Special Issue INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES AND

January 2016 CULTURAL STUDIES ISSN 2356-5926

The study of a relationship between information asymmetry and earnings

management in mutual funds (short term and long term)
Mohammad Anvar Barfi
MA Student, Department of Management, Zahedan Branch, Islamic Azad University, Zahedan,
Iran

Mohammad Ghasemi (Co-Author)

Assistant Professor, Department of Management, University of Sistan and Baluchestan,
Zahedan, Iran
M_ghasemi@mgmt.usb.ac.ir

Abstract

The main purpose of this study is to investigate a relationship between information asymmetry and
earnings management in mutual funds (short term and long term). Therefore, earnings management is
determined as a dependent variable while the monitoring effect and information asymmetry are specified
as independent variables. Concentration of ownership and the percentage of non-executive members of
the board of directors are also specified as control variables of the research. In this survey, the method of
collecting information includes library method and documents mining of financial statements of
companies in the site of Tehran Stock Exchanges. The research statistical society consists of mutual funds
(Tehran Stock Exchange) during 2010 -14. Since the number of investment funds are limited, so the
census rule has been used and all the members of the statistical society have been selected as a statistical
sample. The statistical sample size is 80 mutual funds. The research method is a descriptive-correlation
one by a practical approach and the data analyzing method using panel data is including descriptive
analyzing, the normality test, the correlation test and the multiple regression test. The study results
indicated that the average of earnings management variable of sample companies was 0.2024 and its
minimum and maximum values were -0.9936 and 2.9233, respectively. The study of skewness and kurtosis
of the variable, that should be 0 and 3 respectively to encompass a normal distribution, indicated that the
variable was not normally distributed. According to presented descriptive statistics, the average of the
information asymmetry variable and the monitoring effect of sample companies during the period of the
research have been positive and 0.2671, 0.3936, respectively. The numbers of observations in a
descriptive statistics related to companies are 400 cases (80 funds during 5 years). According to
descriptive statistics, the diffusion index of these variables is low in different companies. The highest and
lowest standard deviations are respectively related to the monitoring effect and information asymmetry.
Also, assumption test results showed each of the three hypotheses is approved and there is a positive and
significant relationship between information asymmetry and degree of earnings management in mutual
funds. The monitoring effect on earnings management in long term investment funds is stronger than
short term ones and the monitoring effect on earnings management in long term investment funds is
stronger when information asymmetry is low.

Keywords: monitoring effect, earnings management, mutual funds, information

asymmetry.

http://www.ijhcs.com/index.php/ijhcs/index Page 182

Special Issue INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES AND
January 2016 CULTURAL STUDIES ISSN 2356-5926

Introduction:

Investment funds play an important role in stock markets. In the American stock exchange, for
example, investing institutions are dominant. Investment funds in Iran are rapidly developing
from the first Investment fund that was founded in 2008. Investment funds are a set of stock,
participation papers and other securities that could be actually considered as a corporation in
which individuals put their money together to invest in a basket of securities. One of the most
important benefits of investment funds is that managed by a group of analysts and professions.
Therefore, it is possible they use their professional advantages to monitor earnings management
of listed companies in the stock exchange and to participate in the process of corporate
governance. Today, managers, financial analysts and investors have allocated most of their
attention toward reported information from companies’ financial statements. Since managers’
reward depends on companies’ profit, so they benefit from keeping a growth procedure.
Financial analysts are involved in trading of information interpretation and processing and true
perception about quality of earnings is a basic part of this procedure. Publishing good news
about companies’ earnings would significantly affect stock’s price and it’s impossible that
sensitivity and obsession of the market reduce toward the performance appraisal based on
earnings. Also, market concentration on the net profit has caused inattention to the rest of
performance appraisal indices. It should also be noted that, whether reported net profit is a final
result of a desired extensive accounting process to mangers or not? (Christie & Zimmerman,
2011).
Stock Information is the most valuable asset. Information that is fairly available to public will
lead to market transparency. In financial markets, both sides of a deal usually do not have
sufficient information about the situation of each other (information is defective) to be able to
make accurate decision based on that, this unawareness about information is called asymmetric
information or information asymmetry. In the financial system, lack of information before and
after a deal is also problematic and issue which arise due to information asymmetry before a deal
is an adverse selection that will lead to hazards, as well as , a problem that occurs after a deal due
to information asymmetry is a moral hazard. Asymmetric information increases the investment
risk and causes investors be exposed to an adverse selection and moral hazard. Information
affecting situation of the stock market , which are directly or indirectly related to companies
issues, have an internal origin that if they disclose, the status of the stock market would change
and do not move toward equitable information distribution and could be eventuate in false
decision making of investors (moral investment). Since, in the most of the world stock
exchanges, trading based on this information has been forbidden and some measures have been
conducted to clarify information, which could be underline the equitable distribution of the
capital market information in the community level, especially stock activists and shareholders
(Haton & Stoken, 2009).

