and the police authorities had already discovered the
crime and had, in fact, control over the truck when the petitioners drove it towards
Nueva Ecija.43 Article 19 of the RPC only punishes accessories who prevent the
discovery of the crime.44 On the other hand, the respondent maintains that the
petitioners’ acts were aimed at preventing the discovery of the crime. The respondent
alleges that without the truck, the accused in the present case could easily produce the
necessary transportation documents to account for the entire volume of the confiscated
lumber.45 The respondent refers to the testimony of James Martinez of CENRO
Dingalan who tried to make it appear that the seized lumber had the proper
transportation permit for 8,254 board feet and 261 pieces of lumber. This transportation
permit did not tally, however, with the actual volume of the confiscated lumber of 10,253
board feet, totaling 818 pieces.46 The Court’s Ruling We emphasize at the outset the
well-settled doctrine that an appeal throws the whole case wide open for review. An
appeal therefore empowers, and even obligates, the appellate court to correct errors as
may be found in the appealed judgment even if these errors have not been raised. It is
likewise settled that when an accused appeals, he opens the whole case for a new
trial.47 The Court is therefore not precluded from determining the correct criminal
liability of the appealing accused, and from imposing the corresponding punishment in
accordance with the charges in the Information and the crime proved during trial. Thus,
in People v. Manalili et al., 48 the Court held that since the Information in that case
contained a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessarily constituting
both the crimes of illegal possession of firearms and of murder, the separate crime of
multiple murder may be validly taken into account49 in the resolution of the appeal
before the Court, 42 Id. at 70. 43 Id. at 14. 44 Id. at 13. 45 Id. 46 Id. at 144-145. 47
People v. Llaguno, et al., G.R. No. 91262, January 28, 1998, 285 SCRA 124, 147. 48
355 Phil. 652, 688-689 (1998). 49 The appellants in this case did not file a motion to
quash the information that charges two offenses; thus, they were deemed to have
waived this objection. Decision 8 G.R. No. 181111 although the appellants have been
acquitted of illegal possession of firearms. The Court ruled that the appellants in that
case were fairly apprised of the nature of the crime of multiple murder and granted a fair
opportunity to defend themselves. Even with this premise, we find that insofar as the
petitioners are concerned, the facts alleged in the Information and the crime proved in
the present case do not make the petitioners liable as accessories for violation of P.D.
705. They are, however, liable for violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829. The petitioners
are not liable as accessories to the crime The well-settled doctrine is that the allegations
in the Information determine the nature of the offense, and not the technical name that
the public prosecutor assigns in the preamble of the Information. From a legal point of
view, and in a very real sense, the accused is not concerned with the technical name of
the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits.
His attention should be directed and his interest should be on the facts alleged. The real
question is not “did he commit a crime given in the law with some technical and specific
name,” but “did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner
therein set forth.”50 In the present case, the Information charges the petitioners of
committing the following acts: xxx the aforesaid accessories, confederating together and
mutually helping one another, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously and willfully take
and carry away the aforementioned ten wheeler truck with Plate No. TFZ-747 so it could
not be used as evidence and avoid confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the
government as tool or instrument of the crime. Applying the doctrine, the controlling
charge against the petitioners is not the allegation that they were accessories to the
crime, which is merely the public prosecutor’s conclusion of law or the technical name of
an accused’s criminal participation under Article 19 of the RPC, but the factual charges
against them. In short, their alleged acts control in defining the crime for which they
should stand trial. These material factual allegations pertain to their act of conspiring
with each other to take and carry away the subject truck so that it could not be used as
evidence and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government as tool
or instrument of the crime. Notably, the petitioners had been sufficiently apprised of
these factual allegations, against which they should defend themselves. 50 Matrido v.
People, 610 Phil. 203, 210-211 (2009). Decision 9 G.R. No. 181111 Reading the facts
alleged in the Information and proved at the trial, in relation with the legal definition of
“accessories” under Article 19 of the RPC, we find that the RTC and the CA erred in
convicting the accused as accessories to the crime of violation of P.D. 705. Article 19,
paragraph 251 defines “accessories” as those who, with knowledge of the commission
of the crime and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices,
take part subsequent to its commission by concealing or destroying the body of the
crime, its effects or instruments, in order to prevent its discovery. Under this provision,
the punished acts should have been committed for the purpose of preventing the
discovery of the crime.52 In the present case, the crime punishable under P.D. 705 –
the illegal possession of lumber – had already been discovered at the time the
petitioners took the truck. This discovery led to the confiscation of the truck and the
loaded lumber on November 15, 2002. The petitioners took the truck on November 16,
2002, after its confiscation. In these lights, the petitioners are not liable as accessories
to the crime charged in the Information as the legal definition of the technical term
“accessories” does not coincide with the factual allegations in the Information that
serves as the actual criminal charge against the petitioners. The factual allegations in
the Information constitute the crime of obstruction of justice under Section 1(b) of P.D.
1829 The petitioners, however, cannot go scot-free. The factual allegations in the
Information, while not constituting an offense committed by accessories under Article
19, paragraph 2 of the RPC, constitute instead the criminal offense of obstruction of
justice, which is defined under Section 1(b) of P.D. No. 1829 entitled “Penalizing
Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders.” P.D. 1829
addresses the necessity of penalizing acts which obstruct or frustrate or tend to obstruct
or frustrate the successful apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders. Under
Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829, the crime of obstruction of justice is committed through the
following acts: 51 Article 19. Accessories. - Accessories are those who, having
knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein,
either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the
following manners: xxx 2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime or the
effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; xxx 52 People v.
Versola, 170 Phil 622, 632 (1977). Decision 10 G.R. No. 181111 Section 1. The penalty
of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000
pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs,
impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and
prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts: x x x x (b)
altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object,
with intent to impair its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as
evidence in any investigation of or official proceedings in criminal cases, or to be used
in the investigation of, or official proceedings in criminal cases; xxx” [emphasis supplied]
The factual allegations in the Information, as duly proved during trial, show that the
petitioners’ acts actually constituted a violation of Section 1(b) above. First, the
Information duly alleges all the essential elements of the crime of obstruction of justice
under Section 1(b). The factual allegations in the Information clearly charge the accused
of taking and carrying away the truck so that it could not be used as evidence and to
avoid its confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government as a tool or instrument of
the crime. In the present case, the truck that carried the undocumented lumber serves
as material evidence that is indispensable in the criminal investigation and prosecution
for violation of P.D. 705. Particularly, the truck is an indispensable link to the persons
involved in the illegal possession/transportation of the seized lumber as the permit for
the transportation of the lumber necessarily involves the truck and the lumber.
According to DENR forest ranger Rogelio Pajimna,53 the transport of lumber should be
covered with supporting documents that should be in the possession of the transporter.
Second, the petitioners deliberately took the truck or “suppressed” this particular
evidence. The term “suppress” means to subdue or end by force.54 Specifically, the
petitioners intentionally suppressed the truck as evidence, with the intent to impair its
availability and prevent its use as evidence in the criminal investigation or proceeding
for violation of P.D. 705. This intent was duly proved during trial. It is undisputed that
Santiago owns the truck, which serves as his link to the illegal possession/transport of
the seized lumber. Santiago had every reason and motive to take his truck after its
confiscation. Without the truck, 53 Rollo, pp. 37-38. 54 Black Law’s Dictionary, Fifth
Edition, p. 1291. Decision 11 G.R. No. 181111 Santiago could be exculpated and the
forthcoming criminal investigation or proceedings for violation of P.D. 705 would be
frustrated. The petitioners’ intent to take and carry away the truck is established by their
knowledge of the status of the truck and their commission of the crime at Santiago’s
prompting. Notably, both the RTC and the CA correctly considered the testimonies of
the witnesses and the petitioners’ admissions in ruling that the petitioners knew that the
truck had been involved in the illegal transportation/possession of the seized lumber.
Mesina admitted that he knew the truck’s involvement in illegal activities as it had been
previously loaded with lumber that was confiscated. According to Mesina, Roxas also
initially refused to go with them because he already heard the news of the truck’s
apprehension. Roxas admitted that he only agreed to join Santiago and Mesina, after
being assured that there was no problem with the truck. Padiernos’ demeanor after the
army flagged them down establishes his knowledge of the truck’s involvement with the
seized lumber. Padiernos uttered bad words at the DENROs, saying they had no right
to apprehend the truck and the lumber. This testimony, together with his close
association with the other petitioners, destroys his flimsy defense of denial. The RTC’s
findings during its ocular inspection of the truck also prove that the petitioners
deliberately drove the truck to Nueva Ecija despite evident knowledge of the
policemen’s warning shots, tapping, and the DENROs shouting for help from the back of
the truck. Clearly, these testimonies, the petitioners’ admissions, and the findings of the
trial court negate the petitioners’ defense of denial of their intent to take the truck and
their knowledge of the truck’s involvement in an illegal activity. The unanimous factual
findings of the RTC and the CA – such as the petitioners’ close association with each
other, their flimsy defense of denial of their intent to take away the truck, and the totality
of their acts showing their common design to take the truck – lead us to conclude that
the petitioners had indeed mutually conspired with one another to take away the truck to
suppress it from being used as evidence in the criminal investigation or proceeding for
violation of P.D. 705. Since the crime charged in the Information and the crime proved
during trial point to the petitioners’ violation of P.D. 1829, we reverse the CA’s findings
and find the petitioners guilty of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829. • Decision 12 G.R. No.
181111 ' Under Section 1 of the same law, the penalty for the crime of obstruction of
justice is prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from Pl,000.00 to
P6,000.00 pesos, or both.55 WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE the
Court of Appeals' decision dated May 10, 2007, and its resolution dated December 20,
2007. We find petitioners Jackson Padiemos y Quejada, Jackie Roxas y German, and
Rolando Mesina y Javate GUILTY for violation of Section l(b) of P.D. 1829. They are
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of prision correccional for 4 years, 9 months, and
11 days to 5 years, 4 months, and 20 days. SO ORDERED. QVWJJidt~ ARTURO D.
BRION Associate Justice WE CONCUR: ac Associate Justice Chairperson MARIANO
~~
 January 12, 2016

G.R. No. 174471

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JERRY PEPINO y RUERAS and PRECIOSA GOMEZ y CAMPOS, Accused-
Appellants.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

This is an appeal filed by Jerry Pepino (Pepino) and Preciosa Gomez (Gomez) assailing
the June 16, 2006 decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02026.

ANTECEDENTS

The prosecution evidence showed that at 1:00 p.m., on June 28, 1997, two men and a
woman entered the office of Edward Tan at Kilton Motors Corporation in Sucat,
Parafiaque City, and pretended to be customers. When Edward was about to receive
them, one of the men, eventually identified as Pepino pulled out a gun. Thinking that it
was a holdup, Edward told Pepino that the money was inside the cashier's box. Pepino
and the other man looted the "'cashier's box, handcuffed Edward, and forced him to go
with them.2 From the hallway, Jocelyn Tan (mentioned as "Joselyn" in some parts of the
record), Edward's wife, saw Pepino take her husband. She went to the adjoining room
upon Edward's instructions.3

Pepino brought Edward to a metallic green Toyota Corolla where three other men were
waiting inside. The woman (later identified as Gomez) sat on the front passenger
seat.4 The abductors then placed surgical tape over Edward's eyes and made him wear
sunglasses. After travelling for two and a half hours, they arrived at an apartment in
Quezon City. The abductors removed the tape from Edward's eyes, placed him in a
room, and then chained his legs. Pepino approached Edward and asked for the phone
number of his father so that he could ask for ransom for his (Edward's) liberty. Edward
told Pepino to negotiate with his wife, but the latter insisted on talking to his father. 5

At around 5:00 p.m. of the same day, the kidnappers called Edward's father and
demanded a P40 million ransom for his release. Edward's father told the kidnappers
that he did not have that amount. The abductors negotiated with Jocelyn who eventually
agreed to a P700,000.00 ransom. The kidnappers told Jocelyn to pack the money into
two packages and to drop these at a convenience store in front of McDonald's at
Mindanao Avenue. They further demanded that Edward's vehicle be used to bring the
money.6

After four days, or on July 1, 1997, Antonio Gepiga (the family driver) brought the
agreed amount to the 7-Eleven convenience store at Mindanao A venue as
instructed.7 That evening, three men and Gomez blindfolded Edward, made him board a
car, and drove around for 30 minutes. Upon stopping, they told Edward that he could
remove his blindfold after five minutes. When Edward removed his blindfold, he found
himself inside his own car parked at the UP Diliman Campus. He drove home and
reported his kidnapping to Teresita Ang See, a known anti-crime crusader.8

After five months, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI!) informed Edward that they
had apprehended some suspects, and invited him to identify them from a lineup
consisting of seven persons: five males and two females. Edward positively identified
Pepino, Gomez, and one Mario Galgo.9 Jocelyn likewise identified Pepino.10

Pepino and Gomez did not testify for their defense. The defense instead presented
Zeny Pepino, Reynaldo Pepino, NBI Special Investigator Marcelo Jadloc and P/Sr. Insp.
Narciso Quano (mentioned as "Qano" in some parts of the record).
Zeny testified that she and her husband, Jerry Pepino, were inside their house in Cebu
City on December 7, 1997, when about 20 heavily armed men entered their house
looking for Jerry. When Jerry asked them if they had a warrant of arrest, one of the men
pointed a gun at him and handcuffed him; the armed men then hit him with the butt of
an armalite and punched him. The men also took Pepino' s wristwatch and wallet, as
well as Zeny's bag and watch. Some of the armed men searched the second floor of the
house, and found a .45 caliber gun. The armed men brought Zeny and Pepino outside
their house where Zeny saw Renato Pepino and Larex Pepino already handcuffed. The
armed men brought them to the Cebu City Police Headquarters before bringing them to
the NBI Headquarters in Manila. The following day, Jerry, Renato, and Larex were
brought to the Department of Justice (DO.I). Zeny, on the other hand, was released
after being detained at the NBI for three (3) days.11

Reynaldo's testimony was summarized by the CA as follows:

x x x On December 6, 1997, he accompanied accused-appellant Gomez to his brother's

sister-in-law who happens to work in a recruitment agency. While they were inside the
latter's house at Lot 2, Block 15, Marikina Heights, Marikina City, they heard a noise at
the gate. When he peeped through the window, he saw two (2) motorcycles and two (2)
Vannette vans. Shortly thereafter, someone kicked the back door and several armed
men emerged therefrom and announced their arrest. When he asked them if they had
any warrant, they replied: "Walang warrant, warrant. Walang search, search." They
were then hogtied and made to lie face down. Five (5) of them then went upstairs and
seized his personal belongings together with his briefcase which contained P45,000.00,
documents of accused-appellant Gomez, and his .45 caliber pistol as well as his license
and permit to carry the same. No receipts were issued for their personal effects which
were confiscated. They were subsequently brought to Camp Crame and subjected to
torture. The following day, they were brought to the Department of Justice and a case
for kidnapping was filed against him. Upon reinvestigation, however, he was discharged
from the Information and the court dismissed the case against him. 12

SI Jadloc and Police Senior Inspector Quano, Jr. were presented as hostile witnesses.

Jadloc declared on the witness stand that NBI Assistant Director Edmundo Arugay
dispatched a team to Cebu City to investigate a kidnap-for-ransom case. The team
immediately conducted surveillance operations when they arrived at Calle Rojo, Lahug,
Cebu City. One of the team members saw Renato and Larex Pepino with guns tucked
in their waists. When the team approached them, the two men ran inside their house.
The team went after them and on entering the house, they saw Jerry in possession of a
.45 caliber gun. The team arrested Jerry, Renato and Larex, and then brought them to
the NBI Headquarters in Manila.13

Quano testified that he was designated as the leader of a team tasked to arrest
members of a kidnap-for-ransom group at their safe house in Lot 2, Block 50, Marikina
Heights, Marikina City. When they arrived there, they introduced themselves as police
officers. The police forcibly opened the door after the occupants of the house refused to
open the ground floor door. During their search at the second floor, the operatives found
an armalite and a .45 caliber gun. The members of the team handcuffed Gomez and
Reynaldo, and then brought them to Camp Crame.14

The prosecution charged Preciosa Gomez, Jerry Pepino, Reynaldo Pepino, Jessie
Pepino, George Curvera, Boy Lanyujan, Luisito "Tata" Adulfo, Henriso
Batijon (a.k.a. Dodoy Batijon), Nerio Alameda, and an alias Wilan Tan with kidnapping
for ransom and serious illegal detention before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
259, Paranaque City.15 Reynaldo was subsequently discharged after reinvestigation.
Only Pepino, Gomez, and Batijon were arraigned; their other co-accused remained at
large.

In its May 15, 2000 decision, the RTC convicted Pepino and Gomez of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended) and
sentenced them to suffer the death penalty. The RTC also ordered them to pay Edward
P700,000.00 representing the amount extorted from him; P50,000.00 as moral
damages; and P50,000 as exemplary damages. The trial court acquitted Batijon for
insufficiency of evidence.

The R TC held that Edward positively identified Pepino and Gomez as two of the
persons who forcibly abducted him at gunpoint inside Kilton Motors, and who
consequently detained him somewhere in Quezon City for four (4) days until he was
released inside the UP Diliman Campus after the payment of ransom. The RTC added
that Jocelyn corroborated Edward's testimony on material points. It also pointed out that
Edward identified both Pepino and Gomez at the lineup conducted inside the NBI
compound, although Jocelyn only recognized Gomez.

The R TC further ruled that the accused were already estopped from questioning the
validity of their arrest after they entered their respective pleas.

The case was automatically elevated to this Court in view of the death penalty that the
R TC imposed. We referred the case to the CA for intermediate review pursuant to our
ruling in People v. Mateo.16

In its decision dated June 16, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision
with the modification that the amounts of moral and exemplary damages were increased
from P300,000.00 and Pl00,000.00, respectively.

The CA held that Pepino and Gomez were deemed to have waived any objection to the
illegality of their arrests when they did not move to quash the information before
entering their plea, and when they participated at the trial.

The CA further ruled that Pepino and Gomez conspired with each other to attain a
common objective, i.e., to kidnap Edward in exchange for ransom.

While the case was under review by the Supreme Court, Pepino filed an urgent motion
to withdraw his appeal, which the Court granted.17 Only Gomez's appeal is now pending
before us.

In her brief18 and supplemental brief,19 Gomez maintained that it was impossible for
Edward to have seen her in the front seat of the getaway car because he (Edward) was
blindfolded. She also alleged that the prosecution failed to prove that she had conspired
with the other accused.

Gomez further claimed that Edward's identification of her during trial "may have been
preconditioned x x x by suggestive identification"20 made at the police lineup. She
further argued that the death penalty imposed on her is no longer proper due to the
enactment of Republic Act No. 9346.

THE COURT'S ·RULING

We affirm Gomez's conviction, but we modify the penalty imposed and the
awarded indemnities.

Illegality of the Arrest

We point out at the outset that Gomez did not question before arraignment the legality
of her warrantless arrest or the acquisition of RTC's jurisdiction over her person. Thus,
Gomez is deemed to have waived any objection to her warrantless arrest.

It is settled that [a]ny objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition
by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely raised
before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.21 As we held
in People v. Samson:22

[A ]ppellant is now estopped from questioning any defect in the manner of his arrest as
he failed to move for the quashing of the information before the trial court.
Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest was cured when he voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of "not guilty"
and by participating in the trial.23

At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a
valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. Simply
put, the illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to
prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability. It is much
too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information had
been filed, the accused had been arraigned, the trial had commenced and had been
completed, and a judgment of conviction had been rendered against her. 24

Sufficiency of the Prosecution Evidence

a. Elements of kidnapping proved

The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he
kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3)
the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the
offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention
lasts for more than three (3) days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; or
(c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or
threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female,
or a public officer. If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the
duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally
detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is also of no
moment and the crime is qualified and becomes punishable by death even if none of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 is present. 25

All these elements have been established by the prosecution. Edward positively
identified Gomez and Pepino - both private individuals - as among the three persons
who entered his office and pretended to be Kilton Motors'customers. He further declared
that Pepino pointed a gun at him, and forcibly took him against his will. To directly quote
from the records:

ATTY. WILLIAM CHUA:

Q: Can you tell us if anything unusual happened to you on June 28, 1997?

EDWARD TAN:

A: I was kidnapped.

xxxx

Q: Can you tell this Court how the kidnapping was initiated?

A: At around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, there were three persons who entered the
office of Kilton Motors and pretended to be customers.

Q: What was the gender of these three persons that you are referring to?

A: Two men and a woman.

Q: After they pretended to be customers, tell us what happened?

A: · They told me they were going to pay but instead of pulling out money, they pulled
out a gun.

Q: How many people pulled out guns as you said?

A: Only one, sir.

Q: Will you look around this courtroom now and tell us if the person who pulled out a
gun is in court?

A: (WITNESS POINTED TO A PERSON AT THE RIGHT SECTION, SECOND ROW

WHO, WHEN ASKED HIS NAME, ANSWERED JERRY PEPINO)

Q: Now, you said that there were two men and a woman who went up the Kilton Motors
Office and you pointed to one of the men as Jerry Pepino, can you look around the
courtroom and tell us if any of the two others are in court?

A: (WITNESS POINTED TO A WOMAN INSIDE THE COURTROOM WHO, WHEN

ASKED HER NAME, ANSWERED AS PRECIOSA GOMEZ)

xxxx

Q: You said Mr. Pepino pulled out his gun, what happened after he pulled out his gun?

A: He told me just to be quiet and go with him.

Q: What was your reaction when he pointed a gun to you and he stated those words?

A: I thought it was only a holdup and so I told him there was money with the cashier and
told him to get it.

Q: What happened after you told him the money was in the cashier's box?

A: His companion took the money and told me to still go with them.

Q: When they told you to go with them, what happened next? A: I told them why should
I still go with them and then, I was handcuffed and was forced to go down.

xxxx

Q: As they were bringing you down, what happened next, Mr. Witness?

A: When we went down nearing his car, I was boarded on [in] his car.

xxxx

Q: When they boarded you inside that car, what did they do to you, Mr. Witness?

A: They put surgical tape on my eyes and also sunglasses.

xxxx

Q: Who was at the passenger's front seat of the car?

A: It was Preciosa Gomez.26

xxxx

Edward further declared on the witness stand that Pepino, Gomez, and their other co-
accused brought him to a safe house in Quezon City; detained him there for four (4)
days; and demanded ransom from his (Edward's) family.

It is settled that the crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a
person in an enclosure, but also in detaining him or depriving him of his liberty in any
manner. For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going
home. Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with
indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation. 27
Notably, Jocelyn corroborated Edward's testimony on the following points: Pepino
poked a handgun at Edward while they were on the second floor of Kilton; Pepino and
his companion brought him downstairs and out of the building, and made him board a
car; and the kidnappers demanded ransom in exchange for Edward's release.

Both the RTC and the CA found the respective testimonies of Edward and Jocelyn
credible and convincing. We affirm the credibility accorded by the trial court (and
affirmed by the CA) to these prosecution witnesses, in the absence of any showing that
this factual finding had been arbitrarily arrived at. There is nothing in the records that
would put the testimonies of Edward and Jocelyn under suspicion. We recall that
Edward had close contacts with Pepino at Kilton Motors and at the safe house. He also
saw Gomez (a) seated at the front seat of the getaway Toyota Corolla vehicle; (b) at the
safe house in Quezon City; and (c) inside the car before the kidnappers released him.

Jocelyn, for her part, stated that she was very near Pepino while he was taking away
her husband.

In People v. Pavillare,28 the Court found the testimonies of the private complainant
Sukhjinder Singh and his cousin, Lakhvir Singh, to be credible and convincing, and
reasoned out as follows:

Both witnesses had ample opportunity to observe the kidnappers and to remember their
faces. The complainant had close contact with the kidnappers when he was abducted
and beaten up, and later when the kidnappers haggled on the amount of the ransom
money. His cousin met Pavillare face to face and actually dealt with him when he paid
the ransom money. The two-hour period that the complainant was in close contact with
his abductors was sufficient for him to have a recollection of their physical appearance.
Complainant admitted in court that he would recognize his abductors if he sees them
again and upon seeing Pavillare he immediately recognized him as one of the
malefactors as he remembers him as the one who blocked his way, beat him up,
haggled with the complainant's cousin and received the ransom money. x x x It bears
repeating that the finding of the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses is given
utmost respect and as a rule will not be disturbed on appeal because it had the
opportunity to closely observe the demeanor of the witness in court.29

b. Admissibility of Identification

We find no merit in Gomez's claim that Edward's identification of her during

trial might have been preconditioned by the "suggestive identification" made during the
police lineup.

In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,30 the Court explained the procedure for out-of-court
identification and the test to determine the admissibility of such identifications in this
manner:

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done

thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to
identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect
from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In resolving the admissibility of
and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of
circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness'
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of
attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4)
the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of
time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure.31

Applying the totality-of-circumstances test, we find Edward's out-of-court identification to

be reliable and thus admissible. To recall, when the three individuals entered Edward's
office, they initially pretended to be customers,32 and even asked about the products
that were for sale.33 The three had told Edward that they were going to pay, but Pepino
"pulled out a gun" instead.34 After Pepino' s companion had taken the money from the
cashier's box, the malefactors handcuffed Edward and forced him to go down to the
parked car. From this sequence of events, there was thus ample opportunity for Edward
- before and after the gun had been pointed at him - to view the faces of the three
persons who entered his office. In addition, Edward stated that Pepino had talked to him
"[a]t least once a day"35 during the four days that he was detained.

Edward also saw Gomez seated at the front seat of the getaway metallic green Toyota
Corolla vehicle. In addition, the abductors removed the tape from Edward's eyes when
they arrived at the apartment, and among those whom he saw there was Gomez.
According to Edward, he was able to take a good look at the occupants of the car when
he was about to be released.

On the part of Jocelyn, she was firm and unyielding in her identification of Pepino as the
person who pointed a gun at her husband while going down the stairs, and who brought
him outside the premises of Kilton Motors. She maintained that she was very near when
Pepino was taking away her husband; and that she could not forget Pepino's face. For
accuracy, we quote from the records:

ATTY. CORONEL:

Q: You stated that you were able to see one of the persons who kidnapped your
husband, if you see this person again, would you be able to identify him?

JOCELYN SY TAN:

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you look around the courtroom and see if the person you are referring to is here
today?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you point to him?

A: (WITNESS POINTED TO A MALE PERSON INSIDE THE COURTROOM WHO

WHEN ASKED HIS NAME ANSWERED AS JERRY PEPINO).

Q: Ms. Witness, what role did this person whom you identified and gave his name as
Jerry Pepino, what role did he play in the kidnapping of your husband?

A: Siya po bale 'yang nakayakap sa husband ko tapos nakatutok ng baril.

xxxx

A TTY. ESTRUCO:

Q: When Jerry Pepino was at Kilton Motors, he embraced your husband?

JOCELYN SY TAN:

A: Yes, sir. And pointed a gun at my husband.

Q: And he was not blindfolded at that time?

A: No, he was not blindfolded, he was only wearing a cap.

Q: You are very sure that he is Jerry Pepino?

A: Yes, I am very, very sure. I could not forget his face.

Q: You are very sure?

A: Yes, sir. Kahit sa nightmare ko, kasama siya.

xx x x36

We add that no competing event took place to draw Edward's and Jocelyn's attention
from the incident. Nothing in the records shows the presence of any distraction that
could have disrupted the witnesses' attention at the time of the incident. 37

Jurisprudence holds that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to
see the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was
committed. As the Court held in People v. Esoy:38

It is known that the most natural reaction of a witness to a crime is to strive to look at the
appearance of the perpetrator and to observe the manner in which the offense is
perpetrated. Most often the face of the assailant and body movements thereof, create a
lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from a witness's memory. Experience
dictates that precisely because of the unusual acts of violence committed right before
their eyes, eyewitnesses can remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of
criminals at any given time.39

While this pronouncement should be applied with great caution, there is no compelling
circumstance in this case that would warrant its non-application.

Contrary to what Gomez claimed, the police lineup conducted at the NBI was not
suggestive. We note that there were seven people in the lineup; Edward was not
compelled to focus his attention on any specific person or persons. While it might have
been ideal if there had been more women included in the lineup instead of only two, or if
there had been a separate lineup for Pepino and for Gomez, the fact alone that there
were five males and two females in the lineup did not render the procedure irregular.
There was no evidence that the police had supplied or even suggested to Edward that
the appellants were the suspected perpetrators.

The following exchanges at the trial during Edward's cross-examination prove this point:

ATTY. ESTURCO:

Q: When they were lined up at the NBI, where were they placed, in a certain room?

EDWARD TAN:

A: Yes, sir.

Q: With a glass window? One way?

A: No, sir.

Q: You mean to say you were face to face with the alleged kidnappers?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And before you were asked to pinpoint the persons who allegedly kidnapped you,
you conferred with the NBI agents?

A: The NBI agents told me not to be afraid.

Q: No, my question is, you conferred with the NBI agents?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What is the name of the NBI agent?

A: I cannot remember, sir.

Q: And how many were lined up?

A: Seven, sir.

Q: And the NBI agent gave the names of each of the seven?

A: No, sir.40

We also note that Jocelyn's and Edward's out-of-court identifications were made on the
same day. While Jocelyn only identified Pepino, the circumstances surrounding this out-
of-court identification showed that the whole identification process at the NBI was not
suggestive. To directly quote from the records:

ATTY. ESTURCO:

Q: How about the alleged kidnappers, where were they placed during that time?