The present study tries to investigate a relationship between information asymmetry and earnings
management in mutual funds, in this context, the research question can be stated as follow:
Is there any relationship between information asymmetry and earnings management in mutual
funds?

http://www.ijhcs.com/index.php/ijhcs/index Page 183

Special Issue INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES AND
January 2016 CULTURAL STUDIES ISSN 2356-5926

Research hypotheses:

The first hypothesis (H1): there is a significant and positive relationship between information
asymmetry and degree of earnings management in mutual funds.
The second hypothesis (H2): the monitoring effect on earnings management in long term mutual
funds is stronger than short term ones.
The third hypothesis (H3): when information asymmetry is low, the monitoring effect of mutual
funds is stronger in earnings management.

Research methodology:

The present research was a descriptive - correlation one, and since the used information have
been collected from available documents and previous information so it was an Ex-post facto
research. Due to the spatial territory of the research, the statistical society is including mutual
funds during 2010 - 14. Since the number of investment funds are limited, so the census rule has
been used and all the members of the statistical society have been selected as the statistical
sample. The statistical sample size was 80 mutual funds.

The Normality test on distribution of the research dependent variable

The image of the Normality test results on distribution of the research dependent variable
Variable )Sig( )K-S( )N(
earnings 4/444 0/371 044
management

Given that for the earnings management variable, k-s statistics significance level is less than
0.05, so, the null hypothesis based on the normal distribution of these variables at 95%
confidence level has been refused and indicated that the earnings management variable does not
have a normal distribution. The plot (Q-Q plot), represented non-normal distribution of the
dependent variable.
The Plot displaying non-normal distribution of the companies’ earnings management variable

Normality of the dependent variable is perquisite for regression models. Therefore,

normalization of this variable before hypotheses testing is necessary. For normalization of data
in the present research Johnson Transformation Function has been used and analyzed by Minitab

http://www.ijhcs.com/index.php/ijhcs/index Page 184

Special Issue INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES AND
January 2016 CULTURAL STUDIES ISSN 2356-5926

16 software. (Appendix 2). Obtained results from the k-s test after the process of data
normalization are as the following image.

The image of normality test results of the research dependent variable after normalization
process
Variable )Sig( )K-S( )N(
earnings 4/518 4/123 044
management

According to the image, since after data normalization the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics
significance level for the dependent variable is higher than 0.05 ( 0.835), so the null hypothesis
at the 95% confidence level has been approved and indicated that the dependent variable after
the normalization process has a normal distribution. The plot (Q-Q plot), represented normal
distribution of the dependent variable after normalization by the Johnson Transformation
function.
The plot displaying normal distribution of the earnings management dependent after the
normalization process

The study of correlation between research variables

Figure 3: the Pearson correlation coefficient matrix between research variables

Monitoring Concentration Non- Concentration

Earnings effect of ownership executive of ownership
management members

Earnings
management 3
( P  Value )
Monitoring .
-4/421
effect 3
( P  Value ) )4/401(

http://www.ijhcs.com/index.php/ijhcs/index Page 185

Special Issue INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES AND
January 2016 CULTURAL STUDIES ISSN 2356-5926

Information 4/424
4/438
asymmetry )4/146( 3
( P  Value )
)4/444(
Non- 4/424 -4/081
executive -4/437 )4/145( )4/444( 3
members )4/443(
( P  Value )
Concentration -4/431 -4/485 4/427
4/337
of ownership )4/178( )4/314( )4/064( 3
( P  Value ) )4/444(

Obtained Results from the research hypotheses test

The first hypothesis (H1): there is a significant and positive relationship between information
asymmetry and degree of earnings management in mutual funds.
The second hypothesis (H2): the monitoring effect on earnings management in long term mutual
funds is stronger than short term ones.
The third hypothesis (H3): when information asymmetry is low, the monitoring effect of mutual
funds is stronger in earnings management.

Test results of the research first hypothesis

Table of Chow and Housman test results Model 1

Figure of Results Chow and Hausman test model 1

Test DF Statistic Statistic N P-
value Value
Chaw )08،744( 2/4040 F 044 4/4341
Hausmen 1 32/1014  2 044 4/4373

Figure of Results Chow and Hausman test model 2

Test DF Statistic Statistic N P-
value Value
Chaw )08،744( 2/4064 F 044 4/4401
Hausmen 1 33/1271  2 044 4/4443

Figure of Results Chow and Hausman test model 3

Test DF Statistic Statistic N P-
value Value
Chaw )08،744( 2/082، F 044 4/4250
Hausmen 1 31/5243  2 044 4/4057

http://www.ijhcs.com/index.php/ijhcs/index Page 186

Special Issue INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES AND
January 2016 CULTURAL STUDIES ISSN 2356-5926

According to Chaw test results and its P-Value, the null hypothesis at the %95 confidence level
has been refused and indicated that the data panel method could be used. Also according to
Housemen test results and its P-Value that is lower than 0.05, the null hypothesis at the 95%
confidence level has been refused and the alternative hypothesis H1 has been accepted.
Therefore, it’s necessary to estimate the model using the fixed effects method.

To measure the validity of the model and to study assumptions of the classical regression, in
addition to study the lack of co-linearity between independent variables in the model, some tests
relevant to normality of residuals, variance parallelism, independence of residuals and lack of a
model stipulated error ( linearity model) are also needs to be done. To test the normality of error
sentences various tests could be used. One of them was Jarkio – Bera test which has been used in
this research. The Jarkio- Bera test results suggest that the obtained residuals from the research
estimation at 95% confidence level have a normal distribution, so that the probability relevant to
this test is higher than 0.05.

Another statistical assumption of the classical regression parallelism is the residual variance. If
variances are dissimilar, the linear estimator has not been indirect and will not have the least
variance. In the present study, to study variances parallelism the Pagan cutting test has been
used. According to the significance level of the test that is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis
based on existence of variance parallelism has been refused and we can say that the model
encompasses the problem of variance dissimilarity. In this study, in order to fix the estimation
problem, the generalized least squares estimation method (GLS) has been used. Considering that,
the significance level of the symbolic test is higher than 0.05, so the null hypothesis of this test
based on the model linearity has been confirmed and the model does not have a stipulated error.
Summary results of above tests have been presented.

Table of test results related to statistic assumption of the model 1

Ramsey Durbin-Watson Breusch-Pagan Jarque-Bera
P  Value F D P  Value F P  Value 2
4/1241 4/0770 3/68 4/4362 2/4567 4/3604 1/2761

Table of test results related to statistic assumption of the model 2

Ramsey Durbin-Watson Breusch-Pagan Jarque-Bera
P  Value F D P  Value F P  Value 2
4/1241 4/0770 3/68 4/4362 2/4567 4/3604 1/2761

Table of test results related to statistic assumption of the model 3

Ramsey Durbin-Watson Breusch-Pagan Jarque-Bera

http://www.ijhcs.com/index.php/ijhcs/index Page 187

Special Issue INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES AND
January 2016 CULTURAL STUDIES ISSN 2356-5926

P  Value F D P  Value F P  Value 2

4/1241 4/0770 3/68 4/4362 2/4567 4/3604 1/2761

According to obtained results from Chaw and Housemen tests and also test results of statistical
assumptions of the classical regression, the research model (1) has been estimated as fixed
effects by using panel data method . Results of the model estimation have been presented in the
table. Figure of the estimated model will be using Eviews 7 software.

The table of the first hypothesis test results using fixed effects method
The dependent variable : earnings management
Number of observation : 400 years – investment fund
relationship P- t Coefficient Variable
Value
meaningless 4/960، -9/0269 -4/9980 Constant element

Positive 4/4094 9/4400 9/4404 Information asymmetry

Negative 4/4094 -9/4،،9 -4/4020 Non-executive of the board of

directors
Positive 4/4249 9/2406 4/4980 Concentration of ownership

4/0244 Determining model

9/2،60 F
)4/4000( ) P  Value (

To study the significance of the entire model, considering that the probability value of the f-
statistics is lower than 0.05 (0.0366), with 95% confidence it is approved that the entire model is
significant.