JOCELYN TAN:

A: They were in front of us.

Q: Without any cover?

A: None, sir.

Q: Without any glass cover?

A: See-through glass window.

Q: One-way mirror?

A: Not one way, see-through.

Q: And before you were asked to pinpoint the alleged kidnappers, you were
already instructed by the NBI what to do and was told who are the persons to be
lined up?

A: No, sir.

xxxx

Q: And between the alleged length of time, you were still very positive that it was
Gerry (sic) Pepino inside the NBI cell?

A: At first, I did not know that he was Jerry Pepino but we know his face.

Q: At first, you did not know that it was Jerry Pepino?

A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: It was the NBI officer who told you that the person is Jerry Pepino, am I
correct?

A: They identified that the person we identified was Jerry Pepino. We first
pinpointed na heto ang mukha at saka sinabi na 'yan si Jerry Pepino.

xx x x41

These exchanges show that the lineup had not been attended by any suggestiveness
on the part of the police or the NBI agents; there was no evidence that they had
supplied or even suggested to either Edward or Jocelyn that the appellants were the
kidnappers.

We are not unaware that the Court, in several instances, has acquitted an accused
when the out-of-court identification is fatally flawed. In these cases, however, it had
been clearly shown that the identification procedure was suggestive.

In People v. Pineda,42 the Court acquitted Rolando Pineda because the police
suggested the identity of the accused by showing only the photographs of Pineda and
his co-accused Celso Sison to witnesses Canilo Ferrer and Jimmy Ramos. According to
the Court, "there was impermissible suggestion because the photographs were only of
appellant and Sison, focusing attention on the two accused." 43

Similarly, the Court in People v. Rodrigo44 acquitted appellant Lee Rodrigo since only a
lone photograph was shown to the witness at the police station. We thus held that the
appellant's in-court identification proceeded from, and was influenced by, impermissible
suggestions in the earlier photographic identification.

The lack of a prior description of the kidnappers in the present case should not lead to a
conclusion that witnesses' identification was erroneous. The lack of a prior description of
the kidnappers was due to the fact that Jocelyn (together with other members of
Edward's family), for reasons not made known in the records, opted to negotiate with
the kidnappers, instead of immediately seeking police assistance. If members of
Edward's family had refused to cooperate with the police, their refusal could have been
due to their desire not to compromise Edward's safety.45 In the same manner, Edward,
after he was freed, chose to report the matter to Teresita Ang See, and not to the police.

Given these circumstances, the lack of prior description of the malefactors in this case
should not in any way taint the identification that Edward and Jocelyn made.

c. The Right to Counsel

The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the slightest
coercion that would lead the accused to admit something false. The right to counsel
attaches upon the start of the investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to
ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the accused.46

Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled
out as a suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation.47 As a rule, a police
lineup is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed
by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. The right to be assisted by
counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the
accused during identification in a police lineup.

Our ruling on this point in People v. Lara48 is instructive:

x x x The guarantees of Sec. 12(1 ), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-
called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial
investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect
taken into custody by the police who starts the inte1Togation and propounds questions
to the person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line-up is not part of the custodial
investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be
invoked at this stage.49

Defense witness Reynaldo, however, maintained that Pepino and Gomez were among
those already presented to the media as kidnapping suspects by the DOJ a day
before the police lineup was made. In this sense, the appellants were already the focus
of the police and were thus deemed to be already under custodial investigation when
the out-of-court identification was conducted.
Nonetheless, the defense did not object to the in-court identification for having
been tainted by an irregular out-of-court identification in a police lineup. They
focused, instead, on the legality of the appellants' arrests.

Whether Edward and Jocelyn could have seen Pepino and Gomez in various media
fora that reported the presentation of the kidnapping suspects to the media is not for the
Court to speculate on. The records merely show that when defense counsel, Atty.
Caesar Esturco, asked Jocelyn during cross-examination whether she was aware that
there were several kidnap-for-ransom incidents in Metro Manila, the latter answered that
she "can read in the newspapers."50 At no time did Jocelyn or Edward ever mention that
they saw the appellants from the news reports in print or on television.

At any rate, the appellants' respective convictions in this case were based on
an independent in-court identification made by Edward and Jocelyn, and not on
the out-of-court identification during the police lineup. We reiterate that the RTC
and the CA found the court testimonies of these witnesses to be positive and credible,
and that there was no showing that their factual findings had been arrived at .arbitrarily.
The in-court identification thus cured whatever irregularity might have attended the
police lineup.

As the Court ruled in People v. Algarme:51

Even assuming arguendo the appellants' out-of-court identification was defective, their
subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have initially attended it. We
emphasize that the "inadmissibility of a police lineup identification x x x should not
necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-court identification." We also
stress that all the accused-appellants were positively identified by the prosecution
eyewitnesses during the trial.

It is also significant to note that despite the overwhelming evidence adduced by the
prosecution, Pepino and Gomez did not even testify for their respective
defenses.1âwphi1

d. The Presence of Conspiracy

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a crime and decide to commit it. It may be proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words, or conduct of the alleged conspirators
before, during and after the commission of the felony to achieve a common design or
purpose.

Proof of the agreement does not need to rest on direct evidence, as the agreement may
be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among
them with respect to the commission of the offense. Corollarily, it is not necessary to
show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement
setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective
is to be carried out.52

In the present case, the records establish the following facts: Pepino, Gomez, and
another man entered Edward's office, and initially pretended to be customers; the three
told Edward that they were going to pay, but Pepino pulled out a gun. After Pepino' s
companion took the money from the cashier's box, the malefactors handcuffed him and
forced him to go down to the parked car; Gomez sat at the front passenger seat of the
car which brought Edward to a safe house in Quezon City; the abductors removed the
tape from Edward's eyes, placed him in a room, and then chained his legs upon arrival
at the safe house; the abductors negotiated with Edward's family who eventually agreed
to a P700,000.00 ransom to be delivered by the family driver using Edward's own car;
and after four days, three men and Gomez blindfolded Edward, made him board a car,
drove around for 30 minutes, and left him inside his own car at the UP Diliman campus.

The collective, concerted, and synchronized acts of the accused before, during, and
after the kidnapping constitute undoubted proof that Gomez and her co-accused
conspired with each other to attain a common objective, i.e., to kidnap Edward and
detain him illegally in order to demand ransom for his release.

The Proper Penalty:

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates the imposition of the
death penalty when the kidnapping or detention is committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. Ransom, as employed in the Jaw,
is so used in its common or ordinary sense; meaning, a sum of money or other thing of
value, price, or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a kidnapped or
detained person, a payment that releases one from captivity. 53

In the present case, the malefactors not only demanded but received ransom for
Edward's release. The CA thus correctly affirmed the RTC's imposition of the death
penalty on Pepino and Gomez.

With the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled ''An Act Prohibiting the Imposition
of Death Penalty in the Philippines" (signed into law on June 24, 2006), the death
penalty may no longer be imposed. We thus sentence Gomez to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole pursuant to A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC.54

The reduced penalty shall likewise apply to the non-appealing party, Pepino, since it is
more favorable to him.

The Awarded Indemnities:

In the case of People v. Gambao55 (also for kidnapping for ransom), the Court set the
minimum indemnity and damages where facts warranted the imposition of the death
penalty if not for prohibition thereof by R.A. No. 9346, as follows: (1) Pl00,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (2) Pl00,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have
suffered and thus needs no proof; and (3) Pl00,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an
example for the public good. These amounts shall earn interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of the finality of the Court's Resolution until fully paid.

We thus reduce the moral damages imposed by the CA from P300,000.00 to

Pl00,000.00 to conform to prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping cases. This reduced
penalty shall apply to Pepino for being more favorable to him. However, the additional
monetary award (i.e., P100,000.00 civil indemnity) imposed on Gomez shall not be
applied to Pepino.56

We affirm the P700,000.00 imposed by the courts below as restitution of the amount of
ransom demanded and received by the kidnappers. We also affirm the CA's award of
Pl00,000.00 as exemplary damages based on Gambao.

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, we AFFIRM the challenged June 16,
2006 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02026 with the
following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) the penalty imposed on Gomez and Pepino shall be reduced from death to reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole;

(2) they are jointly and severally ordered to pay the reduced amount of
PI00,000.00 as moral damages;

(3) Gomez is further ordered to pay the victim Pl00,000.00 as civil indemnity; and

(4) the awarded amounts shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of the finality of the Court's Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN* MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(No Part)
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

See Dissenting Opinion

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

No part prior OSG action

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA*
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

CERTIFIED XEROX COPY:

FELIPA B. ANAMA
CLERK OF COURT, EN BANC
SUPREME COURT
VICENTE H. MANULAT, JR., Petitioner, versus - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R.
No. 190892 Present: VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
PERALTA, ** PEREZ, and JARDELEZA, JJ. Promulgated: x.----------------------
~~~~~~~~~~~--------------------~~-~ DECISION PERALTA,J: Before this Court is a
petition for review on certiorari dated January 14, 2010, seeking the reversal of the
Decision 1 dated December 7, 2009, of the Court of Appeals (CA) affinning with
modification the Decision2 dated February 12, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tagum City, Davao del Norte, Branch 2, finding petitioner Vicente H. Manulat, Jr. guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide. Designated Acting Member in lieu of
Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., per Special Order No. 2144 dated August 10,
2015. •• Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes,
per Special Order No. 2084 dated June 29, 2015. I Penned by Associate Justice Ruben
C. Ayson, with Associate Justices Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. and Leoncia Real-Dimagiba,
concurring; rolln, pp. 26-42. 2 Penned by Presiding Judge Justino G. Aventurado; id. at
61-70. d Decision 2 G.R. No. 190892 The accused is charged with the crime of
parricide3 as follows: That on or about September 5, 2005, in the City of Tagum,
Province of Davao del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and choke and hang and strangle with the use
of a nylon rope one Genebe Manulat, his wife, which caused her death, and further
causing actual, moral and compensatory damages to the heirs of the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4 Upon arraignment, petitioner Vicente H. Manulat, Jr. entered a
plea of not guilty. The evidence of the prosecution is summed up as follows: Petitioner
is the husband of the deceased Genebe Manulat. They have two children, Vince Earl
and Leslie Kate, aged three and two years old, respectively. In the afternoon of
September 4, 2005, Mary Jane Soriano, neighbor of the spouses, heard the spouses
quarreling. She heard petitioner telling Genebe “Day, if I get hurt I would box you.” She
also heard sounds of breaking ceramics and a thud, then there was silence.5 Around
6:40 in the evening of the same day, petitioner, with his two children left their home and
went to the house of his mother-in-law, Carmen Abarquez. Petitioner confided to
Carmen that Genebe scolded and shouted at him for arriving late. He said that Genebe
was throwing things. He quipped that “had the children been hit, he could have killed
her (Genebe).” Carmen ignored it and advised petitioner to just do his best since
Genebe was not difficult to deal with. After dinner, petitioner left his children with
Carmen and went home at 11 o'clock in the evening.6 The following morning,
September 5, 2005, Carmen bathed the two children and asked them what happened to
their parents. Leslie Kate answered, “Father threw the cellphone, mother’s mouth bled,”
while Vince Earl said, “Father choked mama” and “Mama was left home dead.” Carmen
did not mind what the children told her and instead told them that their mother was on
duty at Gold City.7 3 Art. 246 Parricide. — Any person who shall kill his father, mother,
or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or
his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death. 4 Rollo, p. 44. 5 Id. at 27. 6 Id. 7 Id. at p. 28. Decision 3 G.R. No.
190892 Around 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, Nilda Cañabiral rushed to
the house of the spouses upon hearing the petitioner's shout for help. She saw Genebe
hanging from the ceiling on top of the bed.8 Her body was somewhat bent with her feet
touching the bed.9 Then, petitioner slipped out the knot and laid the body of his wife on
the bed while crying.10 Petitioner did not do anything but cry and asked his wife why
she had done it. The neighbors began gathering in the house. George Biñan, one of the
neighbors, was drinking at home with some visitors.11 He then noticed the commotion
from his neighbors and someone told him that somebody committed suicide.12 He ran
to the spouses’ house and went inside the bedroom. He saw Genebe lying on the bed
with petitioner shaking his wife and heard him uttering why their problem had gone that
far. He saw the yellow rope hanging about 14 inches above the bed and another rope
on top of the mattress.13 Police officers came around 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the
same day, after receiving a radio call from the barangay kagawad that there was a dead
person inside the house of petitioner. They arrived at the spouses' house and
immediately called for the photographer to record the crime scene. SPO3 Bonifacio
Santillana told the petitioner to bring his wife to the hospital for they might resuscitate
her. Petitioner replied that he could not come with her because he still has to inform his
parents-in-law.14 Santillana detached the rope and noticed that the noose could not be
tightened.15 A neighbor of the spouses informed Carmen that her daughter committed
suicide. She and her husband immediately rushed to the Davao Regional Hospital
where Genebe was first brought. They were informed that Genebe was already brought
to the Topaz Funeral Parlor when they arrived. They proceeded to the house of the
spouses instead of going to the funeral parlor. Nobody was there when they arrived and
she observed that the house was in total disarray and that many things were hurled
around it.16 Doubting the real cause of death of their daughter, Carmen and her
husband went to the office of Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG) and
requested assistance for the autopsy of the cadaver of Genebe. 8 TSN, August 16,
2006 p. 8. 9 Id. at 17. 10 Id. at 9. 11 TSN, December 14, 2005, p. 9. 12 Id. at 10. 13 Id.
at 11. 14 TSN, June 20, 2006. 15 Rollo, p. 66. 16 Id. at 29. Decision 4 G.R. No. 190892
Police Chief Inspector, Dr. Tomas Dimaandal, Jr., the Medico-legal Officer, responded
favorably and conducted an autopsy. He concluded that Genebe died of asphyxia by
strangulation.17 He submitted Medico-Legal Report No. M-0165-2005:18
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS: A well-nourished, developed previously embalmed female
cadaver with embalming incisions at the umbilical region (right of the anterior midline)
and at right inguinal region. EXTERNAL and INTERNAL FINDINGS OF INJURY at:
NECK and THORAX: 1. Postmortem ligature mark, measuring 38 x 0.6 cm located
circling around the neck from the right posterior auricular region running obliquely
downward and anteriorward, and horizontally to the left and posteriorward passing the
anterior midline at the level of thyroid cartilage, obliquely upward at the nape crossing
the posterior midline and terminating at the right temporo-occipital region. PLEURAL,
PERICARDIAL and PERITONEAL CAVITIES The pleural and pericardial cavities are
free from adhesions and fluid accumulations. LARYNX, TRACHEA and ESOPHAGUS:
The mucosal linings of the laryngopharynx, trachea up to the bronchus are markedly
congested and hemorrhagic while the mucosal linings of the esophagus are pale. The
hyoid bone is intact while the thyroid cartilage is fractured. OTHER FINDINGS: The
entire length of the ligature mark is pale in color with no signs of inflammatory reaction
on both margins as well as the adjacent tissues surrounding the ligature mark. A small
hemorrhage is visible at the anterior and left portion of the body of fourth (4th) cervical
vertebrae. xxx xxx xxx CONCLUSION Cause of death is due to asphyxia by
strangulation. 17 Id. 18 Id. at 60. Decision 5 G.R. No. 190892 In addition, Antonio
Zaragoza, operator of the Topaz Funeral Parlor and embalmer, recounted that he and
his assistant embalmed the body of Genebe on September 5, 2005. He noticed a cut,
about one centimeter, on the upper lip of the deceased, and sutured it.19 He only
noticed the wound in the process of embalming as they had to clean the mouth.20 The
defense, in refutation of the prosecution’s evidence presented the following: The
petitioner’s defense consisted mainly of denial. He averred that around 6 o’clock in the
evening of September 4, 2005, he arrived home from Apokon, Tagum City. His wife,
Genebe, got mad at him for coming home late. Despite his explanation, she did not
listen and continued hurling things at him. She even brushed aside the borrowed CD
player. To avoid altercation, he left their house with his children and brought them to his
parents-in-law. He ate supper with them at the insistence of his mother-inlaw and left at
about 11 o’clock in the evening and went home. He checked his wife inside the
bedroom, albeit it was locked. He proceeded to his office and slept there. He went home
at 4 o’clock in the afternoon and found his wife hanging in their bedroom. He shouted
for help and his neighbors Cañabiral and one Christine Tojong came. His neighbors
brought his wife’s body to the hospital and he did not go with them because he could
not bear looking at his wife. He said that he loved his wife so much.21 Consequently,
the RTC rendered a Decision dated February 12, 2007, finding petitioner Manulat, Jr.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, thus: WHEREFORE, this court
finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide under Article
246 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7659 and
hereby sentences him to serve an imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua. He is likewise
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity. SO
ORDERED.22 Petitioner elevated the matters to the CA which then affirmed the
decision of the RTC with modification that he indemnify the heirs of the victim with an
additional P50,000.00 and P25,000.00 for moral and exemplary damages, respectively.
The fallo of the said decision reads: 19 Rollo, p. 65. 20 TSN, December 14, 2005, p. 8.
21 Rollo, p. 66. 22 Id. at 70. Decision 6 G.R. No. 190892 WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum City, Davao del
Norte dated February 12, 2007 appealed from finding the accused-appellant Vicente
Manulat Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim, Genebe Manulat, the amounts of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages. SO ORDERED.23 Hence, petitioner filed before this Court the
present petition stating the following grounds: A. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE COURT A QUO THAT SUFFICIENT
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE EXISTS TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED-PETITIONER MANULAT JR. FOR PARRICIDE BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT B. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE VICTIM GENEBE COMMITTED SUICIDE BY HANGING
HERSELF BY STRANGULATION In its Comment dated June 15, 2010, the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) stated that under Section 1,24 Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, only pure questions of law may be raised to this Court via
Petition for Review on Certiorari. The petitioner submitted an issue that requires a re-
evaluation by the Court of the facts and evidence on record. He failed to specifically cite
the errors committed by the CA that show that its findings of fact are at variance with
those of the trial court or that its findings of fact are contradicted by the evidence on
record or its inferences are manifestly absurd, mistaken or impossible.25 At the outset,
it bears stressing that this Court is not a trier of facts, and only errors of law are
generally reviewed in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45. A reading of the
petition would reveal that petitioner actually raised questions of fact – the sufficiency of
the circumstantial evidence against him and the issue that his wife took her own life.
Nonetheless, this Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion and after taking into
account the attendant circumstances, may take cognizance of and decide the factual
issues raised in the interest of the proper administration of 23 Id. at 41-42. 24 SECTION
1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. 25 Rollo, pp. 83-84. Decision 7 G.R.
No. 190892 justice.26 Considering the gravity of the crime of parricide and its imposable
penalty, we opt to take cognizance of and decide on the present petition. We now delve
on the issues posed by the accused. Petitioner claims there is no sufficient evidence to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He submits that the circumstances
appreciated by the court a quo and sustained by the CA as bases for conviction invite
two (2) inferences, hence, should be resolved in his favor as they do not lead to a
logical conclusion that petitioner feloniously killed his wife, but rather the latter willfully
took her own life.27 We do not agree. In the case at bar, although there was no
eyewitness or direct evidence presented that categorically point to the petitioner as the
one who killed his wife, there was also no direct evidence establishing that the victim
took her own life. The court a quo, in convicting the petitioner, relied solely on the
circumstantial evidence established by the prosecution. It is settled that the lack or
absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the guilt of the accused
cannot be proved by evidence other than direct evidence. The crime charged may also
be proved by circumstantial evidence,28 sometimes referred to as indirect or
presumptive evidence. Circumstantial evidence, if sufficient, can supplant the absence
of direct evidence.29 Where the court relies solely on circumstantial evidence, the
combined effect of the pieces of circumstantial evidence must inexorably lead to the
conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction must rest on
nothing less than moral certainty, whether it proceeds from direct or circumstantial
evidence.30 The series of circumstances duly proved must be consistent with each
other and must likewise be consistent with the accused's guilt and inconsistent with his
innocence. The circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility that some other
person has committed the offense.31 26 Bon v. People, 464 Phil. 125, 135-136, citing
Santos v. Sandiganbayan, 400 Phil. 1175, 1201 (2000). 27 Rollo, p. 13. 28 Rules of
Court, Rule 133, Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstances; (b)
The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 29
Bacolod, v. People, G.R. No. 206236, July 15, 2013, 701 SCRA 229, 233. 30 People v.
Canlas, 423 Phil. 665, 669 (2001). 31 Id. Decision 8 G.R. No. 190892 Furthermore, it is
the quality of the circumstances, rather than the quantity, that will draw the line on
whether the circumstances presented, consist of an unbroken chain that will
inescapably lead to the conclusion that the accused is guilty without an iota of doubt.32
In this case, the circumstantial evidence at hand convincingly prove petitioner's
culpabilities in the crime, and foreclose the possibility that another person is liable for it
or the victim took her own life. A careful perusal and review of the records and the
evidence established in the court a quo, would reveal an unbroken chain that
unquestionably lead this Court to conclude that the petitioner is responsible for the
death of his wife, to wit: First, in the afternoon of September 4, 2005, Soriano, the
spouses’ neighbor, heard a heated quarrel with sounds of breaking ceramics and a
thud; she also heard the petitioner telling his wife that he would box her if he get hurt;
Soriano thus testified as follows: PROS. PALMA: Q: While you were folding the clothes
of your children, did you hear anything that might arose? A: Yes, sir. Q: And what is it
that you heard? A: I heard that the couple were quarreling. x x x x Q: And what did you
hear? A: I heard that they were quarreling then I heard the husband saying that “Day, if I
get hurt, perhaps I would box you”. Q: What other things that you heard other than
those utterances? A: I heard thud aside from the breaking sounds of ceramics that were
broken. x x x33 Second, around 6:40 in the evening of the same day, petitioner, with his
two children, went to the house of Carmen, the victim’s mother and his mother-in-law.
Petitioner told Carmen that his wife (victim) had an emergency duty contrary to the
established evidence that the wife was not on emergency duty. Carmen testified during
direct and cross examinations: 32 People v. Operaña, Jr., 397 Phil. 48, 70 (2000). 33
TSN November 22, 2005, pp. 4-5. Decision 9 G.R. No. 190892 PROS. PALMA: Q: Did
you ask your son-in-law (petitioner) what was his purpose in going there to your house
together with their children? A: Yes, sir. Q: And what was his purpose? A: He left the
children with me because he said that she (victim) has an emergency duty at Gold City.
x x x x ATTY. TAASAN: Q: Did you tell us that when Vicente (petitioner) arrived in their
house, you mean when he arrived in your house, his wife was already going to Gold
City, is that what you mean? A:Yes, he said his wife was rendering duty at Gold City
and he left the children with me. x x x34 Third, during dinner, petitioner quipped that had
the children been hit, he could have killed her; Carmen, during direct examination,
testified: PROS. PALMA: Q: While having dinner, did you have a conversation with the
accused? A: Yes, sir. Q: What was the tenor of your conversation? A: We were talking
about the incident wherein they have an [argument]. Q: And can you still recall what
was that particular conversation wherein your curiosity is called? A: When he uttered
these words, “had the children been hit, I could have killed her.” x x x35 Fourth,
petitioner admitted to Carmen that he and his wife had a violent altercation as he said
that he was going home after dinner to clean the house as their things were in disarray;
during direct examination, Carmen testified: Q: Did you ask the accused if after leaving
his children where was he going? A: Yes, sir. He said he is going home after dinner, sir.
34 TSN, November 29, 2005, pp. 6 and 18. 35 Id. at 7. Decision 10 G.R. No. 190892 Q:
Did you ask him why he was going back? A: Yes, sir, I asked him. x x x x Q: My
question is, what was his purpose in going back to their house? A: He said, he is going
to clean up the house. Q: You said, he is going to clean up their house. Why? Is their
house dirty? A: The things were in disarray, sir. x x x36 Fifth, the petitioner checked on
his wife at around 11 o'clock in the evening, contrary to what he told his mother-in-law
that the victim was on duty. It was testified that the victim normally reported for duty at 8
o'clock in the evening until 2 o'clock in the morning; in his direct testimony, the accused
testified: ATTY. TAASAN: Q: After you left at about 11:00 o’clock in the evening, where
did you go? A: I went back home. Q: Why did you go home? A: To check if my wife was
still there. Q: And were you able to check on you wife? A: Yes, she was in our room. x x
x37 However, Carmen, during cross examination, testified the usual working hours of
the victim, contrary to what the accused said. COURT: (To the witness) Q: The
accused’s wife worked at Gold City? A: Yes, sir. Q: She worked even on Sundays? A:
Yes, sir. x x x x Q: And what time does she report to work? Up to what time? A: She
reports on duty at 8:00 o’clock in the evening until 2:00 o’clock dawn. 36 Id. at 6-7. 37
TSN, August 9, 2006, p. 6. Decision 11 G.R. No. 190892 x x x38 Sixth, at 8 o’clock in
the morning, the following day, September 5, 2005, the petitioner and victim’s daughter
candidly responded that “father threw cellphone, mother's mouth bled” and their son
said that “father choked mama. Mama was left at home dead” when asked by their
grandmother what happened to their parents. The pertinent portions of her direct
testimony about her conversation with the children are as follows: PROS. PALAMA: Q:
Now, while assisting them in taking a bath, did you have any conversation with the two
children? A: Yes,sir. Q: Did you ask the children what happened to their papa and
mama? A: Yes, sir. Q: And who was the first to respond on what happened? A: The girl,
Leslie Kate, sir. Q: And how did she answer? A: Leslie said, “father threw the cellphone,
mother’s mouth bleed.” x x x x Q: After uttering those words, what was the reaction of
the other child of there was any? A: Vince Earl said, “father choked mama.” COURT
INTERPRETER: (Witness is demonstrating by choking her own neck.) Q: And after that,
what other things that they said? A: Vince Earl said, “mama was left at home, dead.” Q:
And what was your reply? A: I told him, “no she was not. Your mother was rendering
duty at the Gold City.” x x x39 Seventh, his own witness, Cañabiral, saw the victim
hanging from a rope tied to a piece of wood from the ceiling with her body somewhat
bent and her feet touching the bed, which only puts doubt on the claim of petitioner that
his wife committed suicide, considering that she was not freely hanging from the ceiling,
but was in a bent position and her feet were 38 TSN, November 29, 2005, pp.18-19. 39
Id. at 8-10. Decision 12 G.R. No. 190892 touching the bed. The pertinent portions of her
testimony during cross examination state: PROS. PALMA: Q: And what was the position
of the victim at time you first saw her? A: She was hanging. Q: Will you please
demonstrate to us? A: Her body was somewhat bent while hanging. Q: How about her
feet, was it touching the bed at that time? A: Yes.40 Eighth, for more than an hour
before the police came, petitioner was resigned that his wife was already dead and did
not do anything to revive her aside from his initial attempt after he detached her body as
testified by his own witness, Cañabiral, during cross examination - PROS. PALMA: Q:
You said that after the accused removed the rope from the neck of the victim he laid her
down? A: Yes. Q: And what did he do after that? A: He cried. Q: After crying, what else
did he do? A: He kept on saying why did you leave your children? x x x x Q: Are you
sure, the accused, other than crying did nothing to the victim when the victim was laid
down? A: No, he just kept on crying while making her wife lie down on the bed. 41
Ninth, petitioner refused to rush his wife to the hospital and merely gave his flimsy
reasons for not doing so, thus: COURT: Q: You said you tried to revive your wife, is that
correct? A: Yes, your Honor. Q: Because you love her very much? A: Yes, your Honor.
40 TSN, August 16, 2006, p. 17. 41 Id. at 18. Decision 13 G.R. No. 190892 Q: Why did
you not decide to bring her (victim) to the hospital? A: After I had detached her from the
rope and after I felt her pulse and feeling that she was already cold and having told
myself that she was already dead. Q: So, you gave up already? A: Then knowing that
she was already dead, my neighbor suggested that we bring her to the hospital and I
confirmed. Then I suggested that they themselves, would bring her there because I
cannot bear to look at her. x x x42 Tenth, when the victim's mother went to the spouses'
house, she found that things were in shambles and disarray. Carmen stated in her
direct testimony that: PROS. PALMA: Q: Did you go straight to Topa[z] Funeral Parlor?
A: No I did not. Q: Where did you go? A: I went home (petitioner and victim’s house)
yet. x x x x Q: Did you observe the things inside the house of your daughter? A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what can you see on the things around inside the house of your daughter? A:
Many things were hurled around it. The place was totally in disarray. x x x43 Eleventh,
Zaragoza, the embalmer, found a one centimeter cut on the upper lip of the victim
strongly corroborating the statement of the minor daughter Leslie Kate, as told to her
grandmother Carmen, that her Mama was hit by a cellular phone thrown by the
petitioner that caused a bleeding on her Mama’s mouth, thus: PROS. PALMA: Q: Aside
from embalming the said dead body, did you notice anything on the face of the dead
body? A: I had noticed a cut on her right upper lip. Q: Did you measure how long was
the cut on the right upper lip? 42 TSN, August 9, 2006, p. 29. 43 TSN, November 29,
2005, pp. 11-12. Decision 14 G.R. No. 190892 A: That was more or less one (1) cm or
10mm. x x x x COURT: Q: Was the injury linear or round? A: From the outside to inside
it is not so obvious. Q: So from the mere glance of the face you can hardly notice the
wound? A: I think so, because on the process of embalming we have to clean the
mouth. x x x44 Twelfth, Dr. Dimaandal, Jr.’s physical findings of the presence of ligature
mark, pale in color, located at the neck of the victim and his findings that the absence of
tissue reaction or any inflammatory reaction of the said ligature mark that could have
caused the ligature mark, made him conclude that the ligature mark was postmortem,
thus: PROS. PALMA: Q: Let us go to the postmortem findings specifically on the
external/internal findings on the injury. Can you please explain to us in layman’s term of
your findings in number 1. Postmortem ligature mark, measuring 38 x 0.6 cm., so on
and so forth? A: There was a ligature mark located at the neck of the said victim.
However, said ligature mark is pale in color, There was no tissue reaction or any
inflammatory reaction of the said ligature mark. I categorically label it as postmortem
ligature mark, which means that the ligature mark happened after the death of the said
victim.45 The above-mentioned circumstances are all consistent with each other clearly
establishing that the victim was killed by her own husband and not by the claim of the
accused that his wife took her own life. In order to discredit the evidence of the
prosecution, petitioner claims that the testimony of Carmen was purely hearsay and not
reliable since the prosecution never presented the children as witnesses to testify as
what was told by them to Carmen, their own grandmother.46 Hence, inadmissible in
evidence being hearsay and not statements as part of the res gestae. Said argument is
untenable. The res gestae exception to the hearsay rule provides that the declarations
must have been “voluntarily and spontaneously made so nearly 44 TSN December 14,
2005 pp. 4; 7-8. 45 TSN, November 29, 2005, p. 30. 46 Rollo, p. 14. Decision 15 G.R.
No. 190892 contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the transaction which they
illustrate and explain, and were made under such circumstances as necessarily to
exclude the idea of design or deliberation.”47 There are three essential requisites to
admit evidence as part of the res gestae, namely: (1) that the principal act, the res
gestae be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant
had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern
the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances.48 In People v.
Salafranca, 49 the Court cited two tests in applying the res gestae rule: (a) the act,
declaration or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal
fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself;
and (b) the said evidence clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to
manufacture testimony. There is no hard and fast rule by which spontaneity may be
determined although a number of factors have been considered, including, but not
always confined to, (1) the time that has lapsed between the occurrence of the act or
transaction and the making of the statement, (2) the place where the statement is made,
(3) the condition of the declarant when the utterance is given, (4) the presence or
absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement relative
thereto, and (5) the nature and the circumstances of the statement itself.50 In the case
of People v. Villarama,51 the Court held that the ability or chance to invent a story is a
critical factor in determining the spontaneity of a statement. In the said case, the four-
year-old victim, at her age, could not have had the sophistication or malice to fabricate
statements and invent a story of rape.52 It was also settled in the case of People v.
Bisda53 that children of sound mind are likely to be more observant of incidents which
take place within their view than older persons, and their testimonies are likely more
correct in detail than that of older persons.54 In this case, this Court finds that the
statements of the petitioner and victim’s three-year-old son and two-year-old daughter
were spontaneously made. They had no opportunity or chance to invent a story
although they 47 People of the Philippines vs. Anecito Estibal y Calungsag, G.R. No.
208749, November 26, 2014. 48 People v. Manhuyod, Jr., 352 Phil. 866, 882 (1998). 49
682 Phil. 470, 484 (2012). 50 People v. Dianos, 357 Phil. 871, 885-886 (1998) 51 445
Phil. 323 (2003). 52 People v. Villarama, supra, at 335. 53 454 Phil. 194 (2003). 54
People v. Bisda, supra, at 224. Decision 16 G.R. No. 190892 made the statements the
morning after the occurrence while being bathed by their grandmother Carmen. Their
statements were unreflected and instinctive since a three-year-old and a two-year-old
children, given their age, do not have the capability, sophistication or malice to fabricate
such an incredible story of a violent altercation between their parents and to impute their
own father to the killing of their mother. Thus, this Court finds the above requites of res
gestae present. First, the principal act, which by any measure was undoubtedly a
startling occurrence, was the violent altercation between petitioner and the victim, as
witnessed by their young children, which led to the killing of his own wife of which he is
being charged. Second, the statements were made spontaneously to which we ruled
that given the tender age of the children, they could not have contrived or concocted
such a story. Lastly, the statements refer to the violent altercation that led to the killing
of the victim. Petitioner insists that careful examination of the physical evidence and
medico-legal clearly reveal that Genebe died of suicide without findings of foul play. He
further claims that he could not have killed his wife whom he loved so much. Petitioner
avers that the testimony of Dr. Dimaandal, Jr., an expert witness, is not very certain nor
persuasive and that the ligature mark on the victim’s neck can be caused by manual
strangulation. Finally, petitioner alleges that the single ligature mark on the victim’s neck
clearly infers that his wife had committed suicide. This Court is not persuaded. There is
nothing on record that would compel this Court to believe that said prosecution witness,
Dr. Dimaandal, Jr., has improper motive to falsely testify against the petitioner nor was
his testimony not very certain. In the absence of evidence of an improper motive
actuating the witness, his testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. Furthermore, his
straightforward and consistent testimonies bear the earmarks of credibility. He positively
concluded that the ligature mark on the neck of the victim was post-mortem. He further
explained that a pale ligature mark implied that there was already no circulation of the
blood in the body. Hence, no inflammatory reaction was noted on the ligature mark
found on the victim and its color was the same as the entire body. The color of the
ligature mark would remain the same even if there's a lapse from time of death and time
of examination/ autopsy. If there are tissue reactions, whether the cadaver would be
embalmed, there will be no color changes until the body will be fully decomposed. To
support his assertions, Dr. Dimaandal, Decision 17 G.R. No. 190892 Jr., presented the
photographs of the victim that he took, clearly establishing that the injuries he found
from the victim were indeed post-mortem. PROS. PALMA: Q: Briefly, Doctor, can you
tell us what would be the significance of pale ligature mark on this first cadaver of which
allegedly have been exhumed after you have examined? A: For comparative purposes,
this is the photo I have taken on one Genebe Manulat, your Honor wherein the ligature
mark on the said cadaver if you can distinguish, this is the ligature mark, I caused this in
sessions. If you have noticed the color of the ligature mark is the same as that of the
entire skin of the cadaver. Q: What would be the significance if the color of the ligature
mark is the same as that of the body? A: There is no tissue reaction that happened on
this area. Q: Why is it so? A: One reason is that, there is [already no] blood circulation
going on the body wherein we can see that the heartbeat had already stopped. Q: You
mean to say that this ligature mark was caused after death of the victim? A: Yes, sir. Q:
What about if the color of the ligature mark is different than that of the body? What
would be the significance on that? A: The significance if there is a tissue reaction of the
ligature mark, since in hanging incidents or strangulation caused by other person,
before the time of death because the skin is rubbed on the rope, there would be friction
created. Friction is going on as the rope tightens. The roughness of the rope will cause
the skin to be abraded slightly. And if there is circulation going on the body, it will cause
somehow a certain blood in the skin which will cause the darkening or the tissue
reaction on the said area. But if there is no more blood circulation even though rope
tightens and tightens until obstruction comes in on the airway passage. There will be no
blood flow or even though the skin would be abraded, there will be no blood that will
slightly oozed on the abraded area. So the color will still be pale. x x x x Q: Would the
color of the ligature mark be changed considering the span of time of her death at the
time of the examination if the strangulation is made by hanging or manual? A: No, sir.
Well in fact, I have photo samples wherein this was already conducted many days and
were in fact that was already buried. Wherein the ligature mark had no change before
this was decomposed. Q: So the color would be the same even if you have examined
days after the death? A: If there is tissue reactions, whether the cadaver would be
embalmed, there will be no color changes until the body will be fully decomposed.
Decision 18 G.R. No. 190892 x x x55 Thus, from the testimony of the Doctor, an expert
witness whose opinion deserves respect and great weight, the telltale absence of
abrasions or the reddish or pink bands or linear streaks along the side of the neck of the
victim, coupled with other attendant circumstances are strong indications that this was
not a case of ante-mortem hanging, instead the pale ligature mark found on the victim
was clearly postmortem, ruling out the possibility of suicide as claimed by the accused.
It has always been said that criminal cases are primarily about human nature.56 This is
a case of a husband refusing to rush his wife to the hospital even for possible
resuscitation for flimsy reasons that there was nobody left at their house and that he still
had to inform his parents-in-law. It is noted that from the time he supposedly discovered
his wife, he only cried, did not exert any effort to rush her to the hospital, and, instead,
waited for the police officers to arrive. Such inaction of a supposed loving husband is
contrary to human nature. It was only an hour and upon the arrival of the police and
through their suggestion that the wife was finally brought to the hospital, but it was
already too late. All considered, the CA did not err in affirming the trial court's conclusion
that the presumption of innocence of petitioner has been overcome by the totality of the
physical and testimonial evidence against him. The aforesaid circumstances, as
presented, constitute an unbroken chain leading to no other conclusion than that the
petitioner is guilty of parricide. Petitioner's mere denial is self-serving, speculative, and
uncorroborated and cannot outweigh the circumstantial evidence which clearly establish
his culpability in the crime charged. It has been settled that the commission of parricide
is punished more severely than homicide since human beings are expected to love and
support those who are closest to them.57 Recent jurisprudence fixes civil indemnity in
the amount of 75,000.00, which is automatically granted to the offended party, or his/her
heirs in case of the former's death, without need of further evidence other than the fact
of the commission of murder, homicide, parricide and rape.58 As regards to the penalty,
the court a quo and CA were correct in imposing reclusion perpetua under Article 246 of
the Revised Penal Code. However, the award of moral damages should be increased
from 50,000.00 to 75,000.00 in view of the award of 75,000.00 as civil 55 TSN,
November 29, 2005, pp. 32-33. 56 People v. Operaña, Jr., supra note 32. 57 People v.
Tibon, 636 Phil. 521, 532 (2010). 58 Id. at 532-533. Decision 19 G.R. No. 190892
indemnity. Furthermore, petitioner should pay the heirs of the victim P30,000.00 by way
of exemplary damages to deter others from committing such bestial act of killing one's
spouse. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated January 14, 2010, of
petitioner Vicente H. Manulat, Jr. is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated
December 7, 2009 of the Court of Appeals, affirming with modification the Decision
dated February 12, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Tagum City, Davao del Norte,
Branch 2, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide
under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 7659, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Vicente H. Manulat,
Jr. is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with all its accessory penalties and to
indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. SO
ORDERED. WE CONCUR: PRESBITERQ'J. VELASCO, JR. Assof iate Justice
TERESITAJ. ~~~~ LEONARDO-DE CASTRO EZ Associate Justice FRAN~~ZA
Associate Justice Decision 20 G.R. No. 190892 ATTESTATION I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. 0 J. VELASCO, JR.
ssociate Justice Chaifuerson, Third Division CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. MARIA LOURDES P.A.
SERENO Chief Justice
G.R. No. 203961 July 29, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RODERICK LICAYAN, ROBERTO LARA AND ROGELIO "NOEL" DELOS
REYES, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

On August 15, 2001, this Court affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (R TC)
of Marikina City convicting two of herein accused-appellants, Roderick Licayan
(Licayan) and Roberto Lara (Lara), of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom and
sentencing them to death. The dispositive portion of this Court's August 15, 2001
Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 272, Marikina City
finding accused-appellant RODERICK LICA YAN and ROBERTO LARA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom and sentencing each of them
to death is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that each of the accused-appellants is
ORDERED to pay ₱50,000.00 as moral damages to each of the complainants. The
award of ₱20,000.00 as actual damages made in favor of complainant Joseph Co is
deleted. Costs against accused-appellants.

In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659, amending Art. 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, upon the finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith
forwarded to the President of the Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning
power.1

The Motion for Reconsideration of Licayan and Lara was denied by this Court in a
Resolution dated October 9, 2001. The Decision became final and executory on
November 9, 2001. On November 18, 2003, the trial court issued a Writ of Execution
ordering the execution of Licayan and Lara on January 30, 2004 at 3 :00 p.m.

Before the date of Licayan and Lara's scheduled execution, and with the torrent of
initiatives sparked by the passionate national debate on the morality of capital
punishment, two of their co-accused in the original Information were arrested. On
January 9, 2004, Pedro Mabansag (Mabansag), a double arm amputee and suspected
mastermind of the kidnapping of Joseph Tomas Co and Linda Manaysay, was arrested
at Sitio Lanipga, Barangay Magsaysay, Escalante City. On January 12, 2004, Rogelio
Delos Reyes (Delos Reyes) was arrested at Barangay Bayang Marihatag, Agusan del
Sur.

In light of these arrests, the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) filed with this Court on
January 15, 2004 (which was 15 days before the scheduled execution of Licayan and
Lara) an Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of Court. Pending resolution of
the Urgent Motion, this Court, by a vote of 7-6, issued a Resolution on January 26, 2004
ordering the temporary suspension of the execution of Licayan and Lara for a period of
30 calendar days.2 On February 17, 2004, this Court, voting 8-6, issued a Resolution,
the dispositive portion of which states:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court resolves to GRANT pro hac vice the Urgent
Motion to Re-Open the Case with Leave of Court. Accordingly, the execution of the
Decision of this Court dated August 15, 2001 is suspended. The records of the case are
hereby REMANDED to the lower court for further reception of evidence pursuant to
Section 2 (b), Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, together with the trial of accused Rogelio
delos Reyes and Pedro Mabansag. In accordance with Section 6(b) and (c), Rule 121 of
the Rules of Court, insofar as the accused Roberto Lara and Roderick Licayan is
concerned, the evidence already taken shall stand and the additional evidence as the
trial court may, in the interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall be taken and
considered with the evidence already in record. Towards this end, the Court directs