The determination coefficient of the model is also indicating that 32.08% of earnings
management variable is explained by entered variables in the model.
To study the significant coefficients according to presented results in the figure above, since the
probability of the t-statistic for the coefficient of the information asymmetry variable is lower
than 0.05 (0.0310), so it has been approved that there is a significant relationship between
information asymmetry and earnings management at 0.95% confidence level. Therefore, the first
research hypothesis has been accepted and by 95% confidence could be stated there is a
significant relationship between information asymmetry and earnings management.
The positive coefficient for this variable (1.0030) indicates that there is a positive relationship
between information asymmetry and earnings management, so that by increasing 1 unit of
information asymmetry, earnings management would also increase 1.0030 units. Therefore,
according to conducted analysis related to confirmation of the first research hypothesis it can be
concluded that there is a positive and significant relationship between information asymmetry
and earnings management in mutual funds.

http://www.ijhcs.com/index.php/ijhcs/index Page 188

Special Issue INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES AND
January 2016 CULTURAL STUDIES ISSN 2356-5926

Test results of the second research hypothesis

According to presented results to investigate significance of coefficients, considering that the

probability of t-statistics for the variable coefficient of the monitoring effect in both tables is
lower than 0.05 , so it confirmed that there is a significant relationship between the monitoring
effect and earnings management in long and short term investment funds at 95% confidence
level.
A negative coefficient for this variable (- 0.5118 , -0.0114 ), showed a negative relationship
between the monitoring effect and earnings management in short and long term investment funds
.
Table of the second research hypothesis test results using the fixed effects method

The dependent variable : earnings management in short term investment funds

Number of observation : 280 years – short term investment fund
variable relationship P-Value t Coefficient
Constant component meaningless 4/2604 -9/99،0 -4/02،،
Monitoring effect Negative 4/444 -9/،04 -4/4990

Non- executive members of Negative 4/400، -9/،080 -4/0046

the board of directors
Concentration of ownership Positive 4/444 9/4660 4/2،64
4/0006 Determining model
9/6042 F
)4/4499( ) P  Value (

Figure of results Table of the second research hypothesis test results using the fixed effects
method
The dependent variable : earnings management in long term investment funds
Number of observation : 120 years – short term investment fund
variable relationship P-Value t-statistics coefficient
Constant Meaningless 0.2777 -1.4251 -0.1194
component
Monitoring effect negative 0.0093 -1.7726 -0.5118
Non- executive negative 0.0116 -1.8094 -0.3178
members of the
board of directors
Concentration of positive 0.0265 1.6594 0.9265
ownership
Determination 0.2884
coefficient of the
model

http://www.ijhcs.com/index.php/ijhcs/index Page 189

Special Issue INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES AND
January 2016 CULTURAL STUDIES ISSN 2356-5926

F- statistics 1.7289

P  Value 0.0000

Results Test results of the third research hypothesis

The purpose to test the third research hypothesis is to investigate the issue that whether when
information asymmetry is low, the monitoring effect of long term investment funds in earnings
management is stronger or not ?
H0: when information asymmetry is low, the monitoring effect of mutual funds is weaker in
earnings management.
H1: when information asymmetry is low, the monitoring effect of mutual funds is stronger in
earnings management.

This hypothesis using the following models is estimated by panel data and if the  2 coefficient
at 95% confidence level is significant it will approve. By comparing coefficients of the
monitoring effect this hypothesis is concluded.
Investment funds with information asymmetry less than the average were included 36 companies
and 44 companies were also participated with high information asymmetry. Therefore, using the
panel data regression we examined the monitoring effect and earnings management in
investment funds with high and low information asymmetry. By comparing coefficients of
models the third hypothesis could be accepted or refused.
According to presented results in the table to study the significance of coefficients, since the
probability of t-statistics for the variable coefficient of the monitoring effect in the table is less
than 0.05, so it confirmed that there is a significant relationship between the monitoring effect
and earnings management in investment funds with high and low information asymmetry at 95%
confidence level.

A negative coefficient for this variable (- 0.1012, -1.2659), showed a negative relationship
between the monitoring effect and earnings management in investment funds with high and low
information asymmetry.

http://www.ijhcs.com/index.php/ijhcs/index Page 190

Special Issue INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES AND
January 2016 CULTURAL STUDIES ISSN 2356-5926

Table of the third hypothesis test results using fixed effects method

dependent variable: earnings management in investment funds with low information asymmetry
number of the observations : 180 years- investment funds with low information asymmetry
Variable relationship P-Value t-statistics coefficient
Constant component Meaningless 4/2604 -9/99،0 -4/02،،
Monitoring effect negative 4/4092 -9/880 -9/20680
Non-executive members of the negative 4/4402 -9/0480 -4/28،4
boards of directors
Concentration of ownership positive 4/4444 9/2840 4/008،
4/0،08 Determining model
0/8404 F
)4/4444( ) P  Value (

Table of the third hypothesis test results using fixed effects method

dependent variable: earnings management in investment funds with high information asymmetry
number of the observations : 220 years- investment funds with high information asymmetry
Variable relationship P-Value t-statistics coefficient
Constant component Meaningless 4/0420 9/49،0 4/804،
Monitoring effect negative 4/444 -2/494، -4/9492
Non-executive members of the negative 4/4446 -9/8420 -4/04،4
boards of directors
Concentration of ownership positive 4/4499 9/،482 4/0046
4/004، Determining model
2/4040 F
)4/4260( ) P  Value (

Discussion and conclusion:

One of the main outcomes related to data quality, is information asymmetry that refers to
information superiority of one side of a deal over another. The existence of information
asymmetry in the market will bring negative individual and social consequences including a
minimum participation of investor, high transaction costs, watered markets and decrease in
earnings from trading. ( Shabahang, 2010).

On the one hand, compilation of financial statements is one of the most important activities of
managers in order to respond to owners, other entities and the origins of beneficiary, which
among these, income statements which represent the company's profit have a special position. In
fact, the profit is as the final result of economic activities and accounting process that is affected
by various applied procedures from companies’ managers, and due to different reasons they try

http://www.ijhcs.com/index.php/ijhcs/index Page 191

Special Issue INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES AND
January 2016 CULTURAL STUDIES ISSN 2356-5926

to change their financial profit by applying various methods of accounting in order to supply
their policies and aims ( Bahar Moghaddam et al. 2010).
Important findings of this research can be summarized as follows.
There is a positive and significance relationship between information asymmetry and earnings
management of mutual funds during 2010-14. Then it could be argued that whatever information
asymmetry between managers and shareholders is more, the probability of manipulating into
company's earnings increases.

By formation and development of institutions which have public ownership, the necessity of
separation of ownership from management was felt more than before, as a result a new stratum
as stewards undertake to manage institutions , therefore management actually is separated from
ownership.

Managers as representatives of stakeholders are responsible for company’s administration and

their main goal is to maximize stakeholders’ wealth. Since, managers more than stakeholders are
at the head of company’s administration, therefore, they are more aware of capital market
information. This information must be completely provided to stakeholders.
The monitoring effect on earnings management in long term investment funds is stronger than
short term ones. So it could be argued that the monitoring effect of institutional owners in
earnings management in long term investment funds is stronger than short term ones.
Institutional investors play an important role in the company’s strategic system. They can
monitor the company’s earnings management by their sufficient experience and knowledge in
the relevant financial and technical fields. This affair can be a basis to align the interests of
management with interests of shareholders in order to maximize shareholders' wealth. Also, they
are able to resolve the brokerage problems due to their ability of having advantage of economic
efficiency of scale and diversity, so, it seems that institutional investors as a shareholder will
cause to separate ownership and control, while their increasing involvement in companies and
ownership concentration provides a way to monitor company’s earnings management (Salmono
et al, 2003).

When information asymmetry is low, the monitoring effect of investment funds on earnings
management is stronger. When information asymmetry is low this means that information is
fully provided to shareholders and the behaviors of managers is monitored well. Investment in
long term investment funds is more sensitive than short term ones and because of this the
monitoring effect is more on them.
These results are compatible with obtained results from Chen et al, (2012); Pensil et al (2000);
Chang et al (2002) and Etemadi and Chalaki (2009), but they are incompatible with research
results of Mitoun (2012).