Hon. Reuben P. dela Cruz, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Marikina City,
Branch 272, to hear the case of the accused Roberto Lara and Roderick Licayan, and
thereafter report to this Court with deliberate dispatch.

Let copies of this Resolution be personally served on the Office of the President and the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections.3

On April 19, 2005, Mabansag and Delos Reyes were finally arraigned and pleaded not
guilty to the crimes charged in the Informations under which their co-accused Lara and
Licayan were previously indicted. We quote the material portions of said Informations
here:

Crim. Case No. 98-2605-MK

That on or about August 10, 1998 at around 1:45 a.m., the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with a handgun and
with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
the use of force and intimidation kidnap JOSEPH TOMAS CO and LINDA MANA YSA Y
for the purpose of extorting ransom in the amount of P 10 million at Goodies Pares
Marni House located at Loyola cor. Constancia St., Sampaloc, Manila, owned and
managed by the aforementioned victim Co and thereafter took them with the use of
Toyota Tamaraw FX likewise owned by Co as getaway vehicle to a house in Daang
Bakal, Parang, Marikina and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court where they
were kept under detention against their will until they were able to escape the following
day at around 4:30 in the afternoon on August 11, 1998.4

Crim. Case No. 98-2606-MK

That on or about August 10 and 11, 1998 at Daang Bakal, Parang, Marikina City and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
handgun and with intent to gain, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each
other, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take and divested (sic) JOSEPH TOMAS CO and LINDA MANA YSA Y of
the following personal properties after forcibly taking them as hostages for ransom, to
wit:

1. Wallet of Co containing his driver's license, original copy of official receipt

(OR), certificate of registration (CR) of his two (2) L-300 vans;

2. Bank time deposit certificate at Metrobank, Valenzuela Branch;

3. Casio G-Shock watch;

4. Necklace and earrings of Manaysay; and

5. ₱10,000.00 cash
to the damage and prejudice of said victims as owners thereof against their will.5

Lara, Licayan, Mabansag and Delos Reyes had five other co-accused in said
Informations, namely Alex Placio, Jojo Sajorgo, Allan Placio, Dodong Adolfo and Benjie
Mabansag, all of whom remain at-large.

On November 15, 2005, Mabansag died while detained at the Marikina City Jail. The
trial against Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes proceeded. On February 17, 2009, the RTC
of Marikina City rendered its Decision finding Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes guilty of
the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused

RODERICK LICA YAN, ROBERTO LARA and ROGELIO 'NOEL' DELOS REYES in
Criminal Case No. 98-2605-MK, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM as defined and penalized under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences them to reclusion perpetua and each of
them is also ordered to pay the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages to each of the
complainants.

The period during which the herein accused were in detention during the pendency of
this case shall be credited to them in full provided that they agree to abide by and
comply with the rules of the City Jail of Marikina.

However, in Criminal Case No. 98-2606-MK of the crime of ROBBERY, for lack of
sufficient evidence presented by the Prosecution to prove the guilt of the said accused
beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby rendered ACQUITTING them of the said
offense charged in the Information.

These two (2) cases against the other accused, ALEX PLACIO @ "Tata Pandak," JOJO
SAJORGO, ALLAN PLACIO, DODONG ADOLFO and BENJIE MABANSAG who
remain at-large up to the present are ordered archived and let an (sic) alias warrants of
arrests be issued.6

The RTC Decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, on July 4, 2012,
affirmed the conviction of Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes in toto.7 Licayan, Lara and
Delos Reyes filed a Notice of Appeal,8 thus allowing this Court another hard look into
the events surrounding the captivity of Joseph Tomas Co and Linda Manaysay on
August 10-11, 1998.

In this Court's February 17, 2004 Resolution granting accused-appellants' Motion to

Reopen the Case, we held that insofar as the accused Lara and Licayan are concerned,
the evidence already taken shall stand, although additional evidence may be introduced
to be taken and considered with the evidence already in record. This Court summarized
said evidence in its August 15, 2001 Decision, thus:6

Complainant Joseph Tomas Co owns a restaurant called Goodies Pares Marni House
with branches in Valenzuela, Cubao, and Sampaloc. Co's regular routine was for him
and the other complainant, Linda Manaysay, the restaurant's cashier and accounting
officer, to make the rounds of the three branches for inspection and collection of left-
over food and cash sales. The rounds would normally begin late in the evening and last
until early in the morning of the next day.

The prosecution evidence shows that on August 9, 1998, complainants went to the
Goodies Valenzuela branch where they stayed until midnight. From there, they
proceeded to the Cubao branch where they stayed until about 12:45 a.m., August 10,
1998. Their last stop was at the Sampaloc branch which they visited at 1:30 a.m.

While Co was at the Sampaloc branch, supervising the loading of left-over food into the
back of his Tamaraw FX. service vehicle, three men approached him from behind.
When Co saw the men, he asked what they wanted. The men were armed with two
caliber .45 pistols and a .38 revolver. None of the men wore any mask.

Co told the men that if they wanted money, they could get it from the store. The men
refused to get money from the store. Without any warning, one of the men's guns went
off. When Manaysay heard the shot, she came out and asked the men what they
wanted. She· told them that they could get money from the store, but they refused to do
so. Instead, complainants were made to board the rear of the Tamaraw FX. Two of the
men's companions were already seated in the front seat. The man in the driver's seat
asked Co for the key to the vehicle. The three other men also boarded the vehicle with
the complainants. Co identified accused-appellant Roderick Licayan as one of his five
abductors.

Co said their hands were tied and their eyes taped, and that they were made to wear
caps over their heads as the vehicle reached Quezon Avenue in Quezon City. After 45
minutes, Co said he felt the vehicle stop. The rear door was opened and he heard the
voices of people approaching the vehicle.
Complainants were brought inside a room of a house made of light materials and which
had no ceiling. They were made to sit on the floor. Then, they were transferred to
another room where the covers of their eyes were removed and their feet were tied.
Manaysay testified that she saw accused-appellants in the house after the masking tape
was removed from their eyes. Co's wallet which contained ₱5,000.00 in cash and his
watch and Manaysay's necklace and earrings were taken from them. A person was left
to guard them inside the room, whom both complainants identified as accused-appellant
Roberto Lara.

After about two hours, Manaysay told Co that she wanted to urinate. Hence, Co asked
their guard if Manaysay could go outside to do it. The guard left and came back with a
half-gallon container which he gave Manaysay to urinate in.

Co tried talking to the guard9 and pleaded with him to let them go. But the guard replied
that he was just following orders. Co offered him some money which he had, but the
guard did not accept the money and instead threw it away.

[On August 11, 1998, at around 4:30 p.m., Licayan10 who was guarding them at that
time] fell asleep and Co and Manaysay somehow managed to escape without being
noticed by the look-out outside their room. After running for several meters,
complainants took refuge in a house. An old woman living in the house allowed them to
use the telephone from which Co was able to call the Marikina Police Headquarters.
The woman told them that they were in Kaolin St., Twinriver Subdivision, Parang,
Marikina. Two police officers from the Marikina police arrived, followed by a police
SWAT team. Complainants' case was later turned over to the Presidential Anti-
Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) for investigation.

On August 11, 1998, at around 6:30 p.m., members of the PAOCTF raided the
safehouse at Daang Bakal, Parang, Marikina where Co and Manaysay had been held
captive. A man seen running away was arrested by SPO3 Ismael Fajardo Jr. Upon
being questioned, the man identified himself as accused-appellant Roberto Lara. SP03
Fajardo identified accused-appellant Lara from photographs shown to him in court as
the man he arrested. Lara pointed to accused-appellant Licayan as one of his
companions and told the PAOCTF members that Lara was hiding in his (Lara's) uncle's
house at the back of the San Mateo Rizal Municipal Hall. The P AOCTF members
thereafter proceeded to the house and were able to arrest accused-appellant Licayan.

Lara and Licayan were thereafter brought to the PAOCTF headquarters in Camp Crame
where they were identified by Co and Manaysay in a line-up consisting of Lara, Licayan,
and eight PAOCTF members.

Benjamin Co, complainant Joseph Tomas Co's brother, testified that he was twice
called in his office by unidentified persons who demanded P 10 million for the release of
complainants. The kidnappers were of course frustrated as complainants were able to
escape.

Accused-appellants' defense is alibi. Accused-appellant Licayan claimed that on August

11, 1998, at around 7:00 p.m., he was at home in Sta. Cecilia Village, San Mateo Rizal,
having dinner with Nicolas Salvivia, a dump truck driver; that on the next day, August
12, 1998, he was arrested by members of the PAOCTF while he was having drinks with
Salvivia and Salvivia's father at the latter's residence in Sta. Cecilia Village; and that
when he was arrested, he was not informed of the charges against him. He said he only
learned that he was arrested for the kidnapping of complainants after he had been
brought to Camp Crame.

In Camp Crame, he and his co-accused were handcuffed and made to stand in a police-
line up. They were not assisted by counsel. The complainants pointed to him and Lara
as part of the group who kidnapped complainants. Licayan claimed he only saw
complainant Co for the first time when he (Licayan) was brought to Camp Crame.

On the other hand, accused-appellant Lara, a construction worker, testified that from
7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. of August 10, 1998, he was in his place of work in Antipolo. At
7:00 a.m. of August 11, 1999, he went home to Novaliches, stopping by the house of his
uncle, Pedro Mabansag, in Parang, Marikina. Mabansag had driven Lara's family out of
his house and Lara had gone there to get his child's belongings. However, before he
could do so, he was arrested by the Marikina Police at Greenheights.

Lara wanted to ask his cousin Nicolas Salvivia for help. The police beat him up and told
him that they would go to Salvivia's house.

He was made to board a van where his head was covered with a plastic bag and he
was again beaten up. The police found Salvivia and Licayan in Salvivia's house and
ordered the two to drop to the ground. The police poked a gun to Lara's head and told
him to identify his companions, otherwise he would be killed. Thus, according to Lara,
he pointed to Licayan.

Lara claimed that at Camp Crame, after he and Licayan were identified by complainants
in a police line-up, they were forced to sign a statement. They were not informed of their
right to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel. Lara denied that Atty. Confesor B.
Sansano, who appeared to have assisted him in making his statement, actually assisted
him.11

In subsequent proceedings, the prosecution presented as rebuttal witness Confessor

Sansano, the lawyer whom Lara had claimed did not really assist him. Sansano testified
that as IBP governor and chairman, he gave free legal assistance to all persons who
could not afford the services of a lawyer. On August 12, 1998, Police Chief Inspector
Trampe brought Lara to Sansano's office at the Justice Hall of Quezon City. Sansano
required the police agents to step out of the room when he personally interviewed Lara
for 10 minutes. He apprised Lara of his constitutional rights. He was assured that Lara
will tell the truth, and that La1:"a was not harmed. He even examined the upper torso of
Lara and found no signs of maltreatment. He was present throughout the investigation
held in his office, until Lara affixed his signature in the sworn statement. On cross-
examination, Sansano admitted that he cannot remember the number of persons
brought to him by Trampe for legal assistance. He testified that he warned Lara about
the implication of the statement that he will give to the police.12

During the second trial, Prosecutor Nestor Gapuzan stated that the prosecution is
adopting the direct testimony given by the prosecution witnesses during the first trial.
Co, however, was recalled for additional direct examination on the alleged participation
of Delos Reyes.

Joseph Tomas Co testified that Delos Reyes was one of the five men who abducted him
and Manaysay. Delos Reyes was the person who sat at the middle portion of the
Tamaraw FX at the back of the driver, while Co and Manaysay were forced to sit in the
rear portion of the Tamaraw FX with two of their abductors, who later tied their hands.
Co identified Delos Reyes in court. He was not sure whether Licayan was one of the
five men who abducted them. Delos Reyes, while seated at the middle portion of the
Tamaraw FX, faced Co and demanded from him with a forceful voice, "Nasaan ang
susi?" and "Akina ang susi." He did not notice any hint of Manilefio or regional accent in
the voice of Delos Reyes and was not aware of said accents. He did not immediately
give the key to Delos Reyes, but the latter repeated "Akina ang susi." The man beside
him pointed a gun at him, so he gave the key to Delos Reyes, who then handed the key
to the man seated at the driver's seat.13

During the time Co and Manaysay were detained in the safehouse, Co identified
Licayan and Lara on different occasions but was not able to see Delos Reyes. 14 He
reiterated that he tried to bribe Lara to get the remaining money inside his pocket but
Lara said that he could not do it because he will be killed. Co explained that he did not
identify Licayan and Lara by their feet. Even before he pointed to their feet, he had
already identified them by their faces which he was positive about and he was just even
more assured of their identities when he saw their feet.15 The defense presented Radio
Veritas reporter Corazon Zony Esguerra, New Bilibid Prison Chaplain Msgr. Roberto
Olaguer, Lara's co-worker Abelardo Ramirez, Lara's employer Florencia Lavarro
Salvador, and accused-appellant Delos Reyes. Licayan was likewise recalled to the
witness stand.

Radio Veritas reporter Zony Esguerra testified that she was able to interview Mabansag
at the airport after he was arrested. Mabansag told her that his nephew, Lara, had
nothing to do with the incident. Esguerra also interviewed Delos Reyes at the PACER
Office in Camp Crame around two hours after he arrived from the airport. Delos Reyes
told her that "talaga wala akong kasalanan pinilit lang nila akong tagabantay sa victim."
According to Delos Reyes, the real culprits are "Tata Placio and Allan Placio." 16

New Bilibid Prison Chaplain Msgr. Roberto Olaguer, knowing that Licayan and Lara
were scheduled for execution in January 2004, told them before Christmas in December
2003 that he will personally attend to their case more intensely. When he learned from
.Lara that his relatives did not know the schedule of his execution, he told Lara that he
will personally inform his parents. On January 6, 2004, Lara finally gave Msgr. Olaguer
the address of his parents, but warned him about his uncle Pedro Mabansag: there was
a warrant for the arrest of Mabansag at the Marikina Police Station. It occurred to Msgr.
Olaguer that if Mabansag would be arrested, the execution of Lara and Licayan may be
postponed. He immediately called Mayor Marides Fernando of Marikina City and told
her about the possibility of helping him get a copy of the warrant. He was able to secure
a copy of the warrant at around 8:00 p.m. of January 7, 2004. He called the station
manager of Radio Veritas, who told him to go to the station as he will contact the chief
of the PAO. He asked PAO Chief Atty. Acosta if there is a possibility that the lives of
Lara and Licayan would be saved if Mabansag is arrested, and she told him about the
possibility of reopening the case and suspending the execution.17

Before going to Bacolod, he told Lara about having secured the warrant. Lara warned
him that even though his uncle "Putol" (Mabansag) had both arms a,mputated, he can
still drive a car, fire a shotgun, and ride a horse. He relayed this warning to Col. A
venido,. who organized two to three teams to arrest Mabansag. 18

In Bacolod on January 8, 2004, Msgr. Olaguer, Col Avenido and his group of around 20
men went to the house of Lara's mother, and told her that her son will be executed on
January 30, 2004. He invited her to go to Manila and offered to shoulder her travel
costs. She told him that BOMBO Radyo and ABS-CBN already offered to pay for her
expenses. During this time, the police were searching the area and conducting
interviews. The police told him that they have to go to a certain sugar plantation to look
for Mabansag. They arrived at the sugar plantation at 2:00 p.m. The people at the
plantation, however, were not cooperative and appeared to be afraid of Mabansag,
except for a little child who gave them a lead. Msgr. Olaguer was regularly updated as
regards the search for Mabansag. At around 2:00 a.m. the following day, January 9,
2004, CoL Inocentes Capuno called him and said that they were able to apprehend
Mabansag.19

At the police station, Msgr. Olaguer introduced himself to Mabansag. They were allowed
to talk in private, wherein Msgr. Olaguer told Mabansag that his nephew, Lara, will be
executed by lethal injection on January 30, 2004. Mabansag cried and said many things
in Ilonggo. Msgr. Olaguer asked his companion to translate what Mabansag was saying.
He understood Mabansag saying "inosente man si Tungkoy," referring to Lara. When
he informed Mabansag about Licayan, Mabansag was so surprised and told him that he
had not seen Licayan for a long time. Mabansag said that he knew that he was one of
the accused in the case, but he was innocent. Mabansag denied that the house where
the kidnap victims were brought was his, but clarified that it was his daughter's house.
The kidnappers offered money if he could lend the house to them. He accepted
because he needed money at that time. Mabansag told him that he somehow
participated in the safekeeping of the victims.20

Upon their arrival in the airport in Manila, they were brought to the VIP room. When
Mabansag was interviewed by reporter Gus Abelgas, Msgr. Olaguer was surprised to
hear Mabansag say that he did not know anything about the kidnapping. Mabansag also
said that he was being threatened by the police and the media people in Bacolod by
telling him "lkaw ang ipapalit kay Roberto Lara."21
On cross-examination, Msgr. Olaguer testified that Lara told him exactly "Kung pupunta
po kayo sa Nanay ko, mag-ingat po kayo sa tiyo ko. Yung uncle ko, putol po ang
dalawang kamay niyan pero kaya pa na bumaril." Lara further told him that Mabansag
was one of the masterminds in the kidnapping of Co and Manaysay. Msgr. Olaguer
observed that the people at the sugar plantation in Bacolod seemed to be afraid of
Mabansag as they told him that Mabansag had a close connection with the rebels who
were somehow controlling the sugar plantation.22 Abelardo Ramirez testified that he had
known Lara for five years since 1995 because they were neighbors at Daang Bakal,
Bagong Silang, Parang, Marikina. Lara's house was two houses away from his.
Everytime he gets a job, he gets Lara as his co-worker. Lara worked as a ''piyon," who
mixes cement.23

On August 10, 1998, he was in his house in Daang Bakal at 6:00 a.m., waiting for Lara.
At 7:00 a.m., Lara arrived. They took two jeepney rides to their place of work in Antipolo
where they were constructing a residential house. They arrived at the construction site
at 8:00 a.m. and worked there until 5 :00 p.m. They parted ways on Kaolin Street
because Lara said he would go to his grandparent's house in Novaliches. Ramirez
arrived home at 6:30 p.m.24

On August 11, 1998, Lara arrived at Ramirez's house past 8:00 a.m. They proceeded to
the same construction site where they worked until 5 :00 p.m. They left the site at 6:00
p.m. and they parted ways at Kaolin.25

On August 21, 1998, Ramirez secured a certification from their employer Florencia
Lavarro Salvador to prove that during the kidnapping, Lara was with him. He placed the
certification in a small brown envelope and kept it for five years. He retrieved the
certification in 2003 when he saw on television that Lara will be executed.26

Florencia Lavarro Salvador testified that Ramirez, whom she calls "Mang Bado,"
recommended Lara to work in the construction of her house. On August 9, 1998, she
supervised the work of Ramirez and Lara, who both arrived at 7:00 a.m. and worked
from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. On August 10, 1998, Ramirez and Lara arrived at 7:30 a.m.,
worked from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., and left at around 5:30 p.m. On August 11, 1998,
Ramirez and Lara arrived past 8:00 a.m., worked until 5:00 p.m., and left at around 6:00
p.m.

On August 12, 1998, Ramirez told her that Lara was arrested, and requested for a
certification to prove the whereabouts of Lara during the kidnapping incident. Salvador
executed such certification.27

PAO lawyer Howard Areza testified that he assisted in the execution of the Sinumpaang
Salaysay of Delos Reyes and Mabansag. The latter was already deceased at the time
of Atty. Areza's testimony. Since Mabansag had no arms, he stamped his right toe on
the document.28

Atty. Areza confirmed Mabansag's answers in Questions 17 and 18 of the Sinumpaang

Salaysay wherein he narrated that a TV reporter interviewed him upon arrival at the
airport in Manila. He said in the interview that Lara is not liable ("walang kasalanan")
because Lara was working in a construction in Cavite and Antipolo. Atty. Areza also
confirmed Mabansag's answers in Question 30 and 31 wherein he stated that he drove
away (''pinalayas") Joy, Lara's wife, from Daang Bakal one week before August 10,
1998. Mabansag did not know whether Joy and Lara lived in Novaliches after he drove
Joy away.29

Atty. Areza likewise confirmed Delos Reyes's answers in Questions 36 and 37 of the
Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he stated that, on August 10, 1998, he saw Mabansag
in the safehouse. According to a certain Tata Alex Placio, Mabansag was the financier
of the operation as he was the owner of the house. Atty. Areza also confirmed the
answers of Delos Reyes in Questions 15, 16, 18 and 20 that Delos Reyes was
interviewed by reporter Zony Esguerra when he was in the PACER Office. He stated in
said interview that Lara is not liable ("walang kasalanan"). Delos Reyes also stated that
he guarded the victims and did not report the matter to the police because of his fear of
Tata Alex Placio, Allan Placio, Jojo Sajorgo and Benjie. 30 Recalled to the witness stand,
Roderick Licayan testified that, in the police line-up, he was at first identified by Co by
pointing at his and Lara's feet. Co did not mention any specific identifying mark on their
feet. Licayan heard Co say that whenever anybody enters the room in the safehouse,
he looks at their feet. Licayan cannot recall how many of his companions in the line-up
were wearing shoes and how many were wearing slippers. Licayan testified that a
police officer in civilian clothes instructed Co to point to his face. It took a few minutes
before the victims pointed to their faces. Co identified him and Lara from among several
persons (more than five; not sure if 10) who were in the line-up.31

At the time he and Lara were arrested, Licayan already knew Delos Reyes because the
latter was his townmate. . Delos Reyes was not in the police line-up.32

Accused-appellant Rogelio "Noel" delos Reyes was arrested on January 12, 2004 in
Barangay Bayang Marihatag, Surigao del Sur, and was taken to Camp Crame where he
was detained. Delos Reyes confirmed the radio interview he had with Zony Esguerra,
and that he said therein that he was forced to guard the victims (''pinilit na magbantay")
by Tata Placio, which the latter did by pointing a gun at him.33

Delos Reyes testified that on August 10, 1998, he went to the house of Mabansag to
accompany a friend who wanted to buy a fighting cock. He had previously met
Mabansag at the "manukan" sometime that same year, 1998. Delos Reyes stated that
he met Tata and Alex for the first time in Mabansag's house. The sale of the two fighting
cocks was done outside Mabansag's house but, with Mabansag's permission, he
entered said house to drink water. Inside the house, Tata and Jojo pointed a gun at him.
He then saw a man and a woman seated near the kitchen. The couple saw him through
the curtain. Mabansag told him, "Noel, magmadali ka lumabas, may mangungupahan
na mag-asawa." Tata, however, said "Dito ka Zang, huwag kang aalis." Delos Reyes
answered that he will leave and that he does not want to stay any longer. 34

The court noted at this point of Delos Reyes's testimony that he mentioned Tata as if he
knew him prior to the time he entered the house. Delos Reyes then admitted that he
already knew Tata and Jojo two months before the incident and that his earlier
statement that he did not know Tata and Jojo when he entered the house was not
true.35

Delos Reyes did not ask Tata and Jojo why they were pointing a gun at him. 36 He saw
the hands of the woman were tied, and suspected that Tata and Jojo were engaged in
bad activities. He stayed in the place from 3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. He did not help the
victims because he was afraid that Allan, Jojo, Tata and Benjie might shoot him. After
leaving the place, he stayed in the house of his godmother, Emelita Alcober, in
Concepcion for two weeks.37

Delos Reyes knows both Licayan and Lara. He visited Lara in his residence every
Sunday. Licayan was his neighbor in the province. Delos Reyes affirmed his statement
in the Sinumpaang Salaysay that Licayan and Lara were not liable ("walang
kasalanan"). Lara was not in the safehouse, while Licayan just happened to pass by.
When Delos Reyes entered Mabansag's house, Mabansag told him that there were
kidnap victims inside.38

During cross-examination, Delos Reyes stated that the friend he accompanied to buy
fighting cocks was named Luisito. He did not know Luisito' s surname because he had
known him for only two weeks. He had known Tata for around two months because
Tata accompanied Mabansag when the latter went to Delos Reyes' s residence three
times to bring fighting cocks to sell. Delos Reyes learned from a neighbor about
Mabansag's trade of selling fighting cocks. Mabansag usually brings the fighting cocks
to Delos Reyes, at the latter's godmother's house. Delos Reyes did not know why this
changed on August 10, 1998, when. Mabansag told him to get the fighting cocks at the
latter's house. When Delos Reyes entered the safehouse, his companion, Luisito, had
already left to drive a tricycle; Delos Reyes will just give Luisito the fighting cocks they
bought at a later time. Answering a query from the court, Delos Reyes affirmed that
after he and Luisito arrived. at the place, Luisito immediately left.39
Delos Reyes asked permission from Benjie Mabansag to go inside the house. He did
not ask permission from Pedro Mabansag to go inside the house since he had already
gone to the place four times.40 When asked by the court for clarification, Delos Reyes
said he did not ask for permission from Benjie.41 He asked Tata why he was pointing a
gun at him, to which Tata replied that he should stay and that Tata will kill him if he
reports the matter to the police.42 When Delos Reyes went near the kitchen, he saw a
man and a woman. He noticed that the woman's hands were tied, but it did not occur to
him that their captivity was the matter that Tata warned him not to tell the police. Delos
Reyes did not consider it unusual to see a woman's hands tied. 43 Despite what was
happening, he stayed in the house for one hour and merely sat on the floor near the
door where the man and the woman were kept. He was also allowed to leave after one
hour. He did not notice the persons inside the room except for the man and the woman.
Even after Tata pointed a gun at him and he saw a woman tied, it did not occur to him
after he left the place that something was wrong.44

In the appeal now before the Court, accused-appellant Delos Reyes reiterates his
defense that the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear was present in his case
while accused-appellants Licayan and Lara seek to overturn their conviction on the
basis of the newly discovered evidence presented during their retrial.

Whether or not the exempting

circumstance of uncontrollable fear
should be considered in favor of
Delos Reyes

Delos Reyes, who was still at-large during the first trial, was found guilty at the
conclusion of the retrial. The trial court held:

With respect to accused DELOS REYES, he did not refute the testimony of MR. CO that
he was one (1) of his abductors who [was] seated at the middle portion of the Tamaraw
FX and who demanded from him the key of said vehicle. Instead he admitted going to
the house of Pedro Mabansag on August 10, 1998 accompanying a friend who would
buy a fighting cock. According to DELOS REYES, after he asked permission from Pedro
Mabansag, he entered his house to drink water, but he was met by a certain "TATA"
and "JOJO" and they pointed a gun at him and he was told not to leave. He claimed that
Tata Placio and his companion after poking a gun at him threatened him that they would
kill him if he reports the matter to the police. He admitted that he saw two (2) persons
inside the house near the kitchen and the woman was hand tied. After he arrived at the
said safehouse at 3 :00 p.m., of August 10, 1998, he was allowed to leave at 4:00 p.m.,
of said date. And after he left the safehouse, he admitted that he feels not anymore
being threatened by the group of Tata Placio, but still he did not report what he
witnessed in the house of Pedro Mabansag to the police authorities. Said accused also
claimed that when "TAT A" and "JOJO" poked a gun at him and was told not to leave
and not to report to the police, he acted under the "compulsion of an irresistible force,
hence, one of the exempting circumstances under Article 12, paragraph 5 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Court begs to disagree. DELOS REYES testified that even
before August 10, 1998, he knows already TATA and JOJO because they went to the
house of his Ninang together with Pedro Mabansag for three (3) times. Since they all
know each other, then the court cannot comprehend why TATA and JOJO still need to
poke a gun at DELOS REYES and threatened him. This is only a last ditch effort of said
accused to deny any participation in the conspiracy in kidnapping the two (2) victims. As
could clearly be gleaned from the testimony, DELOS REYES made inconsistent and
improbable statements. The Court also observed the demeanor of said accused when
he testified and he is obviously lying [through] his teeth. Manifest falsehood and
discrepancies in the witnesses' testimony seriously impair their probative value and cast
serious doubts on their credibility.45

The Court of Appeals affirmed these findings, adding that the testimony of Delos Reyes
was self-serving and could not stand on its own to prove the elements of the exempting
circumstance relied upon.46 Before this Court, Delos Reyes again pursues that he is
exempt from criminal liability based on Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides:
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. -The following are exempt
from criminal liability:

xxxx

5. A.ny person who act under the compulsion of irresistible force.

Delos Reyes claims exemption from criminal liability under Article 12, paragraph 5 of the
Revised Penal Code, because he allegedly acted under the compulsion of an irresistible
force, specifically the fact that a co-accused, who is still at-large up to this date, pointed
a gun at him. Delos Reyes has been invoking practically the same defense even before
the trial: in his Radio Veritas interview by reporter Zony Esguerra, he insisted that "wala
akong kasalanan" and that he was merely forced to guard the victims.47

In People v. Dansal,48 this Court held that a person invoking the exempting
circumstance of compulsion due to irresistible force admits in effect the commission of a
punishable act, and must therefore prove the exempting circumstance by clear and
convincing evidence. Specifically: He must show that the irresistible force reduced him
to a mere instrument that acted not only without will but also against his will. The
compulsion must be of such character as . to leave the accused no opportunity to
defend himself or to escape.

The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending; and it
must be of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious
bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. A speculative,
fanciful or remote fear, even fear of future injury, is insufficient.49

The appellate court did not err when it relied on the doctrine that the matter of assigning
values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by
the trial judge, who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to
assess their credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected on the record. It
is the trial judge that can capture the truth from the "forthright answer or the hesitant
pause, the quivering voice or the angry tone, the flustered look or the sincere gaze, the
modest blush or the guilty blanch."50 In the case at bar, the trial court even expressly
stated that it observed the demeanor of Delos Reyes when he testified and found that
he is obviously lying through his teeth.51 This is in contrast to the testimony of Co which
the trial court described as very clear, positive and straightforward.52 Even without the
advantage of being able to observe the demeanor of Delos Reyes, however, a mere
examination of the transcript of his testimony convinces us of the hesitation and
untruthfulness of his testimony. Delos Reyes kept on changing details and correcting
himself even without inducement from opposing counsel. The content of the testimony
was itself incredible. This Court finds it hard to believe that a person who accidentally
discovers kidnap victims would be held at gunpoint by the kidnappers to guard said
victims; or that a mastermind of a kidnapping syndicate, instead of conducting his
fighting cock selling activities in the regular meeting place, would invite a recent affiliate
to the place where he is holding prisoners; or that Delos Reyes did not find it unusual to
see a woman with her hands tied.

In all, we find no reason to doubt that Delos Reyes was part of the plan to abduct and
detain Co and Manaysay.

Whether or not Licayan and Lara

should be acquitted based on
purportedly newly discovered
evidence

The pro hac vice resolution of this Court on January 15, 2004 allows this Court an
unusual, though not unprecedented,53 task to revisit our own final and executory
Decision. It should be stressed that a new trial based on newly discovered evidence
may only be granted by the court on motion of the accused, or motu proprio with the
consent of the accused "(a)t any time before a judgment of conviction becomes
final.54 Furthermore, the affidavits of Mabansag and Delos Reyes cannot be considered
newly discovered in that the affiants are the movants' co-accused who were already
identified as such during the trial.55 Nevertheless, the Court, alluding to its power to
suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operations whenever the
purposes of justice require it,56 and noting the support of the Office of the Solicitor
General to Licayan and Lara's motion, voted 8-6 to order the suspension of the Rules of
Court itself and remand the case to the trial court for further reception of evidence. 57

On June 24, 2006, more than two years after the pro hac vice Resolution of this Court,
Republic Act No. 934658 was approved, irrevocably sparing Licayan and Lara from the
severest and most permanent of penalties. In the meantime, both the R TC and the
Court of Appeals were unmoved by the new evidence presented for the accused-
appellants. Thus, for the second time, Licayan and Lara were convicted by the trial court
and their appeals denied by the Court of Appeals.

To put things in perspective, the pro hac vice Resolution expressly granted the effects
of Rule 121, Section 6(b} of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 6. Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration. – The effects of granting a

new trial or reconsideration are the following:

xxxx

(b) when a new trial is granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, the
evidence already adduced shall stand and the newly-discovered and such other
evidence as the court may, in .the interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall be
taken and considered together with

the evidence already in the record.

In general, the "new" evidence adduced in the second trial consists in (1) allegations
that the identification of Licayan and Lara by Co and Manaysay was unreliable; (2)
testimonies and affidavits of the recently apprehended Mabansag and Delos Reyes,
both of whom allege that Licayan and Lara were not involved in the crime; and (3)
testimonies purporting to establish that Lara was at work in Antipolo during the
kidnapping incident.

While the second trial was meant to give Licayan and Lara the opportunity to present
newly-discovered evidence that were not available during the first trial, the focus of their
defense was to show that the identification made by the victims was unreliable. Licayan
was recalled to the witness stand to testify that in the police line-up, he was identified by
Co by pointing at his and Lara's feet. Licayan emphasizes that Co did not mention any
specific identifying mark on their feet, and that he heard Co say that whenever anybody
enters the room in the safehouse, he looks at their feet. Likewise, when Co was recalled
to the witness stand to testify as regards the participation of Delos Reyes in the crime,
the cross-examination concentrated on trying to establish that Co was not certain about
the identity of Licayan and Lara. This Court observes that the defense was not
successful in doing so as borne out by the following portions of the transcript:

ATTY AREZA

Q But the reason why you were pointing to the feet of the accused was to assure
yourself about the footwear they were wearing, that was the reason you were pointing to
their feet and not to their faces?

A I was positive with their faces, sir. The feet I was more assured of their identities when
I saw their feet.

COURT

Q You already identified them through their faces?

A Yes, your honor.

Q You told the investigator?

A Yes, your honor.

Q As a support to their identification you pointed to their feet?

A Can I say something Your Honor. On the second day, there was a time that they
would come and enter the room with their faces covered, but there are times that they
would forget to cover their faces so I was able to identify them, that is the reason why I
took an extra effort in remembering their feet and what they were wearing. Your Honor.

ATTY AREZA:

Q What you are trying to say is that you are 100% sure of their identities and you were
more assured by looking at their feet?

PROSECUTOR GAPUZAN:

Misleading. There was no testimony that the witness ...

COURT

Witness may answer.

A I am sure with their faces. I was able to talk to them face to face, sir. I was more
assured when I saw their feet, sir.59

Even though Co was able to positively identify Licayan and Lara through their faces,
prudence requires that he at least check on the other details from his captivity to identify
his abductors. His certainty is not negated by his meticulosity.

The defense brings up several instances of supposed inconsistencies in Co's testimony,

apparently to prove that Co's memory was unreliable: (1) that Co was uncertain as to
whether or not Licayan was among the armed men who abducted them; (2) that Co was
inconsistent as to who asked for the keys to his Tamaraw FX, which was used to
transport them; (3) that Co inaccurately described in his affidavit what Mabansag looks
like and omitted that he was a double arm amputee; ( 4) that Co saw a family picture of
Lara in the safehouse which might have been the basis of his identification of Lara; and
(5) that Co corrected himself about whether there was light in the room where he and
Manaysay were held captive.

We have, on numerous occasions, held that discrepancies in testimonies concerning

minor details and not actually touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair
their credibility. Instead of weakening the testimonies, these inconsistencies tend to
strengthen their credibility, because they discount the possibility of their being
rehearsed.60

While Co may have been uncertain as to whether Licayan was among the armed men
who abducted him and Manaysay, he nevertheless positively identified Licayan as the
person with medium built, fair complexion and thin hairline whom he talked with
regarding the ransom, and who fell asleep in the afternoon of August 11, 1998, allowing
them to escape.61 Manaysay also identified Licayan as one of the persons she saw
upon arriving at the safehouse,62 as the person who removed the masking tape from her
eyes,63 and the person guarding them who fell asleep, allowing them to escape. 64

Co and Manaysay had no reason to lie. We find it hard to believe that Co and
Manaysay, the victims of a heinous crime, would use the picture of Lara at the
safehouse and make up the following statements just to pin an innocent person for an
offense he did not commit. Co identified Lara as the short, tiny black man who guarded
them shortly after they arrived at the safehouse and brought the plastic container for
Manaysay,65 the guard with whom he tried to plead with for their lives but who told them
that he was just following orders, and refused the money that Manaysay managed to
keep to herself during their captivity.66 Manaysay identified Lara as one of the persons
she saw upon arriving at the safehouse,67 and as the one who guarded them shortly
after they arrived at the safehouse, who gave her a plastic container, and with whom Co
pleaded with to help them escape.68

It bears to stress that both Co and Manaysay had several opportunities to see the faces
of Lara and Licayan.1avvphi1 Co and Manaysay each identified Lara and Licayan in
both the police line-up and the trial proper in open court. In the line-up, they were
chosen from a group of 10 persons, the other members of which have appearances that
do not offer any clue that differentiate them from Lara and Licayan.69

As regards Co's allegedly faulty identification of Mabansag in his affidavit, 70 wherein he

described Mabansag as "matangkad at medyo matanda na ang tawag nila ay Putol" 71 it
was clear that Co was merely being asked to describe in general the persons he saw
during his captivity: "Doon sa bahay na sinabi mong pinagdalhan sa inyo mayroon ka
bang napansin na ibang tao doon maliban sa limang tao na tumangay sa inyo?"72 We
examined Mabansag's picture in the records73 and observe that even in said picture,
Mabansag's allegedly short stature and his being an amputee was not immediately
apparent because of what appears to be a jacket he was wearing. If he was wearing
similar clothes at the time Co saw him, it is very possible that he simply did not notice
Mabansag's handicap.

The new evidence alluded to by this Court in its pro hac vice resolution to grant a new
trial was supposed to be the testimonies of the then recently captured Mabansag and
Delos Reyes, who both denied that Licayan and Lara participated in the crime. The
statements of Mabansag and Delos Reyes, however, would have been given more
weight had they personally admitted their own involvement in the crime. As testified by
Msgr. Olaguer, witness for the defense, Mabansag stated in his interview with Gus
Abelgas that he (Mabansag) does not know anything about the kidnapping. 74 We cannot
give weight to his denial that Licayan and Lara participated in the crime if he, himself,
claims that he does not know anything about the kidnapping. On the other hand, Delos
Reyes swears that he was merely forced at gunpoint to guard the victims, and was at
the scene of the crime only from 3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. of August 10, 1998. 75 Delos
Reyes claims that Lara was not in the safehouse, while Licayan just happened to pass
by.76 Co and Manaysay, however, placed Lara at the scene of the crime in the early
morning of August 10, 1998,77 making the testimony as regards his absence from 3:00
p.m. to 4:00 p.m. of same day irrelevant. Licayan, on the other hand, denies having
been in the safehouse on August 10 and 11, 1999, and claims that he was at home in
San Mateo, Rizal.78 The testimony of Delos Reyes that Licayan passed by the
safehouse sometime from 3 :00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. was therefore even unintentionally
inculpating as to Licayan.

Finally, with respect to Lara's witnesses, namely co-worker Abelardo Ramirez and
employer Florencia Lavarro Salvador, their combined testimonies account for Lara's
whereabouts during the following dates and times:

August 9, 1998 (Sunday)-from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

August 10, 1998 (Monday)-from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

August 11, 1998 (Tuesday)-from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.

Co79 and Manaysay,80 however, testified that Lara was at the scene of the crime during
the early morning of August 10, 1998, which was shortly after they were abducted at 1
:30 a.m. of the same day. We have repeatedly held that for alibi to prosper, it is not
enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed;
he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission.81 Ramirez's house, where he was
fetched by Lara at 7:00 a.m. on August 10, 1998 is at Daang Bakal, Bagong Silang,
Parang, Marikina - the very same area where the safehouse was located. It was
certainly not physically impossible for Lara to have been at the scene of the crime at
around 2:00 a.m. of August 10, 1998 and still be able to arrive. at Ramirez's house
within the same vicinity at 7:00 a.m. Furthermore, on both August 10 and 11, Ramirez
testified that he and Lara parted ways on Kaolin Street, which was the very same street
Co and Manaysay ran to when they escaped from the safehouse. 82

In sum, the new evidence presented by Licayan and Lara not only failed to prove that
either of them was in another place during their alleged participation in the kidnapping of
Co and Manaysay, but likewise failed to discredit the positive identification made by
both Co and Manaysay.

Criminal and Civil Liability for

Delos Reyes, Licayan and Lara

The guilt of Delos Reyes, Licayan and Lara for the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom,
having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, would have warranted the imposition of
the death penalty under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. With the passage,
however, of Republic Act No. 9346, the imposition of the death penalty has been
prohibited. The RTC thus correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on Delos
Reyes, Licayan and Lara.

Nevertheless, we have to modify the amount of damages to be awarded to conform to

recent jurisprudence. In the similar case of People v. Gambao 83 for Kidnapping for
Ransom, the Court set the minimum indemnity and damages where facts warranted the
imposition of the death penalty if not for prohibition thereof by Republic Act No. 9346, to
wit: (1) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages which the
victim is assumed to have suffered and thus needs no proof; and (3) ₱100,000.00 as
exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.

Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes are jointly and severally liable for these amounts
awarded in favor of each of the victims. These amounts shall accrue interest at the rate
of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of the Court's Resolution until
fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03797
dated July 4, 2012, which affirmed in toto the disposition of the Regional Trial Court of
Marikina in Criminal Case No. 98-2605-MK and 98-2606-MK dated February 17, 2009,
is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) Roderick Licayan, Roberto Lara and Rogelio Delos Reyes are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. They are also ordered to
jointly and severally indemnify each of the victims in the following amounts:

(a) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity;

(b) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages; and

(c) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages,

(2) All of these amounts shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of the finality of the Court's Resolution until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO*

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, First Division

WE CONCUR:

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA**
Associate Justice
 LUCAS P. BERSAMIN JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, First Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

G.R. No. 206442 July 1, 2015

JOVITO CANCERAN, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the August 10,
2012 Decision1 and the March 7, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-
G.R. CR No. 00559, which affirmed and modified the September 20, 2007 Judgment 3 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City (RTC), in
Criminal Case No. 2003-141, convicting petitioner Jovito Canceran (Canceran) for
consummated Theft.

The records disclose that Canceran, together with Frederick Vequizo and Marcial Diaz,
Jr., was charged with "Frustrated Theft." The Information reads:

That on or about October 6, 2002, at more or less 12:00 noon, at Ororama Mega Center
Grocery Department, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Jovito Canceran,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another with his co-
accused Frederick Vequizo, URC Merchandiser, and Marcial Diaz, Jr., a Unilever
Philippines merchandiser both of Ororama Mega Center, with intent to gain and without
the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, steal and carry away 14 cartons of Ponds White Beauty Cream
valued at ₱28,627,20, belonging to Ororama Mega Center, represented by William
Michael N. Arcenio, thus, performing all the acts of execution which would produce the
crime of theft as a consequence but, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some
cause independent of accused’s will, that is, they were discovered by the employees of
Ororama Mega Center who prevented them from further carrying away said 14 cartons
of Ponds White Beauty Cream, to the damage and prejudice of the Ororama Mega
Center.

Article 308 in relation to Article 309, and 6 of the Revised Penal Code.4

Version of the Prosecution

To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution presented Damalito Ompoc
(Ompoc),a security guard; and William Michael N. Arcenio (Arcenio), the Customer
Relation Officer of Ororama Mega Center (Ororama),as its witnesses. Through their
testimonies, the prosecution established that on or about October 6, 2002, Ompoc saw
Canceran approach one of the counters in Ororama; that Canceran was pushing a cart
which contained two boxes of Magic Flakes for which he paid ₱1,423.00; that Ompoc
went to the packer and asked if the boxes had been checked; that upon inspection by
Ompoc and the packer, they found out that the contents of the two boxes were not
Magic Flakes biscuits, but 14 smaller boxes of Ponds White Beauty Cream worth
₱28,627.20; that Canceran hurriedly left and a chase ensued; that upon reaching the
Don Mariano gate, Canceran stumbled as he attempted to ride a jeepney; that after
being questioned, he tried to settle with the guards and even offered his personal
effects to pay for the items he tried to take; that Arcenio refused to settle; and that his
personal belongings were deposited in the office of Arcenio.5

Version of the Defense

Canceran vehemently denied the charges against him. He claimed that he was a promo
merchandiser of La Tondeña, Inc. and that on October 6, 2002, he was in Ororama to
buy medicinefor his wife. On his way out, after buying medicine and mineral water, a
male person ofaround 20 years of age requested him to pay for the items in his cart at
the cashier; that he did not know the name of this man who gavehim ₱1,440.00 for
payment of two boxes labelled Magic Flakes; that he obliged with the request of the
unnamed person because he was struck by his conscience; that he denied knowing the
contents of the said two boxes; that after paying at the cashier, he went out of Ororama
towards Limketkai to take a jeepney; that three persons ran after him, and he was
caught; that he was brought to the 4th floor of Ororama, where he was mauled and
kicked by one of those who chased him; that they took his Nokia 5110 cellular phone
and cash amounting to ₱2,500.00; and that Ompoc took his Seiko watch and ring, while
a certain Amion took his necklace.6

Canceran further claimed that an earlier Information for theft was already filed on
October 9,2002 which was eventually dismissed. In January 2003, a second Information
was filed for the same offense over the same incident and became the subject of the
present case.7

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Judgment, dated September 20, 2007, the RTC found Canceran guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of consummated Theft in line with the ruling of the Court in
Valenzuela v. People8 that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),there is
no crime of "Frustrated Theft." Canceran was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment from ten (10) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years, eight (8)
months of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.9

The RTC wrote that Canceran’s denial deserved scant consideration because it was not
supported by sufficient and convincing evidence and no disinterested witness was
presented to corroborate his claims. As such, his denial was considered self-serving
and deserved no weight. The trial court was also of the view that his defense, that the
complaint for theft filed against him before the sala of Judge Maximo Paderanga was
already dismissed, was not persuasive. The dismissal was merely a release order
signed by the Clerk of Court because he had posted bail.10

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Aggrieved, Canceran filed an appeal where he raised the issue of double jeopardy for
the first time. The CA held that there could be no double jeopardy because he never
entered a valid plea and so the first jeopardy never attached. 11

The CA also debunked Canceran’s contention that there was no taking because he
merely pushed the cart loaded with goods to the cashier’s booth for payment and
stopped there. The appellate court held that unlawful taking was deemed complete from
the moment the offender gained possession of the thing, even if he had no opportunity
to dispose of the same.12

The CA affirmed with modification the September 20, 2007 judgment of the RTC,
reducing the penalty ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as maximum. Canceran moved for the reconsideration of the said
decision, but his motion was denied by the CA in its March 7, 2013 resolution.

Hence, this petition.

As can be synthesized from the petition and other pleadings, the following are the
issues: 1] whether Canceran should be acquitted in the crime of theft as it was not
charged in the information; and 2] whether there was double jeopardy.

Canceran argues that the CA erred in affirming his conviction. He insists that there was
already double jeopardy as the first criminal case for theft was already dismissed and
yet he was convicted in the second case. Canceran also contends that there was no
taking of the Ponds cream considering that "the information in Criminal Case No. 2003-
141 admits the act of the petitioner did not produce the crime of theft." 13 Thus, absent
the element of taking, the felony of theft was never proved.

In its Comment,14 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)contended that there was no
double jeopardy as the first jeopardy never attached. The trial court dismissed the case
even before Canceran could enter a plea during the scheduled arraignment for the first
case. Further, the prosecution proved that all the elements of theft were present in this
case.

In his Reply,15 Canceran averred that when the arraignment of the first case was
scheduled, he was already bonded and ready to enter a plea. It was the RTC who
decided that the evidence was insufficient or the evidence lacked the element to
constitute the crime of theft. He also stressed that there was no unlawful taking as the
items were assessed and paid for.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds the petition partially meritorious.

Constitutional Right of the

Accused to be Informed of
the Nature and Cause of
Accusation against Him.

No less than the Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal
prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. 16 It is
fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in
the complaint or information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a
crime to be set out in the information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his
defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute
the offense.17
Under Article 308 of the RPC, the essential elements of theft are (1) the taking of
personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done
with intent of gain; (4) the taking away was done without the consent of the owner; and
(5) the taking away is accomplished without violence or intimidation against person or
force upon things. "Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one’s personal property,
is the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. At the same time,
without unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense could only be attempted theft,
if at all."18

"It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property
stolen delves into the concept of ‘taking’ itself, in that there could be no true taking until
the actor obtains such degree of control over the stolen item. But even if this were
correct, the effect would be to downgrade the crime to its attempted, and not frustrated
stage, for it would mean that not all the acts of execution have not been completed, the
"taking not having been accomplished."19

A careful reading of the allegations in the Information would show that Canceran was
charged with "Frustrated Theft" only. Pertinent parts of the Information read:

x x x did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away 14
cartons of Ponds White Beauty Cream valued at ₱28,627,20, belonging to Ororama
Mega Center, represented by William Michael N. Arcenio, thus performing all the acts of
execution which would produce the crime of theft as a consequence, but nevertheless,
did not produce it by reason of some cause independent of accused’s will x x x.

[Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied]

As stated earlier, there is no crime of Frustrated Theft. The Information can never be
read to charge Canceran of consummated Theft because the indictment itself stated
that the crime was never produced. Instead, the Information should be construed to
mean that Canceran was being charged with theft in its attempted stage only.
Necessarily, Canceran may only be convicted of the lesser crime of Attempted Theft.

"[A]n accused cannot be convicted of a higher offense than that with which he was
charged in the complaint or information and on which he was tried. It matters not how
conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused cannot be
convicted in the courts of any offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or
information on which he is tried, or necessarily included therein. He has a right to be
informed as to the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on
trial, and to convict him of an offense higher than that charged in the complaint or
information on which he is tried would be an unauthorized denial of that right." 20 Indeed,
an accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or
necessarily included in the information filed against him.21 An offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the
latter.22

The crime of theft in its consummated stage undoubtedly includes the crime in its
attempted stage. In this case, although the evidence presented during the trial prove the
crime of consummated Theft, he could be convicted of Attempted Theft only.
Regardless of the overwhelming evidence to convict him for consummated Theft,
because the Information did not charge him with consummated Theft, the Court cannot
do so as the same would violate his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
allegations against him, as he so protests.

The Court is not unmindful of the rule that "the real nature of the criminal charge is
determined, not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the
specification of the law alleged to have been violated – these being conclusions of law –
but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information." 23 In the case of
Domingo v. Rayala,24 it was written:
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense
charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere
conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and
the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged
in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.
No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege
the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the
information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must
be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The
requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the
accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably
prepare his defense.25

In the subject information, the designation of the prosecutor of the offense, which was
"Frustrated Theft," may be just his conclusion. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the
charge was qualified by the additional allegation, "but, nevertheless, did not produce it
by reason of some cause independent of accused’s will, that is, they were discovered
by the employees of Ororama Mega Center who prevented them from further carrying
away said 14 cartons of Ponds White Beauty Cream, x x x.26 This averment, which
could also be deemed by some as a mere conclusion, rendered the charge nebulous.
There being an uncertainty, the Court resolves the doubt in favor of the accused,
Canceran, and holds that he was not properly informed that the charge against him was
consummated theft.

No double jeopardy when

the first jeopardy never
attached

Anent the issue of double jeopardy, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the ruling
of the CA.

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for punishment for the same offense. The rule
of double jeopardy has a settled meaning in this jurisdiction. It means that when a
person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or
conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot
again be charged with the same or identical offense. This principle is founded upon the
law of reason, justice and conscience.27

Canceran argues that double jeopardy exists as the first case was scheduled for
arraignment and he, already bonded, was ready to enter a plea. It was the RTC who
decided that there was insufficient evidence to constitute the crime of theft.

To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been
validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in
the first. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a
competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the
case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused.28

Here, the CA correctly observed that Canceran never raised the issue of double
jeopardy before the RTC.1âwphi1 Even assuming that he was able to raise the issue of
double jeopardy earlier, the same must still fail because legal jeopardy did not attach.
First, he never entered a valid plea. He himself admitted that he was just about to enter
a plea, but the first case was dismissed even before he was able to do so. Second,
there was no unconditional dismissal of the complaint. The case was not terminated by
reason of acquittal nor conviction but simply because he posted bail. Absent these two
elements, there can be no double jeopardy.

Penalty of Attempted Theft

The penalty for consummated theft is prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods.29 The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony shall be imposed upon principals in an attempt to commit a
felony.30 The basis for reduction of penalty by two degrees is the penalty prescribed by
law for the consummated crime. Also, when the offenses defined in the RPC are
punished with a penalty composed of two periods, like in the crime of theft, the penalty
lower by one degree is formed by two periods to be taken from the same penalty
prescribed.31

Here, the products stolen were worth ₱28,627.20. Following Article 309 par. 1 of the
RPC, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the penalty prescribed in. the same
paragraph, because the value of the things stolen exceeded ₱22,000.00. In other
words, a special aggravating circumstance shall affect the imposable penalty.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty should be within the
range of Arresto Mayor Minimum to Arresto Mayor Medium. In view of the special
aggravating circumstance under Article 309 (1), the maximum penalty should be Arresto
Mayor Maximum to Prision Correccional Minimum in its maximum period.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The August 10, 2012 Decision
and the March 7, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00559 are
hereby MODIFIED, in that, the Court finds accused Jovito Canceran guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Theft.

Accordingly, the Court sentences the accused to suffer the indeterminate prison term
ranging from Four (4) Months of Arresto Mayor, as minimum, to Two (2) Years, Four (4)
Months of Prision Correccional, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN* MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer 'of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - CRISTINA SAMSON, Accused-

Appellant. G.R. No. 214883 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION, DEL CASTILLO, MENDOZA,
and LEONEN,JJ Promulgated: O 2 SEP 20~5- _ ~;Tu x------------------------------------ DECISION
MENDOZA, J.: For review in this appeal is the May 6, 2014 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 05832, which affirmed the September 27, 2012 Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 12285, convicting
accused-appellant Cristina Samson (Cristina) for parricide committed against her husband,
Gerry Delmar (Gerry), and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
Antecedents On August 14, 2002, Cristina was charged with the crime of Parricide, defined and
penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The Information articulates the
following criminal charges, viz: 1 Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid with
Associate Justices Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, concurring. Rollo,
pp. 2-9. 2 Penned by Judge Ma. Magdalena A. Balderama. CA rollo, pp. I 0-15. F ~ DECISION 2
G.R. No. 214883 That on or about the 27th day of June, 2002 in Tarlac City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
and with intent to kill her husband Gerry Delmar, with whom she was united in lawful wedlock,
armed herself with a deadly weapon, a knife, and stabbed said Gerry Delmar on his chest,
which resulted to his death. CONTRARY TO LAW. 3 When arraigned almost four (4) years later,
Cristina entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with the parties
agreeing to a reverse trial on account of her invocation of the justifying circumstance of self-
defense. Version of the Defense The version of Cristina appears in the Brief for the
AccusedAppellant4 as follows: On June 27, 2002, CRISTINA SAMSON (Cristina) was in their
house watching television together with her children when her husband, Gerry Delmar (Gerry),
who was drunk at that time, arrived. Gerry asked Cristina if she had cooked food already but
the latter answered in the negative because she had no money to buy food. Gerry scolded and
uttered words against her, and then slapped her. They had an altercation for about ten (10)
minutes when Cristina’s father arrived and pacified them. Gerry left but after thirty (30)
minutes, he returned. He pointed a knife at Cristina’s neck. The latter begged Gerry not to hurt
her and to pity their children if something happens to her. Gerry continued pointing the knife
and told Cristina to stop talking or otherwise, he will put a hole in her neck. Then, Gerry slapped
Cristina’s face twice. While Gerry was still holding the knife, Cristina pushed him and he fell on
the ground. She took the knife which Gerry was holding and begged him not to come near her.
She was holding the knife near her chest pointed at Gerry when he suddenly grabbed her and
that was the time that the knife went in contact with his chest. When she saw her husband
bloodied, she shouted for help and her father (Rodolfo Samson) and brother (Allan Samson)
came and brought Gerry to the hospital. Her relatives told her that Gerry died in the hospital.
(TSN, September 6, 2006, pp. 14-27) On June 27, 2002, ALLAN SAMSON (Allan) was at home
watching television with his father. He heard yelling and shouting from the house of his sister
Cristina and brother-in-law Gerry. Since it was just ordinary for him to hear his sister and
brother-in-law fight, he and his father just ignored it. After fifteen (15) minutes of listening to
their quarrel, they heard Cristina cry for help. Upon hearing this, he immediately went to the
house of his sister and saw 3 Id., as quoted in the RTC Decision, p. 47. 4 Rollo, pp. 33-45.
DECISION 3 G.R. No. 214883 her holding Gerry and she requested him and his father to bring
Gerry to the hospital. They called a tricycle and he, together with his father, brought Gerry to
Talon General Hospital. The doctor, however, declared that Gerry was already dead. Then, the
tanod arrives and Allan instructed the tanod to call the siblings and relatives of Gerry. When the
relatives arrived, they went home. (TSN, November 18, 2006, pp. 4-6)5 Version of the
Prosecution In its Brief for the Appellee,6 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) provided the
following as its Counter-Statement of Facts: On January 25, 1994, appellant Cristina Samson
and victim Jerry Delmar were married. They were blessed with two (2) daughters namely
Christine and Cherrie Lou. The couple lived in their own house which is just adjacent to the
house of appellant’s family. The union of the two was never a peaceful one. Constant quarrels
filled their household and occurred in front of their children and other relatives. On June 27,
2002, appellant and the victim had one of their usual fights. As testified by appellant herself,
she and her two children were watching television in their home when the victim arrived drunk.
Victim asked for his dinner but appellant was not able to cook food which led to the fight.
Christine, the youngest daughter of the appellant and the victim, narrated that she witnessed
the fight between her parents, that as the fight escalated, appellant was able to get hold of the
knife which was placed on the roof and stabbed the victim. The victim fell on the ground and
crawled until he reached the door. Cristine remembered that people arrived in their home,
helped the victim board a tricycle and brought him to the hospital. Appellant, on the other
hand, ran out and went to her father and asked for money and left. That was the last night that
Christine and Cherry Lou saw their mother.7 The Ruling of the RTC In its September 27, 2012
Decision, the RTC found the proffered selfdefense of Cristina to be untenable. In its view, there
was no longer any threat to her life before she stabbed her husband Gerry. Though there was
an existent danger as there was an altercation before the stabbing incident, the imminence of
such danger ceased when, as admitted by her, Gerry already put down the knife. The RTC even
concluded that it was she who provoked him when she suddenly pushed him to the ground.
She then took the knife and told him not to come near her. When he grabbed her, she stabbed
him. After she took hold of the knife, there was no longer any unlawful 5 Id. at 37-38. 6 Id. at
62. 7 Id. at 67-68. DECISION 4 G.R. No. 214883 aggression to speak of that would necessitate
the need to kill Gerry.8 Thus, the decretal portion of the RTC decision reads in this wise:
WHEREFORE, finding accused CRISTINA SAMSON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony
of Parricide defined and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, accused
CRISTINA SAMSON is hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of “Reclusion Perpetua” pursuant to
R.A. 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines). Accused is also
ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Christine S. Delmar and Cherrie Lo S. Delmar the
amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages and costs of suit. SO ORDERED.9 The Ruling of the CA The CA affirmed the
ruling of the RTC. It stated that although there could have been an unlawful aggression at the
start when Gerry repeatedly slapped Cristina and held a knife at her throat, it already
disappeared when he put down the knife. According to the CA, it was this precise act that gave
Cristina the opportunity to push her husband and gain control of the knife. Moreover, the fact
that she fled and evaded arrest for four (4) years contradicted her claim of innocence.10 The CA
disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 27, 2012 of the RTC, Branch
65, Tarlac City in Criminal Case No. 12285, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of parricide and sentencing her to reclusion perpetua and to pay damages
and the cost of suit, is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. 11 Hence, this appeal. ISSUE The sole issue to
be resolved in this appeal is whether or not the CA erred in not appreciating the justifying
circumstance of self-defense in favor of Cristina. 8 Id. at 51. 9 Id. at 52. 10 Id. at 7-8. 11 Id. at 9.
DECISION 5 G.R. No. 214883 Let it be underscored that appeal in criminal cases throws the
whole case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and
appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned.12
Considering that what is at stake here is no less than the liberty of the accused, this Court has
meticulously and thoroughly reviewed and examined the records of the case and finds that
there is merit in her appeal. There appears to be a conflict between the testimony of Cristina
and her daughter, Christine Delmar (Christine). Cristina claimed that she got the knife from her
husband who fell down after she pushed him. After taking possession of the deadly weapon,
she told her husband not to come near her. She was holding the knife near her chest and
pointed towards him when he suddenly grabbed her and that was the time that the knife went
in contact with her husband’s chest. Christine, however, perceived it differently. According to
her, she witnessed the fight between her parents. She narrated that as the fight escalated, her
mother was able to get hold of a knife, which was inserted in the roof, and used it in stabbing
her father. Both the RTC and the CA believed the version of Cristina, but both were of the view
that before she stabbed her husband, there was no more imminent danger to her life. For said
reason, her fatal stabbing of her husband was not justified. The Court’s Ruling Self-defense,
when invoked as a justifying circumstance, implies the admission by the accused that he
committed the criminal act. Generally, the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt rather than upon the accused that he was in fact
innocent. When the accused, however, admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon him to
prove any claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence.13 Well-settled is
the rule that in criminal cases, self-defense shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to
the defense.14 To invoke self-defense, in order to escape criminal liability, it is incumbent upon
the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence the concurrence of the following
requisites under the second paragraph of Article 11 of the RPC, viz: (1) unlawful aggression; (2)
reasonable necessity 12 People v. Balagat, 604 Phil. 529, 534 (2009). 13 People v. Delos Santos,
G.R. No. 207818, July 23, 2014. 14 People v. Genosa, 464 Phil. 680, 714 (2004). DECISION 6 G.R.
No. 214883 of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person defending himself. 15 Presence of Unlawful Aggression even if
Aggressor was Disarmed Among the requisites of self-defense, the most important that needs
to be proved by the accused, for it to prosper, is the element of unlawful aggression. It must be
proven first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded. There can be no self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against
the person who resorted to self-defense. 16 When the Court speaks of unlawful aggression, it is
an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person.
There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he puts the life, limb, or right of
the person invoking selfdefense in actual or imminent danger. There must be actual physical
force or actual use of a weapon. It is present only when the one attacked faces real and
immediate threat to his life. It must be continuous, otherwise, it does not constitute aggression
warranting self-defense.17 The question now is: was there unlawful aggression when Cristina
killed her husband? The Court answers in the affirmative. The Court hesitates to share the
observation of the RTC and the CA that Cristina failed to discharge the burden of proving that
unlawful aggression was present when she killed her husband. Contrary to the conclusion of the
CA that Gerry’s aggression had already ceased when he was disarmed, it is the Court’s view that
the aggression still continued. Her perceived peril to her life continued and persisted until she
put an end to it. It must be noted that after she was able to take hold of the knife from her
husband, he did not stand down but, instead, continued to move towards her despite her plea
that he should not come nearer. He grabbed her by the arm which could have precipitated her
well-grounded belief that her life was still in danger if he would be able to wrest the weapon
from her. It was not farfetched to presume that, being stronger, he could have easily
overpowered her and eventually killed her. 15 People v. Gamez, G.R. No. 202847, October 23,
2013, 708 SCRA 625, 635. 16 Guevarra v. People, G.R. No. 170462, February 5, 2014, 715 SCRA
384, 396-397. 17 People v. Camillo, Jr., 620 Phil. 775, 796 (2009). DECISION 7 G.R. No. 214883 A
similar situation was presented in the case of People v. Rabandaban18 (Rabandaban), wherein
the Court ruled that despite the fact that the accused succeeded in wresting the bolo from his
wife, he was still justified in using the weapon against her because his life was still in danger.
The Court explained: xxxWhen appellant got possession of the bolo he already must have been
in a precarious condition because of his wounds, one of which was described by the sanitary
inspector as "fatal" since the large intestine came out of it. And appellant, we think, was
justified in believing that his wife wanted to finish him off because, according to the evidence,
she struggled to regain possession of the bolo after he had succeeded in wresting it from her.
With the aggressor still unsubdued and showing determination to fight to the finish, it would
have been folly on the part of appellant, who must already have been losing strength due to
loss of blood, to throw away the bolo and thus give his adversary a chance to pick it up and
again use it against him. Having the right to protect his life, appellant was not in duty bound to
expose himself to such a contingency.19 [Emphases Supplied] In Rabandaban, the victim,
instead of running away from the accused husband after the bolo was wrested from her,
continued to struggle with him to regain possession of the bolo. This fact, together with her
husband’s compromised condition, being already badly wounded, justified him in finally
neutralizing his wife who was then determined in putting an end to his life. In the case at
bench, the unlawful aggression would have ceased if he just walked away from the scene
considering that Cristina had gained the upper hand, being the one in possession of the knife.
Instead, Gerry chose to ignore her plea not to come near her and continued moving towards
her without regard to his safety despite the fact that the knife was pointed towards his
direction. In both Rabandaban and the present case, the victims, despite having been disarmed,
still posed a threat to the lives of the accused. The danger to their lives persisted leaving them
with no other choice but to defend themselves lest they be the ones to be victimized. In that
situation, Cristina had reasons to believe that her life was still in danger. It is to be noted that
before she was able to take hold of the weapon, her husband held the same knife and pointed
it at her throat. So when he, who was taller and stronger, approached her and grabbed her by
the arm, it was instinctive for her to take the extreme precautionary measure 18 85 Phil. 636
(1950). 19 Id. at 637-638. DECISION 8 G.R. No. 214883 by stabbing him before he could get back
the knife and make good his earlier threat of putting a hole in her throat. Contrary to the trial
court’s assessment, she did not show aggression towards her husband when she pushed him
after he pointed the knife away from her. She was, in fact, manifesting a passive attitude
towards him when she just stood her ground, with the knife in hand, asking him not to come
near her.20 It would have been a different story if Gerry, after dropping the knife, walked away