When information asymmetry is low, the monitoring effect of investment funds on earnings
management is stronger. When information asymmetry is low this means that information is
fully provided to shareholders and behaviors of managers is monitored well. Investment in long
term investment funds is more sensitive than short term investment funds and because of this the
monitoring effect is more on them.

http://www.ijhcs.com/index.php/ijhcs/index Page 192

Special Issue INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES AND
January 2016 CULTURAL STUDIES ISSN 2356-5926

These results are compatible with obtained results from Chen et al, (2012); Pensil et al (2000);
Chang et al (2002) and Etemadi and Chalaki (2009), but they are incompatible with research
results of Mitoun (2012).

http://www.ijhcs.com/index.php/ijhcs/index Page 193

Special Issue INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES AND
January 2016 CULTURAL STUDIES ISSN 2356-5926

References

Akbari, Majid; “study the accuracy of earnings prediction by managers and its affecting factors ,
Accounting and Auditing Reviews, 2006, 14 (50).

Bahar Moghaddam, Mahdi. Kouhi, Ali. (2010), “study the type of earnings management in
accepted companies in Tehran Stock Exchange” the Journal of Accounting Knowledge, NO.2,
pp 75-93.

Bidelman,S. (2012), "On the association between institutional ownership and aggressive
corporate earnings management in Australia", The British Accounting Review, Vol. 35, pp. 105-
137.

Bushee, R.L. (2008), "Positive Accounting Theory", Prentice Hall, New Jersey.

Dechow, J., Massa, M., & Matso, P. (2012), "Shareholder Investment Horizons and the Market
for Corporate Control", Journal of Financial and Economies, Vol. 76, pp. 135-165.

Dechow,J. (2011), "The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance, Institutional Ownership, and

Audit Quality as Monitoring Devices of Earnings Management", for Taiwan IPO.

Dichu, D., )2012(. Book Values and Stock Returns. The Chicago MBA: A Journal of Selected
Paper.

Ebrahim,Vakili. Eftekharnejad Alireza. (2013) "The relationship between symmetry and

information asymmetry with conservatism", accounting studies ", No. 20, pp. 37- 40.

Foster, H. (2011), "Does Corporate Governance Affect Earnings Quality Preliminary Evidence
from Bangladesh", School of Accounting. Working Paper. SSRN.

Khajavi, Shokrollah. Nazemi, Amin.(2011) , “ study the relationship between earnings quality
and stock returns with emphasis on the role of accruals in Tehran Stock Exchange”, Accounting
and Auditing Reviews, 2006, NO. 40, PP 37-60 .

Lorginsoun ,J., Carter, M., & Gerakos, J. (2013), "Institutional investor preferences for corporate
governance, mechanism", working paper, University of Pennsylvania, The Wharton School ,
Boston College, Carroll School of Management and University of Chicago, Graduate School of
Business.

Mehrani, Sasan. Bebahani Nia, Parisa Sadat. (2011), Accruals and future stock returns with an
emphasis on ownership of institutional shareholders and the firm size ", Journal of Accounting
Research, No. 5, pp. 38-56.

Miller, G.A., & Yoon, S.S. (2012), " Is earnings management opportunistic or beneficial? An
agency theory perspective", International Review of Financial Analysis, Vol. 17, pp. 622–634.

http://www.ijhcs.com/index.php/ijhcs/index Page 194

Special Issue INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES AND
January 2016 CULTURAL STUDIES ISSN 2356-5926

Nouravesh, Iraj. Nazmi, Amin. Heidari, Mahdi. (2010) "study the quality of accruals and profit
with emphasis on the role of accruals estimation error", Journal of Accounting and Auditing
Reviews, No. 43, pp. 135-160.

Ogneva. (2012), "Corporate governance and earnings management in the Chinese listed
companies: A tunneling perspective", Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 13, pp. 881–906.

Rahmani, Ali.Fallah Nejad, Rouhollah (2010), “study the relationship of profitability and returns
with regard to life cycle and company’s size.” The journal of Accounting Researches, NO.9, pp
104-122.

Rostami, Naim; “study the accuracy of earnings prediction by managers and its affecting factors.
Accounting and auditing Reviews, (2013), 14 (50).

http://www.ijhcs.com/index.php/ijhcs/index Page 195