and Cristina still went after him. If that were the case, she could not assert self-defense. She
was no longer acting in self-defense but in retaliation for the earlier aggression. Retaliation is
inconsistent with selfdefense and in fact belies it. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun
by the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him; while in self-defense the
aggression still existed when the aggressor was injured by the accused.21 Now that unlawful
aggression has already been established, it is well to consider the other two requisites in order
to determine whether the selfdefense is complete or incomplete. Reasonable Necessity of the
Means Employed The requisite of reasonable necessity of the means employed is met if the
person invoking self-defense used a weapon or a manner equivalent to the means of attack
used by the aggressor. The reasonable necessity of the self-defense utilized by an accused is to
defend himself “depends upon the nature or quality of the weapon, the physical condition, the
character, the size and other circumstances of the aggressor; as well as those of the person who
invokes self-defense; and also the place and the occasion of the assault.” 22 Moreover, the
nature and location of wounds are considered important indicators whether or not to disprove
a plea of self-defense.23 In the case at bench, the lone stab wound located on the victim’s
chest supports the argument that Cristina feared for her life and this fear impelled her to
defend it by stabbing him. It was a reasonable means chosen by her in view of the attending
circumstances, to wit: that her stronger husband, who had earlier pointed the said knife to her
throat, approached her and grabbed her arm, despite her plea that he refrain from coming near
her; and that she had no other available means or any less deadly weapon to repel the threat
20 TSN, September 6, 2006, p. 9. 21 People v. Gamez, supra note 15, at 636. 22 Nacnac v.
People, G.R. No. 191913, March 21, 2012, 668 SCRA 846, 857. 23 People v. De Leon, G.R. No.
197546, March 23, 2015. DECISION 9 G.R. No. 214883 other than the knife in her hand. She did
not have the time or sufficient tranquillity of mind to think, calculate and choose the weapon to
be used. In predicaments like this, human nature does not act upon the processes of formal
reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation. 24 When it is apparent that a
person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction that act
or to mitigate his liability.25 Moreover, the fact that Gerry was no longer armed does not
negate the reasonableness of the means employed by Cristina. Perfect equality between the
weapon used by the one defending himself and that of the aggressor is not required.26 What
the law requires is a rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter as principal
factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which the accused is exposed, and the instinct
more than reason, that moves or impels his defense; and the proportionateness thereof does
not depend upon the harm done, but upon the imminent danger of such injury.27 Lack of
Sufficient Provocation The last requisite to be considered is lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself. The Court cannot sustain the trial court’s observation that
it was Cristina who provoked her husband when she suddenly pushed him. Her shoving him
cannot be considered a sufficient provocation proportionate to the act of aggression.28 She
merely capitalized on a window of opportunity, when her husband removed the knife away
from her throat, to save herself from what she had perceived to be a danger to her life.
Anybody, in her situation would have acted in the same reasonable way. Flight as an Indication
of Guilt or Non-guilt The CA took the fact of Cristina’s flight and evasion of arrest for four (4)
years against her. To the appellate court, it belied her claim of innocence. 24 Jayme v. People,
372 Phil. 796, 804 (1999). 25 Rimano v. People, 462 Phil. 272, 289 (2003). 26 People v. Padua,
C.A., 40 O.G. 998, as cited in Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal, Book One, Seventeenth Ed. 180
(2008). 27 People v. Rabanal, 436 Phil. 519, 532 (2002). 28 People v. Alconga, 78 Phil. 366, 373
(1947). DECISION 10 G.R. No. 214883 Under the attendant circumstances, the Court cannot
subscribe to that view. Generally, flight, in the absence of a credible explanation, would be a
circumstance from which an inference of guilt might be established, for a truly innocent person
would normally grasp the first available opportunity to defend himself and assert his
innocence.29 It has been held, however, that non-flight may not be construed as an indication
of innocence either. There is no law or dictum holding that staying put is proof of innocence, for
the Court is not blind to the cunning ways of a wolf which, after a kill, may feign innocence and
choose not to flee. 30 In Cristina's case, she explained that she took flight for fear of her safety
because of possible retaliation from her husband's siblings.31 The Court finds such reason for
her choice to flee acceptable. She did not hide from the law but from those who would possibly
do her harm. The R TC and the CA might have some hesitation in accepting her explanation for
her choice of action. Nevertheless, under the circumstances, a cloud of uncertainty lingers. In
such a case, it is the duty of the Court to resolve the doubt in favor of the accused. Considering
that Cristina was justified in killing her husband under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the RPC, she
should be exonerated of the crime charged. For the same reason, the Court finds no act or
omission from which a civil liability may arise. WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The May 6,
2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 05832, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The accused-appellant, Cristina Samson, is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. Let a copy of this
Decision be furnished the Superintendent, Correctional Institution for Women, Mandaluyong
City. The Superintendent is DIRECTED to cause the immediate release of appellant, unless she is
being lawfully held for another cause and to report the action she has taken within five ( 5) days
from receipt of this Decision. SO ORDERED. 29 People v. Beriber, G.R. No. 195243, August 29,
2012, 679 SCRA 528, 543-544. 30 People v. Diaz, 443 Phil. 67, 89-90 (2003). 31 TSN, October 4,
2006, p. 15. DOZA DECISION WE CONCUR: 11 ~ Associate Justice Chairperson G.R. No. 214883
cafWA}~~ ~ ~ .. ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice "' M 0 C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice 41
Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson, Second Division ~ DECISION 12 G.R.
No. 214883 CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division. ~ *11"1,,,,_. A.Ac:"~. • ~ MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Chief Justice

G.R. Nos. 183152-54 January 21, 2015

REYNALDO H. JAYLO, WILLIAM V ALENZONA and ANTONIO G.

HABALO, Petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HEIRS
OF COL. ROLANDO DE GUZMAN, FRANCO CALANOG and AVELINO
MANGUERA, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

What are the repercussions of the failure of the accused to appear, without justifiable
cause, at the promulgation of a judgment of conviction? With the resolution of this
singular issue, the Court writes finis to the 24-year-old controversy before us.

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
the Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of homicide. Petitioners also challenge the Resolution dated 29 November
20072 issued by the same court, which took no action on the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioners, and the Resolution dated 26 May 2008 3 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the earlier Resolution.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

Petitioners Reynaldo Jaylo (Jaylo), William Valenzona (Valenzona) and Antonio Habalo
(Habalo), together with Edgardo Castro (Castro),4 were officers of the Philippine
National Police Western Police District placed on special detail with the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI).5

In June of 1990, the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (US DEA) approached
the NBI with information on the sale of a considerable amount of heroin in the
Philippines. Jaylo was assigned by then NBI Director Alfredo Lim to head the team that
would conduct a buy-bust operation with the aid of US DEA undercover agent Philip
Needham (Needham).

From 3 to 8 July 1990, Needham, posing as a member of an international drug

syndicate, conducted negotiations for the purchase of 10 kilos of heroin from Estella
Arrastia (Arrastia), Franco Calanog (Calanog) and Rolando De Guzman (De
Guzman).The exchange was scheduled on the evening of 10 July 1990 at the parking
lot of the Magallanes Commercial Center.
Needham arrived at the parking lot on board a taxicab with Arrastia and Philip Manila
(Manila), an undercover NBI operative who posed as Needham’s bodyguard. 6 The
taxicab was driven by Romeo Noriega (Noriega), another undercover NBI operative. 7

At the parking lot, Needham and Arrastia met Calanog and Avelino Manguera
(Manguera), who both alighted from a blue Volkswagen Beetle; and De Guzman, who
alighted from a brown Saab.8 Needham approached the Volkswagen and examined the
heroin in the backseat.9 After some time, he straightened up and walked back towards
the taxicab, while executing the prearranged signal of taking out his handkerchief and
blowing his nose.10

It is at this point that the versions of the prosecution and the defense diverged,
particularly on the manner of the arrest.

Version of the Prosecution

On board two vehicles, Jaylo, Castro, Valenzona, Habalo, and at least 15 other
operatives, rushed in and surrounded De Guzman, Calanog, and Manguera. 11

Jaylo pointed his gun at De Guzman. Two other operatives instructed Calanog and
Manguera to lie face down on the ground and placed a foot on their backs while training
a gun at them. The rest cordoned the area.

Later, a car with passengers Needham, US DEA country attaché Andrew Fenrich
(Fenrich), and two armed bodyguards moved out of the cordoned area. When the car
was safely on its way, Jaylo and his men shot De Guzman, Calanog, and Manguera.
They waited 15 minutes for the victims to bleed out and thereafter loaded them into the
vehicles under the ruse of bringing them to the hospital.12

Version of the Defense

When he saw Needham executing the prearranged signal, Manila executed the second
signal of wiping the right side of his face as confirmation.13

Castro, who was driving a Lancer car with Jaylo as his passenger, stepped on the
accelerator to block the path of the Volkswagen.14 Both of them immediately alighted
from the vehicle. Jaylo confronted De Guzman in the Saab, while Castro arrested
Calanog in the Volkswagen. Meanwhile, Valenzona and Habalo approached
Manguera.15

A speeding blue-green car and a burst of gunfire caught the attention of the operatives
while they were approaching their quarries.16 Taking advantage of the distraction, De
Guzman, Calanog, and Manguera reached for their firearms and tried to shoot.

Jaylo was able to move away, so only the window on the driver’s side of the Saab was
hit and shattered.17 He retaliated and shot De Guzman twice, hitting him in the left eye
and chest.18

Out of instinct, Castro shoved the gun of Calanog upward and shot him twice. 19 Calanog
staggered, but again aimed the gun at him. It was then that Castro shot Calanog two
times more, causing the latter to finally fall down.

Valenzona and Habalo saw Manguera in the act of drawing his firearm.20 Both of them
fired and hit him.

The operatives brought De Guzman, Calanog, and Manguera to the hospital. 21 Upon
verifying their identities, the victims were found to be soldiers: Colonel Rolando de
Guzman and Major Franco Calanog.22 Manguera was the driver/security aide of Major
Calanog.23

The Elma Committee

President Corazon Aquino issuedAdministrative Order No. 18224 on 13 July 1990
creating the "Elma Committee." Headed by Presidential Assistant for Legal and Judicial
Affairs Magdangal Elma, with Undersecretary of National Defense Leonardo
Quisumbing and Undersecretary of Justice Eduardo Montenegro as members, the Elma
Committee was tasked to conduct an investigation of all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the seizure of heroin and the shooting incident.

Pursuant to its mandate to submit its findings and recommendations to the President
after the completion of its investigation, the Elma Committee recommended the
prosecution of Jaylo for the killing of De Guzman, Castro for that of Calanog, and
Valenzona and Habalo for that of Manguera.25

However, in three separate Amended Informations dated 8 September 1992 and filed
before the Sandiganbayan, Jaylo, Castro, Valenzona and Habalo, together with several
John Does, were charged with conspiracy in the murder of De
Guzman,26 Calanog,27 and Manguera.28 RULING OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN

In a Decision dated 17 April 2007, the Sandiganbayan found Jaylo, Castro, Valenzona,
and Habalo guilty of homicide. Jaylo was convicted for the killing of De Guzman under
Criminal Case No. 17984; Castro for that of Calanog under Criminal Case No. 17985;
and Valenzona and Habalo for Manguera’s under Criminal Case No. 17986.29 Each of
the accused was sentenced to imprisonment ofsix years and one day of prision
mayoras minimum to 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporalas
maximum, and perpetual disqualification from public office. Each was likewise ordered
to pay ₱50,000 as damages to the heirs of their respective victims, and a proportionate
share in the costs of suit.

The Sandiganbayan noted that the prosecution and the defense were in agreement that
the four accused shot and killed the three victims.30 With this established fact, it was
only necessary to determine the following:

a) Whether the accused conspired to kill the victims;

b) Whether the killing was attended by treachery, evident premeditation and

taking advantage of superior strength; and

c) Whether the killing was justified by the circumstance of fulfillment of duty or

lawful exercise of a right or office.

According to the Sandiganbayan, the evidence presented did not show conspiracy or
any intention on the partof the four accused to aid one another in the shooting. 31 They
did not demonstrate a preconceived common plan or scheme to liquidate the suspected
drug dealers. The prosecution was also unable to prove the attendance of any of the
qualifying circumstances.32 Treachery was not established. The Sandiganbayan ruled
that it could not take judicial notice of the statements given before the Elma Committee
by Dr. Desiderio Moraleda, who had conducted the autopsy on the victims. Dr.
Moraleda died before he could testify before the Sandiganbayan, and his testimony
onthe trajectory of the bullets and the positions of the assailants relative to those of the
victims could not be admitted in evidence without violating the rules on hearsay
evidence.

On the allegation that the four accused took advantage of superior strength, the court
ruled that there was no evidence showing the use of excessive force out of proportion to
the defense available to the victims. In particular, the shooting of Manguera by
Valenzona and Habalo only showed numerical superiority, not superior strength.

The prosecution also failed to prove evident premeditation. It was not able to indicate
the time when the four accused determined to commit the killing; neither was it able to
pinpoint the overt act demonstrating that they adhered to their resolve to commit the
crime even after the lapse of enough time "to allow their conscience to overcome the
resolution of their will."33
For their part, the accused also failed to prove their defense of fulfillment of a duty or
lawful exercise of a right or office.34 The Sandiganbayan was not convinced that they
had acted within the bounds allowed for an arrest in a buy-bust operation.

For one, the Sandiganbayan highly doubted the existence of the speeding car that
distracted the operatives while they were arresting the suspected drug dealers. In this
regard, it took note of the inconsistent testimonies of Manila and Noriega on one hand
and of Needham on the other.

According to Manila, when he heard the gunfire from the speeding car, he covered
Needham and ran with him towards the South Superhighway, away from the taxicab
driven by Noriega.35 Needham got into the diplomatic car that approached them. When
the shooting subsided, he went back to the scene.

According to Noriega, he saw the speeding car going towards the Maranaw Building
parking lot and heard three gunshots. Thereafter, he saw Needham run towards his taxi
and board it. While Noriega was trying to get Needham away from the area, a
diplomatic car blocked their taxicab, and the latter transferred to that car.

According to Needham, however, he immediately walked back to the taxi after

executing the prearranged signalfor the arrest, got in the cab and left the scene. As the
taxicab was leaving, he saw the "rescue" coming in.36 Other than that, he did not notice
any commotion or gunfire. He was then picked up by Fenrich, and they went on their
way.

The Sandiganbayan also noted that the slugs or shells recovered from the scene all
came from short firearms, contrary to Jaylo’s testimony that the shots from the speeding
car were from a rifle (an "armalite").

Further militating against the existence of the speeding car was Jaylo’s incident Report
dated 10 July 1990, in which he stated that when they rushed in for the arrest, they
were met by a volley of gunfire from the three cars of the suspected drug
dealers.37 There was no mention at all of any speeding car.

Considering the failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy and the attendance of
any of the alleged qualifying circumstances, as well as the failure of the defense to
prove the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise of a right or
office, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the crime committed was homicide.

During the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan’s judgment on 17 April 2007, none of the
accused appeared despite notice.38 The court promulgated the Decision in absentia,
and the judgment was entered in the criminal docket. The bail bonds of the accused
were cancelled, and warrants for their arrest issued.

On 30 April 2007, counsel for Jaylo, Valenzona, and Habalo filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration39 of the Decision. In the assailed Resolution dated 29 November 2007,
the Sandiganbayan took no action on the motion and ordered the implementation of the
warrants for the arrest of the convicted accused.40 The court ruled that the 15-day
period from the promulgation of the judgment had long lapsed without any of the
accused giving any justifiable cause for their absence during the promulgation. Under
Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court,41 Jaylo, Valenzona and Habalo have lost
the remedies available under the Rules against the Sandiganbayan’s judgment of
conviction, including the filing of a motion for reconsideration.

In an Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration42 dated 25 January 2008, counsel for the
three urged the Sandiganbayan to givedue course to and resolve the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. The Sandiganbayan issued the second assailed Resolution dated 26
May 2008. The court ruled that for the failure of the three to surrender and move for
leave to avail themselves of a motion for reconsideration within 15 days from the date of
promulgation, the judgment has become final and executory, and no action on the
motion for reconsideration can be taken.43 It then reiterated its order to implement the
warrants for the arrest of the three. ISSUE
On 19 June 2008, petitioners Jaylo, Valenzona and Habalo, by counsel, filed the instant
petition assailing the Sandiganbayan Decision dated 17 April 2007 and Resolutions
dated 29 November 2007 and 26 May 2008. Regarding the Decision dated 17 April
2007, petitioners argue that the

Sandiganbayan erred in ruling as follows:

1. The negative finding of a conspiracy did not lead to the positive finding of the
justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty.

2. There was a contradiction between the testimonies of Manila and Noriega on

one hand and Needham on the other.

3. The existence of the speeding car was highly doubtful.

4. The inconsistency in the testimony of Jaylo was determinative of his lack of

credibility.

5. There should be conclusive physical evidence to prove the justifying

circumstance of fulfillment of duty.

6. The admissions of petitioners before the Elma Committee were admissible in

evidence.

7. Petitioners are guilty of homicide even in the absence of their positive

identification as the ones who committed the crimes charged.

Anent the Resolutions dated 29 November 2007 and 26 May 2008, petitioners argue:

1. Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court cannot diminish, increase or

modify substantive rights like the filing of a motion for reconsideration provided
under Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1606.44

2. The conditions under Section 6 Rule120 of the Rules of Court do not obtain in
the instant case.

As stated at the outset, the resolution of the instant case hinges on the question
regarding the effects of the non appearance of the accused, without justifiable cause, in
the promulgation of the judgment of conviction. In the interest of judicial economy, we
shall proceed with a discussion on this question. For reasons that will be expounded on
below, the application in this case of the law and rules on the non appearance of the
accused, without justifiable cause, in the promulgation of the judgment of conviction
shall determine for us the propriety of conducting a review of the Sandiganbayan
Decision dated 17 April 2007.

OUR RULING

Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court provides that an accused who failed to
appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies
available against the said judgment.

Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court states:

SECTION 6. Promulgation of judgment. — The judgment is promulgated by reading it in

the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered.
However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the
presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside the
province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.

If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be
promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over
the place of confinement or detention upon request of the court which rendered the
judgment. The court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice
of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of
the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-
bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed and resolved by the
appellate court.

The proper clerk of court shall givenotice to the accused personally or through his
bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of
the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped
from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last known address.

In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment
despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal
docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without
justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the
judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation
of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to
avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled
promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be
allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.(6a) (Emphasis
supplied)

Except when the conviction is for a light offense, in which case the judgment may be
pronounced in the presence of the counsel for the accused or the latter’s representative,
the accused is required to be present at the scheduled date of promulgation of
judgment. Notice of the schedule of promulgation shall be made to the accused
personally or through the bondsman or warden and counsel.

The promulgation of judgment shall proceed even in the absence of the accused
despite notice. The promulgation in absentia shall be made by recording the judgment
in the criminal docket and serving a copy thereof to the accused at their last known
address or through counsel. The court shall also order the arrest of the accused ifthe
judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause. 45

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause,
the accused shall lose the remedies available in the Rules of Court against the
judgment. Thus, it is incumbent upon the accused to appear on the scheduled date of
promulgation, because it determines the availability of their possible remedies against
the judgment of conviction. When the accused fail to present themselves at the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction, they lose the remedies of filing a motion for
a new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121) and an appeal from the judgment of conviction
(Rule 122).46

The reason is simple. When the accused on bail fail to present themselves at the
promulgation of a judgment of conviction, they are considered to have lost their standing
in court.47 Without any standing in court, the accused cannot invoke itsjurisdiction to
seek relief.48

Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away substantive rights;
itmerely provides the manner through which an existing right may be implemented.

Petitioners claim that their right to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal has a
statutory origin, as provided under Section 7 of P.D. 1606, to wit:

Section 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. — All decisions and final orders
determining the merits of a case or finally disposing of the action or proceedings of the
Sandiganbayan shall contain complete findings of the facts and the law on which they
are based, on all issues properly raised before it and necessary in deciding the case.
A petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may be filed within fifteen
(15) days from promulgation or notice of the final order or judgment, and such motion
for reconsideration shall be decided within thirty (30) days from submission thereon.
(Emphasis supplied)

xxxx

According to petitioners, Section 7 of P.D. 1606 did not provide for any situation as to
when the right to file a motion for reconsideration may be deemed lost. Thus, it is
available at all times and the Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court cannot operate
to diminish or modify the right of a convicted accused to file a motion for
reconsideration.49 Furthermore, they argue, the right to file a motion for reconsideration
is a statutory grant, and not merely a remedy "available in [the] Rules," as provided
under Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. Thus, according to them, their
absence at the promulgation of judgment before the Sandiganbayan cannot be deemed
to have resulted in the loss of their rightto file a motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners’ argument lacks merit.

Like an appeal, the right to file a motion for reconsideration is a statutory grant or
privilege. As a statutory right, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is to be exercised
in accordance with and in the manner provided by law. Thus, a party filing a motion for
reconsideration must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of
Court.50

It bears stressing that the provision on which petitioners base their claim states that "[a]
petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision maybe filed within fifteen (15)
days from promulgation or notice of the final order or judgment." 51 In Social Security
Commission v. Court of Appeals,52 we enunciated that the term "may" denotes a mere
possibility, an opportunity, or an option. Those granted this opportunity may choose to
exercise it or not. If they do, they must comply with the conditions attached thereto.53

Aside from the condition that a motion for reconsideration must be filed within 15 days
from the promulgation or notice of the judgment, the movant must also comply with the
conditions laid down in the Rules of Court, which applies to all cases and proceedings
filed with the Sandiganbayan.54

Petitioners insist that the right to file a motion for reconsideration under Section 7 of
P.D. 1606 is a guarantee, and no amount of Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court
can operate to diminish or modify this substantive right. Aptly citing Fabian v.
Desierto,55 the Sandiganbayan was correct in rejecting the argument of petitioners in
this wise:

Fabian v. Desiertolays down the test for determining whether a rule prescribed by the
Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges
or modifies any substantive right, to wit:

"…whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing
rights and duties recognized by substantive lawand for justly determining remedy and
redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is
not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified
as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right
then the rule deals merely with procedure.

Applying the Fabian v. Desiertotest, it appears indubitable that Section 6, Rule 120 of
the Rules of Court (ROC) clearly applies to the Sandiganbayan.

Section 6, Rule 120, ROC as well as Section 4, Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the
Sandiganbayan (which makes applicable Section 6, Rule 120, ROC when the accused
is absent during promulgation of judgment) merely regulates the right to file a motion for
reconsideration under P.D. 1606. These are mere rules of procedure which the
Supreme Court is competent to adopt pursuant to its rule-making power under Article
VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. And, contrary to the view espoused by the
accused, said rules do not take away, repeal or alter the right to file a motion for
reconsideration as said right still exists. The Supreme Court merely laid down the rules
on promulgation of a judgment of conviction done in absentia in cases when the
accused fails to surrender and explain his absence within 15 days from promulgation.
The Supreme Court can very well do this as the right to file a motion for reconsideration
under P.D. 1606 is not preclusive in character. Indeed, there is nothing in P.D. 1606
which prevents the Supreme Court from regulating the procedure for promulgation of
decisions in criminal cases done in absentia.56

Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the
convicted accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the
accused to appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of
the judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies
against the judgment.

It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or
modifies the substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of
the Supreme Court to "provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases."57 This provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy
disposition of criminal cases – delay arising from the simple expediency of
nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled promulgation of the judgment of
conviction.

In this case, petitioners have just shown their lack of faith in the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan by not appearing before it for the promulgation of the judgment on their
cases. Surely they cannot later on expect to be allowed to invoke the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction to grant them relief from its judgment of conviction.

It is incumbent upon the accused to

show justifiable cause for their
absence at the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction.

According to petitioners, even if wewere to apply Section 6, Rule 120, the conditions
under which an accused loses the remedies available in the Rules of Court do not
obtain in this case. It is argued that for the provision to apply, it must be shown that 1)
the accused was notified of the scheduled date of promulgation, and that 2) the accused
failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction without justifiable
cause.

Petitioners insist that the Sandiganbayan did not bother to determine whether their
absence at the promulgation of judgment was without justifiable cause. In other words,
as petitioners would have it, it was incumbent upon the Sandiganbayan to take pains to
find out whether their absence at the promulgation was without justifiable cause, and
only then could the court conclude that petitioners have lost the remedies available in
the Rules of Court against the judgment of conviction.

It is well to note that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court also provides the
remedy by which the accused who were absent during the promulgation may reverse
the forfeiture of the remedies available to them against the judgment of conviction. In
order to regain their standing in court, the accused must do as follows: 1) surrender and
2) file a motion for leave of court to avail of the remedies, stating the reasons for their
absence, within 15 days from the date of the promulgation of judgment. 58

In Villena v. People,59 we stated that the term "surrender" contemplates the act by the
convicted accused of physically and voluntarily submitting themselves to the jurisdiction
of the court to suffer the consequences of the judgment against them. Upon surrender,
the accused must request permission of the court to avail of the remedies by making
clear the reasons for their failure to attend the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction.
Clearly, the convicted accused are the ones who should show that their reason for
being absent at the promulgation of judgment was justifiable. If the court finds that the
reasons proffered justify their nonappearance during the promulgation of judgment, it
shall allow them to avail of the remedies.60 Thus, unless they surrender and prove their
justifiable reason to the satisfaction of the court, their absence is presumed to be
unjustified.

On the scheduled date of promulgation on 17 April 2007, the Sandiganbayan noted that
only Atty. Francisco Chavez, counsel for petitioners, appeared. 61 Jaylo was not served
notice of the promulgation, because he was no longer residing athis given address.
Valenzona and Habalo were duly notified. Castro had died on 22 December 2006. 62

Petitioners did not surrender within 15 days from the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction.1âwphi1 Neither did they ask for leave of court to avail themselves of the
remedies, and state the reasons for their absence. Even if we were to assume that the
failure of Jaylo to appear at the promulgation was due to failure to receive notice
thereof, it is not a justifiable reason. He should have filed a notice of change ofaddress
before the Sandiganbayan.

The Sandiganbayan was correct in not taking cognizance of the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration filed by counsel for petitioners. While the motion was filed on 30 April
2007, it did not operate to regain the standing of petitioners in court. For one, it is not
anact of surrender that is contemplated by Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, nowhere in the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was it indicated that
petitioners were asking for leave to avail of the remedies against the judgment of
conviction, or that there were valid reasons for their absence at the promulgation.

For the failure of petitioners to regain their standing in court and avail themselves of the
remedies against the judgment of conviction, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan
attained finality 15 days reckoned from 17 April 2007.

In view thereof, this Court no longer has the power to conduct a review of the findings
and conclusions in the Decision of the Sandiganbayan. The Decision is no longer
subject to change, revision, amendment, or reversal.63 Thus, there is no need to pass
upon the issues raised by petitioners assailing it.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated 29

November 2007 and 26 May 2008 in Criminal Case Nos. 17984-86 are AFFIRMED. The
Sandiganbayan Decision dated 17 April 2007, having attained finality, stands.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

July 29, 2015

G.R. No. 212929

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ENRIQUE GALVEZ, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

On appeal is the Decision1 dated January 14, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03210 convicting accused-appellant Enrique Galvez of four counts of
qualified rape.

Informations2 for four counts of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, and four counts of sexual
abuse under Section 5 (b), Article III, R.A. No. 7610 were filed against the accused-
appellant. Except for the dates of the commission of the crimes, all the Informations for
the rape charges were worded similarly as in the Information for Criminal Case No. 228-
953:

That on or about the 14th day of May. 1995 at Sitio [X:XX], Brgy. [YYY], in the
municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, being the uncle of minor [AAA 4], by means of
force, intimidation and threats, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of said [AAA], a girl of 13 years old, against her will and
consent, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The Court restates the facts as summarized by the CA.5 At the time of the incidents
complained of, private complainant AAA, the niece of accused-appellant Galvez, was
thirteen (13) years old.

On several occasions during the summer vacation of 1995, complainant AAA stayed at
the house of her father’s brother, accused-appellant Galvez, at Sitio [XXX], Barangay
[YYY], Subic, Zambales, to keep company accused-appellant’s wife.

On several days, such as on May 14, 15, 16 and 18, 1995, when accused-appellant’s
wife was not in the house, accused-appellant Galvez removed AAA’s clothes and
underwear, went on top of AAA, forced himself on AAA, and had sexual intercourse with
her. Private complainant could not do anything.

Afterwards, AAA was able to leave accused-appellant’s house and go to her house.
There, AAA told her father what had happened to her.1âwphi1 AAA’s father brought her
to the Subic Police Station, where she gave a Sworn Statement [about the alleged
incidents of rape]. Afterwards, AAA’s father brought her to the San Marcelino District
Hospital, where AAA was examined by Dra. Echaluse.

The Medico-legal Certificate issued by Dra. Echaluse revealed the following:

"DIAGNOSIS/ FINDINGS:

- Old Hymenal tears on the 3:00, 6:00, 9:00 o’clock position.

- (-) Negative smear for spermatozoa.

- Cervix- Pink, firm with whitish discharge.

- No hematoma, echymosis, abrasion.

- No menarche." (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of accused-appellant
Galvez, in order to establish the following:

Upon his brother’s request, accused-appellant Galvez allowed his thirteen (13) year old
niece, private complainant AAA, to stay in his house. According to accused-appellant,
no unusual incidents occurred from May 14 to 16 and May 18, 1995 while AAA was at
his house. Accused-appellant Galvez denied AAA’s accusation that he had sexual
intercourse with her. According to accused-appellant, it was his brother, the father of
AAA, who molested AAA. Accused-appellant Galvez added that, on May 18, 1995, he
went to his brother’s house. There, accused- appellant Galvez saw AAA’s mother, who
was mute, standing at the door of her house. Private complainant AAA’s mother, using
her two (2) index fingers, demonstrated the acts of embracing and kissing. Accused-
appellant Galvez then confronted his brother about the gestures made by AAA’s
mother. However, accused-appellant’s brother ran away. Accused-appellant Galvez ran
after his brother and told him, "Baboy[,] pati anak mo inaasawa mo".

Afterwards, when accused-appellant Galvez was unable to catch his brother, accused-
appellant went back and told the incident to accused-appellant’s mother-in-law.1âwphi1

Accused-appellant Galvez only came to know of the charges of Rape and violation of
Sec. 5 (b), Art. III, R.A. 7610 against him when he was arrested by the barangay
officials.

Subsequently, four (4) sets of Information for the crime of Rape under the Revised
Penal Code, and another four (4) sets of Information for violation of Sec. 5 (b), Art. III,
R.A. No. 7610, otherwise known as "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act" were filed against accused-appellant Galvez.

Accused-appellant pleaded "NOT GUILTY" to all charges.

On May 2, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 74, Olongapo City, rendered
its Decision6 and convicted accused-appellant of four counts of sexual abuse under
R.A. No. 7610 and four counts of rape under the Revised Penal Code:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, accused is hereby found GUILTY for four
(4) counts of sexual abuse under RA 7610 and sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua for each act; and four (4) counts of
rape under the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each act.

SO DECIDED.7

The RTC, relying on the testimony of AAA and the Medico-legal certificate issued by Dr.
Joan Marie C. Echaluse, found accused-appellant guilty of the crimes charged.8 The
RTC gave weight to AAA’s testimony which it found to be straightforward, honest, and
consistent on all material points. The RTC added that based on AAA’s testimony alone
the prosecution succeeded in proving all the elements of the crimes.9

The CA affirmed with modifications the Decision of the RTC. The CA convicted
accused-appellant of the crimes of rape only on the ground that the accused may not be
subjected to criminal liability twice, for both sexual abuse under Section 5 (b), Article III,
R.A. No. 7610 and rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, for the same
act.10 The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED, with the

following MODIFICATIONS:

a.) Accused-appellant is CONVICTED of four (4) counts of Qualified Rape under

the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case Nos. 228-95, 229-95, 230-95, and 231-
95;

b.) Accused-appellant is to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, for each

count of Qualified Rape;

c.) Accused-appellant is to pay private complainant AAA the amount of Php

75,000.00 as Moral Damages, for each count of Qualified Rape;

d.) Accused-appellant is to pay private complainant AAA the amount of Php

30,000.00 as Exemplary Damages, for each count of Qualified Rape; and,

e.) Accused-appellant is to pay private complainant AAA the amount of Php

75,000.00 as Civil Indemnity, for each count of Qualified Rape.

SO ORDERED.11

The CA noted that the testimony of AAA was corroborated by the findings of Dr.
Echaluse, who conducted the physical examination of AAA. 12 The CA added that
accused-appellant was positively identified by AAA as the one who had sexually forced
himself on her on four occasions.13 The CA rejected the argument of accused-appellant
that the testimony of AAA was unbelievable and rehearsed. The CA noted the RTC’s
observation that the testimony of AAA was straightforward, honest, and consistent on all
material points.14 The CA also stated that it saw no ill-motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses and that the uncorroborated and weak defense of denial
asserted by accused-appellant was negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of
weight in law.15

Hence, this appeal.

The issues for our consideration are:

1. Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of four counts of qualified rape.

2. Whether or not the award of civil indemnity and damages to AAA is proper.

This Court affirms the conviction of accused-appellant with modifications.

The accused is not guilty of qualified

rape but is guilty of simple rape.

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of rape and enumerates its
elements, to wit:

ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. – Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

 xxxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:

1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

x x x x16

We now examine whether the elements of simple or qualified rape were proved beyond
reasonable doubt in this case.

Carnal knowledge

Carnal knowledge is proven by proof of the entry or introduction of the male organ into
the female organ; the touching or entry of the penis into the labia majora or the labia
minora of the pudendum of the victim’s genitalia constitutes consummated rape.17

In this case, the RTC and the CA both found that the element of carnal knowledge was
sufficiently established by AAA’s narration that accused-appellant had sexual
intercourse with her, to wit:

[TSN, December 13, 1995]

xxxx

FISCAL:

Q And you stayed [at the accused’s house] on May 14, 1995 and while you were there
do you know of any unusual incident that happened between you and [the accused]?

A Yes, sir.

Q Would you please tell this Honorable Court [w]hat was that unusual incident that
happened between you and [the accused] on May 14, 1995 while you stayed with him?

A He removed my clothes and then my under wear then he went on top of me.

xxxx

A He had sexual intercourse with me, sir.18

xxxx

Q The following day on May 15, 1995[,] were you in the house of Idring or the accused
Enrique Galvez?

A Yes, sir.

Q Was there any unusual incident that happened between you [and the accused] on
May 15, 1995?

A Yes, sir.

Q Could you tell us what was that unusual incident that happened between you and the
accused on May 15, 1995[?]

A He did the same thing to me sir, he again undressed me, I was naked.

COURT:
Q And after you were undressed?

A He again went on top of me ma’am.

Q And?

A None, your Honor. He again had a sexual intercourse with me.

xxxx

FISCAL:

Q How about on May 16, 1995 were you still in the house of [the accused]?

A Yes, sir.

Q And do you recall of any unusual incident that took place between you [and the
accused] on the same date?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was that unusual incident that happened between you and [the accused on May
16, 1995]?

A The same thing, sir.19

[TSN, April 27, 1998]

FISCAL:

Q While in the house of the accused on May 18, 1995, do you recall of any unusual
incident that happened to you?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was that unusual incident that happened to you inside the house of the accused
on May 18, 1995 at around 12:00 noon?

A [The accused] undressed me and thereafter he had sexual intercourse with me.

xxxx

Q And after he removed your clothes, what did the accused do if any?

A He went on top of me.

Q And when he was already on top of you, what did the accused do?

A He had sexual relation with me.20

This Court agrees with the lower courts that carnal knowledge was proved. We disagree
with accused-appellant that the prosecution failed to prove rape because the testimony
of AAA was not detailed.21 In People v. Salvador,22 we held that the credible testimony
of the victim narrating that she was defiled, such as the testimony of AAA in this case, is
sufficient for a conviction of rape, to wit:

x x x [W]hen a victim of rape says that she was defiled, she says in effect all that
is necessary to show that rape has been inflicted on her, and so long as her
testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the
basis thereof. This is a basic rule, founded on reason and experience and becomes
even more apparent when the victim is a minor. In fact, more compelling is the
application of this doctrine when the culprit is her close relative. 23 (Citations omitted;
emphasis supplied)

In People v. Gecomo,24 we also held that what is merely required in establishing rape
through testimonial evidence is that the victim be categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank25 in her statements about the incident of rape. In this case, we
agree with the RTC that the testimony of AAA was straightforward, honest, and
consistent on all material points26 and it is sufficient to establish carnal knowledge as an
element of rape.

Further, while AAA may not have described the incidents of rape in detail during the
trial, she identified27 her sworn statement28 containing a detailed account of the
incidents of rape and admitted placing her thumb mark on said statement. 29 The
testimony of AAA, while not as detailed, is consistent with what is stated in the sworn
statement and accurately reflects points such as the approximate time when the rape
incidents on May 14,30 1631 and 18,32 1995 occurred and the fact that the incidents
occurred while accused-appellant’s wife was away.33

Furthermore, we note that AAA’s testimony is corroborated by the findings stated in the
Medico-Legal Certificate34 issued by Dr. Echaluse after her examination of AAA.
In People v. Mercado,35 we ruled that when the testimony of a rape victim is consistent
with the medical findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that there has been carnal
knowledge.

Based on the foregoing, this Court agrees with the lower courts that the element of
carnal knowledge has been sufficiently established.

Moral ascendancy in substitution of

violence and intimidation

With respect to the element of violence or intimidation, it is settled in jurisprudence that

said element may be substituted by moral ascendancy.36 The Court reiterated this rule
in numerous cases where the offender and the victim were the uncle and niece
respectively.37

In this case, the CA recognized the existence of moral ascendancy because accused-
appellant is AAA’s uncle and AAA lived with him and his wife during the time the acts of
rape occurred.38 We agree with the CA that accused-appellant had moral ascendancy
over AAA who was a young girl living in accused-appellant’s house where the only
adults to provide for and discipline AAA were the accused and his wife. 39 In People v.
Gonzales,40 the Court also found moral ascendancy because the victim lived in a house
with an uncle who raped her while her parents were not living in the same house.

Qualifying circumstance of the

victim being below 18 years of age
coupled with the fact that the
offender is a relative within the
third degree of said victim

With respect to the element that makes the offense qualified rape, that is, the minority of
the victim coupled with the fact that the accused is related to her within the third civil
degree,41 it bears stressing that both minority and the third degree relationship must be
established.

As to the age of the victim as a component of the qualifying circumstance, the case
of People v. Flores42 laid down the following guidelines on how to prove the age of the
offended party:

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
 2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as
baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim
would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost
or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victim’s mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who
is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or
date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules
on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to

be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to

be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to

be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the

testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the
complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended
party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding
age shall not be taken against him.

In this case, no birth certificate was offered in evidence to prove AAA’s age. 43 Neither
was there any other authentic document offered to prove AAA’s age. It must also be
pointed out that there is doubt as to AAA’s real age based on the records of this case
as, for instance, she testified to being 12 years old, on December 13, 1995 (6 months
after the incident of rape).44 The Medico-Legal Certificate dated May 24, 1995 stated
that AAA was 14 years old.45 Ms. Angustia R. Clavecilla46 also testified that AAA was 12
years old at the time the felony was committed.47 AAA herself said that she does not
know when she was born.48 Contrary to this, the Informations alleged that she was 13
years old at the time the felony was committed.

In People v. Ortega,49 we explained how to resolve this doubt in the victim’s age:

x x x Given the doubt as to AAA’s exact age, the RTC properly convicted Ortega only of
simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua.

In People v. Alvarado,50 we did not apply the death penalty because the victim’s age
was not satisfactorily established, thus:

"We agree, however, that accused-appellant should not have been meted the death
penalty on the ground that the age of complainant was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt. The information alleged that, on July 26, 1997, the date of the rape, Arlene was
14 years old. In her testimony, Arlene stated that she was 14 years old at the time of the
incident. Accused-appellant confirmed this during the presentation of the defense
evidence, but Lonelisa Alvarado, complainant’s mother, testified that Arlene was born
on November 23, 1983, which would mean she was only 13 years old on the date of the
commission of the crime. No other evidence was ever presented, such as her certificate
of live birth or any other document, to prove Arlene’s exact age at the time of the
crime. As minority is a qualifying circumstance, it must be proved with equal
certainty and clearness as the crime itself. There must be independent evidence
proving the age of the victim, other than the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses and the absence of denial by accused-appellant. Since there is doubt
as to Arlene’s exact age, accused-appellant must be held guilty of simple rape
only and sentenced to reclusion perpetua."
 xxxx

We further stressed in People v. Villarama51 that:

"Court decisions on the rape of minors invariably state that, in order to justify the
imposition of the death penalty, there must be independent evidence showing the age of
the victim. Testimonies on the victim’s age given by the prosecution witnesses or the
lack of denial of the accused or even his admission thereof on the witness stand [are]
not sufficient. This Court has held that, to justify the imposition of the death penalty for
rape committed against a child below 7, the minority of the victim must be proved with
equal certainty and clarity as the crime itself. The failure to sufficiently establish the
victim’s age with factual certainty and beyond reasonable doubt is fatal and
consequently bars conviction for rape in its qualified form." (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

It must likewise be remembered that the minority of the victim must concur with the
second component which is the third degree relationship between the victim and the
offender. As to such second component of the qualifying circumstance, People v. Libo-
on52 teaches:

It is well-settled that this attendant circumstance, as well as the other

circumstances introduced by Republic Act Nos. 7659 and 8493 are in the nature of
qualifying circumstances. These attendant circumstances are not ordinary aggravating
circumstances which merely increase the period of the penalty. Rather, these are
special qualifying circumstances which must be specifically pleaded or alleged with
certainty in the information; otherwise, the death penalty cannot be imposed.

In this regard, we have previously held that if the offender is merely a relation – not a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, or guardian or common-law spouse of the mother of the
victim – it must be alleged in the information that he is "a relative by consanguinity or
affinity (as the case may be) within the third civil degree." Thus, in the instant case, the
allegation that accused-appellant is the uncle of private complainant is not
specific enough to satisfy the special qualifying circumstance of relationship. The
relationship by consanguinity or affinity between appellant and complainant was not
alleged in the information in this case. Even if it were so alleged, it was still necessary
to specifically allege that such relationship was within the third civil
degree. (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Since the Informations contained only a statement that the accused-appellant was the
uncle of AAA without stating that they were relatives within the third civil degree, the
qualifying circumstance of relationship cannot likewise be appreciated in the case at
bar.

In sum, since the prosecution was able to prove the elements of carnal knowledge and
the moral ascendancy of accused-appellant over AAA but failed to clearly prove the age
of AAA and allege the third degree relationship between accused-appellant and AAA,
accused-appellant should be convicted of the crimes of simple rape only.

Because the crime committed was

simple rape, the award of civil
indemnity and damages should be
reduced.

The CA awarded civil indemnity and moral damages of P75,000 and exemplary
damages of P30,000. The award of the CA is premised on the fact that the accused was
convicted of qualified rape. Since the crime committed is simple rape, the amounts
awarded must be modified.

In a simple rape case, the victim is entitled to P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as
moral damages and P30,000 as exemplary damages for each count of rape. 53 Interest
at the rate of 6% per annum on all damages awarded in this case is likewise proper.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal and AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the
Decision dated January 14, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
03210. Accused-appellant Enrique Galvez is hereby convicted of four counts of simple
rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of simple
rape. He is ordered to pay AAA civil indemnity of P50,000 and moral damages of
P50,000 and exemplary damages of P30,000 for each count of simple rape. Interest of
six percent ( 6%) per annum on all damages awarded in this case reckoned from the
finality of this Decision until fully paid shall likewise be paid by accused-appellant.

With costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plain ti ff-Appellee, - versus - RODOLFO OMILIG y MANCIA,

ANACLETO C. MATAS, JR., RAMIL PENAFLOR, and OSCAR ONDO, Accused. RAMIL PENAFLORy
LAPUT, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 206296 Present: SERENO, C.J., Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BERSAMIN, PEREZ, and PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. Promulgated: AUG 1 2 2015 ~ .. x-----------
----------------------------------------------~---------------x DECISION PEREZ, J.: For review is the
conviction of accused-appellant Ramil Penaflor y Laput (accused-appellant Penaflor) for the
crime of murder, punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), 1 Branch 5 of Lanao del Norte, City of Iligan, in Criminal Case No. 4971, entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo Omilig y Mancia, Anacleto C. Matas, Jr., Ramil Penaflor and
Oscar Ondo," which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00109-MIN.
On 7 September 1993, an Information3 was filed against accused Rodolfo Omilig y Mancia
(Omilig) for the killing of Eduardo Betonio Penned by Presiding Judge Moslemen T.
Macarambon; CA rollo, pp. 43-77. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren,....with
Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja, Michael P. Elbinias and Elihu A. Ybanez concurring, and
Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion dissenting; ro/lo, pp. 4-24. CA rollo, pp. I 3-14. rt
Decision G.R. No. 206296 2 (Betonio). On 16 November 1993, the Information4 was amended,
impleading accused Anacleto C. Matas, Jr. (Matas) and accused-appellant Peñaflor. Finally, the
Information5 was again amended, which impleaded accused Oscar Ondo (Ondo). The Second
Amended Information That on or about August 21, 1993, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping each other, armed with a deadly weapon, to wit: a firearm and a
hunting knife, with intent to kill and evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, shoot, stab and wound one
Eduardo Betonio the following physical injurie[s], to wit: Cardiorespiratory Arrest Hypovolemic
Shock due to (1) Stab wound (L) side chest 6ICS penetrating (2) GSW (R) chest superficial exit (1)
chest (3) GSW (B) middle forearm & slug posteriorly extracted and as a result thereof[,] the said
Eduardo Betonio died.6 During arraignment, all the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Trial
ensued. The prosecution presented 10 witnesses, namely: (i) Danilo Estur (Estur), State Auditor
IV of the Commission on Audit, who testified that he was the one who investigated the matter
of the unaccounted 9,000 bags of rice in the bodega of the National Food Authority (NFA),
under the account of accused Matas;7 (ii) Senior Police Officer (SPO)4 Antonio T. Lubang (SPO4
Lubang), Chief of the Homicide Section of the Iligan City Police Department, who testified that
he was the one who investigated the killing of Betonio and who invited accused-appellant
Peñaflor to the police station for investigation; (iii) Johnson Laspiñas, who testified that the
knife used to kill Betonio was the same knife Omilig used to cut the food which was served to
them during the fiesta; (iv) Dr. Livey Villarin (Dr. Villarin), who conducted the post-mortem
examination on the cadaver of Betonio, and testified on the injuries sustained by Betonio and
the cause of his death; (v) Vicenta Betonio (Vicenta), widow of Betonio, who testified that while
inside their house on the evening of 21 August 1993, she heard gunshots quickly followed by 4
Id. at 15-16. 5 Id. at 17-18. 6 Records, p. 108. (Underscoring supplied.) 7 Exhibits “A,” “B,” “D,”
“D-1,” “G,” “K,” and “L”; id. at 398-401 and 413- 414. Decision G.R. No. 206296 3 Betonio’s
voice shouting, “If you want to kill me, don’t include my wife,”8 then after a few minutes, she
went out of the house and saw Betonio slumped on the ground, and while still conscious,
Betonio whispered to her the names of Delfin and Matas; (vi) Atty. Neferteri Salise-Cristobal
(Atty. Cristobal), who testified that she was chosen by accused-appellant Peñaflor to assist him
during his confession before Assistant City Prosecutor Roberto Z. Albulario (Assistant City
Prosecutor Albulario) on 12 November 1993; (vii) Basilio Fajardo (Fajardo), driver of Betonio,
who testified that at about 8:30 p.m. on 21 August 1993, as soon as Betonio disembarked from
the Ford Fiera at the gate of Betonio’s residence, he heard Betonio say, “Aguy! Aguy!,” which
was followed by gunshots, that immediately after the incident, he saw two persons running
away from the scene; (viii) Atty. Floro Cavales (Atty. Cavales), who testified that he assisted
accused-appellant Peñaflor during the latter’s second confession conducted before City
Prosecutor Ulysses Lagcao (City Prosecutor Lagcao); (ix) Rosita L. Abapo, Stenographic Reporter
IV of the City Prosecutor’s Office, who testified that when accused-appellant Peñaflor’s
extrajudicial confessions were taken, the latter was assisted by qualified counsel; and (x) City
Prosecutor Lagcao, who testified on the conduct of the preliminary investigation. On the other
hand, the defense presented eight witnesses (accused Omilig presented five [5] witnesses,
while accused-appellant Peñaflor presented three [3] witnesses), namely: (i) Omilig, who
testified that he was not the owner of the knife used in the killing of Betonio and that at the
time of the incident, he was at a benefit dance in Tambis, Lala, Lanao del Norte. Omilig also
testified that he was forced to sign a sworn statement,9 admitting the ownership of the knife,
under threat, duress, and intimidation; (ii) Orlando Dumaan (Dumaan), who corroborated
Omilig’s testimony that the latter did not own the knife used to kill Betonio; (iii) Ruperto
Ramos, who corroborated Dumaan’s and Omilig’s testimonies that Omilig did not own the knife
used to kill Betonio; (iv) Teofila Romero-Omilig, who corroborated Omilig’s testimony that on
the night of the incident, he attended a benefit dance in Tambis, Lala, Lanao del Norte in
Omilig’s capacity as a peace keeper; (v) Teresita Iboras, who testified that she invited Omilig to
be a peace keeper during a benefit dance on 21 August 1993; (vi) Dioscora Praquilles
(Praquilles), who testified that on 12 November 1993, SPO4 Lubang and SPO3 Anastacio
Badelles (SPO3 Badelles) arrived at her residence and looked for a certain Ruben Baguio. Upon
seeing accusedappellant Peñaflor, SPO4 Lubang and SPO3 Badelles immediately brought
accused-appellant Peñaflor to the police station without any warrant of arrest. On 13
November 1993, Praquilles went to the office of Atty. Gerardo Padilla with Rosello Peñaflor,
accused-appellant Peñaflor’s father, to engage 8 Id. at 780. 9 Exhibit “G”; id. at 405-407.
Decision G.R. No. 206296 4 his services as counsel for accused-appellant Peñaflor’s case; (v)
Rosita Tabugo, an employee of the NFA, identified the report, mission order, and report of the
investigation on Fajardo, and log book of the security guards of the NFA regarding the burning
incident that damaged the Toyota Cruiser driven by Fajardo;10 (vi) Atty. Gerardo B. Padilla, who
testified that accused-appellant Peñaflor’s two confessions were in violation of his
constitutional right to choose a counsel of his own; (vii) Paridu Lu Midsalipag, and (viii) Omar
Mohamad, both employees of the NFA, who identified the mission order and other documents
regarding the burning incident that damaged the Toyota Cruiser driven by Fajardo. The defense
also presented two rebuttal witnesses, namely: (1) SPO4 Lubang, who testified that contrary to
Praquilles’ testimony that he went to the Praquilles residence to look for a certain Ruben
Baguio and not for accused-appellant Peñaflor, SPO4 Lubang attested that he went to the
Praquilles residence to invite accused-appellant Peñaflor to the police station for inquiry; and
(2) Fajardo, who testified that he had no criminal record and had worked with the NFA for a
number of years. The Facts Estur, a COA Auditor, discovered in July 1993 rice stocks
unaccounted for in the bodega of the NFA. The stocks were under the account of Matas. Upon
the recommendation of Estur, COA State Auditor IV, Betonio, who was the Provincial Manager
of NFA, Lanao del Norte, suspended accused Matas. On 21 August 1993, at about 8:00 p.m.,
Betonio, upon disembarking from the Ford Fiera driven by Fajardo, was stabbed and shot in
front of his rented apartment at Bertumen Compound, Palao, Iligan City. Upon hearing her
husband shout, “If you want to kill me, don’t include my wife,” quickly followed by two
gunshots, Vicenta hid inside their apartment. After a few minutes, she went out of the house
and saw Betonio, barely alive, slumped on the ground with a knife, with a handle like that of an
eagle and a carving like that of a dragon, still pierced through his chest. Before Betonio was
brought to the Dr. Uy Hospital, where he was later pronounced dead on arrival, he whispered
to his wife the names, Delfin and Matas. Based on the necropsy conducted by Dr. Villarin,
Betonio died of cardio-respiratory arrest hypovolemic shock due to a gunshot and deep stab
wounds. 10 Exhibits “8” and “9”; id. at 529-539. Decision G.R. No. 206296 5 During the
investigation, SPO4 Lubang initially identified the following as suspects: Edgar Matas, Anacleto
Matas, Jr., and Oscar Ondo. However, in the course of the investigation, after publishing a
sketch of the knife which was found embedded in Betonio’s chest, they were informed that a
certain Ramil Peñaflor was the actual killer. On 12 November 1993, SPO4 Lubang and SPO3
Badelles went to the house of one Dioscora Praquilles. There they found accused-appellant
Peñaflor, whom they invited to the Iligan City Police Station for interrogation. During the
investigation, accused-appellant Peñaflor admitted killing Betonio and that he was hired by
accused Ondo, the brother-in-law of Matas, for the amount of P15,000.00, to kill Betonio. At
3:00 p.m. of that same day, the police brought accused-appellant Peñaflor to the Office of the
City Prosecutor to obtain his admission,11 which was conducted by Assistant City Prosecutor
Albulario, with the assistance of Atty. Cristobal, as counsel de officio. The following day, 13
November 1993, Praquilles went to the Padilla Law Office to engage the latter’s services as
counsel for accused-appellant Peñaflor. Pursuant to the agreement, the Padilla Law Office,
through Atty. Gerardo Padilla, entered its appearance as counsel for accused-appellant Peñaflor
in a letter, which was received by the Office of the City Prosecutor on 15 November 1993.12
However, on the same day that the Padilla Law Office entered its appearance as counsel for
accused-appellant Peñaflor, or three days after accused-appellant Peñaflor’s first extrajudicial
confession/admission, accused-appellant Peñaflor discharged the Padilla Law Office as counsel
and entered a second extrajudicial confession.13 This time, however, the second extrajudicial
confession was conducted by City Prosecutor Lagcao, with the assistance of Atty. Cavales, as
counsel de officio. Ruling of the RTC After trial, the RTC acquitted accused Matas, Omilig, and
Ondo, while it convicted accused-appellant Peñaflor for the crime of murder for killing Betonio.
The RTC admitted accused-appellant Peñaflor’s extrajudicial confessions because they were not
taken under duress or intimidation as the extrajudicial confessions were conducted at the
Prosecutor’s Office and not in a police station, and in the presence of his relatives. The
dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads: 11 Exhibit “P”; id. at 426-429. 12 Exhibit “1”; id. at
518. 13 Exhibits “N” and “2”; id. at 415 and 519, respectively. Decision G.R. No. 206296 6
Wherefore, accused Anacleto Matas, Jr., Rodolfo Omilig and Oscar Ondo are hereby acquitted
for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, their
bonds are ordered cancelled. Upon the other hand, the Court finds Ramil Peñaflor guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
based on his extra-judicial confessions. Hence, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua. He is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of
P50,000.00 as moral damages; P20,000.00 exemplary damages and P30,000.00 attorney’s
fees.14 On appeal, the defense claimed that the two extrajudicial confessions accused-
appellant Peñaflor executed were inadmissible in evidence for having been obtained in
violation of his right to a competent and independent counsel. According to the defense, Attys.
Cristobal and Cavales, the lawyers who assisted him, were not of his own choice. Accused-
appellant Peñaflor claimed that Atty. Cristobal had not been engaged in criminal litigation and
her assistance was merely ceremonial and perfunctory. Finally, accused-appellant Peñaflor
claimed that Atty. Cavales did not even confer with him about the case. Ruling of the Court of
Appeals The Court of Appeals affirmed accused-appellant Peñaflor’s conviction. The Court of
Appeals ruled that accused-appellant Peñaflor’s two extrajudicial confessions were admissible
in evidence as he was not under custodial investigation when the said extrajudicial confessions
were executed; they were conducted before an Assistant City Prosecutor and a City Prosecutor.
As discussed by the Court of Appeals, “[c]ustodial investigation involves any questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases
to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, who
is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that lend[s] itself to
eliciting incriminating statements, that the 14 CA rollo, pp. 76-77. Decision G.R. No. 206296 7
rule[s] [as laid down in Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution and Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 7438] begin to operate.”15 The provision of Article III, Section 12(1) of the Constitution
reads: Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel. Pertinently, Section 2 of R.A. No. 7438 reads: Section 2. Rights of
Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public Officers. – (a) Any
person arrested detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by
counsel. (b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place, who
arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the
latter, in a language known to and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be
allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation.
If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a
competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer. xxxx As used in this Act,
"custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is
investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without
prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law. (Emphases and
underscoring ours.) In detail, accused-appellant Peñaflor’s first extrajudicial confession (Exhibits
“H” to “H-3”)16 was taken before Assistant City Prosecutor Albulario, during which accused-
appellant Peñaflor was assisted by Atty. Cristobal. On the other hand, his second extrajudicial
confession (Exhibits “O” to “O-9” and “P” to “P-3”)17 was taken before City Prosecutor Lagcao,
15 Rollo, p. 18. 16 Records, pp. 408-411. 17 Id. at 416-429. Decision G.R. No. 206296 8 with
Atty. Cavales assisting accused-appellant Peñaflor, and while in the presence of accused-
appellant Peñaflor’s father, mother, and other relatives. During the conduct of the second
extrajudicial confession, all policemen were sent outside by the City Prosecutor. The Court of
Appeals rejected the defense’s claim of inadmissibility of accused-appellant Peñaflor’s
extrajudicial confessions, which is anchored on the sole ground that they were not made with
the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice.
According to the Court of Appeals, the right to competent and independent counsel applies
only to a person under custodial investigation. In the case at bar, as accused-appellant Peñaflor
was not under custodial investigation, but under a preliminary investigation before a public
prosecutor, during which his right to a competent and independent counsel does not apply. The
Court of Appeals further resolved that assuming arguendo that accused-appellant Peñaflor was
under custodial investigation, there was still no violation of the said right because accused-
appellant Peñaflor’s unsubstantiated allegation that the assistance rendered by Atty. Cristobal
was ceremonial and perfunctory cannot overcome the presumption that Atty. Cristobal was
competent and properly discharged her duties. With regard to accused-appellant Peñaflor’s
second extrajudicial confession, the Court of Appeals held that while Atty. Cavales’ admitted
that his participation in the execution of accused-appellant Peñaflor’s confession was merely in
conformity with the legal requirement and that he could not remember if he had a prior
conversation with accused-appellant Peñaflor, these circumstances did not prove incompetency
on the part of Atty. Cavales. Finally, the Court of Appeals resolved that “[g]ranting that
[accusedappellant Peñaflor] was under custodial investigation, there is still no violation of his
rights when he executed his first confession. Hence, the exclusionary rule does not apply to the
first confession.”18 Our Ruling The appeal is not meritorious. 18 Rollo, p. 23. Decision G.R. No.
206296 9 Corpus Delicti Corpus delicti is the body, foundation or substance of a crime.19 It
refers to the fact of the commission of the crime, not to the physical body of the deceased.
Because corpus delicti may be proven by circumstantial evidence, it is not necessary for the
prosecution to present direct evidence to prove the corpus delicti. 20 Nevertheless, the
prosecution must present the following elements: (a) that a certain result or fact has been
established, i.e., that a man has died; and (b) that some person is criminally responsible for
it.21 In murder cases, such as in the case at bar, the corpus delicti, the fact of murder of
Betonio, was established through physical evidence, corroborated by several witnesses’
testimonies. The prosecution presented the Death Certificate22 of Betonio and the Post-
Mortem Examination Report23 on the cadaver of Betonio, conducted by Dr. Villarin, who
identified that the knife presented to him during his examination as witness, was the same
knife he removed from Betonio’s cadaver during the post-mortem examination — the same
knife24 which turned out to be owned by accused-appellant Peñaflor. These pieces of evidence
were further corroborated by testimonial evidence from Vicenta25 and Fajardo,26 who all
attested to the fact of murder of Betonio, committed by accused-appellant Peñaflor.
Extrajudicial Confession As correctly found by the lower courts, accused-appellant Peñaflor
executed his extrajudicial confession not during custodial investigation, but during the
preliminary investigation. In Ladiana v. People, the Court defined the difference between
custodial investigation and preliminary investigation: Custodial Interrogation/Investigation “is
the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way”;27 on the other
hand, Preliminary Investigation “is an inquiry or a proceeding to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that
the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.”28 In Ladiana, this Court
has unequivocally 19 People v. Tuniaco, et al., 624 Phil. 345, 351 (2010). 20 Rimorin, Sr. v.
People, 450 Phil. 465, 474-475 (2003). 21 Id. 22 Exhibit “I”; records, p. 19 23 Sketch of Betonio’s
Cadaver, Exhibit “I-2”; id. at 412. 24 Exhibit “E” (in the RTC for safekeeping) and Exhibit “F”; id.
at 402. 25 TSN, Vicenta Betonio, December 20, 1994. 26 TSN, Basilio Fajardo, December 21,
1994 and October 18, 1995. 27 441 Phil. 733, 749 (2002). 28 Id. Decision G.R. No. 206296 10
declared that a person undergoing preliminary investigation cannot be considered as being
under custodial investigation. The import of the distinction between custodial interrogation and
preliminary investigation relates to the inherently coercive nature of a custodial interrogation
which is conducted by the police authorities.29 Due to the interrogatory procedures employed
by police authorities, which are conducive to physical and psychological coercion, the law
affords arrested persons constitutional rights to guarantee the voluntariness of their
confessions and admissions, and to act as deterrent from coercion by police authorities.30
These safeguards are found in Article III, Section 12(1) of the Constitution and Section 2 of R.A.
No. 7438. Sans proper safeguards, custodial investigation is a fertile means to obtain
confessions and admissions in duress. Resultingly, as pronounced in Ladiana, the claim by the
accused of inadmissibility of his extrajudicial confession is unavailing because his confessions
were obtained during a preliminary investigation. And even if accused-appellant Peñaflor’s
extrajudicial confessions were obtained under custodial investigation, these are admissible. To
be admissible, a confession must comply with the following requirements: it “must be (a)
voluntary; b) made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel; c) express;
and d) in writing.”31 In the case at bar, the prosecution did not present proof of the absence of
any of these requirements. Assistance of competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice The defense claimed that accused-appellant Peñaflor’s two extrajudicial
confessions were inadmissible because he was assisted by an incompetent and not an
independent counsel. We do not agree. To be a competent and independent counsel in a
custodial investigation, “[the] lawyer so engaged should be present at all stages of the
interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and
stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he may
either continue, choose to remain silent or 29 People v. Bravo, 376 Phil. 931 (1999). 30 Id. 31
People v. Tuniaco, et al., supra note 19, at 352. Decision G.R. No. 206296 11 terminate the
interview.”32 It has been made clear that counsel should be present and able to advise and
assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question until the signing of the
extrajudicial confession.33 “Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made
voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully understands the nature and the
consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary
rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel
and to be presumed innocent.”34 In the case at bar, there was no evidence, not even an
allegation, that the counsel who assisted accused-appellant Peñaflor when his extrajudicial
confessions were obtained were absent at any stage of the duration of the proceedings. Based
on his admission, Atty. Cavales was the last person to arrive for the conduct of preliminary
investigation. However, the preliminary investigation commenced only after he arrived. Only
then were questions propounded to accused-appellant Peñaflor.35 With regard to the
submission that accused-appellant Peñaflor’s appointed counsel is not of accused-appellant
Peñaflor’s own choice as warranted by Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, our discussion
in People v. Tomaquin36 on the meaning of “preferably” is relevant: Ideally, the lawyer called
to be present during such investigations should be as far as reasonably possible, the choice of
the individual undergoing questioning, but the word "preferably" does not convey the message
that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other
equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. What is imperative is
that the counsel should be competent and independent. 37 (Emphasis and underscoring ours,
citation omitted.) As borne by the records, the appointments of Atty. Cavales and Atty.
Cristobal as counsel de officio were with the conformity of accusedappellant Peñaflor. They
succeeded Atty. Padilla upon his discharge as counsel for accused-appellant Peñaflor. The
prosecutors allowed accusedappellant Peñaflor to engage the services of the new counsel.38 32
People v. Tomaquin, 478 Phil. 885, 901 (2004), citing People v. Velarde, 384 SCRA 646 (2002).
33 People v. Bagnate, G.R. No. 133685-86, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 633. 34 People v.
Tomaquin, supra note 32, at 901. 35 TSN, Atty. Floro Cavales, March 6, 1995, p. 67; TSN, Roseta
Abapo, March 13, 1995, p. 22. 36 Supra note 32. 37 Id. at 905. 38 People v. Pamon, G.R. No.
102005, January 25, 1993, 217 SCRA 501, 515-516, cited in the decision of the trial court, states
– An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against
his co-accused. Decision G.R. No. 206296 12 Presumption of regularity There was also neither
evidence nor allegation that accused-appellant Peñaflor was coerced to confess and that the
nature and consequence of his extrajudicial confessions in relation to his constitutional rights
were not thoroughly discussed to him. As correctly observed by the RTC, the preliminary
investigations were conducted in a neutral place;39 it was conducted at the Prosecutor’s office
and in the presence of accused-appellant Peñaflor’s relatives, which facts were never refuted
by the defense. What needs to be noted here is that “a confession is admissible until the
accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or
promise of reward or leniency.”40 The prosecution in this case failed to adduce evidence to
prove the presence of any circumstance that would negate the admissibility of his confession.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty prevails over mere allegations. The
presumption of regularity operates when the prosecution proffers that government officials
tasked with responsibilities regarding the enforcement of our laws and procedures submit that
the crime has been duly proven,41 which, however, may be refuted by the defense. It is upon
the defense to disprove such presumption by adducing no less than clear and convincing
evidence, showing that the performance of functions was tainted with irregularity and that the
official had motive to falsify,42 such that, any taint of irregularity renders the presumption
unavailable. In the case at bar, the defense failed to refute such presumption. In the end,
“[w]hat is sought to be protected by the Constitution is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts. The right is guaranteed merely 39 Records, p. 800. 40 RTC Decision citing
People v. Dasig, G.R. No. 100231, April 28, 1993, 221 SCRA 549, 556. 41 Bustillo v. People, G.R.
No. 160718, May 12, 2010, 620 SCRA 483. 42 Ibid. Decision 13 G.R. No. 206296 to preclude the
slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false not to provide him with
the best defense. " 43 WHEREFORE, finding no error in the Decision of the Court of Appeals
convicting the accused-appellant, Ramil Penaflor y Laput, of having violated Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code for the murder of EDUARDO BETONIO, the judgment under appeal is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as to the amount of award of damages.
Accusedappellant Penaflor is ordered to pay the heirs of Betonio the amount of Seventy-Five
Thousand Pesos (P.75,000.00) as civil indemnity, SeventyFive Thousand Pesos (P.75,000.00) as
moral damages, Thirty Thousand Pesos (P.30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and Twenty-Five
Thousand Pesos (P.25,000.00) as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages. Interest at the
rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum is likewise imposed on all the damages awarded in this case
from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. SO ORDERED. WE CONCUR: MARIA
LOURDES P. A. SERENO Chief Justice Chairperson TERESITA ~~k~ J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice 43 ESTELA M~ERNABE Associate Justice RTC Decision, citing People v. Layuso,
G.R. No. 69210, July 5, 1989, 175 SCRA 47; records, p. 799. Decision 14 G.R. No. 206296
CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

February 3, 2016

G.R. No. 213910

VINSON* D. YOUNG a.k.a. BENZON ONG and BENNY YOUNG a.k.a. BENNY
ONG, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, as represented by the OFFICE OF THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1are the Decision2 dated September 10,
,2013 and the Resolution3 dated July 31, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP. No. 07147, which reversed mid set aside the Order4 dated July 24, 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 22 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. CBU-96106,
finding probable cause to indict petition.ers Vinson D. Young a.k.a. Benzon Ong
(Vinson) and Benny Young a.k.a. Benny Ong (Benny; collectively, petitioners) for
violation of Sections 4 (a) and (e)5 in relation to Sections 6 (a) and (c)6 of Republic Act
No. (RA) 9208,7 otherwise known as the "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003."

The Facts

On separate dates,8 members of the Regional Anti-Human Trafficking Task Force

(RAHTTF) of the Philippine National PO1ice (PNP), namely, PO2 Lyman N. Arsua (PO2
Arsua) and PO2 NaPO1eon A. Talingting, Jr. (PO2 Talingting, Jr.), among others,
conducted surveillance operations at Jaguar KTV Bar (Jaguar) in Cebu City, and
observed that its customers paid P6,000.00 in exchange for sexual intercourse with
guest relations officers (GROs), or Pl0,000.00 as "bar fine" if they were taken out of the
establishment. In the course of their surveillance, they learned that: (a) petitioners were
the owners of Jaguar; (b) a certain "Tico" acted as overall manager; and (c) a certain
"Ann" welcomed customers and offered them GROs.9

On April 9, 2011, in the course of an entrapment operation, PO2 Arsua, PO2 Talingting,
Jr., and PO1 JefNemenzo (PO1 Nemenzo), acting as poseur customers, handed
P15,000.00 worth of marked money to the "mamasang"/manager of Jaguar in exchange
for sexual service. At the pre-arranged signal, the rest of the RAHTTF members raided
Jaguar resulting to multiple arrests, seizure of sexual paraphernalia, recovery of the
marked money from one Jocelyn Balili (Balili),10 and the rescue of 146 women and
minor children.11 Later, six 6) of these women - who all worked at Jaguar as GROs,
namely, AAA, BBB, CCC, DDD, EEE, and FFF12 (AAA Group)- executed
affidavits13 identifying petitioners, Tico, and Ann as Jaguar's owners. Accordingly, a
criminal complaint for violation of Sections 4 (a) and (e) in relation to Sections 6 (a) and
(c) of RA 9208 was filed against them, before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Cebu
City (OCP), docketed as NPS Docket No. VII-09-INV-IID00605.14

In defense, Vinson denied ownership of Jaguar and asserted that he had sold his rights
and interests therein to one Charles Theodore Rivera pursuant to a Deed of
Assignment15 dated December 14, 2009 (December 14, 2009 Deed of Assignent). Not
being the manager nor owner of Jaguar, therefore, he had no control and supervision
over the AAA Group, with whom he denied acquaintance. Similarly, Benny claimed that
he was neither the owner nor manager of Jaguar and was not even present during the
raid. He raised "mistake in identity" as defense, stressing that he was not the same
person identified by the AAA Group in their respective affidavits.16

During the pendency of the preliminary investigation, or on May 31, 2011, the AAA
Group submitted affidavits17 stating that their previous affidavits were vitiated and not of
their own free will and voluntary deed,18 effectively recanting the same.

The OCP Ruling

In a Resolution19 dated October 27, 2011, the OCP found probable cause and ordered
the indictment of petitioners, Tico, and Ann for violation of Sections 4 (a) and (e) in
relation to Sections 6 (a) and (c) of RA 9208.

It found that the receipt and subsequent recovery of the marked money from Balili
constituted prima facie evidence that there was a transaction to engage in sexual
service for a fee.20 It also held that the documentary evidence pertaining to Jaguar's
business operations, as well as the positive identification made by the AAA Group,
sufficiently established petitioners as its owners. Besides, it noted that Vinson's defense
- i.e., that he had divested his interests in Jaguar - was evidentiary in nature and hence,
must be threshed out in a full-blown trial. Moreover, while the AAA Group had since
retracted their initial statements, their retractions were found to hold no probative value.
Finally, while the OCP ruled that the crime of human trafficking was qualified for being
committed by a syndicate, or in large scale - carried 0ut by three (3) or more persons -
it, however, did not appreciate the minority of EEE and FFF as a qualifying
circumstance, not having been substantiated by sufficient and competent evidence. 21

Separately, both parties moved for reconsideration.22 In a Resolution23 dated April 23,
2012, the OCP modified its previous ruling and considered the minority of EEE and FFF
based on the certified true copies of their certificates of live birth 24 as additional
qualifying circumstance. On May 29, 2012, the corresponding information25 was filed
before the RTC, docketed as Crim. Case No. CBU-96106.

On June 18, 2012, petitioners filed an omnibus motion26 for a judicial determination of
probable cause, praying that the issuance of the corresponding warrants of arrest be
held in abeyance pending resolution thereof, and for the case against them to be
dismissed for lack of probable cause.27

The RTC Ruling

In an Order28 dated July 24, 2012, the RTC granted the omnibus motion and dismissed
the case for lack of probable cause.29 It ruled that the affidavits of the RAHTTF
members and the AAA Group failed to show that petitioners had knowledge or
participated in the recruitment of the 146 women and minors who were rescued at
Jaguar as sex workers. It also found that the recantations of the AAA Group were fatal
to the prosecution's case, since it effectively cleared petitioners of any knowledge in
Jaguar's operations. It further reasoned that the December 14, 2009 Deed of
Assignment- the authenticity, due execution, and validity of which were not impugned by
the prosecution - showed that Vinson had already ceded his rights and interests in
Jaguar.30

Dispensing with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, respondent People of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition
for certiorari31before the CA, docketed as CA G.R. SP. No. 07147, imputing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing the case for lack of probable
cause. In their Comment,32 petitioners maintained that the RTC properly dismissed the
case. Procedurally, they also pointed out that the correct remedy on the part of the OSG
was to file an appeal, not a petition for certiorari. Even assuming that a certiorari petition
was the proper mode of review, the OSG's failure to file a prior motion for
reconsideration was a fatal infirmity warranting the petition's outright dismissal. 33

The CA Ruling

In a Decision34 dated September 10, 2013, the CA found that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the case for lack of probable cause. Consequently, it
ordered the reinstatement of the information and remanded the case to the RTC for
further proceedings.35 The CA primarily reasoned out that the court a quo failed to
consider the other evidence proffered by the prosecution to support its finding of
probable cause, and that it delved on evidentiary issues in evaluating the affidavits
submitted by the prosecution which are matters better ventilated during the trial proper
than at the preliminary investigation level.36

The CA, however, did not touch on the issue of the propriety of the certiorari petition
filed by the OSG.

Aggrieved, petitioners moved for reconsideration37 which was, however, denied in a

Resolution38 dated July 31, 2014; hence, the instant petition.

The Issues Before the Court

The essential issues for the Court's resolution are: (a) whether or not the CA erred in
finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing the criminal case
against petitioners for lack of probable cause; and (b) whether or not a motion for
reconsideration is a prerequisite to filing a certiorari petition.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Determination of probable cause is either executive or judicial in nature.

The first pertains to the duty of the public prosecutor during preliminary investigation for
the purpose of filing an information in court. At this juncture, the investigating prosecutor
evaluates if the facts are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.39

On the other hand, judicial determination of probable cause refers to the prerogative of
the judge to ascertain if a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. At
this stage, the judge makes a preliminary examination of the evidence submitted, and
on the strength thereof, and independent from the findings of the public prosecutor,
determines the necessity of placing the accused under immediate custody in order not
to frustrate the ends of justice.40

In People v. Inting,41 the stark distinctions between executive and judicial determination
of probable cause were aptly explained, thus:
Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or
released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same
proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of
probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary
investigation proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be
subjected to the exrense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is the function of the
Prosecutor.42 (Emphasis supplied)

Pertinently, the Court declared in Santos-Dia v. CA43 (Santos-Dio) that while a judge's
determination of probable cause is generally confined to the limited purpose of issuing
arrest warrants, he is nonetheless authorized under Section 5 (a),44 Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish probable cause. Thus:

In this regard, so as not to transgress the public prosecutor's authority, it must be

stressed that the judge's dismissal of a case must be done only in clear-cut cases
when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause - that is
when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which
unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged. On the
contrary, if the evidence on record shows that, more likely than not, the crime
charged has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty of the same,
the judge should not dismiss the case and thereon, order the parties to proceed
to trial. In doubtful cases, however, the appropriate course of action would be to order
the presentation of additional evidence.45 (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, a judge may dismiss the case for lack of probable cause only in clear-cut
cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause - that is
when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which
unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged. 46

Applying the standard set forth in Santos-Dia, the evidence on record herein does not
reveal the unmistakable and clear-cut absence of probable cause against petitioners.
Instead, a punctilious examination thereof shows that the prosecution was able to
establish a prima facie case against petitioners for violation of Sections 4 (a) and (e) in
relation to Sections 6 (a) and (c) of RA 9208. As it appears from the records, petitioners
recruited and hired the AAA Group and, consequently, maintained them under their
employ in Jaguar for the purpose of engaging in prostitution. In view of this, probable
cause exists to issue warrants for their arrest.

Moreover, the Court notes that the defenses raised by petitioners, particularly their
disclaimer that they are no longer the owners of the establishment where the sex
workers were rescued, are evidentiary in nature - matters which are best threshed out in
a full-blown trial. Thus, the proper course of action on the part of the RTC was not to
dismiss the case but to proceed to trial. Unfortunately, and as the CA aptly observed,
the RTC arrogated upon itself the task of dwelling on factual and evidentiary matters
upon which it eventually anchored the dismissal of the case. Consequently, grave
abuse of discretion was correctly imputed by the CA against the RTC for its action.

Anent the question of whether a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to the filing
of a certiorari petition, the Court finds the OSG's argument well-taken.1âwphi1 In this
regard, jurisprudence has carved out specific exceptions allowing direct resort to
a certiorari petition, such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the
court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in
the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or
are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an
urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice
the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action ,is
perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency
for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the
lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex
parte, or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; apd (i) where the issue
raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.47

In this case, the assailed RTC Order was a patent nullity for being rendered with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.48 Significantly, the
present case involves public interest as it imputes violations of RA 9208, or the "Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003," a crime so abhorrent and reprehensible that is
characterized by sexual violence and slavery.49 Accordingly, direct resort to
a certiorari petition sans a motion for reconsideration is clearly sanctioned in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 10, 2013 and
the Resolution dated July 31, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 07147
are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

No Part
Prior OSG action
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA**
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the, above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

February 1, 2016

G.R. No. 191185

GUILBEMER FRANCO, Petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
 DECISION

REYES, J.:

The Constitution presumes a person innocent until proven guilty by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The prosecution cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the defense's evidence for it has the onus probandi in establishing the guilt
of the accused - ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non que negat - he who asserts, not he
who denies, must prove.1

Nature of the Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on CertiorarP. under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court where petitioner Guilberner Franco (Franco) assails the Decision3 dated
September 16, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 31706, affirming
the Decision4 dated February 27, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 15, in Criminal Case No. 05-238613. The RTC convicted Franco of the crime of
Theft under an Information, which reads as follows:

That on or about November 3, 2004, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and without the
knowledge and consent or the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away one (1) Nokia
3660 Model cellular phone worth Php 18,500.00 belonging to BENJAMIN JOSEPH
NAKAMOTO Y ERGUIZA to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the
aforesaid amount of Php 18,500.00, Philippine Currency.

Contrary to law.5

On September 5, 2005, Franco, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.6

The Facts

The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:

On November 3, 2004 at around 11 :00 a.m., Benjamin Joseph Nakamoto (Nakamoto)

went to work out at the Body Shape Gym located at Malong Street, Tondo, Manila. After
he finished working out, he placed his Nokia 3660 cell phone worth 'Pl 8,500.00 on the
altar where gym users usually put their valuables and proceeded to the comfort room to
change his clothes. After ten minutes, he returned to get his cell phone, but it was
already missing. Arnie Rosario (Rosario), who was also working out, informed him that
he saw Franco get a cap and a cell phone from the altar. Nakamoto requested everyone
not to leave the gym, but upon verification from the logbook, he found out that Franco
had left within the time that he was in the shower.7

The gym's caretaker, Virgilio Ramos (Ramos), testified that he saw Franco in the gym
but he was not working out and was just going around the area. Tn fact, it was just
Franco's second time at the gym. Ramos even met him near the door and as Franco did
not log out, he was the one who indicated it in their logbook. When Nakamoto
mmounced that his cell phone was missing and asked that nobody leaves the place, he
put an asterisk opposite the name of Franco in the logbook to indicate that he was the
only one who left the gym after the cell phone was declared lost.

Nakamoto, together with Jeoffrey Masangkay, a police officer who was also working out
at the gym, tried to locate Franco within the gym's vicinity but they failed to find him.
They proceeded to the police station and while there, a report was received from
another police officer that somebody saw Franco along Coral Street, which is near the
gym and that he was holding a cell phone. They went to Coral Street but he was already
gone. A vendor told them that he saw a person who was holding a cell phone, which
was then ringing and that the person was trying to shut it off. When they went to
Franco's house, they were initially not allowed to come in but were eventually let in by
Franco's mother. They talked to Franco who denied having taken the cell phone. 9
Nakamoto then filed a complaint with the barangay but no settlement was arrived
thereat; hence, a criminal complaint for theft was filed against Franco before the City
Prosecutor's Office of Manila, docketed as LS. No. 04K-25849.10

In his defense, Franco denied the charge, alleging that if Nakamoto had indeed lost his
cell phone at around 1 :00 p.m., he and his witnesses could have confronted him as at
that time, he was still at the gym, having left only at around 2:45 p.m.11 He also admitted
to have taken a cap and cell phone from the altar but claimed these to be his. 12

Ruling of the RTC

In its Decision elated February 27, 2008, the RTC convicted Franco of theft, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds [Franco], GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of theft penalized in paragraph 1 of Article 309 in relation to Article
308 of the Revised Penal

Code and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day as minimum to seven (7) years and four (4) months as
maximum and to pay the complainant Php 18,500.00.

SO ORDERED.13

The RTC did not find Franco's defense credible and ruled that his denial cannot be
given evidentiary value over the positive testimony of Rosario.14

Franco then appealed to the CA. 15

Ruling of the CA

In affirming the RTC decision, the CA found the elements of theft to have been duly
established. It relied heavily on the "positive testimony" of Rosario who declared to have
seen Franco take a cap and a cell phone from the altar. The CA likewise gave credence
to the testimony of Ramos who confirmed that it was only Franco who left the gym
immediately before Nakamoto announced that his cell phone was missing. Ramos also
presented the logbook and affirmed having put an asterisk opposite the name "ELMER,"
which was entered by the accused upon logging in. The CA stated that taken together,
the foregoing circumstances are sufficient to support a moral conviction that Franco is
guilty, and at the same time, inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent. 16 The
CA further ruled that the RTC cannot be faulted for giving more weight to the testimony
of Nakamoto17 and Rosario,18 considering that Franco foiled to show that they were
impelled by an ill or improper motive to falsely testify against him. 19

In his petition for review, Franco presented the following issues for resolution, to wit:

I.

WHETHER THE HONORABLE [CA] ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE

TO THE PROSECUTI0N WITNESSES' INCONSISTENT AND IRRECONCILABLE
TESTIMONIES.

II.

WHETHER THE HONORABLE [CA] AFFIRMING [FRANCO'S] CONVICTION FACT

THAT THE SAME WAS FABRICATIONS AND PRESUMPTIONS.1âwphi1

III.

WHETHER THE HONORABLE [CA] ERRED IN ACCEPTING THE VALUE OF THE

ALLEGEDLY STOLEN CELLULAR PHONE WITHOUT SUBSTANTIATING
EVIDENCE.20
Ruling of the Court

Preliminarily, the Court restates the n1le that only errors of law and not of facts are
reviewable by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court. This rule applies with greater force when the factual findings of
the CA are in full agreement with that of the RTC.21

The rule, however, is not ironclad. A departure therefrom may be warranted when it is
established that the RTC ignored, overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted cogent
facts and circumstances, which, if considered, will change the outcome of the case.
Considering that what is at stake here is liberty, the Court has carefully reviewed the
records of the case22 and finds that Franco should be acquitted.

Failure of the prosecution to prove

JCranco's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt

The burden of such proof rests with the prosecution, which must rely on the strength of
its case rather than on the weakness of the case for the defense. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that
would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is
indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.23

In every criminal conviction, the prosecution is required to prove two things beyond
reasonable doubt: first, the fact of the commission of the crime charged, or the presence
of all the elements of the offense; and second, the fact that the accused was the
perpetrator of the crime.24 Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, the essential
elements of the crime of theft are: (1) the taking of personal property; (2) the property
belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done with intent to gain; (4) the taking away
was done without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking away is accomplished
without violence or intimidation against person or force upon things.25

The corpus delicti in theft has two elements, to wit: (I) that the property was lost by the
owner; and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking. 26

In this case, the crucial issue is whether the prosecution has presented proof beyond
reasonable doubt to establish the corpus delicti of the crime. In affirming Franco's
conviction, the CA ruled that the elements were established. Moreover, the RTC and the
CA apparently relied heavily on circumstantial evidence.

To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, Section 4, Rule 133 of the

Rules of Court provides that the following requisites must concur: (l) there must be more
than one circumstance to convict; (2) the facts on which the inference of guilt is based
must be proved; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. With respect to the third requisite, it is essential
that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain, which
leads one to a fair nnd reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion
of others, as the guilty person.27

The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses - Nakamoto, the complainant; Ramos,
the gym's caretaker; and Rosario, nnother gym user.

Their testimonies established the following circumstances: (l) Nakamoto placed his cell
phone on the altar, 28 left and went to change his clothes, and after ten minutes,
returned to get his cell phone but the same was already missing;29 (2) Rosario saw
Franco get a cap and a cell phone from the same place;30 and (3) Ramos saw Franco
leave the gym at 1 : 15 p.m. and the latter failed to log out in the logbook. 31 The RTC
and the CA wove these circumstances in order to arrive at the "positive identification" of

Franco as the perpetrator. 32

A perusal of their testimonies, however, shows that certain facts have been overlooked
by both courts.

For one, it was only Rosario who saw Franco get a cap and a cell phone from the altar.
His lone testimony, however, cannot be considered a positive identification of Franco as
the perpetrator:

In People v. Pondivida,34 the Court held:

Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not perse to that of
being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of
positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as
the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the
crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where,
although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime,
he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a
crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with
the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the
second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence,
which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken
chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the
author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. x x x.35 (Emphasis omitted and
underscoring ours)

Rosario's testimony definitely cannot fall under the first category of positive
identification. While it may support the conclusion that Franco took a cell phone from the
altar, it does not establish with certainty that what Franco feloniously took, assuming
that he did, was Nakamoto's cell phone. Rosario merely testified that Franco took "a cell
phone." He stated:

Q: How did you know that the said cell phone was taken by the accused?

A: [W]e were then in a conversation when I asked him to spot or assist me with the
weights that I intended to carry. We were then situated in an area very near the altar
where his cap and cell phone were placed. After assisting me, he went to the area and
took the cell phone and the cap at the same time.

Q: [W]ho were you talking [sic] at that time?

A: Guilbemer Franco.

Q: 1t was also [G]uilbemer Franco who helped or spot you in the work out?

A: Yes, sir

Q: And after assisting you, what did Franco do?

A: He took the cell phone of Mr. Nakamoto and his cap at the same time and covered
the cell phone by his cap and left the place.

Q: Where was that cell phone of the private complainant placed at that time?

A: At the top of the altar where is [sic] cap is also located.

Q: How far was that altar from where you were working?

A: Only inches.

Q: It was directly in front of you?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you do when the accused took the cap as well as the cell phone of
the private complainant?

A: None, sir. I thought the cap and cell phone was his.

Q: How did you know that the cell phone belongs to the private complainant?

A: After Mr. Nakamoto came out from the shower, he went directly to the altar to
get his cell phone which was not there anymore and asked us where his cell
phone and I told him that I saw Mr. Franco get a cell phone from that
area.36 (Emphasis ours)

On cross-examination, Rosario also stated that he did not actually see Franco take
Nakamoto's cell phone37 but on re-direct, he clarified that he did not see the cell phone
of Nakamoto because he thought that the cell phone was owned by Franco. 38

What was firmly established by Rosario's testimony is that Franco took a cell phone
from the altar. But Franco even admitted such fact.39

What stands out from Rosario's testimony is that he was unable to particularly describe
at first instance what or whose cell phone Franco took from the altar. He only assumed
that it was Nakamoto's at the time the latter announced that his cell phone was missing.
This was, in fact, observed by the RTC in the course of Rosario's testimony, thus:

COURT: What you actually saw was, [G]uilbemer Franco was taking his cap together
with the cell phone placed beside the cap but you do not know that [the] cell phone was
Bj's or Nakamoto 's?

A: [Y]es, Your Honor.

COURT: You just presumed that the cell phone taken by Guilhemer Franco was his?

A: Yes, Ma'am.40 (Emphasis ours)

Moreover, it must be noted that save for Nakamoto's statement that he placed his cell
phone at the altar, no one saw him actually place his cell phone there. This was
confirmed by Rosario -

COURT:

Q: And on that day, you were able to see that Nakamoto on four incidents, when he
logged-in, during work-out and when he went inside the C.[R].?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Therefore, you did not sec Nakamoto place his cell phone at the

Altar·?

A: Yes, sir.41 (Emphasis ours)

Ramos, the gym caretaker, also testified that he did not see Franco take Nakamoto 's
cell phone and only assumed that the cell phone on the altar was Nakamoto's, thus -

Q: And do you know who owns that cell phone put [sic] over the altar?

A: Benjamin Nakamoto.

Q: How do you know that it belongs to Benjamin Nakamoto?

A: He is the only one who brings a cell phone to the gym.

 xxxx

Q: [D]id you actually see him take the cell phone of Nakamoto?

A: l did not see him take the [cell] phone but as soon as the cell phone was lost, he was
the only one who left the gym.42

Neither can the prosecution's testimonial evidence fall under the second category of
positive identification, that is, Franco having been identified as the person or one of the
persons last seen immediately before and right after the commission of the theft.
Records show that there were other people in the gym before and after Nakamoto lost
his cell phone. In fact, Nakamoto himself suspected Rosario of having taken his cell
phone, thus:

ATTY. SANCHEZ:

Q: You said that you s1ayed inside the rest room for more or less 10 minutes?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: After 10 minutes, you don't know whether aside from Franco somebody went out
from the gym because you were inside the c.r.?

A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: As a matter of fact, one of your witness[es] who went near the place where your cell
phone was placed was this Arnie Rosario?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And it was only the accused and [Rosario] who were near the place

where you said you placed the cell phone?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You did not suspect [Rosario] have taken the cell phone'!

A: I also suspected, sir:43 - (Emphasis ours)

Moreover, the prosecution witnesses confirmed that the altar is the usual spot where the
gym users place their valuables. According to Rosario:

ATTY. SANCHEZ:

Q: And in that place, you said there was a Sto. Niño

A: At the Altar

Q: Those who work-out in that gym usually place their things jon

top ofl the altar.

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Therefore, there were people who place their ('.ell phones on top

(of] the Altar?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Aside from Nakamoto, other people place their things on top

[of! the Altar?

A: Yes, sir.44 (Emphasis ours)

The prosecution's evidence does not rule out the following possibilities: one, that what
Franco took was his own cell phone; two, even on the assumption that Franco stole a
cell phone from the altar, that what he foloniously took was Nakamoto's cell phone,
considering the fact that at the time Nakamoto was inside the changing room, other
people may have placed their cell phone on the same spot; and three, that some other
person may have taken Nakamoto's cell phone.

It must be emphasized that "[c]ourts must judge the guilt or innocence of the accused
based on facts and not on mere conjectures, presumptions, or suspicions." 45 It is
iniquitous to base Franco's guilt on the presumptions of the prosecution's witnesses for
the Court has, time and again, declared that if the inculpatory facts and circumstances
are capable of two or more interpretations, one of which being consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other or others consistent with his guilt, then the
evidence in view of the constitutional presumption of innocence has not fulfilled the test
of moral certainty and is thus insufficient to support a conviction.46

Franco also asserts that the logbook from which his time in and time out at the gym was
based was not identified during the trial and was only produced after Ramos testified.47
Ramos testified that when Nakamoto announced that his cell phone was missing and
asked that nobody leaves the place, he put an asterisk opposite the name of Franco in
the logbook to indicate that he was the only one who left the gym after the cell phone
was declared lost.48

Under the Rules on Evidence, documents are either public or private. Private
documents are those that do not fall under any of the enumerations in Section 19, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court.49 Section 20 of the same Rule, in turn, provides that before
any private document is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must
be proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or written, or by evidence
of the genuineness of the signature of handwriting or the maker.50

In this case, the foregoing rule was not followed. The testimony of Ramos shows that
the logbook, indeed, was not identified and authenticated during the course of Ramos'
testimony. At the time when Ramos was testifying, he merely referred to the log in and
log out time and the name of the person at page 104 of the logbook that appears on line
22 of the entries for November 3, 2004. This was photocopied and marked as Exhibit
"C-1."51 Meanwhile, when Nakamoto was presented as rebuttal witness, a page from
the logbook was again marked as Exhibit "D."52 The logbook or the particular page
referred to by Ramos was neither identified nor confirmed by him as the same logbook
which he used to log the ins and outs of the gym users, or that the writing and notations
on said logbook was his. The prosecution contends, meanwhile, that the RTC's
evaluation of the witnesses' credibility may no longer be questioned at this stage.53 The
Court is not unmindful of the rule that the assignment of value and weight to the
testimony of a witness is best left to the discretion of the RTC. But an exception to that
rule shall be applied in this case where certain facts of substance and value, if
considered, may affect the result.54 In Lejano v. People,55 the Court stated:

A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against slipping into hasty conclusion,
often arising from a desire to quickly finish the job or deciding a case. A positive
declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not
automatically cancel out the accused's claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can
make as positive an identification as a truthful witness can. The lying witness can also
say as forthrightly and unequivocally, "He did it!" without blinking an eye. 56

The facts and circumstances proven by the prosecution, taken together, are not
sufficient to justify the unequivocal conclusion that Franco feloniously took Nakamoto's
cell phone. No other convincing evidence was presented by the prosecution that would
link him to the theft.57 The fact Franco took a cell phone from· the altar does not
necessarily point to the conclusion that it was Nakamoto's cell phone that he took. In the
appreciation of circumstantial evidence, the rule is that the circumstances must be
proved, and not themselves presumed. The circumstantial evidence must exclude the
possibility that some other person has committed the offense charged.58

Franco, therefore, cannot be convicted of the crime charged in this case. There is not
enough evidence to do so. As a rule, in order to support a conviction on the basis of
circumstantial evidence, all the circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty. In this case, not all the facts on which the inference of guilt is
based were proved. The matter of what and whose cell phone Franco took from the
altar still remains uncertain.

Franco's defense of denial

The evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own weight and not rely on the
weakness of the defense.59 In this case, Franco did not deny that he was at the Body
Shape Gym on November 3, 2004, at around l :00 p.m. and left the place at around 2:45
p.m.60 He did not even deny that he took a cell phone from the altar together with his
cap. What he denied is that he took Nakamoto's cell phone and instead, claimed that
what he took is his own cell phone.61 Denial may be weak but courts should not at once
look at them with disfavor. There are situations where an accused may really have no
other defenses but denial, which, if established to be the truth, may tilt the scales of
justice in his favor, especially when the prosecution evidence itself. is weak. 62

While it is true that denial partakes of the nature of negative and self-serving evidence
and is seldom given weight in law,63 the Court admits an exception established by
jurisprudence that the defense of denial assumes significance when the prosecution's
evidence is such that it does not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 64 The exception
applies in the case at hand. The prosecution failed to produce sufficient evidence to
overturn the constitutional guarantee that Franco is presumed to be innocent.

Value of the cell phone

It is also argued by Franco that the value of the cell phone must be duly proved with
reasonable degree of certainty. On the other hand, the people contended that there has
been a judicial admission of the same.65 This issue, however, is now moot and
academic considering Franco's acquittal.

Conclusion

The circumstantial evidence proven by the prosecution in this case failed to pass the
test of moral certainty necessary to warrant Franco's conviction.1avvphi1 Accusation is
not synonymous with guilt.66 Not only that,

where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations
or interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the
other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not meet or hurdle the test of
moral certainty required for conviction.67

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Comi of Appeals dated
September 16, 2009 in CA-GR. CR No. 31706 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Guilbemer Franco is ACQUITTED of the crime of Theft charged in Criminal
Case No. 05-238613 because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of Court’s Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13 Article VIII of the Constitution and the Divisions Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice