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Dawn for Islam in Eastern Nigeria: A History of the

Arrival of Islam in Igboland

Book · January 2011

DOI: 10.13140/2.1.3509.3287

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 DEDICATION

In memory of my father, Dr. (M.D.) Moses Ukasonwa Ozo (1925–2008),

to all who aspire to write the history of Islam in Eastern Nigeria
and to all who provided information for this book.

5
6
CONTENTS

Acknowledgements .........................................................................................................9
Illustrations .....................................................................................................................10
Preface .............................................................................................................................11

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................15
The Overview ........................................................................................................15
Sketching the Landscape ......................................................................................19
Religious diversification .......................................................................................27
Igbo—Hausa Relations ..........................................................................................28
Pattern of Religious Expansion in Nigeria .......................................................30
Conceptual clarification .......................................................................................30
The Question of Numbers: Are Igbo Muslims worth studying? ..................35

1. EASTERN NIGERIA BEFORE 1920 .........................................................................39

The journey of Islam towards the Southeast ...................................................39
Earliest inter-ethnic contacts ..............................................................................43
On the trail of the Elephant Hunters .................................................................50
The Organization of the hunt .............................................................................58
Forms of interaction with migrants ...................................................................66

2. THE BEGINNINGS OF ISLAM IN IGBOLAND, 1920–1950 .................................73

The Case of Enugu Ezike .....................................................................................82
Islam in Ibagwa .....................................................................................................93
Women as agents of spread .................................................................................95
Expansion of Strangers’ Settlements and Barriers to proselytization .........97

3. THE EXPANSION OF ISLAM AFTER 1950 ............................................................103

Post 1950 Developments ....................................................................................103
Extending Islam to Owerri ................................................................................105
The Enohia (Anohia) awakening of 1958 .......................................................106
The Civil War Years ...........................................................................................113
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation: The Mbaise affair .................................124
Extending Islam to Nsukka Town ...................................................................129
Enohia after the war ...........................................................................................131
Other new grounds .............................................................................................134

7
4. CONTACTS AND CONVERSIONS:
THE PROPAGATION OF ISLAM IN IGBOLAND .....................................................135
Hausa traders and cattle markets .....................................................................136
The Igbo and their guests: Ambivalent relations ..........................................144
Migrants among themselves .............................................................................151
Da‘wa and the Spread of Islam in Igboland ...................................................152
The State and Islamic proselytization .............................................................160
Transnational support for Da‘wa .....................................................................165
Igbo Muslims and Da‘wa ...................................................................................166

5. INTERROGATING CONVERSIONS TO ISLAM IN IGBOLAND .................................169

Motives for conversions to Islam in Igboland ................................................169
Women and conversion .....................................................................................183
Conversion of children to Islam .......................................................................186
Other factors contributing to conversions in Igboland ................................191

6. “IT IS MY FAITH, IT BELONGS TO ME:”

RESPONSES TO CONVERSIONS TO ISLAM ............................................................196
Induction into Islam ............................................................................................196
The benefits of conversion ................................................................................206
Responses to conversions to Islam ...................................................................211
Reactions to conversions from outside Igboland ...........................................222

7. MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN RELATIONS:
THE CHALLENGES OF COEXISTENCE IN A MIXED RELIGIOUS SOCIETY ............225
Juggling for a niche in the community ...........................................................225
“Multiple people, multiple ignorance:”
Shari‘a implementation in Nigeria ..............................................................238
Issues at the core of the shari‘a dispute ..........................................................244
Death of Igbo Muslims in the riots ..................................................................248
Further insurrection and the progress of Islam in Igboland ........................254
Suggestions for lasting peace in Nigeria .........................................................255

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................260

ANNEX ...........................................................................................................................264
INDEX .............................................................................................................................279

8
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Responses to this study were very supportive. Very many people were willing
to share the story of their conversion to Islam and also to provide other relev-
ant information contained in this work. I thank all my interviewees who al-
lowed their recollections to be reflected in these pages. For those who wished to
remain anonymous, I am equally grateful for their testimonies, for the warmth
of their reception and their remarkable patience in answering my queries. I also
thank all my research assistants – Calista, Kelechi, Nnennaya, and Obinna –
and some of my students in the Department of History and International Stud-
ies, University of Nigeria, who contributed to the fieldwork by selectively inter-
viewing contacts in various towns or informing me of such individuals. Our ef-
forts together ensured a reasonably wide coverage of Igboland and Eastern Ni-
geria that this study warranted but more importantly the enthusiasm of my re-
search team was of considerable encouragement to me. Worth mentioning, too,
is the support of my University administration in approving the long research
leave that was devoted to this study.
I acknowledge the huge financial contributions of the following: Prof. C. N.
Uchendu, my husband, who sponsored the preliminary stages of the fieldwork
in 2003, and the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in
Africa (CODESRIA), for its Advanced Research Fellowship Award that fin-
anced the field research from 2005 to 2006. The Alexander von Humboldt Stif-
tung (AvH) sponsored my twenty-eight months stay in Berlin, from June 2006
to September 2008, most of which were spent at Zentrum Moderner Orient
(ZMO) where this work was written, and an additional one year of research in
the Niger Delta region from October 2008 to September 2009. It further made a
generous printing allowance for this project.
To Jane Saidi, Prof. Dr. Ulrike Freitag, Dr. Marloes Janson, Dr. Chanfi
Ahmed, and Dr. Hassan Mwakamiko, my thanks for their warm friendship all
through my Berlin days and their useful remarks on various drafts of this book.
Katharina Zöller was indispensable to this project, producing and reproducing
all the illustrations in addition to other assistance rendered. I also benefitted
from the comments of Ishaq Al-Sulaimani for which I express my thanks. My
children provided necessary and pleasant distractions that were part of the mem-
orable experience of my Berlin days. I acknowledge other contributions by per-
sons too numerous to mention toward the success of this project. I am however
responsible for flaws and errors of judgment wherever they occur in this book.

9
MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

Fig. 1: Southern Nigeria Protectorate and its three provinces, 1916..........................20

Fig. 2: Igboland, east and west of the Niger River, and their neighbors..................22
Fig. 3: Nigeria’s tripartite units with major linguistic groups....................................40
Fig. 4: Hausa trade routes in the “pre-nineteenth” and “nineteenth” centuries......43
Fig. 5: Eastern Nigeria showing the five main ethnic groups....................................45
Fig. 6: Map of Igboland, east and west of River Niger, and their neighbors...........46
Fig. 7: Elephant hunting sites in Eastern Nigeria.........................................................56
Fig. 8: Southern Nigeria showing the provinces in Eastern region by 1925 ...........60
Fig. 9: Strangers’ Settlements in Eastern Nigeria between 1891 and 1920 ..............63
Fig. 10: Old Nsukka Division ............................................................................................74
Fig. 11: Shelton’s illustration of trade routes connecting Nsukka
with her neighbors ................................................................................................76
Fig. 12: Nsukka Local Government Area, 1986...............................................................81
Fig. 13: Strangers’ settlements and their economic engagements................................99
Fig. 14: Migration from Sokoto to Eastern Nigeria, 1954............................................104
Fig. 15: Ebonyi State showing Enohia in Afikpo North Local Government Area .108
Fig. 16: Leaders of the Lokpanta cattle market.............................................................140
Fig. 17: A section of the cattle market............................................................................141
Fig. 18: A young female convert, Sarah Dike................................................................155
Fig. 19: Igbo converts learning to do ablution...............................................................158
Fig. 20: The turbaning of Mr. Orji Uzor Kalu, former governor of Abia State........164
Fig. 21: Nigeria’s population distribution.......................................................................239
Fig. 22: Major riots with religious coloration, 2000–2006, and 2008....................258-59

10
PREFACE

Writing on religious conversions

1
Rambo’s Understanding Religious Conversions more than any other work af-
firmed my determination to see the conversion to Islam of the Igbo of Eastern
(or Southeast) Nigeria from the perspective of the converts. Ambivalence best
describes Igbo reaction to Islam right until the present, reasons of which are
located in historical realities most especially the frictions that surrounded initial
contacts between some Igbo communities and early Muslim migrants from
Northern Nigeria to Igboland, and also in the circumstances leading up to the
Nigeria-Biafra war (the Nigerian civil war) of 1967 to 1970. The war deepened
the post independence divide between the Igbo and Hausa ethnic group. The
situation deteriorated in the face of the emerging reputation of Islam as a reli-
gion aspiring to world domination. It was little wonder that the civil war was
believed by majority of Eastern Nigerians to be an attempt by the Muslim
Hausa ethnic group to enthrone Islam in that region of Nigeria in pursuance of
2
its agenda of global ascendancy. The post-war political and economic margin-
alization of the Igbo in response to their attempted secession from Nigeria from
1967 to 1970 and recourse to arms in defense of their independence did not
3
ameliorate Igbo hostility to Islam but rather had the opposite effect. Other
reasons for which the Igbo ethnic group regarded Islam as an unacceptable
creed during its earliest appearance in the homeland would appear to come
second to the multilevel repercussion of the civil war.
At the early stages of my engagement with this research on the emergence
of Islam in Igboland I went through several intellectual cross-examinations. I
was intrigued by what possibly attracted some Igbo to the religion of a sup-
posedly rival ethnic group long criminalized as enemies of the Igbo ethnic na-
tion. Becoming impassive was the solution to potential ethnic bias. This resolve
1 L. Rambo, Understanding Religious Conversion (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1993); and “Anthropology and the Study of Conversion,” The Anthropology of Reli-
gious Conversion (eds.), Andrew Buckser and Stephen Glazier (New York: Rowman
and Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 211-222.
2 See text of the 1969 Ahiara Declaration of the defunct Republic of Biafra. http://www.-
biafraland.com/Ahiara_declaration_1969.htm
3 Paul Obi-Ani, Post-Civil War Social and Economic Reconstruction of Igboland, 1970-
1983 (Enugu: Milkon Press, 1998); Onwuka Njoku, “A Synoptic Overview,” in Toyin
Falola (ed.), Igbo History and Society: The Essays of Adiele Afigbo (Trenton, NJ: Africa
World Press, 2005), 37.

11
was fostered by the fact that multi-religiousness is an ingredient of globaliza-
tion. Any attempt to rid Eastern Nigeria of Islam, or ban the Igbo from convert-
ing to Islam, on any scale whatsoever, will indeed be difficult to achieve. This
is in spite of the connection made between Islam and violent behavior since
4
early colonial times, both within Nigeria and internationally. Adopting this
outlook allowed me some degree of detachment in discussing my subjects,
which was liberating. But, ultimately, the sense of relief derived from reading
Rambo was wonderful. Some of Rambo’s findings ring true with my discoveries
on conversions of the Igbo to Islam. More importantly, it felt good to read how
affirmative Rambo was of conversions generally irrespective of the religious
community to which the conversion was directed. An important benefit derived
from reading Rambo is realizing my personal status as a convert, too; a situ-
ation many people “born” into specific religions take for granted.
Several Igbo-born Muslims during interviews distinguished themselves
from other Igbo Muslims with the parameter of “being an original Muslim,”
contrasting it with “being a convert.” The latter was used in reference to per-
sons not born by Muslim parents. Some spoke of their religious identity in a
manner clearly suggesting a superior placement vis-à-vis the converted. An ex-
ample is provided by the response of a male interviewee to the question “Are
you Muslim?” The response promptly given was: “Yes. I am a Muslim, born and
5
brought up and not converted.” But natural members, out of a taken-for-gran-
ted familiarity with their religious rituals, might not experience or value the ap-
peal and depth of religious practice in the manner that a convert would. This
book tells the story of Igbo Muslims, born and converted.
The historical background to the appearance of Islam in Eastern Nigeria and
eventually in Igbo territory is provided in chapters 1 through 4. The remaining
chapters concentrate on the multi-level motives for conversion, address the
contestations over conversions, and give attention to developments originating
from the emergence of Islam in the study area. The book is structured to fully
incorporate conversion narratives, processes, and experiences of both men and
women thus giving voice to both genders from which we gain an understand-
ing into what conversion signifies for each group.

4 See various issues of the Foreign Field of the Wesleyan Methodist Church, Volumes 1-
XXVI (MMSL X O 4), Methodist Archive, London.
5 Abdullahi Chukwudi, b. 1966, interview, Oguta, February 2006.

12
The Research process

A rich store of oral records is available for any scholar interested in investigat-
ing religious conversions in Igboland not least the current fascination with Is-
lam. However, Igbo Muslims have not considered documenting their path into
Islam. To what extent this derives from the oral quality of the Igbo society is
unclear. One would naturally expect Sheikh Ibrahim Nwagui who led the
group conversion in Enohia with his apparently more than average education
in Western and Arabic education to have left behind some records on Islam in
Enohia in particular or in those other parts of Igboland— Nsukka Division and
Owerri—that were already touched by Islam before his demise in 1975.
Whatever records Nwagui kept have not been made public. Dauda Ojobe, a
freelance writer, who converted to Islam in 1971 reported not writing on Islam
because he had little knowledge of Arabic; but he also neither wrote in Igbo nor
6
in English. Deficiency in Arabic was presented as the challenge that curbed his
employing his professional skills in documenting a life experience. In a way
this brings to the fore possibilities that religious change embeds a diverse range
of challenges for converts.
The absence of written accounts on the outcome of the contacts between the
Igbo and migrants from Islamized parts of Northern Nigeria, chiefly the Nupe
and the Hausa, was a burden on this study. Therefore, this reconstruction of an
aspect of Igbo as well as Nigerian history depended largely on oral sources
alongside entries in archives made by colonial officials on Northern Nigerian
migrants to Eastern Nigeria, and, the records of traders and early missionaries
to Eastern and North Central Nigeria. Personal observations featured as well.
In addition to the above, Simon Ottenberg’s article on the group conversion of
a section of the village of Enohia in 1958, Doi’s chapter on Nsukka Muslims in
1984, and Anthony’s report on Igbo Muslims in Kano city in 2002 were useful
in piecing together various pieces of the puzzle and facilitating better under-
standing of the story of Islam in Igboland from its earliest indication in the
area. It is expected that other scholars will build on the foundation laid by this
study and expand general knowledge of the phenomenon of Islam both in Igbo-
land and Eastern Nigeria, which remains at present an unexplored territory as
far as the emergence of Islam is concerned.
A qualitative methodology was adopted for this study. Various research
activities were employed. Preliminary interviews began in February 2003. It
was driven by the need for data to expand the contents of the course “Islamic

6 Dauda Ojobe, b. 1928, interview, Amufie, May 2003.

13
Revolutions in West Africa” whose terminal date in the nineteenth century
meant the exclusion of Southern Nigeria from the course content. The aim was
to incorporate Southern Nigeria into the course content and extend the time
frame to the twentieth century. The preliminary investigation drew attention to
the untold story of Islam in Igboland consequently leading to six years engage-
ment with this project. It answers skeptics denying the presence of Islam in Ig-
boland in spite of the evident existence of Igbo Muslims and counters feelings
widely current within Nigeria that being Igbo is tantamount to being non-
Muslim. If that was the case a century ago, recent developments suggest other-
wise.
Field research for the study was carried out in Nigeria, with interviews held
in the northern, western, and eastern parts of the country between February
2003 and May 2006 and again from 2008 until 2010. In between interview sea-
sons, archival investigations were carried out in Nigeria’s three national
archives located at Enugu, Ibadan, and Kaduna; and also in London in 2008.
The study population consisted of Igbo Muslims in Nigeria. Muslims of all
walks of life and non-Muslims of Igbo and other ethnic groups were inter-
viewed for this study. Over 250 persons collaborated in this study. Majority
was directly interviewed in English, Igbo, a combination of both, and in Pidgin
English. These interviews were scheduled at the time most convenient to the
interviewees whose ages ranged from thirteen years to ninety-five years.
Hausa interviewees, with the exception of a few, were also educated. Some had
post secondary school certificates. All interviewees fall within two broad cat-
egories: one half is drawn from different professional groups, and the other half
comprises local elites, cattle moguls, the gainfully self-employed, undergradu-
ates, and much younger students. Nearly all interviews were taped except on
the few occasions that interviewees preferred to have their accounts written in-
stead. During the process of transcription, interviewees became the experts that
were relied on to negotiate around the occasional confusion posed by textual
differences arising from variations of the Igbo dialect. Those consulted con-
firmed that their vernacular renditions were represented as accurately as pos-
sible in the English notation. A comprehensive list of all interviewees appears
in the bibliography but for reasons of confidentiality some personal data may
be withheld.

14
INTRODUCTION

“All history begins with the necessary and inescapable observation of

change around us. Writing the history of anything involves finding out
7
the nature, extent and pace of that change and trying to explain it.”

The Overview

The global expansion of Islam is currently a publicly debated phenomenon.

There is no other time more appropriate than now to engage with this
paradigm with respect to Southeast Nigeria, also popular as Eastern Nigeria, an
area cut off from Islamic influences until recently. This book is the outcome of
a historical investigation into the emergence of Islam in the Igbo territory of
Eastern Nigeria. The Igbo are one of three major ethnic groups in Nigeria. Igbo-
8
land encompasses three-quarters of the entire Eastern region of Nigeria. It is
currently divided into five states. Eastern Nigeria and Igboland in particular
9
have been famous as “the heartland of Christianity in Nigeria.” Igboland is be-
10
lieved by scholars to be one of the homogenous Christian regions in Africa. In
considering the expansion of Islam into this territory, this book attempts to an-
swer two fundamental questions that can be simply stated as “How” and
“Why.” The following pages recounts how Islam was introduced in Igboland
and why it was possible for the religion to find a foothold in an environment
that was visibly anti-Islam right up to, all through, and after, the period of the
Nigeria-Biafra war or the Nigerian civil war of 1967 to 1970. As shown in
chapter 3, the propaganda by the government of the defunct Republic of Biafra
had situated the Nigeria-Biafra conflict that led to the secession of Biafra from
the Nigerian federation within a religious matrix and projected the Biafran
11
struggle—more appropriately the Igbo struggle —as partly a rejection of Islam-

7 John Edwards, “What is African History,” in John Edwards, ed., Writing African His-
tory (Rochester, New York: University of Rochester Press, 2006), 25.
8 C. K. Meek, Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe: A Study in Indirect Rule (London:
Oxford University Press, 1937), 1.
9 I. R. A. Ozigbo, A History of Igboland in the twentieth Century (Enugu: Snaap Press,
1999), 5.
10 Columba Nnorom, “Islam in Igboland: Lessons in History,” paper presented at the Con-
ference on Igbo Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, April 1-2 2003.
11 When Eastern Region (Eastern Nigeria) seceded from the Nigerian federation as Biafra
it comprised all the ethnic groups found therein. There was strong support for the

15
ic-Arab expansionism. Notwithstanding, one peculiarity of the spread of Islam
in Igboland is its largely unplanned nature, which contrasts with the jihads or
reform movements linked to Islamic conquests in parts of Hausaland and Yor-
ubaland, Northern and Western (or Southwestern) Nigeria respectively, and
also in other parts of West Africa until the nineteenth century.
The exact time that the Igbo ethnic community north of Efikland (the
present Cross River state) became aware of Islam as a religious faith is un-
known although Muslim migrants from Northern Nigeria identified as “Mu-
hammadans” by early Christian missionaries or “Mohammedans” by British co-
lonial administrators had been in Eastern Nigeria in the Efik territory since the
turn of the twentieth century. The earliest reference to Hausa presence in East-
ern Nigeria dates to around 1890. Hugh Goldie and Mr. Dean both of the Prim-
itive Methodist Missionary Society in Calabar, an important Efik town, made
this observation:

A military station established at Ediba, a town beyond Ungwana,

where a small detachment of Hausa soldiers under an English officer
was stationed, greatly promoted the pacification of the river.
(Later, he added) The Hausa soldiers brought a new religion, Moham-
medanism, before the eyes of the people, and it was not long before
Mohammedan traders from the Niger swarmed into Duke Town, and
even up the river. The erection of a mosque has given a concrete form
to the new influence.
The strangeness of dress and habits of these newcomers, as well as the
regular attention to their devotions, strangely impressed the natives,
and they soon began to look upon them with a vague fear, which may
12
in time become a great impulse to imitation.

In 1896 Major Galway and Mr. A. B. Harcourt confirmed the presence at Elele
Biafran cause amidst very clear objections. The Nigerian Head of State quickly split
Eastern region into three states in 1967 primarily to break the support of the non-Igbo
groups for the Biafran cause. Although this move barely affected the already consti-
tuted Biafran leadership that drew members from the other groups, it was very obvious
that the non-Igbo preferred their disassociation from Biafra. There was allegations all
through the civil war regarding the support of these other groups for the Nigerian go-
vernment and reprisals from Biafra. By the time the Ahiara Declaration was announc-
ed, it was already clear that in actuality Biafra was an Igbo affair and non-Igbo support
from within the old Eastern region was very weak. Egodi Uchendu, “Recollections of
childhood experiences during the Nigerian Civil War,” Africa 77 (3) 2007, 394-418.
12 Hugh Goldie, Calabar and its Mission (Edinburgh: Oliphant Anderson and Ferrier,
1901), 352 and 354.

16
 13
of a team of elephant hunters from Kano. Oral testimony of this event indic-
ate that the elephant hunters had moved from Calabar to Elele, some kilomet-
14
ers away from where the city of Port Harcourt was later founded.
Calabar stands out in the history of Eastern Nigeria as a major international
entréport, drawing as well traders from the hinterland chiefly from Igboland to
its factories in their quest for trade with European merchants. Although Gol-
die’s remarks lacked the necessary details that would enable a researcher piece
more carefully the impact of these migrants on the indigenous peoples or the
nature of their relationship with their hosts, they were nonetheless useful as
one of the earliest observations from within Eastern Nigeria that confirmed the
presence of Muslim migrants in the region; identifying also the possibility of
the adoption of another foreign religion by the indigenous people.
Excluding Muslim soldiers of the newly constituted colonial army and a
few accompanying Muslim traders, the first recognized and well-known Mus-
lim migrant from Northern Nigeria to Eastern Nigeria was Diko, a Hausa and
an elephant hunter, who settled in 1891 at Elele a few kilometers from Port
Harcourt. Diko attracted few other settlers who by 1935 had nearly all returned
15
to Hausaland. There is proof also of another migrant, Ibrahim Aduku, who
came from Nupe to Enugu Ezike in northern Igboland around 1909. Ibrahim
Aduku came to trade horses and would subsequently become adopted as a full
citizen in one of the thirty-three villages of Enugu Ezike.
It would appear that Islam was right up to this time and for some time after-
wards ignored by the Igbo and the rest of the peoples of Eastern Nigeria in
spite of the occasional commercial dealings when and where necessary be-
tween the indigenous populations of Eastern Nigeria and the Muslim traders or
migrants in their midst. The dearth of data on this interregional interaction in
the accounts of historians and other scholars who chronicled various aspects of
the history of the Igbo and of Eastern Nigeria is suggestive of the indifference
16
to Islam in this region and in Igboland in particular. Almost no mention was

13 Abdulrazaq Kilani, Minaret in the Delta: Islam in Port Harcourt and its Environs
1896-2007 (Lagos: Global Dawah Communications, 2008), 42-43.
14 Alhaji Mairiga Diko, b. 1946, grandson of Diko the first migrant hunter to settle in Ele-
le, interview in Elele, June 2009.
15 “Status of Hausa Chiefs,” File: AHODIST 14/1/436, National Archives Enugu, p.6
16 See, for example, Toyin Falola, ed., Igbo History and Society: The Essays of Adiele
Afigbo (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2005); Ozigbo, A History of Igboland in the
20th Century (Enugu: Snaap Press, 1999), Onwuka Njoku, Ohafia: A Heroic Igbo Society
(Okigwe: Whytem Prints, 2000), and Okwudiba Nnoli, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria (Enu-
gu, Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1978).

17
made concerning the presence of Muslims and the practice of Islam in Igboland
until Simon Ottenberg published in 1971 the article “A Muslim Igbo Village.”
This was followed more than a decade later by Abdurrahman Doi’s chapter “Is-
17
lam in Igboland” that was published in 1984.
The silence on Islam and Muslims in Igboland and in Eastern Nigeria is rep-
licated in literary works that issued from the region prior to and after Nigeria’s
independence in 1960. One is left to ponder on how unimportant Muslims or
their beliefs were to the indigenous peoples of Eastern Nigeria for over half a
century after their presence was identified in the region that no mention was
18
made of the religion and its mediators for many decades. Since literary works
are windows revealing the thinking patterns of a given society at different
points of focus, a logical deduction from this silence, and one corroborated by
colonial records and oral data, would be that Muslim migrants found in Igbo-
land and in other parts of Eastern Nigeria before 1960 made little impact on the
community to warrant some recognition in documented works from this region
and in their oral traditions. In part, this denied them academic consideration
and literary engagement. Indeed it is an oversight of sorts that there was no
earlier attempt to acknowledge Muslim migrants to those parts of Eastern Ni-
geria where they first came to, and to document the economic and social im-
plications of their stay, before the reports of Ottenberg (1971) and Doi (1984).
Such documentation would have yielded diverse materials that would have
formed the basis from which to assess and report on the varied nature of their
influence and of Islam both on Igboland and Eastern Nigeria prior to and after
the civil war. How much easier it would have been to assess the ramifications
of their presence on the five ethnic groups in Eastern Nigeria at this stage.
This book attempts to fill this historical void. It deals with the introduction
of Islam in Igboland using individual accounts of conversions. Its focus is on
persons who converted to Islam, their motivations, the processes and experi-

17 Simon Ottenberg, “A Moslem Igbo Village,” Cahiers D’Etudes Africaines, Vol. XI (42)
1971, 231-259. Abdurrahman Doi, Islam in Nigeria (Zaria, Gaskiya Press, 1984).
18 For instance, the famous literary author from this region and an Igbo, Chinua Achebe,
published his epic novel Things Fall Apart in 1958 in which he devoted considerable
attention to the social upheavals caused by Christianity in conjunction with colonial
rule. Achebe neither mentioned nor hinted in this novel, albeit ever so slightly, the pre-
sence of Muslims or their religion in Igboland yet Things Fall Apart was published the
year Islam witnessed its first major breakthrough in Igboland through the group con-
version to Islam of a section of the village of Enohia in Abakaliki Division. Achebe also
neither mentioned Muslims nor Islam in his second novel Arrow of God (1964) where,
again, he explored the intersections of Igbo custom and European Christianity.

18
ences of conversion, and the outcomes of their actions for themselves, their
communities, and for the country. Persons whose narratives featured in this
study were once Christians or members of the Igbo indigenous religion. The
changing patterns of conversions to Islam in Igboland reflect on Igbo, as well as
Nigeria’s, religious, cultural, and political sensibilities. This piece of social his-
tory strives to put an end to the long silence about a section of Igbo society—
Igbo Muslims—who on account of their religious change and new religious
identity were regarded as marginal members of the Igbo society by the major-
ity. Their existence is frequently denied, sometimes ignored, and occasionally
disdained by the wider society. In documenting this aspect of Igbo, Eastern Ni-
geria, and Nigerian history, this book exposes the problems of integrating a
marginal category within the mainstream of society. For Igboland that main-
stream is roughly composed of Christians and members of the Igbo indigenous
religion; and for the Nigerian society, it is composed of members of existing re-
ligious groups but chiefly Christians and Muslims. Hence we see the challenges
of conversion from one major religion to the other. The account of the emer-
gence of Islam in Igboland is taken simultaneously with the examination of the
social reconfigurations that took place in Igboland and in Nigeria deriving from
this development. In this respect this book chronicles social change in post-
independence Nigeria and builds on the rationale that mass conversions are
responsible sooner or later for social and other changes all of which make
their occurrence relevant to surviving generations and worthy of scholarly
attention. One outcome of this study is the information it provides on the
nature, depth, and success of the advance of Islam in recent times using as a
site for discussion the Igbo society where long-held frictions had existed with
the Muslim Hausa ethnic community whose members consider themselves ori-
ginal worshippers of Allah in West Africa. The book further shows how such
an advance both resembles and contrasts with what occurred in other places
and in different centuries. The scope of the study stretches from the late nine-
teenth century until 2009.

Sketching the Landscape

A wealth of anthropological and historical studies on the Igbo, Efik, Ibibio,

Ekoi, and Ijaw—groups that inhabited Eastern Nigeria since pre-colonial times
—exist from which the study landscape can be sketched. The West Coast of
Africa was unveiled to the world in the late fifteenth century by Portuguese
sailors but it was not until 1784, three centuries later, that that part of the con-

19
tinent in which Calabar is situated was explored along its coastline. Commerce
was soon attracted to the coast and, as this increased, a line of settlements or
19
forts was planted along the seaboard. This part of the West African coastline,
20
which jutted into the Bight of Biafra was famous from the sixteenth to the
early nineteenth century on account of the slave trade; at the end of which, in
1885, an Oil Rivers Protectorate, later Niger Coast Protectorate, was established
incorporating Calabar, areas close to the Atlantic, and the southern fringes of
Igboland.

21
Fig. 1: Southern Nigeria Protectorate and its three provinces, 1916

In 1900 the territory now known as Nigeria was administered as two inde-
pendent British protectorates: Northern, and Southern, Nigeria Protectorates.

19 Goldie, Calabar and its Mission, 9.

20 The defunct Republic of Biafra, encompassing all of Eastern Nigeria, derived its name
from this Bight.
21 All maps and illustrations are courtesy of this author unless otherwise stated. By this
date, colonial rulers were indifferent to ethnic and cultural differences in the delimitati-
on of administrative boundaries. Hence, the Eastern Province included some Igbo com-
munities with the Efik, Ibibio, Ijo, and Ogoja; and the Central Province held the Edo,
Itsekiri, Urhobo, some Idoma, the rest of Igboland, the Ishan, and some Yoruba.

20
Eastern Nigeria, the area of study was part of Southern Nigeria Protectorate
and encompassed the old Oil Rivers Protectorate, its hinterland, and more.
Southern Protectorate had three sections: the Western, Central, and Eastern
Provinces with Eastern Nigeria encompassing all of the Eastern Province and
also part of the Central Province. It was with the amalgamation of the Southern
and the Northern Nigeria Protectorates in 1914 that Eastern Nigeria came into
use as the official designation for the area lying south of the River Benue and
east of the River Niger; stretching southwards into the Bight of Biafra and the
Atlantic Ocean. It became the official name for the area inhabited by the Igbo,
Ibibio, Efik, Ekoi, Ijaw and few other smaller ethnic groups.
The Igbo retains a long held status as the major and dominant group in this
part of Nigeria. In addition to its vast territory, it has extensive groups in the
old Central (or Warri) province, west of the Niger and therefore in Southwest
Nigeria. These Igbo communities were once known as the West Niger Igbo but
presently as Anioma. For simplicity of understanding, the Igbo homeland in Ni-
geria sits astride the River Niger. On the eastern side, as mentioned, is the ori-
ginal homeland from where the forebears of Anioma migrated westwards
22
many centuries ago to occupy territories west of the Niger River. In 1998 the
Igbo homeland east of the Niger would become southeast geopolitical zone
while the remaining four ethnic groups of Eastern Nigeria, along with Delta
State where Anioma is currently located, would become the south-south geo-
political zone. All through this book Eastern Nigeria (or Southeast Nigeria) is
used to refer to the territory given that designation in 1914, which was home to
the Igbo—east of the River Niger, the Ibibio, Efik, Ekoi, and Ijaw. The main fo-
cus of the study, however, is with the Igbo territory of Eastern Nigeria split
23
into the following five states; Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, and Imo states.
Nevertheless, references are made to other ethnic communities of the Eastern
region where and when necessary to facilitate our understanding of the jour-
24
ney of Islam into Eastern Nigeria and eventually into Igboland.

22 Don Ohadike, Anioma: A Social History of the Western Igbo People (Athens: Ohio Uni-
versity Press), 15.
23 The restructuring of Nigeria into six geo-political zones in 1999 was designed to ad-
dress lingering administrative and political irregularities in the country following the
unequal and long disputed colonial regional structure that defined Nigerian politics for
many decades. Under the current geo-political zone structure, Igbo communities of Ri-
vers State and Anioma in Delta State both located in the new South-south geopolitical
zone are excluded from this discussion.
24 Unless where necessary and otherwise stated, Anioma, the west Niger Igbo territory,
lies outside the scope of this book.

21
Fig. 2: Igboland, east and west of the Niger River, and their neighbors

The Igbo homeland in Eastern Nigeria is enclosed within an imaginary line

running outside of the western boundary of the River Niger; Enugu Ezike in
northern Igboland; Abakaliki, Afikpo, and Arochukwu on the eastern end; and
Port Harcourt in the south. Towns located within this periphery are united in
their acceptance of Igbo as their ethnic identity and their use of the Igbo lan-
guage albeit with certain dialectical variations. The one exception is the
Ikwerre of Rivers state who, prior to the outbreak of the Nigerian civil war in
1967, spoke the Igbo dialect common in southern Igboland, identified them-

22
 25
selves as Igbo, and were identified by others as Igbo; but had since the end of
the civil war assumed a new identity as “the Ikwerre.”
Outside Eastern Nigeria to the north of Igboland is found the Igala, Idoma,
and Tiv of North Central Nigeria (previously the Middle Belt) and westwards is
26
the Anioma. Meek describes the Igbo ethnic group as “one of the largest in
Africa, with an exceptionally difficult language.” He went on to report that
with their population of four million in 1929 “they would outnumber all other
Nigerian [ethnic groups], not excluding the Hausa who are generally regarded
as the most numerous and most important [ethnic group] in West Africa, if not
27
in the whole of Africa.” The most characteristic feature of the Igbo is the al-
most complete absence of any higher political or social unit above the com-
mune or small group of contiguous villages, whose customs and cults are
identical, who prior to colonial domination took common action against an ex-
ternal enemy, and whose sense of solidarity is so strong that they regard them-
28
selves as descendants of a common ancestor. The Igbo are not alone in their
lack of higher political units as understood by certain foreign scholars employ-
ing western yardsticks in analyzing African cultural groups. Rather, the lack of
higher political units is a feature of nearly all the ethnic groups in Eastern Ni-
geria.
Harry Johnson who observed similarities in the Igbo and Efik languages
suggested that the Efik are allied in language to the Igbo and similarly allied to
29
them in origin. Nevertheless, the Efik tradition of origin current in the late
nineteenth century claims that they are an extension of the Ibibio—who by
30
1915 consisted of some three-quarters of a million inhabitants —but were ex-
pelled from the former after a military defeat sometime in the late seventeenth

25 “A Report on the History and Organization of the Ikwerri People living in the Elele and
Nkarahia Native Court Areas: Ahoada Division.” File: AHODIST 14/1/217 (1931), Na-
tional Archives, Enugu. The Ikwerre are included in this study for the period of time
that their Igbo identity was their acknowledged identity.
26 Further westwards, beyond Anioma, lies the territory of the ancient Kingdom of Benin.
27 Meek, Law and Authority, v and 1. The exact term used by Meek to describe the
Igbo and other ethnic groups was “tribe.” This has been dropped for the more ap-
propriate term “ethnic group.”
28 Ibid., p. 3.
29 Charles Patridge, Cross River Natives (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1905), 33.
30 D. A. Talbot, Woman’s Mysteries of a primitive People: The Ibibios of Southern Nige-
ria (London: Frank Cass and Co., 1915), 4. Another Efik tradition of origin claims that
Efiks are the descendants of a union between an Igbo man and an Ibibio woman. See
A. E. Afigbo, The Igbo and their Neighbours (Ibadan: University Press, 1987), 34.

23
 31
or early eighteenth century. Locating themselves at their present site close to
the Atlantic, the Efik shut off groups behind them from communication with
European traders to emerge as the dominant local partners of European traders
along the Atlantic coast until the Aro of Igboland and the Akunakuna of Ekoi
32
broke that hold. Centuries’ long interaction of the Efiks and the Europeans
made the former the earliest of the Eastern Nigeria ethnic communities to be
Christianized and the better educated by the turn of the twentieth century.
While the Igbo and Ibibio were mainly agricultural groups, with the Igbo
also famous for trading, the Efik and Ijaw depended primarily on fishing, and
the Ekoi on hunting leaving much of the agricultural work to women. From the
reports of Patridge and Talbot the soil in most parts of Eastern Nigeria was fer-
33
tile up till the turn of the twentieth century. The closeness of the Atlantic
Ocean and its many tributaries allowed extensive fishing. The Igbo interacted
regularly with the Ekoi, Efik, Ibibio, and Ijaw long before the establishment of
colonial domination. Trade provided the chief reason for these interactions in
the process of which intermarriages and political alliances were formed among
them. The major trade trajectory was southwards through Calabar to the At-
lantic Ocean and the trade items were slaves and imported European goods un-
til a new economic era, under the legitimate trade, replaced the obsession with
slaves and diversified the goods put forward for sale by the indigenous popula-
tion. Igbo external dealings revolved within Eastern Nigeria marginalizing eth-
nic groups found northwards beyond the Benue River until colonialism opened
up that corridor early in the twentieth century. Hugh Goldie’s account of the
coastal peoples sheds light on the extent of the interactions of the Southeast
peoples and their neighbors prior to the colonial subjugation of any part of Ni-
geria:

A Mr. Colthurst, in the decade of 1830, attempted to penetrate the

continent from Calabar, but reached no farther than Ikorofiong
(Ekrikok), where taking sick, he returned and died at Duke Town. In a
communication to the Royal Geographical Society, Mr. Colthurst
states that people from Old Calabar traded with the Niger… There is a
traffic of no great extent between the Niger region and Calabar, but it
is conducted overland, and no connection so far as is known, exists

31 Goldie, Calabar and its Mission, 12.

32 Patridge, Cross River Natives, 74.
33 Patridge, Cross River Natives, 103. Talbot, “The Land of the Ekoi, Southern Nigeria,”
The Geographical Journal, 36 (6) 1910, p. 639.

24
 between the two rivers. The late governor, Beecroft, when in charge
of a small steamer, the Ethiopa, went up the Cross river till stopped by
rapids, at about three hundred miles from the mouth, the farthest dis-
tance to which it has yet been navigated, and found it take a sudden
turn to the south, so that a conjecture that it might have a communic-
34
ation with the Benue was disproved.

Afigbo advanced reasons for the relatively narrow range of Igbo external con-
tacts before the colonial era. He asserted that the Igbo were first and foremost
35
an agricultural people bound to their land by strong traditions and taboos. He
added, that the needs of the Igbo as an agricultural people were limited and
easily satisfied from within their locality or those of their immediate neighbors
within Eastern Nigeria. The small fraction of the Igbo predisposed to long-dis-
tance travel were Arochukwu (Aro) traders and the Nkwere and Awka smiths
who were described as “those who had detached themselves partially or com-
pletely from the land in order to supply a more generally felt need or the more
exotic needs of a narrow elite class who had developed appetites that could no
longer be fully or satisfactorily met from the productive resources of their local
36
communities.” In addition, Horton shows that Aro trade with the outside
world was towards the Atlantic to the Ibibio, Ekoi, and Ijaw countries. He
writes:

The Aro, members of a modestly sized village group became more and
more deeply involved in the long-distance commerce stimulated by

34 Goldie, Calabar and its Mission, 11.

35 A. E. Afigbo, “The Age of Innocence: The Igbo and their Neighbours in pre-colonial Ti-
mes.” Ahiajoku Lecture: http://ahiajoku.Igbonet.com/1981/ Afigbo holds that nowhere
in the world are farming communities noted for long-range travel. This view enjoys
the support of early missionaries reporting on parts of Eastern Nigeria in the periphery
of Calabar and the Cross River and also by some scholars of Africa. For instance, Robin
Horton, “On the Rationality of Conversion,” Part I, Africa (3) 1975, p. 220. For further
confirmation of this view see the Quarterly Reports of the Primitive Methodist Missio-
nary Society Archive Reports since 1879. It seems likely that in previous centuries the
menace of the slave trade helped to limit movements outside one’s familiar environ-
ment.
36 A. E. Afigbo, ‘The Age of Innocence.” See Also Meek’s remarks about these groups in
C. K. Meek, Law and Authority, 18. In The Igbo and their Neighbours (1987), p. 41-2,
Afigbo identified the well established and much frequented trade routes linking the
Igbo area with non-Igbo areas by 1750 and the key people responsible for operating
these routes. They are as follows: In the northern section, the Igala, Jukun, Aro and
Awka; in the middle section, the Aro, Awka, and Nkwerre; and in the southern section,
the Aro, Nkwerre, and Ijaw.

25
 the Atlantic slave dealers, and eventually succeeded in establishing a
trading network whose tentacles extended not only through much of
Iboland itself but also through parts of the neighbouring Ibibio, Ekoi,
37
and Ijo [Ijaw] countries.

More of the adventures of Aro traders is taken up in chapter 1. They, in partic-

ular, ventured beyond the north-most reaches of Eastern Nigeria to the homes
of the Igala, Idoma, and Tiv situated south of the River Benue.
Beyond the territories of the Igala, Idoma, and Tiv, above the Benue River
lie, the Hausa and Nupe ethnic groups of Northern Nigeria with whom the Igbo
had nearly no contact before the colonial era even though they were also
widely traveled. When contact was established, it was fraught with frictions
arising from cultural dissimilarities. The earliest known cases of friction re-
volved around the involvement of the Hausa in the British conquest of Igbo-
38
land and over fishing. Fishing was not widely indulged in in Igboland. Ex-
ceptions were in Onitsha, Ossomari, Oguta, Afikpo, Azumini, and Umuna;
communities along the Niger, Imo, and Oguta Rivers to which fishing was con-
fined. Oral traditions from Igboland showed that it was a taboo to fish in many
Igbo villages because of the belief that the fish embodied the souls of the
people’s ancestors.” Meek reported instances of keen resentment “frequently
expressed against itinerant Hausa fishermen who disregard the feelings of the
39
local inhabitants in this matter.” The action of migrant fishermen from North-
ern Nigeria was identified as religiously motivated. Occurring at a time when
Igbo converts to Christianity displayed same insensitivity for local beliefs and
totems; it became a sore point in the early stages of the Igbo–Hausa relation-
ship in Igboland.

37 Horton, “On the Rationality of Conversion,” Part I, Africa 45 (3) (1975), 228.
38 Meek, Law and Authority, 18. Meek ’s investigation of the social circumstances that led
to the women’s war of 1929 brought to the fore inter-ethnic frictions involving mi-
grants from Northern Nigeria to Igboland.
39 Meek, Law and Authority, 18. There is a strong probability that these fishermen may
not all be Hausa probably also the Kakanda of Nupe. According to Asaba oral traditi-
ons they were the earliest migrants to fish on the banks of the Niger alongside trading
in slaves. The Hausa started to settle along the Niger early in the twentieth century.
The use of the Hausa language by the Nupe contributed to their being classed as Hausa
by their host communities as reported by Meek. See also Mabel Ukagwu, “The Deve-
lopment of Cattle Trade in Imo State with Special Reference to Umuahia-Ibeku up to
1960.” M. A. Dissertation, University of Nigeria (1987), 18.

26
Religious Diversification

From the Efik territory, Christian missions from 1857 extended their activities
to Igboland and began to gain converts among the local people. Christianity be-
came the first foreign religion to gain a foothold in Igboland. A century after-
wards Igboland had gained the reputation of being one of Africa’s homogenous
40
Christian regions. Ozigbo in the opening of his discourse on twentieth century
Igboland notes: “Igboland was to become a heartland of Christianity in Nigeria
41
with a cacophony of churches, diocese, districts, and high ranking ministries.”
The process of planting Christianity in Igboland was not without challenges
and problems both for the Igbo whom the missionaries desperately wanted to
reform and for the missionaries whose goodwill met with determined rebuff in
the early stages of their work.
Theological battles appeared to have raged for many decades over the need
(or absence of it) for the new theology. Christian missions never adequately ad-
dressed Igbo scepticism over the primacy of Christianity or the truth of its
42
claim vis-à-vis the Igbo religious belief. Ultimately, the Igbo acquiesced to
Christianity not because they were convinced of the better standing of that
faith over theirs but rather because they needed an urgent ally to deal with the
violent establishment of colonial rule particularly between 1900 and 1910. Their
need became more pressing as the many advantages of the missionary enter-
prise unfolded themselves; namely, trade prospects, new employment oppor-
43
tunities, and the benefits of western education.
Having fought the long battle before eventually accepting the Christian reli-
gion that literally took away the cream of its society, and isolating outside that

40 Nnorom, “Islam in Igboland: Lessons in History.” Ottenberg, who regards Igboland as a

land of almost total Christianity, saw parallels between Igbo religious identity and Ni-
geria’s socio-political variation. He foresaw a situation where Igboland was determined
to be Christian just as Northern Nigeria is Islamic. Simon Ottenberg, “Reflections on
Igbo Culture and Society,” unpublished manuscript (2006), 9-10.
41 Ozigbo, A History of Igboland in the 20 th Century, 5.
42 An illustration is provided by the encounter of the Primitive Methodist Society and the
Bende clan in Igboland. In 1910 the Society had opened a station in Bende District on
the telegraph road and built a church that would comfortably sit 200 worshippers. Very
optimistic of some fruitful results, the mission was surprised and forced to close the
year after because the older population of Bende were unreservedly hostile and suspi-
cious and had told them that “they do not desire [their] presence.” See Primitive Me-
thodist Missionary Society Archive Reports, Box No. 1139, Quarterly Reports, Bende,
1910–1911.
43 Elizabeth Isichei, “Seven Varieties of Ambiguity: Some patterns of Igbo Response to
Christian Mission,” Journal of Religion in Africa, Vol. 3 (1970), 211-215.

27
core a minority composed of the older generation, Igboland found itself reluct-
ant to make another comprehensive switch to Islam which projected another
conflicting set of doctrines and a different world view. With no prior links to,
or influences from, the Sokoto caliphate in Northern Nigeria, the Igbo had little
to encourage their conversion to Islam earlier than they did and in the numbers
they did quite unlike Muslims in Northern and Western Nigeria who came un-
der pressure in the long years of colonialism to become Christians in order to
benefit from Christian missionary education or become the employees of Brit-
44
ish colonial officials. Earliest attempts at Islamic propagation in Igboland
dates to the 1920s with the first evidence of conversion occurring in the 1930s.
However, it was not until after the end of the Nigeria-Biafra war in 1970 that
Islamic propagation in Igboland peaked. The success of this enterprise, which
drew actors from within and outside Nigeria, is now evident. While retaining
its profile as Nigeria’s most populous Christian region, Igboland has since the
1980s gradually tilted towards a broader religious diversification that shows Is-
lam as its latest major addition.
Before 1970, Islam encountered a strong rebuff in Igboland in attempts to in-
45
troduce it. Indeed Islam continues to experience this rebuff in Igboland despite
its gains. Denials of its existence or of the presence of indigenous Muslims were
common in many parts of Igboland during this study. Associating Islam with
the Hausa ethnic group was no help to its cause in Igboland. An interviewee
summarized Igbo response to Islam thus: “The Igbo are either Christians or tra-
46
ditionalists and should remain what they are.” In other words either the Igbo
indigenous religion or Christianity is appropriate for Igboland and not a third
option. Perhaps, this may be modified if the religion in question is anything
other than Islam but we do not know this yet.

Igbo–Hausa Relations

This study of Islam in Igboland is both a study of the emergence of a religious

community and an examination of ethnic relationship between two major

44 Shobana Shankar, “A fifty-year Muslim conversion to Christianity: Religious ambigui-

ties and colonial boundaries in Northern Nigeria, C. 1906–1963,” Benjamin Soares, ed.,
Muslim-Christian Encounters in Africa (Leiden: Brill, 2006) 89-91.
45 A similar reaction was recorded in the Kano Chronicles for Kano around the fifteenth
century. Patrick Ryan, “In my end is my Beginning,” in Benjamin Soares, ed., Muslim-
Christian Encounters in Africa, 194.
46 Mr. John Azi, interview, Awgu, September 2003.

28
 47
groups in the country, the Igbo and the Hausa. The two major ethnicities and
two major religions involved are quite similar to each other and still different
from one another. Igbo-Hausa relations have a long and complex history, the
early aspects of which are shrouded in mystery due to non-documentation. Ini-
tial attempts at a cultural meeting as earlier observed occurred at the turn of
the twentieth century, which incidentally was a delicate period in their histor-
ies. Their competitions and efforts at cooperation are recounted alongside the
progression towards religious connection between the two. Speaking about at-
tempts for a religious connection, the Hausa assumed the leading role and have
had some meaningful results.
The Igbo identity is hard to define, as the Igbo are a heavily fragmented eth-
nic group, independent and autonomous, and living in localized communities.
Between the time the Igbo established contacts with European merchants and
missionaries and the period when colonialism engendered exposure to ethnic
groups beyond their immediate neighbors, they lacked a unified identity. Each
community, usually governed by elders, was independent. Pan-Igbo identity
48
dates only to the 1940s with the formation of the Igbo (then Ibo) Union.
Ohombamu provides the outsider’s view of the Igbo around this time. He
writes:

Unlike the Yorubas who had the early opportunity of contact with the
outside world and consequently of higher education the Ibos were late
starters. They were poor, their land barren and over-populated. They
lacked the refined culture of the average westerner or mid-westerner
but they had the international ‘go’. They were called names but with
their determination to succeed they have reached the top. To get there
they have had to migrate to every corner of Nigeria, nay, even Africa.

47 The Igbo are dominantly found in Nigeria except for considerable Diaspora communi-
ties while the Hausa have considerable kith and kin in Niger Republic, The original
home of the ancient Hausa people was in Niger Republic where they also constitute
over 54% of the population.
48 A major catalyst for the formation of the Igbo Union was the growing inter-ethnic ri-
valry of the colonial period. The bone of contention was the control of the government
and therefore of national resources. Each of the three key ethnic groups – Igbo, Hausa,
and Yoruba – was determined to control the Nigerian state at the expense of the others.
Okwudiba Nnoli’s in-depth analysis of ethnic rivalry prior to and immediately after Ni-
geria’s independence sheds some light on the root causes of the broad span of ethnic
conflicts in Nigeria so early in its history.

29
 To get there they have had to use fair and sometimes foul means
49
which have not always pleased their neighbors.

The proclivity for using fair and foul means, depending on which best serves in-
dividual interests, is a constantly reiterated trait of the average Igbo. Instances
of this peculiarity appear also in reports on conversions of some Igbo to Islam.

Pattern of Religious Expansion in Nigeria

A pattern can be identified in Nigeria with respect to religious propagation, ex-

pansion, and adherence. Christianity and Islam both thrived best in areas
where they came second to the indigenous faiths. Islam which came second to
the indigenous system of worship in Northern Nigeria swept through the area,
emerged dominant over the indigenous faith, and had since retained that dom-
inance, which Christianity, introduced afterwards, had been unable to dislodge
despite commendable gains. In the Yoruba homeland in Western Nigeria, towns
that first “encountered” Islam retained their Islamic coloration and, although al-
lowing Christianity a few converts, did not make any wholesale switch to
Christianity in much the same way as towns that first encountered Christianity
retained their commitment to it and were unwilling, it would appear, to con-
cede more than a temporary foothold to Islam.
There is today in Yorubaland an almost equal balance in the population of
Muslims and Christians deriving from the almost simultaneously nature of
Muslim and Christian proselytization activities in the area. The pattern where
the first “universal” religion in a given area retains its dominance appears rep-
licated in Igboland at present. While explaining why Islam has had the edge, so
far, in Africa, Horton notes: “In many areas, it was there first. However, in
areas where Christianity was first on the scene ... people opted for it as enthusi-
50
astically as others in areas of prior Islamic presence opted for the latter.”

Conceptual clarification

Christianity and Islam share fundamental elements of the basic reper-

toire of symbols and concepts through which the faith traditions are
articulated and expressed—and these elements distinguish both of

49 Obarogie Ohonbamu, The Psychology of the Nigerian Revolution (Ilfracombe: Arthur

H. Stockwell, 1969), 119.
50 Horton, “On the Rationality of Conversion,” Part II, p. 393.

30
 them … from the other major modes of religious faith and experience.
These elements include—beyond the basic shared emphasis on one,
not many, divinities—the concepts of revelation by the One God, pro-
51
phethood and scriptures.

Inter-religious switches are common occurrences dating many centuries back.

They leave in their wake consequences beyond the imagination of the society
contemporaneous with their occurrence. The main concept dealt with in this
study is conversion, which in Muslim conceptualization is reversion. Conver-
sion is used in this work because of its wide scholarly application. Conversion
52
is understood in different ways by scholars and religious institutions. What is
central to conversion is change and this neither needs to be instantaneous nor
drastic. The experience of conversion has rather recommended itself to be more
or less a process that occurs over time, capable of manifesting different charac-
teristics as against a monolithic experience common to all. A similar thought, I
would say, is the burden of Macmullen’s deconstruction of early conversions
53
and converts to Christianity. As a matter of fact Macmullen points to the
great probability of converts retaining much of their religious or ideological
past even after conversion.
The Catholic Church understands religious conversion to imply the adop-
tion of new opinions or beliefs, or a new religious identity. It defines it as
change from a state of sin to repentance, from a lax to a more earnest and
serious way of life, from unbelief to faith, from heresy to the true faith. It
consists not merely in joining a Church or a family of worshippers who meet
regularly for religious observances, but in a change of heart and in the accept-
ance of the doctrines and submission to the laws of the Church established by
54
Jesus Christ. Islam, on the other hand, uses reversion—aslama—for conver-
sion. Muslims’ preference for “reversion” is based on the concept of fitrah that
asserts that every soul is born believing. Reversion is symbolized with the
recitation of the Shahada, the Muslim confession of faith, in which the new
51 John Voll, “African Muslims and Christians in world history: The irrelevance of the
“Clash of Civilizations,”” in Benjamin Soares, ed., Muslim-Christian Encounters in Af-
rica, 21.
52 Nock, who only allowed the possibility of conversion within Christian tradition, had
suggested that it goes with a consciousness that a great change is involved. A. D.
Nock, Conversion: The Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Au-
gustine of Hippo (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), 7 and 14.
53 Ramsay Macmullen, “Conversion: A Historian’s View,” The Second Century: A Jour-
nal of Early Christian Studies 5 (2) 1985/1986, 67-81.
54 The New Catholic Encyclopaedia (Michigan: Thomas Gale, 2002).

31
member states “There is none worthy of worship except God, and Muhammad
55
is His Messenger.”
In a very simplified way, therefore, and going by the standpoints of Chris-
tianity and Islam, conversion or reversion involves a reorientation of the soul, a
turning towards a new belief system and a new pattern of worship. Conversion
or reversion pre-supposes the holding by the convert of a prior religious belief,
but this may not always be the case as conversion is also possible from “non-
belief” to “belief.” Inter-religious and intra-religious conversions are regular oc-
currences. In this book, emphasis is on inter-religious conversion from either
Christianity or Igbo indigenous religion to Islam. Instances of conversion in
Eastern Nigeria do not suggest a strong connection between the experience of
conversion and any profound change especially in the light of similarities in Is-
lam and Christianity. Depending on the brand of Christianity—Catholic or
Anglican—from which conversion to Islam occurred, conversions were at best a
change from one pattern of worship to another that involved a not-too-pro-
found realigning of religious views and practices with the apparent possibility
of most converts retaining much of their religious or ideological past well after
their conversion. In conversions from Pentecostal Christianity to Islam, the pro-
fundity of the change would appear to be more because of the basic tenets of
Pentecostalism that privileges total belief in and submission to Jesus Christ,
which Islam denies. What appropriately captures the essence of conversion is
the process of relinquishing a worldview or philosophy of life for another
thereby shifting the basic presuppositions upon which both self and others are
56
understood.
Many conversion theories have been peddled in the last hundred years since
57
Starbuck published The Psychology of Religion (1900). The varied nature of

55 Sheikh Idoko, b. 1958, Chief imam of University of Nigeria, Nsukka, mosque, interview,
Nsukka, June 2003. Sheikh Idoko explained this further that all humans are born Mus-
lims and only made members of other religions through the agency of their parents or
by other means. See also Mercedes García-Arenal, “Dreams and reason: Autobiogra-
phies of converts in religious polemics,” in Mercedes García-Arenal, ed., Islamic Con-
versions: Religious identities in Mediterranean Islam (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose,
2001), 99
56 Andrew Buckser and Stephen Glazier, eds., The Anthropology of Religious Conversion
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2003), xi.
57 Literature on theories and models of conversions include: E. D. Starbuck, The Psycholo-
gy of Religion (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1900), John Lofland and Rodney
Stark, “Becoming a World-Saver. A Theory of Conversion to a Deviant Perspective,”
American Sociological Review (December 1965), 862-874; Horton, “African Conver-
sion,” Africa 41 (2) (1971), 85-108; Robin Horton, “On the Rationality of Conversion”

32
the theories and models of conversions developed by scholars of different dis-
ciplines using different methodological tools makes it out as a multi-layered
and diverse experience that lacks a singular explanation. It is heavily tilted to
the Christian perspective and environment and do not always perfectly explain
the Muslim experience. In deciding the theoretical formula to explain the varied
cases of conversion to Islam among the Igbo of Eastern Nigeria, the Intellectu-
alist theory of Robin Horton that attempts to elucidate the conversion history
of African peoples to Islam and Christianity was applied to the conversion nar-
58
ratives collected in Igboland. As useful as the Intellectualist theory is in un-
derstanding the initial conversions to Islam in Igboland—from the 1930s to
1950s when conversions were from the Igbo religion to Islam; it fails to explain
without a shadow of doubt the variegated patterns of conversions from the
1960s to the present when conversions occurred mostly from Christianity to Is-
lam but also from the Igbo religion to Islam.
The Intellectualist theory throws light on the shift among the Igbo from a
cosmological perspective that centred on lesser deities to one that favoured a
supreme deity. The starting point in understanding this development is to con-
ceptualize African cosmology as a two-tier structure in which the lower tier,
composed of lesser spirits, controlled events and processes in the microcosm of
the local community while the upper tier of the supreme being controlled
events and processes in the macrocosm. The important premise of the Intellec-
tualist theory rests on the fact that where the way of life is dominated by
substistence farming and commerce is poorly developed, the social relations of
people of a particular area are likely to be confined by the boundaries of their
microcosm. They may be aware of the wider world but as an area that does not
directly concern them. And where there is the development of factors making
for wider communication (for instance the development of long-distance trade),
the social life of those involved will no longer be so strongly confined by the
Parts I & II, Africa 45 (3 &4) 1975, 219-234 and 373-399; Humphrey Fisher, “Conversion
Reconsidered: Some aspects of religious conversions in Black Africa,” Africa 43 (1973),
and “The Juggernaut’s Apologia: Conversion to Islam in Black Africa,” Africa 55
(1985); Emefie Ikenga-Metuh, “The Shattered Microcosm: A Critical Survey of Explana-
tions of Conversion in Africa,” in Kirsten Holst Petersen, ed., Religion, Development
and African Identity (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1987), 11-27;
L. Rambo, Understanding Religious Conversion (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1993); Andrew Buckser and Stephen Glazier, eds., The Anthropology of Religious Con-
version (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002). A comprehensive discus-
sion on conversion theories and models is found in Rambo (1993).
58 Horton, “On the Rationality of Conversion Part I” and “On the Rationality of Conversi-
on Part II.”

33
boundaries of their microcosm. Many of their relationships will cut drama-
tically across these boundaries as less attention is paid to the lesser spirits but
59
more to the supreme being. In otherwords, the weakening of microcosmic
boundaries trigger both a more elaborate definition and worship of the supreme
being and a more developed cult of this being. Any acceptance of a mono-
theistic faith will nonetheless be selective and determined by the basic cosmo-
logy of the people in question.
Increase in communication first involving the crossing of international
boundaries and subsequently the crossing of ethnic or local boundaries was the
important factor in the dissemination of montheistic beliefs in Nigeria as a
whole. Narrowing this down to Eastern Nigeria, it was this traversing of
60
ethnic, instead of racial, boundaries that gave rise to the earliest incidents of
conversion to Islam in northern Igboland, involving a shift away from the
veneration of lesser deities of the Igbo cosmology to a monotheistic deity; in
this case the Muslim Allah. Excluding northern Igboland, the rest of the study
area was already significantly Christian by the 1930s after nearly eight decades
61
of missionary enterprise, from 1857 to 1935. How then do we explain the un-
derlying reasons for those conversions that occurred from Christianity to
Islam? For this latter development, the Intellectualist theory provides no clear
explanation. We however find an answer in Rambo’s hypothesis, which states:
“Except in cases of coercion, converts choose a new option on the basis of per-
ceived advantages to themselves.” Rambo expanded further on this in the fol-
lowing manner: “Each person converts when it is to his or her perceived ad-
62
vantage: satisfaction, benefit, fulfilment, improvement, and/or compulsion.”
An examination of converts’ narratives and patterns of conversions to Islam in
Igboland from the late 1950s onwards shows indeed that the pull of indi-

59 Horton, “On the Rationality of Conversion Part I,” 219-220. It was not in all cases that
the breaking of microcosmic boundaries resulted in the privileging of either of the two
established monotheistic deity—the Christian God or the Muslim Allah. Among the
Aroh of central Igboland, observes Horton, such a shift occurring some three hundred
years ago was in favour of the cult of a supreme deity that was unique to the commu-
nity,Ibiniukpabi. See Horton, “On the Rationality of Conversion Part I,” 228.
60 The break up of the Igbo microcosmic boundaries via the crossing of racial boundaries
—involving European traders and missionaries—saw the introduction of Christianity
from 1857. The Intellectualist theory answers more appropraitely the shift in much of
Igboland to Christianity from the 19th century, which was the result of widened com-
munication nertworks that brought within the Igbo orbit European traders and missio-
naries through whose mediation Christianity was established in the area.
61 Afigbo, The Igbo and their Neighbours, 85.
62 Lewis Rambo, Understanding Religious Conversion (New Haven: Yale, 1993), 42, 140-1.

34
vidually preconceived advantages was responsible for previous converts to
Christianity shifting their spiritual allegiance to Islam. This same sense of per-
ceived advantages was also found at the core of latter conversions from the
Igbo religion to Islam and explains why Islam succeeded in finding a foothold
in an area that was strongly antagonistic to it. Detailed cases of these conver-
sion stories are examined in chapters 3 to 5.

The Question of numbers: Are Igbo Muslims worth studying?

Colonialism set off the religious change in Igboland under investigation in this
book. Conversions to Islam were first recorded in the village of Enugu Ezike in
the Nsukka Division of northern Igboland, an area where Christianity was late
in establishing itself. In 1970 there were about 400 (four hundred) Igbo Muslims
63
in the whole of Igboland. Igbo Muslims were concentrated in the Nsukka and
Afikpo Divisions. In the former, they were found at Enugu Ezike, Ibagwa, and
Obukpa; and in the latter at Enohia. Few others were found at Owerri and
64
Afikpo town. Enohia, in Afikpo Division, where group conversion to Islam by
a quarter of the village occurred in 1958, had by far the largest Igbo Muslim
community before and at the end of the Nigeria-Biafra war in 1970. Their num-
bers were estimated at about 200. Nsukka Division had much fewer indigenous
Muslims supposed to number slightly less than a hundred. These villages and
towns where conversions to Islam first occurred gained converts from the Igbo
religion except Enohia where most converts including the leader were previ-
65
ously Christian converts.
Beginning from 1970 when concerted efforts began to be made both from
within and outside Nigeria to propagate Islam in Igboland, instances of conver-
sions peaked with reported increase in the number of Igbo Muslims. The
Pakistani scholar, Doi, was the first to publish the statistics of Igbo Muslims us-
ing figures collected from Muslim religious leaders in Igboland. He put their
66
number in 1984 at 3450 persons. Doi’s account of Islam in Igboland is widely
upheld as reliable by local Muslim leaders none of which queried his estimation

63 This figure is based on inferences by Muslim imams since no statistical record on their
numbers could be procured
64 Alhaji Iwuanyanwu, interview, Mbaitoli, January 2006; and, Ottenberg, “A Moslem
Igbo Village,” 231-259.
65 Mallam Abubakr, chief imam, interview, Awka, July 2003.
66 See Abdurrahman Doi, Islam in Nigeria, 182. This figure is the result of subtracting the
number of non-Igbo Muslims from the total figure of Muslims in Igboland.

35
 67
of Igbo Muslim population but rather referred me to his publication. Since
1990 the population of Igbo Muslims has remained a matter of conjecture and a
guarded secret. Collating demographic data on indigenous Muslims in Igboland
became a major challenge encountered in this study. It was difficult deducing
with the aid of census data the progression of conversions to Islam among the
Igbo before and after 1970 for two major reasons: Firstly, censuses taken during
the colonial era were burdened by a lack of consideration and careful represent-
ation of religious beliefs not in consonance with the most popular religion in a
given region or to the most popular religion among the migrant population. For
instance, the preamble to the 1911 Southern Nigeria Census observed as fol-
lows: “Excepting in the ports, no attempt was made to schedule the religious
68
beliefs of the natives.” Subsequent censuses in Eastern Nigeria in particular,
although recognizing the major religion of the dominant migrant community,
provided no details of the minority religion(s) of the ethnic groups in the area.
Secondly, the colonial pattern of recording demographic data with respect to re-
ligion was inherited by the Nigerian government, which justifies official exclu-
sion of religious details on the grounds of ethnic rivalry and political manipula-
tions engendered thereby. There was as well the reluctance on the part of
Muslim religious leaders and organizations in Igboland to divulge their figures
for indigenous Muslims. Imams reported not keeping any record of their mem-
bers or of persons worshipping at their mosques.
Typical responses from Muslim religious leaders to questions on the popula-
tion of Igbo Muslims are reproduced here. In the first a sheikh replies:

See the mosque. You can estimate for yourself. You can come on Fri-
day and join us. Fridays are the main services. The Youth Corpers
working with us, and others, attend worship on Fridays. The whole
house is full. We may be up to 300 but before the election many [non-
69
Igbo] went home. They were afraid something would happen to them.

The mosque in question, situated at the Islamic Centre at Enugu, is one of the
major mosques in Igboland. The visit to the mosque was undertaken in May
2003. It was scheduled three hours prior to the Jumat prayers and two hours

67 Alhaji Osuji, Sheikh Idris, and Sheikh Idoko, interviews, Enugu and Nsukka, May and
June 2003.
68 “Southern Nigeria Census Report,” File 4179/1912, p. 3. National Archives, Kaduna.
69 Sheikh Idris Al-Hassan, b. 1959, Director and Chief Imam of the Islamic Centre, Enugu,
interview at Enugu, May 2003. This interview was held less than a month after the
country’s national elections.

36
after the service. This arrangement allowed a clear observation on Muslims’
most important worship day of activities in the mosque premises leading up to
the time of prayer and hours after the prayer. We estimated that close to 200
persons comprising men, women, and children worshipped at the mosque that
Friday. They were drawn from different ethnic backgrounds, the obvious ones
being Yoruba, Igbo, and Hausa. Three other mosques used mostly by the Hausa
exist in Enugu. One is located within the premises of the Nigerian army bar-
racks while the other two are found at Owerri Road and the Garki market re-
spectively. In these other mosques artisans, soldiers, traders, and labourers
comprising the bulk of the migrants from Hausaland and other parts of North-
ern Nigeria assemble for worship. Most elite Hausa appears to prefer the mos-
que in the premises of the Islamic Centre.
Visits to different mosques in Igboland showed that Igbo Muslims were out-
numbered by non-Igbo Muslims. Muslim interviewees including religious lead-
ers among them generally acknowledged this disproportion. In Nsukka town
the following response was given regarding the number of Muslims in the com-
munity:

In this environment, you may get five or six people in each village
who are Muslims. Many come in but in less than five years they leave
Islam. I think that when those who bring them in take time to explain
to them what the religion is all about they would not be going back as
70
they have done rather they will worship and enjoy it.

If nothing else, such a coming and going would cause clear instability in the
number of worshippers. The unavailability of official statistics on Igbo Muslims
was one reason for reliance on the approximations provided by Muslim inter-
viewees among whom were religious leaders.
In 1991 Abdulaziz Onyeama, the most prominent Igbo Muslim and a mem-
ber of the Nigerian Supreme Islamic Council, announced in an interview that
there were some 10,000 Muslims of Igbo origin all over Nigeria, nearly a triple
71
increase on the figure published by Doi seven years earlier. Onyeama’s postu-
lation was regarded more as a bold projection than the reality and one that pre-
supposes a momentous progress for Islam from the land of “almost total Chris-
72
tianity” as Igboland was construed to be. In 2003, Alhaji Abubakr, a chief
imam of non-Igbo origin, took the debate further by proposing a conversion

70 Adam Usman, interview, Nsukka, May 2003.

71 M. Akoshile and I. Umunna, “Igbo Muslims: Their Trials and Triumphs,” Citizen 4
(1993), 10-19.

37
 73
rate of 1 Muslim for every 1000 Christians. Both estimations are not replicated
by this research since there is no evidence to support them. But, should we con-
cede Abubakr’s projection, then we should be considering at present some
16,000 (sixteen thousand) Igbo Muslims from an Igbo population of over sixteen
million.
Should we study a section of a group considerably outnumbered by the ma-
jority? Certainly yes! This issue came up at a preliminary discussion of this
work at Humboldt Universität zu Berlin in February 2007. One scholar queried
this study on the basis of the number of the Igbo Muslim population. He was
alone in expressing the contrary opinion that the number of converts did not
justify the bother. The persistent occurrence of conversions to Islam in Igboland
in itself justifies scholarly investigation of the change process and its chal-
lenges; the dividends to, as well as the consequences on, Igbo society and on in-
ter-ethnic relationships in a multi-ethnic country like Nigeria. The social or
political reconfigurations stimulated by religious change could proceed for as
long as possible making an early engagement necessary as a foundation for fu-
ture and more diversified investigations of its overall impacts. This attempt at a
comprehensive study of a process that commenced nearly a century ago is by
no means premature irrespective of the numbers involved. It goes without say-
ing that in the absence of an inclusive account of the emergence of Islam in Ig-
boland, this book fills an important gap and provides a relevant resource for
further studies on this theme. With the ever-present fear of global religious
fundamentalism, understanding expressions of faith in local environments
should be one paramount concern of scholars.

72 Douglas Anthony, “Islam Does Not Belong to Them: Ethnic and Religious Identities
among Male Igbo Converts in Hausaland,” Africa 70 (2000), 1.
73 Alhaji Abubakr, interview cited.

38
CHAPTER 1
EASTERN NIGERIA BEFORE 1920

The history of Islam in Eastern Nigeria (or Southeast Nigeria), and in Igboland
in particular, requires an understanding of the mode of transmission and the
agents of its spread from its original homeland in Hausaland in Northern Ni-
geria to its newest outposts in Eastern Nigeria where the Igbo, Efik, Ibibio,
Ekoi, and Ijaw ethnic groups are found. This chapter outlines the migratory
patterns of the Nupe and Hausa (Northern) and Yoruba (Southwestern) Mus-
lims and therefore of Islam to the Southeast. Included is the examination of the
multifarious factors that motivated contacts between persons from the north
and southwest with those in Eastern Nigeria; the circumstances surrounding
their meetings and the forms of their interactions until an indigenous Muslim
population emerged in the Southeast, precisely in Igboland. In this reconstruc-
tion, substantial use is made of colonial and other official records, oral data
from the author’s fieldwork, and relevant published works.

The journey of Islam towards the Southeast

Islam existed in and around the city-state of Kano in Northern Nigeria before
the fourteenth century. It took the jihad of Uthman dan Fodio in 1804 for Islam
to extend its geographical limits and triggered the creation of a theocracy,
which survived for nearly a century before the British colonization of Hausa-
74
land and other parts of Northern Nigeria in 1900. Islamic values, already in
operation in parts of Hausaland and also in the Kanembu (Kanem-Bornu) Em-
pire, were with the jihad reinvigorated and extended to much of Hausaland and
beyond, encompassing what in Nigeria is regarded as the far north (i.e. north-
east and north-west Nigeria). Considerable non-believing minority ethnic com-
75
munities referred to as “pagan” found themselves eclipsed by new Islamic
76
towns and provinces but were not compelled to become Islamized.
74 N. Levtzion, “Patterns of Islamization in West Africa,” in N. Levtzion (ed.), Conversion
to Islam (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1979), 215.
75 Pagan (or paganism), a highly contested term infused with negative labelling, is used to
refer to spirits-and-essences filled belief systems that are based upon direct perception
of the forces of nature and usually involves the use of idols, talismans, and taboos for
conveying respect for these forces and beings. See, http://www.religioustolerance.org/
paganism.htm
76 The theocracy of the Sokoto Caliphate did not prevent the Islamized Hausa from retai-

39
Fig. 3: Nigeria’s tripartite units—North, Middle Belt or North Central and
South—with major linguistic groups

In the space of six decades from the launching of the jihad wars in 1804, Is-
lam was pushed southwards beyond Hausaland into Nupe, Ilorin, Abuja, Nas-
sarawa, Keffi, and Adamawa located on the northern periphery of North Cent-
ral Nigeria. The establishment by Islamic reformers of the Emirate of Nas-
sarawa in the mid 1850s corresponded with a turn in Fulani power in North
Central Nigeria. Two of the important factors, among other setbacks, that un-
dermined further military expansion were the tsetse fly hazard and the collapse
of the post 1860 world market for slaves, which meant that coastal supply of
77
firearms was cut off, leading to the eventual decline of Fulani military power.
ning aspects of their pre-Islamic culture: their folklore, magic, indigenous medicine,
drumming, and dance. Mervyn Hiskett, The Course of Islam in Africa (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1994), 111.
77 R. G. Armstrong, “The Idoma–Speaking Peoples,” in Daryll Forde (ed.), Peoples of the
Niger-Benue Confluence (London: International African Institute, 1955), 97; R. J. Gavin
and Wale Oyemakinde, “Economic Development in Nigeria since 1800,” in Obaro Ikime
(ed.), Groundwork of Nigerian History (Ibadan: Heinemann, 1980).

40
Thus, Igalaland, Idomaland and Tivland on the southern fringes of North Cent-
ral Nigeria were not incorporated into the expanding Islamic empire. With the
imposition of British colonial rule in Northern Nigeria from1900 the independ-
ent military and political assertiveness of colonized groups were curbed mean-
ing that the Hausa-Fulani commitment to spreading Islam southwards was hal-
ted.
Although the colonial experiment favored a peaceful spread of Islam as a
result of the British policy of imposing Muslim Fulani or Hausa district officers
over non-Muslim peoples and of establishing Islamic courts in those areas, the
impact of the exposure to Islam of non-Muslim groups in the southern peri-
phery of North Central Nigeria did not occasion the adoption of Islamic religion
78
as it did in Northern Nigeria. The following ethnic groups of North Central
Nigeria—the Jukun, Tiv, Mumuye, Birom, Longuda, Kutep, Taroh, Jen, Rukuba
79
—continued to resist Islam well beyond the 1970s. Mahdi Adamu gave a de-
tailed discussion of the role of the Jukun in particular in preventing Hausa
Muslim soldiers from overrunning North Central Nigeria prior to the twentieth
80
century. The immense opposition of the Tiv to Islam right up to the present is
also proverbial. Indications of this can be found in Tiv folklore and in reports of
several studies including those of Laura and Paul Bohannan (1953) and Gillil-
and (1986). This total rejection of Islam had been part of what it means to be a
Tiv. It is a self-awareness that Gilliland describes as “a dynamic that can scar-
81
cely be equalled in northern Nigeria.” Two of Gilliland’s interview reports on
Tiv views of the Hausa and Islam read:

It was the colonial administrators who brought the Hausas. …They

were looked upon as different, mysterious and secretive. Their writing
was strange as well as their habits, but most objectionable was their
religion. The Tiv looked upon them as having no real tribe, but as
transients—traders, lazy and selfish…
Anyone who does salla [prayer] is considered a Hausa man—he is no
78 The British colonial government’s role in fostering the extension of Islam to non-Mus-
lim groups in Northern and North-Central Nigeria is discussed in C. N. Ubah, “Colonial
Administration and the spread of Islam in Northern Nigeria,” The Muslim World 81 (2)
1991, 133-148. Also, A. H. M. Kirk Greene, The Principles of Native Administration in
Nigeria: Selected Documents 1900–1947 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965).
79 Dean S. Gilliland, African Religion meets Islam: Religious Change in Northern Nigeria
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986), 30.
80 Mahdi Adamu, The Hausa Factor in West African History (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello Uni-
versity Press, 1978), 25.
81 Gilliland, African Religion meets Islam, 63.

41
 longer accepted as a Tiv. Why then would anyone wish to do it (be-
come Muslim)? ... The convert must be rejected for the same reasons
that the Hausa man is rejected. They are exclusive. They won’t mix.
82
Our women wouldn’t marry them.

The Tiv up till recently have remained proud that their ancestors halted the
southwards advance of Islam many decades after the establishment of Muslim
83
emirates in northern and North Central Nigeria.
When between 1900 and 1905 British authority was militarily imposed on
Hausaland and other interior territories of the Royal Niger Company, the polit-
ical authority of the Sokoto Caliphate was suspended provoking stiff opposition
from the latter. Little did the Fulani leaders and the largely Hausa Muslim com-
munity imagine that that “evil wind,” referring to the British military operat-
ives, would in due time provide the easiest opportunity for a successful, non-
dramatic, and bloodless spread of Islam in the far north, eventually extending
to the northern fringes of North Central Nigeria. Meanwhile, acting on the spur
of the moment, Sultan Attahiru I of Sokoto emigrated in 1903 to the Egyptian
Sudan and onwards to Mecca with a large retinue of Fulani Muslims reportedly
84
numbering about 25,000. The vast majority of Muslims, unable to throw off
British yoke, despite their consistent attempts until 1921, submitted to British
authority. On the strength of earlier scholarly investigations, the acceptance of
colonial rule was part of the strategy of taqiyya that allows Muslims to cooper-
ate with a non-Muslim authority when they have no alternative while reserv-
ing the right to re-assert their individual and religious independence when they
85
consider it appropriate to do so. With the success of the British suppression of
Northern and parts of North Central Nigeria, the Protectorate of Northern Ni-
geria was created and organized into the following sixteen administrative pro-
vinces: Sokoto, Kano, Katagun, Northern Bornu, Bauchi, Zaria, Adamawa,
86
Yola, Nassarawa, Borgu, Nupe, Muri, Ilorin, Kabba, Bassa, and Kontagora.

82 Ibid.
83 James Gire, personal communication, November 2007.
84 “History of Islamic political propaganda in Nigeria,” File ZARPROF C.7/1927, National
Archives, Kaduna, pages 5-9.
85 Hiskett, The Course of Islam in Africa, 114-5. Taqiyya is an Arabic term suggesting
“being faithful.”
86 “Population Statistics,” File: KANPROF 3530, National Archives, Kaduna. Subsequent
re-organisations found them split into 12 provinces: Sokoto, Zaria, Kano, Katsina, Bau-
chi, Bornu, Niger, Ilorin, Plateau, Kabba, Benue and Adamawa. Changes, however,
continued until the end of the colonial period.

42
Earliest inter-ethnic contacts

One very important consequence of colonial imposition was the opening up of

the interior of Nigeria and the linking together of hitherto disparate ethnic
communities. This is very marked with regards to contacts between ethnic
groups in Eastern Nigeria with those farthest from them located in Northern
Nigeria. A very compelling case is between the Igbo, the most populous ethnic
group in the Southeast, and the Hausa that occupy same position in the north.
The same applies also to the minority groups of the Southeast – Efik, Ibibio,
Ijaw, Ekoi, and few others – with the Hausa. The nature of inter-ethnic rela-
tionships between Southeast groups and the Hausa stands in contrast with that
between some groups in the Southwest and the Hausa who became connected
87
through trade associations predating the eighteenth century. The commercial
link between the Yoruba of Southwest Nigeria and the Hausa was strengthened
in the nineteenth century when Afonja, the Yoruba warrior ruler from Ilorin,
invited the assistance of Muslim reformers in his political quarrel with Oyo,
eventually setting in motion events that led to the incorporation of Ilorin with-
in the Sokoto Caliphate.

88
Fig. 4: Hausa trade routes in the “pre-nineteenth” and “nineteenth” centuries.

87 See Diagram illustrating “Main Trade Communications of Muslim Africa,” in Hiskett,

The Course of Islam in Africa. See also, Adamu, Hausa Factor in West African Histo-
ry, 64-65.
88 This pictographic presentation was adapted from Adamu’s, Hausa Factor in West Afri-
can History, 64.

43
 Prior to the first decade of the twentieth century contacts among persons
from Northern Nigeria with those in the Southeast were very few and far
between. The reasons for this are found in the following: The absence of any
direct trade relations between the Hausa and ethnic groups in the Southeast;
the nature of inter-ethnic interactions before the twentieth century, which was
defined by the exigencies of the slave trade and its insecurity that curbed inter-
ethnic contacts, continuing beyond 1906 when it was officially banned in Ni-
89
geria by the British; and, the chasm created by the largely non-Muslim ethnic
90
nations of North Central Nigeria. The Kola nut trade that took Muslim Hausa
traders all over West Africa incidentally did not bring them into Eastern Niger-
91
ia. The Kola nut traffic from Northern Nigeria via Sokoto Province and the
famous market at Jega passed through Oshogbo, Ibadan, and Ilorin in Yorubal-
and and onwards to Accra and Kumasi in the Gold Coast. Though in decline, it
92
continued until the 1930s. Eastern Nigeria was not incorporated in the Hausa
economic network because the Igbo kola nut – C. acuminatae – was not popu-
lar outside the Southeast with the exception of Yorubaland where it was
planted in small quantities. Lovejoy’s study shows that C. acuminate “was in-
significant in comparison with the far more popular C. nitida—gworo” pro-
duced in the Gold Coast and further up to the Volta and traded by Hausa mer-
93
chants over many centuries. Colonialism radically altered that trajectory of
Hausa economic activities and turned some Hausa traders southwards into
peripheral Efik and Igbo communities. Further advance into the interior of Ig-
boland would await several decades and the agency of some Igbo.
The Igbo, Efik, Ibibio, Ijaw, and Ekoi of Eastern Nigeria were before the
twentieth century known for two distinct engagements: agriculture and fishing.
Trade was a secondary and elite occupation even also in the Niger Delta, which
between 1885 and 1893 was known as the Oil Rivers and regarded as the hub of

89 Abolition of slavery in Northern Nigeria was effected in 1936: Paul Lovejoy and Jan
Hogendorn, Slow death for slavery: The course of abolition in Northern Nigeria, 1897-
1936 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
90 Gavin and Oyemakinde, “Economic Development in Nigeria since 1800,” 495.
91 Adamu, The Hausa Factor in West African History. See diagram between pages 64 and
65; and Paul Lovejoy, Ecology and Ethnography of Muslim Trade in West Africa (New
Jersey, Trenton: Africa World Press, 2005), 159.
92 SOKPROF 260, p. 8; National Archives, Kaduna. R. M. Prothero, Migrant Labour from
Sokoto Province Northern Nigeria (Kaduna: Government Printer Northern Region of
Nigeria, 1958), 18.
93 Lovejoy, Ecology and Ethnography of Muslim Trade, 296.

44
 94
Fig. 5: Eastern Nigeria showing the five main ethnic groups
95
nineteenth century trade between the Southeast peoples and Europeans.
Afigbo’s study of the Igbo and their neighbors informs us that the Igbo com-
monly interacted with the Efik, Ibibio, Ijaw, and Ekoi through intermarriage
and trade and in other undertakings long before the British colonization of the
96
region began in 1886. As peasant farmers, traders, and fishermen the needs of
the Igbo and their neighbors were limited to the basic requirements for exist-
ence, all of which were easily obtainable within their locality. The satisfaction
of these ethnic communities with the life styles and patterns that their environ-
ment made possible partly explains the very limited character of inter-group re-
lations that existed between them and groups located beyond North Central Ni-
geria before 1900.

94 The Ekoi and Ijaw are the dominant groups in their locations. In other words, there are
few smaller ethnic groups that are not indicated in the map.
95 The Niger Delta radiates southwest in a triangular shape, with its apex located appro-
ximately at the old trading town of Aboh, in Anioma, west of the Niger. Through its
innumerable meandering tidal creeks, which interlace small rivers like the Orashi, Imo,
Aba, and Kwa Ibo, the Niger sluggishly empties itself into the Bight of Biafra. Sylvanus
Cookey, King Jaja of the Niger Delta: His Life and Times, 1821–1891 (New York: Nok
Publishers, 1974), 11.
96 Adiele Afigbo, “The Age of Innocence: The Igbo and their neighbours in pre-colonial
Times.” Ahiajoku Lecture. (Owerri: Ministry of Information, Culture, Youth and Sports,
1981.)

45
Fig. 6: Map of Igboland, east and west of River Niger, and their neighbors

Sections of Eastern Nigeria that interacted more with groups located north
of the region were Igbo communities situated on the northern fringes of Igbo-
land—the Nsukka Igbo and parts of the Awka–Onitsha periphery; and also the
Ekoi of the Cross River area whose immediate northern neighbours were the
Igala, Idoma, and Tiv. On the part of the Efik, Ibibio, and Ijaw, similar interac-
tions were southwards to the Bight of Biafra. The Ijaw could reach out to sister
communities located westwards in the delta and also to Itshekiri and Edo still
west of them. Indeed for Efik, Ibibio, and Ijaw, they required on each turn to
traverse Igboland in order to communicate with ethnic communities north and
west of Igboland.
The Arochukwu (Aro) Igbo, renowned for their long-distance trading in
slaves and their famous deity – Ibini Ukpabi or Long juju – along with Nri ritu-
al specialists and Awka and Nkwerre smiths pursued their economic engage-
ments past the boundaries of Igboland into the southern limits of North Central
Nigeria but neither up to Nupe nor Hausaland. These Igbo village groups earli-
er than others disengaged from the land when it became less productive from
over-exploitation. Ottenberg says of Aro commercial enterprise in northeast Ig-
boland, precisely in Abakaliki Division of Ogoja Province, which is contermin-
ous with Idoma to its west:

46
 There was some trade with the North-East Igbo, but this does not ap-
pear to have become important until the latter part of the nineteenth
century. Yet, it probably took some time for the Aro to establish them-
selves in this area, which is pretty much at the limits of their northern
97
influence.

Although the Aro operated widely more than any other group from Eastern Ni-
geria and were clearly visible in Abakaliki in north-east Igboland, in Igumale
and Yangedde in southern Idomaland and central Idomaland respectively; Hor-
ton’s report on the Aro before the twentieth century reads: “Aro can have had
only the most indirect commercial links with Islamized groups to the north. Nor
98
were they in direct contact with European slavers on the coast to the south.”
There was no evidence of direct contact before the turn of the twentieth
century between ethnic groups in Eastern Nigeria with groups in Northern Ni-
geria located beyond North Central Nigeria. Nevertheless, perusing accounts
on events around 1900, we come across a few possibilities that help with this
investigation on the beginning of Islam in Igboland and Eastern Nigeria. Arm-
strong records that Abakaliki in Igboland and Yangedde in central Idomaland
99
had “big slave markets regularly visited by Nupe and Arochukwu Ibo.” Igbo
traders from Nsukka, Onitsha, Ossomari, and Asaba (west of the Niger) traded
with the Igala with whom they have had centuries of contact to the point that
the Igbo language was used alongside Hausa and English languages for trade in
Igala markets. On their part, Igala traders head loaded cotton grown in Ife Dis-
100
trict north of Ankpa to markets in Nsukka Division.
Contacts would probably have existed between Igbo traders who ventured
101
into Igala and Idoma lands with traders from Nupe and also probably with
Hausa traders they met at these markets but Gavin and Oyemakinde show that

97 Simon Ottenberg, Farmers and Townspeople in a Changing Nigeria: Abakaliki during

Colonial Times (1905-1960) (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 2005), 28.
98 Robin Horton, “On the Rationality of Conversion” Part I, Africa 45 (3) 1975, 229.
99 R. G. Armstrong, “The Idoma–Speaking Peoples,” 99.
100 R. G. Armstrong, “The Igala,” 79 and 82-83. For references to early contacts between
the Igbo and other ethnic communities north of Igboland see: MacGregor Laird and
R.A.K. Oldfield, Narrative of an expedition into the interior of Africa by the River Ni-
ger, 1832-1833 (London: Richard Bentley, 1857); Laura and Paul Bohannan, The Tiv of
Central Nigeria (London: International African Institute, 1953), and Adamu, The Hau-
sa Factor in West African History.
101 The Nupe were the only group in North Central Nigeria “to have been Islamised to any
considerable extent,” by the second half of the nineteenth century. Daryll Forde, Peop-
les of the Niger-Benue Confluence, xiv.

47
these contacts were controlled by the middlemen role of the Igala and Idoma,
who in addition denied Hausa and Nupe traders free movement through their
territory southwards before the twentieth century. In spite of their efforts, off-
shoots from Adamawa succeeded before the end of the nineteenth century in
moving in a southwesterly direction through what became the Camerouns to
the sea in attempts to secure such trade items as slaves and ivory thus leaving
the mass of the Tiv, Idoma, Igala, and Igbo peoples untouched by Muslim
102
traders. The thrust from Adamawa partly explains the presence of “Moham-
medan” traders in Calabar in 1890 reported by Hugh Goldie of the Primitive
103
Methodist Missionary Society. On the part of the Igbo and their neighbors in
Eastern Nigeria, the major economic influence was the growth of foreign com-
merce on their southern periphery. The Aro exemplified the strength of this
southward pull for as Horton observed, they “became more and more deeply in-
volved in long distance commerce stimulated by the Atlantic slave dealers, and
eventually succeeded in establishing a trading network whose tentacles exten-
ded not only through much of Iboland itself but also through parts of neighbor-
104
ing Ibibio, Ekoi, and Ijo [Ijaw] countries.”
Adamu’s extensive study of Hausa commercial activities in the nineteenth
century offers us nothing on the probable trade interactions between the Hausa
and the peoples of Eastern Nigeria except to mention a notation from John
Lander’s recordings of an Hausa trader he “noticed” in the Igbo kingdom of
105
Aboh, west of the Niger, during his travels with Clapperton in 1830 to 1832.
It remains a mystery as to what the Hausa trader was doing in the court of the
king of Aboh. Was he captured like Lander was? Unfortunately, before Lander
could speak to him and ascertain these details, Lander was taken away. The
mystery is all the more puzzling because Hausa commercial enterprise by this
date, as mentioned, was directed southwestwards to the Gold Coast and bey-
ond through Yorubaland, completely circumventing Edoland, seat of the old
Benin Kingdom, and the territory of the Igbo kingdom of Aboh where the
trader was “noticed.” It also circumvented Igboland east of the Niger and the
106
rest of Eastern Nigeria. The likely possibility, therefore, of interaction be-

102 Gavin and Oyemakinde, “Economic Development in Nigeria since 1800,” 495.
103 Hugh Goldie, Calabar and its Mission (Edinburgh: Oliphant Anderson and Ferrier,
1890), 354.
104 Horton, “On the Rationality of Conversion, Part I,” 228.
105 Adamu, The Hausa Factor, 47.
106 See the pictographic representations of this trade in Adamu, The Hausa Factor, and,
Paul Lovejoy, Ecology and Ethnography of Muslim Trade.

48
tween Hausa and Igbo and other groups in Eastern Nigeria before 1900 would
have been by indirect mode and occurring in areas where the Hausa main-
tained trade links as they did in parts of North Central Nigeria east of the con-
fluence of the Niger and Benue Rivers in the territory of the Igala and Idoma
where Igbo traders also ventured to for trade.
From the angle of the Southeast, very little suggests the existence of in-
107
ter-ethnic dealings with the Hausa (and Fulani ) before 1900. Perhaps, part of
the difficulty in finding traces from Eastern Nigeria of pre-colonial interaction
with groups in the far north could be that Eastern Nigeria was largely an oral
society. The ethnic groups in the region kept no written records, having the
rich resources of their past stored in human memories whose accuracy after
many decades and centuries of retelling naturally diminished. Exceptions may
108
be made, with care, of some well-diffused accounts.
An indigenous pictographic form of writing called Nsibidi developed at a
point in pre-colonial Igboland and became the privilege of an elite class of
prominent men composed mostly of Igbo smiths and members of the Ekpe
secret society. Its use with time extended into Ekoi, Ibibio, and Efik lands in the
Cross River area. Little of this secret script already in use by 1700 survived and
much of what survived of Nsibidi lacks an interpreter, the script having been
discontinued following the introduction of western education in Eastern Niger-
109
ia. Being forewarned of the danger of reading too much into silence and thus

107 Macgregor Laird and R. A. K. Oldfield reported the use of “a red pigment prepared
from redwood brought from the Eboe (Igbo) country” by Fulani women in Raba, Nupe.
The item was the Igbo camwood brought by Igbo traders to Igala and Idoma markets
from where they were bought by Nupe traders. R. N. Henderson, The King in Every-
man: Evolutionary Trends in Onitsha Ibo Society (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1972), 68-71. This, again, illustrates the indirect nature of the contact bet-
ween the Igbo and Hausa and Nupe before the twentieth century.
108 There is also no archaeological evidence supporting inter-ethnic contact between these
groups before the twentieth century. The excavations by Thurstan Shaw in Igbo-Ukwu,
south of Onitsha, in 1959, do not suggest evidence of Hausa culture on Igbo territory,
even though the archaeological site “was one relating to great social and spiritual pres-
tige,” and dated to the 9th century A.D. The horse motif found in the Igbo Ukwu bronze
was traced to Nupe traders who brought the animal to Ejule (Ejure) and later to Agba-
abutaji, and then to Idah. Igala and Idoma traders brought the animal into Igboland be-
fore being joined in the twentieth century by Nupe traders. See J. Desmond Clark,
Igbo-Ukwu: An Account of Archaeological Discoveries in Eastern Nigeria by Thurstan
Shaw, Man, New Series, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Sep., 1971), pp. 493-495. Afigbo, The Igbo and
their Neighbours, 61-2.
109 Adiele Afigbo, Ropes of Sand: Studies in Igbo History and Culture (Nsukka: University
of Nigeria Press, 1981), 375. Nsibidi was used for a variety of things including warfare

49
 110
ending up with dangerous conclusions, we may have to look elsewhere for
evidence of early inter-ethnic contacts that could have laid the foundation for
exchange of religious views among the groups under study during the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries.

On the trail of the Elephant Hunters

The Kano Chronicle, Hausa manuscripts dealing with the early history of the
Hausa up to the 1890s made no mention of interactions between Hausa and the
peoples of Eastern Nigeria either directly or indirectly. None of the scholars
who have investigated the commercial activities of the Hausa has made re-
ference to any commercial or other links either from the Kano Chronicle or
other journals and documents involving the groups in question. It should not
be forgotten that these groups were independent of each other belonging as it
were to different “countries” quite far removed from each other. Despite Hausa
use of caravans, travels from north to south were accomplished over many
111
weeks. This prospect would not have made regular contacts possible. Never-
theless, we continue the search for links and suggestions, working from Hausa-
land down.
“Agriculture and handcrafts and commerce were the main ways in which
Hausa men traditionally made their living,” observes Adamu in his treatise on
112
Hausa and their economic activities in West Africa. The Hausa have predom-
inantly been cultivators and the Fulani herdsmen. Adamu shows that the prac-
tice of pursuing several occupations simultaneously was long a notable feature
of the group. The location of Hausaland in a savannah environment meant that
agriculture could only be practiced for half the year, leaving the people free for
craftwork and trade engagements in the remaining half of the year. In Southern
Nigeria incidentally Hausa are known more for trade and craftwork than for
agriculture but what interests us here is how Hausa commercial activities facil-
itated the extension of Islam into Eastern Nigeria.

and magic and for recording narratives like evidence recorded in continuous love af-
fairs.
110 Adiele Afigbo, “The Idea of Igbo Nationality and its Enemies,” in Toyin Falola (ed.),
Igbo History and Society: The Essays of Adiele Afigbo (Trenton, NJ: Africa World
Press, 2005); 428-425.
111 Data collected from migrants in 1952-3 showed that they required thirty-one days
walk, at 20 miles per day, to move from Northern Nigeria to a place like Onitsha on the
River Niger: Prothero, Migrant Labour from Sokoto Province, 36.
112 Adamu, The Hausa Factor, 7.

50
 Herding was long a popular engagement of the Fulani, who with the Jihad
became closely integrated with the Hausa ethnic group, and this took them sea-
sonally beyond their home areas in search of water and pasture for their stock.
Land hunger for grazing and farming was a major concern in Hausaland, pre-
ceding the colonial administration. In the early decades of the twentieth cen-
tury, colonial authorities had identified the Hausa as producing two distinct
groups of migrants: Men who migrate short distances from their homes for so-
cial and economic reasons to participate in craft making, do dry season farming
—depending on availability of water, or to trade; and men who migrate over
longer distances to engage in various laboring occupations not requiring any
113
skill. Individuals from the second group, encouraged by the peace and secur-
ity embedded in pax Britannica, moved southwards into Eastern Nigeria. Little
was recorded about this group and the places they migrated to prior to 1915
when the earliest official reference was made with respect to Gwandu Division
in Sokoto Province from where that year “a large number of men … went … to
the Gold Coast between September and December” in connection with the Kola
114
nut trade. Adamu notes that the majority of Hausa migrants of all ages were
115
traders and clerics. Nevertheless, he mentions towards the end of his book
the presence of few Hausa elephant hunters who migrated before the end of the
nineteenth century towards Eastern Nigeria; details he gleaned from the journ-
al of McGregor Laird dated to the 1830s. The presence of elephant hunters in
the Southeast, precisely around what later became Enugu city, was mentioned
to me by the Sarikin Hausawa of Enugu, the chief of the Hausa community at
Enugu, who recalled that when his father and few other Hausa moved down to
Enugu from Kano in 1922 to join in the construction of the Port Harcourt –
Enugu railway they met a few elephant hunters, who seemed not to be of
Hausa origin:

You know during the colonial period Hausa traders were few who
were here. It was the hunters who came here first. They would come
116
and go. After some time the Hausa started coming.

113 Prothero, Migrant Labour from Sokoto Province, 17-18.

114 Ibid., 18. (A few colonial reports on Hausa–Nupe communities in Eastern Nigeria also
exist, dating to the 1930s. The earliest of these reports came about on account of a court
case involving right of headship of the Hausa settlement in Owerri Province, South-
eastern Nigeria.)
115 Adamu, The Hausa Factor, 15.
116 Alhaji Sule, Sarikin Hausawa, interview, Enugu, May 2003.

51
The rarity of Hausa settlers in Eastern Nigeria before the 1930s was severally
117
reported in colonial records. However, some colonial reports on Hausa–Nupe
settlements in the Eastern region in the 1930s complement the Sarikin’s story
although the exact locations in the Eastern region where the hunters operated
were not specified in the reports. Merging oral information and the sparse colo-
nial reports with ethnographic studies deriving in part from oral reports from
Tiv, Igala, and Idoma lands as well as the records of early European travelers,
the story of elephant hunters in Eastern Nigeria can be sketched.
Laura and Paul Bohannan report: “by 1906 Hausa traders were found in Tiv-
118
land.” They added that ivory armbands were popular with Tiv men and wo-
men but did not specify whether or not elephants were hunted in and around
Tivland, although this could be assumed from the reference to ivory armbands.
Adamugu, in Igalaland, located 24 river miles north of Idah, the ancient capital
of Igala Kingdom, Armstrong notes, was a centre for the ivory trade as well as
for slaves by 1830. Ivory would presumably have been supplied by professional
Igala hunters who operated in the riverrine marshes from Idah southwards to-
wards Onitsha, in Igboland; the Igbo section being of course largely exploited
119
by Igbo themselves. With respect to Idomaland, west of Igalaland and also
north of Igboland, Armstrong in 1955 also writes: “elephants were common in
Oturkpo region until two or three generations ago, but they were nearly all
killed off by Hausa ivory hunters before the beginning of the British adminis-
120
tration.” The oral history of Asaba in Anioma, west of the River Niger, has it
that elephants, common in its jungles some four hundred years ago, became ex-
121
tinct before the twentieth century through the activities of ivory hunters.
With respect to Enugu, which was established by the colonial administration in
122
1915 as a camp for coal miners, ivory hunters whose ethnic identity was un-

117 “Intelligence report on Eteh Clan, Nsukka Division, Onitsha Province,” File: CSE
1/85/4782, National Archives, Enugu, reads: “a few Hausa traders were observed in the
market. They are not very common and are simply passing through Eteh on their way
to the south.” (The report was prepared in 1926.); “Hausa people,” File: AHODIST
14/1/436, National Archives, Enugu, records that the group of hunters and their aides
who settled at Elele had by 1935 nearly all returned to their original homes.
118 Laura and Paul Bohannan, The Tiv of Central Nigeria, 13 and 68.
119 Armstrong, “The Igala,” 82.
120 Armstrong, “The Idoma-speaking peoples,” 93.
121 S. O. Okocha, interview, Asaba, February 2003; and Elizabeth Isichei, A History of Ni-
geria (London: Longman, 1983), 195.
122 J. N. Young, “The Growth and Development of Enugu,” B.A. Project, University of Ni-
geria, Nsukka (1989), 2.

52
disclosed preceded other labourers into the new settlement, which decades later
became the capital of Eastern Province (Eastern Nigeria), developing into the
major city in Eastern Nigeria.
The different sources mentioned did not clarify the identity of the ivory
hunters in each of the ivory-hunting zones. However, the dairy of McGregor
Laird, which Adamu refers to provides information on the ivory trade from
which details on its chief architects, their areas of operation, and the periodicity
of the hunt, could be extrapolated:

When Laird and his associates started buying ivory from the peoples
of the Niger-Benue confluence area in the 1830s, ivory was easy to
procure because in most cases the chiefs and a few private individuals
had some tusks stored in their houses. But over the years the supply
along the river banks became exhausted and, with rising demand, reg-
ular hunting expeditions became necessary to maintain the level of
supply. Hausa and Nupe hunters joined the Jukun, Tiv, Idoma, Igbo
and Igbirra hunters in tracking down the elephants. By the last
quarter of the nineteenth century, the profitable hunting grounds
were not along or even near the banks of the rivers Niger and Benue
but the jungle forests to the south of the Benue and east of the Niger
123
below the confluence.

Although we do not know as much as we should about elephant hunting in

North Central, and Eastern, Nigeria, a number of issues are clear from the
124
statements above. Ivory trade would appear to have been relatively on a
moderate scale in the 1830s when such European traders as Laird and his asso-
ciates started buying it. This date also corresponds with the period efforts were
under way to effect the ban on the slave trade. Although the slave trade contin-
ued clandestinely for many decades afterwards, by this time it was already a
hazardous and costly venture for the slavers; and European traders were shift-
ing attention to alternative trade goods including ivory. It also appears that the
initial elephant hunters were drawn from the areas where the elephants were
found and these were: in Jukunland, Tivland, Idomaland, and Igbirraland all in
the Niger-Benue area (North Central Nigeria). The other two elephant bases

123 Adamu, The Hausa Factor, 105.

124 For more on elephant hunting in the nineteenth century see Edward Steinhart, “Ele-
phant Hunting in 19th-Century Kenya: Kamba Society and Ecology in Transforma-
tion,” The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 33 (2) 2000, 335-349.

53
outside this zone were Igboland and, from Partridge’s report of 1905, around
125
Ogoja (precisely in Obubura Hill District) in the territory of the Ekoi.
The entry in Mcgregor Laird’s journal would imply that in Igboland, as in
the hunting sites of North Central Nigeria, elephant hunting was done by the
indigenes until sometime later, at an undisclosed date, when Hausa and Nupe
hunters joined in the business. But before Hausa and Nupe hunters began to
operate alongside the locals in Oturkpo in Idomaland, they first functioned as
126
aides to local hunters. It could also have been the pattern by which they later
operated in Igboland when the focus was shifted to that area. If we consider
that “by the last quarter of the nineteenth century,” i.e. anytime between 1875
and 1899, “the profitable hunting grounds were … the jungle forests to the
south of the Benue and east of the Niger below the confluence” we can surmise
that it was sometime within this date that Nupe and Hausa hunters joined in
the hunting operation in Igboland and perhaps also in other parts of Eastern
Nigeria. This date also corresponds with Gavin and Oyemakinde’s report on
when the offshoot from Adamawa entered the southern periphery of Eastern
Nigeria through the Camerouns in search of slaves and ivory.
Elephants were not hunted in the Ekoi forest, south of Arum, in Cross River
Division (later renamed Ogoja Province) before 1898. Partridge, the Assistant
District Commissioner in Southern Nigeria, records: “Major Roupel tells me
that in 1895 he saw great herds of elephant in the district, and that in 1898 he
127
induced Hausas to come and hunt them.” On the invitation of Major Roupel,
hunters moved into the area from “Northern Nigeria, Lagos [Western Nigeria],
Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast.” Hunters from Lagos, Yorubaland, operated in
Obokpa, in Oban Hill District. These hunters first obtained the necessary li-
cense from the British colonial authority before they could operate in Ekoi
forest. By 1904, there were few elephants in this area as reported by Partridge:
“Southern Nigeria is a poor hunting-ground for the sportsman who seeks “big
game,” and the few large quadrupeds that it does possess are already decreas-
128
ing in numbers.”
In Abakaliki Division of Ogoja Province the situation appears a little differ-
129
ent. Nupe and Hausa hunters operated in this area in the first decade of the

125 Charles Partridge, Cross River Natives: Being Some Notes on the Primitive Pagans of
Obubura Hill District Southern Nigeria (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1905), 114-115.
126 Adamu, The Hausa Factor, 105.
127 Charles Partridge, Cross River Natives, 115.
128 Ibid.
129 Names of sub-units or divisions were changed severally during the colonial period. I

54
twentieth century. They did so at the invitation of the British colonial officers
acting on behalf of the local farmers who wanted the elephants cleared as they
posed serious threat to crops. Elephant hunting ended in Abakaliki by 1920, a
130
little later than it did in other parts of Eastern Nigeria. This may be the result
of the lateness of the commencement of operations here. Meanwhile, the
hunters moved into Abakaliki from Ekoiland precisely from Ejeke (or Ejege) on
131
the Okpauku River, north of the Cross River.
The need to service the ivory trade in its twilight years and later to contain
the menace of elephants on crops brought Nupe and Hausa hunters into the
forests of Igboland and its neighbors from probably 1890. The Igala were not
specifically mentioned as having hunted elephants anywhere in Eastern Niger-
ia although as is well known their close interactions with the Igbo dated two
132
centuries previously. The once lucrative ivory trade began to decline as,
wrote Laird, “supply along the river banks became exhausted” causing it, in its
later stages early in the twentieth century, to depend largely on the highly
wooded forests of the Ekoi and the Igbo. The very sites migrant hunters oper-
ated in were Obubura Hill (Ogoja) and Oban, Onitsha, and in locations where
Enugu and Port Harcourt later sprang up. Apart from those hunters from Nupe
and Hausaland, it was not clear if others from Lagos, Sierra Leone, and the
Gold Coast were also Muslims.
The colonial administration was interested in the hunt for revenue reasons
hence in 1901 Ralph Moor, the High Commissioner of the Protectorate of
Southern Nigeria, enacted “The Wild Animals, Birds, and Fish Preservation
Proclamation” to regulate hunting, specifying which animals, birds, and fish
should be hunted, when and how, and what royalties the government should
derive. Emphasis was given to elephants and their tusks: The Proclamation re-
quired that young elephants and female elephants, when accompanied by its
young, should not be hunted, captured, or killed. Matured elephants, however,
may be hunted “in such numbers and under such other conditions as the High
Commissioner may prescribe.” This appears also to have been intended as a

try to adopt the correct designation for the exact the date of reference. Before May
1906, Abakaliki Division was under Afikpo District in Cross River Division. From May
1906 to 1913, it became Abakaliki Division of Eastern Province. From 1914 until 1959,
the same area was known as Abakaliki Division of Ogoja Province, Eastern Nigeria.
130 Ottenberg, Farmers and Townspeople, 64. (For the date of their operation, see Adamu,
The Hausa Factor, 106)
131 Ibid., 77.
132 Igala fishermen operated extensively in Asaba in Anioma, even founding a fishing sett-
lement on the banks of the Niger.

55
Fig. 7: Elephant hunting sites in Eastern Nigeria

conservation policy in the face of the apparent absence of such considerations

by hunters. The Proclamation was the prelude for the licenses issued to migrant
hunters who hunted in the forest of Ekoi, south of Arum. It was clearly spe-
cified: “Nothing in this Proclamation or in any Order there-under shall prevent
any person from capturing or killing any animal seriously injuring crops, cattle,
133
land, or other property.” It does not appear likely that the indigenous hunters
operated on license in the same way as hunters from outside the region. The
exception made on grounds of damage to crops, cattle, land or property would
have provided a covering for their operations. In Oban District in particular
hunting was an esteemed profession and the indigenous people had a hunting

133 “Appendix No. I,” in Partridge, Cross River Natives, 308-313.

56
deity represented in masked forms with an axe held between its jaws to signify
its special fierceness. Talbot describes the Ekoi of Oban District as “a race of
hunters.” The towns of Niaji and Ndebbiji, he notes, were “the most celebrated
134
in the district for their skill in the chase.”
It was not only the Igbo of Abakaliki who needed elephants hunted off their
territories because of damages to crops. British colonial officers in the early
days of their administration of Eastern Nigeria had reasons to want the ele-
phants reduced if not entirely hunted off. We already have evidence of Major
Roupel who invited Hausa and other hunters in 1898 to hunt in Ekoi forest,
south of Arum, for reasons unspecified. Following his survey of the land of
Ekoi in 1907, Talbot writes with respect to Oban District:

All along one sees the spoor of various bush animals, which use the
road as well as their two-footed brothers. Antelope, buffalo, wild pig,
leopard, and elephant, all leave their traces—the latter too often in
broken bridges, which, alas! were not constructed with a view to such
135
heavy traffic.

Indeed persons of Northern Nigeria—from Adamawa, Nupe, and Hausaland—

were among the occasional visitors to the southern periphery of Eastern Niger-
ia. They came in connection with the trade in ivory. That their stay was fluid is
not in doubt. Notwithstanding, their presence alarmed European missionaries
working in the region. Mention has already been made of the earliest reference
to their presence in Calabar in 1890. This was followed by another remark
made fourteen years later by Bishop James Brown of the Niger Mission at their
presence at Calabar:

Mohammedanism, represented by a floating population from Lagos

and other places on the coast, has had a considerable growth since my
last visit in 1902. This religion has not yet attracted the native Calab-
ar. He rather looks down upon it and regards its worship and the cere-
136
monies connected with it as unmeaning.

134 Ibid, 642, 644.

135 P. A. Talbot, “The Land of the Ekoi, Southern Nigeria,” The Geographical Journal, Vol.
36, No. 6. (1910), 639.
136 “A Report of a Missionary Journey in Southern Nigeria by James Johnson, 1903–1904.”
G3A3/09-10 Niger Misson.

57
The Organization of the hunt

There is very little information on the organization of the hunt in Eastern Ni-
geria. Elephant hunting was a group affair. We learn with respect to the hunt-
ing by foreigners in Ekoi forest, south of Arum, that local custom required a
hunter to give to the chief in whose territory he killed an elephant one of the
tusks and certain portions of the highly esteemed flesh. This custom, observes
Partridge, was the cause of frequent disputes, most probably between the chiefs
and the foreign hunters.
Adamu’s fieldwork in Oturkpo and Idomaland, both of which lie north of
Igboland, suggests that financiers who were veteran hunters organized hunts.
Hausa hunting parties composed of hunters, scouts who surveyed the move-
ment of herds, and a mallam diviner who advised the leader of the group when
to dispatch a hunting party. Three financiers known to have operated in the
last quarter of the nineteenth century in the forests of Idomaland, Igboland, and
137 138
Ogoja (Ekoi) were Na-bakango from Kano city, Mallam Dikko (Diko), and
Bagobiri from Gobir. A small group of hunters from around River Niger assum-
ed by colonial authorities to be Hausa, according to Patridge, and led by Sarikin
Muru lived for a while at Nishi Atam, on the right bank of the Cross River. By
1903 they had moved to Ejege from where some later moved to Abakaliki to
139
hunt at the invitation of the farmers in Abakaliki Division. Eventual settle-
ment of these migrant hunters at Abakaliki would however await a latter date
being motivated by reasons other than hunting. This group of hunters would
from all likelihood be of Nupe origin as their homeland was situated around the
Niger and they were said to have come to the Cross River by walking from
140
Ogrugu (Ogurugu) on the Anambra creek. For the time they settled at Nishi
Atam, they paid an annual rent of 20 pieces of cloth worth £6 (pounds Sterling)
to the chiefs of the town. Tusks realized from the Cross River District were

137 “Status of Hausa Chiefs,” File: AHODIST 14/1/436 (1935), National Archives, Enugu.
138 Adamu, The Hausa Factor, 106. Na-bakango hunted in Idoma territory for about 15 to
20 years before the establishment of colonial rule in Idomaland around 1909. He died
shortly after the beginning of colonial rule in the area. Dikko is the same as the Diko in
colonial records who in 1891 settled his family at Elele, some fifty-six kilometers north
of where Port Harcourt later sprang up and where he died in 1920, and Bagobiri from
Gobir in Sokoto Emirate who operated in Ogoja.
139 Partridge, Cross River Natives, 116. See also Ottenberg, Farmers and Townspeople.
140 Partridge, 116.

58
transported back to Northern Nigeria or to trade outposts in German Cameroun
141
that was nearer to the division.
That these hunters from Northern Nigeria were Muslims would seem not to
be in doubt. Patridge had a high estimation of them, anticipating that their
ordered existence and deference to authority might rub off on the local people
of the Cross River interior. Could this perhaps be the main motivation why
their presence was courted for the Cross River interior? He writes:

The hour or so I spent in their clean settlement at Ejege in November

1903, carried me back in remembrance to the compounds of Mamadu
Latopa of Idah and Sabba of Alabeta. These little Mohammedan com-
munities [Idah and Alabeta] are oases of comparatively high culture
in the midst of a desert of pagan primitiveness. Their superior form of
religion with its high code of self-denial and morality, their decent
picturesque clothes (breeches, flowing robe, and turban) their well-
built and well-kept dwellings, their knowledge of arts and comforts
unknown to the pagan natives are everyday exercising an influence
for good upon the people among whom they have taken up their
abode. They are courteous and dignified in their demeanor and al-
ways anxious to learn and willing to carry out the wishes of the gov-
142
ernment…

Later, Patridge would wish that “if it is ordained that [the Cross River peoples]
shall be “civilized” out of their present condition, the men will adopt the grace-
ful draperies of Mohammedan Africans … and the women the very becoming
143
series of cloths or wrappers worn by Hausa and Yoruba women.” Sentiments
such as were expressed by Partridge was very common among British colonial
officials in Nigeria who, thoroughly enamoured with Muslim way of life did
not disguise their contempt of non-Muslim groups in Nigeria, believing rather
that forcing them into close contact with Muslims would facilitate their cultural
144
development. The eloquent praise and admiration of Muslims by colonial of-

141 Ibid.
142 Ibid., 116-117.
143 Ibid., 161.
144 Ubah, writing on the marginalization of non-Muslims of Northern Nigeria by British
colonial administration, notes “The argument put forward in support of this viewpoint
was that the Fulani system of administration was of superior quality to that of non-
Muslim populations. The expectation was that such imposition would be a blessing to
the people concerned as it is believed that this would raise their level of cultural deve-
lopment.” Ubah, “Colonial administration,” 134.

59
Fig. 8: Southern Nigeria showing the provinces in Eastern region by 1925

ficials stands in contrast with Christian missionary views of the same group.
The following remark by George Basden of the Niger Mission in 1910 on mis-
sion work in Onitsha exemplifies the unflattering assessment of Muslims by
missionaries who esteemed the local population morally better:

At present Islam has not touched the Ibo and will not… Give the Ibo
the choice and most assuredly he will choose Christianity. Why has
not Mohammedanism won converts from among the Ibos yet? Be-
cause the Igbo is too sturdy of character. He is also a cute observer of
things as they really are. He judges by results. He takes note of the
145
cheating in trade, the deceit and lying of the professors of Islam.

Nupe and Hausa hunters who operated in the jungles of Onitsha, Ogoja,
around Enugu and Port Harcourt did not settle permanently and often did not
146
spend any considerable time during each visit. They would come and go, pos-
sibly after a successful hunting expedition, to dispose of their catch before an-
other visit. Adamu notes that each hunting party might consist of about fifty

145 G3A3/011-12, Niger Mission, November 1910.

146 Alhaji Sule, interview cited.

60
persons and might be away for up to one month before returning to their
147
homes as the Hausa rarely totally emigrated. Diko’s party, according to Aliru
Diko his son, comprised forty men who moved in groups because of unsafe
highways. Elephant hunting began to come to an end early in the twentieth
century when elephants became scarce in Eastern Nigeria and at which point
an unspecified number of hunters and their aides had returned home. Aliru
Diko reports in a letter to the District Officer at Ahoada in Owerri Province:

My father settled at Elele with many Hausas but now many are dead
and some have gone to their homes, with the exception of two others
148
in addition to Mallam Agu, a woman and a man.
149
Some who joined Diko at Elele were from Bida in Nupeland. These hunters
and their aides moved down on foot or on horses, and some rode their cows
down, in some cases covering a distance of over 600 square miles to the South-
150
east. Yoruba, Sierra Leonean, and Ghanaian hunters who came from Lagos
and Ilorin covered less distances, sometimes traveling by river transport to the
Southeast. By the end of the first decade of the twentieth century most foreign
hunters had returned home. Those who did not, quite few in number it would
seem, settled in Eastern Nigeria seeking employment with the colonial author-
ities as opportunities for them materialized, and taking up trade. Diko, Aliru’s
father, who settled at Elele in 1891, was described as one of the Africans who
took part in the military subjugation of Arochukwu, Bende, Ahoada, Aba, and
parts of Ibibioland between 1901 and 1902. He also took part in the “Expedition
of Gun Destruction,” a colonial subjugation offensive by which the British re-
lieved the local people of any form of firearm or weapon after military con-
151
quest. Dodo, a former hunting colleague of Diko, also said to have been his
former slave, acted as guide for the British expeditions to Allua, Igrita, Mbodo,
and Ebeda, all Ikwerre (Igbo) communities of Ahoada Division, now in Rivers
152
State. The presence of Hausa soldiers in the 1901-1902 Aro expedition,
christened “a war to end all wars” is significant to our examination. It was the

147 Adamu, The Hausa Factor, 15 and 105.

148 “Status of Hausa Chiefs,” paragraph 6.
149 Ibid.
150 Prothero, Migrant Labour, 36.
151 “Status of Hausa Chiefs,” paragraphs 6 and 20.
152 “A Report on the History and Organization of the Ikwerri People living in the Elele and
Nkarahia Native Court Areas: Ahoada Division,” File: ADODIST 14/1/217, National
Archives, Enugu.

61
first project by British colonizers that brought into Igboland a considerable
153
number of Hausa, some 317 men. Northern Nigeria Protectorate then a separ-
ate colony from the Southern Nigeria Protectorate contributed this regiment of
Hausa soldiers. In the years following, the colonial administrators of Southern
Nigeria would depend as much on Hausa soldiers as on Yoruba soldiers in sub-
jecting Igboland to British rule. For the periods they were stationed in Igboland
Hausa soldiers enhanced the minimal number of other Hausa and northern
Muslim migrants, which included hunters and traders. One would expect after-
wards clear interactional distance between the soldiers and the Igbo whom
they militarily subdued as the various expeditions had been instructed “to sup-
press barbarous native customs, to collect all rifles and cap guns from natives.”
154
Accoding to a report “The military conquest of Igboland was a stunning ex-
perience for the Igbo. Burning of houses, farms, barns and seizure or killing of
155
domestic animals characterized the British expeditions and patrols.” Such an
experience was unlikely to endear the conquered with their conqurors.
Diko founded the oldest Hausa settlement at Elele in 1891 close to where
the city of Port Harcourt sprang up. By 1920, giving a space of twenty-nine
years, there were twelve “strangers’ settlements” in Eastern Nigeria as the table
below shows. Not all the settlements were of Hausa and Nupe origin. Yoruba
migrants from Ilorin founded a couple of settlements. A former Yoruba hunter
first settled in Oguta in southern Igboland while the Ibagwa-nkwo settlement
in northern Igboland was credited to Yoruba traders. Hunters and other mi-
grants temporarily settled in a few places not indicated in the table below.
156
These were Obopka in Oban Hill District where Yoruba hunters operated and
Nishi Atam on the bank of the Cross River but these settlements broke up
eventually when their settlers returned back home or joined other settlements.
There were relocations from among the early settlers who lived at Elele.
157
Settlements at Owerri, Omokun, Port Harcourt, Aba, Umuahia, Uzuakoli, and
Afikpo Road, on land belonging to the Ishiagu people of Aba, began as as satel-

153 Mabel Ukagwu, “The Development of Cattle Trade in Imo State with Special Reference
to Umuahia-Ibeku up to 1960.” M. A. Dissertation, University of Nigeria (1987), 44; and,
I. R. A. Ozigbo, A History of Igboland in the 20th Century (Enugu: Snaap Press, 1999), 33.
154 Ozigbo, A History of Igboland, 37.
155 J. E. N. Nwanguru, Aba and British Rule: The Evolution and Administrative Develop-
ments of the Old Aba Division of Igboland 1896–1960 (Enugu: Santana Press, 1973), 73.
156 Partridge, Cross River Natives, 321.
157 Strangers’ settlements in Aba quadrupled over a number of decades. Three were occu-
pied by northerners of mixed ethnic origin and one by Yoruba migrants. Baba Ibrahim,
Sarikin Hausawa, interview, Aba, July 2003.

62
Fig. 9: Strangers’ Settlements in Eastern Nigeria between 1891 and 1920
Division Settlement Town of Year of Name of Remarks
Origin settlement founder
Owerri Owerri Kano 1903 Yabiya (Yahia) Yabiya later returned
to Kano

Oguta Ilorin 1902 Ajala

Degema Elele Kano 1891 Diko Elephant hunter

Omokun Kano Unknown* Kasimu Agu Elephant hunter who

came with Diko and
first lived at Elele

Portharcourt Zaria 1917 Halihu (Alilu) A Tailor

Okigwe Okigwi Borno 1909 Sali Oseni came in 1913

Uzuakoli Sokoto –– Momo and first lived in Afikpo
Umuahia Kano 1915 Oseni Road (in Aba) and
Afikpo Road Gombe –– Jibrin Abakaliki before
moving to Umuahia

Aba Aba Bauchi 1910–12 Bello Land on which the

settlement developed
was purchased in July
1936**

Ogoja Ikom Bauchi –– Boyi Abakaliki settlement

Abakpa- –– 1918 –– was started by Hausa
Abakaliki traders operating in
the Cross River area
at the invitation of
Hausa soldiers
temporarily stationed
at Abakaliki***

Obudu**** Abakpa- –– 1911 –– Exact year of be-

Obudu ginning of settlement
unknown, but was in
existence by 1911
census with 460
settlers.

Nsukka***** Ibagwa-aka Bida (Nupe) 1916 ––

Ilorin/Oshun 1918
(Yorubaland) Baba Aridjo

* Agu came with Diko and Dodo. Dodo was reported to have been Diko’s slave who be-
came the leader of the settlement after the death of Diko.
** Baba Ibrahim, Sarikin Hausawa of Aba, interview, July 2005.
*** Ottenberg, Farmers and Townspeople, 62.
**** Information on this settlement came from “Report on the Southern Nigeria Census,
1911,” File: 4179/1912, National Archives, Enugu. There is no data on when the settle-
ment was founded, but by 1911, its population stood at 460 persons.
***** A second settlement at Nsukka Division would have been that of Aduku at Amufie,
Enugu Ezike. However, the special circumstance of Aduku’s adoption into Enugu Ezike
community changed his status to that of an indigene of Enugu Ezike. At a much later
date, a strangers’ settlement developed at Ogrute in Enugu Ezike.

63
 158
lite outposts by persons who came with or later joined Diko at Elele. These
subsequent arrivals, encouraged to migrate by news of commercial prospects,
first lived at Elele or Owerri before exploiting the opportunity provided by the
construction of roads and railway from 1910 onwards to found new sites in
places like Obudu and Ikom where they could operate as Sakirin Hausawa and
enjoy direct patronage from colonial authorities for services such as providing
159
labor from their own hometowns for the colonial administration. Mallam
Halilu, on arrival in Eastern Nigeria in 1917, heard of plans to build Port Har-
court and volunteered to provide 500 laborers from his hometown of Zaria. He
left Owerri where he first settled with Yahia and moved to Port Harcourt to be-
come the first Hausa settler, but recognized Dodo as the leader of Hausa mi-
160
grants in this part of the region. All subsequent founders of the satellite
camps began as Sarikin Hausawa in their settlements and as representatives of
those who settled in the area before them. Strangers’ settlements also sprang up
at Onitsha and Enugu owing to infrastructural developments mainly the build-
ing of roads and railway and the establishment of government stations, all of
161
which made trade possibilities in these places attractive.

158 These towns grew as railway settlements.

159 “Status of Hausa Chiefs.”
160 Ibid.
161 A note on the terminology used with respect to strangers’ settlements: Settlements
founded and populated by persons of Northern Nigeria origin were indiscriminately re-
ferred to, by colonial authorities in Eastern Nigeria, as “Hausa settlements” or for spe-
cificity as “Hausa and Nupe settlements.” Today, they are more commonly called Hau-
sa settlements. In reality these settlements took in persons of Northern Nigeria origin,
including those from and around Bornu and Adamawa, and excluded the Igala and
Idoma with whom the Igbo have had centuries of mutually benefiting contacts and
who, in most cases, lived among the Igbo. This situation was made possible by the ab-
sence of any religious barrier between them. Yoruba migrants, however, tended to live
in separate settlements away from migrants from Northern Nigeria but still close
enough to them. In Abakaliki Division, for instance, they formed a settlement within
the original Hausa settlement.
When these strangers’ settlements were not called Hausa-Nupe settlements, they were
referred to as Abakpa—a word with a curious and as yet unclear origin. The Igbo, Efik,
and Ekoi used this term, and also the colonial officials, but the northerners called their
settlements Ngwa-Hausa, meaning “where the Hausa settle.” Two main threads of
meaning will at the moment be associated with Abakpa. One refers to the name of the
Qua or Kwa, an Ekoi group, found around Calabar but who later were displaced by the
Efik. Talbot’s report suggests that while Abakpa was the name Efik gave this Ekoi
group they met around Calabar, it was not necessarily the name the group went by as
they were known to have called themselves Qua, probably after the Qua River. The
other is the terminology by which the ethnic communities in the Benue River Valley

64
 The Southern Nigeria 1911 Census Report provides data on Hausa presence
in Eastern Nigeria by this date. Persons of Northern Nigeria origin at Abakpa
in Obudu Division and at an Hausa settlement in Ogoja Division (exact loca-
tion unspecified) numbered 460 and 300 respectively. The exception was Onit-
sha Division, then in the Central Province, where no migrant from Northern
Nigeria was listed but rather some 2,153 Igala indigenes from North Central Ni-
162
geria. The actual counting of persons and the language listing in the Central
and Eastern Provinces reinforce each other. Igala (written Igarra) was the only
non-indigenous language listed to have been in use in Awka, Onitsha, and Udi
163
Districts of Eastern Nigeria. Hausa language was not listed as used by locals
or strangers in the much larger Eastern Province by 1911.
The census report presupposes a number of facts: it is either that those
Hausa hunters who settled at Elele, Owerri, Oguta, and Omokun returned to
their towns by the time of the census or that they moved to Ogoja or Obudu
where they were counted with other persons of Northern Nigeria origin settled
there. The important fact, though, is that by 1911, there were 760 persons from
northeast and northwest Nigeria in the entire Eastern regionand these were
found at Abakpa Obudu and at the Hausa settlement at Ogoja. No other town
reported in the colonial records and from oral sources to have been settled by
strangers from Northern Nigeria was listed as having any stranger in 1911. The
implication would be that these early settlements were very fluid and did not
always have settlers.
After the census a new Hausa settlement named Abakpa sprang up in
Abakaliki. This settlement started at the instance of Hausa soldiers in the
Southern Nigeria Regiment who were stationed in the town in 1911. They were
first quartered in Abakaliki town from 1905 to 1908 during the colonial offens-
ive to subdue the Cross River basin region and open it up for trade to and from

(North Central Nigeria) addressed the Hausa. Samuel Crowther, in his diary of the ex-
pedition up the Niger, recorded that the Igbirra, Idoma, Kororofa, and others found
above River Niger, called the Hausa Abakpa. (Jukun rendering of the name was Abak-
wa and it was for the original Hausa settlers in their midst.) Besides these two threads
of meaning, Abakpa was the name of an Igala town on the boundary between Igala
and Idomaland. From all indications, Abakpa became for the people of Eastern Nigeria
what Sabon Gari has been to Muslims of Northern Nigeria. Both were settlements of
“native strangers” as the British called persons from other parts of Nigeria who were
not indigenes of a given area.
162 “Southern Nigeria Census Report,” File 4179/1912, National Archives, Kaduna.
163 Ibid., 10-55. Igala was also listed for Agbor, Aboh, Asaba, and Kwale Districts of the
Central Province. These territories belong today in Anioma.

65
 164
Calabar. These Hausa soldiers deployed to Abakaliki in 1911 at the instance
of the Izzi-Ezza boundary dispute invited fellow Hausa traders living in the
Cross River region to Abakaliki. The traders and their leader, Sarikin Bambo
from Zaria, moved to Abakaliki, living within the government station, until
after World War I. With the help of the colonial administration, they leased
land for a settlement from the Agbaja and Nkaliki, owners of the land on which
Abakaliki town developed, and named it Abakpa Abakaliki. These traders were
later joined by traders from other parts of Northern Nigeria and also from Yor-
ubaland in Western Nigeria. Abakpa Abakaliki settlement developed into an
active trade and service centre for colonial personnel, having also in residence
wives of Hausa traders and hunters, Muslim religious teachers, and prostitutes,
165
altogether numbering some 300 persons by 1918.
The general use of the term Hausa for persons whose homelands were in
territory above the rivers Benue and Niger confuses the actual identity of the
individuals in question. Early records were frequently indiscriminate in regard-
ing persons from around and above the rivers Niger and Benue as Hausa while
in fact they may not be at all. This situation further confuses issues as the Igbo
in particular have long taken it for granted that Hausa and Muslim are syn-
onymous, erroneously projecting the view that whoever is Hausa is automatic-
ally Muslim, a summation that does not do justice to the considerable popula-
tions of Hausa, Fulani, and Nupe that were not Islamized and therefore non-
Muslim. The inter-ethnic misconstruction caused by this confusion of terms is
currently all too obvious in Igbo responses to Islam as would be discussed later.

Forms of interaction with migrants

There is little information on the relationship of the elephant hunters with their
host communities. Ethnographic studies and Adamu’s account do not suggest
any close interaction between Nupe, Hausa, and Yoruba hunters on one hand
and the peoples of Eastern Nigeria on the other capable of engendering conver-
sion to Islam in Onitsha, Ogoja, Enugu, Port Harcourt or Abakaliki where these
hunter-traders operated and where Muslim soldiers were quartered before 1920.
Close contacts when it did occur, like when mutual economic interests brought

164 Ottenberg, Farmers and Townspeople, 52. Adamu, p. 16, argues that the Hausa in the
colonial army were not original Hausa as popularly assumed but rather freed slaves of
Hausa people who had been “Hausanized” and therefore spoke the Hausa language.
The same Hausanized ex-slaves joined the colonial army.
165 Ottenberg, Farmers and Townspeople, 62-63.

66
them together as it occasionally did in the markets, were through the agency of
166
middlemen. The major middlemen functionaries in Eastern Nigeria before
1905 were the Aro. Ottenberg referring to their activities writes: “Serving as
middlemen between the Igbo interior and coastal peoples in the Abakaliki re-
167
gion, they settled near or at existing markets…” (Note also Horton’s already
mentioned remark that Aro could have had only the most indirect commercial
168
links with Islamized groups to the north.) The Aro functioned for much of its
pre-colonial and early colonial eras as middlemen in many well known Igbo
and non-Igbo markets. Nupe traders, according to the journal of the Lander
brothers, held sway in 1830 at Adamugu and Ikiri, north and south of Idah re-
spectively alongside Igbo traders from Bonny. These were centres for trade in
169
slaves and ivory in Igalaland. Partridge wrote about the Efik who competed
with the Aro on the Calabar estuary:

The Efiks have for several generations been the chief medium through
whom Europeans have traded with the numerous tribes that inhabit
the banks and inland parts of the Cross River from its mouth to the
Anglo-German boundary, their language has become the lingua fran-
ca of the Calabar and Cross River divisions, and their laws, customs,
fetishes, and fashions have been adopted by many of the up-river
peoples. According to Sir Harry Johnston, they are allied in language,
170
and no doubt, in origin to the Ibos of the Niger Delta.

Partridge further asserts that Efiks and Inokuns (another term for the Aro) have
so long been the middlemen trading between the European factories of Calabar
and the local markets of the Cross River that “both objected to opening up of
the country which would bring the bush natives into direct trade with Euro-
171
pean merchants.”
Adamu’s study informs us that the commercial networks of the Hausa until
the end of the nineteenth century went in all directions but far away from
Eastern Nigeria. Traders who ventured too far south operated at Bida and
166 Dauda Ojobe explained that the desire to navigate around the middleman system,
which dominated inter-group trade relations, was what motivated Aduku, the Nupe
trader who introduced Islam in Enugu Ezike, to move southwards from Igala to Enugu
Ezike in 1919.
167 Ottenberg, Farmers and Townspeople, 27
168 Robin Horton, “On the Rationality of Conversion” Part I, 229.
169 Armstrong, “The Igala,” 82.
170 Partridge, Cross River Natives, 32-33
171 Ibid., 74

67
Lafia, eventually extending to Igala and Idoma markets from where they sent
their goods to Lagos. At these markets the Igala and Idoma were the chief
172
middlemen. Meanwhile, Aro trade networks went southwards towards the
Atlantic through the Bight of Biafra, which was the normal exit route for sla-
ves, their major export. Quite naturally, slaves from Northern Nigeria passed
through Hausa dealers into the hands of Aro traders at markets located in Igu-
male in Idomaland and also through Igalaland. That northward trade traffic as
we have seen in the preceding pages was not as strong as its southward coun-
terpart towards the Atlantic. With much of the interactions between Igbo and
Hausa carried out through Igala and Idoma middlemen, Hausa traders failed to
influence their Aro trade contacts whose belief in their indomitable deity Ibini
Ukpabi and the economic advantages of that deity allowed no room for accept-
ance of a rival religious worldview. Aro in effect would have had little if any
inclination to jeopardize their economy then based on their deity and their
skillful manipulation of the fear of neighboring peoples and trading partners for
it.
The trade contacts early in the twentieth century depended also on Aro as
leading middlemen. Just as Ibini Ukpabi continued to be central to the Aro trad-
ing empire so also was the belief in Allah for Hausa Muslim operations, eco-
nomic and otherwise. Again even at this point there was nothing to suggest
that the Aro showed the acceptance of another religious opinion except Chris-
tianity and this refers also to the decades after the destruction of Ibini Ukpabi
173
by the colonial government. Partridge who applauded “the great intelligence
of the Aro” writes in 1905 both about them as well as the Ibibio and Ekoi of
Calabar Division and indirectly of the Hausa and Igala:

I met some of them far away in the interior of the Ikwe country,
where they are called Inokuns, and where their higher culture and in-
telligence and superior clothing easily distinguish them from the local
natives, from whom they differ almost as much as the Hausa traders
from the pagan Igarras of the Niger. I found these Inokuns always
pleasant to deal with—intractable, intelligent, and clean, and appar-
174
ently, trusted and liked by the wild tribes among whom they settled.

Until 1910, therefore, the leading middlemen in Eastern Nigeria were the Aro,
followed by the Efik. With these groups firmly in control of trade around the
172 Adamu, The Hausa factor. See illustration on pages 64-65.
173 Partridge, Cross River Natives, 52-53.
174 Partridge, 52-53, 67

68
Cross River, the Calabar estuary, and on the tributaries of the Niger onwards to
the Atlantic Ocean there were hardly possibilities of close interaction between
the migrants from Northern Nigeria, as yet very few in number, and the Igbo,
Efik, Ibibio, and Ijaw.
There must have been some understanding between the hunters who first
came to Eastern Nigeria and their host communities in whose jungles they eked
out a living. Although the hunting parties were few and therefore their popula-
tion insignificant in relation to their hosts, it would seem probable that if there
was any mixing between the indigenes and the hunters, it would have led to
one or two things: a stated or unstated understanding that the hunters do not
interfere with the indigenous customs of their hosts, and, some curiosity – with
or without any admiration – over each other’s practices. Going by customary
practice in the Southeast, no stranger from one village group or town had the
right to settle in another except on permission. In Igboland approval was “given
to those who are ready to recognize the town as befriending them but is re-
fused to any who will not give proof that they will be orderly law-abiding in-
175
habitants.” The exception to this practice involved forceful displacements of
militarily weak groups by stronger groups like in Abakaliki Division where the
stronger and numerically dominant Igbo dispossessed some Cross River groups
176
of their lands in the attempt to address their land scarcity.
A report on Abakpa settlement at Abakaliki division of Ogoja Province be-
fore 1920 sheds some light into the nature of the interaction between the north-
east Igbo and Hausa strangers up to this date:

The Izi, and probably some Ezza, used to come to the growing Abakpa
market to sell yams and other foods, but the relationship with
Abakpa’s inhabitants was at best a shy one. Until the end of World
War I, Muslim hunters, probably Nupe and Hausa, mainly from Bida
and Sokoto, brought ivory and elephant tails to sell at the Abakpa
market, where among others, wealthy Izi and Ezza bought them for
ceremonial dress.
Muslim traders living in Abakpa married Muslim women from the
north. At this time the men did not attempt to proselytize. Females

175 “Minute M.P. 3402/03 of 12.10.1903 by the Acting High Commissioner Leslie Probyn in
the file Aro Dist. 1/7/33,” National Archives, Enugu. Taken from A.E. Afigbo, Ropes of
Sand, 255.
176 Ottenberg, Farmers and Townspeople, 9-10.

69
 rarely traveled with the trading groups, except as wives or as prosti-
177
tutes.

Traders from Northern Nigeria who operated in the Eastern region before the
1920s organized their businesses very professionally, staying at settlements be-
longing to northerners, often with persons from their own home areas and usu-
ally of similar religion. They rendered considerable help to each other provid-
178
ing credit facilities and interpretive skills. Lovejoy describes each satellite set-
tlement as largely independent of the non-Muslim society. The Hausa commer-
cial settlement also functioned as a twin town to an indigenous administrative
179
center.
One other factor that determined the nature of interactions between mi-
grant communities and their hosts before 1920 was the issue of ethnic pride.
Most early migrants to Eastern Nigeria were connected with the colonial gov-
ernment either as soldiers, servants, or as other employees. Some ambiguity ex-
isted over the status of the local people on one hand vis-à-vis the African work-
ers of the colonial regime along with the Hausa and Nupe traders on the other.
Using the experience in Abakaliki Division, where from 1905 Hausa and Yor-
uba in the colonial army moved into the Division to effect the subjugation of
the local people, they looked upon the indigenes unfavourably. Ottenberg re-
cords:

The Hausa, Fulani, Yoruba, Bini and Efik at the government station
generally considered themselves socially and culturally superior to the
rural people: They saw themselves as associated with the British with
whom they worked, coming among rural peoples they considered to
be scantily dressed, living a simple rural village life, and having
strange rituals, views not too dissimilar from the British towards
180
Abakaliki’s inhabitants.

The aloofness of migrant settlers towards the inhabitants would at best have
been reciprocated resulting undoubtedly in the Igbo of Abakaliki Division hav-
ing very limited contact with migrants at the Abakpa settlement. Karigoudar
writing about the same migrant settlement in Abakaliki Division in the 1920s
notes: “No Ibo lived there at this time, as far as is known, though some began

177 Ibid., 64-5.

178 Interviews with Barrister Aduku, Dauda Ojobe, and Alhaji Mutalib (2003).
179 Lovejoy, Ecology and Ethnography of Muslim trade, 156-58.
180 Ottenberg, Farmers and Townspeople, 60.

70
trading foodstuffs with the Northerners, but these local Ibo were too shy to en-
181
gage in large-scale long-term economic relationships.” Fights and killings
commonly occurred at Abakpa among the Igbo about this time and must have
been of such intensity that it remained in the memories of those who witnessed
182
them as late as 1960.
183
When elephant hunting in Eastern Nigeria ceased by 1920, hunters who
remained in Igboland turned their attention to other lucrative engagements in-
cluding trade in horses and cattle and in such agricultural goods as palm oil
and kernels, which along with rubber, were major commodities in markets in
184
Nsukka and Owerri Divisions and also in the delta region. Hunters like Diko
of Katsina and Kasumu Agu had come down with a few herds of cattle. They
switched over to herding and marketing of cattle meat besides seeking for prof-
itable engagement as labourers, guides or soldiers with the colonial administra-
tion. Cattle meat was first sold at Okigwe at the military barracks in 1906 but
was soon discontinued when the soldiers were moved away. Beef would again
be sold in Nkalagu in 1914 and at Umuahia in 1918. Ottenberg shows that
Nkalagu market was “of great interest as it seems to be the meeting place of
185
north and south.” It was held every four days. An important trade commod-
ity was the horse, which came from the north. Locally made cotton goods were
also common and cattle were sold in some numbers. Umuahia eventually be-
came the major cattle centre of Eastern Nigeria feeding lesser centers such as
Abakaliki, Uzuakoli, Owerri, and Enugu. From these centers, the rest of the re-
gion was served with cattle and the by products. All over the Southeast, Hausa
migrants dominated the cattle business and the cattle trade became the catalyst
for the multiplication of the Hausa and Nupe and other strangers’ settlements
in the region.
One quality of the cattle trade was its domination by Hausa traders and its
dependence on the Hausa language. Ukagwu’s study of the cattle trade in East-
ern Nigeria from 1906 reveals the impact of language restrictions on inter-eth-
nic relations early in the twentieth century. For the reason that the language of

181 Ishwaran Karigoudar, Politics and Social Change (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1967), 180.
182 Ottenberg, Farmers and Townspeople, 67.
183 Ibid., 64.
184 The Nigerian delta region was formerly within the Oil Rivers zone. The area was a ma-
jor producer of palm oil in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and has since re-
mained so. The five ethnic groups under discussion in this chapter fall within the area
designated by the British from 1885 to 1893 as the Oil Rivers.
185 Ottenberg, Farmers and Townspeople, 61-62.

71
trade was Hausa, transactions were done through interpreters “who spoke the
Igbo and (sometimes Ibibio) and Hausa languages.” The relevance of these in-
terpreters to the trade was such that they “received a commission of about 6
186
pence … from both the seller and the buyer for every cow that was sold.” Al-
though indigenes attempted to learn Hausa for trade purposes, Hausa traders
on their part were unenthusiastic about learning Igbo and other languages used
in Eastern Nigeria. This attitude both enhanced their cultural exclusivity and
created enough distance between them and their hosts. Ukagwu concludes: “In
187
any case, the Hausa merchants did not embark on any proselytization…”
In conclusion, this chapter illuminates our understanding of the progression
of Islam to Eastern Nigeria. First, elephant hunting parties in search of ivory
tusks migrated from North and North Central Nigeria to areas beyond the
River Benue beginning from the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In 1898
hunters from Northern and North Central Nigeria, Lagos, Sierra Leone, and the
Gold Coast were invited by Major Roupel, a British official, to Ogoja Province
of Eastern Nigeria to hunt elephants. They duly obtained the necessary license
from the colonial authority. From 1898 to 1904 the “great herds of elephant in
Ogoja Province” became extinct from hunting. The end of elephant hunting
saw the switch to the trade in horses and cattle. Second, Hausa soldiers of the
colonial army operated in Eastern Nigeria but had no contact with the local
people outside the battlefield. In 1905 more native strangers from Northern Ni-
geria were encouraged to visit Eastern Nigeria in the hope that their higher
civilization, deriving from “their superior form of religion” and their willing-
ness “to carry out the wishes of the government” might rob off on the indigen-
ous peoples of Eastern Nigeria. Third, the nature of Igbo–Hausa interactions
was determined by the “native-settler” identities created by British officials.
Settler communities in Eastern Nigeria were very fluid even beyond the 1920s.
Until 1920 Eastern Nigeria witnessed only the individual and sporadic migra-
tion of Muslims into its territory. It was by no means subjected to any activity
suggestive of a spread of Islam and resulting in the form of conversions or the
development of Islamic infrastructures and institutions anywhere in that re-
gion. The next chapter will consider the emergence of Islam in the Igbo home-
land of Eastern Nigeria in the 1930s.

186 Ukagwu, “The Development of the Cattle Trade,” 99.

187 Ibid., 146-47.

72
CHAPTER 2
THE BEGINNINGS OF ISLAM IN IGBOLAND, 1920–1950

“If you go to Ibagwa they will tell you that it is the first place Islam
came to. When you meet people from Eluagu Obukpa, they will tell
you this is the first place Islam came to. I do not know if these claims
are political. You also come to Enugu Ezike they will tell you this is
the first place. Remember that at that time there was little communic-
ation between groups… You cannot actually say it started here or
there but we know that these village groups are very close to each oth-
er… What we also know is that the first place Islam came to was
188
Nsukka Division because of its closeness to Northern Nigeria.”

Islam was first acknowledged in the Nsukka area of northern Igboland. This is
the closest part of Eastern Nigeria to North Central Nigeria and became import-
ant thereafter as the place where “Islamic influence in Igboland first began to
189
be felt.” A number of Igbo Muslim interviewees were of the opinion that Is-
lam was extended to Nsukka Division in the nineteenth century. Some sugges-
ted that this happened in the eighteenth century through the agency of Hausa
Muslim traders. In 2003 Sheikh Idoko reports:

Islam came to Nsukka area around the eighteenth century. That was
before the arrival of Europeans or Christian missionaries. The people
they came into contact with belonged to the Igbo religion. Those who
came with this noble message of Allah came for trade or Sufism. Cer-
tainly that was not primarily aimed at propagation. It was by coincid-
ence that people who had dealings with them embraced Islam. Be-
cause they were not so eager to propagate Islam, the spirit of religious
190
propagation was lost with them.

Persons who claimed an early date for Islam in Igboland were influenced by the
191
writings of Abdurrahman Doi. Doi theorized that the proximity of Nsukka to

188 Sheikh Adam Idoko, chief imam of University of Nigeria, Nsukka, mosque and presi-
dent of the League of Islamic Scholars and Missionaries of Eastern Nigeria, interview,
Nsukka, May 2003.
189 Abdurrahman Doi, Islam in Nigeria (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1984), 169.
190 Sheikh Idoko, interview cited. These same remarks were published in “Islamic Propaga-
tion Activities in Eastern Nigeria,” Muslim Newsforum, December 1998, p. 7.
191 I observed in the course of fieldwork that the claims made by Igbo and non-Igbo Mus-

73
Igala and Idoma and to the trade routes that traversed these areas in the nine-
teenth century (in addition to the trade interactions of Nsukka Igbo with these
neighbors) made possible the introduction of Islam in Nsukka Division by Nupe
192
and Hausa traders. Our investigation in the previous chapter does not au-
thenticate the possibility of the introduction of Islam in Eastern Nigeria in the
eighteenth or nineteenth century. Doi’s claim and similar others dealing with
the introduction of Islam in Igboland and therefore in Eastern Nigeria would be
examined here.

Fig. 10: Old Nsukka Division

In a sixteen-page article based on personal observations and inquiries made

in the mid 1960s and after, Doi discussed Islam in Igboland concentrating on
the beginnings of Islamic influence in Igboland, the arrival of Christian mis-
sions, the beginning of regular Islamic activities, and the “Emergence of Islam
193
towards the End of the Civil War.” His very informative and honest account

lims of Islam beginning earlier than was historically factual have their origin on Doi’s
writing. Sheikh Idoko referred me to Doi’s work as proof of their assertion. Doi’s
claims of a nineteenth century date for the beginning of Islam in Nsukka Division in
particular and Southeast Nigeria in general is not substantiated by written, oral, and
archival records.
192 Doi depended completely on the introductory remarks of Shelton for the statement on
trade routes that traversed Nsukka Division. See A. Shelton, The Igbo–Igala Border-
land: Religion and Social Control in Indigenous African Colonialism (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1971), 3-4.
193 Doi, Islam in Nigeria, 168-184. This sub-heading in itself tells clearly the period when
Islam emerged as an identifiable religion in Southeast Nigeria.

74
of the emerging community of indigenous Muslims from the Nsukka area is
marred by an attempt to credit an earlier date to Islam than was factually and
historically appropriate.
In his opening paragraphs, tracing the progress of the spread of Islam from
Yorubaland in Western Nigeria, Doi observes that after Islam entered parts of
the Midwest from Yorubaland “Islam did not make any headway further bey-
ond the Niger in the Igbo-speaking area.” He gave the reasons for the non-ex-
tension into Igboland and Southeast Nigeria as follows:

When the Christian missionary activities began in Nigeria, the areas

beyond the Niger became their strongholds. The Christian missionar-
ies were not allowed to expand their activities in the predominantly
Muslim north… Southern Nigeria beyond Yoruba country offered im-
mense opportunities to Christian missionaries where they could open
194
new centres without any restrictions whatsoever.

With this accurate entry, Doi narrows down to the beginning of Islam in East
Central State of Nigeria, the Igbo homeland. Utilizing interviews with “some
195
Hausa-Fulani, Nupe and Yoruba Muslims having Ibo wives,” he reports:

Approximately one hundred miles long by forty miles wide, Nsukka

division encompasses important trade routes which have increased
contacts between Nsukka Ibos and other peoples to the north, east and
west. It was from these trade routes that Islam began to penetrate
through the traders…
Islam first started in Iboland in the Ibo-Eze division near Nsukka and
the first place where a substantial number of Muslims settled, prac-
ticed Islamic teachings, built mosques was Ibagwa-Nkwo, only five
miles from Nsukka. The Igala Muslims came to this area …The Hausa-
Fulanis and Nupe Muslims had established trade contacts with these
areas much earlier than this, but the Fulani Jihad of Shehu Uthman
dan Fodio gave them greater enthusiasm to spread Islam. Thus Islam
began to influence the Ibos in this area in the 19th century although
very few Ibos accepted Islam in the early days and it did not spread
any further in Iboland.

194 Ibid., 168.

195 Ibid., 169-170

75
In the first two sentences Doi postulates that important trade routes increased
contacts between the Nsukka Igbo (erroneously called “Nsukka Ibos” by Doi)
and other peoples to the north, east, and west. These were remarks lifted dir-
ectly from Shelton with the exception of the statement “It was from these trade
routes that Islam began to penetrate through the traders,” being Doi’s own ad-
196
dition to Shelton’s.

Fig. 11: Shelton’s illustration of the trade routes that connected Nsukka with
her neighbors

Shelton’s illustrations of those trade routes (and of “alien influences on

Nsukka”) and his elucidation of both is unambiguous as to his reference to Iga-
la and Idoma lands and certainly not beyond the natural boundary created by
196 A. Shelton, The Igbo–Igala Borderland, 3-4.

76
the Benue River upwards to Hausaland as Doi would have us believe. In effect
those trade routes connected Nsukka Igbo with Igalaland and Idomaland, an-
cient neighbors and trading partners of the Igbo. These ethnic groups in North
Central Nigeria were not Islamized before or during the colonial period, as
Shelton and other scholars clearly observed, and therefore could not have been
avenues through which Nsukka Igbo contracted Islam in the nineteenth cen-
tury as Doi postulated; or earlier as others who followed Doi’s reasoning had
indicated. Besides, the presence of important trade routes connecting Nsukka to
the outside world is not enough in itself as a basis for a claim that those net-
works brought, in addition to material goods, the Islamic religion. Ubah who
treats in detail British government’s complicity in fostering the Islamization of
non-Muslim groups during the colonial era by imposing on them Hausa or Fu-
lani Muslim district heads, Islamic courts, and Muslim judges, reports also on
the British colonial policy from 1931 to 1934 that aimed at reversing the spread
of Islam among non-Muslim groups. His observations show that North Central
Nigeria was unaffected by the indirect extension of Islam to non-Muslim
groups via British Indirect Rule system:

The real beneficiaries from the new policy were the people of the Ni-
gerian Middle Belt in the then Benue, Kabba, and Plateau provinces.
In these provinces there were no big emirs whose prestige and influ-
ence among non-Muslims had to be protected. Islam and the Hausa
language still had some chance to spread, but this was in the normal
process of social and economic interaction. The people were not sub-
197
jected to them by formal institutional structures.

Doi’s study would have been richer and would have filled an important gap in
our knowledge of the spread of Islam in Igboland and in Southeast Nigeria if
Doi had incorporated among his interviewees Igbo indigenes, including com-
munity elders and leaders, to balance the reports received from his Hausa-Fu-
lani, Nupe, and Yoruba Muslim interviewees whose choice as qualified custodi-
ans of Igbo local history appears to be hinged on the fact that they had “Ibo
wives.” One important point worth mentioning is that Doi’s observation of

197 C. N. Ubah, “Colonial Administration and the spread of Islam in Northern Nigeria,”
The Muslim World 81 (2) 1991, 148. Ubah argues that the phenomenon of Muslim dis-
trict heads, Islamic courts, and exposure to such courts, eclipsed local political leader-
ship and undermined the indigenous legal system of non-Muslim groups. When this
became obvious to Donald Cameron, the British colonial governor of Nigeria (1931-
1934), the policy was reappraised and changes were initiated where possible.

77
contacts between Nsukka Igbo and peoples north of them should be situated in
time. Although Doi made no attempt to date his story, the interaction of
Nsukka Igbo with Nupe and Hausa migrants speak of the period from the 1930s
onwards, by which time remarkable results had begun to be observed with re-
spect to the construction of roads, railways, and bridges that connected Igbo-
land, and not just Nsukka Division, with parts of Nigeria far removed from
them, and resulting in increased communication between Igbo communities
and ethnic groups in Northern Nigeria. This is the development that justifies
Doi’s statement: “It was from these trade routes that Islam began to penetrate
198
through the traders.” Nonetheless, it should be accurately dated to its time of
occurrence in the second quarter of the twentieth century and not earlier.
Since Doi’s conclusion that Islam began to influence the Igbo of Nsukka Di-
vision in the nineteenth century challenges the historical account of the devel-
opment of Islam in Igboland, we will engage with his assumptions further.
Hausa presence in Igboland before 1900, as shown in the previous chapter, was
indeed rare or nonexistent in spite of the closeness of northern Igboland to
North-Central and Northern Nigeria. Evidence of this already exists for Igbo
groups in Ogoja province, on an analogous location as the Nsukka Igbo, whom
as Ottenberg shows had no close contact with persons of Northern Nigeria ori-
199
gin before 1920.
Grove provides insights that could help us here from his study of the eco-
nomic value of the Benue Valley of North Central Nigeria; an area that was
scarcely populated right into 1950. The Benue Valley has on its borders Lokoja,
Abuja, Jos, Gombe, Mumbi, Bamenda, and Gboko. Outside its borders are
found Nupeland, Hausaland, and other ethnic groups of Northern Nigeria. In
other words, the Benue Valley encompassed Tivland, parts of Igala, Nassarawa,
Keffi, among others, whose inhabitants Grove in 1956 described as “pagan
200
peoples.” He records that after the forceful entrance by the Fulani into North
Central Nigeria in the early nineteenth century, “their power extended over
most of the country north of the river [Benue], with the exception of the hill
201
country to which the pagan peoples retired.” To Grove, the confinement of
the Fulani to areas beyond the river Benue and above the pagan communities
was blamed on the following:

198 Doi, Islam in Nigeria, 169.

199 Ottenberg, Farmers and Townspeople, 64-65.
200 A. T. Grove, The Benue Valley (Kaduna: Ministry of National Resources, Northern Ni-
geria, 1956), 8.
201 Ibid.

78
 Much of the Benue Valley especially near streams in the west is infec-
ted with tse-tse fly throughout the year. Other areas are not attractive
to cattle herds on account of other diseases, poverty of grazing and
lack of water… There has been some long distance trading over estab-
lished routes all in the North. The ivory from Ngaundere passed
through Yola to the northwest… The rivers of the Benue valley are a
hindrance rather than a help to communication, and the valley is not
202
bound together as an economic unit linked by its rivers.

In other words, the geographical hostility of North Central Nigeria and the Be-
nue Valley in particular to horses and cattle kept Fulani warriors and cattle her-
ders away for so long. If early in the twentieth century Hausa presence was
rare within this southern periphery of North Central Nigeria, it logically fol-
lows that it was also rare in Nsukka Division of northern Igboland, located
203
south of this region.
Doi’s claim that Islam began to influence the Igbo in the nineteenth century
contradicts his initial remark that Islam made no headway into Igbo-speaking
areas unless it is to be understood that he was referring solely to Islam spread-
ing from the direction of Yorubaland in Western Nigeria and not from North
Central Nigeria. However, his last statement in the first quote that “Southern
Nigeria beyond Yoruba country offered immense opportunities to Christian
missionaries where they could open new centers without any restrictions”
would also suggest that Islamic influence in this area was nonexistent and that
was the reason why Christian missions were allowed to operate freely in
“Southern Nigeria beyond Yoruba country”—where the Igbo, Efik, Ibibio, Ijaw,
and Ekoi homelands are situated. There is no confusion indeed that Islam was a
twentieth century phenomenon in Eastern Nigeria including in Nsukka Divi-
sion of northern Igboland regardless of Doi’s assertion now being echoed by
Igbo and non-Igbo Muslims.
Furthermore, the emergence of Islam in Igalaland was as much a twentieth

202 Ibid., 13, 16-17. Grove’s description of the waterways of the Benue River being a hin-
drance rather than a help to communication is striking. It shows that the Benue River
separated the peoples of the area from each other.
203 Owerri and Calabar Provinces of Eastern Nigeria also fall within the natural habitat for
tse-tse fly. Consequently, the long-horned and humped cattle from Northern Nigeria
could not be reared in Eastern Nigeria, but the Muturu, the short-horned, humpless va-
riety, indigenous to the region and resistant to trypanosomiasis. Mabel Ukagwu, “The
Development of Cattle Trade in Imo State with Special Reference to Umuahia-Ibeku up
to 1960.” M. A. Dissertation, University of Nigeria (1987), 3.

79
century development just as in Igboland and therefore there could not have
been considerable numbers of Igala Muslims living in Ibagwa nkwo near
Nsukka or elsewhere in Igboland prior to and shortly after the jihad wars of the
nineteenth century for Igala was decidedly “pagan” by this date. Igala domin-
ance of Nsukka area and also of the area around the Anambra River before the
nineteenth century is factual. This incident nonetheless provided no avenue for
introducing Islam to these areas in Igboland even remotely. When Igala control
of Nsukka Division began to decline in the nineteenth century it gave room for
the rise, not of Hausa or Nupe influence through trade or any other means but
204
of Aro domination. One question for Doi is, if Igala hegemony as he postu-
lates was partly responsible for Islam in Nsukka Division why did it not replic-
ate same effect on communities around the Anambra River that were also un-
der Igala control within the same point in time as the Nsukka area? A good ex-
ample is the Onitsha Igbo who trace their origin to Igala and the Edo who oc-
205
cupy land owned originally by the Igala.
Forde, Laura and Paul Bohannan, and Armstrong, using previous accounts
by scholars such as Nadel (1942) and personal investigations from 1949 to 1953,
had mentioned that Igbo traders visited markets in territories belonging to Ig-
206
ala, Idoma, and Tiv early in the twentieth century. Armstrong’s study of Ig-

204 Nwando Achebe, Farmers, Traders, Warriors, and Kings: Female Power and Authority
in Northern Igboland, 1900–1960 (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2005), 32-33; Kenneth
Dike and Felicia Ekejiuba, The Aro of South-eastern Nigeria, 1650–1980 (Ibadan: Uni-
versity Press, 1990), 96-121.
205 Let us review some additional records here: John Lander’s travels, and, Samuel Crow-
ther’s in the company of McGregor Laird, are of particular relevance. Armstrong re-
cords Lander’s observation of seeing a Hausa in Igbo territory in 1830, precisely in the
kingdom of Aboh, west of the river Niger and therefore outside the Southeast. Mean-
while, Doi already showed that the trajectory of Islam stopped short of the Igbo territo-
ry found beyond Yorubaland. So, even if a Hausa was noticed in Igbo territory, west of
the Niger, it is not a pointer to a probable spread of Islam in Igbo territory in the nine-
teenth century, the 1800s. On his part, Crowther wrote of an event that occurred close
to northern Igboland: of hearing Igbo spoken in markets at the confluence of the Rivers
Benue and Niger, in 1855, by actors whose identity was unknown. That isolated event
also does not warrant the interpretation that close trade contacts existed between Igbo,
including Nsukka Igbo, with traders of Northern Nigeria origin or that Islam came into
Igboland from that trade contact. Samuel Crowther, Journal of an expedition up the
Niger and Tshadda Rivers…in 1854 (London: Church Missionary House), 167.
206 Daryll Forde, “The Nupe,” in Daryll Forde (ed.), Peoples of the Niger-Benue Conflu-
ence (London: International African Institute, 1955); Laura and Paul Bohannan, The
Tiv of Central Nigeria (London: International African Institute, 1953); R. G. Armstrong,
“The Idoma–Speaking Peoples,” and “The Igala” in Daryll Forde, ed., Peoples of the Ni-
ger–Benue Confluence.

80
 207
Fig. 12: Nsukka Local Government Area, 1986

ala and Idoma-speaking peoples indicates that Igbo language was almost a local
language in Idoma. He reports with respect to Igala that “since a great deal of
trade and transport is in Igbo hands, knowledge of Igbo would doubtlessly
208
carry one a long way in Igala.” The periodicity of these events should not be
ignored. In contrast to the ubiquity of Igbo traders in these areas, we lack simil-
ar references to Nupe and Hausa traders in Igbo territory even though Arm-
strong, the Bohannans, and Forde show that traders of Nupe origin operated
209
closer to Igboland, precisely in Igala and Idoma markets, than Hausa traders.
Their observation is corroborated by oral testimony in Nsukka Division, which
informs that the trading operations of the Nupe within Nsukka Division began
210
from 1909 and depended on middlemen.
Trade via the medium of middlemen was not the preserve of Nupe migrants
to Igboland. When the Yoruba and the Hausa entered the Igbo homeland they
resorted to the same old practice. In their trade on rubber, palm oil, and kernels

207 The Old Nsukka Division was split, in 1986, into seven Local Government Areas with
Nsukka Local Government at the centre.
208 R. G. Armstrong, “The Idoma–Speaking Peoples,” 92; R. G. Armstrong, “The Igala,” 79.
209 Armstrong, “The Igala,” 82, and “The Idoma,” 99. Daryll Forde, “The Nupe,” 27-28.
210 Alhaji Mutalib and Dauda Ojobe, interviews, Ibagwa and Enugu Ezike, May 2003.

81
in Nsukka Division Yoruba traders utilized middlemen just as the Hausa did
with respect to the cattle trade, which was at its early stages in Eastern Nigeria
211
around 1919. The development of middlemen in different trade goods and
markets was not unconnected with the determination to maintain ethnic sphe-
res of influence. The different ethnic groups did their best to protect their trades
or trade interests by blocking stranger traders from having direct access to
212
owners of goods and from getting into a particular line of business. It was not
likely, unless it can be proven otherwise, that communities in northern Igbo-
land where Yoruba and Nupe Muslim traders established a couple of settle-
ments in 1916 and 1918 interacted very closely and openly with Muslim settlers
before the twentieth century. My Yoruba interviewees, descendants of early
213
Yoruba migrants to Ibagwa, disclosed that that was not so. The pattern of
minimal interaction that existed in Calabar and Cross River Divisions in the
Eastern Province as recorded in the previous chapter was replicated in the
Nsukka village groups of Onitsha Division in the Central Province until the late
1920s. Putting all together, Doi’s assertion on the beginning of Islam in Nsukka
Division and in Southeast Nigeria is historically not factual.

The Case of Enugu Ezike

The main figure connected with the introduction of Islam into Nsukka Division
was Ibrahim Aduku, a horse trader well known by his last name Aduku. Some
myths have developed around Aduku with some alleging that militarily and
with superior weapons he conquered Enugu Ezike and its thirty-three villages,
settled there against the wishes of the indigenes, and became their Eze or
214
ruler. Aduku is the earliest and most remembered horse trader in the en-
virons of Nsukka. He started visiting Enugu Ezike “around the time the British
station (outpost) was established in the town,” observed his grandson. Garba
Oheme of Enugu Ezike, reputed by Igbo Muslims as the oldest Igbo to convert
to Islam and who, according to his testimony reverted to Islam in 1937 while at

211 See Ottenberg, Farmers and Townspeople, 64, and Ukagwu, “The Development of Catt-
le Trade,” chapter 4.
212 Interviews with Alhaji Mutalib, Dauda Ojobe, and Papa Garba Oheme. Also, Robert
Launay, “An Invisible Religion? Anthropology’s Avoidance of Islam in Africa,” in
Mwenda Ntarangwi, David Mills, and Mustapha Babiker (eds.), African Anthropolo-
gies: History, Critique and Practice (London: Zed Books, 2005), 195-196.
213 Alhaji Mutalib, interview cited.
214 Adam Usman, interview, Nsukka, May 2003. Enugu Ezike is in Igboeze North Local
Government Area.

82
Calabar at the age of twenty-nine, told of another horse trader who preceded
Aduku but was seemingly overshadowed by the latter perhaps because of the
strategic time in history when Aduku appeared in Enugu Ezike. In the dialogue
below Oheme recounted the story of the two horse traders:
215
Ndi ocha [white men] came to Hausaland and disorganized their
lives. Many of them because of the wars of subjugation dispersed and
moved southwards, reaching this far south. As my father told me and
as this very person told me, he was the first man to come to this place.
His name was Usman Buzu. He came on a horse as he fled the wars in
216
Northern Nigeria. He came from Utege, a town close to Keffi (Plat-
eau state) and moved to Angba and from Angba he came to Enugu
Ezike. The ruler of Angba (in Igalaland) at this time was Abutaji. Us-
man was a horse trader. In his journeys southwards away from the
colonial wars he met people needing horses so they started doing
business. For instance, he will buy horses and bring to sell to those
needing it. … He sold horses for a while before Aduku came…
217
Dauda: Was he here before Aduku? The story says Aduku was the
first.
Oheme: Bring the Qur’an and I will swear on it. Usman was here be-
fore Aduku. He first started selling horses before Aduku came to this
218
town and began his own business.

215 Hausaland is commonly used by Igbo indigenes to refer to the whole of Northern Nige-
ria and not exactly to Hausaland alone. Such usage is evident in this account.
216 Utege could not be located, but Keffi is in Plateau State in North-Central Nigeria.
217 Dauda Ojobe, the local historian, accompanied me on this visit. He reverted to Islam in
1971 and was the second oldest Muslim convert in Amufie.
218 Garba Oheme, interview cited. Sheikh Saliu Abugu, the son was present, helping with
interpretation when necessary. The horse trade between Enugu Ezike and Igala began
prior to Aduku’s arrival in the town and probably even before Usman Buzu brought
horses to sell there. The initial pattern was for individuals, or their contracted traders,
to visit Ejule in Igalaland in whose markets they purchased horses, and dragged them
home. The interviewees who spoke about the horse trade observed that these events
were happening when “the influence of the colonial administration had been felt,” sug-
gesting that the horse trade in Enugu Ezike could have commenced later than similar
trade in Abakaliki Division of Ogoja Province, and in Awgu of Onitsha Province.
Ojobe, Barrister Hamza Aduku, Garba Oheme, and Alhaji Umaru, all from Enugu Ezi-
ke, dated the horse trade to the colonial era. Ottenberg shows that in Abakaliki the
horse trade preceded the British who tried to stop it because of their fondness for the
animals.

83
Usman Buzu could have been the first horse trader to do business in Enugu
Ezike after the coming of the British, the specific date unknown except to situ-
ate it between 1900 and 1905 when Hausaland and other parts of the Sokoto
Caliphate were militarily subdued causing waves of migrations southwards and
outside Nigeria. Buzu obviously remained an itinerant trader for the entire dur-
ation of his brief career in Enugu Ezike. His connections, if he had any, to
Aduku are unknown. Aduku, as generally accepted, came later and operated
longer in the town. His coming coincided also with the time the Roman Cathol-
ic Mission and Church Missionary Society were trying to establish primary
schools in the Nsukka area. In fact a handful of locals in the environs of Enugu
219
Ezike had accepted the Catholic faith by the time of his visit. Nevertheless,
Enugu Ezike itself had not been appreciably infiltrated by Christian missions to
boast of any convert then, it seemed.
Hamza, a grandson of Aduku, recalled that his father told them that their
grandfather’s visit corresponded with the British incursion with a patrol of
African soldiers drawn largely from Northern and Western Nigeria. The iden-
tity of the soldiers, observed Hamza, was ascertained from the dialogue that en-
sued between their grandfather and the soldiers. Hamza recounted as follows:

Aduku was originally from Bida… He was born at Bida and grew up
at Bida but his mother lived at Idah in Igalaland… Idah people were
not Muslims. They believed in spirits and things like that. So in the
beginning, at Idah, he was trading, coming through Bida and Idah
with his horses. He traded on horses... Whenever he visited Enugu
Ezike he stayed with the family of Agboke Nwoma. Up till the present
our family had retained close links with them… The story had it that
during one of the times he was here the British outpost came through
Okwoga in Northern Nigeria and entered Enugu Ezike, which had
never seen a whiteman and did not know the whiteman’s way. The
story also had it that because of his trading and other activities, he
probably knew the white people; he had had contact with them … My
grandfather was not part of the incursion but was here when it
happened...Invariably one thing led to the other. The people developed
confidence in him to intervene in the new setting. He became a go-
between for our community and the white strangers. Through that he
219 Alhaji Umaru, interview, Enugu Ezike, January 2004. See “List of county Grant-aided
School,” File: NS DIV 12/1/137, National Archives Enugu. And D. Opata, J. Ozioko and
C. Eze (eds.), Nsukka: Development Challenges (Nsukka: Adada Investment Ltd, 1997),
149.

84
 was given a warrant … Our people wanted to make sure that having
received the warrant he would act in utmost good faith. He was given
an option of becoming a full citizen … You may be wondering what
the language of communication was. Nigerians in the incursion were
either Hausa or Yoruba. It was easy for him to communicate with
220
them. He spoke Nupe, Hausa, and Igala languages.

The story of Aduku is a rather lengthy one and relatively well known in Enugu
Ezike and especially in the village of Amufie into which he naturalized. I have
used the accounts of Hamza and Dauda for this reconstruction, taking note
where necessary of other view points. When the colonial troops arrived and
bombarded Enugu Ezike, the people were considerably surprised and intimid-
ated. The first casualty from this engagement was a woman named Nweyeoli.
Dauda gave details of the encounter from the time of the death of Nweyeoli:

So when this happened, people of Ajie … went home to raise an alarm

that people of a different color were around and killing people… The
gunfire caused tension in Enugu Ezike. One man remembered Agboke
Nwaoma. He had seen a stranger who had visited him. They decided
221
to tell him what happened to know what they would do…

Dauda and Hamza’s accounts both agreed that the town elders eventually sent
Aduku to find out what the “visitors” wanted, which Aduku did. The British
officers invited the people through Aduku to meet with them but the elders
(onyishi) of Amufie requested Aduku to meet with them on their behalf. Even-
tually, Aduku was prevailed upon to settle in the village with an offer of a set-
tlement close to a market made by the elders of Amufie. Dauda continued:

So when he settled, people from Yagba in the Nupe area and places
that had already been subdued started migrating to Enugu Ezike and
they were Muslims. This was how Muslims started coming to Enugu
Ezike.

Casting our minds back to the accounts by Hamza and Dauda, a few things are
obvious. Aduku’s visit to Enugu Ezike did not precede the British. If Aduku
was the person who introduced Islam into Enugu Ezike and thus into the
Nsukka area, he certainly did not do that before the twentieth century. Hamza

220 Barrister Hamza Aduku, interview cited

221 Dauda Ojobe, interview cited. Note also his assumption that the trader from above the
River Benue was Hausa, although in reality he was of Nupe–Igala origin.

85
said of his grandfather “he had had contact with them,” referring to the British,
and “My grandfather was not part of the incursion but was here when it
happened.” The degree of familiarity between Nsukka Igbo with the Hausa as a
people or of Islam before the twentieth century, as some would have us believe,
is called into question by the fact that the patrol which first came to Enugu
Ezike and comprised mostly of Hausa and Yoruba soldiers under the command
of British personnel considerably surprised the people. Long contact with per-
sons from Northern Nigeria would have meant that the persons from Enugu
Ezike would have identified Hausa elements in the patrol that advanced into
Enugu Ezike from Okwoga (actual name Okpoga). It is also to be expected that
they would have been aware through their supposed Hausa contacts and trade
associates of happenings elsewhere or been informed by their own local intelli-
gence of the conquests and patrols going on in the North Central Nigeria, cer-
tainly very close to them. No such pre-knowledge of danger came from these
angles suggesting indeed that no contact with the Hausa existed by this date.
Such privileged intelligence if received would have helped minimize the dis-
tress in Enugu Ezike at their first contact with a foreign colonizing power and
the people of Amufie would not have refused ever meeting with the “white
men” as they did preferring instead that a thorough stranger do so on their be-
half. Aduku’s trade with Enugu Ezike through Agboke Nwaoma of Amufie is
not by any means being denied. However, weighing all that was supposed to
have occurred in Enugu Ezike from around 1905 until 1919, it appears that dir-
ect trade interactions between Muslim traders whether from Nupe, Hausaland,
or any other group in Nigeria on one hand and the Igbo of Nsukka Division on
the other was not the common practice that Doi and a few local imams had
suggested.
There is some contention on the exact date of Aduku’s arrival in Enugu
Ezike. Aduku’s grandson, Hamza, had suggested 1906 as both the date of his
grandfather’s visit and the British military incursion into Enugu Ezike. Mallam
Usman Omada, also from Enugu Ezike, is of the view that Aduku came during
the influenza pandemic that diffused from Europe to Africa between 1918 and
1919, being the concluding years of World War I. The pandemic was an unfor-
gettable disaster in the records of the Nsukka Igbo who called it okija, as it also
222
was in other parts of Igboland and beyond. Dauda had asserted in an inter-
view:

222 Mallam Omada, interview, Enugu Ezike, January 2004. For more information on the
pandemic in selected parts of Nigeria see Don Ohadike, Anioma: A Social History of
the Western Igbo People (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1994), 198-204.

86
 Islam started in Enugu Ezike in 1914… It came through the influence
of Aduku who came from Nupe. He settled in Enugu Ezike. There was
no other religion in the town then except the traditional religion.
When he came in 1914, he introduced Islam… Eventually, Islam
spread in Enugu Ezike. But because of our love for drinking people
did not embrace it as they did the Anglican religion that came in 1933.

Note that Dauda linked Islam in Enugu Ezike to the date of Aduku’s arrival in
the town and not to the time that Islam gained its first convert from that area.
In terms of periodicity, the colonial advance into Enugu Ezike occurred in 1909
according to the following entry in the colonial records: “From January 1909
when the town was first visited until 1920 Enugu Ezike was a scene of constant
223
military and police patrols.” Shelton dates the British colonial incursion into
Nsukka Division to 1910, correctly observing that effective colonization of the
224
Nsukka Igbo occurred in 1920. I have adopted 1909 as the date of the earliest
invasion based on the intelligence report on the event. If Usman Buzu preceded
Aduku, coming shortly after the disturbances in Northern Nigeria; and Aduku,
equally displaced by the same incident but operating for a while at Idah prior to
moving southwards into Enugu Ezike, it would be assumed that he could not
have started visiting Enugu Ezike before 1909. What is more, at the time of the
British incursion Aduku’s association was limited to Agboke Nwaoma, his ini-
tial business associate. Aduku, it should be remembered, spoke no Igbo but
communicated in Igala, which though known by some in Enugu Ezike was still
not the general language in use in the town. If Aduku had been in contact with
the people for any considerable length of time, he would have been able to
speak some Igbo by the time of the British incursion. This is a clear indication
of how recent his operations in this area were previous to the British colonial
invasion of Enugu Ezike.
The aspect of the story that mentioned Aduku settling down in Amufie does
not imply that the action occurred straight away after the British patrol.
Hamza’s clarification in the following dialogue is informative:

Question: Since your grandfather was from Bida how was he able to
communicate with the people?

Answer: He spoke Igala…. Some families in Enugu Ezike were origin-

223 Mr. V. K. Johnson, “Intelligence report on the people of Enugu Ezike, Nsukka Division,”
File OP 1071/ ONDIST 12/1/709 (October 1934), National Archives, Enugu.
224 Shelton, The Igbo-Igala Borderland, 27.

87
 ally from Igala … Even if it was adulterated Igala, it was still easy to
comprehend … At a particular point the question of his naturalization
came in because he was now given the warrant and he became the
intermediary between the colonial representative and the people. The
British began to develop an administration using the local people as
warrant chiefs.

Mr. V. K. Johnson, the Assistant District Officer, wrote in his Intelligence Re-
port of 1932: “From existing records, it appears that Enugu Ezike was first vis-
ited in January 1909 and from that year until 1920 was the scene of constant
military and police patrols. … In October 1918 the Native Court of Enugu Ezike
was formed, the principal court members being Aduku, an ambitious and
powerful Nupe, Ayiogu Ede brother of the Atama Uguaka of Amube, and
225
Ahebe of Umuida, a female of strong Igala tendencies.” Aduku’s settlement
in Enugu Ezike would therefore have occurred at anytime close to when he
was put forward for the warrant, and this was in 1918 (the year of the outbreak
226
of the influenza pandemic.) Hamza’s remark “the issue of naturalization came
in because he was now given the warrant” was also clear on the timing of this
incident.
With respect to Enugu Ezike, however, the invitation to a foreigner by the
Amufie community to settle among the indigenes was first suggested and fol-
lowed up by the village elders for their own good in contrast to the pattern ob-
served in other parts of the region where the move to settle was championed by
northern migrants for purely economic gains or by the British on behalf of
northern migrants in their attempt to open up the Southeast to trade and to civ-
227
ilize its “natives” as they called them. Mallam Omada’s date for Aduku’s ar-
rival in Enugu Ezuke is supported by Mr. Johnson’s report. It corresponded

225 Mr. V. K. Johnson, “Intelligence report on the people of Enugu Ezike.”

226 It is also probable that 1918 could have been the year he came to Enugu Ezike in the
first place just as observed by Usman Omada in his account of Aduku.
227 Prior to the emergence of the colonial state, the peoples of the country categorised each
other on language basis. Categorisations based on regional locations, and later on reli-
gious affiliations, were a colonial development. It waited until the complete delineation
of the country and the development of British administration, which in some places,
like Abakaliki, took longer than in others. Nigeria did not become a political unit until
the 1914 amalgamation. Moreover, up till the mid-1920s the Southeast, in particular,
was in turmoil from insurgences against British conquest, and military operations ai-
med at “pacification” of the conquered peoples. As such, Aduku’s identity as a norther-
ner could not have been conceived this early in his dealings with the people of Enugu
Ezike.

88
with both the time Aduku’s trade activities became reasonably established in
the town and when he earned the confidence of the town’s leadership causing
228
their recommending him to British colonial administration for the warrant.
When Aduku yielded to the wishes of Amufie community and subjected
himself to the prescribed process of assuming local citizenship leading to his be-
coming an indigene of Enugu Ezike, his identity changed. His naturalization in-
volved choosing one of the lineages as his father’s and another as his mother’s
natal homes in line with the rule of exogamy observed in Igboland. Aduku
chose Umuogodo as his father’s village and Amachara as his mother’s, both in
Umu Itodo. Although up till the present some persons in that community re-
gard him as a foreigner who settled and raised his family there, the testimony
of his naturalization with the symbolic relics of the event situates him as a full
indigene and no longer a foreigner. This event marks a turn in our discussion.
Aduku should more appropriately be regarded as the first Muslim from Amufie
in Enugu Ezike and not only the horse trader through whom, eventually, Islam
was introduced in the community. What is more, it was after Aduku’s natural-
ization in 1918 that other local strangers from Nupe and elsewhere joined him
in his new home, gradually building up a modest community of Muslim stran-
gers of Nupe origin. Aduku remained an exception in this community of Mus-
lim migrants as the only person of non-Igbo origin given full citizenship in the
community.
What indeed is important in these series of occurrences is that from the time
Amufie adopted Aduku and vice versa, Amufie village in Enugu Ezike and

228 Putting forward persons for warrant in the early stage of the colonial experience was
fraught with manipulations. There was no part of Eastern Nigeria where indigenes
boldly identified their local leaders. Unsure of the plans of the invading power, as the
British were regarded, communities all over put forward either slaves, “good-for-no-
thing” persons, and in a few cases non-indigenes for warrant. The colonial administra-
tors were aware of this practice. With respect to the Ikwerre Igbo of Ahoada Division
in Owerri Province, the District Officer observed: “The actual nature of pre-govern-
ment organization has been often deliberately hidden by persons who had an interested
motive in doing so.” He added “Few, if any, of these Warrant Chiefs were Ndi-Nwe-A-
la [indigenes] of their village areas.” D.C. Ugwu (1987) reported about Obukpa, a town
close to Enugu Ezike: “The British with the help of Nupe subdued Obukpa and introdu-
ced Indirect Rule, imposing chiefs of Nupe origin.” Just as Aduku was put forward for
the warrant by the elders of Enugu Ezike, Mallam Dodo, a Hausa from Katsina, recei-
ved the warrant for Elele an Igbo community close to Port Harcourt, but in this case at
the instance of the colonial authorities, because he “had been of great service to Gover-
nment in the early days,” explained the District Officer. To circumvent the refusal by
the right candidates to take up the warrant, District Officers issued it to whoever was
available.

89
northern Igboland on the whole became the cradle for Islam in Eastern Nigeria.
In other words, Garba Oheme, the indigene celebrated as the first Muslim in
the town and in Igboland who converted to Islam in 1937 in Calabar, has a dual
status. He is the first indigenous convert and at the same time the second
229
Muslim from Nsukka Division.
One group of interviewees had alleged that Aduku attempted to make con-
verts of persons who came under his protection during his career as a warrant
chief. Such persons comprised his in-laws and protégé but no specific example
230
was proffered to substantiate this view. If indeed Aduku had converts from
Enugu Ezike those converts either reverted to their original religious status or
never converted to Islam at all since no other convert was identified as preced-
ing Garba Oheme. We gain some idea about Aduku’s agency in favor of Islam
from his grandson:

The institution that brought him and made him an Enugu Ezike indi-
gene was a traditional institution but he told them that he would re-
main a Muslim. However, for political purposes and the necessity for
naturalization, he subjected himself to traditional rituals… You can see
what is happening to my family now. Everything that happens in
Umuogodo, we take part in it… Our particular unit in Umuogodo is
Umuogbuanyi. Every contribution we make to Amufie is through our
unit… We encourage building bridges among us all by supporting tra-
ditional institutions where they do not offend social norms.

Aduku’s grandson and other interviewees maintained that Aduku was commit-
ted more to his business than to proselytization. He did not publicly adopt the
Igbo religion nor did he pursue the adoption of Islam by the people of Amufie,
recalled his grandson who maintained that only few of his progenitors became
Muslim:

Most accounts of the past are deductive. When you look at the present
you can interpret what happened to give shape to what we have
presently. If Aduku was anti-Christian, he would not allow any of his

229 Before meeting Mallam Garba Oheme, I was severally informed by prominent Muslims
in Igboland that he was the oldest Igbo convert from Southeast Nigeria. In testimony of
his status as the first Igbo, convert Garba declared: “I joined Islam in 1937…Your rese-
arch on Islam needs me. No person in Nsukka will tell you how it started. I am the first
in Nsukka Division to join Islam.”
230 Hamza Aduku, Adam Usman, Abubakar Abugu, and Sayeed Suleiman, interviews,
2003.

90
 children to join Christianity. If he was anti-traditional religion, he
would not have had the kind of cooperation he had with the tradition-
al institution. The institution that brought him and made him an
231
Enugu Ezike indigene was of a traditional setting …

Aduku sent his sons to live with British colonial officers and gave every sup-
port to Christian missionaries in their proselytization of Enugu Ezike because
232
“he needed the cooperation of others.” The first mission school that opened in
Amufie in 1930 was situated in his compound, only preceding his death by
roughly a year. Aduku’s support for Christian missionaries was replicated by
his contemporaries and was in reality urged of the warrant chiefs by the Dis-
trict Officer who also encouraged their embracing the religion and establishing
233
schools for reading, writing, and arithmetic. Aduku forged ties with various
families in the town; sustaining his political ambition by marrying up to sixty
234
local women from all quarters of Enugu Ezike, as is remembered. Some of
235
these women were alleged to include other men’s wives. It was only in 1924
that Aduku built a family mosque. It was possible that between the time of
Aduku’s arrival in 1918 and the construction of a family mosque in 1924,
Aduku played down his religion or did not practice it at all until he felt secure
enough in his new home to revive his original religious practice. By this time
he had established adequate contacts in the town through his multiple mar-
riages. What is not certain is how many of his wives acceded to Islam, adopting
it as their own religion. If today majority of his descendants are Christians in-
stead of Muslims, we may assume that few of his wives converted to Islam or
that most who converted recanted after his death in 1931.
The popularity of Garba Oheme as the first convert to Islam in Igboland
could well mean that Aduku’s efforts in encouraging Islam in Enugu Ezike
withered with his death. It is important to note that the chief imam of Enugu
Ezike, Alhaji Ossai, dated conversions to Islam in Enugu Ezike to the 1930s but

231 Hamza Aduku.

232 Ibid.
233 R. Agbedo, “The Socio-Political and Economic Developments in Enugu Ezike during
the Colonial Period,” B.A. project, University of Nigeria (1990).
234 What is not clear but probable about Aduku’s marriages is the extent to which they
had to do with a misapplication of his authority as a warrant chief as was common
with that generation of intermediate local rulers in the British Indirect Rule experi-
ment.
235 Adam Usman, interview cited.

91
was uncertain of the year. Perhaps of relevance is the following extract on
Enugu Ezike from a colonial report of 1934:

Many of the men including quite young men wear beard and turban
suggestive of Igala fashion. Despite northern influences their affinities
are definitely Igbo and they are unwilling to consider any form of
236
northern administration.

The influx of migrants from Nupe and Hausaland into northern Igboland do
not seem to have been either high or regular in the first three decades of the
twentieth century. From 1918 when Aduku received the warrant until the cen-
sus of 1931 “stranger” elements in Enugu Ezike numbered only seventy-one
(71). The breakdown was as follows: 23 adult males, 33 adult females, 4 non
adult males and 8 non adult females. These strangers were identified as “a few
Hausas, Nupes and Yorubas mostly at the village known as Amufie, who have
237
settled in the area for trading purposes.”
Dauda Ojobe is among the interviewees from Enugu Ezike who identified
factors that prevented widespread acceptance of Islam in the clan to include the
religion’s prohibition of drinking for a people famed for their love of palm wine
and the relative inefficacy of charms peddled by migrant Muslim traders in
Enugu Ezike. The following remarks will be useful in understanding this
second claim:

Enugu Ezike holds the upper hand in this business. The difference
between our native doctors and Muslim spiritualists is that the latter
does not believe that it is necessary spilling animal blood and pouring
it on an idol… For example, a Muslim will kill any kind of animal but
he pours the blood on the ground and covers it after making his pray-
ers. The belief is that the prayer goes directly to Allah and not
through an intermediary. Coming to our town, because the people be-
lieve that if you kill the animal and spill the blood on an idol it be-
comes powerful, they therefore regard the imams’ procedure as inef-
238
fectual…

236 “Intelligence report on Enugu Ezike, Nsukka Division (1934),” File: OP 1071/ONDIST
12/1/709, National Archives, Enugu.
237 Ibid.
238 Dauda Ojobe, interview cited.

92
Islam in Ibagwa

A neighboring village community in Nsukka Division contesting for promin-

ence with Enugu Ezike as the birthplace of Islam in Igboland is Ibagwa, which
has two sections—Ibagwa-aka and Ibagwa-ani. According to an elderly Igbo
chief imam,

Muslims from Bida brought Islam to Ibagwa-aka. It was the first place
where Islam started in Nsukka. When traders from Bida entered Ibag-
wa, they settled there. Later, some moved to Ibagwa-ani. Ibagwa-aka
and Ibagwa-ani were the first towns where Muslim traders from Bida
settled. After Yoruba Muslims came followed by traders from Igala.
239
Each of these groups had their different settlements.

Migrants from Bida in Nupeland preceded the Yoruba in Ibagwa-aka but more
is known about the Yoruba migrants than the Nupe because descendants of
Yoruba settlers living permanently in the town told how their ancestors mi-
grated to Ibagwa for trade, settled, and raised families in the community. Nupe
traders first arrived at Ibagwa-aka from where some later moved to Ibag-
wa-ani. The Nupe were joined in Ibagwa-aka by the Yoruba and later by Igala
traders who were not identified as Muslims either by oral testimony or in the
colonial reports. Traders from each of these ethnic groups settled around each
other although in different quarters. Mallam Eze holds that Nupe traders came
240
to Ibagwa during World War I. For the Yoruba community, the earliest to ar-
rive in Ibagwa was Baba Aridjo who came in 1918, followed in 1919 by Badam-
asi—my chief interviewee’s father; Kpukpola and Alfa Aminu—an Imam, and
Alfa Buhari. Badamasi and Kpukpola came from Oshogbo now in Osun State.
The others were from Ilorin in the present Kwara State. These traders migrated
241
to Ibagwa on foot. Although the horse trade brought the Yoruba to Ibag-
wa-aka, their attention later shifted to trade with European traders at Ogurugu
to whom they supplied palm oil and rubber. The medium of exchange was pen-
nies (ego anini). These migrant traders included among their European partners
British traders stationed at Adada some miles away from Ibagwa as well as
those at Nsukka town to whom also they sold rubber and palm oil. Their major
trade goods—palm nuts and rubber—were bought from local producers and

239 Mallam Eze, interview cited. For Doi who theorized that the Igala migrants were Mus-
lims, notice the silence on that from this remark.
240 Ibid.
241 Alhaji Mutalib, interview cited.

93
traders in Ibagwa to whom they sold hand-woven cloths (asoke) manufactured
242
in the environs of Lokoja in Yorubaland. When Mutalib, the son of Badamasi,
was asked to date the time Ibagwa indigenes began to convert to Islam, he
243
answered: “Between 1937 and 1938 and not before then.” The second genera-
tion of Yoruba migrants found in Ibagwa-aka, majority of whom are Muslims,
married multiple women of Yoruba and Igbo origins and raised many children.
244
The Yoruba population in 2003 was assumed to stand at around 150 persons.
Mutalib who had three wives—one from Oshun State and two from Ibagwa—
counted thirty persons as belonging to his household. It is likely that the cur-
rent Yoruba community in Ibagwa may come close to the number claimed.
Other strangers from North Central and Northern Nigeria mentioned in
connection with the coming of Islam in Nsukka Division were Chief Momoh
who was alleged to have migrated on the invitation of Aduku of Enugu Ezike
and who operated also as a horse trader, eventually settling at Ovoko. Ochiaba
and Mallam Ali, also traders supposedly from Bida and Aguji both in Nupe,
245
settled at Eteh and Obukpa respectively. The exact dates of the arrival of
these traders in Nsukka Division are unknown but evidence suggests that they
came after Aduku. Colonial records, however, indicate that Momoh and Ochia-
246
ba received warrants. Ochiaba, already “too old and infirm to be of much
use,” according to colonial report, was a court member at Eteh from 1919 until
247
he “handed in his warrant in January 1923”.

242 For more on British encouragement of cotton growing and production of cotton goods
in Lokoja and other parts of Northern Nigeria, see E. O. Egbo, “Northern Nigeria
Cotton for Lancashire, 1902–1913,” Nsukka Journal of History (December 1989),
134-150.
243 Alhaji Mutalib, interview cited. See, Abdulrazaq Kilani, Minaret in the Delta (Lagos:
Global Dawah Communications, 2008), 267.
244 Ibid.
245 Sheikh Idoko and Imam Omeh Musa, interviews cited.
246 Imam Omeh added that Ochiaba joined Aduku at Enugu Ezike. Ochiaba was not a
warrant chief at Enugu Ezike and his name was not reflected in the list of warrant
chiefs prepared by Mr. V. K. Johnson, the Assistant District Officer for Enugu Ezike,
dated October 1934, but for Eteh clan from 1919 to 1923. See, “Intelligence Report on
the People of Enugu Ezike,” File: OP 1071/ONDIST 12/1/709 (Oct 1934), National Archi-
ves, Enugu; and “Intelligence Report on Eteh Clan, Nsukka Division, Onitsha Pro-
vince,” File: EP 9262a/CSE 1/85/4782, National Archives, Enugu. Further investigation
is necessary in establishing the real identity of Ochiaba because he was not listed as a
stranger in the colonial records, only acclaimed as such by interviewees.
247 “Intelligence Report on Eteh Clan.” Oral tradition from Eteh claims that Eteh’s ancestor
was born to an Igala father and his Igbo wife from Nguru. He first lived with his mo-
ther’s people and eventually settled close to Enugu Ezike. During the 1919 reorganiza-

94
 Indigenes of Nsukka Division began to embrace Islam from the mid 1930s. A
1935-6 date could be given for Enugu Ezike and Obukpa village groups to ac-
commodate possible influences from Aduku although the only known evidence
so far has remained Garba Oheme and dates to 1937. 1937-8 would be the date
for the first conversion to Islam in Ibagwa and Alor Agu according to the testi-
monies of Mutalib and Imam Eze. The first Igbo Muslim in Ibagwa was identi-
248
fied as Amedu Nwaoyima, who was named after his mother. Three inter-
viewees—Imam Omeh (Enugu Ezike), Imam Eze (Alor Agu), and Mallam
Ahmedu Omeje (Ibagwa-aka)—said that they were “born into Islam” to father’s
who had recently embraced Islam. None of the three was born before 1936 ac-
cording to their biographical submissions. This generation of indigenous
Muslims would have been born into Islam in the second half of the 1930s
shortly after their fathers’ conversion to Islam. If they preceded Garba Oheme
it would have been by a year or two but this is uncertain and none of them
claimed so, being themselves aware of Garba Oheme. The number of converts
was decidedly small if by the outbreak of the civil war in 1967 they were less
than a hundred as deposited by Mallam Omeje.

Women as agents of spread

Men were not the only agents through whom knowledge of Islam diffused in
Nsukka Division and also to other parts of Igboland. Women also played a role
in this development. The first convert to Islam in Alor Agu was a female re-
named Zainab. She was given in marriage to Chief Momoh from Nupe. Momoh
came as a trader at an unknown date but well after Aduku and settled at
Ovoko. Zainab, on her marriage, took along her younger brother to Momoh’s
249
home where he embraced Islam and assumed the name Abubakr Ugwuanyi.
Shelton and Doi made references to a Chief (Bawallah) Momoh who was
one of their major interviewee during their investigations of the history of the
Nsukka Igbo. Shelton describes him thus: “A Nupe politician and man of all
sorts … son-in-law of the ruler of Ankpa, Onu Yacubu. Conniving and clever…
the proud knowledge that his own grandfather had formerly been ruler of
250
much of the borderland led only to minor embellishments.” Doi writes of

tion of provinces and districts, Eteh opted to join the Nsukka Igbo. The Eteh clan is si-
tuated in the extreme north of Nsukka Division.
248 Imam Omeh Musa, interview cited.
249 Sheikh Idoko, interview cited.
250 A. Shelton, The Igbo-Igala Borderland, xiv.

95
him: “My informant, Mallam Bawallah Momoh, a Nupe politician and an influ-
ential person in the area, has married the daughter of the ruler of Ankpa, Onu
251
Yakubu and another wife happens to be an Ibo lady.” It seems very likely
that our Momoh and the Momoh described by Shelton and Doi are one and the
same person. In that case, the conversion of his Igbo wife to Islam could have
occurred sometime between 1964 and 1965. Shelton did not mention that Mo-
moh had an Igbo wife at the time of his interaction with him between 1962 and
252
1964 while Doi who met him from 1965 on observes his Igbo wife. In effect,
therefore, conversions by indigenes to Islam began in Alor Agu in the 1960s
through the instrumentality of the woman, Zainab.
Intermarriage, which became an important means of conversion after the
253
Nigeria-Biafra war, featured little before 1950. The earliest known case of in-
ter-marriage between Igbo women and Muslim migrants from North Central
and Northern Nigeria was that of Aduku whose marriages with local women
occurred after his naturalization into Enugu Ezike citizenship. Apart from the
example of Aduku, another incidence of intermarriage between a Muslim and a
local woman involved Aliru Adamu Diko, son of Diko who settled at Elele.
254
Aliri Diko was reported to have married Bojirikwe. Bojirikwe’s ethnic iden-
tity was not given in the colonial report that announced her marriage to Aliru
Diko but the name very much resembles an Igbo female name “Mgbojirikwe.”
There is a strong possibility that the rendering Bojirikwe was rather the result
of difficulty in pronunciation for persons of non-Igbo origin and this became re-
flected in the writing of the name. This marriage would definitely have oc-
curred some years after 1920. Aliru was a young man of fifteen years when his
father died in 1920 leaving him and his siblings and his property in the care of
his slave servant Alhaji Ododo. In September 1935 Aliru Diko, the eldest of
Diko’s sons in Elele, regarding himself to have grown up, sought the interven-
tion of the District Officer at Ahoada in assuming his position as the rightful
heir and adjudicator of his deceased father’s property. The non-inclusion of the
date of marriage of Aliru Diko and Bojirikwe leaves us in doubt of the true pic-
ture of things regarding Bojirikwe’s possible conversion to Islam after her mar-
255
riage; but one supposes that it could have occurred later than 1935 since it

251 Doi, Islam in Nigeria, 169.

252 Shelton, The Igbo-Igala Borderland, xiii; Doi, Islam in Nigeria, 169.
253 Ukagwu, The Development of Cattle trade,” 147.
254 “Hausa people,” File: AHODIST 14/1/436, National Archives, Enugu.
255 Ibid. Although Muslims expect their non-Muslim wives to convert to Islam after mar-
riage, this was not always the case in the early days of Islam in Igboland, just as it is at

96
was mentioned after Aliru Diko’s September 1935 appeal to the District Officer
256
of Ahoada in Owerri Province.
From all indications, marriage between migrants and indigenes of the re-
gion was an exception until the 1950s. It also did not appear that sub-groups of
Igbo intermarried that much. The incidence that illustrates this was a case of
intermarriage between an Ikwerre man and an Arochukwu woman. Both were
Igbo from Owerri and Calabar provinces respectively. Their proposal of mar-
riage prompted the Acting Resident of Owerri Province to ask: “Are Aro wo-
257
men allowed to marry Ikwerri men?” Mahdi Adamu’s hypothesis that “wher-
ever Hausa migrants went, one of their first actions in settling down was to
take wives from the local communities,” perhaps true of other places, falls short
258
of becoming a theory in the experience of Hausa migrants to Eastern Nigeria.
It took Hausa migrants decades before they started to marry Igbo women. Uk-
agwu’s study of the Cattle trade in Eastern Nigeria from 1906 confirms this.
The very few fathers’ who gave their daughters in marriage to migrants before
1960 did so to Nupe trade partners and not to Hausa. Ottenberg records such an
incidence: “While I was at Afikpo [1960] there was a young Hausa man, and
259
another young man born of an Nsukka Igbo mother and a Nupe father.” In
the 1980s onwards, as we would see in a subsequent chapter, women through
mixed-religious marriages with Muslim migrants and Igbo Muslims alike
would become important agents of proselytization for Islam in Igboland.

Expansion of Strangers’ Settlements and Barriers to proselytization

Migrations from Northern, North Central, and Western Nigeria into the East-
ern Nigeria were facilitated by infrastructural developments set in motion by
the British colonial administration. Roads, railways, and waterways were built
to connect different sections of the country after the enactment in 1903 of the
Roads and Rivers Proclamation. By this Proclamation district commissioners

present. However, in trying to establish instances of early conversions in the oral socie-
ties of Southeast Nigeria, such possible evidence should not be glossed over for lack of
supporting documents.
256 Using the evidence of her name, it does not appear that her conversion occurred before
1935 because she would have been listed with her Muslim name as happened with
Zainab of Ovoko.
257 File: AHODIST 14/1/217, National Archives, Enugu.
258 Adamu, The Hausa Factor.
259 Simon Ottenberg, “A Moslem Igbo Village,” Cahiers D’Etudes Africaines, Vol. XI (42)
1971, 250.

97
had the power to compel capable men and women, through their chiefs, to
260
provide free labor for construction works. The infrastructural development
was to ensure effective administration, easy movement of colonial troops, the
economic exploitation of colonial territories, and the civilization of the local
261
peoples in remote districts. At first, labor was sourced from the local people
but from around 1917 migrants from different parts of Northern, North Central,
and Western Nigeria trickling down to the Southeast joined the work force in
the new and emerging towns. Mention was made in chapter one of Mallam
Halilu of Owerri who on hearing of plans to build Port Harcourt in 1917 volun-
262
teered and provided 500 laborers from his hometown of Zaria. Hausa mi-
grants regularly shuttled to and fro their original homes and the new settle-
ments. The dry seasons, from October to March, found them in Eastern Nigeria
where they hired themselves out as laborers. Those who did not work as
laborers engaged in trade and other economic activities. At the end of the dry
season they returned to their homes to wait for the rainy season to resume
their normal economic obligations. Thus, they rarely stayed too long in their
settlements in Eastern Nigeria to clear the ground for proselytization, if they
had wanted to proselytize.
The flow of migrant laborers was partly arrested following the outbreak of
the influenza pandemic in mid 1918. This incident affected mostly persons in
the 20–45 years age bracket. In the peak of the crisis migrant laborers deserted
263
Southern Nigeria and returned to their towns and villages. The movement of
264
laborers from Northern Nigeria was resumed from 1920 after the pandemic.
Generally, Hausa migrants were stimulated by stories of places with social con-
ditions very different from theirs and where economic development had ad-
vanced beyond the situation in their home areas. The people so attracted and
who joined in the road construction projects in Eastern Nigeria made it possible
for colonial officials to circumvent the frequent interruptions caused by wide-

260 Felix Ekechi, Tradition and Transformation in Eastern Nigeria (Kent, Ohio: The Kent
University Press, 1989), 33.
261 Joyce Cary, Britain and West Africa (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1946), 51. Ar-
mury Talbot, in 1904, described the road networks in our area of study as “meandering
native tracks, often hardly distinguishable from those of bush animals, which were the
only means of communication over a great part of Southern Nigeria.” Talbot, “The
Land of the Ekoi,” The Geographical Journal, Vol. 36, No. 6. (1910), 639.
262 “Status of Hausa Chiefs,” File: AHODIST 14/1/436, National Archives, Enugu.
263 Ohadike, Anioma, 201.
264 It was during this period that Mallam Sule, father of the Sarikin Hausa of Enugu, came
to Southeast Nigeria to join the colonial workforce.

98
 265
spread resistance to road work in most of Igboland. The situation was differ-
ent with the Ekoi who were praised for their initiative in road construction in
1910 and for their willingness generally, in spite of much hardship, to build
266
whenever called upon to do so.
Compulsory construction of roads facilitated inter-provincial communica-
tions. Influx of migrants including cattle traders from Northern Nigeria had by
1921 produced migrant settlements at Umuahia, Okigwe, and Uzuakoli, all of
267
which were led by cattle moguls. North-Southeast migrations increased from
the 1930s. The poor agricultural harvests in Northern Nigeria in 1936 following
unusual flooding also fed the stream of migrants southwards. These late ar-
rivals engaged in a variety of activities chief of which was trading but also as
268
laborers with the Public Works Department. An inventory taken in 1924 by
the Resident of Owerri Province detailed the major economic engagements in
269
each of the existing stranger’s settlements as follows:

Fig. 13: Strangers’ settlements and their economic engagements

Settlement Economic Engagements
Umuahia Cattle trade and petty trading

Uzuakoli Petty trading

Okigwe/Afikpo Road Trade in groundnut oil, onions, leather goods, cloth, and cattle from
Northern Nigeria

Owerri (Yoruba and Hausa) Trade in cloth, leather goods, and sheep from Lokoja and Onitsha

Oguta Produce carriers for European firms

Aba Trade in kola nut and ivory from Doula in Cameroun; Hawking of
leather goods and mats from Northern Nigeria

The 1930s witnessed the diffusion in Eastern Nigeria of Nupe, Hausa, and
Yoruba migrants in places where commercial towns developed but the migrant
270
trading population continued to be an unstable one. At Enugu, one of the
new major towns that owed its development to colonial efforts, “Hausa” pres-
ence was at Coal camp where workers of the colonial government lived. This
small Hausa-Nupe Community had by 1931 elected its own Sarikin, by name

265 For a detailed discussion of local resistance to road building see Ekechi, Tradition and
Transformation in Eastern Nigeria, 33-38.
266 Talbot, “The Land of the Ekoi,” 639.
267 “Status of Hausa Chiefs,” AHODIST 14/1/436.
268 R. M. Prothero, Migrant Labour from Sokoto Province Northern Nigeria, 37.
269 “Hausa Settlements: Owerri Province,” File: C20/24 UMPROF 1/1/3, National Archives,
Enugu.
270 “Hausa People in 1935,” File: AHODIST 14/1/436.

99
Garuba, who was replaced with Sarikin Sule, a professional butcher, elected by
271
members of the Community. Their representative was Mallam Mustapha, a
272
yard foreman. By 1932 Ogui Nike, one of the outlying communities around
Enugu, also had some Hausa and Nupe settlers. Numerical growth in the stran-
gers’ settlements—Hausa and Nupe communities—was not even. Some settle-
ments expanded quicker than others. One example is Enugu, which by 1935
already had 182 settlers from Northern Nigeria.
What the roads could not do, the rails were projected to accomplish. Rail
construction in Eastern Nigeria, which began in 1913 at Enugu, was intended
for the full exploitation of the commercial opportunities in this region by con-
necting its various administrative divisions for optimal economic rewards. The
major impetus was the discovery of coal at Enugu in 1909. By 1926, the South-
east rail line from Port Harcourt had reached Udi, a few miles away from
273
Enugu. The railway that was to terminate at Jos connected Igboland with
North Central Nigeria at Makurdi and Jos. Feeding the rail routes were a rough
network of roads both seasonal and regular roads. Most feeder roads that
linked Igboland with North Central Nigeria were built in the 1940s. The net-
work of roads and railway made north—south movements easier than in previ-
ous decades. As the population of the Nupe, Hausa, and Yoruba increased in
Eastern Nigeria, so also did persons from Eastern Nigeria move around within
274
their region and to Northern and Western Nigeria for work and trade.
Proselytization, early in the interactions of Muslim migrants and the
peoples of Eastern Nigeria, was quite uncommon. The goal of the Hausa and
Nupe migrants in the first four decades of the twentieth century was purely
trade. Interviewees, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, repeatedly echoed this. The
zeal to conquer the world for Islam did not seem to have had an overriding
place in the thinking of Nigerian Muslim migrants in Eastern Nigeria before
1950. These migrants conducted themselves and their affairs in their places of
275
sojourn with care.

271 “Headship of the Hausa and Nupe Communities at Enugu, Onitsha Province,” File: CSE
1/85/6145, National Archives, Enugu. According to the colonial report, Garuba was re-
moved after his conviction “in March 1932 … for stealing £14 tax money.”
272 “Headship of the Hausa and Nupe Communities at Enugu, Onitsha Province,” File: CSE
1/85/6145, National Archives, Enugu.
273 Ekechi, Tradition and Transformation in Eastern Nigeria, 44.
274 “Intelligence Report on the Agbani Akpugo Group, Udi Division. October 1934,” File:
ONDIST 12/1/708, National Archives, Enugu.
275 Doi criticized Yoruba Muslims for giving “their daughters in marriage to pagans or
Christians.” Doi, Islam in Nigeria, 180.

100
 Of utmost importance is the fact that Eastern Nigeria was a new horizon to
Hausa, Nupe, and Yoruba migrants in the first half of the twentieth century.
Having entered the region, they were reserved and showed no inclination to-
wards upsetting their host communities and endangering their business goals.
There were some mutual suspicions borne out of ignorance of the inclinations
276
and tendencies of the other in migrants as well as their hosts. With the still
lingering insecurity from clan and inter-ethnic wars, migrants minimized con-
tacts with their hosts to avoid being involved in their internal squabbles and
277
perhaps do so to their own peril. Open religious advocating by strangers
would have sparked further suspicion.
Ottenberg provides details of an anti-colonial opposition led by women in
Eastern Nigeria in 1925. It swept through Igboland and Ekoiland. In Ogoja
Province this rebellion was known as the Dancing Women Movement and in
Okigwe, Owerri, and Onitsha Provinces it was called Nwaobiala. The women
“advocated a return to pre-European life, and a denial of colonial and mission-
ary behavior, dress and values” and demanded for “a return to the customs and
278
religion of their ancestors.” Although the administrative officer in Abakaliki
Division viewed it as an anti-government propaganda, it was nonetheless a re-
action to a religious worldview, which in this case was Christianity. A similar
protestation would have erupted against Muslim migrants if they had attemp-
ted, at the early stages, to draw their hosts into Islam.
There was another reason why proselytization was not common in Eastern
Nigeria beyond 1940. This has its origin in the colonial policy of racial segrega-
tion. The settlement of Hausa migrants was facilitated in many places by Brit-
ish administration. The same government kept persons from different Nigerian
ethnic groups distant from each other using as yardsticks “culture” and “reli-
gion.” The major differentiation in Eastern Nigeria was made with respect to
Muslims on one hand and members of the Igbo religion and Christians on the
other. To effect this separation, migrants were confined to their settlements and
the indigenes to their villages. The practice continued until 1939. Some contacts
between the Igbo and the Nupe, Hausa, and Yoruba occurred when trade in-
terests brought them together. However, British colonial agents backed their

276 Circumstances that prevailed a few years previously, such as danger from abduction
into slavery and clan warfare, were still realities facing different ethnic groups beyond
the 1920. Trade in slaves continued discretely into the late 1920s.
277 Hamza Aduku, interview cited. Also, Mohammed Bugu, Cattle merchant from Maidu-
guri, interview, Umuahia, February 2006.
278 Ottenberg, Farmers and Townspeople, 99.

101
policy up with official orders. A promulgation in 1932 ruled against the peoples
of Eastern Nigeria “residing in Abakpa, restricting it to persons from Northern
279
Nigeria and the Yoruba.” When in 1939 internal movements increased within
the region, the colonial government abandoned their policy of separating differ-
ent cultural and religious groups, widened stranger’s settlements, and shared it
280
among the Hausa and Nupe, Yoruba, and Igbo. Igbo migrants, however, paid
281
gratuities to Hausa chiefs for plots in these settlements.
Language difficulty was also an important factor that undermined proselyt-
ization at this period. Interactions between strangers were effected mostly with
signs. This fostered the continued dependence on middlemen who could com-
municate in whatever way possible with the other party. An example of this is
found in Abakaliki town where Mallam Momo Taylor, a Hausa from Lafia near
Nassarawa in North Central Nigeria functioned as an interpreter for the Hausa
and Igbo in the 1940s. Taylor migrated as a young man to Abakaliki in 1917.
Within three decades he had acquired knowledge of Igbo and English and
could assume leadership roles for the Muslim community in relation to both the
host community and the colonial government. Taylor’s multilingualism
brought him into the Urban Council in 1946 where he served as spokesman for
matters involving people from Northern Nigeria with the Igbo and also for the
282
northern migrant community and the government. Converts to Islam in Igbo-
land between 1937 and 1950 reported that their attraction to Hausa traders and
Islam was not because of contact through friendship ties but from their isolated
observation of Hausa Muslims’ commitment to their religious duties, chiefly
283
the daily prayers.

279 Ibid., 93.

280 Ibid., 87.
281 Ibid., 94.
282 Ibid., 208.
283 Imam Omeh Musa and Imam Eze, interviews cited.

102
CHAPTER 3
THE EXPANSION OF ISLAM AFTER 1950

Post 1950 Developments

Islam made significant headway in Igboland in the 1950s and again in the 1970s
after the civil war. Some of these gains will be examined in this chapter. The
success of Islam in Igboland during this period corresponded with increase in
migration from Northern Nigeria to Eastern Nigeria. The first wave, precisely
from Sokoto, Niger, and Zaria Provinces, was engineered by the difficult dry
284
season and bad harvest of 1952 to 53. Movement was by way of the River Ni-
ger and the major town of interest was Onitsha. Migrants, assumed to be be-
tween fifteen and forty-five years, covered a distance of about 610 miles to get
285
to Onitsha. With almost no knowledge of literacy in Roman script, they en-
gaged in trade or worked as unskilled laborers. Prothero reports some degree of
286
antipathy from their hosts because of their uncouth appearance and illiteracy.
Despite the spirited efforts made by three brothers from Kano, who claimed to
have been sent by Allah to Onitsha to teach the people Islam, the religion re-
mained the concern of migrants until 1973 when Tijani Akubuo became the
287
first indigene of Onitsha to convert to Islam.

284 R. M. Prothero, Migrant Labour from Sokoto Province, Northern Nigeria (Kaduna: Go-
vernment Printers, Northern Region of Nigeria, 1958), 33-37.
285 Ibid., 29, 36-37.
286 Ibid., 43. Also, Obinna Muoh, “Islam in Onitsha, 1943–2006,” B. A. project, University
of Nigeria (2007), 36-45.
287 Dr. C. Emetuma, b. 1954, Traditional Ruler of Akabo Autonomous Community, inter-
view, Owerri, April 2010. G. T. Basden confirmed the presence of Muslim migrants
from Northern Nigeria in Onitsha by 1900, observing that the people “closed all fronts
against invasion by Islam:” Basden, Among the Ibos of Nigeria (London: Frank Cass,
1966), 241. Mallam Haruna, a cattle dealer, arrived Onitsha in 1930 with two brothers
for missionary work. They were successful among the migrant community but not
with the indigenes. In an interview, in 2005, with the leader of the Hausa Muslim com-
munity, whose opinion it was that Islam has greater chances of progressing with the
Igbo as agents of propagation, he reported on Islam in Onitsha before and after the civil
war: “Regarding the spread of Islam in Onitsha, the Muslim migrants minded their eco-
nomic interests. Neither they nor the indigenes allowed themselves to be influenced by
the religion of the other. There was no case of an indigene joining in the weekly prayer
before the war that I can recall. At present Islam is mainly practiced by Muslim settlers
who brought the religion.” Mallam Ibrahim, chief imam, interview, Ontisha, June 2005.
(Mallam S. M. Suberu, leader of the Yoruba Muslim community, also expressed the
same view in a separate interview.)

103
Fig. 14: Migration from Sokoto to Eastern Nigeria, 1954

The Roads and Rivers Proclamation of 1903 had by the 1950s been effective
in connecting all sections and peoples of Nigeria to each other and to the colo-
nial economy. By 1952 the Port Harcourt rail line started in 1917 had connected
major colonial Igbo towns like Aba, Bende, Umuahia, and Enugu with towns in
North Central and Northern Nigeria such as Oturkpo, Markurdi, Lafia, Kafan-
chan, Bukuru, Jos, Gombe, and Maiduguri. By 1956 Onitsha was connected by
288
road with Enugu, and onwards to Gboko and Makurdi, Jos and Yola. The
road networks linked together many hinterland peoples and led to the spring-
ing up of a series of roadside markets. An Hausa trader spoke on the degree of
change in Nigeria since the colonial times and emphasized the facilitation of in-
ternal travel and communication by the development and expansion of modern
transportation systems. His forefathers in 1910, he observed, walked on foot
with their cattle to Igboland in the process of which some animals and migrants
died on the way. Within a few decades, all that was required was a maximum
289
of 48 hours “to come from the north to Owerri with whatever goods” they had.

288 A. T. Grove, The Benue Valley (Kaduna: Ministry of Natural Resources, Northern Ni-
geria, 1956), 7 & 10.
289 Alhaji Danladi, b. 1950, interview, Owerri, February 2006.

104
Extending Islam to Owerri

Owerri was the next town after Enugu Ezike and Ibagwa where Islam touched
the lives of Igbo indigenes. Conversions to Islam in Owerri began in 1950 des-
pite the existence since 1903 of a Hausa settlement in the town, whose numbers
had reasonably appreciated in 1939 to warrant their sending a representative to
290
the Oratta Native Authority Council. Alhaji Dauda Onyeagocha, the chief
imam of Owerri central mosque, told how in the years after 1945, which saw
the settling at Owerri of colonial soldiers most of whom were from Northern
Nigeria and the influx of Muslim Hausa traders into the town, Owerri experi-
enced a series of strange occurrences in the form of mysterious deaths. The
people attributed these happenings to the presence of the Muslim migrants in
their midst and therefore expelled Muslims from areas inhabited by Owerri in-
291
digenes. They offered them, instead, a part of their evil forest. The migrants,
as reported, cleared and settled in the evil forest that eventually became Ama
Awusa—Hausa settlement at Owerri. The survival of these migrants in the evil
292
forest fascinated Owerri indigenes, drawing their attention to Islam. This in-
cident did not immediately produce conversions to Islam in Owerri town. One
of the early converts told how people from Owerri began to convert to Islam:

Muslims first came to Owerri around 1910 and 1911. They were most-
ly from Hausaland… The local people were ignorant of the religious
practices of these settlers… Later, the religion began to appeal to those
Igbo who had resided or attended one school or the other in Northern
Nigeria…
I was born into a Christian family and my parents were staunch pro-
pagators of the Catholic faith. I became a Muslim in 1950 and by that
time there were just few Igbo Muslim converts. It was during that
293
period that Islam started taking shape in Owerri and its surroundings.

The initial converts to Islam in Owerri were persons who sojourned in North-

290 Felix Ekechi, Tradition and Transformation in Eastern Nigeria: A Sociopolitical Histo-
ry of Owerri and its Hinterland, 1902–1947 (Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1989),
188.
291 These are bushes where persons who died mysteriously were thrown into. The Igbo di-
stanced themselves from such areas, believing them to be the home of malevolent spi-
rits.
292 Alhaji Dauda Onyeagocha, chief imam of Owerri central mosque, interview, February
2006.
293 Alhaji Ibrahim Iwuanyanwu, b. 1934, Mbaitoli, January 2006.

105
ern Nigeria, schooled or worked there, and became Muslims there. Organized
Islamic worship began in Owerri after “the end of the Nigerian Civil War,” re-
294
ports the chief imam. Muslims erected a place of worship in the 1970s on land
that previously housed Nigerian soldiers. Following their evacuation from
Owerri, the land was donated by its owner to Muslims for the development of
295
Islam in Owerri.
Islam did not thrive rapidly in Owerri. Non-Igbo Muslims continued to out-
number the Igbo by a very visible margin. Shehu Kangiwa, who by 2006 had
296
lived in Owerri for fifty-six years, reported: “very few Igbo worship with us.”
Alhaji Iwuanyawu’s projections for the growth of Islam in Owerri in the next
decade indicates the difficulty of propagation of Islam for fifty years:

I expect that in the next ten years a much larger number of Igbo con-
verts would be recorded. This is Igboland. It is not good that settlers
297
outnumber us. Our number should be increased.

The Enohia (Anohia) awakening of 1958

Afikpo, a sub district of the old Abakiliki Division from 1915 to 1923, was from
1905 a familiar terrain to Hausa settlers. With the British conquest of the area
in 1902, a government station was established at Afikpo that served as a base
298
for military patrols and had in residence “Moslem Hausa” soldiers. Muslim
traders and prostitutes from Northern Nigeria later joined the soldiers at Afik-
po. When the soldiers left the station in the 1930s so also did the prostitutes and
299
traders. The village of Enohia, one of twenty-two villages in the Afikpo vil-
lage-group was an isolated community in Afikpo Division. Its major occupation
was fishing, engaged in by all able-bodied men who spent October to June each
year on the Cross River. Enohia’s contacts with the outside world were largely

294 Alhaji Dauda Onyeagocha.

295 The land belonged to the father of Alhaji Dauda Onyeagocha.
296 Shehu Kangiwa, b. 1945, interview, Owerri, February 2006. Doi’s statistics of Igbo Mus-
lims in 1984, compiled from data submitted by Muslim leaders in Igboland, put together
the number for Owerri and Orlu at 500 persons. Incidentally, Orlu has more indigenous
Muslims than Owerri. No recent statistics for Owerri Muslims could be procured. Ho-
wever, making allowance for increase in conversions and the birth of children to con-
verts, I propose that Owerri Muslims may number about 300 to 400 persons currently.
297 Alhaji Iwuanyanwu.
298 Charles Patridge, Cross River Natives (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1905), 116
299 Simon Ottenberg, “A Moslem Igbo Village,” Cahiers D’Etudes Africaines, Vol. XI (42)
1971, 236.

106
through Calabar, one hundred miles south of Afikpo town, at whose markets
they traded their manufactures and other trade goods. Contacts with the Efik
were of such depth that many from Enohia like other Afikpo villages learned to
300
speak Efik. Previous to 1939 when the colonial policy of separating groups on
the parameters of religion and culture was in force, there was no evidence of
direct contacts between Enohia and persons of Northern Nigerian origin. Ot-
tenberg writes of “some contact with Moslems at Afikpo from the 1940s on, for
they had a cattle trade route running from Abakaliki to Umuahia which passed
by the village-group.” He goes further to say that “While a few of these ‘Hausa’
301
lived at Afikpo, others were itinerant cattle traders.” There was no suggestion
of an indigene of Enohia converting to Islam either directly or remotely. A
turning point occurred in the religious configuration of Afikpo and of Abakaliki
302
Division in 1957 when Okpani Egwuani of Enohia, Anohia in colonial records,
returned to Afikpo. He was previously a member of the Roman Catholic
Church who converted to Islam and assumed the new name of Sheikh Ibrahim
Niasse Nwagui. Simon Ottenberg’s article “A Moslem Igbo Village” consider-
ably lightens the task of reconstructing the story of the spread of Islam in this
303
community. However, oral accounts collected between 2003 and 2006 is be
304
used alongside Ottenberg’s article for this incident.
Okpani Egwuani, popular as Okpani Agu prior to his conversion to Islam
and change of name to Ibrahim Niasse Nwagui, was born at Enohia Itim in
305
Afikpo Division in 1920. His primary education was obtained under the Ro-

300 Simon Ottenberg, Farmers and Townspeople in a Changing Nigeria: Abakaliki during
Colonial Times (1905-1960) (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 2005), 225-5; Simon Ottenberg, “A
Moslem Igbo Village,” 231-259. The Afikpo village group had 22 villages of which Eno-
hia was one.
301 Ibid.
302 Enohia is preferred over Anofia because it is how the people address themselves and how
they are represented in the records of Ebonyi State Government to which they belong.
303 Simon Ottenberg, “A Moslem Igbo Village,” 231-259. There are also few remarks by Doi
on Enohia, which he called “Nnohia.” See Doi, Islam in Nigeria, 171-72.
304 Oral data on Enohia came from the following: Sheikh Adam Idoko; Haroun Aja, b.
1958, interview, Abakaliki, October 2003; Chief P. E. Nwainyinya, b. 1951, interview,
Abakaliki, October 2003; Dauda Arua, interview, Abakaliki, February 2003; Yusuf Item,
b. 1976, interview, Abakaliki, January 2004; Sheikh Obini Ekpe, b. 1958, interview, Aba-
kaliki, January 2004; Mrs. Maria Nwachukwu, b. 1937, interview, Enohia Itim, February
2006, and Mallam Yusuf Ude, c. 75 years, interview, Amaukpo Afikpo, February 2006.
305 One of my interviewees reported that Okpani (Nwagui) was born in 1910 but since Ot-
tenberg interviewed him in person in 1960, I have used his rendering of his birth date
of 1920.

107
Fig. 15: Ebonyi State showing Enohia in Afikpo North Local Government Area

man Catholic Church and the Afikpo Government Primary School. Ibrahim
Nwagui worked at Calabar, Fernando Po, and Lagos. He served in the Nigerian
army from 1944 to 1946. It was supposedly at Lagos that he had the dream that
led to his conversion, the contents of which was recounted by Alhaji Dauda
Arua as follows: “Allah revealed to him everything about Islam and its pro-
pagation. On waking up he traced the religion according to the dream to Seneg-
al where he attended an Islamic school and became a full Arabic scholar and
theologian.” The popular story about Nwagui’s conversion, which also Otten-
berg recorded, had it that he was shown in his dream Ibrahim Nyas (or Niasse)
of Kaolak, in Senegal, and two other “Muslim holy men fully bearded and
306
wearing white.” We can reconcile these accounts by assuming that in the
same dream where Ibrahim Nyas and the two other holy men appeared to

306 Dauda Arua, interview cited.

108
Nwagui, he was also informed about Islam and its propagation, of course, in
Enohia and other Afikpo towns. There is a strong possibility that the Hausa
community in Afikpo could have indirectly influenced Ibrahim Nwagui’s con-
version to Islam although this was neither suggested nor inferred by my inter-
viewees, nearly all of whom were closely acquainted with him. Afikpo was one
of the emerging colonial towns in the Igboland with a settled Hausa com-
munity dating to 1921, approximately about the time that Nwagui was born.
Nwagui would have been aware of this group and their existence in his youth
in the 1940s, a time also when the colonial policy of separation of races was
already ended and from which time there was greater intermingling of Igbo
and northern strangers. There is nothing to prove that Nwagui did not en-
counter them at markets and in the streets in the early 1940s even though his
307
chroniclers assume that he had no dealings with them. If a remote awareness
of Islam or an attraction for the religion developed, it would have been nur-
tured in the years he worked at Lagos and when he was an employee in the Ni-
gerian army where he served alongside Muslim Hausa and Yoruba soldiers pri-
or to his trip to Senegal in 1946. Since he did not convert to Islam in Nigeria, his
conversion could well have taken place anytime between 1946 and 1950, the
date of his first pilgrimage to Mecca.
On one hand, Nwagui’s conversion appears like an act of defiance to west-
ern colonial and religious domination and, on the other, an attempt to break the
strong correlation of Islam with the Hausa ethnic group very current in Igbo-
308
land in his days. His conversion, outside the agency of a northern Muslim,
became a boost for Islam in Igboland thereafter. As Doi rightly noted, Nwagui’s
conversion and aggressive propagation of Islam suggested to the Igbo that Is-
lam merits consideration beyond its narrow confines as the Hausa man’s reli-
309
gion.
Nwagui spent roughly a decade in Senegal from where he performed two

307 Sheikh Idoko suggests that Nwagui converted in Nigeria prior to his trip abroad but
other interviewees, and even scholars, maintain that his conversion occurred outside
the country. Reports Idoko: “I learnt that people in Nsukka went to Nwagui’s town and
participated in their conversion… Many were not literate but Nwagui who some said
was a Christian evangelist or Catechist became a Muslim while already literate. After
his conversion he traveled to Senegal. After acquiring Islamic knowledge there he came
back and took that spirit of evangelism and became aggressive in his propagation of Is-
lam in his town.”
308 It is my opinion that Nwagui carefully “planned” his conversion to occur outside Nige-
ria and through a non-Nigerian Muslim.
309 Doi, Islam in Nigeria, 172.

109
pilgrimages in 1950 and 1955 before returning to Afikpo in 1957. Dauda Arua
reports that a letter, from Nwagui to the town’s leaders calling them away from
idol worship and informing them of his intention to destroy their idols, pre-
310
ceded his return to Enohia in 1958. The slight deviation in the above remarks
from the account presented by Ottenberg, collected the year after these events
took place, would be blamed partly on the distortion that attends oral history
while in the process of diffusion and partly also on the need to embellish the
story to the advantage of Nwagui’s career and the prestige of Islam. Ottenberg
shows that the prelude to the verbal remark about destroying idols was the vis-
it to Nwagui by the elders of Enohia requesting help with certain mysterious
deaths and other untoward happenings in Enohia. Consequently Nwagui re-
sponded that before he would come to live with them the shrines must be des-
troyed. He then asked if they agreed to his suggestion. When they consented he
told them to go back and tell their people. He could not have written a com-
munity announcing intention to destroy communal places of worship without
precedence. That would have appeared confrontational and a breach of peace
when Enohia and all Nigeria were still under colonial domination.
Enohia’s final acceptance of Islam is remarkable and stands in very clear
contrast to other Igbo communities. Enohia community celebrated Nwagui’s re-
turn and requested him to settle and establish his religion in the village. Al-
though Nwagui was more concerned with reaching out to the wider Afikpo vil-
lage-group and preferred to settle outside Enohia, at the Government Station at
Afikpo, his community was no doubt well disposed to his new religion being
attracted by his recently acquired wealth. He had returned with an escort of
Hausa Muslims, with vehicles, and other material possessions. The process
however of getting the community to accept Islam was tortuous. When Nwagui
pressed through direct propagation, money, and sheer force to turn Enohia into
a Muslim village, refractory voices were heard. Majority clearly opposed the
move along with other changes intended including the already mentioned de-
struction of village shrines. “Being a new religion, the environment was hostile
to its propagation,” recalled Dauda Arua. He added that later some joined
Nwagui while “majority of the people rejected Islam because it was against the
religion of their ancestors and did not allow them to practise their culture
311
fully.”

310 Dauda Arua, interview cited.

311 Ibid.

110
 Nwagui’s attempt to bring the village of Enohia to revert to Islam generated
much conflict in Enohia. There were a series of court cases from 1958 requiring
the mediation of the police, the Afikpo Native Authority Court, and the Assist-
ant District Officer. Temporary peace came when, under the supervision of the
Assistant District Officer, a part of the village was formally converted to Islam
on October 28, 1958 in a ceremony officiated by Hausa companions of Nwagui
312
and witnessed by Muslim guests from Nsukka Division. The event was in-
deed revolutionary. Shrines were destroyed and the sacred bush was nearly all
cleared. Enohia’s three wards became divided into Muslim and non-Muslim
sections separated by a mat fence that has remained a feature of the village
since then. The Muslim section, renamed Medina village, grew out of one of the
three original wards of Enohia. In actual numbers the converts were not many.
Ottenberg records that Nwagui converted persons “who belonged to the related
group of patrilineages of which he was a member, wives who had married into
these groupings, and a few other Anohia persons,” and about ten other converts
313
were drawn from the central villages of Afikpo. Enohia became the village
with the highest concentration of Igbo Muslims from this date. About 50 per-
314
sons would have taken part in the group conversion in 1958.
In 1959 Sheikh Ibrahim Nwagui converted into a mosque the communal rest
house for Enohia men that housed the secret society masks and other
paraphernalia. Enohia Muslims relocated to the vicinity of the mosque. In 1960,
at the beginning of the secret society season, a dispute ensued. Enohia non-
Muslims took legal action against the Muslims for denying them access to the
building and preventing them from preparing for their traditional ceremony.
The Native Court ruled in favor of non-Muslims. Muslims were fined £50 (50
315
pounds) and asked to move their mosque away from the rest house.
Nwagui’s house was used instead as mosque for several years. As tensions con-
tinued to mount in the Muslim-non-Muslims relations in Enohia, Muslims were
barred from some social functions, including sitting with other elders at meet-
316
ings and in the village market.
From 1963, Nwagui embarked on a series of projects aimed at transforming
Enohia Muslim community. Haroun Ajah, Nwagui’s son-in-law, reports:

312 Sheikh Adam Idoko, interview cited.

313 Ottenberg, “A Moslem Igbo Village,” 240-1.
314 From information supplied by Ibrahim Nwagui, Doi placed the number of Enohia Mus-
lims in 1984, twenty-six years after, at 300 persons. Doi, Islam in Nigeria, 182.
315 Ottenberg, “A Moslem Igbo Village,” 245.
316 Alhaji Ahmed Onyeama, 62 years, interview, Abakaliki, September 2003.

111
 Those Hausa mallams and teachers that moved to Enohia with
Nwagui taught Enohia Muslim converts what Islam was all about.
Together with Nwagui, they transformed Enohia into a viable citadel
317
of learning and a strong base for Islamic propagation.

Nwagui’s first project was the establishment of a nursery school where Muslim
children could learn to recite the Qur’an. The nursery school was run by Arabic
scholars and Muslim companions of Nwagui from Senegal and Hausaland and
was funded by the Senegalese government through Alhaji Nias from its incep-
tion until the death of Ibrahim Nwagui in 1975. The establishment in 1965 of an
Islamic Centre, called the Bahia Islamic Centre, came next. The Jordanian Am-
318
bassador to Nigeria, Kamil Eisshariff, laid the foundation stone of the centre.
When Enohia Muslims complained that their children suffered discrimina-
tion in the mission schools and were not allowed to do their prayers at school,
Nwagui directed their withdrawal from the mission schools and proceeded to
319
establish, with financial assistance from Senegal, an Islamic school. Nwagui
wanted a pro-Muslim education for Enohia Muslim children and to avoid any
exposure that could challenge their Islamic belief similar to the experience of
320
Muslim converts in Western Nigeria. Doi records on Enohia in 1965 reads:

The Islamic centre, apart from organizing Islamic activities, built a

Muslim primary school with a bias on Quranic studies. The teachers
were provided by the Saudi Arabian government. The two enthusiast-
ic teachers in the early stage of the school were Muhammad Ali Hag
Nur, a Sudanese, and Maulay Hassan, a Morrocan who organized Is-
lamic preaching activities after school hours. Later they were joined
by an Igbo teacher, Ibrahim Chukwu Idam, a native of Amuze in
321
Afikpo.

The result of Nwagui’s efforts to popularise his faith in and around Enohia was
quite remarkable. First it reversed the low status of Enohia in the Afikpo vil-
lage group. Second, in spite of the hostility to Islam and suspicions over the
true intent of Enohia Muslims, some young, mission-educated, persons in and

317 Sheikh Haroun Aja, interview cited.

318 Ebonyi State Government: http://ebonyistategov.net/tourismt.htm (2007).
319 Another reason given for the withdrawal of Muslim children from mission schools was
that “the school was established for Christians and not Muslims.” Olaiyi Saibou, inter-
view, Abakaliki, January 2006.
320 P. B. Clarke and Ian Linden, Islam in Modern Nigeria (Mainz: Grunewald, 1984).
321 Doi, Islam in Nigeria, 173.

112
around Enohia admired the rapidity with which Nwagui introduced change in
322
his Muslim community between 1958 and 1959. It contrasted with the slow
pace common with the leadership of their elders. Mallam Ibrahim Eze paid him
the following tribute: “The history of Islam in Igboland is largely the history of
323
Sheikh Ibrahim Niasse Nwagui.” In the 60s and 70s, his efforts resonated at
Afikpo town, Amasiri, Okposi, Akabo, Eddah, Orlu, and Ugwulangwu.

The civil war years

The political climate in Nigeria after independence in 1960 was one of total
breakdown of law and order. The major incidents were the coup d’état of Janu-
ary 1966 and the Nigerian Civil War of June 1967 to January 1970. It would be
shown later how the 1966 coup and Nigeria – Biafra war, 1967 to 70, brought
about the degeneration of the Igbo – Hausa relationship, deepening their ethno-
324
religious differences.
The January coup was blamed on the Igbo ethnic group subsequent to an
325
allegation made by a British Newspaper that it was an Igbo coup. The Igbo
refuted this claim on the grounds that the coup had other ethnic groups repres-
ented among its executors. The actual implementation, indeed, left much to be
desired and therefore created room for the claim that it was an Igbo coup. A re-
cent analysis of the coup reads:

The cause of the Nigerian Civil War was the miscalculation of Nigeri-
an Army officers at that time, under Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu,
when their coup appeared to be partial. There were killings in Kadu-
na, Ibadan, and Lagos, but not in the eastern part of the country. If the
322 Ottenberg, “A Moslem Igbo Village,” 247.
323 Mallam Ibrahim Eze, b. 1938, chief imam, interview, Nsukka, July 2003.
324 In between these crises were other equally explosive incidents that polarized Nigerians
along ethnic and political lines: The controversy over the 1962-63 population censuses,
the 1964 federal elections—Nigeria’s first post-independence elections, again the Wes-
tern Region election of 1965, and Decree 34 of May 1966 that prescribed a unitary go-
vernment for Nigeria. These crises and the loss of confidence they generated affected
intergroup mingling and temporarily halted migrations across ethnic borders. The mi-
gratory routes were reversed as migrants began to return to their original homelands
or to less turbulent areas. The highly charged areas were first Western Nigeria from
1962 until December 1965 and, afterwards, Eastern Nigeria and Northern Nigeria si-
multaneously from January 1966 until the outbreak of the civil war in June 1967. See,
Egodi Uchendu, Women and Conflict in the Nigerian Civil War (Trenton, New Jersey:
Africa World Press, 2007) 4-5.
325 John de St. Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1972), 43-44.

113
 premier of Northern Nigeria or premier of Western Nigeria or the
prime minister of Nigeria were that bad; I don’t see what made Ok-
para [in the East] a saint. They didn’t touch anybody in the Midwest
and the East, or even arrest their leaders. But here in the North, it was
a bloody coup. So, it was patently clear, two days after, when the dust
cleared, that the coup was essentially up against the Northern and
326
Western interests…

The massacre of the Igbo, which mildly affected the Efik and Ibibio of Eastern
Nigeria, was the eventual outcome of a coup that privileged a section of the
country against others. Amidst the tension created by the massacres in North-
ern and Western Nigeria, the government of the Eastern Region issued an evic-
tion order in November 1966 requesting all migrants from the Northern and
Western Regions to vacate the Southeast. The disturbances of 1966 that forced
the Igbo out of Northern Nigeria did same to northerners in Eastern Nigeria es-
pecially. The political situation in Nigeria further degenerated when the East-
ern Region government opted for a separate existence from Nigeria in March
1967 adopting the ancient name of Biafra for the new republic. The Nigerian
government under Lieutenant Yakubu Gowon sent troops to the region to quell
the rebellion. The humble inroad Islam was making into Eastern Nigeria and
Igboland in particular was nearly obliterated by the Nigeria–Biafra war that
spanned the months of June 1967 to January 1970.
The civil war pitched Igbo society against the emerging Igbo Muslim group,
then a very insignificant minority amidst an overwhelming non-Muslim popu-
lation that exceeded 14 million. Doi noted the sparseness of Igbo Muslims in
327
Nsukka Division between 1965 and 1967. Decidedly, the civil war was a diffi-
cult time for the Igbo as a group but was tougher on Igbo Muslims. One Igbo
Muslim family from Owerri that escaped to Cameroon during the war did so
because “in the north they were killing the Igbo; in the east they were search-
328
ing out Muslims.”
Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu who led Biafra in its war of separation from
Nigeria articulated in 1969 the stand of the Igbo, if not for the entire Southeast,
on Islam. The official communication on the war partly located it within a reli-

326 Alhaji Dambatta in Desmond Mgboh, “Nigerian nationalists fought for independence
without vision of what to do with it,” Daily Sun, Thursday, 1 May 2008.
327 Doi, Islam in Nigeria, 178.
328 Abdullahi, interview, Owerri, February 2006.

114
gious matrix, describing the crisis as a conflict against Muslim expansionism in
Nigeria. Extracts from the Ahiara Declaration of 1969 reads:

Our struggle has far-reaching significance… We are the latest victims

of a wicked collusion between the three traditional scourges of the
black man - racism, Arab-Muslim expansionism and white economic
imperialism. …
The Biafran struggle is, on another plane, a resistance to the Ar-
ab-Muslim expansionism which has menaced and ravaged the African
continent for twelve centuries. As early as the first quarter of the sev-
enth century, the Arabs, a people from the Near-East, evolved Islam
not just as a religion but as a cover for their insatiable territorial ambi-
tions. By the tenth century they had overrun and occupied, among
other places, Egypt and North Africa. Had they stopped there, we
would not today be faced with the wicked and unholy collusion we
are fighting against. On the contrary, they cast their hungry and envi-
ous eyes across the Sahara on to the land of the Negroes.
Our Biafran ancestors remained immune from the Islamic contagion.
From the middle years of the last century Christianity was established
in our land. In this way we came to be a predominantly Christian
people. We came to stand out as a non-Muslim island in a raging Is-
lamic sea. Throughout the period of the ill-fated Nigerian experiment,
the Muslims hoped to infiltrate Biafra by peaceful means and quiet
propaganda, but failed. Then the late Ahmadu Bello, the Sarduana of
Sokoto tried, by political and economic blackmail and terrorism, to
convert Biafrans settled in Northern Nigeria to Islam. His hope was
that these Biafrans on dispersion would then carry Islam to Biafra,
and by so doing give the religion political control of the area. The
crises which agitated the so-called independent Nigeria from 1962
gave these aggressive proselytisers the chance to try converting us by
force. …
Biafra is one of the few African states untainted by Islam. Therefore,
to militant Arabism, Biafra is a stumbling block to their plan for con-
329
trolling the whole continent.

The studies on the civil war have not addressed the fate of the roughly less
than three hundred Igbo Muslims who as Biafrans engaged in battle with sol-
329 Odumegwu Ojukwu, The Ahiara Declaration: The principles of the Biafran Revolution
(Government Printers, 1969).

115
diers many of whom they had strong religious bonds with. In their recollec-
tions of the war, they presented the crisis as a very difficult experience. Igbo
Muslims interpreted the war as an occasion for Biafra leadership to deal with
indigenous Muslims in the region and described themselves as “victims of the
330
war in the hands of their own bothers.”
Among some Igbo and Hausa Muslims, the Nigeria–Biafra war was a reli-
gious crisis while some perceived it as ethnic rivalry. Undoubtedly, there were
many sides to that war. There were personal, national, international, political,
and social dimensions to the war. And, Muslims and Christians fought together
on both sides of the conflict. It is therefore amateurish to limit the war to
simply religious or ethnic causes. Biafran leadership, dominated by the Igbo,
would appear to have envisaged the war as offering an opportunity to wipe out
Islam in Eastern Nigeria. Biafran persecution of Igbo Muslims was gradual be-
ginning after the assassination in May 1966 of Major General Aguiyi Irosi, the
Igbo Head of State; and the waves of massacres that swept Northern and West-
ern Nigeria, targeting primarily persons of Igbo origin.
Biafran government would appear to have avenged the death of the Igbo in
Northern Nigeria on persons of Northern Nigeria origin found in Biafra after
November 1966 when the evacuation edict was issued to northerners. Dauda
Ojobe, who was a former Biafran officer, shared the experience of few Hausa
women married to Igbo men whom he encountered in 1969. These women re-
turned to Igboland with their Igbo husbands and children in 1966 as the Igbo
fled the massacres in Northern Nigeria. In Biafra, they were taken and detained
at Umuahia. Their circumstances altered according to the fortunes of the war.
As circumstances in Biafra deteriorated, their situation worsened. Mid way
through the war, they were fed once on alternate days until eventually released
and sent out of Biafra. At Owerri some Igbo men married to northern women
331
were mobbed because of the crisis.
Biafran government treated indigenous of Igboland Muslims as it did non-
indigenes. First, Igbo Muslims were asked to change their names to Christian

330 Haruna Aja, interview cited. Some interviewees expressed delight that the Biafra
dream did not materialize. They claimed that the motive was deceitful and gave credit
to God for denying Biafra victory.
331 Dauda Ojobe, b. 1928, (became Muslim in 1971), interview, Enugu Ezike, May 2003.

116
 332
and traditional names or anything that is neither Islamic nor Hausa. Ibrahim
Eze, who dropped his Arabic name recounted that experience:

Question: Papa, is there any reason why you do not have an Igbo
name?

Answer: I gave myself an Igbo name during the war. I answered Mi-
chael Eze. You will find it in my identity card.

Question: But your father did not give you an Igbo name?

Answer: No… During the war people knew that I was a Muslim. They
also knew when I was praying together with Hausa Muslims. Some
started saying “Is this Hausa man still here; what is he still doing?” I
had to explain that I was Igbo and Muslim and not an Hausa man as
some misunderstood me to be. When they asked me my name, I told
them Michael. I started then to use that name. I put Michael Eze on
333
my identity card.

The demand for change of name was followed by calls for abandonment of Is-
lam. Some renounced their faith but some did not. Some who did returned to
334
Islam after the war. An elderly Muslim, recounted some of the happenings in
Enugu Ezike in 1967 as follows:

In April, local authorities in Enugu Ezike summoned an elders’ coun-

cil to which Igbo Muslims from the different villages were invited. It
was demanded of them to renounce their faith and take an oath at the
ancestral shrine not to practice Islam. Some Igbo Muslims out of fear
of persecution renounced their faith, some ignored the briefings and
others left their villages for towns in Benue and Kogi States like Ak-
panya, Odoru, Ogugu, and Okpoo. Those who stayed behind lived in
fear. They suffered rejection from their communities, denial of justice
related to civil or criminal cases. Right to landed properties were
denied them as well as claim to debts owed them. There was also the
harassment, by the Civil Defence, of people they were meant to pro-

332 Yusuf Ude, interview cited. Igbo Muslims around Nsukka construed this as an attempt
to blot out Hausa Islamic ideology and custom and replace it with Western Christian
colonial ideology.
333 Mallam Ibrahim Eze, interview cited.
334 Mallam Ahmed Omeje, b. 1936, interview, Ibagwa-aka, May 2003.

117
 tect. The Civil Defence targeted suspect criminals and saboteurs. Be-
335
cause of this, Igbo Muslims were seldom seen in the day.

In a separate interview at Ibagwa, Mallam Omeje reported similar occurrences

in Ibagwa at the onset of hostilities:

The community had a meeting for us. They treated us as Hausas...

They killed Muslims here. We are not Hausa but there was little dif-
ference between our way of life and theirs… During the war we could
not practice Islam. Some relocated but I stayed behind. I led the Mus-
lims who met the Federal Unit Commander to ask for permission to
stay with them because of the problems we were having in the com-
munity. We were allowed to relocate close to the army camp. Later,
336
our camp became a refuge for non-Muslims.

The stigmatization of indigenous Muslims in Igboland, according to eyewitness

account, was general all over Eastern Nigeria. Reports from Port Harcourt were
337
no different from other parts of Igboland. There were claims that Biafran sol-
diers destroyed the property of the Muslim community of Enohia during the
338
crises, the destruction of the mosque at Enugu Ezike by the Civil Defence,
339
searching of residences of Muslims for arms, and physical abuse by beating.
Mohammed from Orlu recalled his discomfort when relatives and neighbors be-
came suspicious of him and on occasion demanded that he prove his innocence
and commitment to Biafra by joining the Biafran army. He was twenty-two
years at the outbreak of the war and therefore well within the age for military
service. His refusal to join the Biafran army meant that he was constantly in
hiding to escape Biafran soldiers when on recruitment drives. These frequently
visited his home forcing his relocation to Nassarawa in North Central Nigeria
340
where he remained till the end of the war. Adam Usman linked Biafra perse-
cution of Igbo Muslims to their refusal to fight for Biafra during the war: “None
of us accepted to fight in the war so the people said that we were enemies.

335 Garba Oheme, b. 1908, interview, Enugu Ezike, June 2003. In a hyperbolic sense the re-
moval to non-conflict zones could be regarded as a hijra, except that no jihad was de-
clared but the normal efforts after the war to seek for spiritual, alongside material, re-
habilitation of survivors.
336 Mallam Omeje, interview cited.
337 Alhaji Ali, b. 1941, imam, interview, Port Harcourt, February 2006.
338 Haroun Aja and Adam Idoko, interviews cited.
339 Abdullahi Igboama, interview, Enugu, January 2006.
340 Alhaji Mohammed, b. 1945, interview, Orlu, February 2006.

118
They persecuted us through their sons in the army. So we ran to Nigerian sol-
341
diers…” Apparently considerations on which side to support in the conflict
were determined as much by religious ties as by ethnicity.
Igbo Muslims took various precautionary measures to protect their families
and escape harassments from the early stages of the war. Children and youths
were sent to North Central or Northern Nigeria. Printed materials on Islam
some of which originated from other Muslim countries and, which prior to the
war, could be purchased at Onitsha were with the crisis unpopular in Igboland.
Persons in possession of such materials destroyed or buried them for fear of
punishment if found in their possession. Other markers of Islam such as the
flowing white gowns for men, the caps, and prayer beads were carefully dis-
pensed with. Religious celebrations were also kept at bay. An attempt to hold a
group prayer session in Ibagwa in 1968 led to the arrest of worshippers by the
342
regular police. Hunger was a common problem, too.
The embattled Igbo Muslims found themselves at the crossroads between
two opposing camps: with one they shared ethnic allegiance, and, with the oth-
er, religious allegiance. Non-Muslim parents of Muslim converts were also in
similar situation. These parents joined their Muslim children wherever they
were. Both were suspects to the contending armies. Biafra categorized them as
Biafran saboteurs and federal soldiers suspected them of spying on them for Bi-
afra. It was not surprising that a few of those who sought refuge outside Igbo-
land never returned to it after the war and completely relinquished their Igbo
identity. The example was cited of Mallam Saidou who in addition to settling
343
permanently at Oturkpo had since the war not spoken Igbo.
The allegations of harassment from members of the Biafra Civil Defence or-
ganization add to the pile of charges levelled against that organization by Bi-
344
afran civilians as a whole during that war. An incident that occurred early in
the war, between an Igbo convert to Islam and the civil defence, came up a
number of times during interviews. The first time I heard it, the convert told
the story. Subsequently, I heard it repeated by his son and some other acquaint-
ances. The account from the son is reproduced here along with reactions to it:

341 Adam Usman, interview, Nsukka, May 2003.

342 Hassan Isah, interview, Ibagwa-ani, January 2006; Yaro Mohammed, b. 1947, interview,
Nsukka, January 2006; and Alhaji Ali, interview cited.
343 Hassan Issah, interview cited.
344 See, A. Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War (Enugu: Fourth Di-
mension, 1980); J. O. G. Achuzia, Requiem Biafra (Enugu: Fourth Dimension, 1986),
and Uchendu, Women and Conflict.

119
 Mallam G was one of those who remained behind in his village as
other Muslims left for Northern Nigeria and the Middle Belt. Severally
he was summoned for questioning by the civil defence and security
agents in his town. One day, by midnight, he went over to the federal
army and surrendered. The next day he returned to the village escor-
ted by a federal soldier and met his family intact. Five days later, fed-
eral soldiers invaded Enugu Ezike. Finally, Nsukka as a whole was
liberated. Mallam G became the go between for his community and
the federal soldiers. Through him relief materials and medical aid
from the International Red Cross came in. Harassments from the civil
defence stopped. Individuals arrested and detained were released.
Muslim Igbo with no knowledge of western education were made me-
diators between federal soldiers and the civil populace. Mallam G,
Audu, and others were at the helm of affairs ensuring peaceful rela-
tions between federal soldiers and civilian population at Nsukka and
345
Enugu Ezike in particular during the war.

Non-Muslims summed up Mallam’s action as sabotage. Their contentions were

as follows: Mallam reported the village to federal soldiers; he provided soldiers
with information that led to the invasion of his village group; Mallam did not
report any harassment to Biafran authorities but to federal soldiers. Mallam felt
that officials of the Biafran government would not treat his case fairly and took
it to the federal authorities. Mallam’s case became an example of the disloyalty
of Igbo Muslims to Biafra and her dream for political independence from Niger-
ia. One outcome of the war was that it brought Igbo Muslim to the limelight
and led to their forging ties with Muslim soldiers from places beyond the
boundaries of Igboland.
Local reaction to allegations of sabotage by Muslims was demonstrated a
year later when Audu’s house was broken into and his wife and a son killed.
This retribution, blamed on the Biafra Freedom Fighters (BOFF), terrified
Muslims in Enugu Ezike who moved out of the community close to the federal
military quarters. Any Muslim threatened, maltreated, or killed was blamed on
BOFF, while any non-Muslim attacked in similar circumstance was blamed on
federal soldiers. The remaining months of the war found Muslims of Enugu
Ezike, Ibagwa, and Enohia gripped with fear as both federal soldiers and BOFF
or Biafran soldiers engaged in retaliatory killings. The federal soldiers avenged
the death of a Muslim supposed to be killed by BOFF members on non-Muslim

345 Sheikh Saliu Abugu, b. 1958, interview, Enugu Ezike, February 2006.

120
civilians and BOFF avenged any non-Muslim Igbo killed by federal soldiers on
Igbo Muslim civilians. Non-Muslim Igbo were worried that Igbo Muslims
would tell their secrets to federal soldiers while federal soldiers worried that
non-Muslim Igbo were Biafran spies sent after them. Ahmed Omeje from Ibag-
wa recalled that “when federal soldiers granted us protection non-Muslims saw
it and returned to the village. Occasionally the soldiers will catch them and ac-
346
cuse them of being Biafrans…” In Port Harcourt, remarked Alhaji Ali, “some
who ran to Nigerian soldiers were killed. Most people remained in their homes
because they were afraid that if they run to Nigerian soldiers and Biafra even-
tually wins, they would not be allowed to return to their homes. Some who ran
347
to Nigerian soldiers were killed.” One common fear that Igbo Muslims lived
with was the fear that Biafra could win the war and then exterminate them.
The relative security some groups of Muslims enjoyed with the Nigerian sol-
diers and the regular supply of food materials failed to extinguish their anguish
348
over their eventual survival.
Towns in northern Igboland, on the Biafra-Nigeria border, fared better than
the Biafran hinterland. Nigerian soldiers provided protection as well for indi-
genous Muslims in Alor Agu, Ibagwa-aka, and Obukpa. The report from Alor
Agu reads:

We moved to Kogi State. We spent a month there before the police

moved us to Idah Police Barracks where we spent 6 months. From
there soldiers of the Nigerian army transported us back to Nsukka as
refugees. We were settled at St. Paul’s primary school. Other Igbo
who crossed the battle lines to the Northern side for shelter were also
moved there. That was where I experienced for the first time chinchi
and kwrikwata (ashama)… After three months at St Paul’s the army
moved us back to Enugu Ezike… We remained there until the end of
349
the war.”

There were reports from a section of the Muslim population of Alor Agu who
sought refuge at Idah that the water there caused diarrhoea in their children.
They were moved back to their village where Nigerian soldiers provided some
security against molestation. Soldiers on occasion accompanied some to the

346 Ahmed Omeje, interview cited.

347 Alhaji Ali, interview cited.
348 Hassan Issah, interview cited.
349 Alhaji Idris Okonkwo, b. 1953, interview, Nsukka, May 2003.

121
 350
farm to collect their produce. At Ibagwa-aka Muslim soldiers joined indigen-
ous Muslims at the mosques during prayers; strengthening their sense of com-
munity in addition to providing protection. There was no separate mosque for
351
the combatants making it practical and useful to worship with the indigenes.
Aminatu Musa from Obukpa who sent her three children to Kaduna during
the war had since lost touch with them, believing that they got missing in the
352
process of acquiring Qur’anic education. The three years of the war affected
access to education for Muslim children. Adolescent girls felt this disadvantage
more. By the time the war ended few had time for schooling as social pressure
353
to marry mounted.
Audu Nwinyi was among those who adopted a Christian name during the
war in order to safeguard his life. Relationship with non-Muslims in Obukpa
was very strained during the hostilities, he noted. Ajuma Abu, one of the
young adults who sought refuge from the raging conflict at Akpanya in North
Central Nigeria, found the Muslim community there distrustful of Igbo refu-
gees. He was suspected of coming to implement a secrete Igbo plan. This put
him at risk of being mobbed. He was spared by the intervention of a Nigerian
354
soldier who first asked him to recite the Qur’an and told the mob to leave him.
Enohia and Afikpo Muslims felt differently about the war. They confronted
unsympathetic Nigerian soldiers. Retelling the accounts he heard, Sheikh Idris
Al Hassan mentioned how “Muslims at Afikpo were victims of their Muslim
355
brothers’ bullets, which made some to abandon their religion.” The federal
onslaught on Afikpo did not recognize the Muslim community in the town.
They suffered as much from federal soldiers as they did from Biafran soldiers.
There were a number of desertions from Islam by irate Muslims because of the
federal soldiers’ onslaught on Afikpo.
Igbo Muslims had so much to say about Biafra and its ambition for self-rule.
First, they cited her anti-Islam policy as what undermined her dream for sover-
eignty. In their perception, the probability that in the event of victory, Biafra
would emerge as an oil state was an unacceptable prospect in the Arab world.
Sheikhs Idoko and Al Hassan gave this as the reason for the strong Arab sup-

350 Alhaji Yakubu, b. 1955, chief imam, interview, Enugu Ezike, January 2006.
351 Ahmed Omeje, interview cited.
352 Aminatou Musa, b. 1937, interview, Obukpa, January 2006.
353 Memuna Eze, b. 1956, interview, Nsukka March 2003.
354 Ajuma Abu, b. 1938, interview, Orba, January 2006.
355 Skeikh Idris Al Hassan, Director, Islamic Centre, Enugu, interview, May 2003.

122
 356
port for the Nigerian government during the crisis. The ghost of Biafra would
appear to have survived in various forms in Igbo Muslim consciousness for in
2003, three decades after the war, an elderly Igbo Muslim remarked that Igbo
Muslims construed Odumegwu Ojukwu’s presidential ambition in the present
357
fourth republic as a threat to Islam in Igboland.
There were isolated cases of conversions to Islam during the war. These
conversions were fuelled by starvation and the fear of intimidation and humili-
ation. Persons who converted did so to guarantee their protection from the Ni-
gerian soldiers whose assault on Biafran civilians provoked international out-
358
cry. Ibrahim who was raised in Northern Nigeria where he escaped the 1966
killings with his family recalled his family’s ordeal during the war:

We lived in Sokoto before the war. My mother pleaded with my fath-

er to take Islam but he refused. When the 1966 killing started, our
Hausa maid, Hadija, hid us in their compound for five days. Later, we
escaped to Zaria and from there came home. My father joined the (Bi-
afran) army. My mother and the children lived in the bush. We were
plagued with hunger. Two of my younger siblings suffered from kwa-
shiorkor. My mother sold all she had until she was left with a single
wrapper. She washed it at night, covering herself with rags, and wore
it again in the morning. It was then I started nursing the idea of be-

356 Idoko reminded me that Egyptian pilots bombed Biafra during the war and rendered
other military services.
357 Imam Hassan Omeh Musa, b. 1937, interview, Obukpa, May 2003.
358 See “Operation Calabar,” Presbyterian Record (Scotland), December 1967; The Times,
London, April 25, 1968; For instances of federal brutality on Biafra civilians, see John
Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War; Egodi Uchendu, Women and Conflict, and “Recollecti-
ons of childhood memories on the Nigerian Civil War,” Africa, 77, (2007). A report sub-
mitted to the UN Human Rights Commission in 2004 reads: “… In the villages predomi-
nantly populated by Biafran citizens, there was utter destruction of all structures for
human habitation, livestock and farms. Witnesses mentioned villages around Onitsha,
Owerri and Nsukka where this method of extermination was extensively used. … In
most areas where troops of the Federal Authority entered, peoples of Biafran (most
Igbo) origin were loaded on to trucks and taken out of the towns. It was explained that
these people were sent into jungles where the older ones were assembled and shot, and
their bodies were left to be disposed of by the wild beasts that roam the jungles. The
younger men were sorted out and posted to the units of the Federal Army where they
were used as cannon fodder in attacks on Biafran positions. It was testified to me that
the children were sent to the Northern region to be sold into slavery, and the women
were made to serve in the camps of the Federal troops, where they were ravished.”
(“The Violations of Human and Civil Rights of Ndi Igbo in the Federation of Nigeria,”
Submission to UN Human Rights Commission (2004), 38.)

123
 coming a Muslim. I told myself: “If my parents were Muslims, I would
not have suffered like this.” Our neighbors who were Muslims did not
suffer like we did. They remained in their houses… My father’s prop-
erty and buildings in Sokoto were confiscated… We lost the docu-
359
ments and could not get them back.

Other seeds of conversion were sown during the war. The actors were the sol-
diers of the Nigerian army who appropriated Igbo women in conquered zones
360
as wives. When the war ended in January 1970, a new scenario played itself
out in the form of extensive abductions of Igbo women by Nigerian soldiers in
celebration of Nigeria’s victory over Biafra. This wartime inter-ethnic and in-
ter-religious marriages laid the foundation for conversion to Islam of some of
the Igbo women so married. In retrospect, Dauda Ojobe judged the career of
Nigerian soldiers in Igboland, “most of whom were Muslims,” to have been in-
jurious to the cause of Islam. The misgivings bred much bitterness against Is-
361
lam and the Hausa.

Reconstruction and Rehabilitation: The Mbaise affair

The Nigerian army crushed the Biafra resistance in January 1970 bringing the
thirty months civil war to an end. The Igbo recognized forthwith the splitting
of Nigeria into twelve states and of Eastern Nigeria into three states: East Cent-
ral State (comprising the Igbo homeland east of the Niger River), Southeast
State (for the Ibibio, Efik, and Ekoi), and Rivers State (the Ijaw and marginal
Igbo groups that have since denounced their Igbo identity). There was, in addi-
tion, the emergence all over Igboland of military barracks as a check on further
recourse to arms by Biafra. Post-war reconstruction of Igboland and the rehab-
ilitation of survivors commenced almost immediately after the war. These pro-
grammes were intended to ease the plight of war victims and to manage their
restoration to peacetime. From 1970 the federal government through the East
Central State government channeled what it called relief materials—food and
drugs—to Igbo survivors of the conflict. It also promised in a national broadcast
that it “shall make all necessary arrangements to ensure the security of all Ni-

359 Mallam Ibrahim, b. 1950, interview, Umuahia, February 2006. Ibrahim converted to Is-
lam shortly after the war.
360 Dauda Ojobe, Hassan Issah, and Alhaji Ali, interviews cited. Also, Ken Saro Wiwa, On
a Darkling Plain: An Account of the Nigerian Civil War (Port Harcourt: Saros Interna-
tional Publishers, 1989), 210; and Egodi Uchendu, Women and conflict, 156-7.
361 Dauda Ojobe, interview cited.

124
gerians wherever they choose to reside and take all measures to enhance recon-
362
ciliation and national unity.” The federal efforts were buttressed by addition-
al assistance from few state governors, the first of which was from Major Has-
san Katsina of North Central Nigeria who welcomed those Igbo who fled
Northern Nigeria in the wake of the 1966 massacres back to the region.
Clearly noticeable from this time on was a south-north and north-south
movement of civilians. Persons who moved into Igboland (East Central State)
did so for a wide range of reasons including religious considerations as the
Mbaise affair, which will be discussed in this chapter, attests and also for trade
interests as the Nsukka incident will show. Substantial numbers were govern-
ment employees and soldiers whose relocation was officially determined. There
were in addition smaller influxes of destitutes, coming from as far as Chad and
Niger Republic, who subsisted as beggars. Thus, the end of the war found the
abandoned Hausa settlements receiving back former settlers and welcoming
new ones. Additional settlements emerged and were named Ama-Hausa, also
363
meaning Hausa settlement. Most residents of these settlements were un-
skilled persons, traders, mobile cobblers, and tailors. Rich migrants lived out-
side the strangers’ enclosures and among the Igbo. Their tenancy was of import
to Igbo landlords who needed the rents for personal rehabilitation after the
364
war.
362 Federal Military Government, “Ending the War: The Last Lap.” Broadcast to the nation
by His Excellency Major-General Yakubu Gowon, Head of the Federal Military Govern-
ment and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (July 1968), p. 9. Many Igbo who
were displaced from Northern Nigeria by the 1966 massacres returned to the north to re-
suscitate their abandoned careers and their business activities. They were joined by other
war survivors needing self-rehabilitation, but confronted by job-squeeze in Eastern Nigeria.
363 As explained in chapter two, the settlements housed migrants from Northern and
North Central Nigeria and had more residents who were Muslims than non-Muslims.
364 The plight of the Igbo after the war cannot be overemphasized. The end of the war
found the majority wretched. This wretchedness undermined for most their ethnic pri-
de. Thus, in the need to recover from the trauma of the war, the Igbo found themselves
amenable to ethnic groups and ideologies they previously were ambivalent about. For
an account of post-war Igboland see, Paul Obi-Ani, Post-Civil War Social and Econo-
mic Reconstruction of Igboland, 1970–1983 (Enugu: Milkon Press, 1998). Post-war Hau-
sa settlements functioned just as in the pre-war period. Each settlement appointed a re-
presentative who was the leader of the group and functioned as its intermediary in
matters with the host community. Through him information was passed to and fro bet-
ween migrants and their hosts. As more migrants moved outside the settlements to live
among the Igbo, specific towns like Enugu and Umuahia had in the last three decades
leaders who lived outside the settlement. Thus, in Enugu is found the Sarikin Enugu, a
cattle trader, overseeing the welfare of all Hausa in Enugu and not necessarily only
those found at the Ama-Hausa.

125
 1970 marked a turning point in the journey of Islam to Igboland. It was the
year when Islamic organizations from Northern and Western Nigeria and also
from outside Nigeria began to formally extend their activities to Igboland. They
articulated another trajectory for the rehabilitation of Igbo survivors of the civil
war that combined material with spiritual rehabilitation. The first incident oc-
curred in Mbaise shortly after the war and was the result of a partnership
between Hausa soldiers, two Saudi Arabian missionaries, and a couple of Igbo
traders recently converted to Islam. Muslims from Mbaise date the beginning of
Islam in their town to 1974, the year Muslim visitors from Hausaland and Saudi
Arabia arrived in the town in the company of the two newly converted Mbaise
Muslims. Oral evidence from Mbaise, however, shows that efforts towards in-
365
troducing Islam in the town began in 1972. Isa Ekeji recalled this event in
Mbaise:

Islam came through Mallam Usman Iwuala when Hausa soldiers

came here after the war. They allied with Mallam Iwuala to introduce
Islam in Mbaise. Through gifts and preaching, they gathered together
some twenty-two people comprising Igbo and Hausa. I was one of
366
them …

The missionary project to Mbaise, initiated by Hausa soldiers in the Nigerian

army, received the support of the Nigerian Supreme Islamic Council. The
Council approved an application for a mosque in Mbaise for onward submis-
367
sion to Mecca. The Mbaise mosque was built between 1974 and 1976 with
368
fund from Saudi Arabia. The construction was done by Mbaise converts to Is-
lam with the assistance of Muslim youths doing their national youth service
programme in the town. Alhaji Bugaje, president of the Muslim Society in
Minna, Niger State, supervised the project. Land for the mosque was purchased
from Chief Ogujiuba in return for which his son received a scholarship for uni-

365 Information on Islam in Mbaise came from interviews held in Mbaise in January and
February 2006 with: Mallam Isa Ekeji, b. c. 1938, (converted to Islam in 1974); Mallam
Isa Ugiri, b. c. 1931, imam of Mbaise, (converted to Islam in 1966); Mrs. Maimuna Ugiri;
Mallam Mohammed Ibeh, b. 1959, (converted to Islam in 1996); Nze Desmond Njoku, b.
c. 1927, traditional Prime Minister of Mbaise; Mr. A. Obube, (converted to Islam in 1977
but later recanted); Mr. A. Ibe, b. c. 1941, (converted to Islam in 1975 and recanted in
1987).
366 Mallam Isa Ekeji, interview cited.
367 A second mosque was approved for Calabar.
368 There is some uncertainly on the exact dates for the building of the mosque. Another
interviewee mentioned 1975 to 1976.

126
versity education abroad. The traditional council of Mbaise was fully involved
in the negotiation for the introduction of Islam in the town as the report below
indicates:

We had a series of cabinet meetings when they came especially when

they asked to buy land in our community so soon after the war. We
realized that they were only interested in religion and we welcomed
them. Their chief agent was Mallam Iwuala. They came soon after the
war with so much money. Seeing that hunger was thriving due to the
just concluded war, people easily gave in but later withdrew when
369
there was much consequences and death.

The two years that the Muslim missionaries from Saudi Arabia spent in Mbaise
saw the construction of houses for converts and the award of scholarships to
their children. The missionaries focused as much on the financial rehabilitation
of their converts as on their spiritual wellbeing. Thus, the attraction to Islam by
persons who had lost homes and property in the civil war was inevitable. The
timing was most appropriate for the success of Islamic propagation. Many war
victims were receptive to the new philosophy that simultaneously promised
eternal salvation and immediate rehabilitation in war-ravaged Igboland. Testi-
monies from early converts to Islam in Mbaise indicated that they received di-
verse assistance including the provision of capital for trade and other business
ventures. They also could access such scarce commodities like building materi-
als. A former convert shared the motivation for his conversion. This story
throws light on the social circumstances of the people after the war:

I went to war and came back extremely wretched. I first resorted to

stealing fowls but as I saw a member living very well from gifts, food
items, and money from these Muslims, I paid him a visit at night to
know his secret and he told me. The next day I professed… I joined to
help myself with daily bread and money to start a business. I left
when I achieved some of my aims and after seeing how they were
mercilessly killing and rendering useless defaulting members with
sophisticated charms.

Efforts to propagate Islam in Mbaise fizzled out within four years but not until
an estimated one hundred or more converts had been won to Islam through
generous gifts and other forms of financial assistance given at a time of dire

369 Nze Desmond Njoku, interview cited.

127
need. The abandonment of the missionary work in Mbaise was linked to the
mysterious disappearance of Mallam Iwuala while on a trip to Northern Niger-
ia. Mbaise Muslim converts, many of whom eventually turned away from Is-
lam and back to Christianity or to Igbo religion, claimed that Iwuala appropri-
ated for himself much of the fund entrusted to him for the mosque project. Iwu-
ala was not the only member of the young Muslim community of Mbaise who
mysteriously disappeared in 1976. A couple of other converts also suffered sim-
ilar fate and were assumed dead by their former companions. Another victim of
the unfortunate backlash was Mallam Ibekwe who developed sudden mental
disorder after selling, without the permission of the sponsors, a lorry load of ce-
ment meant for the construction of the mosque. The suicide, by hanging, of
Mallam Johnson, another early convert, was also ascribed to these events.
These retributions, according to the interviewees, occurred after the completion
of the mosque and were all connected to the crime of misappropriation of funds
intended for the building of a mosque, a hospital, an Islamic center, a primary
school, and a recreation center. In the end only the mosque was built. The
bizarre deaths, disappearances, and disorders had the most negative impact on
the growth of Islam in the town, scaring away converts and deterring others
from joining the group after only three years in which Islam flourished in
Mbaise. According to the imam of Mbaise, decline set in “when there was no
370
more fund to finance the people to Mecca.”
The embattled Muslim community of Mbaise renewed efforts in the 1990s to
revive Islam and to seek for support outside the boundaries of Igboland. A two-
man delegation was sent to the Islamic Education Trust in Niger State with the
complaint that they “were ignored, marginalized, rejected and were left in
371
bushy, unhealthy and undeveloped environment…” The delegation reques-
ted, among other things, for assistance in completing various projects that
would further the spread of Islam in Mbaise. The outcome of this is at present
unknown except the attempts from within and outside Nigeria to woo back
former converts. In 2006, the mosque keeper summarized the long-term con-
sequences of these events as follows: “Imagine, for several years this mosque
has been here there are just few converts. Now our people want to turn it into a
372
town hall.”

370 Mallam Isah Ugiri, interview cited.

371 “Letter from the Centre for Islamic Development Mbaise to the Director, Islamic Edu-
cation Trust, Minna, Niger State,” 16 May 1999.
372 Mallam Mohammed Ibeh, interview cited.

128
Extending Islam to Nsukka Town

The indigenous Muslim population in northern Igboland received a boost from

the federal contingent, composed mostly of Muslim soldiers, quartered in the
area during the war. Although some Muslims deny the preponderance of Mus-
lim soldiers in the Nigerian army during the war, it is nonetheless upheld that
the bulk of the federal soldiers in Biafra were Muslims drawn from different
parts of Northern and North Central Nigeria and from Western Nigeria as well.
Doi writes how the presence of Nigerian soldiers contributed in creating aware-
ness for Islam in Eastern Nigeria:

Another factor which has helped further Islamic expansion since the
war is the presence of Muslims in the Nigerian Army. Those areas in
Igboland which had not seen any mosque building or any form of Is-
lamic activities before now had an opportunity to witness Muslims
praying and practicing the tenets of Islam in the Army mosques tem-
porarily erected by the soldiers through the length and breadth of East
373
Central state wherever they encamped.

Nigerian soldiers in Igboland attracted to themselves persons from Northern

and North Central Nigeria who came to service the federal barracks that dotted
Igboland and others who came to trade in the war ravaged communities. Con-
tinuous influxes were partly instrumental in consolidating the little gains al-
ready made in Eastern Nigeria. One notable example of this occurred in the vil-
lage of Nsukka in Nsukka Division at the instance of Metumbi, a Muslim yam
trader from Jukun. The presence before the war of Muslims of Nupe, Yoruba,
and Hausa origins at Enugu Ezike, Ibagwa, Obukpa, and Alor Agu did not fa-
cilitate the spread of Islam in the rest of Nsukka Division including Nsukka vil-
lage, which was reasonably close to the areas already familiar with Islam. The
village of Nsukka now trace the introduction of Islam to the arrival of federal
soldiers in the First Division of the Nigerian Army in July 1967 to suppress Bi-
afra secession from the Nigerian federation. The soldiers, were within four
months of their arrival, followed by Hausa traders. By this time they had won
their first major victory over Biafra in the defeat of Biafran forces at Opi and
374
the subsequent establishment at Nsukka of a barrack for federal soldiers.
373 A. Doi, Islam in Nigeria, p. 174.
374 See, A. Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War (Enugu: Fourth Di-
mension, 1980); O. Obasanjo, My Command (Ibadan: Heinemann, 1980); Bernard Odog-
wu, No Place to Hide: Crises and Conflicts inside Biafra (Enugu: Fourth Dimension,
1985), and J. O. G. Achuzia, Requiem Biafra (Enugu: Fourth Dimension, 1986).

129
Mallam Ibrahim Eze, one of few Igbo Muslims who fought in the war on the
Biafran side recalled:

It was through the Nigerian army that Islam came to Nsukka town…
It was when the Nigerian soldiers came, accompanied by Muslim tra-
ders who were buying people’s property looted by the soldiers. Mus-
lim traders would buy looted items from the soldiers and transport
them to their bases outside Igboland. They were visiting the soldiers
375
at Nsukka on and off. But eventually they settled permanently.

From the accounts collected, items looted by soldiers were disposed through
traders. In the village of Nsukka, which earlier than most of Igboland came un-
der federal control, non-Igbo traders involved in selling looted wares enjoyed a
long career. One trader who became famous from buying and selling booty at
Nsukka during the war was Alhaji Useni. It was also during the civil war that
Alhaji Usman, a Jukun and World War II veteran popularly known as Metum-
bi, came to Nsukka. When the civil war ended in 1970, Metumbi switched pro-
376
fession and became a food contractor. It was in the process of this that he em-
barked on the self-assigned task of enhancing yam distribution in Nsukka in or-
der to solve the troubles he faced as a food contractor: The monopoly of the
yam trade by Igbo traders, which oftentimes caused scarcity of yam. He suc-
ceeded in starting the popular yam depot (ozo ji) at Afia ogige market in
Nsukka in 1972. Igbo yam traders were few and formed a clique that held dom-
inance in the market and controlled the price of yam. Since the monopoly of the
yam trade worked both against non-indigenes as much as it did to the indi-
genes, Metumbi’s campaign to reverse it had supporters from both groups. His
employed a simple tactic to achieve his goal. Coming from Zakibiam—one of
the major yam production centers in North Central Nigeria—he convinced
traders of Zakibiam to send yams to Nsukka market. Thus began the massive
exportation of yam from Zakibiam, in Jukunland, to Nsukka village and this
has continued till date. The yam war, for his meddling sparked opposition from
indigenous yam traders, saw the influx of an unspecified number of Muslim
traders into Nsukka from North Central and Northern Nigeria. These Muslim
traders would in due course become agents for the conversion of some Igbo
traders to Islam.

375 Ibrahim Eze, interview cited.

376 Food contracting was a lucrative business during the Nigeria–Biafra war. Nigerian and
Biafran armies relied on food contractors to feed their armies: Egodi Uchendu, Women
and Conflict, 150-52.

130
 Metumbi’s interference with the yam trade incensed Igbo yam traders
whose trade became threatened by the exceptional inflow of yam into the mar-
ket. Igbo traders took the case to court but it was not resolved for a reasonable
length of time until Metumbi himself died. While the case lasted, yams from
Zakibiam continued to flood Nsukka market. They were cheaper and more in
377
demand than varieties sold by Igbo traders. In the mid 1980s the yam market,
now on a new site assigned by the Nsukka local government, came under the
domination of traders from North Central Nigeria and also utilized a retinue of
middlemen from North Central Nigeria. It redefined the position of Igbo traders
who thus became the major retailers and found themselves at a lower level of
the marketing ring. With the ascendancy of traders of North Central Nigeria,
the yam trade was reorganized and supervised by a Sarikin Doya, market chief,
who controlled that section of the market as a semi-independent unit of the
Nsukka market. As the number of the Jukun, Hausa, and other non-Igbo traders
increased, Muslim traders erected a small temporary structure for the daily
prayers. Few indigenes, according to the imam of Nsukka central mosque, have
378
converted to Islam through the agency of migrant Muslim traders. However,
the expanding population of migrant Muslim traders in itself continues to boost
the small number of Igbo Muslims in Nsukka. In 2002 the makeshift mosque
was extended to accommodate a classroom for Qur’anic education where pre-
school children of Muslim traders would receive religious education in the
evenings. From the onset, the Sarikin Doya recruited teachers from Northern
Nigeria for the Qur’anic school. Subsequently, the school supplemented with
Muslim corpers from various parts of the county doing their National Youth
Service Corp programme at Nsukka. Occasionally, Muslim students of Univer-
sity of Nigeria helped out when regular teachers were few. Since inception, all
teachers associated with the school were male except the school’s assistant
379
headmistress.

Enohia after the war

Enohia Muslim community suffered the fate of other Igbo Muslims during the
civil war. Enohia counted among its losses during the war, the destruction of

377 Ibrahim Eze, interview cited.

378 Ibid.
379 Alhaji Sanni Ibrahim Idoko, b. 1957, interview, Nsukka, September 2003, and Miss Se-
fiyat Abdullahi, b. 1977, interview, Nsukka, September 2003. Ibrahim Eze and Hassan
Omeh Musa, interviws cited.

131
its mosque and damages to its school. During post-war reconstruction, the
nursery school was reopened. A primary section was started and there were
plans for introducing secondary education. The secondary school eventually
called School of Arabic and Islamic Studies resumed academic activity in 1973
even while the buildings awaited full rehabilitation from war damages. The
school curriculum was communicated only in Arabic. There was no single sub-
ject in English. From 1980, Saudi Arabia through the World Muslim League be-
came its chief sponsor. On occasion financial assistance was received from oth-
er Muslim countries especially Kuwait and Egypt. The Saudi government fin-
anced the renovation of the school and sent teachers who doubled as mission-
380
aries to teach at the school. Ibrahim Nwagui was the first director the school
had. Following his death in 1975 at Owerri, his brother, Sheikh Daud Nwagui,
served briefly as the school’s director until the arrival of Sheikh Muhammad
Amanaturllah with a team of teachers from Saudi Arabia in 1981.
The school became affiliated with “Rabita Makkatan Al-Mukkaramah” in
381
Saudi Arabia and was administered according to the Sharia law. Students of
the school were subjected to full Sharia regulations in the school, said a former
382
graduate. The missionary goal of the school was neither in doubt nor played
down by its staff members. It functioned primarily as a recruiting ground for Is-
lam and concurrently as a training facility for future missionaries who would
propagate Islam in their home communities. Said a staff member:

By 1974 the Arabic school was admitting Muslims and non-Muslims

with the hope to convert them later. Pressure was mounted on non-
Muslims to accept Islam, which some of them did. Those who refused
383
to embrace Islam were withdrawn from the school.

The Arabic curriculum of the school was modified years later to include the
English language and Mathematics. In 2001, after twenty years’ service and
just the year after the senior secondary school certificate examination was first
written in the school, the Saudi Arabian teachers and Muhammad Amanaturl-
lah, the director, departed. Sheikh Maama, a Togolese Muslim, took over as dir-
ector. He gave the school its name and introduced mid-term breaks and the use
384
of school uniforms by students. Maama employed new teachers with diversi-

380 Sheikh Haroun Aja and Sheikh Idoko, interviews cited.

381 Alhaji Dauda Arua and Mr. Emmanuel Ude, interviews cited.
382 Mr. Okpani Oko, interview, Nsukka, March 2006.
383 Alhaji Dauda Arua, interview cited.
384 Additional information on the school came from Okpani Oko, interview cited; Haruna

132
fied academic backgrounds. The school’s curriculum was also modified and in-
cluded the following subjects: Biology, Physics, Chemistry, Literature in Eng-
lish, and Igbo language. The diversification of subjects set the school on equal
footing with regular secondary schools in Nigeria. In part it heightened its ad-
vantage over other schools because it offered, in addition to basic skills ac-
quired, knowledge of Arabic language. Even with the diversified curriculum,
the performance of the pupils in non-Arabic subjects was relatively poor and
this was assumed to derive from the overemphasis on Arabic and Islamic stud-
385
ies. “We studied both Western and Qur’anic subjects,” recalled a former stu-
dent of the school; “the subjects were Qur’anic study, Qur’anic exposition,
386
prophetic traditions, jurisprudence etc.” Until 2003, the school required stu-
dents to pass all subjects, minimum of sixteen per term, before promotion to the
next class.
In spite of the need for reforms to streamline the school along the lines of
regular secondary schools, the financial position of the school again became un-
stable after the tenure of Sheikh Amanturllah. The school administration con-
tinued nonetheless continued with the chief goal of preparing their graduates
for studies abroad in Muslim countries. The diversification of subjects did not
dramatically change the Arabic/Islamic focus of the curriculum. The number of
subjects taught in Arabic remained higher than those taught in English. On
graduation former students of the school first served as auxiliary teachers,
Mashaya, for a year or two before continuing with further studies elsewhere.
To Okpani Oko, an alumni and former staff of the school, the policy that disal-

Sule (jnr.), interview, Enugu, May 2003; Jameel Okoro, interview, Asaba, October 2005;
Abubakar Anidu Shuaib, interview, Nsukka, April 2010. All four were graduates of the
school.
385 Staff and students of the school observed that during the tenure of Sheikh Daud Nwa-
gui, from 1975 until 1981, the school’s performance was poor. One index used in mea-
suring this was the state of its student population. This was reported to have consis-
tently declined until 1981 when the missionary-teachers from Saudi Arabia arrived. It
would not be such a hard guess to determine other causes of the poor state of the
school between 1975 and 1981: the focus on Arabic language and Islamic studies did
not appeal to a wide range of parents. A good number of Muslims themselves wanted
their children to acquire general competence in regular subjects that was necessary for
employment in the country, which the pro-Qur’anic studies’ curriculum deterred. Du-
ring the tenure of Mohammed Amanturllah, academic performance remained poor. His
Saudi Arabian teachers were best suited for teaching Arabic language and Islamic reli-
gion and not the general subjects offered in Nigerian secondary schools, knowledge of
which would make graduates of the school competitive and qualified for work and for
further studies in Nigeria using certificates issued by the school.
386 Haruna Sule, jnr, interview cited.

133
lows Nigerian graduates of the school from taking up employment in the
Muslim nations where they are sent for their university education, is a major
387
setback in their association with the school. Dauda Arua described the school
388
as “the fruit of Saudi Arabian labour.” On its merit, the school has recorded a
high success rate with respect to its missionary goal for nearly all formerly
non-Muslim pupils admitted to it conclude their studies as professing Muslims.
The provision of free education and free clothing to students, said Sheikh Har-
oun Aja, “has led many parents to send their children to the school.” He added
“it is also through these children that the minds of their parents are won for Is-
389
lam.”

Other new grounds

Most towns and villages in Igboland made contact with Islam after the war.
The introduction of Islam in Ohafia, Abia State, was linked to the establishment
of an army camp in the town after the war. Earliest conversion to Islam was
390
dated, however, to 1979. Nnewi, Awka, and Amawbia all in Anambra State
gained their own converts from about this date. Pre-civil war Muslim migrants
to Nnewi kept off the way of the local people. One interviewee remarked:
“They kept to themselves, concentrated on themselves, and did not interact
with the people. They were not like the Igbo who if they live near you, would
391
come and make friends.” The situation changed with the arrival in 1976 of
the pioneer advocate, Mallam Bello Sambas, from Adamawa. Mallam Bello
consequently became both the Sarikin Hausawa and the first imam of the
Hausa Muslim community in Nnewi. The Hausa community that emerged at
Awka after the war was composed of soldiers quartered in the town at the end
of the hostilities. The reputation for drunkenness and aggressive behavior,
which frequently resulted in fights, has survived them. In the years following
the end of the war, this core community received more migrants, mostly traders
392
from Northern Nigeria.

387 Okpani Okoh, interview cited.

388 Alhaji Dauda Arua, interview cited.
389 Sheikh Haroun Aja, interview cited.
390 Chief Ani Nwaoke, b. c. 1930, interview, Akanu Ohafia, February 2006.
391 Chief Nnamdi Obi, interview, Nnewi, January 2004.
392 Christopher Nwagbo, b. c. 1936, interview, Awka, February 2004.

134
CHAPTER 4
CONTACTS AND CONVERSIONS:
THE PROPAGATION OF ISLAM IN IGBOLAND

A major concern of Muslim clerics in Igboland is how to win the Igbo to Islam.
Igbo Muslims and Muslim migrants are very conscious of the ambivalence to
Islam in Igboland. A youth from Osun State on national service in Enugu State,
in 2005, posted this comment in a magazine:

When we got here we discovered that the majority of the people (80-
90%) are non-Muslims and the problem is that the awareness is not
enough. Most people do not really know what Islam is all about. They
are still hostile to Islam. So, we should take it upon ourselves, as
serving corps members, to ensure that we disseminate the message of
Islam by telling people what Islam entails so that people who want to
393
embrace Islam will have to embrace it …

In responding to an interview question on the toughest challenge Muslim cler-

ics face in Igboland, Sheikh Adam Idoko responded:

I think our tough challenge is to remove the misconceptions about Is-

lam. Some of them are worldwide; some are as a result of propaganda.
And to establish to them that Islam is a peaceful religion [that] es-
chews in totality violence, crisis, unrest and other social vices. The
other challenge is how do we raise fund because majority of the Mus-
lims in Igboland are poor… [We need] to raise fund to establish such
facilities that can enable us to carry out Da’awah and Islamic pro-
394
pagation …

The various endeavors at propagating Islam in Igboland especially from the

1980s will be discussed in this chapter. A remarkable attempt in this direction
was the posting of a cleric of Ghanaian origin from Saudi Arabia to Enugu in
1982. Until then, migrant Muslims devised ways of reaching the Igbo with Is-
lam. One important category of Hausa migrants who utilized their profession
as a medium for conversion of the Igbo to Islam is the cattle dealers who oper-
ated through the cattle markets. Although a few comments have been made in

393 “How I see Islam in the East,” Al-Huda Magazine, May 2005, p. 12.
394 “Interview,” Al-Huda Magazine, May 2005, p. 28.

135
previous chapters about them, their contributions towards entrenching Islam in
Igboland require more attention and will be told alongside their economic im-
portance.

Hausa traders and cattle markets

Cattle markets in Igboland dates to 1914 but their numbers expanded after the
Nigeria-Biafra war. It was the practice of cattle dealers to import large heads of
cattle, which were driven down by herders who pastured the animals in Igbo-
land, until sold. Since the Igbo did not rear cattle on any significant scale, the
cattle business run by Muslim traders from Northern Nigeria was very neces-
sary because it addressed the demand for meat and related products in Igbo-
land. The diffusion, after the war, of cattle traders and cattle markets in Igbo-
395
land helped the cause of Islam. Post-war cattle merchants rank among the
chief propagators of Islam in Eastern Nigeria, even though they deny this in-
396
sisting that they “came purposely for business and not for evangelization.”
Nonetheless, they provided needed advertisement for Islam and used the cattle
business as a site for conversion. The practice of having among them clerics,
who coordinated their religious welfare, meant that counseling services were
readily available for persons who wanted to know about Islam and those who
showed inclination to convert.
The cattle market at Lokpanta in Umuchieze Local Government Area of
Abia State is symptomatic of the cattle business and the cattle markets found in
all major towns and some remote places in Igboland. The Lokpanta cattle mar-
ket has a long history and can be traced back to about the time that the cattle
trade developed in Abakaliki in 1914. Two bands of herders left Abakalili. One
397
group led by Oseni, who years later became the Sarikin of Umuahia, arrived
Isiama Afara-ukwu in Umuahia; while the second group moved to Uzuakoli. It
was claimed that at Umuahia the warrant chief Wariaku Ngwuli gave Oseni
and his herders a place to settle, an action that was approved by the village eld-
398
ers. Communication with the migrants was through interpreters and in
395 This is also true of other parts of Eastern Nigeria. The first convert to Islam in Uyo did
so through his involvement in the cattle business. According to his narrative, his busi-
ness mentor convinced him to become a Muslim if he wants to forge ahead in the busi-
ness. Alhaji Baba Jaro, b. 1951, interview, Uyo, May 2009.
396 Kabiru Hudu, interview, Lokpanta, February 2006.
397 “Owerri Province, Hausa Settlements,” File ON 3851, RIVPROF 8/9/321, National
Archives, Enugu.
398 Oral data on the cattle market at Lokpanta came from Chief Godwin Ngwuli, Alhaji

136
Pidgin English, which, according to various narratives, Oseni could fairly con-
verse in. Their market, commonly called Garki, was situated in the land oppos-
ite the present premises of Golden Guinea Breweries in Umuahia. There were
also claims of influxes into the settlement in Umuahia from Uzuakoli and other
towns.
Two Hausa settlements were recorded in colonial records for Umuahia. Os-
eni led one, and the other was listed as a satellite of Okigwe. Most probably the
two groups merged at a point. The list of the Hausa settlements in Okigwe Di-
vision in 1921 showed just one Hausa community existing in Umuahia Town-
ship, headed by Oseni who in 1923 was a member of the Native Court. He was
allowed to sit in the court when cases involving members of the Hausa com-
399
munity were tried. The same year Oseni was requested by the Resident of
Owerri Province, Mr. Watt, to return to Northern Nigeria “for making trouble,”
the nature of which was not disclosed. The matter must have been resolved for
Oseni remained the Sarikin of Umuahia until his death in 1943 when the office
passed to his son, Adamu Oseni, but not without “some unrest in the Hausa
400
community,” observed the Resident of Owerri Province, Mr. Mylius.
After the Nigeria–Biafra war, and the gradual return of non-Igbo traders to
Umuahia, the cattle market resumed operations but changed its location sever-
ally. Its last move was right to the center of the town where it remained until
Umuahia became the capital of the newly created Abia State in 1991. In 1994,
Ike Nwosu, the military governor of Abia State, moved the market out of the

Maikano Mohammed, Alhaji Suleiman Mohammed, Mohammed Usman, Alhaji Ibra-

him Yusuf, Mr. J. Ekeleme, Alhaji Mohammed Bugu, Sariki Hayatu Adamu, Alhaji
Buba Abdullahi Kedemure, Alhaji Umaru Jalingo, Kabiru Hudu, Mr. Innocent Okeke,
Mrs. Veronica Nwoga, His Highness Odogwu Eze.
399 “Status of Hausa chiefs,” File AHODIST 14/1/436, National Archives, Enugu.
400 Ibid. Since the colonial records failed to report the exact nature of the unrest, one may
assume that it was connected with rival claims to headship of the community because,
shortly after, a rival Sarikin emerged in the person of Momo Nakare. Nakare and Ada-
mu Oseni had a protracted dispute over who should be recognized as Sarikin Hausa in
colonial Umuahia Township, at the time, the main cattle trading and dispersal center in
Eastern Nigeria. Counter petitions on their quarrel were addressed to the Acting Resi-
dent of Owerri Province in the 1950s. Their contest periodically escalated into violence.
The Acting Resident viewed a petition by Adamu Oseni in 1953 as “an attempt by Ada-
mu Oseni to steal a march over his political and business rival and to gain a monopoly
of the cattle trade in the Township.” The business aspect of the conflict, involving the
regulation of cattle in the Township, was left to the Local Authority and the Township
Advisory Board. See, Simon Ottenberg, Farmers and Townspeople in a Changing Ni-
geria: Abakaliki during Colonial Times (1905-1960) (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 2005),
152; and “Hausa Chiefs,” CSE 1/85/9798, National Archives, Enugu.

137
center of the town to one of the suburbs, Ubakala, for the following reasons:
that the market marred the aesthetic qualities of the capital; its location, so
close to a gorge, was contributing to incidents of road accidents; and the graz-
ing of cattle within the city was a nuisance and not helpful to the vegetation of
401
the area. The traders did not welcome their relocation to Ubakala, and com-
plained that it was not favorable to their trade; that Ubakala refused to sell land
for a settlement to them, requiring them only to rent at an exorbitant price; that
there was water scarcity in Ubakala, and that the location of Ubakala in the in-
terior was unsuitable for their business. In response to the eviction, therefore,
one batch of traders left Umuahia on September 1994 for Okigwe in Imo State,
some kilometers away and on the boundary between Abia and Imo States,
where they occupied both sides of the dual carriage road that runs through
Enugu to Abia and Rivers States. After nine years at Okigwe, that group of
cattle traders moved their market back into Abia State, precisely to the town of
Lokpanta. The current Sarikin, Hayatu Adamu, summarized the nature of their
stay at Okigwe as follows:

We came to Okigwe on 15 September 1994. At first the people receiv-

ed us well but later we started having problems between the farmers
and our cattle herders. Okigwe farmers complained that our cattle
were destroying their crops and that we littered the roads and
streams. They started to attack our cattle and us. When we com-
plained to the government, they did nothing. So we started negotiat-
402
ing for this land in Lokpanta and later succeeded.

Adamu omitted to add that in response to their complaints over attacks at

Okigwe the government offered them an alternative site at Arondizuogu,
which they did not move to because they surmised that “the place was in the
interior and likely to expose them to a great deal of armed robbery attacks;”
403
considerations that made them “decide to look for another location.” Access
to enough land that will accommodate various facilities, including a Muslim
cemetery, have electricity and pipe-borne water, with some proximity to a
banking institution, and of course security, were the fundamental reasons for

401 Chief Chris Osuagwu, b. 1959, Abia State Commissioner for Public Utilities, interview,
Umuahia, April 2006.
402 Hayatu Adamu, b. c. 1944, cattle merchant and Sarikin Hausa of Lokpanta, interview,
Lokpanta, February 2006.
403 Umaru Jalingo, b. c. 1954, cattle merchant, interview, Lokpanta, February 2006.

138
 404
the decision to find another settlement. Another cattle merchant explained:
“Anywhere we are is our home. Somebody cannot die here and we take him to
the north. That is why wherever we settle we make sure that we have all these
things around us. So when they refused to provide all of them, we decided to
405
move to this place.”
There was the additional complaint that the land at Arondizuogu was un-
even for easy movement of their cattle. Underneath all these complaints lay the
fact that the cattle traders still hankered for Umuahia where they had all they
needed—relatively constant electricity, adequate security and a cemetery,
406
which they continued to use even after their departure from Umuahia. There
was some talk on who should best decide where a cattle market should be situ-
ated. One of the young cattle traders and secretary of the Hausa community re-
marked:

We left Okigwe because of the misunderstanding between the leaders

of Hausa community and Imo State government. They gave us a place
that was not enough for us. In our own tradition in establishing a
cattle market, it is the cattle dealers who will choose a place and not
the government. When they later gave us a place which we agreed to
go to, we asked them to provide all the necessary amenities like light,
water, police post, bank, and 175 stores for cattle dealers. They refus-
ed. They built only twenty stores. They told us to move there and we
refused. Some people supported going there while some refused. Tho-
se who refused were in the majority, so there was problem. The gov-
ernment gave us 5 January 2005 as the last day to pack to the place
they gave us but before then we were offered this place by the Abia
State government. So on 6 January 2005, everybody came to this
407
place.

It was to their advantage, therefore, that the first civilian governor of Abia
State, Orji Uzo Kalu, approved their request for Lokpanta. This site was offered
after consultations with the leaders of the town who accepted to lease the land
on both sides of the dual carriage road, which runs through Enugu to Rivers
State, for both the cattle market and the Hausa settlement. Despite the commit-
ment of the town leaders to this contract, there were dissent voices that op-

404 Ibid.
405 Alhaji Maikano Mohammed, b. c. 1950, interview, Lokpanta, February 2006.
406 Umaru Jalingo, interview cited.
407 Alhaji Buba Abdullahi, b. 1971, cattle merchant, interview, Lokpanta, February 2006.

139
posed the settlement on grounds of destruction of farmland. These wrote the
government stating their claims and exacted a pledge from the Abia State Dir-
ector of Lands, Mines and Urban Development that they will be adequately
compensated for their losses.
Movement to Lokpanta started on 5 January 2005 and continued for the
next one year. Between 1994 when the cattle market was moved out of Umua-
hia until 2005 when it settled at Lokpanta, cattle traders split and spread into
different towns in Igboland, where they formed new markets and new settle-
ments. In Abia State, some modest activities continued at Umuahia, while a
faction moved into Ubakala, and another through Okigwe to Lokpanta. In Imo
State, a small community had continued to exist at Okigwe independent of the
group that set up post at Arondizuogu. In effect, a cattle market will expand,
then splits and move into new towns not previously hosting such a market.

Fig. 16: Leaders of the Lokpanta cattle market. Seated left to right: Sarikin
Hausa—Hayatu Adamu, Alhaji Buba A. Kedemure, and Alhaji Umaru
Jalingo.

The community at Lokpanta put up temporary shelters that could be dis-

mantled anytime. The settlement boasts nearly all the features of a normal
Hausa Muslim village structured around Islam. It has a spiritual leader in the
person of a chief imam—who runs the Qur’anic school for the children of
traders and their travel companions; commercial and social leaders in the per-
son of the sarikin yaro (head of the cattle market, sarikin mpawa (chief
butcher), and a secretary of the community, among other officials. The com-

140
munity observes all the rules of their religion and Hausa social customs, includ-
ing wife seclusion. Within a year of the arrival at Lokpanta a few cattle traders
including the Sarikin Hausa (the leader of the community), had married local
women, thus building up a core of local converts to Islam through marriage.

Fig. 17: A section of the cattle market

Sales take place in the cattle market on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Sat-
urdays. Buyers come from the adjoining villages and also farther afield to the
market at Lokpanta, thus fulfilling the reason central to its establishment: “For
the area to develop into a very popular market that will attract people from dif-
408
ferent parts of the country,” reported the local government chairman. Cattle
markets have their uses besides the provision of meat and related products for
consumption. They diversified employment prospects for local youths, some of
whom work as secretaries or sales assistants to cattle moguls. To cater for the
market population, Igbo women have found self-employment as mobile food
vendors during market hours. Increased mobile phone operators and quick
transport services (with motorbikes), have all flourished in small and remote
towns in attempts to service the cattle market. The employment index in Niger-
ia have long privileged the major towns forcing persons in remote areas to

408 Dr. Chidiebere Ude, b. 1967, Umunneochi Local Government Chairman, interview,
Lokpanta, April 2006. Civil unrest such as the shari’a riot reprisals of February and
March 2006 saw nearly all northern traders and their aides wherever found temporarily
deserting Lokpanta and Igboland for their home states. They returned after the crisis.

141
move to urban areas in search of employment, but as market activity grows, no
matter what type, prospects for employment increase and remote and small
towns in particular benefit from the developments. Thus, the cattle market suc-
409
ceeded in transforming Lokpanta from a quiet to a very busy town.
The post-war expansion of the cattle trade in Igboland has been impressive.
The business itself has shown tendencies to attract other smaller ventures
alongside it, operated also by migrants. Once a cattle market is thriving, it be-
comes a matter of time before sections of the market are dotted with traders re-
tailing foods commonly grown in Northern Nigeria. Tomato, onions, dried fish,
and beans are among the common items sold along with meat products at Lok-
panta. Besides this group of small-scale traders, other migrants from Northern
Nigeria provide other services. In this category are found individuals who came
to tap subsidiary business prospects created by the cattle trade such as roving
cobblers who mend and polish shoes for traders and their clienteles as they
carry on with daily transactions. These subsidiary traders do not restrict their
operations to the market, but also hawk wares in the villages around, sparing
their clients some of the hassles involved in sourcing for the goods themselves.
In between trading, they hire themselves out for all manner of unskilled jobs.
The Igbo have noted the overall relevance of these ubiquitous unskilled mi-
grant laborers. Some, however, are apprehensive like this interviewee from
Isiokpo:

There are many Muslims in the town who engage in different types of
businesses—cattle trade, yam trade, shoe repair, jewelries, security etc.
We accommodate them because of their business. They are only inter-
ested in their trade and religion. For other social activities, count them
out. Instead, they will be looking for how to convert you. Some sell
their goods on credit to make you come closer to them. Some will
410
forgo the credit if you become a Muslim…

Others focus more on their economic utility like this assessment from Nnewi
shows:

We now rarely travel to other towns to buy wristwatches. Today, any

type of watch you want, you get from them. They hawk all kinds of
things and bring these to your home. They have also made meat
cheaper and they do those jobs many of us will not like to do like dig-

409 Mrs. Veronica Nwoga, b. c. 1946, interview, Lopkanta, February 2006.

410 Mr. William Uche Ohia, b. 1934, retired principal, interview, Isiokpo, February 2006.

142
 ging sewage pits and similar tasks. We prefer white-collar jobs and
abhor some of the hard jobs they do. Whatever odd job you want to
411
do, they will come and do it at a cheap rate.

Notwithstanding the advantages of the cattle market, some indigenes on Lok-

panta have occasionally grumbled against the interference by migrants in the
normal trade of the Igbo. They mentioned in particular migrants’ encroachment
into the palm oil trade, which has made cooking oil expensive. Besides that,
communities, on whose land the traders settled, counted among their losses the
shrinking of their farmlands, which were donated for the cattle trade; the prob-
lem of overgrazing of land by cattle left to wander indiscriminately in the com-
412
munity; and the destruction of cultivated farms by cattle. Even in villages
without a cattle market complaints over grazing and destruction of farmland
have come up severally, indicting herders for driving their herds through vil-
413
lages and towns for pasture. Squabbles over ruined farmlands have on many
occasions engaged local and state governments as individuals or whole villages
demanded compensation from cattle owners and intervention from the state in
preventing future incidents.
One other recurring complaint by the Igbo over Hausa settlements in recent
years revolved around issues of hygiene. This was one of the considerations for
the removal of the cattle market and settlement from Umuahia city centre in
1994. At Okigwe, the squabble between migrant traders and their Igbo hosts, in
the former’s nine years residence, was over the poor hygienic conditions of the
cattle market and settlement. The community grumbled that migrants littered
both roads and streams. A visitor to the Hausa settlement at Lokpanta in 2005
remarked:

The place was very untidy with a lot of flies, and the traders did not
care to drive them away, including in sections where they were pre-
paring suya, cooked food, and brewed tea for sale. The women selling
fresh cow milk had so many flies around them. It irritated me so much

411 Chief Nnamdi Obi, interview, Nnewi, January 2004.

412 Mr. Innocent Okeke, b. c. 1954, interview, Lokpanta, February 2006.
413 There were several clashes in Ezeagu and Uzo-Uwani local government areas between
indigenes and cattle herders, over destruction of farms by cattle when driven through
these places. Mr. Obele Maduegbunam, b. 1969, interview, Umulokpa, January 2006;
and Mr. John Ezeama, b. 1953, interview, Adani, January 2006.

143
 that when I was thirsty I refused to buy bottled water from there until
414
I returned to Enugu.

The cattle business and the cattle market, as mentioned, have functioned in the
last three decades in particular as a site for conversion. A number of Igbo cattle
traders at Umuahia, Lokpanta, Uga, and elsewhere are Muslims who linked
415
their conversion to Islam to their involvement in the cattle trade. One cattle
trader from Sokoto State who has spent twenty-five years in Igboland narrated
as follows:

We buy cattle from the far north and sell in Igboland … We teach the
Igbo how to trade on cattle. Some days we travel to the far north with
our Igbo trainees. There they join us during our worship. We also use
gifts to attract them, like giving them money to establish their own
business. Another way of converting non-Muslims is by marrying
416
them.

The Igbo and their guests: Ambivalent relations

Tales told about Igboland are as numerous and varied as the individuals who
had visited the area. Muslim strangers to Igboland at first appear disconcerted
by Igbo pragmatism. Many have concluded that the environment is a challenge
to Muslims. The Ghanaian cleric deployed from Saudi Arabia, in 1982, for mis-
sionary work among the Igbo felt confronted, according to him, by “forces of
anti-Islam”:

I never dreamt of coming to Nigeria... When I finished my studies I

was asked to choose three countries. I chose Nigeria because it is close
to Ghana. I did not know that I was coming to be a missionary who
will stay here for ten years. Basically I thought I was coming to teach
in one of the Nigerian schools. But God chose Igboland for me…
Maybe God knows that I can do this little thing. So instead of being in
417
the classroom analyzing words, I am faced with forces of anti Islam.

414 Ogechukwu Ike, personal discussion, February 2005.

415 Chief Godwin Ngwuli, interview, Umuahia, February 2006; Chief B. C. Nwosu, b. c.
1937, interview, Umuahia, February 2006, and Sheikh Ali Ukiwo, b. 1960, interview,
Umuahia, February 2006.
416 Alhaji Ibrahim Musa, b. 1948, interview, Uga, February 2006.
417 Sheikh Idris Al-Hassan, b. 1959, Director of the Islamic Centre in Enugu, interview,
Enugu, May 2003.

144
I misunderstood his meaning and assumed that some persons were hostile to
him and asked about those experiences. He then clarified the situation thus:

You may not understand. I have a picture of Saudi society. Imagine a

young man of 18 years taken to that place for eight years. You cannot
interview me as you are doing now. First, your dress will not be what
it is now. Even if you are talking to me, you will not be facing me…
Can you now see what I mean? … The first problem I had in my
neighborhood was: As a new person I went round to greet people. I
met a certain man, with my companion, and he served us beer! … It
was like being thrown into an ocean. I did not take the beer and the
418
man viewed me as an abnormal human being.

Clearly Al-Hassan judged Igboland with his knowledge of Saudi society and
found the Igbo and their society jointly antagonistic to his spirituality and his
mission. His challenges can be summarized as follows: dealing with women
who have no inhibitions over their physical assets and who are accustomed to
public and unrestricted interactions with men, and conflicts over societal norms
on hospitality that run contrary to the teachings of Islam. These differing prac-
tices had little to do with the chasm created by the different theologies of Igbo
religion and Christianity, on one hand, and, Islam, on the other. Al-Hassan is
not alone in feeling threatened by the Igbo and their way of life. A young
Hausa male Corp member to Enugu State, in 1991, who was visiting Igboland
for the first time, was alighting from a motor vehicle when he missed his foot-
ing and stumbled. An Igbo girl steadied him. Not used to such close contact
with female strangers, he fainted from shock, leaving those who witnessed the
incident bewildered. Not long after the incident, he requested for redeployment
out of Igboland. Narrating the encounter to fellow Muslims he confessed feel-
ing like he was going to die because he had never been held that way by a wo-
419
man. This incidence prompted the Islamic Centre at Enugu to introduce an
orientation programme for Muslim Youth Corpers posted to Enugu State, in-
volving lectures about the Igbo and their culture. The orientation programme is
held yearly for Corpers at any suitable time between their arrival in the state
and their dispatch to their places of primary assignment.
The economic advantages of Igboland notwithstanding, migrants have

418 Ibid.
419 The Public Relations Officer of the Islamic Centre at Enugu, who handled the matter,
told me this story: Alhaji Mutui Osuji, b. 1936, (converted to Islam in 1982), interview,
Enugu, May 2003.

145
much to cope with. Alhaji Haruna Sule, a Hausa from Kano and the Sarikin
Hausa of Enugu, was born in 1934 in Enugu and also grew up there. He found
the Igbo to be very different in custom, habits, and worldview from the Hausa,
his own ethnic group. However, such cultural differences as might have existed
between migrants from Northern Nigeria and their Igbo hosts have not preven-
ted the former from pursuing their dream of economic advancement in the Igbo
homeland. An aspect of Igbo culture Haruna and other old migrants from
Northern Nigeria severally commented on is the pattern of dressing. Haruna
made this remark about it: “Islam did not specify what precisely people should
420
wear or not wear.”
The ambivalence, which characterized the relations between the non-
Muslim Igbo and Muslim migrants until after the civil war period, is gradually
giving way to a less stringent form of relationship with wide diversities from
place to place. Using Lokpanta as a case study, when the Hausa community
was barely two years old, migrant traders expressed their pleasure at the cordi-
al welcome received from Lokpanta chiefs the leaders of the settlement nar-
rated how their hosts presented them with a memorandum of understanding
during a scheduled celebration to mark their arrival. Inter-religious conversions
in which Muslim Hausa and non-Muslim Igbo converted to each other’s reli-
gion were all cited as proof of peaceful coexistence and mutual bonding
421
between migrants and hosts. The celebration marking their arrival symbol-
ized more than a welcome for these guests. It served also as a commemoration
of the business contract signed by both parties.
Soon after, some Igbo regretted that their women were so easily lured away
422
“by cattle money” into marrying Muslims. Later, a group of farmers, men and
women, petitioned against the ceding of their farmlands for the cattle market.
The probability that the Muslim migrants posed some economic challenge to
Igbo farmers and traders engaged in same line of commodity marketing should
not be ignored and may partly inform some of these complaints, thereby caus-
ing some reticence from the parties. An example can be shown with an incident
in Aba in 2005 in which Igbo traders accused migrant Muslim traders of ob-
structing their trade by marketing their wares on the roadside, which, for them,
was preventing consumers from moving into the market where Igbo stores
were located. Hausa traders were asked to leave their positions at the roadside,

420 Alhaji Haruna Sule, Sarikin Hausa of Enugu, interview, Enugu, May 2003.
421 Sarikin Hayatu Adamu and Alhaji Umaru Jalingo, interviews cited. My Muslim inter-
viewees reported the conversion, by February 2005, of five Hausa to Christianity.
422 Mr. Innocent Okeke, interview cited.

146
 423
but as one of them remarked, “We had nowhere to go so we remained there.”
A month later an angry mob descended on yam traders of Northern Nigeria
origin for refusing to pay market toll. Some yam traders were ill-treated and
their goods confiscated. Some escaped the attack being forewarned of the incid-
ent. Piecing together the testimonies from migrant and Igbo traders, along with
the report of an imam and a police officer, it appeared that market toll was in-
creased and the migrant traders refused to pay it. Law enforcement agents
blamed Igbo market workers for attempting to force the payment and for caus-
ing the scuffle that interrupted market activities in the town. Three lives were
424
lost in the confrontation. The accusation of obstructing trade seems uncon-
nected with the latter incident over market dues but both incidents show how
easily tensions can occur in Igbo—Muslim migrant relations.
Another reason for aloofness arises from the prejudice against migrants
from Northern Nigeria for “contributing zero percent to social development
425
where they reside.” This was described as a natural habit of migrants from
Northern Nigeria who “cannot invest tangible things … or do a nice business
426
that can bring development...” The complaint hidden in these statements is
actually that instead of reinvesting part of the profits they make in Igboland
into their host communities through building good structures, starting indus-
tries or similar enterprises with development potentials, majority of the Muslim
migrants from Northern Nigeria live in make shift structures and channel their
earnings back to their homelands. Varying expressions of this comment were
427
heard in different parts of Igboland during this study. Some who spoke thus
contrasted the migrants’ attitude to material possession with the Igbo inclina-
tion for acquisition of property, which they exhibit wherever they find them-
selves. Two Muslim migrants, a trader and a lorry driver, commented on this

423 Alhaji Mohammed Umar, b. 1972, itinerant trader, interview, Aba, January 2006.
Others who were interviewed on this incident include: Aisha Audu, b. 1983, food ven-
dor; Miss Halima Umaru, b. 1989; Alhaji Idris Bashiri, b. 1976, imam of Aba central
mosque; Musa Abdullah, b. 1972, yam trader; Mr. U. Nwosu, b. 1977, Police Inspector,
Mr. Nnamdi Okonkwo, b. 1977, yam trader; and Alhaji Nuhu, b. 1966.
424 Mr. U. Nwosu, interview cited.
425 William Uche Ohia, interview cited.
426 Ibid.
427 Ms. R. Nduagu, b. 1968, interview, Kaduna, January 2006; Mr. Ikechukwu Ileka, inter-
view, Nnewi, January 2004, and Dr. John O. Alutu, interview, Nnewi, January 2004. For
Dr. Alutu: “They have not contributed to the development of Nnewi. They are not pro-
gressive people. No schools or hospitals. Their mosque is very untidy. If they are pro-
gressive people they should have put up a better structure for their worship. They have
done nothing for themselves and Nnewi people.”

147
difference between persons from Northern Nigeria and the Igbo and cited it as
what attracted them to Igboland.
Further to the accusation over lack of reinvestment in the host community
will be the disapproval with the market-initiating processes of cattle traders
whereby they anticipate the governments of their host communities to meet
their every requirement—building the stalls they will use and providing secur-
ity for their settlement and the cattle market—when the same government have
not met these needs for its local population. What cannot be said for certain is
if these demands and expectations contributed to the frequency of denials
Hausa traders experienced in their efforts to spread their commercial activities
in Igboland. In places where they succeeded in engineering the emergence of a
thriving cattle market—in exchange for the land they received and the permis-
sion to trade—they provided basically the main commodity sold, the cattle and
related accessories, but these can as well be provided by Igbo traders them-
selves if they determine to do so. When calculated this way, it appears, on one
hand, as though Igboland gain little lasting benefits from the commercial activ-
ities of Muslim migrants in their midst. However, on the other hand, the trade
relationship appears quite a normal one. The Hausa, as professional cattle pro-
ducers and traders, have made meat commonly available to the Igbo who were
never great cattle producers despite having their own local brand of cattle, the
muturu. Moreover, the local governments derive some revenue from cattle tax
and market dues and individuals have gained financial benefits as landlords to
Hausa tenants, besides also tapping into the cattle trade.
In spite of the complaint about hygiene, the occasional rivalry over trade in-
terests, the discourse on the absence of investments, and the absence of any
428
overriding political and religious unity between the Igbo and the Hausa, the
wall of ethnic exclusivity that defined Igbo—Hausa relations since the turn of
the twentieth century is melting away. In some Igbo communities a less turbu-
lent form of relationship has existed in the last two decades. The remarks on Ig-
bo-Hausa relations in Owerri, by a Hausa trader born in Owerri in 1950 and
raised there, indicate a thawing of the relationship. Although he identified little
progress with conversion of Igbo to Islam and cited instances of exploitation by

428 Igbo Muslims’ political preferences follow two discernible trajectories: one half favor
the Muslim dominated All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) because Islam encourage
support for a member, and the other half support just about any party they want to ir-
respective of its religious views or tendencies. The parties most favored by this second
group of Igbo Muslims are the People Democratic Party (PDP), the ruling party since
1999, and All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA), the “Igbo” party.

148
the Igbo, he observed the existence of a cordial relationship that has enable
429
more of them to marry Igbo women.
Hausa traders mentioned the relative absence of violence in Igboland as one
430
of the attractions of the area. Also inspiring Hausa migrations into Igboland
is the claim that money circulates much more in Eastern Nigeria. A 68-year old
interviewee from Nassarawa State, interviewed at Akowka in Imo State, put it
this way: “Igboland is the only area one can stay without disturbance. The
people of this town and the Igbo generally accommodate strangers. In Igboland
there is no trouble but in Hausaland they are fighting every time… So we have
431
no problem living in Igboland.” Another migrant, a transporter from Taraba
State resident at Isiokpo remarked: “At our side there are always crises because
of the nature of our religion and this has become a pattern in Hausaland. In Ig-
432
boland, people struggle for themselves without waiting for anybody.” These
remarks may not be taken to be fully representative of the opinion of all north-
ern migrants or of the Hausa as a whole but as very personal views.
The affable relationship reported between Hausa Muslim migrants and the
Igbo at Nnewi, Mbaise, and Nsukka were respectively attributed to the numer-
ical insignificance of the latter vis-à-vis their hosts. Some Igbo, including
Muslims among them, imagined Hausa Muslims as exhibiting the highest level
of tolerance when they are in the minority. “In my village,” reported an Igbo
Muslim from Mbaise, “they are gentle and humble. They socialize well with
433
non-Muslims because they are few in number.” In Awgu a different scenario
was presented. In 1998, a Hausa Muslim attacked a boy who mocked him while
he said his prayers, leaving him unconscious. The violence displeased the com-
munity and many demanded for the departure of the Hausa from the village,
434
but this was not upheld by the leadership of the town.

429 Alhaji Danladi, interview, Owerri, February 2006.

430 Igboland is by no means the only less traumatized part of Nigeria. Eastern Nigeria as a
whole qualifies to be considered as the most peaceful part of Nigeria. This applies espe-
cially to religious disturbances. This peace was breached from 2000 when groups in the
Southeast began to respond in kind to Muslim attacks on Christians in Northern Nige-
ria. In 2006 a wave of reprisal attacks swept through Igboland in the wake of yet ano-
ther Muslim-Christian clash in Northern Nigeria. Such incidents temporarily provoke a
return to the unfriendly existence of the early years of contact between the Igbo and
migrants from Northern Nigeria. This, however, will be taken up in chapter 7.
431 Usman Ali, b. c. 1938, interview, Akokwa, February 2006.
432 Mohammed Tafida, b. c. 1951, interview Isiokpo, February 2006.
433 Mallam Mohammed Ibeh, b. 1959, interview, Mbaise, January 2006.
434 Mr. John Azi, interview, Awgu, September 2003.

149
 Yoruba Muslims in Igboland do not appear to have encountered the same
degree of isolation that the Hausa did in the history of their stay in Igboland.
The Igbo appear more tolerant of the Yoruba. In the first instance, the Yoruba
have consistently been fewer in number in Igboland than the Hausa and other
migrants from Northern Nigeria. They have also earned the reputation of being
the major Nigerian ethnic group that least allow themselves to live outside
435
their homeland. Secondly, many Yoruba migrants in Igboland are govern-
ment employees who live side by side their hosts with as little friction as pos-
sible. They seem to pose little economic challenge to the Igbo as they did not
require considerable portions of land for settlement or for economic purposes
like the Hausa. With the end of the colonial policy of separation of natives in
1939, the Yoruba have mixed more with their hosts, living outside enclosed set-
tlements, than the Hausa. Perhaps, the considerable number of Christians and
civil servants among their numbers may well make them more acceptable to
the Igbo than the Hausa. In a town like Owerri Igbo parents allowed Yoruba
436
Muslim suitors to marry their daughters earlier than they did Hausa suitors.
This is confirmed by Doi in his account of Islam in Nsukka where he con-
demned Yoruba Muslims for giving their daughters in marriage to pagans and
437
Christians, unlike the emerging Igbo converts to Islam. Igbo-Yoruba rapport
is not based on any historical affinity for there have been reasons for tensions
between the two ethnic groups just as there were between the Igbo and the
Hausa. One obvious case and which has lingered in the memory of the older
population of Igbo is connected with the Nigeria-Biafra war for which the Igbo
criticize the Yoruba as an unreliable partner because of their failure to secede
from the Republic of Nigeria in sympathy with the Igbo.
Even with what may be considered the less rigid contacts of the Yoruba and
their Igbo hosts, getting accepted and integrated in smaller communities in Ig-
boland sometimes took Yoruba migrants a bit longer than in the urban areas.
Saka Adekunle, a carpenter who came to Akokwa in 2000, gave himself the
Igbo name “Emeka” to circumvent his isolation, which was creating employ-
ment problems for him during his first few years in the town. Using an Igbo
name was his way of integrating himself with the Igbo. From his testimony, his
438
job-related problems ended after his change of name.

435 Margaret Peil, “Interethnic Contacts in Nigerian Cities,”Africa 45 (2) 1975.

436 Alhaji Mutui Osuji, interview, Enugu, May 2003.
437 Doi, Islam in Nigeria, 180.
438 Saka Adekunle, b. 1974, interview, Akokwa, February 2006.

150
Migrants among themselves

Migrants to Igboland have lived peaceably among themselves, observed an old

Yoruba Muslim born at Ibagwa. This will not imply that there has been a total
absence of the occasional strife between them within the more than one cen-
tury of their intermingling in Igboland, but that on average they coexisted se-
renely. In Ibagwa-aka in the old Nsukka Division the cordiality among mi-
grants from Northern and Western Nigeria was attributed to their common
status as migrants. Under colonial rule, cooperation was inevitable in the face
of the ambiguous policy of colonial administrators to strangers. Islam was in-
strumental in fostering harmony among Muslims in particular irrespective of
their ethnicity, yet each group guarded or projected its ethnic identity by pre-
ferring to associate more closely with persons from their ethnic group except
439
where it was inevitable that they interact across that boundary. Another me-
dium for fostering this ethnic unity was the town meetings, a trend that be-
came popular all over Nigeria by the 1940s.
While Islam has been instrumental in the mutual acquaintance of migrants
of different ethnic affiliations in Igboland, and their cooperation with each oth-
er, it did not demolish ethnic peculiarities that informed different spiritual tra-
jectories. Nearly all over Igboland, Hausa Muslims in conjunction with other
Muslims of Northern and North Central Nigeria have worshipped separately
from Yoruba and other Muslims from Western Nigeria, although in principle
each Muslim is free to enter any Muslim place of worship. At Aba, Enugu,
Umuahia, and Onitsha, to mention a few, Yoruba mosques are distinct from
mosques jointly used by the Hausa and Nupe. It did not appear to matter that
their numbers sometimes were very small. It also became obvious that the cor-
diality among migrants is not burdened by their opinions of each other’s ethnic
culture. Hence, such observations as were made by Zachary Obaseki, an Edo
Muslim, that “Muslims who are neither Hausa nor Yoruba are scorned in some
circles,” and by Yahaya Ahmed, a Hausa Muslim, that “Yoruba Muslims mix up
440
Islam with their tradition …” neither prevented, in the past nor at present,
migrants’ cooperation at the private and public levels both for the sake of Islam
and for their own good in their host communities. One disadvantage of mul-
ti-ethnicity on Nigerian society is the negative almost jealous criticisms of the
“other.” The Igbo-Hausa and Hausa-Igbo relationship is riddled with this just as

439 Ottenberg, Farmers and Townspeople, 90-2.

440 Zachary Obaseki, interview, Aba, July 2003. Yahaya Ahmed, interview, Kaduna, Au-
gust 2003.

151
the Hausa-Yoruba and Yoruba-Hausa relationship, etc. The sequence is as var-
ied as there are ethnic groups in the country.
Dotted all over Igboland are temporary structures serving as mosques. In
some cases they are merely small spots marked on their boundaries with wood
or building blocks and lacking the most basic facilities of a proper mosque.
Worshippers bring their mats, pray, and go away with the mats, leaving no
trace whatsoever of what the structure stands for. Outside the prayer hours,
these structures serve as resting places for domestic animals, goats most espe-
cially, and these leave behind their imprints and wastes at the venue. Mosques
in Ibagwa, Enugu Ezike, Nsukka town, and Inyi, among others that I saw in
2003 much resembled these structures and are used mostly for the five daily
prayers. Mosques used for the Friday congregational worship were better con-
structed and also maintained, even though they may, in reality, be provisional
mosques. Herein lies the contradiction between expectations and the reality.
Muslims do not expect that a mosque must be a proper building lavishly orna-
mented before it can serve its purpose, but most non-Muslims in Igboland ap-
pear to think otherwise and have judged the progress of Islam in Igboland by
references to Islamic institutions and structures around them.

Da‘wa and the Spread of Islam in Igboland

441
Da‘wa is one of the exotic terms recently gaining currency in Igboland.
Da‘wa is the act of “preaching Islam” and any Muslim engaged in da‘wa, either
as a cleric or as the occasional volunteer, qualifies to be categorized as the
Islamic equivalent of a missionary, I was severally informed. Da‘wa is under-
stood by Igbo Muslims to be an all-embracing activity. A Muslim teacher
explained it as incorporating “those activities by Muslims to uplift the tenet of
Islam in a non-Muslim society like Igboland. These will include religious acts
such as praying, dressing appropriately as a Muslim, fasting, building a mos-
442
que, and running a school.” The process was summarized as “a mild form of
443
jihad.” The connection to jihad suggests a wider application of the word
“struggle,” which jihad represents, and not any indication of aggressive behavi-
or, synonymous with the 9-11 bombings in the United States by Muslims, and

441 “Da‘wa” is synonymous with “to call” or “to invite.” Larry Poston, Islamic Da‘wah in
the West: Muslim Missionary Activity and the Dynamics of Conversion to Islam (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 3.
442 Mallam Lawal Wakili, b. 1966, interview, Nsukka, July 2003.
443 Zachary Obaseki, interview cited.

152
similar incidents elsewhere, for which “jihad” has in recent years assumed a
new coloration beyond its dominant theological understanding as a struggle for
self-purity. Islamic proselytization and jihad have no clear distinction to Mus-
lims in Igboland. Both words are at the root of the mandatory injunction on
Muslims to bring lost humanity to the Muslim God.
Muslims migrants, traders, undergraduate students, and young Nigerian
graduates in their National Youth Service programme (youth corpers) common-
ly talked about their da‘wa adventures, making it one of the recurring themes
in my interviews. Undergraduates and youth corpers, more than traders and
other migrants, mostly used the term da‘wa in their discussions of their contri-
butions to the spread of Islam in their host communities. Clearly Igboland was
presented as being full of possibilities for Muslim advocates and missionaries
especially members of the Muslim Corpers Association of Nigeria (MCAN), a
national organization formed in 1979 by young Muslim graduates, with bran-
ches in all states of the federation. Majority of the Muslim migrants, including
some Igbo Muslims, proclaimed themselves as independent and self-deployed
missionaries. These “missionaries” and different groups of Muslim Corpers ap-
pear to hold regular monthly missions to villages and to different other places
444
for the purpose of winning converts to Islam. They traverse Igbo villages
with gifts for the poor, sick, and old, and with the message of Islam, exhorting
their listeners to convert to Islam either on the spot or at a latter date. The zeal
and efforts of these official and private agents of Islam parallel the resistance
they confronted by the sheer dominance of Christianity in Igboland. Dhikrullah
Olalade from Lagos State posted this comment about the activities of Muslim
Corpers in 2005:

Before my coming here, the general misconception has been that there
is no Islam in the East. On getting to Enugu I found out that there is
Islam, but its level is low due to the fact that there are Muslims … The
conscious ones are not many. Although, praise be to Allah, with the
advent of MCAN’s activities which is primarily Da’wah propagation,
more Islamic awareness and orientation programmes, are emerging
445
everyday… In a nutshell, Islam is coming up gradually in the East.

444 MCAN members are very active with Islamic propagation wherever they find themsel-
ves. The overall MCAN mission and vision states: “Jointly carrying out the collective
Islamic duties of Da‘wa and asserting the rights of Muslims in Nigeria.” Source:
http://muslimcorpers.org/serviceguide.htm
445 “How I see Islam in the East,” 13.

153
Of all the groups and individuals engaged with Islamic proselytization in Igbo-
land, the youth corpers have been the most commended for their commitment
to da‘wa. An elderly Igbo Muslim described their endeavors as “the only con-
446
certed effort so far aimed at converting the Igbo to Islam.”
Alongside the Muslim Corpers is the Association of Muslim Professionals,
established in the 1990s, with migrants and indigenes as members. Various
branches of the association have been active with da‘wa in Igboland. Its object-
ives are: to reach out to non-Muslims and educate them about Islam; to con-
vince them to become Muslims; to provide them with Islamic and Western edu-
cation when they accept Islam, and to provide Masjids and learning centers for
447
their development.
Muslim migrants in towns with longer history of resident northerners show
greater boldness in reaching out to locals than those in towns that started about
three decades ago, from the 1980s, to play host to Muslim migrants. In the
former, long familiarity with the community bolster their confidence; while in
the latter, migrants and hosts are still negotiating a convenient form of rela-
tionship. Far fewer cases of open proselytization of the Igbo appear to have oc-
curred before 1970. A case in point, which took place at Abakaliki, was recor-
ded by Ottenberg: “In 1960, three northern Muslims itinerant proselytizers were
going about the town and the rural areas preaching Islam to whoever would
448
listen and they claimed some 25 Igbo converts.” In 2009, I met in Port Har-
court Alhaji Abubakar Asabi, from Sokoto State, a graduate of the University of
Manchester, who was a member of a small missionary team, all Hausa, which
toured Igboland in 1976 visiting Onitsha, Enugu, Abakaliki, Umuahia, and Port
449
Harcourt, preaching Islam.
Doctrinally, it is the responsibility of all Muslims to do da‘wa. Notwithstan-
ding, two divergent views were expressed in Igboland regarding it. The least
heard goes thus: “The religion is highly against the idea of preaching about

446 Alhaji Mutui Osuji, interview cited. Data on da‘wa by migrants to Igboland came from
interviews with Yusuf, Zachary, Chief Bello, Alhaji Abdulazeez, Jibril, Alhaji Sulei-
man, Alhaji Garba, Umaru, Inusa, Haruna, Mrs. Ribbi, Mallam Yusuf, Baba Abubakar,
Usman, Abdullahi, Alhaji Ibrahim, Mallam Musa Moshood, and Mr. Ugonoh.
447 Alhaji Idris Okonkwo Eze, b. 1953, tailor, interview, Nsukka, May 2003; and Engr. Ya-
haya Dutse, President, Association of Muslim Professionals of Rivers State, interview,
Port Harcourt, May 2009.
448 Ottenberg, Farmers and Townspeople, 226.
449 Alhaji Abubakar Asabi, b. 1954, Chairman, Rivers State Council of Imams and Scholars,
interview, Port Harcourt, June 2009.

154
 450
Allah on the street. Preaching must be in the mosque.” The popular sura: “let
451
there be no compulsion in religion,” was quoted to support this inclination.
The more widespread opinion suggests that the conversion of non-Muslims
“must be achieved because it is expected that at all times the number of Mus-
452
lims should be greater than those of non-Muslims.” In a situation where this
fails, observed some, Muslims have to abide by Allah’s injunctions in carrying
out a holy war to convert the non-Muslims. We can surmise that the philo-
sophy driving Islamic proselytization in Igboland since the post war period is to
convert as many non-Muslims as possible to Islam. Much individual and group
efforts have been expended in achieving this, and no form of violence, so far,
453
has been employed in accomplishing this religious goal. Clearly, the phe-
nomenon of “Peoples of the book” as categories that may not be converted to
Islam, to which Christians belong, is not recognized in Igboland where Christi-
ans naturally constitute the major target of Muslim proselytization. Members of
the Igbo religion, on the other hand, constitute yet an important target, being
regarded more favorably as having the higher propensity to believe the mes-
sage of Islam and therefore better prone to conversion than Christians.

454
Fig. 18: A young female convert, Sarah Dike

450 Haruna Danjuma, b. 1972, interview, Owa, January 2006.

451 Sura 2:256. From The Holy Qur’an translated into English by Abdullah Yussuf Ali.
452 Abdullahi Chinedu Igboama, b. 1961, interview, Enugu, January 2006, and Alhaji Bada-
ru Eze, b. c. 1931, interview, Nsukka, February 2006.
453 Some Igbo inferred that the incessant clashes of Muslims and Christians in Northern
Nigeria qualify to be perceived as a form of jihad to intimidate non-Muslims into Islam.
454 Source: Engr. Yahaya Dutse, President, Association of Muslim Professionals of Rivers
State.

155
 How migrants proselytized is the next important consideration. All possible
means went into winning converts. Promises of money, material endowments,
education and gifts, all constitute methods of da‘wa. Public lectures, media
broadcasts (TV and Radio), and circulation of printed materials, are included.
One-on-one preaching has been a relevant form of da‘wa just as marriage to
non-Muslims is yet another. Incidents of marriages of Christian women by
Muslims have increased in the two and half decades since Doi wrote about it,
and are driven by the obligation to do da‘wa. Doi writes concerning Nupe,
Hausa, and Yoruba migrants to Nsukka Division in 1984: “On marrying the
Christian or pagan women, they feel that some day they will convert them to
455
their own faith.” Marriage to Igbo women appears to have an economic ap-
peal, besides the spiritual satisfaction of gaining a convert and qualifying for
paradise thereby. Usman Ali, from Nassarawa State, who married an Igbo wife
explained that he and others he knew married Igbo women because they “find
it easy, by so doing, to be close to them, and to convert them to Islam.” He fur-
ther added: “The Igbo are hard working. Marrying Igbo women yield us more.
We benefit from their hard work and they transfer that spirit of hard work to
us.” The least discussed method of conversion used by Muslim migrants in win-
ning converts to Islam was mentioned by Inusa, from Bauchi State, who at the
time of interview was a trader at Ogrute in Enugu Ezike. According to Inusa
“another way of having a new convert is through magical power and medi-
cine.” This is understood to refer to some kind of spiritual manipulation or a
form of bewitchment into Islam but the details of the procedure were not dis-
closed, even though two former Muslims, an Igbo and a Ghanaian, confirmed
the use of such a method for conversion. Further investigation into this process
will be necessary.
The propagation of Islam in Igboland started before the Nigeria-Biafra war,
yet very little, it appears, was accomplished by way of gaining large numbers
of converts to Islam before the arrival, in 1982 in Enugu, of the Saudi-trained
Islamic scholar and missionary, Sheikh Al-Hassan. Most foreign and other non-
Igbo missionaries who engaged in proselytization in Igboland right into the
1980s confronted language difficulty especially in rural areas and among popu-
lations dependent on indigenous dialects for communication. Mallam Garba felt
that language “created a big problem to Muslim missionaries to the degree that
when the Igbo attempted to cooperate with them they thought instead that the

455 Doi, Islam in Nigeria, 180.

156
 456
Igbo were insulting them.” Foreign-trained missionaries, especially the Saudi-
trained who also are affiliated to organizations in that country, are reasonably
well funded for their work. They are better educated than local advocates, most
of whom lack any formal training for the task and are also hindered by finan-
cial constraints. In part, fiscal restrictions made attempts to lease land or altern-
atively rent property for Islamic religious activities in Igboland difficult for
Muslim advocates. Perhaps these difficulties informed the remarks in 2003 by
Igbo Muslim leaders that there was no organized or coordinated Islamic mis-
sionary programme for Igboland and Eastern Nigeria by major Islamic organiz-
457
ations in the country. Nevertheless, the innovative work of Sheikh Al-Hassan
in Anambra and Enugu States from 1982 has eased the career of other Muslim
missionaries and advocates who followed on his heels in the 1980s and 1990s.
Al-Hassan adopted the proselytization strategy of Sheikh Ibrahim Nwagui of
Enohia in the propagation Islam in Igboland. His emphases have been on edu-
cation and the provision of social services, such as counseling and healthcare in
particular. The Islamic Centre at Enugu, which he manages, functions as a
counseling center for Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The additional plan to
build an Islamic hospital has not materialized because of lack of sponsorship for
458
the project. However, he uses the medium of private discussions with non-
Muslims at every opportunity and engages in public preaching sessions in the
major markets in Enugu.
The strategy of promoting conversion through provision of educational ser-
vices is very popular with Muslims in Igboland. The clerical class referred to
459
this approach as one of “catching them young.” Islamic schools are therefore
intended as outreach projects to non-Muslims, and for providing Muslim chil-
dren with what they are unlikely to receive in Christian-dominated public gov-
ernment schools. The Islamic nursery and primary schools, which emerged in
the last four decades all emphasize Islamic studies and Arabic languages in
460
their curriculum.
The Islamic Center at Enugu is the secretariat of the Muslim community in
Enugu State, and the center for Islamic proselytization in Igboland. Conceived
before the Nigeria-Biafra war by Muslim migrants, it has, since becoming oper-
ational in 1982, inspired Muslim migrants and indigenes, to propagate Islam in

456 Mallam Garba Oheme, b. c. 1908, interview, Enugu Ezike, July 2003.
457 Sheikh Adam Idoko, Mallam Ibrahim Eze, and Imam Omeh Musa, interviews cited.
458 Sheikh Idris Al-Hassan, interview cited.
459 Alhaji Mutui Osuji, Sheikh Idris Al-Hassan, Mallam Ibrahim Eze, interviews cited.
460 Jabir Osuji, b. 1977, interview, Enugu, May 2003.

157
Igboland. The Al-Miraj Muslim Society, responsible for the welfare of Muslims,
was inaugurated at the Islamic Centre in May 1983. The organization has join-
ed Christian and other social groups in visiting inmates in the state prison.
They are credited with building a mosque in the state prison, and providing an
imam to hold Friday prayers for Muslim inmates and converts to Islam. The Is-
lamic Center, in the last twenty-five years, hosted several public lectures to cre-
ate awareness about Islam in and around Enugu State. One of its landmark
activities is the Islamic proselytization day of the Muslim Student Society of the
University of Nigeria held in 1987. Most of the activities of the Islamic Center
at Enugu are replicated by other Muslim Associations in other parts of Igbo-
land. Another vibrant da‘wa-oriented Muslim community is the emerging Is-
lamic centre at Nnewi in Anambra State. Anambra State Muslims yearly obser-
ve a da‘wa week when members make a celebratory procession to the mosque,
461
dressed only in white.
Shehu Abdulkadir Sunni from Kwara State, a self-proclaimed missionary
shared his approach to proselytization in Igboland. In January 2005, he and
some colleagues toured villages in the environs of Aba in Abia State where
they distributed “gifts to some poor and sick old people, and held a discussion
session, akin to a crusade, where the truth in the true worship of Almighty Al-
462
lah was preached.” This outing was a sequel to a previous one held in De-

463
Fig. 19: Reaching out, door to door

461 Mr. Abdullahi Shehu, Secretary of the Hausa Community in Nnewi, interview, January
2004.
462 Shehu Abdulkadir Sunni, interview, Aba, July 2003.
463 Source: Engr. Yahaya Dutse, President, Association of Muslim Professionals of Rivers
State.

158
cember 2004, which took the team to a different group of villages. They were
warmly received by the indigenes, he reported; but no conversion was made.
The data on Muslim migrants’ commitment to Islamic proselytization in Ig-
boland after the Nigeria-Biafra war stands in sharp contrast to the evidence on
early migrants whose commitment to their trade, observed Sheikh Adam Idoko,
dowsed their zeal for proselytization. The civil war, having opened up Igboland
to Muslims from Northern and Western Nigeria on a much larger scale both for
military service, career prospects for government employers, and for trade,
qualifies as the turning point that ended the isolation of Igboland from influ-
ences from Islam. Post-war Muslim migrants into Igboland have done remark-
ably well in promoting Islam in Igboland, acting as its mediator both directly,
through obvious premeditated proselytization, and indirectly, by acting out
their beliefs for all to see. Traders and unskilled migrants engaged in da‘wa as
much as the trained and certified advocates—imams, mallams, and licensed
missionaries—many of whom belonged to the League of Islamic Scholars and
Missionary of Eastern Nigeria, and of other missionary organizations now op-
464
erating in Igboland. The story below demonstrates a typical indirect form of
proselytization very common of Muslim Hausa traders in Igboland:

My father died when I was 15 years. I was the oldest of six children.
We all stopped school. My mother had no means of livelihood so we
started wheeling barrows and selling palm nuts on market days. One
day a man came to me and gave me a huge amount of money. I
thought he wanted to buy palm nuts. When he did not return to col-
lect the money I went for him. He said that I should use it for busi-
ness. I called people to witness what he said so that nobody would call
me a thief later. This gesture made me join Islam … after all when I was
465
in pain nobody came, not even to give my mother feeding money.

Many Igbo now identify the important role of Muslim migrants in stimulating
interest in Islam. It has become normal, driving along major highways in Igbo-
land and, spotting one praying by the roadside. As insignificant as these incid-
ents may seem, they have proven to be weighty actions that make a lot of im-
pression on observers. Some Igbo confessed surprise, initially, at such public de-
votions so commonly displayed by the untrained, unorganized, supposedly un-
sophisticated itinerant Muslims traders from Northern Nigeria. Indeed, their

464 Sheikh Adam Idoko and Mallam Garba, interviews cited.

465 Hamza Garuba, b. 1982, interview, Ogrute, February 2006.

159
contribution to creating Islamic awareness cannot be overemphasized. Their
role in Islamic proselytization in Igboland confirms the broad implication of
Levtzion’s submission that “traders served as vehicles for the proselytization of
466
Islam beyond the boundaries of military expansion.”
It will be misleading to conclude that all migrants were engaged in da‘wa.
Also found are those who became integrated into Igbo way of life that they
slackened in their religious commitments; blaming it on the environment, the
scarcity of mosques, and the exertions individual Muslims must make to ob-
serve even the simplest religious obligation. One such Muslim, Jenini Lawal, a
tailor from Osun State, excused himself with the comment: “You know this is
467
Eastern Nigeria.”

The State and Islamic proselytization

Nigerian administrations and administrators have, in a number of ways, en-

abled Islamic proselytization programmes in Igboland. Some official policies
have affected religious developments in Nigerian states, not just Igboland
alone, thus making observers of Nigeria’s socio-political landscape to regard the
decades from 1970 to 1999 as the period of Islamization. Almost soon after the
war, the Nigerian military government expelled all foreign Christian missionar-
ies for their involvement in the war, creating a spiritual vacuum for Churches
in Eastern Nigeria. A few years after, the same government took over all mis-
468
sion schools and converted them into government schools. The post-war ex-
pansion of the Nigerian military, which was responsible for the establishment
of military outposts and barracks all over Igboland, was first identified by Doi
469
to have contributed in creating awareness of Islam in Igboland.
One major event that ultimately changed the national profile of Nigeria was
her attainment of full membership in the Organization of Islamic Conference
(OIC) in 1986. Interest in the membership of OIC was first indicated by the
Murtala-Obasanjo military regime in 1975 when, at the 6th conference of Is-
lamic foreign ministers in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria was granted observer
status in the organization. In January 1986 Ibrahim Babaginda concretized steps

466 N. Levtzion, “Toward a Comparative Study of Islamization,” in N. Levtzion (ed.), Con-

version to Islam (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1979), 15.
467 Jenini Lawal, b. 1968, interview, Enugu, September 2003.
468 Egodi Uchendu, Women and Conflict in the Nigerian Civil War (Trenton, NJ: Africa
World Press, 2007), 179.
469 Doi, Islam in Nigeria, 174.

160
towards full membership and Nigeria “was admitted as the 46th Member of the
470
OIC” during its 16th conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers in Fez, Morocco.
As shown elsewhere, Ibrahim Babangida was motivated in this action by the
desire “to curry favour with Muslim elites who held key roles in state bureau-
cracies and military command,” and to attract patronage from OIC member
471
states. The volatile reaction to the OIC membership communicated the grow-
472
ing apprehension about the official role of Islam in the country. As much as
Babangida is accused in Christian circles for religious favoritism he displayed
less religious favoritism than his predecessor, Major General Muhammadu
Buhari. Miles compares these two Muslim military dictators:

Under Buhari (January 1984 to August 1985), the government took

over several schools run by Christian denominations and delayed per-
mits for church construction; at the same time the building of mos-
ques intensified. In contrast, Babangida—whose usurping of power
from Buhari was in part a “corrective” measure designed to mollify
non-Muslim apprehensions, and perhaps forestall an anti-Muslim
coup—had actually been quite ecumenical, at least in his public pro-
473
nouncements.

The federal government appears to have further facilitated religious conversion

by default through two policies, namely the introduction of unity schools, and
condoning, via inaction, the indigenization policy. Unity schools (Federal Gov-
ernment Colleges) were introduced in the 1970s. From the beginning, they were
staffed by teachers drawn from all parts of the country. Care was taken to en-
sure that staff representation corresponded with major religious groups. This is
necessary for the fielding of teachers for the two religious studies’ subjects:
Christian and Islamic religious studies. The admixture of students from all parts

470 Noor Ahmad Baba, Organisation of Islamic Conference: Theory and Practice of Pan-
Islamic Cooperation (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1994), 172-3. See, Paul Freston,
Evangelicals and Politics in Asia, Africa and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001). A Nigerian delegation attended the first meeting held to delibe-
rate on the need for pan-Islamic cooperation in 1938.
471 Adebayo Oyebade, “Reluctant Democracy: The State, the Opposition, and the Crisis of
political transition, 1985-1993,” in Adebayo Oyebade (ed.), The Transformation of Ni-
geria (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, 2002), 151.
472 William Miles, “Religious Pluralism in Northern Nigeria,” in N. Letzion and Randall
Pouwels (eds.), The History of Islam in Africa (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000),
217.
473 Ibid.

161
of the country in unity schools promoted conversions. Indeed, in Igboland the
comparatively fewer number of Muslim students in unity schools means that
these students are often likely to be swayed towards Christianity, than Igbo
Christian students are to Islam. The reverse is the case in Muslim dominated
states. A number of adolescent Igbo converts to Islam became Muslims in unity
474
schools in Western and Northern Nigeria. The following report by Sheikh
Idoko illustrates the usefulness of unity schools in fostering the religious devel-
opment of the dominant group:

My children were in the University Primary School. I felt that it was

not helpful to them because we do not have many Muslims there and
they do not learn Islamic knowledge. I transferred them to Federal
Government College, Abuja, where they can mix with Muslims and
475
do Islamic studies …

The indigenization policy has its foundation in the distinction made between
indigenes and non-indigenes in a given community. Chapter 2 addressed the
British colonial policy of separation of natives on the grounds of religion and
custom thereby creating the idea of “host” communities and migrant or settler
groups, even within same ethnic society. This approach continued after inde-
pendence in 1960 with Nigerians expanding on its claims, and institutionalizing
an unconstitutional quasi policy of separation in daily life and most funda-
mentally along ethnic lines. Regional governments before 1960 pursued policies
suggesting that host communities were entitled to preserving a certain distance
between themselves and their migrants, and to have sole access to certain priv-
ileges special to their environment. A strong public expression of it occurred in
1965 during a debate on the floor of the Northern House of Chiefs when Alhaji
Ahmadu Bello, the late Premier of Northern Region remarked: “We do not
want to go to Lake Chad and meet strangers catching our fish in the water, and
taking them to leave us with nothing. We do not want to go to Sokoto and find
a carpenter who is a stranger nailing our houses. I do not want to go to the Sa-
bon Gari, Kano, and find strangers making the body of a lorry, or to go to the
476
market and see butchers who are not Northerners.” This isolation of other

474 One remarkable example is Cynthia Audu, b. 1983, an undergraduate, interview, Nsuk-
ka, February 2006.
475 Sheikh Idoko, interview cited.
476 Isaac Albert, “The Socio-Cultural Politics of Ethnic and Religious Conflicts,” in Ernest
Uwazie, Isaac Albert, and Godfrey Uzoigwe (eds.), Inter-Ethnic and Religious Conflict
Resolution in Nigeria (New York: Lexington Book, 1999), 73.

162
ethnic groups, for Northern Nigeria, derive from both religious and economic
considerations aimed at protecting the then economically deficient region, and
preserving their religious unity. It became also exemplified in other regions,
and has partly contributed to inter-ethnic conflicts in Nigeria. The idea that
non-indigenes have no right to demand the full benefits of citizenship has be-
come deeply ingrained in Nigerian political thinking, and almost taken for
granted. The discrimination against non-indigenes, in the decades after the Ni-
geria-Biafra war, was severally cited among the major reasons for Igbo mi-
grants’ conversion to Islam in Northern Nigeria. The remark by a Kaduna indi-
gene in a fact-finding mission of the Human Rights Watch in Kaduna further il-
lustrates this: “For an Igboman it is very difficult here. You cannot even go to a
government office and be received… This is because in the east, all of the win-
477
dows are locked to us, let alone the doors.”
After the civil war, Igboland has been governed as much by Muslim gov-
ernors as by non-Muslim governors. Consequently, besides federal policies that
impact on religious interests, state governors are known to have promoted own
religions in the states under their control. Depending on their religious inclina-
tions, state governors have pursued and supported policies that upheld either
the Christian and traditional image of Igbo states or lent credence to Islam.
Highly placed Igbo public servants convert to Islam more rapidly under Muslim
military administrators in their bid to attracting political appointments. In some
cases, these conversions endure for as long as the Muslim governor was in of-
478
fice.
Similarly, highly placed Muslim civil servants also use their positions to en-
courage their Igbo subordinates to become Muslims. A police inspector from
Adamawa State to Akokwa, Imo State, and an Area Commander, on transfer
from Niger State to Nnewi, Anambra State, made their new posts their pros-
elytization sites and their targets their colleagues. The police inspector nar-
rated that he regularly gave out gifts during Muslim festivals “to show them
479
the need to be Muslims.” The Area Commander took the time to organize the
migrant Muslim community. In line with this, he attempted, in 2003, to build a

477 Human Rights Watch, ““They Do Not Own This Place” Government Discrimination
Against “Non-Indigenes” in Nigeria,” Human Rights Watch Vol. 18, No 3(A) April
2006, p. 6.
478 Mr. Nnamdi Uzoigwe, interview, Enugu, September 2003.
479 Abdullahi Umaru, b. c. 1961, Inspector of Police, interview, Akokwa, February 2006.

163
Fig. 20: The turbanning of Mr. Orji Uzor Kalu, former governor of Abia State

mosque near a military base, but was halted by an official order that queried
480
his action and faulted it for his failure to consult with the owners of the land.
Since 1999, democratically elected governors in Igbo states have fostered
harmony between migrants and host communities in their territories. This is a
marked difference from older administrations under military dispensations. Imo
state government, in recognition of the growing religious mixture of its cit-
izens, began to invite in addition Muslim leaders to official functions such as
the swearing in of newly elected political officers, and they are sometimes re-
quested to give words of admonition in the same manner that Christian clergy
481
will. Orji Uzo Kalu, the governor of Abia State from 1999 to 2007, became
popular with Muslims when he built a big mosque in Aba in place of the old
mosque that was destroyed in 2000. The Zamfara State government commem-
orated his efforts by turbanning him as the Bachirin Zamfara in 2006, amidst
482
vituperations by many Igbo in the homeland and in Diaspora. An imam from
Ondo State spoke on the role of governments in aiding the proselytization of Is-
lam especially in Igboland:

480 Garuba Haruna, b. c. 1964, interview, Awka, February 2006.

481 Alhaji Dauda Onyeagocha, chief imam of Owerri central mosque, interview, February
2006.
482 See, for example, http://www.biafraland.com

164
 I must admit and recognize the governmental support that we have
been enjoying. Islam is spreading today in the east as a result of max-
imum support and cooperation from state governments. They have
created a favorable and conducive environment and atmosphere for its
spread. Go to Abia State; see what the governor is doing there. Under
such protective environment, Islam has continued to grow. In Delta
State, the government is trying. We prayed for Governor James Ibori
last year [2004] during the Ramadan and he won his protracted Su-
preme Court case. He showed appreciation to the Muslim community
in substance. Anambra State is not left out. The establishment of vari-
ous mosques was made possible during the military regimes. The mil-
itary administrators in Anambra and Delta States were Muslims and
they sponsored and supported many projects. All these have suppor-
483
ted in no small measure the spread and growth of Islam in Igboland.

Transnational support

A lot of the credit for proselytization of Islam in Igboland went to foreign

Muslim countries and international organizations. Educational assistance for
Igbo converts to Islam came from Islamic organizations based in Saudi Arabia
and also from Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iran, Senegal, Sudan and Pakistan, countries
that in various ways have championed the progress of Islam in Igboland. Gen-
erous donations from King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and Jordan paid for the devel-
opment of the Islamic centre at Enohia and the rehabilitation of the Islamic
centre at Orlu, along with the mosque that was damaged during the Nige-
ria-Biafra war. The mosque at Shell camp in Owerri, Imo State, was built dur-
ing the military regime with financial assistance from Saudi Arabia. It is one of
a number of mosques built by same government in Igboland. Muslim mission-
aries and teachers sponsored by foreign Muslim nations have worked in Igbo-
484
land since 1970.
Organizations recognized for their support of Islamic proselytization in Ig-
boland include Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI) with headquarters at Kaduna. JNI
stands out as an active agent for Islamic proselytization in Igboland. Its main
activities revolve around the expansion of education among Muslims and
spreading Islamic doctrines. A branch of the organization was established in Ig-

483 Alhaji Ahmed Adekola, chief imam, interview, Asaba, September 2005.
484 They include Sheikh Idris Al-Hassan, Sheikh Adam Idoko, Sheikh Saliu Abugu, Sheikh
Haruna Aja, Sheikh Ibini Ekpe, among others.

165
boland in the late 1970s and was led by an Igbo Muslim, Alhaji Suleiman
Onyeama, who also was the first Igbo member of the Nigerian Supreme Coun-
cil for Islamic Affairs. Jama’atu Nasril Islam earned the credit for organizing
many activities through which some Igbo converted to Islam and in turn be-
485
came members of the organization.

Igbo Muslims and Da‘wa

Igbo Muslim leaders one denied the existence of any organized and coordinated
Islamic missionary endeavor, by major Islamic organizations in Nigeria, for Ig-
boland and Eastern Nigeria as a whole. Sheikh Idoko had remarked: “If Muslim
personalities and Islamic organizations outside Igboland do not support the ex-
tensive proselytization of Islam among the Igbo with funds and moral encour-
486
agement; they should not sit down and expect miracles to happen.” In his as-
sessment, so much more than what was received up till 2003 was needed for a
successful proselytization of Igboland. As observed by the imam, the Igbo field
requires so much aid that will transcend internal and external support received
during special feasts, and huge supply of Islamic literature for proselytization
and for young converts.
In 2002, The Triumph daily paper carried the following:

The Igbo Muslim community in Bauchi State has called on Muslims in

the country to take urgent steps to propagate Islam in the eastern
states, saying that “the Igbo people are hungry for Islam.” In his Eid-
el-Kabir message the leader of the community, Alhaji Abdullahi
Okere, said that propagation of Islam among the Igbo would enhance
harmony among Muslims irrespective of ethnic origin. Okere said that
Muslims must intensify efforts toward the propagation of the religion,
especially in Igboland, adding that adherents of the religion must be
“courageous and make sacrifices by using their wealth to donate to-
wards helping the poor.” While praying for the progress of Islam and
peace in the country, the Igbo Muslim community enjoined Muslims
to intensify the building of more mosques and Islamic schools so as to
487
facilitate propagation.

Muslim clerics in Igboland are emphasizing more and more the crucial respons-
485 Doi, Islam in Nigeria, 175-6.
486 Sheikh Idoko, interview cited.
487 The Triumph Newspaper, 28 February 2002.

166
ibility of Igbo Muslims towards Islamic proselytization in Igboland. In 2005,
Sheikh Idoko appealed to the Igbo Muslim Diaspora to join in. He declared: “Fi-
nally, I am calling the Igbo Muslims in Diaspora to come back home and wage
war against shirk, ‘kufr’ (polytheism). They should not hide anymore that they
488
are not Igbo …”
From the five converts Sheikh Idriss Al-Hassan met at Enugu in 1982, the
indigenous Muslims in that city have grown to number well over two hundred.
489
Their number increased as converts in turn converted family members,
friends, and acquaintances to Islam. In all mosques “missionary groups” are
found with responsibilities ranging from hosting open-air meetings, lectures,
and public discussions on Islam, distribution of religious pamphlets, and bring-
490
ing friends and acquaintances to mosques to hear divine messages. It is obvi-
ous that the aggressive ubiquitous proselityzation strategies of Christian chur-
ches have influenced Igbo Muslims. Kilani described it as the impact of Americ-
an type “Television Churches” on Muslim youths who had “to organize pro-
491
grammes to retain their members in Islam.”
The same pattern by which many Igbo were won to Islam—through gifts—
has featured as the foremost method through which Igbo converts seek to make
converts of non-Muslim Igbo. Reports on Alhaji Suleiman Onyeama indicated
that from 1975 to 1980, he championed the spread of Islam in his village, Eke.
The offer of scholarships for all educational levels and promise of jobs to gradu-
492
ates were foremost incentives used to encourage conversions. Cynthia, a fe-
male Muslim undergraduate, who will not necessarily go preaching to get
people converted, still achieve same purpose by addressing some of the needs of
her non-Muslim acquaintances and friends. She has introduced some young fe-
male graduates to wealthy and influential Muslims for employment into very
attractive jobs with the condition that they convert to Islam. Cynthia, in addi-
tion, promises a silver tooth to any friend who becomes a Muslim. She was un-
493
equivocal in her declaration: “we use wealth to get people into our religion.”

488 “Interview,” Al-Huda Magazine, May 2005, p. 29.

489 The chief imam of the mosque at the Islamic center, Enugu, which is the main mosque
used by Igbo Muslims, estimated their numbers to be “up to 300”. This includes Yoruba
and other non-Igbo Muslims who use the same mosque.
490 Alhaji Idris Okonkwo Eze, interview cited.
491 Abdulrazaq Kilani, “Proliferation of Muslim Organisations in Nigeria: Merits and De-
merits,” in Journal of Objective Studies, 8 (1996), 18.
492 Michael Mmadu, b. 1964, interview, Enugu, April 2006.
493 Cynthia Audu, interview cited.

167
One explanation for the emphasis Muslims place on conversion through mater-
ial inducements is captured in the comments by a Yoruba imam:
I saw myself in a region where anything goes: In a place where the
quest for material things superseded the search for Allah. A place
filled with men who are arrogant and boastful; men who are them-
selves niggardly and enjoy others being niggardly, too; men who con-
ceal that which Allah of his bounty has bestowed upon them, men
who spend their wealth for the sake of ostentation. Allah has prepared
494
a shameful punishment for these unbelievers.

In conclusion, the contributions of Muslim migrants to proselytization have

considerably complimented all other efforts towards that goal. In recent years,
migrants and indigenes have worked together on joint da‘wa projects and in
495
social services where conversions can potentially take place.

494 Alhaji Adekola, interview cited.

495 Alhaji Mutui Osuji, interview cited.

168
CHAPTER 5
INTERROGATING CONVERSIONS TO ISLAM
IN IGBOLAND

“I have told you that if you join the Hausa to become Muslim nothing
will happen to you. You will be making steady progress all the
496
time.”

Motives for conversions to Islam in Igboland

When large-scale conversions occur, it socially and politically restructures a

given landscape. Not too long ago, Malony reiterated the psychologists’ stand-
497
point that there is no such thing as unmotivated behavior. We may boldly as-
sert that the motives for religious conversions taking place in Igboland will be
fundamental to what converts anticipate out of conversion. Understanding
these factors makes for better appreciation of social changes likely to occur in
Igboland with its growing multi-religious character, some of which are already
evident. There are two discernible categories of Igbo Muslims. One group is
composed of persons born to Muslim parents and, the other, persons who
changed their religious identity to Islam sometime in their lives. This section
concentrates on the latter. Converts whose stories feature in this chapter, ex-
cept otherwise stated, were resident in Igboland at the time their stories were
collected.
For a good number of Igbo Muslims, their religious change hinged on the
498
conviction that “Islam is the truth.” This knowledge came in various ways to
different persons. It was also the product of different interpretations of personal
encounters with Muslims and of personal experiences, all convincing them of
their predestined link with Islam. Different yardsticks were used to arrive at the

496 Imam Ibrahim Eze, c. 1938, (“born into Islam”), chief imam of Nsukka town central
mosque, interview in Nsukka, March 2003. All persons “born into Islam” were born by
Muslim parents or to fathers who were Muslims at the time of their birth. In all cases
they identified themselves with that phrase.
497 H. N. Malony, “The psychology of Religious Conversion,” paper delivered at the “Con-
ference on Religious Freedom and the New Millennium,” Tokyo, May 23-25 1998.
498 Garba Oheme, b. c. 1908, (converted to Islam in 1937), interview, Enugu Ezike, June
2003.

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conclusion that Islam is the truth. Garba Oheme, already mentioned as the first
and oldest convert from Igboland, realized that Islam is the truth from events
surrounding his health challenges in the late 1930s. At a time when modern
medical service in Nigeria was in its infancy, Oheme was cured of a long-
standing leg injury, caused by an accident, by a mallam of Hausa origin. The
wound had for years resisted other remedies. This miracle convinced Oheme
499
that Islam must be the true religion and he promptly became a Muslim.
Since Oheme’s experience, similar demonstrations of super-natural healing
by Muslim mallams have motivated quite a number of conversions in Igboland.
Few cases linked to healing from prolonged sicknesses and incidents of barren-
ness were encountered during fieldwork and were cited as reasons for conver-
500
sions by men as well as women. Other proponents of the view that personal
conviction was at the root of their conversions support it with reference to the
Igbo attitude to Islam. These converts, from Nsukka and Afikpo in particular,
argue that popular rejection of Islam in Igboland is proof that those converting
501
did so from conviction. But then, conviction is a subjective terminology hav-
502
ing different meanings for different people. Abdullahi Onyeama, whose fin-
ancial problem was solved by his Muslim friends, from a sense of relief (includ-
ing the knowledge that he could benefit in a similar manner in future) became
503
convinced to become a Muslim just as Abdulaziz Udeh, after a thorough
study of the faith and its teachings, was also convinced that it is indeed the ac-
ceptable way to God. What is important is that individuals have the inner back-
ing for the action that best served their interests.
Closely related to the reasons advanced for conversion on grounds of con-
viction are claims that Muslims are kind—what the elderly class of converts
504
styled Muslim sympathy. Such understanding again is based on personal in-
teractions with Muslims. Detailed instances of better treatment from Muslims

499 Ibid.
500 Imam Hassan Omeh Musa, b. c. 1947, interview, Obukpa, May 2003; Sheikh Adam Ido-
ko, b. 1958, chief imam, University of Nigeria mosque, interview June 2003.
501 Sheikh Haroun Aja, b. 1958, religious instructor, interview, Abakaliki, September 2003:
and Amin Elem, b. 1969, interview in Abakaliki, February 2006.
502 Abdullahi Chinedu Igboama, c. 1959, interview, Awka, January 2006. According to Mr.
Igboama, he lost his business capital in a robbery incident and his Muslim acquaintan-
ces assisted in re-establishing his business. Their generosity impressed him and led to
his conversion.
503 Alhaji Abdulaziz Ude, (converted to Islam in 1978), interview, Lagos, February 2006.
504 Ahmed Omeje, interview, Ibagwa, May 2003: Ibrahim Agbedo, b. 1953, interview, Enu-
gu Ezike, January 2004, and Imam Ibrahim Eze, interview cited.

170
were cited and these took the form of relatively rich traders giving financial as-
sistance of various kinds and providing support in solving a wide range of oth-
er needs. This and similar other instances are in fact the extension to the non-
Muslim of privileges of membership in the Muslim brotherhood in the anticipa-
505
tion of drawing the non-Muslim into Islam. Incorporated in these acts of
kindness were services associated with divination and the making of charms,
which some Muslim clerics perform with relatively great success. The provision
of charms and talismans was widespread in West Africa where, for centuries, it
was an important factor in captivating local interest for Islam. It was severally
506
identified with Muslim proselytization. Currently at Obukpa resides Hassan
Omeh, an Igbo imam, known for his ability in charm production and related
507
services, and who enjoys the patronage of Muslims and non-Muslims.
Dreams played an important role as the veritable facilitator of some conver-
sions to Islam in Igboland. Sheikh Idoko recalled that the conversion of his late
father to Islam sometime in the early 1950s occurred after a dream:

My father was not born a Muslim. According to what he told us his

first experience of Islam was through northern Muslim traders. He
said that he saw in a dream how he was praying like a Muslim…
When he woke up, he imitated what he saw himself doing in the
dream for about two years until he met some Muslim traders who led
him through what we call Kalimah … It is the official reversion to Is-
508
lam where you are told to mention some specific words…

Alhaji Musa Ani who converted to Islam in 1975 narrated the series of dreams
that led to his conversion. Excerpts from his lengthy and detailed account are
reproduced here:

I attended St. John’s Seminary in Kaduna before the civil war. I was
born a Roman Catholic… I was so inquisitive and wanted to know the

505 Abdullahi Umaru, b. 1961, inspector of police, interview, Akokwa, February 2006.
506 See for instance: Frank Salamone, “Becoming Hausa: Ethnic identity change and its im-
plications for the study of Ethnic Pluralism and Stratification,” Africa 45 (4) 1975; N.
Levtzion, ed., Conversion to Islam (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1979); and
Mervyn Hiskett, The Course of Islam in Africa (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 1994).
507 Imam Hassan Omeh Musa, interview cited.
508 Sheikh Idoko, interview cited. Igbo Muslim clerics and missionaries trained in Saudi
Arabia and other countries in the Middle East prefix their names with “sheikh”, mea-
ning learned men. Their colleagues, who trained locally, in Northern or Western Nige-
ria, prefix theirs with “imam”.

171
 in and out of everything I found in the Bible… We were told in the
church that the first miracle of Jesus was changing water into wine
but in the Seminary I read other documents… I found out that Jesus
spoke in the cradle. I started asking questions. The Irish Reverend
Father replied that it was a mystery; that the issues I was probing are
mysteries and that I have not reached the age of knowing such
things… I did not go further… After the civil war when we came back,
I was a member of St. Patrick’s Church and was very committed to all
church activities. All of a sudden, I started noticing things distracting
me from morning mass. I had no idea what was wrong with me… At
a point I wanted to forego everything about the world… I wanted to
go to a monastery … In fact, I just made up my mind to retire from the
world and pray for the rest of my life.
Two days to my departure for the monastery, after making every ar-
rangement necessary, I saw a dream that where I am going is not for
me; that the work I am to do is not there… When I say dream, I was
not in a deep sleep. I did not go into slumber… I sat down with my
eyes closed to have a little rest. That was how I had the dream. I de-
cided not to go to the monastery. I continued with the church as usual
until I had another dream that what I am looking for is not where I
am going… After having those dreams I started contemplating: But if
not there, where? Six months later I saw another dream. I was lying
down with my eyes closed and I saw written on the wall “Islam.” I
was told, “go and search for Islam. That is where your future is.” Then
suddenly I opened my eyes and asked myself “what it Islam?”… I had
no friend who was a Muslim and I had nothing to do with Islam…I
grew up in [northern Nigeria], speak the language, we lived with
Muslims in the same house but we never had anything in common
with regard to religion… I ignored it and continued with my church
activities… So after three months, I saw another one showing me the
type of people I will meet. They were wearing agbada and were pray-
ing… So I traced where to get such people… I met an Hausa tailor and
asked for the imam… and told [the imam] that I wanted to become a
509
Muslim. He said no problem, that he can initiate me…

509 Alhaji Musa Ani, b. 1955, Secretary of the Islamic Centre in Enugu, interview, Enugu,
May 2003. Agbada or Babariga, Yoruba and Hausa terms respectively, refer to long ro-
bes worn by Nigerian Muslims.

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Most Igbo identify with dreams and regard them as supernatural revelations.
Careful analysis of the accounts above exposes some salient qualities in
dreams. In the first the sheikh’s father had met Hausa Muslims. What we do
not know is if he admired them or not. However, he dreamt of himself praying
like them; a move capable of strengthening his admiration for them and
whatever internal reflections he was having about the religion. He met them
again and allowed them to convert him. In the second, being in the seminary
did not stop this interviewee from living self-indulgently as he disclosed but he
yearned for a life of piety and had a spiritual hunger that his circumstances
then could not assuage. He assumed that spiritual satisfaction would be found
in a monastery. His dreams made him decide the direction to take to achieve
his goal. In both accounts dreams confirmed some predisposing circumstances
that favored conversion. Both individuals concluded that their dreams had di-
vine origins and acted accordingly. The importance accorded dreams qualifies
them to act as facilitators, making possible the acceptance of new ideas from
within the self or from outside—including new religious beliefs—and constitut-
ing in their own right a channel of conversion.
Another reason advanced for conversion is the appeal of Muslims’ non-ma-
terialistic lifestyle. Igbo Muslims eulogize Islam for encouraging it. They em-
phasize Muslims as simple people, supporting their claims with references to
Hausa Muslims in particular. The Igbo came into contact with Yoruba Muslims,
mostly from Ilorin, in Southwest Nigeria, relatively soon after their contact
with Hausa and Nupe Muslims of Northern Nigeria. In fact in a few communit-
ies, contact was first with Yoruba Muslims before either Hausa or Nupe
Muslims; but, from all indications, Yoruba Muslims made the least impact on
the Igbo, perhaps because their numbers remained very minimal unlike those of
the Hausa and the Nupe. Hausa Muslims have continued as models of what an
average Muslim is and looks like and are known to the Igbo as very simple
with an equally simple way of life.
When non-Muslim Igbo speak of Hausa as simple people, they connote a
wide range of traits ranging from an uncomplicated lifestyle devoid of luxuries
to straightforwardness, naivety, and a total lack of sophistication. The name
calling of the civil war years bequeathed the linking of this alleged simplicity
510
with the complacency of cows; and it is not uncommon to hear the Hausa re-
ferred to as “ndi bakwomi,” pointing to their naivety, and, more derogatively,

510 The association of Hausa with cows derives from early contacts between the Igbo and
Hausa. Most early Hausa in Igboland came as cattle traders.

173
 511
to lack of intelligence and sophistication. This uncomplimentary view of the
Hausa is not general among the Igbo for indeed a good many Igbo admire their
simplicity and lifestyle. More importantly, for Igbo Muslim converts, these un-
pleasant images are not implied in their own remarks. In fact the noble aspects
of simplicity come into focus in their assessments and the attraction was force-
ful enough to motivate conversions to Islam despite the fact that conversion
makes them, in the eyes of other Igbo, “Hausa” by religion even if not in other
ways. One individual who became a convert on this consideration is Mallam
Ahmed Omeje from Ibagwa. His father was friends with northern Muslims.
That relationship provided a window through which the young Ahmed ob-
512
served Muslims and eventually adopted Islam.
Non-Muslim Igbo regard conversion to Islam as the adoption of an import-
ant feature of Hausa ethnic community. This reasoning is behind the termino-
logy “ndi Hausa,” meaning the Hausa, commonly applied to Igbo converts to
Islam. Connecting conversion to Islam with becoming Hausa is not confined to
the Igbo alone. Salamone encountered similar reasoning in Yauri in present
Kebbi State nearly four decades ago. For the Yauri, conversion to Islam ulti-
513
mately led “to the assumption of Hausa ethnic identity.” Adamu writing from
the perspective of the Hausa shows that conversion to Islam can be regarded as
a marker of classification within the group. He writes:

It is impossible to give a simple definition of an Hausa person because

different criteria were, and still are, used by different people at differ-
ent times and places to define who was or should be defined as Hausa.
To decide who was and who was not, some people used purely histor-
ical claims to Hausa identity, others used cultural traits, and social
values as their yardstick, while still others used religion plus lan-
514
guage.

The association made between Islam and Hausa ethnicity took on a special cur-

511 “Bakwomi” is Hausa for “no problem” but the Igbo use it pejoratively to suggest, “any-
thing goes.”
512 Mallam Ahmed Omeje, interview cited.
513 Frank Salamone, “Becoming Hausa…,” 410-423. In a recent study on the Efik and Ibibio,
same connection was made with local converts to Islam. Both Efik and Ibibio Muslims
were described as persons who have joined the Hausa: Sheikh Trevor Saleh, b. 1968,
(converted to Islam in 1984), interview, Ikot Ekpene, May 2009; and Ahmed Etim Bas-
sey, b. 1985, assistant chief imam of MOPOL mosque, interview, Calabar, June 2009.
514 Adamu, The Hausa Factor in West African History (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University
Press, 1978), 3-4.

174
rency, observes Adamu, following the Islamic reform movement of the early
nineteenth century that encapsulated nearly all of Hausaland and beyond. He
personally agrees that the adoption of Islam positions a person as an Hausa. He
defines the Hausa as “those who historically issued from Hausaland or their
descendants through the male line, or those who became closely associated
515
with Hausa culture by adopting its language, its customs and religion.”
The attractive force of Hausa Muslim simplicity was first made known to
me by Sayeed Suleiman with respect to the conversion of his father to Islam of
whom he said: “He became a Muslim after observing that Muslims are very
simple. Earthly things are not important to them. They do not think about ac-
quiring airplanes or vehicles. They take life very simply. My father wanted to
516
be as simple as them. That was why he converted to Islam.” Imam Ibrahim
Eze, one of the oldest serving Igbo imams, told me: “The beauty of Islam lies in
the efforts of the members to contain their appetites for the things of this life.
Muslims do not struggle to acquire all that could be acquired in the world or to
live and never die just for the sake of worldly enjoyment. Any person with
517
such ambition is not a true Muslim.”
There is the repeated contrast drawn between Hausa Muslims and non-
Muslim Igbo by Igbo Muslims. They place on one side the Igbo attachment to a
life of comfort, and, on the other, the non-materialism of Hausa Muslims.
Muslim simplicity is contrasted with Igbo customary ostentation. Historically,
Igbo ceremonies required a good deal of expenditure, sometimes beyond the
financial capacity of the celebrant. Marriage and burial ceremonies are common
examples. Muslim marriages are comparably much cheaper than Igbo mar-
riages. Dauda Ojobe reasoned thus: “For a burial ceremony, you go with a cow
to show that a great man is dead; but in Islam it is not like that. Islam is
518
cheap…” In other words embedded within the claim of Muslim simplicity and
the contrast with Igbo materialism actually lies the attraction of the cheapness
of the life of Muslims. Some interviewees, indeed, stated that it takes an Igbo
less to be Muslim than to be Christian.
Igbo idealism of Muslim simplicity has a contrast in Last’s study of conver-
sion among non-Muslim Hausa Maguzuwa who, using a different yardstick in
assessing the economic advantages of conversion, see Islam differently:

515 Ibid.
516 Sayeed Suleiman, b. 1975, (“born into Islam”), interview, Ogrute, June 2003.
517 Imam Ibrahim Eze, interview cited.
518 Dauda Ojobe, interview cited.

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 But daily life as a Muslim is expensive, and not all feel they can afford
it. Most notably the husband forgoes the labour of his wife outside the
house: the Muslim wife will neither farm for him nor collect wood nor
draw water; instead of providing them herself, she is entitled to have
wood, water, and ingredients for the gravy bought for her…while she
519
may perhaps work on fields of her own account.

Maguzuwa, in addition, found the process of taking on an Islamic name after

conversion equally expensive. Muslim marriage and burial ceremonies may be
comparatively cheap to the Igbo but the whole baggage that Islam brings with
it may not be that cheap for the vast majority outside the wealthy class. Per-
haps, to minimize some of the cost of Muslim daily life, Igbo clerics and ordin-
ary Muslims assiduously disagree with the practice of female seclusion, insist-
520
ing that it is an Hausa culture and, therefore, un-Islamic. Meanwhile, reading
Last makes one aware that non-Muslim Hausa do not practice seclusion, re-
garding it themselves as an expensive Islamic practice.
Admirers of Muslim simplicity are more from the towns of Enugu Ezike,
Ibagwa, and Alor Agu, in the old Nsukka Division, than from other Igbo com-
munities that have produced converts to Islam. These are towns where the “old
generation” of Igbo converts and their Muslim-born descendants are found.
They appear intolerant of the ostentatious and luxurious life of wealthy
Muslims associating it with a defective commitment to Islam and a recent de-
velopment. Asmau Shittu, a female interviewee from Enugu Ezike, says of af-
fluent Muslims: “That a person acts piously does not mean that he is pious. You
cannot say that because I covered my whole body very well that I am pious.
521
Some take on the Muslim identity yet they have the devil’s heart.” Igbo
Muslims like Asmau, Suleiman, and Imam Eze who admire Hausa Muslims for
their simplicity and uncomplicated way of life have had limited contacts with
Muslims. None, including the imam, by the time of interview, had been outside
Nigeria. They therefore have not had contact with a very wide assortment of
Nigerian and foreign Muslims. Furthermore, except for the imam who did his
advanced Islamic studies in Northern Nigeria, none had any educational exper-
ience beyond the secondary school level. Again, with the exception of the
imam, their evaluation of Muslim lifestyle is based on limited local knowledge
519 Murray Last, “Some economic aspects of conversion in Hausaland (Nigeria),” in N.
Levtzion (ed.), Conversion to Islam (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1979), 244.
520 Mrs. Asmau Shittu, b. 1969, (“born into Islam”), interview, Nsukka, May 2003; and
Imam Hassan Omeh Musa, interview cited.
521 Mrs. Asmau Shittu, interview cited.

176
drawn from interaction largely with a class of unprofessional Muslims of
Northern and North Central Nigeria origin who lived or are living as itinerant
mallams, traders, and laborers in their communities.
The views expressed that Muslims are simple rather conjure up the prefer-
ence of Islam for modesty and should not be taken too literally to assume that
wealth and comfort are antithetical to Muslims’ daily existence for if such in-
deed is the case, it presupposes that a considerable proportion of Muslims
worldwide do not qualify as true Muslims, which of course may not be the
case. Since such a claim is debatable even to Muslims themselves, one should
comprehend the comments of Suleiman and the imam in their local contexts. Of
the more enlightened Igbo Muslims, simplicity is not the yardstick used for the
Hausa or for the totality of the Muslim worldview. For many established and
prospective Igbo businessmen, and some women, found within and outside Ig-
boland, the primary attraction to Islam has been the stereotype of Hausa –
more precisely Northern Nigerian – Muslim businessmen and politicians pop-
ularly called Alhaji. These are individuals who constitute a class of undisguised
wealthy and influential tycoons.
One more reason for most conversions in Igboland derives from the affirm-
ation that Islam is not the privilege of any one ethnic community. This is a dir-
ect reaction to Igbo association of Islam with the Hausa ethnic community.
Olayi Saibou from Ebonyi State asserted: “We have read the Qur’an and the
522
Hadith and saw that Islam is for everybody.” Many professing Igbo Muslims
chanted this remark in modified ways to emphasize their right to choose Islam
as their religion. It was also heard from Muslim clerics of Igbo and non-Igbo
origin wishing to assure the Igbo of the universality of Islam and to encourage
conversions to Islam. The important issue behind this remark is the question of
choice amidst alternatives. Unlike the situation nearly a century ago, the Igbo
of today have the prerogative to choose one religion out of three major ones
and other minor ones found in their locality. This is the right some are freely
exercising through conversion to Islam.
Reasons given for conversions from Christianity in particular to Islam
bordered on discontent with doctrinal issues and from frictions arising from in-
terpersonal interactions among Christians. Dissatisfaction with lack of account-
ability in the management of church funds and compromised commitment to
church procedures made Abubakar, formerly Agu Igboeze from Okpuje in
Enugu State, and Saidou, formerly Ogbonna Okah from Amasiri in Ebonyi

522 Olayi Saibou, b. 1967, (became a Muslim at the age of 7), interview, Izza, January 2006.

177
State, both previously Christians, to break with Christianity in favor of the
523
Muslim ummah. Following further inquiry, it was disclosed that few years
after conversion, members of his mosque found Abubakar guilty of misman-
agement of funds.
A young assistant imam whose conversion to Islam was linked with his am-
bition to win students election in his university a few years back provides an-
other kind of example. His interest in undergraduate students’ politics was
greeted with remarks by Muslim schoolmates who, according to his narrative,
told him that it will be impossible for a Christian to win a student union elec-
tion in a university in Northern Nigeria. To realize his ambition, he became a
Muslim and consequently won the office he contested for. Several other per-
sons became Muslims to address one disadvantage or another in their lives. Un-
able to get their due unhindered, they sought it through religious affiliation.
This state of affairs is well known to the many imams and sheikhs in Igboland
whose priority it is to gain as many followers as possible from Igboland (and
not necessarily to investigate how genuine were the reasons for the conver-
sions). Imam Ibrahim Eze of Nsukka central mosque where Abubakar now
worships responded thus to inquiries on the authenticity of his conversion:

Even if there are underlying motives, I cannot interpret them. But

even if he had those motives for entering Islam, you should know that
to enter a religion one weighs it for its advantages and benefits to the
person, and compares these with what one is already enjoying where
he or she is, to decide which to choose. It is my opinion that whoever
enters Islam in the fear of God (Chineke) understands that Islam is the
524
way that will make him have the fear of God.

Several remarks were made by Igbo Muslim leaders in particular regarding in-
dividuals who approached them professing interest in Islam but who were with
time, sometimes after their induction into Islam, found to be motivated by non-
spiritual factors. In this group were persons who came believing that “their
525
daily bread would no longer be a problem” after their conversion. In order
words, economic challenges were at the base of such conversions. Persons with
anticipation that conversion would guarantee daily sustenance had heard of the

523 Imam Ibrahim Eze told the story of Abubakar from Okpuje. Alhaji S. Okah, b. 1956, Is-
lamic teacher, interview in Amasiri, September 2003.
524 Imam Ibrahim Eze, interview cited. Chineke is Igbo terminology for God.
525 Alhaji Mutui Osuji, b. 1936, (converted to Islam in 1982), public relations officer of the
Islamic Center in Enugu, interview, Enugu, May 2003.

178
munificence of Muslims and concluded that belonging to their faith would
more readily position them to benefit from that generosity. Set within this
bounteousness is the trust Muslims have for persons with whom they interact
closely. Peil’s study of interethnic contacts in Nigeria shows Hausa as less eth-
526
nocentric than may be assumed. The ordinary Hausa may trust almost com-
pletely a non-Hausa business partner who closely associates with Muslims or is
accommodating and friendly to Muslims. The principal of an Islamic school in
Enugu, Al Huda Primary School, confirms this with her own experience: “For
the reason that I work here, Hausa shoe repairers come to my house to give me
their weekly earnings to keep for them… They know I am a Christian but they
believe that I will not cheat them like many Igbo who take advantage of their
527
trust.” Only one interviewee acknowledged attempting to convert to Islam to
exploit such trust targeting specifically the rich Muslims and not the struggling
Hausa itinerant laborers commonly found in the major streets of Igboland.
Indication of conversion for economic reasons is also mooted in this extract
from an interview with a female Igbo resident of Kaduna city:

Q: Are there Muslims of Igbo origin in Kaduna?

A: Yes; but how many are they? They are very few … They are doing
Islam secretly. They use it to get money.

Q: What do you mean by using it to get money?

A: Haba! This people can give you money; do anything you want and
528
set you up in business.

My research disclosed the case of an adult male who ceased being a Muslim
after practicing Islam for well over a decade. Jubril Ocha converted to Islam in
Kano city in 1987, lived as a Muslim, performed the hajj, married an Hausa
Muslim woman of Kano origin with whom he had several children, and after-
wards left his wife and children in Kano because he was no longer interested in
Islam. To him, it had served the purpose for which he embraced it, which was
to make him wealthy. When asked about his wife and children, he responded
that they were in good hands; that the children could not be Igbo because they
529
were raised as Hausa and Muslim according to his Hausa mentor’s wish.

526 Margaret Peil, “Interethnic Contacts in Nigerian Cities.” Africa 45 (2) 1975, pp. 107-121.
527 Mrs. Chinyere Okolie, b. 1963, interview, Enugu, May 2003.
528 Mrs. Nkiru Nduka, b. 1971, interview, Kaduna, 2006.
529 Mr. Jubril Ocha, b. 1958, (converted to Islam in 1987), interview, Kaduna, September 2003.

179
 In Enugu city in particular, cases of aborted conversions involved mostly
students in tertiary institutions and unemployed youths who needed some as-
sistance to get on with life. A couple of clerics in Igboland observed that this
class of converts tended to lose their faith after receiving the desired financial
530
and other assistance. Reading Anthony, it would appear that adult Igbo indi-
genes have long been involved in this conversion game for Anthony gave it as
a reason why some Igbo converts to Islam in Kano city completely assumed
Hausa Muslim identity after conversion to distinguish themselves from the less
531
ingenuous Igbo converts who nominally join Islam for economic reasons.
Some persons who set out to convert but eventually did not might have had
genuine interests in Islam but social and other circumstances, including pres-
sure from family members as in the case of Nathan Okeke, prevented them
from actualizing their conversion dreams. However, this trend partly publicized
conversion to Islam among the Igbo as money-driven. For the economic as well
as politically minded converts, the pathway of wealth and influence goes bey-
ond the boundaries of Nigeria. Alhaji Ahmed Onyema, an Igbo Muslim busi-
nessman, remarked: “Being a Muslim has given some of us the opportunity to
visit Arab countries like Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt. In fact there is nothing
532
to regret in being a Muslim.” A handful of male interviewees sang similar re-
frains. The preponderance of the Igbo who joined Islam in order to have inter-
national connections and access to the wealth of the Islamic world, Saudi Ara-
bia most especially, using the auspices of the annual hajj has caused many non-
Igbo Nigerian Muslims to denounce Igbo Muslims as fake Muslims. The ordin-
ary non-Muslim Igbo also dismiss cases of conversion as guise for economic
and political aggrandizement. Says one:

Only very few Igbo have embraced Islam and that could be attributed
to economic reasons. Some have gone to be appointed Ministers or
awarded contracts and other appointments in federal ministries and in
states controlled by Muslims. They feel that the shortest way of get-
533
ting closer to the northern power brokers is to become Muslim.

Accusations that the conversion of Igbo to Islam since after the civil war was in
anticipation of economic and other benefits do not worry all Igbo Muslims.

530 Sheikh Al-Hassan and Alhaji Mutui Osuji, interviews cited.

531 Douglas Anthony, “Islam does not belong to them: Ethnic and religious identities
among male converts in Hausaland,” Africa 70 (2000), 426-32 and 436.
532 Alhaji Ahmed Onyema, b. 1941, interview, Ezzamgbo, September 2003.
533 Mr. Eze Ezekiel, b. 1966, civil servant, interview, Abakaliki, October 2003.

180
Haruna Aja summed up the opinion of most on this issue. He agrees completely
that many Igbo are joining for the benefits to be derived but holds that every-
body expects something from being a believer in any religion and, in the case
of Islam, since Allah provided the condition that people should ask in order to
receive, persons who joined the group for what they anticipated to gain have
not erred. In his opinion, the Igbo are not alone in expecting economic and oth-
er benefits from their commitment to Islam. New comers to Islam from Hausa-
534
land and Yorubaland also come with expectations. He must have anticipated
Salamone’s 1975 study that recounted the story of a Yoruba headmaster at Yel-
wa Waje Primary School, a former Catholic, “who found it advantageous to his
career and acceptance in Yauri to convert to Islam and to marry four women.”
The significance of his change was clear even to his students who were “well
aware that the path to political success in the North-western State is via Islam.”
535
Earlier records on Islam also show that among the Hausa reformers who
fought the jihad wars of the early nineteenth century were those who were
536
motivated by material rewards that would accrue to them. While on one
hand some Igbo Muslims like Haruna agree that some conversions had eco-
nomic and political undertones; on the other hand, are found individuals who
react angrily to that assumption or rather to its wide application to all Igbo
Muslims. The wealthy businessman, Abdulaziz Ude, angrily retorted that he
was not a civil servant but a successful businessman with chains of businesses
all over the world and therefore could not have converted for economic reas-
537
ons. Economic minded and politically motivated conversions to Islam did not
end in the dustbin of future reversion. This group of converts like their col-
leagues who were largely driven by spiritual quest still made sense of their
538
faiths and only few cases were known to have recanted.
A broader view of Igbo political emancipation was also expressed, albeit dif-
ferently, by persons outside the clerical class. The following extract, from a
widely circulated electronic mail, capture the opinion of some Igbo Muslims in
diaspora on the relevance of the conversion of the Igbo to Islam:

534 Sheikh Haroun Aja, interview cited.

535 Frank Salamone, “Becoming Hausa…,” 419.
536 J. O. Hunwick, “The Nineteenth-Century Jihads,” in J. C. Anene and G. Brown (eds.),
Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press,
1981), 297-98.
537 Alhaji Abdulaziz Ude, interview cited.
538 Two examples are: Mr. I. Ala, b. 1941, (converted to Islam in 1975 as Mallam Usman
but recanted in 1987 and joined the Igbo religion), interview in Mbaise, February 2006;
and, Mr. Jubril Ocha, interview cited.

181
 In an objective analysis it appears that the Northerners have drawn
great strengths of unity and power from their identification with Is-
lam. The Zionists have likewise found the key to independence by ac-
cessing the survivalist instincts of their “eye for an eye religion.” Be-
ing weighed in the balances has Christianity truly benefitted the
Igbo??? Maybe it’s time to read the prophetic words of Maazi Blyden
[Edward Wilmot Blyden] who referred to himself as a "True son of
539
the Ebo race" (Christianity, Islam and the Negro race, 1887).

Blyden compared the impacts of Christianity and Islam on the “Negro.” He pos-
tulated that Christianity will always contain the African in an eternal state of
dependency on the white man, while Islam, on other hand, is by nature more
suited to the black man because it encourages a sense of pride and independ-
ence. On the basis of his identification with the Ebo [Igbo] race, the writer of
this electronic mail considers his comments as having great prophetic signific-
ance for the Igbo in particular. He recommends that the Igbo should follow in
the footsteps of Blyden, who converted to Islam after his analytical study of the
burden of Christianity and Islam on Africans, or, alternatively, refocus their as-
pirations on the tenets of the Igbo religion.
All conversions in Igboland to Islam were not from the Christian religion.
The village head of Akanu, Ohafia, Abia State, narrated that when Hausa and
Fulani nomads wandered into Akanu with their cattle some decades ago, the
indigenes were intrigued by their prostrations “because they resembled our pat-
tern of worship in honor of the earth goddess.” Their observation eased interac-
tion between Akanu and the nomads eventually producing some converts in
540
Akanu after the civil war. Igbo religion also bequeathed members to Islam
from those who observed parallels between Islamic tenets and Igbo traditional
worldview in the areas of re-incarnation, polygyny, and charm making. Dauda
Ojobe’s conversion thirty-eight years ago was because Islam unlike Christian-
ity allows polygyny. Born as the only son to a father who in turn was the only
son, Ojobe admired the culture of multiple and concurrent partners and found
541
the support for it in Islam leading eventually to his conversion. The resemb-
lance between certain Islamic stipulations with Igbo cultural practice made con-
versions to Islam from the latter not to be regarded as a very serious deviation
by the converts in particular. One important pre-empting issue for members of

539 Email from S. Al-Sulaimani, 11 July 2008.

540 Chief Ani Nwoke, c. 1930, village head of Akanu Ohafia, interview, Akanu, May 2005.
541 Dauda Ojobe, b. 1928, (converted to Islam in 1971), interview, Enugu Ezike, May 2003.

182
the Igbo religion is the Islamic prohibition on alcohol consumption; but con-
verts from the Igbo religion declare their adherence to it nonetheless.

Women and conversion

Marriage by far has ranked as the primary reason for the conversion of women
to Islam in Igboland. There have been more cases of such conversions since
after the Nigeria-Biafra war. Men also became Muslims for purposes of mar-
riage but unlike women their rate of post-marriage withdrawal from Islam was
higher. The following account, corroborated in a separate interview by the eld-
er brother of the interviewee, provides an example:

Neither my father nor my mother was born Muslim. My father’s first

wife was the daughter of a townsman who was a Muslim. She was
the mother of my elder brother... Before my father married his mother
he first had to become a Muslim… That was the condition my step-
mother’s parents gave for his marrying their daughter… Actually after
the death of his first wife, he left Islam and went back to the tradition-
542
al religion. He married my mother as a non-Muslim.

Muslim religious leaders and scholars hold to the tenet that a Muslim man
should not marry a woman who is a polytheist, an atheist or an apostate. He
may marry a free woman from the People of the Book—people whose religious
tradition was originally based on a divinely revealed scripture like Jews and
Christians. All schools of Islamic law however forbid a Muslim woman marry-
ing a non-Muslim man. Mraja provides some explanation for this:

It has been pointed out that marriage is a most intimate communion,

and the mystery of sex finds its highest fulfilment when intimate spir-
itual harmony is combined with the physical link. If religion is at all a
real influence in life to both parties or to either party, a difference in
this vital matter must affect the lives of both more profoundly than
543
differences of birth, race, language, or position in life.

On average Nigerian Muslims regard marriage to non-Muslims as an avenue

for bringing converts into Islam and at the same time winning divine approval.
More than half the men interviewed for this study married non-Muslims, citing

542 Imam Ibrahim Eze, interview cited.

543 Mohamed Mraja, Islamic Impacts on Marriage and Divorce among the Digo of
Southern Kenya (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2007), 110.

183
the above reasons as the prop for their actions. In one incidence an Igbo
Muslim married two Igala women, one of who was a Christian and the other a
Muslim. His reason for the first marriage was to reverse the pattern by which
Muslims of other ethnic groups, through marriages to Igbo Christian women,
win converts for Islam. Speaking generally of his efforts towards membership
drives in favour of Islam he remarked: “Those I converted were northerners in
544
whose blood Islam already existed; I have converted no other person.” While
Islam permits men to marry non-Muslim women, it forbids Muslim women
from marrying non-Muslim men. Mutalib was one of many non-Igbo men
whose Igbo wives reverted to Islam upon marriage and Mourihatu, one of a
545
growing population of Igbo women, who became Muslim through marriage.
Ibrahim from Owerri, Imo State, also became Muslim by marriage before the
Nigeria-Biafra war because his father-in-law gave that as the condition for his
546
marrying her daughter.
More than four imams in Igboland reported an increase in the number of
worshippers at their mosques resulting from mixed religious marriages involv-
ing Igbo women. The numerical disparity in the gender composition of Igbo
Muslims that is responsible for the existence of more Igbo Muslim men than
Igbo Muslim women would appear to have left few alternatives for the men
than to marry non-Muslim women especially Christians many of who eventu-
ally convert to Islam. The alternative to marrying non-Muslim Igbo is marrying
Muslim women from other ethnic groups. Not every Igbo Muslim, however,
prefers this option. In 1975 Peil observed: “relatively little interethnic marriage
547
occurs in Nigeria, partly because of social pressure against it.” Although in-
cidents of interethnic marriages have increased since 1975, it is still not com-
monly indulged in and become more difficult when it shows potentials of in-
volving a religious change.
Muslim men, as stated, engage in inter-religious marriages to win converts
to Islam but they abhor giving their daughters to non-Muslims on the grounds
548
that such an action implies “agreeing to someone leaving Islam.” Their stand
is also based on demographic reasons. In the first instance Igbo Muslim popula-
tion is very small and, secondly, many converts “are not strong Muslims,” ob-

544 Dauda Ojobe, interview cited.

545 Alhaji Mutalib, b. 1940, interview, Ibagwa, May 2003; and Mourihatu, interview, Lagos,
August 2003.
546 Mallam Ibrahim, interview, Port Harcourt, February 2006.
547 Margaret Peil, “Interethnic Contacts in Nigerian Cities,” Africa 45 (1975), 113.
548 Imam Ibrahim Eze, interview cited.

184
served Imam Ibrahim Eze. Further, exposing Muslims who are not grounded in
Islam to other religious ideologies and codes of behavior may lead to their be-
ing completely lost to Islam. For these reasons, Igbo Muslims observe as a rule
the injunction that their young members would not marry outside the fold ex-
cept with the absolute confirmation that the un-believing partner joins the be-
549
liever in Islam. This principle, taught in mosques today, dates more than four
decades ago and is credited to early Igbo Muslim converts who arrived at the
550
decision with the guidance of their Hausa and Nupe counsellors.
Igbo Christian women marrying non-Igbo Muslim men roughly fall into
seven categories. The categorisations were determined by the reasons they
gave for their marriages to Muslims and eventual conversions to Islam:
The first group comprised women who indeed married from an emotional
point of view. They loved their spouses and married them for that reason and
not for their religion or for other purposes. These women situate their conver-
sion as attempts to please their partners and to communicate their love.
The second category is of women who were assured by their Muslim hus-
bands of their religious freedom but who after their marriages were constrained
to convert to Islam. Following their conversion, they live as Muslims even
when they feel and would wish otherwise. Some feared that their decision to
551
convert might work against them if they leave Islam. I asked an Imam
Ibrahim Eze the possibility of a certain convert recanting later and he replied:
552
“No … The law is against that.” Perhaps this same “law” has kept some of the
women in this group from leaving Islam. In these first two categories, conver-
sions occurred after marriage and not before marriage, as was often the case for
553
women marrying Muslims.
A third group is made up of women who married for protection. The wo-
men represented here reside in Northern Nigeria where periodic cases of Mus-
lim aggression on Christians have increased in the last two decades and have
become very thorny following the adoption from 2000 of the shari‘a legal code
554
by the twelve northern states. A female interviewee who lost a brother and a

549 Mallam Ahmed Omeje, interview cited.

550 Ibid.
551 In addition to the conversion ritual, a woman may be served a “spiritual drink,” prepa-
red like a potion, by a mallam. This practice was mentioned in Northern Nigeria and
not in the Southeast.
552 Imam Ibrahim Eze, interview cited.
553 Ibid. Also, Alhaji Sadauki, b. 1966, Sarikin Hausa of Uyo, interview, Uyo, May 2009.
554 Rose Nduka, b. 1975, interview, Kaduna, January 2006.

185
sister in the crisis of 2000 narrated as follows: “For fear of being killed, I ran to
an Hausa friend of mine and let him marry me. Having learned much about the
555
religion, I think there is little difference between it and Christianity”
The fourth category comprised women who needed to get married. For this
group, time was ticking away and suitable men from other angles had not
shown up. One of them said “I married an Hausa or Muslim because I have to
be married like other women out there. It is very clear that a man and woman
are meant to be together. It is not said that their being together should be
guided by religious sentiments. So as other women are married, I am also mar-
556
ried.”
The fifth group of women married non-Igbo Muslims because they are
wealth. One woman in this category whose husband is from Kaduna State re-
ported: “I married a Muslim because he likes me. He is a very wealthy man
with lots of buildings and vehicles. I gave up my religion to marry him, which
any other woman will do. Marriage should be based on true love and wants.
My husband is very wealthy. He supplies all my needs. Today, I am a very
557
happy woman.” Wealthy northern Muslims commonly put their wives in se-
clusion, known to Igbo Muslims as Kulleh, and are not anxious for whatever
extra resources their wives may attract to the family by engaging in paid work.
No doubt, wealthy Nigerian Muslims appeal to many young women many of
who described them as good providers. They have acquired a reputation that
they generously allow their wives considerable financial freedom as long as
they live by Islamic injunctions for women. Where right to free spending is the
need of a woman, wealthy northern Muslims in particular make good marriage
partners. Some women, however, reported conflicts, after they defaulted in her
558
conformity with Muslim norms.
The sixth category of women who became Muslims through marriage
switched religious boundaries for other reasons including the need to gain em-
ployment in highly regulated career fields and the quest for excellent paying
jobs. The Nigerian Customs is one establishment that is difficult to get into.
One female interviewee realized that she needed the influence of a Muslim to
secure an employment with the Nigerian Customs and so married her second

555 Hajia Maimana Yankwero, b. 1976, interview, Onitsha, May 2006; Rose Nduka, inter-
view cited.
556 Uchenna Usman, b. 1966, interview, Umuoji, February 2006.
557 Ujunwa Abubakar, b. 1969, interview, Orba, February 2006
558 Rose Nduka, interview cited; Charity Kolawole, interview, Nsukka, March 2006, and,
Mrs. Aishat Adenikan, b. 1973, interview, Port Harcourt, May 2009.

186
husband for that purpose. With the influence of her husband the Nigerian Cus-
559
toms employed her. Perhaps, in this last group we can integrate women
whose marriages to Muslims and subsequent conversions to Islam were facilit-
ated by the relative sameness in the religious rituals they were accustomed to
and what Islam proposed. An example of this category of women is one mem-
ber of the Sabbath faith community who reported that there was no major dif-
ference in the religious obligations Islam enforced on women and what she was
accustomed to in her Sabbath church. The only discernible difference, in her
opinion, between Islamic regulations on women and that of the Sabbath
Church is just the group nomenclature:

As a member of the Sabbath church, I saw a lot of similarities with Is-

lam. In the Sabbath we wash to purify ourselves before prayer … We
don’t attend congregational prayers. These similarities motivated me
560
to marry him.”

According to Peil’s 1975 study, of the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria, the
Igbo and Hausa have more incidents of marriages outside their ethnic boundar-
ies. This has worked spectacularly well in fostering the spread of Islam in Igbo-
land. Relatives of women with Muslim husbands become drawn within the or-
bit of Islamic influences and some have through this closeness become Muslims
themselves. One example is Aminatu Nze who narrated as follows:

I lost my parents when I was a little girl. Fortunately, my elder sister

that I was staying with got married to a Muslim. They did not discou-
rage me from remaining a Christian. They allowed me to attend Church
services on Sundays and every other day… My sister’s husband even
wakes me up for mass on Sundays… After some years things started
changing… Once in a while they will tell me about Islam, their beliefs
and their way of life. So one day I followed them to the mosque. After
the prayers some of their friends preached to me about Allah. They
made me understand that Allah loves me. They also told me some
other things that convinced me… Before then I have started falling in
561
love with the religion. Believe me, this is how I became a Muslim.

559 This interviewee, born in 1963, spoke on the condition of anonymity. The interview
was held in Lagos in February 2006.
560 Chiamaka Ibrahim, b. 1952, interview, Onitsha, February 2006.
561 Aminatu Nze, b. 1977, interview, Owerri, February 2006. Other interviewees who spoke
about their marriages to Muslim husbands include: Monsurat Ego Kareem, b. 1968, in-
terview, Owerri; Obiageli Yakubu, b. 1974, interview, Onitsha; Adamma Mohammed, b.

187
Conversion of children to Islam

Most Igbo converts to Islam were already adults above the age of eighteen at
the time of their conversion. Nevertheless, a handful of children below that age
have also converted to Islam independent of their parents and influences from
other adult relatives. Three such persons were differently encountered during
this study. Meetings with them took place in Igboland, Yorubaland, and Hausa-
land respectively. Of all three, Jabir, at thirteen years while in the junior sec-
ondary (JS) school, was the youngest to become a convert. He was the only one
of the three with a parent who converted to Islam nearly a decade before his
own conversion. He insists, however, that his conversion was the outcome of
personal curiosity and fascination with the prayer motions of Muslims and was
not influenced by his Muslim parent:

I was in JS 3 when I came across the pamphlet: Call for Prayer… After
reading it I felt like joining them. This decision was not fully because
of conviction. I was only interested in their gymnastic form of prayer.
What they were doing appeared like gymnastics to me. They pro-
nounce Allah Akbar, they stand up, they kneel down … I was inter-
ested in those movements… Sometime later, I read more about Islam
and became convinced to be a Muslim… It was not because I under-
stood Muslims but because I understood Islam. Islam and its doctrine
562
are good.

Although Jabir may not see the link, there is little doubt that his father re-
motely exposed him to Islam through creating situations whereby he became
aware of Muslim religious attitude that eventually captivated his attention. It
was from living with this parent that he came across the pamphlet he read, had
contact with Muslims, observed their religious motions and became fascinated
by same until he decided to join them in prayer even if initially just for the fun
of it. The preliminary contacts continued giving way to genuine quest about Is-
lam that ultimately convinced Jabir that Islam and its doctrine are good.
The other two youths, Abdukareem and Cynthia, at the time of interview,
had no Muslim relatives. They took to Islam after years of exposure to the reli-
gion from close interactions with Muslims. Their stories in some ways resemble
1971, interview, Onitsha; Aishatu Chioma Jubril, b. 1977, interview, Owerri; Bilikisu
Adamma Ibrahim, b. 1954, interview, Owerri; and Chika Abdul, b. 1974, interview,
Owerri. These interviews were held between January and February 2006.
562 Jabir Osuji, b. 1977, (converted to Islam in 1990), an undergraduate student of Universi-
ty of Maiduguri, interview, Enugu, May 2003.

188
the account of the non-Muslim Hausa Maguzuwa, many of whom, as Last
563
shows, converted to Islam through habituation. Abdukareem’s conversion oc-
curred in Ogun State in Yorubaland where he was born and brought up. Ac-
cording to him, he associated mostly with Yoruba schoolmates during his sec-
ondary education. Very often after school he accompanied these friends to the
Qur’anic school. He acknowledged being fascinated with “their opinions about
564
life.” From accompanying them to the Qur’anic school, he finally registered
himself in the school and spent five years on Qur’anic education. Efforts by
family and friends to dissuade him from Islam were fruitless. Abdukareem per-
sonally identified the environment he found himself in as what led to his con-
version.
Cynthia grew up in Northern Nigeria and had numerous female Muslim
friends in school. She allowed a friend to convert her in 1997 at the age of four-
teen. The process leading to her conversion began with her association with her
friends. Acting on their encouragement, in school she attended classes on Is-
lamic Religious Knowledge instead of Christian Religious Knowledge that was
expected of students from Christian background. Part of the time she spent
with her friends was invested in listening to them recite the Qur’an. She en-
thused: “It was so lovely reading and listening to them recite the Qur’an. Their
mode of dressing was another thing that appealed to me. Their respect for their
565
religion and their character all motivated me into becoming a Muslim.”
The Igbo residing in cities with a predominant Muslim community either in
Northern or Western Nigeria convert relatively easily to Islam than those in the
566
homeland. Living and closely associating with Muslims in same residences,
at schools, in the offices, and in the course of normal daily activities, bring
within their orbit Muslim practices and the body of knowledge on which they
rest. These contacts engender gradual assumption of Muslim behavior or sym-
pathy for Islamic teachings until conversion occurs. On the one hand, these
persons imbibe Muslim practices and ideas while they simultaneously loose
touch with their former way of life. Even where no conversion has taken place,
persons accustomed to Muslim mannerisms or dressings are commonly nick-
named “mallam” or “Alhaji” for men and “Hajia” for women by their Muslim

563 Last, “Some economic aspects of conversion in Hausaland,” 234-245.

564 Alfa Jamir Abdukareem, b. 1970, (converted to Islam in 1986), interview, Aba, Septem-
ber 2003.
565 Miss Cynthia Audu, b. 1974, (converted to Islam in 1997), undergraduate student of
University of Nigeria, interview, Nsukka, February 2003.
566 See Anthony’s account of Igbo Muslims in Kano (Anthony, 2000).

189
neighbors and acquaintances and also by non-Muslim Igbo. Igbo men display
influences of close associations with Muslims more than Igbo women.
Abdukareem’s pattern of conversion is replicated among much younger
children. These children’s admirations for Islam derived from their attendance
at Islamic schools. The Islamic Centre at Enugu houses Al Huda Nursery and
Primary School opened in 1991. At Enofia in Afikpo, Ebonyi State, less than
two hours drive from Enugu, is also found the Islamic Secondary School estab-
lished in 1973. Graduates of Al Huda primary school are among others who
continue their secondary education at Afikpo. Both schools have been invalu-
able in exposing children to Islam. When education at Al Huda was free for all
567
students, Christian parents sent their children to the school. When they be-
came aware that their children were mimicking a different religious tradition,
which they learnt at the school, many withdrew their children from Al Huda.
By June 2003, only one Christian family had a child studying in the school.
The Enugu and Afikpo schools are mission-oriented establishments that aim
at training students in Islamic precepts. Muslim clerics and activists have used
the auspices of the secondary school to induct youths into Islam. The exposure
to Islamic knowledge and way of life in the secondary school is such that the
568
chance of a graduate of the school being impervious to Islam is very slim.
The case of an orphan recommended by a cleric for admission at the school is a
useful example. Jameel was offered admission into the school at the age of six-
teen. At the conclusion of his studies he was enamored with the passion of
spreading his new faith and excitedly remarked:

I find it joyful to be associated with the school. Now, not only am I

able to read the Qur’an in its original language, I know western sub-
jects as well. I can now boast of knowing two languages and can also
teach the rudiments of Arabic language to people. The school is help-
ful in that it provides assistants and graduates who read and recite
Qur’an to the people during worship and who teach Qur’anic injunc-
tions to the people. Graduates…are playing important roles and hold
important positions not only to the Muslim communities but also to
569
the society at large.

567 Al Huda eventually scraped its sponsorship programme for students because of financi-
al constraints.
568 Others who spoke on the Islamic schools include: Alhaji Musa Ani, Mrs. Chinyere
Okolie, Jabir Osuji, Alhaji Mutui, Alhaji Mutalib, and Mallam Omeje.
569 Jameel Okoroama, b. 1983, (began “to identify with Muslims in 1997”), interview, Asa-
ba, October 2005.

190
Other factors contributing to conversions in Igboland

Conversions, both permanent and temporary, were in addition to the factors

mentioned above the results of a multi-pronged social process involving the
converted and the converter. With respect to the latter, the human elements
ranged from any ordinary Muslim to clerics. The quest for converts, though of-
ten denied by Igbo Muslim clerics who claim that they are not begging people
to join Islam, still has a scriptural base. The Qur’an and Hadith present Islam as
the divine and ultimate religion. Both enthrone the concept that all creatures
are enjoined to submit to Allah. Since after the Nigeria-Biafra war Muslims
from Northern, Western, and North Central Nigeria have made efforts to win
converts from Igboland. These previously localized efforts later took on an in-
ternational dimension when Islamic bodies began sending missionaries into Ig-
boland. Igbo Muslims have themselves shown growing commitment to mis-
sionary work both in their determination to increase their numbers and also to
bring about compliance with the concept that all creatures should submit to Al-
lah. Igbo male converts of varying ages described themselves as Islamic mis-
sionaries. Meanwhile, majority, at the time of this study, had no connections
with national and international Islamic missionary (da`wa) organizations but
instead belonged to neighborhod da`wa societies in which they volunteer time
and resources for proselytization. The promise of eternal blessings to be derived
by converting unbelievers is strongly behind individual proselytization efforts
as suggested by this remark:

If you convert to Islam and it happens through me, I will have lada
(i.e. blessing) in the sight of God. If the level of my lada was 10 per-
570
cent and I bring you into Islam, God will increase it to 25 percent.

In broad terms, the drive for converts to Islam has a nation-wide scope. It can
be regarded as partly responsible for the numerous post independence “jihadic”
uprisings revolving around very minor and petty grievances but targeting non-
Muslims. Such violent socio-religious intimidation has produced a number of
unintended compliance with, and conversions to, Islam, sometimes through
marriage for women, but whose true purpose includes the search for personal
safety. Although the term Jihad is understood from its presentation in the
Qur’an to denote a military struggle for Islam—this is a less form of jihad in
contrast to the more important one, which is the personal struggles, the Al-Ji-

570 Mr. Abubakar Abugu, b. 1974, (“born into Islam”), an apprentice, interview in Amufie,
March 2003.

191
had Al-Kabir—the underlying factor of the struggle is the conversion of infi-
571
dels. Horton puts it in context as a process “to force the population from pa-
572
ganism and “mixing” into pure Islam.” The many cases of religious-based vi-
olence in Nigeria that affect Christians, majority of which belong to the Igbo
ethnic group, testify to the appropriateness of Horton’s summation.
Another aspect of Muslim proselytization that is put forward in Nigeria and
which was mentioned in the preceding chapter is the use of material entice-
ments to win converts to Islam. It is not impossible for real experience to collide
with ethno-religious demarcation and prejudices to discredit the virtues of this
strategy just as it is equally possible for this strategy to be abused and used to
manipulate conversions. In the following statement, Nathan Okeke, a former
Igbo convert to Islam, discussed how this proselytization strategy works and
some opinions about it:

An Hausa will use money to bring you down to where he needs you.
Where money cannot entice you, they cannot get you… Once they are
good to you and you are friends, the first thing they will propose to
you is to change your religion. If you change, they will give you
money. If you want to be an international businessman, they will set
you up as long as you change from Christianity to Islam… At times at
the mosque they discuss how to convert people. They will tell the per-
son who is close, or friendly, to the individual they want to convert to
go ahead with the work, promising that they will contribute whatever
573
he needs for it.

The story of Jubril Ocha’s journey into Islam may again be necessary here:

I came to Kano as a young man. I got a job with a rich mallam who
loved me very much and called me son… He told me that he will
make me rich and will give me his daughter in marriage if I become a
Muslim. So I converted. My relations felt very bad but I did not care; I
574
got what I wanted.

Material enticements work well in situations where a group has been starved of

571 K. S. Vikor, “Jihad in West Africa: A Global Theme in a Regional Setting,” in Lief Man-
ger (ed.), Muslim Diversity: Local Islam in Global Contexts (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon
Press 1999), 80.
572 Horton, “On the Rationality of Conversion,” Part II, Africa, 45 (4) (1975), 384.
573 Nathan Okeke, b. 1969, interview, Kaduna, January 2006.
574 Mr. Jubril Ocha, interview cited.

192
opportunities. After the Nigeria–Biafra war, the numbers of the Igbo in the Ni-
gerian army greatly diminished as many were compulsorily retired for their
role in the Biafra conflict. The ethnic imbalance thus created has since re-
575
mained. The same applies to the Nigerian Customs Department. In Northern
Nigeria, under the policy of indigenization, non-Muslims report discriminations
with respect to job entitlements like promotions and deployment in individual
576
fields of specialization. Non-Muslim self-employed professionals also report
low patronage for their services. For many non-Muslims, the veritable way of
combating these challenges is by conversion to Islam. An Igbo soldier narrated
that after endlessly waiting for promotion he sought the advice of one of his
senior colleagues who told him to realign his religious identity. Compliance
577
with the suggestion produced his missed promotions. This story has similarit-
ies with that of a lawyer who after many years of practice with little progress
in his career eventually decided to become Muslim. In this case, his Muslim-
born relatives were indignant of his action and asked me “what kind of Islam is
578
that; his Islam is not from his heart.”
Many in Igboland, including converts to Islam, presuppose that the various
governments of Nigeria since the civil war in 1970, through pressures exerted
by official policies of exclusion, force the Igbo into Islam. Nnorom shows that
the experience of the Igbo who through social pressures become Muslims is
replicated globally. Part of the history of Egyptian Copts, he quotes, read:
“Banned from the army and important government positions, large numbers
converted to Islam in order to take advantage of the benefits of full citizen-
579
ship.” Speaking on Igbo converts in Northern Nigeria, Nathan Okeke had this
to say: “Many Igbo who are being converted do so because of money or to get a

575 Egodi Uchendu, Women and Conflict in the Nigerian Civil War (Trenton, New Jersey:
Africa World Press, 2007), 190-192.
576 The Igbo are not the only group experiencing discrimination in Northern Nigeria. Ho-
wever, they constitute the highest number of victims by virtue of being the non-Hausa
group with the highest number of settlers. (See Anthony’s account on page 426 of the
Igbo in Kano city alone). The wide dispersal of the Igbo outside Eastern Nigeria since
the colonial days is explained by the severe population pressure in the Igbo homeland
combined with an intense desire for economic improvement. Many went to Northern
Nigeria where their entrepreneurial and technical skills were in demand among a wide-
ly non-western educated population. Like the Igbo and other non-Muslims in Northern
Nigeria, Muslims from Northern Nigeria also face their own set of setbacks in Southern
Nigeria.
577 Mr. Shittu Nwabueze, b. 1955, interview, Ukpani, February 2006.
578 Mrs. Asmau Shittu, interview cited.
579 Columba Nnorom, “Islam in Igboland: Lessons in History.”

193
 580
job, to be a businessman, or just to have their support...” We have already
mentioned the case of the Headmaster at Yelwa who became Muslim because it
would serve his career better.
Material enticements could also be applied in the absence of any known so-
cial disadvantage. My two male research assistants were offered large sums of
money and scholarships to accept Islam. They were given instances of youths
like them who accepted such gifts and who became Muslims. The first of the
two assistants, who interviewed some cattle dealers in Abia State, reports:

… After the interview he asked me to become a Muslim that he will

be paying me one hundred and fifty thousand naira [USD 1202.40]
and also sponsor my education.

His colleague who assisted me in Onitsha, Anambra State, says:

My host took me to lunch. In the course of our discussion he revealed

that his reason for becoming a Muslim was because of the many op-
portunities that abound in Islam. He cited economic and political op-
portunities as what made him change his religion. He said these to
persuade me to accept Islam. These were contrary to his earlier claims
581
of divine revelation…

The value of what is offered the first assistant would be appreciated from stat-
istics of earnings of Nigerian civil servants. A secondary school teacher in a
state-owned school and a medical doctor at a government hospital earn an an-
582
nual salary of 1,920 USD and 6,720 USD respectively. The sum promised is
701 USD less than the annual salary of a secondary school teacher. For a young
man in his twenties that was a huge amount of money.
Muslim proselytization in Igboland is driven both by the quest for religious
members in a supposedly fertile mission field and the assumption, expressed by
some Muslim clerics in Igboland, of possible political unity for Nigeria that will
result when the three major ethnic groups in the country are unified by one re-
583
ligion. These three ethnic groups—Hausa, Igbo, and Yoruba—account for a

580 Nathan Okeke, interview cited.

581 Extracts from field notes by Obi Ugo, b. 1981, Nsukka.
582 “Nigeria: Facts and figures.” Source: BBC News, Published 2007/04/17
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/6508055.stm
583 Clerics who individually made this suggestion were Imam Ibrahim Eze of the Nsukka
town central mosque; Sheikh Idris Al-Hassan, Director of the Islamic Center at Enugu;
and Alhaji Musa Ani, secretary of the Islamic Center at Enugu.

194
 584
little more than seventy percent of the nation’s entire population. The Secret-
ary of the Islamic Centre at Enugu elaborated that Igbo conversions to Islam
would bring about “absolute confidence between the different ethnic groups,
peace and love” that would end “all the problems of the Igbo today, which were
585
the result of the Igbo not considering Islam as a religion.” Proponents of this
view lament the state of Islamic proselytization in Igboland. Says the Ghanai-
an-born missionary in Enugu: “I am not happy that Muslims are not doing
much about the Igbo. They are not doing what I expect them to do. I mean the
Nigerian Muslims in general. The Igbo have churches in Kaduna, Kano, every-
where. They are preaching and sponsoring programmes. Our own Muslims are
586
doing nothing.” It does not appear that the ordinary Hausa and Igbo Muslim
also espouse this hope of political unity via religious affiliation.

584 National Population Commission, Nigeria’s 2006 Census (Abuja: 2007).

585 Alhaji Musa Ani, interview cited.
586 Sheikh Idris Al-Hassan, interview cited.

195
CHAPTER 6
“IT IS MY FAITH, IT BELONGS TO ME:”
RESPONSES TO CONVERSIONS TO ISLAM

From what we saw in the previous chapter, conversions to Islam among the
Igbo derived from the interplay of internal and external factors whose lines of
demarcation were in some cases blurred. These factors include the genuine
spiritual quest and conviction that Islam is the appropriate way to God; the re-
cognition of Islam as a universal religion; perceived divine influence through
dreams and revelations; mixed religious marriages; the desire for integration
within established Muslim financial and political networks, which was height-
ened by the political and economic marginalization of the Igbo since the Ni-
geria-Biafra war; dissatisfaction with a previous religious group; the results of
habituation; proselytization among the Igbo by Muslims whose other goal, be-
sides gaining converts, is bringing about political unity in the country, and, the
587
pull of financial and other inducements.
This chapter is concerned with a number of issues especially the complex
interplay of religious and ethnic identities of Igbo Muslims including the map-
ping of religious values on ethnic ones. Also discussed are recent transforma-
tions within the Igbo Muslim community. Of note is the disconnection since the
1990s of ethnicity from religion, which is one result of the progress of Islamic
education in Igboland. The responses in Igboland of Igbo conversions to Islam
and the challenge to Igbo Christian identity and traditional values are also con-
sidered.

Induction into Islam

The Nigerian constitution supports the right of self-determination of one’s

faith. Igbo Muslims trying to establish their right to be Muslims and to refute
assumptions by other Igbo that Islam is incompatible with Igbo identity sever-
ally reiterated this. The process of conversion to Islam in Igboland is not differ-
ent from what is known about the mechanics of conversion to Islam generally:
an intending male convert informs a Muslim, generally an imam (a Muslim re-
ligious leader or the head of a specific Muslim community that worship in a

587 A version of this chapter is published as “Being Igbo and Muslim: The Igbo of South-
eastern Nigeria and conversions to Islam, 1930s to recent times,” Journal of African
History, 51 (2010), 63-87.

196
particular mosque), if personally acquainted with one, of his decision to become
Muslim. Some first try to obtain basic knowledge about Islam or discuss their
intentions with people around them, friends as well as family members who
appeared predisposed to support their move. Once the decision to convert is
taken, the intending convert contacts an imam directly or through an acquaint-
ance. In response, the imam invites the individual to the next Friday worship at
the mosque. Dauda Ojobe’s conversion in 1971 followed this pattern. When
Ojobe (b. 1929) informed the imam in his community that he wished to become
Muslim, he was asked to return the following Friday to communicate his inten-
tions to the community of Muslim believers in his village, majority of whom
were non-Igbo. In 1990, at Kaduna, Nathan Okeke (b. 1969) passed through a
similar process to become a Muslim, even though he had been a regular visitor
588
for some time at the mosque, taking part in prayer and other acts of worship.
At the end of the Friday congregational prayer, and in conjunction with the
counselling of the imam, the potential convert informs the congregation of his
intention to be Muslim. He is told of the basic observances of Muslims, namely
avoidance of alcohol, cultivation of perpetual love for all, and observance of the
five-daily prayers. If the newcomer pledges commitment to these acts of wor-
ship, he is led through the ritual bath of purification (Tahāra), a symbolic bath
performed without cosmetic soap. The ritual is interspersed with some recita-
tions and the confession of the Shahāda, by which the convert affirms “There is
no God but Allah and Mohammed is his prophet.” Igbo Muslim leaders and
589
converts commonly refer to this event as the “Muslim baptism”. Fitted into
the induction are lessons on pre-prayer ritual washing or ablutions. It appears
that there has been no significant change in this ritual from what was described
by Abdurrahman Doi based on his observations in Ibagwa in 1965:

The intending convert is given a bath, and is dressed in a white robe

especially prepared for him for this occasion; then he is brought to the
mosque where fellow Muslims of different ethnic origin assemble to

588 Nathan Okeke, b. 1969, interview, Kaduna, January 2006. (Nathan later left Islam and
re-embraced Christianity.) Women’s conversions are not made public: they are private
affairs that occur in the private space of the home (Hajia Khadija Essen, b. 1954, inter-
view at Uyo, May 2009; and, Mrs. Amina Ihuoma Kundi, b. 1980, interview at Port Har-
court, May 2009.)
589 Interviews with Sheihk Idoko, b. 1958 (“ born into Islam“), chief imam of the University
of Nigeria, Nsukka, mosque, June 2003: Imam Ibrahim Eze, c. 1938, (“born into Islam”),
chief imam of Nsukka town central mosque; Alhaji Musa Ani, b. 1955, secretary of the
Islamic Center in Enugu, interview, May 2003; and, Nathan Okeke, interview cited.

197
 witness the conversion. The Shahāda is pronounced and repeated by
the convert and the Imam gives him guidance on Islamic matters.
Then the Jama’ah, i.e., the gathering, cheer the new convert, saying
Alhamdu Lillad and Allahu Akbar, after which the congregation
donate whatever they can to help their new Muslim brother, from one
590
kobo to one naira.

In nearly all African Muslim communities, the mere profession of faith has
591
been sufficient for admission into the Muslim community. The conversion ce-
remony is a public proclamation (witnessed only by Muslims), symbolizing the
rejection of any previous religious tradition for Islam. Candidates for conver-
sion who fail to submit to the ceremony do not regard themselves as Muslims
and are also not regarded as such by other Muslims, although some may retain
592
strong interests in Islam, even practicing it somewhat in daily life.
As part of the conversion process, the convert is guided to choose a new
name. At the naming ceremony a ram may be slaughtered. With or without a
special naming ceremony, new names of Arabic origin, either with Islamic con-
notation or not, are adopted to replace the convert’s first name or last name.
The name change reflects the convert’s new faith. Name change after conver-
sion was common with early converts from Nsukka, Abakailiki, and Owerri Di-
visions of Eastern Nigeria before 1967. Hausa and Nupe mallams (scholars)
who came to Igboland as traders and as companions of Muslim traders offici-
ated in those naming ceremonies. Adult naming ceremonies were not as elabor-
ate as the naming of children born to Muslim converts, described by the imam
Ibrahim Eze:

When Hausa Muslims from Kano came to Ibagwa, they gave names
to children born to the Igbo who joined them in Islam. They took a
barber to the naming ceremony and he barbed the hair of the new
baby and gave it facial marks. They gave us facial marks. They taught

590 Abdurrahman Doi, Islam in Nigeria (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1984), 177.
591 Humphrey Fisher, “Conversion Reconsidered: Some aspects of religious conversions in
Black Africa,” Africa 43 (1973), 33.
592 Anthony (2000, p. 436) records the case of Senator Arthur Nzeribe whose much publi-
cized conversion, scheduled to take place at the Emir’s palace in Kano in December
1989, did not hold because Nzeribe never showed up. I came across another Igbo who,
despite pre conversion training in Islamic knowledge also did not appear at the mosque
where his conversion ceremony was to take place. See Douglas Anthony, “Islam does
not belong to them: Ethnic and religious identities among male converts in Hausaland,”
Africa 70 (2000), 422-441.

198
 us that since we have joined Islam, we should observe their cus-
593
tom …

The imam’s story was corroborated by a former female Muslim of Igala origin
of North Central Nigeria married to an Igbo. She noted: “The Muslim naming
ceremony was full of celebration. Once a child was a week old, the hair was
594
barbed and marks were made on the face.”
Conversion to Islam brought changes in the lifestyle of Igbo converts. Tak-
ing on new names to reflect a new religious identity also occurred during the
early decades of Christian missionary activities in the Southeast and elsewhere
in Nigeria. As Christian converts had their local names changed in mission
schools to Christian or European names, in like manner Muslim mallams super-
vised the adoption of Islamic or Arabic names for Igbo converts to Islam. The
Muslim name change does not derive from any borrowing from Christian mis-
sionaries but has an independent origin that dates to the foundation of Islam,
during which time the adoption of new names signified personal worship or
confession of one’s faith. Name change, Frank Salamone points out, made fur-
595
ther identification with one’s religious community easier. Igbo Muslims in-
596
terpreted it as an indication of the authenticity of their conversion claims.
Until the end of the 1980s, widely differing opinions were held concerning
the emphasis on Arabic or Islamic names for Igbo converts. The 1990s, how-
ever, saw a change in Igbo Muslims’ disposition to this identification policy and
its relevance. Since then, imams of Igbo origin have advocated that new con-
verts to Islam should retain their vernacular or Christian names while also ad-
opting an Arabic name as the first or middle name. Imam Ibrahim Eze, one of
the oldest Igbo imams, explained the discourse underpinning this change in
practice, which results from their understanding that Islam does not call for a
loss of ethnic identity:

In the early days of Islam some of the Arab Muslims retained their
pre-conversion names. God ruled that they should retain their names
… There were actually many early Arab Muslims who retained the

593 Imam Ibrahim Eze, interview cited.

594 Mrs. Hawakwunu Josephine Okoroafor, b. 1946, interview at Inyi, August 2005. (Ha-
wakwunu became a Christian after her marriage in 1963.)
595 Frank A. Salamone, “Becoming Hausa: Ethnic identity change and its implications for
the study of ethnic pluralism and stratification,” Africa 45 (1975), 417.
596 Imam Hassan Omeh Musa, c. 1947, (“born into Islam”), a tailor and the imam of Obuk-
pa mosque, interview, Obukpa, May 2003.

199
 original names their parents gave them. Here in Igboland, a long time
ago, we debated this issue and agreed that converts should retain their
original names provided they are practicing Muslims. However, there
is an Islamic injunction that revertees should choose one of the old
prophetic names.

Apart from taking on a new name, Igbo converts were given facial markings by
Muslim mentors from Nupe and Kano to align them with their ethno religious
customs. Facial marks were indeed part of the cultural marker of some riverine
Igbo groups but had no religious basis. These Igbo communities gave marks to
their members during the long centuries of the slave trade when these marks
served as safeguard for clan members and also facilitated quick identification of
slave victims. By the time colonial rule was established and pax Britannica en-
forced, the need for marks dwindled and the practice lost its prominence for
those communities that relied on it as they would on their modern internation-
al passports. It continued, however, in Alor Agu in Nsukka Division, where it
assumed a new significance, being associated with conversion to Islam. C. K.
Meek records that facial marks were used by Hausa ethnic communities in
Northern Nigeria and Islamized communities in North Central Nigeria for a
variety of reasons: to distinguish their members from other ethnic groups; to
prevent loss of identity during the slave period; and, afterwards, as adornment
or as an indication of membership in Islam. He writes:

Religious ideas also exert a modifying influence on the system of scar-

ification. Thus the alternated triple lines at the corner of the mouth,
such as used by the Nupe of Bida, by the younger generation of Ka-
kanda, and by many other Islamized [groups] of Ilorin, Nupe, Nas-
sarawa, and Munshi provinces, are said to be an indication that the
597
parents of children so marked were Muhammadan.

Encouraged by Muslim mallams of Nupe, Hausa, and Yoruba origin, Igbo con-
verts to Islam learned the rudiments of their new faith, giving emphasis to
prayers and their set times, and to identification with Islamic practices such as
the wearing of Muslim clothing; in reality, this required converts to be dressed
in gowns according to the fashion of Muslim Hausa, and many years later in
their Yoruba variants by those who did not wish to align themselves so closely

597 C. K. Meek, The Northern Tribes of Nigeria: An Ethnographical Account of the Nor-
thern Provinces of Nigeria together with a Report on the 1921 Decennial Census, Vol. I.
(London: 1925), 44-45.

200
 598
with Hausa Muslim identify. Nupe and Hausa Muslim settlers in Igboland
had begun by the 1950s to integrate their converts within existing Hausa and
Nupe settlements. Thus, Igbo Muslims, with their Hausa and Nupe mentors
created distinct Muslim communities within existing Igbo communities. These
communities have survived today and are found at Alor Agu, Ogrute, and
Ibagwa, all in the Nsukka area of Enugu State as well as in Owerri and Orlu in
Imo State. In Enohia, Ebonyi State, where group conversion of a quarter of the
village occurred in 1958, the reverse was the case, as the Igbo Muslim com-
munity took the initiative of incorporating Muslim migrants from Northern and
North Central Nigeria within its territory to help train them in the way of Is-
lam. The relevance of these religious communities lay in the fact that basic Is-
lamic precepts with the necessary base culture were thus more easily trans-
ferred to new converts. The realistic conclusion would be that the practice of Is-
lam by the Igbo in its early stages followed the Hausa prototype, with many
Hausa cultural details. Converts lived in a kind of apprenticeship arrangement,
attached to Hausa or Nupe traders, some of whom doubled as itinerant mal-
lams, for purposes of learning Islamic worship and the daily routine of believers
from the original custodians, as these groups were considered to be. Converts
imitated their spiritual mentors in nearly everything, and their wives—most of
whom converted along with them—also conformed to the pattern of the daily
routine of Hausa Muslim women. My oldest female interviewee, who was born
when “there was no school” remarked:

I was young when I entered Islam. If at that age you were married,
you were required to be obedient to your husband. Whatever he told
you not to do, you did not do it. If he said do not go out, you did not
599
go. When he decides to let you go, you go.

Nevertheless, learning the rudiments of the faith at a time and in an environ-

ment where the facilities for it were lacking or inadequate was challenging,
judging from the experience of Igbo converts to Islam in the 1950s to 1970s. Re-
ferring to the life of his father, who became Muslim in Enugu Ezike in the

598 The best example of this group is Alhaji Idris Okonkwo Eze, b. 1953, (became a Muslim
in 1964), a tailor, interview, Nsukka, May 2003. Alhaji Eze joined his elder brother,
Imam Ibrahim Eze, into Islam when he lived with him.
599 Mrs. Ramatu Mohammed Omeje, c. 75, (became a Muslim as a young girl following her
marriage to a Muslim), interview at Enugu Ezike, June 2003. The reference to “when
there was no school” suggests that her birth would have taken place in the late 1920s in
her home community of Enugu Ezike. The first school in her village was established in
1930.

201
1950s, Sheikh Idoko observed: “Actually my father was not so learned in the
600
Qur’an. He learned just the basics, like the prayer.” Alhaji Musa Ani recalled
his experience after his conversion to Islam in Enugu in 1975:

It was not easy knowing what was going on. I joined them in prayer
without knowing what they were saying. I just marked my head on
the ground as I saw them mark their heads on the ground. And, the
601
Hausa man was not literate to educate you…

From the inception of the Igbo Muslim community at the turn of the 1950s,
adult converts to Islam arranged for Qur’anic education for their male children.
Some sent their children to itinerant mallams who served the Hausa Muslim
migrant community to train them in the recitation of the Qur’an. Others sent
their sons to Northern and North Central Nigeria for their Qur’anic education.
Learning centers patronized included Akpanya, Nassarawa, Keffi, Kano, and
Sokoto. The first crop of Igbo Muslim children who learned to recite the Qur’an
outside Igboland did so in the 1950s, before the establishment in 1958 of the
first Qur’anic school in Igboland at Ibagwa-aka in Nsukka Division. Two for-
eign teachers, one of whom was a Sudanese, served the school. A second school
was established in 1963 in Enohia in the old Abakaliki Division. The Ibagwa
and Enohia Qur’anic schools were destroyed during the civil war. Only the En-
ohia school has since been rehabilitated. For the years when the Ibagwa school
602
functioned, it suffered from lack of funds and unavailability of teachers. From
1970, after the civil war, other Qur’anic schools were opened at Owerri (Imo
State) and in the army barracks of Enugu (Enugu State) and Onitsha (Anambra
State) for families of non-indigene soldiers of the Nigerian army stationed in
those places. The Qur’anic schools offered basic knowledge of Arabic language
to help Muslim children say their prayer in its original language. Proper know-
ledge of Arabic language and Islamic studies was acquired outside Igboland. In
1973, the proposal to establish an Islamic primary school that would combine
formal school curriculum with Islamic subjects was first publicly disclosed. A
newspaper report states:

The first Islamic school in the East Central State is to be sited at

Enugu. The school will admit pupils from all parts of the state… The
600 Sheikh Idoko, interview cited.
601 Alhaji Musa Ani, interview cited.
602 In May 2003, when I visited the school, the building was in ruins lacking doors and
windows and with neither pupils nor teachers but occupied by roving domestic ani-
mals.

202
 Igbo Muslim leader in Enugu, Malam Sulaiman Onyeama, said it was
decided at a recent representative meeting of Muslim leaders in the
603
state.

Post 1980 converts would appear to have had better opportunities than the
older generation, although still not comparable with what could be obtained in
the Muslim states of Northern Nigeria or in Western Nigeria, which also boasts
604
a large Muslim population that dates to about the late sixteenth century. In
1988, a second Qur’anic school in the Nsukka area was opened at Obukpa, and
another in 2002 at the Nsukka town market for children of traders or Northern
Nigeria origin. The market school is supervised by the Sarkin Doya, the Hausa
chief of the market responsible for coordinating the business of traders of
Northern and North Central Nigeria origin. It is supported from donations from
Northern Nigeria and the contributions of the local Muslim community. In
much of Igboland, Qur’anic schools operate in the evenings and at weekends to
avoid interfering with the schedule of government schools. More recent
Qur’anic schools are found at the cattle markets of Enugu, Umuahia, and Lok-
ponta in Abia State, serving families of traders from Northern Nigeria. On the
whole, the Qur’anic schools in Igboland report poor attendance of children of
Igbo Muslims, most of whom engage with their education at the government
schools.
Far better access to Islamic religious education was obtained in Northern
and Western Nigeria. In addition to these provisions, Igbo converts living in
those parts of the country were also integrated with indigenous Muslims soon
after conversion, for the same purposes of transferring religious precepts and
basic Islamic culture to new converts, just as occurred in Igboland from the
1950s and onwards. Speaking of Kaduna State in the 1990s, one interviewee ob-
served:

The Igbo who converted to Islam stayed with a mallam for a period of
time to learn about Islam… Previously they were not doing that until
the Hausa discovered that the Igbo were more interested in their
money than in their religion … Now, when they get an Igbo convert,
605
they keep him with a mallam in a place like Tudunwada.

603 “Islamic school to be built in Enugu,” The New Nigerian Newspaper, March 15, 1973, p. 2.
604 J. D. Y. Peel, Religious Encounter and the Making of the Yoruba (Bloomington and In-
dianapolis, 2000), 190-191.
605 Nathan Okeke, interview cited. Tudunwada is one of the exclusive Muslim residential
areas in Kaduna city, Kaduna State. The 2000 sharia crisis in Kaduna State redefined

203
Besides the direct contact with mallams who were on hand to guide the young
convert along his religious obligations, Islamic schools were readily available
and offered basic Qur’anic education and advanced Islamic studies, all in a far
more ideal setting than could be offeres in the Southeast.
Conversion seems to have elicited its own excitement. Male converts repor-
ted feelings of intoxication with their new faith after conversion. Their enthusi-
asm was variously displayed, but one obvious outcome was the quick adoption
of flowing gowns. Alhaji Musa Ani, who converted to Islam in 1975, asserted:

I started wearing babariga (Hausa style flowing gowns) without

wasting time and one long cap longer than [President] Shagari’s.
People called me Aboki (another local term for Hausa Muslims) and
‘Alhaji ba Mecca’ (a Muslim pilgrim who has not performed the hajj).
606
I did not hide what I was doing. I was proud…

Such enthusiastic converts took on with equal speed the task of convincing
family members—wives, children, siblings, and, where possible, friends and as-
sociates to become Muslims.
Unmarried Igbo male converts accelerated their process of adaptation to
their new religious family by taking Muslim wives. Suitable wives were found
without much difficulty in the Nsukka area of northern Igboland and in Kogi
State, in North Central Nigeria. It appears to have been considerably easier,
however, to marry from Hausaland. It spared most grooms the problem of con-
vincing non-Muslims to marry them. Moreover, where a non-Muslim woman
may readily agree to marry a Muslim male, the same ease of acceptance of the
marriage cannot be guaranteed from her relatives. A few converts also men-
tioned the simplified marriage rites of Muslims as another appealing reason for
marrying women from Muslim-dominated communities. For many inter-
viewees, it is easier practicing Islam in areas with predominant Muslim popula-
tions than in the Igbo homeland. Perhaps because of this, a good many Igbo
converts to Islam residing outside their villages are not known in their home
communities as Muslims because they never disclosed that identity there.
Clearly visible outward markers were associated with Igbo converts to Is-
lam, as already noted. Indeed, there is no doubt that conversion to Islam went
hand in hand with the reception of various manifestations of Hausa culture.
Abdurrahman Doi, the Pakistani Muslim scholar who labored in the 1960s with

settlement patterns in Kaduna designating Muslim areas from non-Muslim areas and
limiting interpersonal contacts between Muslims and non-Muslims.
606 Alhaji Musa Ani, interview cited. Aboki is one of the Igbo terms for Hausa Muslims.

204
few Muslim expatriates and non Igbo academics affiliated with the University
of Nigeria to fan the fire of Islam into flame in Ibagwa and Obukpa communit-
ies of Nsukka Division, confirms this connection:

Those Ibos who have accepted Islam have automatically accepted the
material manifestation of Islamic culture. With the acceptance of Is-
lam, they have accepted the ideal of the universal brotherhood in Is-
lam and look upon other Muslims as their Ikhwan fid Deen i.e.
607
‘brethren in Islam’.
608
What Doi calls “Islamic culture” in reality became hausanization. This pro-
cess, which was a more-or-less direct result of conversion, according to non-
Muslim Igbo assumptions, differed in its degree with individual converts and
their locations. For most Igbo Muslims in Southeast Nigeria, hausanization
manifested in the dress pattern, the style of the child-naming ceremony, Islamic
dietary prescriptions, and the interjection of a few Hausa words into common
parlance. The use of these words had so far been restricted to Muslims and is
not very common among the Igbo generally. The popular ones were Kulleh
(“seclusion”), karatu (“Qur’ran”), kafirci (“unbeliever”), makaranta (“Qur’ranic
609
school”), and musulachi (“mosque”). Most Igbo Muslims, including clerics, re-
tained the use of Chukwu (the Igbo term for God) in place of Allah in their ref-
erences to the Exalted One.
Post-conversion transformation was observed more with men than with
women, for whom many of the Muslim markers were blurred by customary
Igbo demeanor. The grooming and comportment of Igbo Muslim women
closely resembled the style of non-Muslims, so that very rarely were their reli-
gious affiliations discerned, even from their attire. The wife of a chief imam,
who was “born into Islam”, disclosed her avoidance of headscarves and other
Muslim markers in public out of consideration for her business, which she did
not want to harm by revealing her religious identity. However, she never failed
to have a scarf handy so that she was not hindered from saying her prayers at
610
the appropriate times. While emphasis was not laid on female public particip-
ation in general prayers, the situation was different for men, whose conversion

607 Doi, Islam in Nigeria, 177.

608 Hausanization here refers to the process of adopting Hausa Muslim culture by Igbo
converts to Islam.
609 These terms were picked out during interviews with Igbo Muslims.
610 Mrs. Memuna Eze, b. 1958 by Muslim parents, interview, Nsukka, March 2003.

205
become known when regularly seen walking to the mosque with Hausa and
other known Muslims.
Among Igbo Muslims found in major cities of Northern Nigeria, the degree
of hausanization varied: one group appeared completely assimilated into Hausa
culture, while the attitudes of another resembled those of their brethren in the
homeland. For those fully assimilated, their spouses were Hausa and their chil-
dren were raised as Hausa. Douglas Anthony’s study of Igbo Muslims in Kano
city shows that, in many cases, the fully hausanized had severed all links with
their non-Muslim families in the Southeast and also with the Southeast itself.
For the category with a lesser degree of hausanization, spouses were largely
Igbo, Igala, or even Hausa but their children were raised as Igbo. One reason
for the thorough hausanization by Igbo Muslims in Northern Nigeria, as found
in this study, was the need to adapt completely to the religious requirements; in
611
the minds of many Igbo Muslims, Hausa culture best typifies Islam. Another
reason, disclosed by Anthony, was the need to avoid being tainted by the hypo-
crisy of less ingenuous Igbo converts, who nominally join Islam for economic
612
reasons but recant later. Just as converts living in Northern Nigeria showed
tendencies indicative of some degree of hausanization, so also did converts
residing in Western Nigeria, although, for this group, the degree of cultural in-
fluence appeared minimal.

The benefits of conversion

In addition to the spiritual wellbeing anticipated from conversion, there were

fringe benefits that Igbo converts associated with being Muslim. Muslims in Ni-
geria have long gained a reputation for helping each other, and this, for the
most part, was the motivation for several pragmatic conversions. An early doc-
umentation of such conversions in Nigeria was Murray Last’s account of the
Maguzawa of Northern Nigeria in the 1960s and 1970s, who though practically
richer than their Muslim neighbors converted to Islam for purposes of expand-
613
ing economic interests. Conversions to Islam in Igboland have similarly been
614
associated with gaining economic and political benefits. Muslim benevolence

611 The most eloquent proponent of this view is Alhaji Musa Ani.
612 Anthony, “Islam does not belong to them,” 426-432, 436.
613 Murray Last, “Some economic aspects of conversion in Hausaland (Nigeria),” in Nehe-
miah Levtzion (ed.), Conversion to Islam (New York, 1979), 236.
614 Nathan Okeke, interview cited; and, Mr. Joe Odo, b. 1953, interview, Enugu, November
2003.

206
was helpful when converts were made: assistance rendered by older Muslims
cushioned the harsh reactions of relatives, friends, and colleagues opposed to a
new convert’s resolution; help from other believers was reportedly relied upon
during stressful moments. The first generation of Igbo converts to Islam, during
the 1930s to 1950s, spoke effusively about the benevolence of Nupe and Hausa
Muslims to them. It was widely reported at Enugu Ezike that persons who
showed interest in Islam in the 1920s found a mentor in Ibrahim Aduku, a
Muslim horse trader of Nupe origin, who took on local citizenship in the town
in the 1920s. Aduku facilitated local interest in Islam through generous provi-
sions of credit to both traders and non-traders. The fruits of his labor in terms
of outright conversion of the local people to Islam were not very significant, be-
ing limited to his wives and children and perhaps a few indigenes who became
615
converts many years after his death in 1931.
Through similar acts of patronage Sheikh Ibrahim Nwagui of Enofia, in the
Afikpo village group of Abakaliki Division, now in Ebonyi State, drew indi-
616
genes of Enofia into Islam from 1958 until his death in 1975, just as Hausa
and foreign Muslim missionaries of Saudi origin did in Mbaise, Imo State,
617
between 1970 and 1974. This latter group of Igbo Muslims, the post-civil-war
converts, enjoyed educational sponsorships that took them to foreign Muslim
countries for study. Among the earliest beneficiaries of such scholarships was
Mallam Isa Ekeji, one of the first converts to Islam in Mbaise: he was trained at
the University of Damascus in Syria. Between 1970 and 1990, converts of vary-
ing ages received scholarships to study in Saudi Arabia in particular, but also in
Egypt, Libya, and Pakistan. Such opportunities became incentives for encour-
615 Mallam Ibrahim Eze, Alhaji Idris Okonkwo Eze, Imam Hassan Omeh Musa, Mallam
Ahmed Omeje, Garba Oheme, Dauda Ojobe, interviews cited. Also, Adam Usman, c.
1953, (“born into Islam”), interview, Nsukka, May 2003; Chief Abubakar Bello, Sarkin
Hausa of Aba, interview, Aba, July 2003; and Ibrahim Agbedo, b. 1951, interview, Enu-
gu Ezike, January 2004. See, Mr. V. K. Johnson, “Intelligence report on the people of
Enugu Ezike, Nsukka Division,” File OP 1071/ONDIST 12/1/709 (October 1934), Natio-
nal Archives, Enugu.
616 Sheikh Haroun Aja, b. 1958, (“born into Islam”), islamic instructor, interview, Abakali-
ki, September 2003; Hajia Sayatu Aja, b. 1960, grand daughter of Sheikh Ibrahim Nwa-
gui and president of Young Muslim Women Association, interview, Abakaliki, Septem-
ber 2003; and Sheikh Obini Ekpe, b. 1958, lecturer, interview, Abakiliki, January 2004.
Also, Ottenberg, “A Muslim Igbo village,” 231-259.
617 Mallam Isa Ugiri, b. 1926, (converted to Islam in 1966), an imam, interview, Aboh
Mbaise, January 2006; Mr. I. Ala, b. 1941, (converted to Islam in 1975 as Mallam Usman,
recanted in 1987 and joined the Igbo religion), interview at Mbaise, February 2006; and,
Mallam Isa Ekeji, b. 1938, (converted to Islam in 1974), interview at Mbaise, February
2006.

207
aging Igbo male youths into Islam. Comparatively, far fewer female Muslims
enjoyed similar benefaction—doing so as rewards for their fathers’ conversions
—and their sponsorship was by and large for secondary education within Ni-
618
geria.
Until the 1980s, study scholarships to Saudi Arabia were for both secondary
and tertiary education. This changed in the 1990s, according to Sheikhs Idoko
and Abugu, when scholarships were given essentially for university program-
mes only, with candidates for secondary education partly or fully sponsored to
study within Nigeria, preferably in Northern Nigeria. The main subjects of
study at Islamic Universities were Islamic sciences and Islamic jurisprudence.
Comparatively few scholarship-holders gained their degrees in the pure and ap-
plied sciences; there is no record so far of any graduate from the Arts and Hu-
619
manities.
The Muslim World League (MWL), popular among Igbo Muslims as Rabita
(from Rabita al-Alam al-Islami), was cited by several interviewees as the major
sponsor of study scholarships to Igbo Muslims. It is also the organization that
trained nearly all the Sheikhs in Igboland in Saudi Arabia. These, on comple-
tion of their training, were posted back as missionaries to Igboland. The MWL
was founded by, and in, Saudi Arabia in 1962 as an agency for the spread of Is-
620
lam and the promotion of Islamic unity. It is financed by various Muslim
countries, whose membership in the organization is voluntary, but Saudi
Arabia is its acknowledged major donor. Of its eight bodies and their functions,
the two whose presence have been felt in Igboland in the past two decades are
the International Islamic Organization for Education and the International
Islamic Relief Organization.
It can be said that Rabita, through its educational and other opportunities

618 Alhaji Mutui Osuji, interview cited; also Engr. Yahaya Dutse, b. 1967, interview, Port
Harcourt, May 2009.
619 Sheikh Ekpe, Sheikh Idoko, Sheikh Aja, and Mallam Ekeji, interviews cited. Also,
Sheikh Abugu, c. 1959, (“born into Islam”), interview, Amufie, May 2003. In an inter-
view, Abubakar Shuaib, who also studied in Saudi Arabia, explained that the Saudi go-
vernment controlled what scholarship-holders study. He reports: “In Saudi, the govern-
ment does not allow scholarship-holders to study anything except religion. There are
many departments and fields under it. Because they pay them to study, they control
what they study. The government regards those they give scholarships to as missiona-
ries. After training them on a four-year course on Islamic jurisprudence, shar’ia, etc.,
they send them back to their countries as missionaries or they retain them in Saudi for
international missionary work.”(Abubakar Shuaib, b. 1988, interview, Nsukka, April
2010.)
620 Saudi Arabia Information Resource website, http://www.saudinf.com/main/k312.htm

208
for Igbo converts to Islam, has effectively promoted Islam in Igboland over the
last three decades. Igbo Muslim missionaries, trained in Saudi Arabia in partic-
ular also in other Islamic countries, have gradually taken over religious re-
sponsibility for the Igbo Muslim community from imams of Egyptian and
Pakistani nationality and their counterparts from Northern Nigeria, who to-
gether constituted the foundational Islamic clerical community in Igboland be-
fore 1990. Although many imams in Igboland are still non-Igbo, an appreciable
number of Igbo imams have emerged since the mid-1980s.
The association of Igbo Muslims, and indeed Nigerian Muslims, with Rabita
presupposes their exposure through Rabita influence to Wahhabiyyah views,
621
which has been regarded internationally as a radical form of Islam. Wahha-
biyyah was variously accused of terrorist activities in different parts of the
world. The MWL and the International Islamic Relief Organization in particular
were both mentioned in connection with financing terrorism, and this, perhaps,
might have fuelled concerns on the likely outcomes of Igbo conversions to Is-
lam, such as the possibility of the development of Islamic fundamentalism in
Igboland in such forms as the emergence of internal strictures like sharia law in
Igbo states. These concerns are quite beyond the scope of this study, given the
recent emergence of Islamic worship in Igboland and the preoccupation of Igbo
Muslims, in the last three decades, with constructing an identity for them-
selves. However, what clearly emerged during this investigation was the un-
622
popularity of sharia law with a great number of Igbo Muslims. The non-
Muslim majority in Igboland have been against any form of religious assertive-
ness in the Igbo homeland by Muslims, Igbo or non-Igbo, as one way of fore-

621 See Ousmane Kane, Muslim Modernity in Post colonial Nigeria: A Study of the Society
for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition (Leiden, 2003); P. Bascio,
Defeating Islamic Terrorism: The Wahhabi Factor (Boston, 2007), 55; D. Gold, Hatre-
d’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports a New Global Terrorism (Washington DC,
2003), 75; and, P. Lilley, Dirty Dealing: The Untold Truth about Global Money Launde-
ring, International Crime and Terrorism (London, 2003), 137. Other relevant publicati-
ons include: Islamic Supreme Council of America, “An open letter to concerned Ameri-
cans,” FrontPageMagazine.com, 11 July 2002; “The Muslim World League: Agent of
Wahhabi propagation in Europe,” TerrorismMonitor, 9 (2005); “Islamic extremism on
the rise in Nigeria,” TerrorismMonitor, 20 (2005).
622 The following interviews revealed just a few of those who are unenthusiastic about the
implementation of sharia law in Igboland: Ismaila Ngwu, b. 1971, (converted to Islam
in 1985 following a vision in which a man in turban appeared to him), a radio mecha-
nic, interview, Amaoda, September 2003; Miss Sefiyat Abdullahi, b. 1977, assistant di-
rector of an Islamic nursery school, interview, Nsukka, September 2003; Mr. Inusa, in-
terview, Alor Agu, October 2003; and, Alhaji Sani Ibrahim, interview cited.

209
stalling the imposition of any strong Islamic influence on the homeland. Mus-
lim converts, therefore, are in many communities excluded from local politics
and disqualified from holding chieftaincy titles. Awudu Munagoro says:

It is assumed that I am a member of the Nnewi Community Union

because every adult male indigene must belong to it. In the real sense
I am not a member because they will never allow me to speak during
meetings and if they give me a chance to speak, my words will not be
accepted. They regard me as an Hausa man because of my religion yet
I know that in the Nnewi Community Union, everybody is not
Christian. Some belong to the Igbo religion. They will allow them to
623
speak and their words will be accepted.

Jamir Abdukareem, who became a Muslim in Western Nigeria before the age of
sixteen and who displays Yoruba Muslim cultural influence, stated: “We do not
keep our heads high like those in western Nigeria. We try to keep our heads
624
low and avoid whatever might generate conflict.” Indeed, Igbo and foreign
Muslim missionaries in Igboland regard the Igbo environment as hostile to
Islam and the people themselves resistant to its ideology. This unresponsive-
ness appears to affect Igbo Muslims, if we accept the view expressed here:

One notices a loss of courage in this society, manifested most strongly

in the failure of Igbo Muslims to individually and collectively face up
to the challenge of being Muslim which otherwise consists in absolute
and unconditional loyalty and submission to Allah, obedience to and
execution of his law, the recognition of the supremacy of the Qur’an
and Sunnah, the propagation of his message and opposition to any
doctrine, philosophy or system that contradicts it, and being ready for
the defense of Islam. Today, Muslims no longer talk of themselves as
Muslims for fear that unbelievers might be angry with them. They
prefer to be identified with the democrats, mixed economists, socia-
lists, Marxists, humanists, and so on, all in the attempt to obscure
their Muslim identity. This is the limit of cowardice: when one can no
625
longer say ‘I am’!

Sheikh Idris Al Hassan, the Ghanaian Muslim missionary in Igboland, ex-

623 Audu Munagoro, b. 1946, interview, Nnewi, March 2006.

624 Alfa Jamir Abdukareem, b. 1970, (converted to Islam in 1986), interview, Aba, Septem-
ber 2003.
625 Sheikh Idoko, interview cited.

210
pressed optimism for future success in Muslim missionary endeavors in Igbo-
land. He was one of those who identified financial constraints as an important
deterrent to launching a strategic and successful missionary campaign in Igbo-
land. In the meantime, he gave the following assessment of the Igbo after
twenty three years (1979–2003) of missionary work among them:

I have not seen the Igbo hostile, but to the religion. What I can tell
you is that they are ignorant of Islam and, naturally, whatever one is
ignorant of he fears it or hates it… If you think that the Igbo would
want to come to Islam en masse, it is not going to be by mere
preaching and preaching alone. Not preaching in this limited form we
are doing… You know your people… If a man does not believe, no
626
matter what you do, he sticks to what he does…

Another factor affecting Igbo responsiveness to Islam is the confusion from

recent incidents of religious conflicts in the country. With the introduction of
sharia law in Northern Nigeria from 2000 and efforts to implement same,
attacks were launched on non-Muslims residing in the sharia states. The out-
come in Igboland was the intensification of the connection drawn between
Islam and violence. The Enugu State Muslim Public Relations officer articulated
the Igbo stand on these incidents as follows:

The Igbo believe that if one joins Islam, he would be killed. If he is not
killed, he would be made a killer. The Igbo man does not want to be a
627
killer and he does not want to be killed.

Responses to conversions to Islam

Humphrey Fisher wrote that conversion “was sometimes, perhaps often, a diffi-
628
cult step, likely to arouse scorn in traditional society”. He offered the example
of the Galla, who ridiculed Muslims as “women water-carriers, back-rinsers,
crying to prayer like monkeys”, and the Bambara, who likened “the Muslim at
prayer to a donkey grazing”. Igbo Muslims have found themselves in same situ-
ation. Reactions to conversions to Islam in Igboland have, in general, rarely
been pleasant, attracting much ridicule. The common tendency leans towards
disappointment with, and denunciation of, the convert. If Igbo society were di-

626 Sheikh Al Hassan, interview cited.

627 Alhaji Mutui Osuji, interview cited.
628 Fisher, “Conversion reconsidered,” 32.

211
vided roughly into two, at one end (and in the majority), would be found those
who are negative about Islam, while, at the other end, would stand those who
appear not too upset by Islam and who rather admire the religion and the com-
629
mitment of its members. This second category includes within its ranks indi-
viduals who have had relatively close interaction with Muslims, either in
630
Northern or Western Nigeria or elsewhere. They are rarely incensed over
Igbo conversions to Islam.
For that majority that treats conversion to Islam with displeasure, their con-
cerns broadly rest on these points: The first is the fear, which is still current,
that conversion would mark the gradual fulfillment of the nineteenth century
Fulani jihad strategy of thrusting south until non-Islamic communities located
well beyond the southern limits of the Sokoto Caliphate were brought within
the sphere of Islam. Johnson described this strategy as an attempt “to dip the
631
Qur’an into the sea”, a phrase that has stuck since colonial times. A second
reason derives from the lingering bitterness over the atrocities meted out to the
632
Igbo during the Nigeria–Biafra war by Hausa soldiers of the Nigerian army.
629 Those who expressed clear admiration for Islam in Igboland were few, but positive opi-
nions included: interview with Mr. Vincent Okezie, c. 1936, a retired teacher, Ezinifite,
February 2006; and, Mr. J. Igwe, b. 1969, a banker, Port Harcourt, October 2003. Mr.
Igwe observed: “Islam is good but the only area I do not agree with them is that they
like fighting and shedding blood unnecessarily and believe it is not evil.”
630 One such person is Nathan. Okeke, known among his friends as “Alhaji”, who lived for
many years in Northern Nigeria and had Muslims among his business associates.
When the current principal of the Islamic primary school, Enugu, contemplated taking
up employment with the Islamic Centre some years back, it was Mr. Okeke that she re-
quested to speak with and convince her husband that taking up appointment with an
Islamic establishment was not synonymous with conversion to Islam and therefore not
a threat to her faith. Mrs. C. Okolie, b. 1963, interview, Enugu, May 2003.
631 Samuel Johnson, The History of the Yorubas from the Earliest Times to the Beginning
of the British Protectorate. (London: 1921), 288
632 For a detailed account of Igbo and Hausa relations in Northern Nigeria from 1966 on-
wards, see Douglas Anthony, Poison and Medicine: Ethnicity, Power, and Violence in
a Nigerian City, 1966 to 1986 (Oxford: James Currey, 2002). For discussions on military
brutality on the Igbo during the Nigeria-Biafra war see John Jorre, The Nigerian Civil
War (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1972); and, Dan Jacobs, The Brutality of Nations
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987). Muslims of Northern Nigeria origin and also Igbo
Muslims now try to refute claims of Hausa brutality to the Igbo during the war by in-
sisting that Christian and other non-Muslim soldiers also fought in the different units
of the Nigerian Army that overran Biafra. They argue that these other soldiers were re-
sponsible for the supposed atrocities against the Igbo and not the Hausa. They add,
also, that the Head of State who prosecuted the war against Biafra was a Christian. Pu-
blished accounts on the Nigeria-Biafra war by foreign and Nigerian authors show that
there is indeed some truth in Igbo claims of Hausa brutality during the civil war. Ho-

212
The third is the resentment arising from the possibility of Igboland losing its
633
long held stand as a non-Muslim territory and its image as a land of “almost
634
total Christianity”, as Ottenberg describes it. The fourth point is the per-
ceived marriage of convenience between Islam and violence. This association
was worsened by upsurge of militant Islam globally and in the country since
635
the 1970s. The recent resurgence of Muslim militancy in Nigeria from 2000
manifested in the accelerated incidents of Muslim attacks on Christians, which
eventually provoked counter-attacks from Christians. This supposed Muslim
flair for violence was contrasted with Igbo aversion to the shedding of blood.
Many Igbo are alarmed that conversion would predispose their members in Is-
636
lam to violence thereby ending the Igbo historical aversion to bloodshed.
Lastly, there is a worry that religious balkanization, a possible consequence of
conversions to Islam, endangers Igbo interests and survival and might bring
about the eclipse of Igbo culture by the imposition of Hausa norms. Added to
this are the hard feelings for certain Hausa Muslim values, such as a traditional
system perceived by many Igbo as unsupportive of economic and social innova-
tion encouraging self affirmation, individualization, and democratic decision
making, all of which are regarded as key features of Igbo ethnic identity.
An Igbo position on the first three points was articulated in 1969, during the
Nigeria-Biafra war, by Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, Biafra’s mili-
tary leader, who described the conflict between Nigeria and Biafra as a war
against Muslim expansionism in Nigeria. Much of the religious aggression and
official proselytization of the late Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, a
descendant of Uthman dan Fodio, and the first Nigerian political head of the
Northern Region until January 1966, was construed by the Igbo to be geared to-
wards accomplishing the nineteenth-century jihad strategy of conquering non-
Muslim lands south of the Sokoto Caliphate. The Igbo in particular, but also
other non-Muslim groups of North Central Nigeria, commonly held that the

wever, we must not lose sight of the fact that wars are not civilized events and there is
no gentleman in a battlefield.
633 Dmitri van den Bersselaar, In Search of Igbo Identity: Language, Culture and politics
in Nigeria, 1900-1966 (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 1998).
634 Simon Ottenberg, “Reflections on Igbo Culture and Society,” unpublished manuscript
(2006), 11.
635 Kane, Muslim Modernity, 92-100.
636 Chief F. A. Ibe, b. 1941, interview, Mbano, October 2003; Chief P. E. Nwainyinya, b.
1951, interview, Abakaliki, October 2003; and, Mr. J. C. Igwe, b. 1969, interview, Port
Harcourt, October 2003.

213
 637
Sardauna was determined to ensure the conquest of Nigeria under Islam. The
result was Colonel Ojukwu’s accusation that the Sardauna tried “by political
and economic blackmail and terrorism, to convert Biafrans settled in northern
Nigeria to Islam,” in the hope “that these Biafrans of dispersion would then
carry Islam to Biafra, and by so doing give the religion political control in the
638
area.” To forestall the accomplishment of this plan in Igboland, state-sponsor-
ed persecutions were unleashed against Igbo Muslims during the war. The
traumatized group, found mostly in Nsukka and Abakaliki Divisions, were
forced to flee Igboland until these areas were brought under the control of the
639
Nigerian army and the safety of Igbo Muslims was guaranteed. Thirty-nine
years after the war, Alhaji Omar Farouk considers it a success for Islam that
there are now indigenous Muslims in Southeast Nigeria, including Rivers State,
the southernmost part of Nigeria. He regards this development as the fulfilment
of the jihad prophecy that the Qur’an would be dipped into the sea and, for
640
him, the sea referred to is the Atlantic Ocean.
In addition, there is a widespread sense that Igbo culture is not aggressive-
ness. There are many popular remarks that the Igbo tradition and worldview
abhor the shedding of blood with which Hausa Muslims have been associated.
Persons who object to Igbo conversions to Islam on the grounds of assimilation
of Hausa Islamic culture are concerned that the sacredness of blood would be
compromised by Igbo converts. They enjoy the support of those who do not

637 The Sardauna was not the first to propose an Islamic conquest of Nigeria. During a de-
bate over Nigerian independence in the Legislative Council in 194, Tafawa Balewa re-
marked: “We [the north] shall demand our rights when the time is ripe. We do not
want Independence and we shall fight for it if necessary, but I should like to make it
clear to you that if the British quitted Nigeria now at this stage the Northern People
would continue their uninterrupted conquest to the sea.” In 1959, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello
described Nigeria (including Western Nigeria) as his grandfather’s old empire over
which he would appoint his lieutenants to rule. (Obarogie Ohonbamu, The Psychology
of the Nigerian Revolution (Ilfracombe: Arthur H. Stockwell, 1969), 125-26.)
638 The Ahiara Declaration: The Principles of the Biafran Revolution (Umuahia, 1969).
639 Interviews with Dauda Ojobe, Mallam Omeje, Imam Ibrahim Eze, Sheikh Aja, and Al-
haji Mutui Osuji. Ojobe, Eze, and Mutui all fought on the Biafran side. Eze was the
only known Muslim Igbo who fought for Biafra, although he relinquished his Muslim
names for that purpose. Ojobe was involved in the state persecution of Muslim indige-
nes. Mallam Omeje was severally arrested by the Biafran authorities and, with many
other Muslims of Nsukka Division, came under pressure to recant.
640 Alhaji Omar Farouk, b. 1949, (converted to Islam in 1989), Secretary General of Rivers
State Islamic Council, interview, Port Harcourt, May 2009.

214
 641
wish to relinguish their members to another ethnic group. Adamu and An-
thony both outline the high assimilation tendencies of the Hausa ethnic group.
Anthony, in particular, reports on three Igbo men who, after conversion to Is-
642
lam, acquired Hausa ethnic identities, relinquishing their Igbo identities. The
fear of such loss for Igbo communities is a major factor in their to Igbo conver-
sions to Islam. Remarks suggestive of this loss are commonly heard and are re-
sponsible for converts being addressed as onye Hausa (“Hausa man”) or nwa-
nyi Hausa (“Hausa woman”), implying that the convert is no longer an Igbo
but a Hausa. It was in an attempt to forestall these losses (as some construed
them) that a community in Igboeze excommunicated a convert in the anticipa-
tion that he would repudiate his faith. The importance of such measures lies in
the social and economic benefits of belonging to a specific ethnic group. In
mounting such pressure, community leaders understood the unlikelihood that
all converts would easily and simultaneously accept rejection from their famil-
ies and from the entire community. One excommunicated convert worked
through his extended family to win his acceptance back into his community but
only succeeded after he agreed to the conditions set by the community leaders,
which were communicated by their chief: that he would retain his Igbo names
and every marker of his Igbo identity and ensure that his children did same;
that he would take part in shared communal activities as an indication of his
involvement in the community; and, lastly, that he would make certain that his
643
children mixed freely with other children of their age in the community.
The Igbo Muslim community is aware of the backlash caused by the series
of riots on non-Muslims in Northern Nigeria between 2000 and 2006, which in
turn provoked retaliatory killings of Hausa settlers in Igboland by the Igbo.
Mallam Ibrahim Eze, a chief imam, lamented the disrepute Islam and Muslims
were brought to by the riots and the hostility from Igbo non-Muslims and re-
marked, “Now Igbo parents regard their sons who want to join Islam as going
to participate in the many crises for which Hausa Muslims were famous and so
644
they try to prevent them from shedding blood.” A strongly worded denunci-
ation of Islam by a young Igbo man, which touched on some of the factors
causing resentment to conversions to Islam in Igboland, demonstrates the out-
look of this class to Islam and its progress in Igboland:

641 Mahdi Adamu, The Hausa Factor in West African History (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello Uni-
versity Press, 1978).
642 Anthony, “Islam does not belong to them,” 426-432.
643 S. Nwabueze, b. 1955, interview, Ukpani, February 2006.
644 Mallam Ibrahim Eze, interview cited.

215
 It was for the lust of knowing what should not be known that man
made this mucky journey into religion…. Taking into consideration
the recent events in Nigeria … one could see the irony of Islam.
Muslims preach peace and propagate war, terrorism, destruction, con-
fusion, and riot. They preach unity and love but regard non-Muslims
as infidels whose necks should be broken. They preach intolerance
where they are in the majority but tolerance where they are in the
minority… About seventy five per cent of riots in Nigeria are caused
645
by Muslims. Islamic religion promotes anarchy.

The thrust of the above remark has been voiced by other observers with respect
to Nigeria, and other parts of Africa. Clark and Linden record in 1984 Muslims’
wide-range interactions with African traditional belief systems and practices:
an interaction that heightened in areas, and during times when, Muslims con-
stituted a minority. At such times, their numerical disadvantage propelled them
toward the view that different forms of primordial religion could exist side-by-
646
side them in the same society. That tendency was the prototype of the “toler-
ance-preaching” expressed by the interviewee above. Another study shows
same pattern. Ali Bhati Juma writes:

Muslims in Sub-Saharan Africa, like most Muslims around the world,

exhibit an “us versus them” mentality. When Muslims form a minor-
ity, they have tended to coexist peacefully with other religions, but
where their populations are substantial (as in Nigeria), they tend to
assert themselves. Whatever ethnic and other divisions are at stake,
the “us versus them” sentiment has played a large role in fermenting
647
religious conflict in Nigeria.

It is not unusual to find a good number of Igbo to whom conversion to Islam

was tantamount to betrayal of, and disloyalty to, their ethnic group. Family
members, colleagues, acquaintances, and friends reportedly use subtle and not-
so-subtle means to express displeasure to conversions to Islam. Deriving from
the basic premises outlined, Igbo aversion to Islam that became public during
the Nigeria-Biafra war continued afterwards, frequently coming to the fore
each time a member of the group became Muslim. Children of Muslim converts

645 Mr. C. Ogbodo, b. 1971, interview, Nkanu, September 2003.

646 P. B. Clarke and Ian Linden, Islam in Modern Nigeria (Mainz: Grunewald, 1984).
647 Ali Bhati Juma, “African Muslims in the Islamic World,” The Journal of Turkish Week-
ly, December 2006. http://www.isro.org.uk

216
were not spared public antagonism for the conversion of their parents and, of
course, their own. The principal of the Islamic primary school at Enugu con-
cluded that children suffered more public antagonism than their parents, sup-
porting this by saying: “When they appear at bus stops other commuters ad-
648
dress them rudely, saying ‘Hausa children, go away!’ In 2003, the city of
Enugu had a projected Igbo Muslim population of roughly less than a thou-
sand, scattered amid a population of about a million inhabitants. There, as in
other parts of Igboland, Muslim converts, who are in the minority, were easily
identified, making them easy targets of public disapproval.
Public antagonism may heighten with each convert gained by Islam, even
when the immediate family of the convert was not bothered by the conversion.
Ironically, in the interesting case of the conversion of a lawyer about a decade
ago, his Muslim relatives were displeased with the conversion on the grounds
that it was a career-motivated act that was not borne out of sincere religious
quest. In this instance, the bone of contention among his Muslim relatives
649
centered on the genuineness of the conversion. Thus, the convert found him-
self in a strait betwixt his Muslim relations, mostly members of his extended
family, and his non-Muslim family members. Both sides had issues with his
conversion.
Igbo converts to Islam tell of unpleasant episodes that attended their con-
version experience. Ottenberg documented the reaction in the village of Enohia
in Afikpo Division over the conversion to Islam in 1958 of Chief Isu Egwu:

He was then fined by the senior Afikpo age grades, and was more or
less ostracized by other leaders, although he was an influential man
and was associated with the progressive and schooled persons in the
village-group. After some time he withdrew from Islam and paid his
£5 fine, but he never regained the stature in Afikpo he had held prior
650
to his conversion, and was much ridiculed for his action.

One other Enohia convert, a well-known wrestler, lost his wives after becom-
ing Muslim: the women simply refused to remain with him. The Igbo Assistant
District officer at Afikpo Division, from Orlu in central Igboland, “was sur-
prised that any Igbo would wish to convert to Islam, and he did not feel that

648 Mrs. C. Okolie, interview cited.

649 Mrs. Asmau Shittu, b. 1969, (“born into Islam”), interview, Nsukka, May 2003; and,
Adam Usman, interview cited.
650 Simon Ottenberg, “A Moslem Igbo Village,” Cahiers D’Etudes Africaines, Vol. XI (42)
1971, 240-245.

217
those who wanted to really understood the implications of what they were do-
651
ing.” Below is Alhaji Mutui’s story of his conversion experience in 1982:

When one embraces Islam he faces persecution from relatives. In my

own case my wife was against my conversion because we were very
good Christians. She did not see why we should abandon Christianity.
Later she converted but after a while she saw that she could not do
those things she did as a Christian… The worst were the daily prayers
and all the hard dos and don’ts. Living a Muslim life is full of dos and
don’ts and commitment to the practice of Islam. She couldn’t cope.
She left the family in 1986 and went back to Christianity…
My other relations also kicked against my conversion. Up till now
they are not comfortable with my being a Muslim. But, it is my faith;
it belongs to me, I cannot compromise it for anything! When in the
course of prayer we say “Allahu Akbar,” meaning “God is great,”
652
people make mockery of us. They call us ndi alakuba.

Two more uncorroborated stories were given as indications of public opposition

to conversions. In the first, the issue at stake was the broadcasting in the 1980s
of a Muslim religious programme by the National Television Authority in
Enugu, the major Igbo city:

Christians had Christian-half-hour so I thought of hosting a similar

programme for Islam. My application to the Nigerian Television Au-
thority for permission was denied. I went to the head office in Lagos
and applied. After a series of petitions, I was directed to the person in
charge of the religious unit. He was a Reverend Father who knew me
as a Christian… He was annoyed with me… He felt I was going to
preach against Christianity and refused my request to host the pro-
gramme. I continued mounting pressure until he asked me to put in an
application and I did…They prepared a set of guidelines that I should
not mention Jesus Christ and that I should not abuse other religions. I

651 Ibid.
652 Alhaji Mutui Osuji, b. 1936, (converted to Islam in 1982), public relations officer of the
Islamic Center in Enugu, interview, May 2003. Alhaji’s story appears well known to
persons close to him. I heard aspects of it in separate interviews with his son and two
of his acquaintances. Alakuba is an onomatopoeic term. Literally, it means “to be bea-
ten up by the ground.” It is, however, used in reference to the Muslim prayer pattern of
touching their foreheads on the floor, which the Igbo ridicule, describing them as peo-
ple who “hit the head on the ground.”

218
 went by that agreement and they aired the programme… The pro-
gramme ran from 1983 until 2000. Sometimes, mid-way though the re-
cording, it would be stopped in anger to a comment made about Jesus
Christ and I would be told to present my religion and not compare
Christianity with Islam…Educated Muslims were shy to appear on the
screen in that programme. Those who did and went back to their of-
653
fices were ridiculed by their colleagues…

Meanwhile, Harun Eze, a twenty-seven year old undergraduate from Enugu

Ezike, narrated this story:

Contrary to what people say, Islam is a religion of peace… But with

respect to my community, I would say that Islam has had a divisive
impact… The constitution of the country accords the right of freedom
of religion to you and me but in my community Muslims are margin-
alized. People treat us like outcasts. They despise us and deprive us of
what is rightfully ours. For instance, the University of Nigeria is one
of the best universities … but I was denied admission there even when
the University is located at my backyard and this was because I am a
Muslim. Islam also created a huge barrier in my relationship with
654
people.

The extent to which Harun’s claim was true is unknown. There have been a
growing number of Muslim students in the University of Nigeria since its in-
ception in 1960. In recognition of its Muslim population, the University has a
mosque within its premises, which serves its Muslim members as well as other
Muslims from the surrounding villages, and also a resident chief imam. An Igbo
Muslim student, Okpani Oko from Enohia, participated actively in this study as
a research assistant. It is questionable that admission into the University was
denied a qualified candidate on the grounds of religious affiliation, since the
same University admits Muslim students of all ethnic backgrounds.
One quality of conversion is that it brings about realignment in religious be-
lief and daily customs, and produces other changes. It necessitates a convert
leaving one religious camp for another and giving up one set of values for an-
other. The group losing naturally fights to win back what they are about to lose

653 Alhaji Mutui Osuji, interview cited.

654 Harun Eze, b. 1979, (“born into Islam”), president of the Muslim Students Society, Uni-
versity of Abuja, interview, Abuja, September 2005. At the time of interview, Mr. Ha-
run Eze was a third-year law student at the University of Abuja.

219
as, simultaneously, the group gaining does all it can to consolidate its gain. The
resulting scenario presents little opportunity for a win-win situation since one
party wins and another looses; the reactions of the losing party could be ima-
gined. Igbo converts to Islam find themselves in the centre of the pull between
their new religious family and their discarded religious family. There is no end,
except the threat of death, to the efforts of friends and relatives eager to dis-
suade the convert from his chosen course. Where parents seemed deeply antag-
onized by a child’s conversion, the often-reported action was to disown—albeit
temporarily—the convert. In Anambra State in 2006, a forty-three years old wo-
man reported this treatment from her father following her marriage to a
655
Muslim, which her family understood as a prelude to her conversion to Islam.
These attempts are not always indications of hatred for the convert but the con-
sequence of personal and group prejudice against Islam and sometimes against
the Hausa, who typify Islam and its worldview to the Igbo. Friends and rela-
tions engaged in the war of reclamation of Igbo converts more often than not
act on the assumption that their actions are necessary to save a precious one
from potential error and deviation from the truth. Few consider the convert’s
interests and choices, thus negating their right to self-determination in the all-
important matter of faith.
Among Igbo converts to Islam are persons who clearly comprehend the
basis for local resentment towards Islam and who acknowledged how difficult
it is for most Igbo to accommodate the regulations of the religion to the point of
converting. Dauda Ojobe, whose conversion occurred in 1971 observed:

Muslim ritual washing that required converts to carry kettles all the
time hindered people from becoming Muslim. Hardly would you meet
a farmer, on his return from the farm, who would agree to do ablution
—wash here and there—before eating; or who would move about with
656
kettle … even after urination when he was mandated to wash.

When matters of religious regulations are combined with memories of the Ni-
geria-Biafra war, and the consequent hausanization of Igbo converts to Islam,
reactions appear intense. Even Alhaji Mutui of Owerri told of his inability,
655 This interviewee, born in 1963, spoke on the condition of anonymity. The interview
was held in Lagos in February 2006. The interviewee, who described herself as “both a
Christian and a Muslim,” narrated the circumstances of her conversion. She converted
to Islam in 1997 when she married her second husband, a Hausa Muslim. An underly-
ing reason for the marriage was her need to gain employment with the Nigerian Cu-
stoms and she was able to do so through the influence of her Hausa Muslim husband.
656 Dauda Ojobe, interview cited.

220
soon after his conversion in 1982, to shake off his bitterness for the Hausa be-
cause of his civil war experience. He recalled:

I was a major in the Biafran army. During the campaign to liberate

Owerri I fell into a trap and was captured by Nigerian soldiers. I was
held at Owerri until the end of the war… When I embraced Islam I
could not visit army barracks. I developed a phobia for military per-
sonnel. Twice I was condemned to death during the war; twice I dug
657
my grave to be buried alive… So, why should I love them?

He overcame his fear, however, and became one of the early converts to Islam
in Enugu after the civil war. Mutui’s case shows that memories dim with time,
even though they hardly die. Generally, the Igbo exemplify this phenomenon
clearly. Thirty-nine years after the Nigeria–Biafra war, many survivors (with
different degrees of vividness of the war) continue to share their experiences
and this has not aided Islam in Igboland. The complicity in war crimes of
Muslims of different ethnic groups deployed to Southeast Nigeria to crush the
Biafra rebellion was one potent factor militating against conversions to Islam in
Igboland. It was not helped by the launching of various websites recycling civil
war stories of victimization, torture, and genocide against the Igbo by the
armed forces of the Federal Government of Nigeria, members of which were
658
drawn largely from Northern Nigeria. Alhaji Sani Ibrahim described Muslim
and non-Muslim relationships in his town as follows: “Because of the Nigeria–
Biafra war, Muslims and non-Muslims in this town have been cat and mouse
659
ever since.”
Instances of conversion-related troubles in Igboland between 1970 and 1990
not only occurred in connection with conversions from Christianity and Igbo
religion to Islam but also the other way round. Converts from Islam to Chris-
tianity narrated similar harassments and, in some cases, more serious outcomes,
being threatened with death in addition to other punishments in accord with
the Muslim concept of Murtadd, which postulates that an apostate of Islam is
660
qualified for death. Hawakwunu described her marriage to an Igbo Christian
in 1963 as “disobedience marriage,” on account of which she was disowned by

657 Alhaji Mutui Osuji, interview cited.

658 See, for example, http://www.ekwenche.org and http://www.emeagwali.com (assessed 18
November 2009)
659 Alhaji Sani Ibrahim, b. 1957, (converted to Islam in 1985 as prerequisite for marriage to
a Muslim woman), a tailor, interview, Amaji, September 2003.
660 The Encyclopedia of Islam CD ROM Edition (Leiden, 2004).

221
 661
her family. A young male Muslim convert to Christianity said of his conver-
sion in 1990: “The reactions from my relatives and friends were harsh. I was
662
boycotted, denied, disowned, and despised.” Quite a number of converts felt
intense pressure from those around them not favorably disposed to their reli-
gious switch. Mallam Ibeh, who became a Muslim in 1996, falls within this cat-
egory. He narrated how strongly tempted he was to renounce Islam:

Each time I thought about how people treated me in this community, I

felt like going back to the church. And each time I remembered my
previous life of affluence, the friends I lost by becoming a Muslim, and
many other things, I felt like renouncing my faith. The worst chal-
lenge was from my family… They want me to renounce my faith and
663
go back to the Church and to my business…

Reactions to conversions from outside Igboland

There have been scepticisms from outside Igboland on the conversion of the
Igbo to Islam. Muslims of other ethnic groups applaud the development and ex-
press hope that the hold of Christianity and indigenous culture on Igboland
will eventually weaken in favor of Islam. The strong attachment to Christianity
has considerably caused concern about the probable success of Islam in Igbo-
land with much grumblings that Islam is not growing as expected in the seven
decades (since the 1930s) that indigenous Muslims started emerging in Igbo-
664
land. One interviewee from Plateau State in North Central Nigeria expressed
the opinion that Igbo society is resistant to change particularly religious
665
change. But it would rather seem that contestations over religion and indi-

661 Mrs. Hawakwunu Okoroafor, interview cited.

662 Mr. John Ade, b. 1971, interview, Ijebu Ode, October 2003.
663 Mallam Mohammed Ibeh, b. 1959, (converted to Islam in 1996), mosque keeper, inter-
view, Nguru, Mbaise, January 2006.
664 “How I see Islam in the East,” Al-Huda Magazine, (May 2005), 12.
665 Abubakar Sadiq, b. 1967, interview, Jos, August 2003. Simon Ottenberg holds a contra-
ry opinion about the Igbo and change. For him, the Igbo “are very willing to change, to
adopt new situations, being an enterprising people”: Simon Ottenberg, “Thoughts on Is-
lam in Southeastern Nigeria,” keynote lecture presented at the International Confe-
rence and Humboldt Kolleg on Islam in Nigeria’s Eastern Region and the Lake Chad
Basin, September 2010. Ottenberg’s view on the Igbo attitude to change is fully discus-
sed in “Ibo receptivity to change,” in William R. Bascom and Melville J. Herskovits
(eds.), Continuity and Change in African Cultures (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press), 129-43.

222
vidual rights to choose a religion run deeper that often envisaged, deriving its
strength from the need for ethnic survival, among other issues, in highly polar-
ized nations like Nigeria. A cautious assessment shows that Tivland and Haus-
666
aland, for example, are in the same stricture over religion as Igboland. With
respect to Hausaland opposition to religious change is consciously or uncon-
scious aligned with the common notion of the primacy of Islam over other reli-
gions. The Igbo locates their opposition in transcendental terms as well as in
socio-political factors for Igbo cosmology considers it an abomination of sorts
to abandon the traditional worship, some interviewees point out. This question
of religious change is as complicated in Igboland as in others places where the
religion of the people form part and parcel of their tradition and in effect de-
termines the tradition. Other scholars of religion have drawn similar conclu-
sions for Nnorom in denouncing Islam in Igboland as a factor that would en-
danger Igbo survival as a people lamented the failure of Christianity to become
culture in Igboland: He writes:

But even by far troubling is the state of our double religious heritage:
Traditional Igbo Religion (TIR – also known as Odinani) and Chris-
tianity. The former is gradually becoming extinct, while the latter is
yet to be fully born. Thus we are an “usuistic people,” – confused, di-
vided and caught between the primal and irresistible force of our an-
cestral faith and the young and brash attractions and promises of a
novel and universal religion [Christianity]. Christianity, the over-
whelmingly majority religion of Ndigbo, is yet to become Igbo cul-
ture. And until religion becomes culture, it cannot perform its social
667
and historic functions, especially in times of crisis.

Another concern expressed by a non-Igbo over conversions to Islam in Igbo-

land addressed the question of violence. Justus Jacob from Edo State origin de-
clared: “Calls for the conversion to Islam of the Igbo to Islam should be stopped
668
so that the Igbo do not become as violent as other Muslims. Echoing same
concern, an interviewee from Oyo State feared that Igbo conversion to Islam
will spell trouble for Nigeria. To put it in his own words: “When the Igbo begin
to join Islam Nigeria is in trouble. The Igbo are aggressive and pursue life ag-

666 Dean S. Gilliland, African Religion meets Islam: Religious Change in Northern Nigeria
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986).
667 Columba Nnorom, “Islam in Igboland: Lessons in History,” paper presented at the Con-
ference on Igbo Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, April 1-2 2003, p. 2.
668 Justus Jacob, interview, Enugu, September 2003.

223
gressively. When they adopt a cause they throw themselves completely into
669
it.” Foreign Muslim missionaries in Igboland commented on this tendency
670
and called it “the spirit of hard work and advancing a cause.” Resting on this
assumption about the Igbo, one of them expressed the hope that if a consider-
able number of Igbo become Muslim, “they will take Islam far beyond the
671
boundaries of Nigeria.” On this confidence rests their hope, he informed me.
Islam may as yet not claim huge followership in Igboland, but it is making
steady progress and conversions are taking place nonetheless. The benefits of
conversion were summed up by Rambo as including gaining some sense of ulti-
mate worth, participating in a community of faith that connects one to both a
rich past and an ordered and exciting present, and generating a vision of the fu-
672
ture that in turn mobilizes energy and inspires confidence. These qualities
would certainly make conversion a continuous human experience. The possibil-
ity, therefore, of completely blocking the conversion process in Igboland ap-
pears slim in the light of the strong forces of accelerated urbanization and glob-
al intermingling, both of which would continue to foster mobility, social het-
erogeneity, and increased interaction between people of different religions and
nationalities.

669 Dr. Oluyemi Akinloye, b. 1968, interview, Berlin, July 2008.

670 Sheikh Idris Al Hassan, interview cited.
671 Ibid.
672 Rambo, Understanding Religious Conversion, 2.

224
CHAPTER 7
MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN RELATIONS:
THE CHALLENGES OF COEXISTENCE
IN A MIXED RELIGIOUS SOCIETY

This chapter considers two important issues relevant for understanding the de-
velopment of Islam in Igboland since the 1930s: the nature of social interactions
(actions, encounters, relations) between Muslims—both migrants and indigenes
—and non-Muslims in Igboland. The second is the changing landscape at the
national level that derives from the intermingling of different groups of people
defined by their religious identity. Social interaction as used in this chapter
refers to the changing sequence of social actions between individuals or groups
who modify their actions and reactions as a response to the actions of their
interacting partner(s). In other words, they are incidents in which people attach
meaning to a situation, interpret what they think others are meaning, and
respond accordingly. The second part of this chapter will examine the confu-
sion that overwhelmed Nigeria following the implementation of shari‘a law in
twelve states of the federation between 1999 and 2000, and the impact of this on
the growth of Islam in Igboland.

Juggling for a niche in the community

One parameter for determining group integration in a mixed society is by ex-

amining the nature of the interactions of the component units in their daily en-
counters. Muslims and non-Muslims in Igboland like Muslims and non-
673
Muslims elsewhere are not monolithic communities that interact as blocs. For
well over a century the primary element defining and determining the Igbo tra-
ditional (conventional) practice was the Igbo religion, itself an important part of
that traditional practice. It is often represented with the word omenani. The
Igbo religious worldview set the precepts for interpersonal and communal rela-
tionships in pre-colonial Igbo towns and villages. It was within this structure
674
that Christianity was introduced in Igboland in 1857. Although Christianity
eventually emerged dominant in Igboland over traditionalists; Christians, non-

673 Benjamin Soares, “Introduction: Muslim-Christian Encounters in Africa,” in B. J. Soares

(ed.), Muslim-Christian Encounters in Africa (Leiden: Brill, 2006), p. 2.
674 F. K. Ekechi, Missionary Enterprise and Rivalry in Igboland 1857-1914 (London: Frank
Cass, 1971).

225
etheless, continued to borrow and retain aspects of the social and religious
675
practices of the traditionalists, with the result that the Igbo omenani along-
side the bible jointly became the determinants of the worldview of Igbo Christi-
ans.
The general perception of Christian-Muslim relations in Africa suggests that
Christian and Muslim relations have been more harmonious in the continent
than elsewhere in the world. This success story, according to Lissi Rasmussen,
derives its weight from the fact that many African families are multi-religious
and that Muslims and non-Muslims remain strongly committed to their ethnic
676
identities despite religious differences. Lamin Sanneh, on his part, saw this
harmony, and further possibilities of it in the future, as arising from the influ-
ence of the African culture on these religious groups and on their relations. He
remarks:

The fact is that Christian and Muslim Africa is for the most part enfol-
ded within the larger setting of the old Africa, with its deep-rooted
hospitality, tolerance, and generosity and it would be surprising if
nothing of that admirable heritage did not survive in the new reli-
677
gions.

There is very little evidence of acceptance of the convert or his integration into
the society. Rasmussen and Sanneh’s thesis is not as yet true of the Igbo experi-
ence perhaps because Islam is still in its emerging state in this part of Africa.
Nevertheless Muslims in Igboland are optimistic that such a situation as de-
scribed by Rasmussen will emerge by the time Islam would have gained a cor-
responding foothold, like Christianity, in Igboland. Al-Hassan stated it clearly:

As my sister you go to church but I am a Muslim. There is no amount

of pressure that will make me to plot against you. ... Secondly, if at all
the Igbo will not embrace Islam en masse, they will build understand-

675 See, Elizabeth Isichei, “Seven Varieties of Ambiguity: Some patterns of Igbo Response
to Christian Mission,” Journal of Religion in Africa 3 (1970), and, A History of Chris-
tianity in Africa: From Antiquity to the Present (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World
Press, 1995); Dmitri van den Bersselaar, In search of Igbo Identity: Language, Culture
and Politics in Nigeria, 1900-1966 (Leiden: Leiden University, 1998), and Desmond For-
ristal, The Second Burial of Bishop Shanahan (Dublin: VERITAS Publications, 1990).
676 Lissi Rasmussen, Christian-Muslim Relations in Africa (London: British Academic
Press, 1993), p. 1.
677 Lamin Sanneh, Peity and Power: Muslims and Christians in West Africa (New York:
Orbis Books, 1996), pp. 23-24.

226
 ing, build tolerance, and that peaceful coexistence we are talking
678
about will come.

The Igbo experience from the 1980s onwards shows that there were moments
of cooperation among members of these three religious communities wherever
they co-existed and there were also times of dissonance. Both situations emerge
in various instances of intermingling that occurred at different socio-political
levels in different communities. To help with this examination, the organiza-
tional structure of the Igbo will be sketched using the works of Ekechi and
679
Harneit-Seivers. Igbo society has various hierarchical levels of social and
political organization that become relevant in different circumstances from both
the individual’s perspective and in terms of socio-political organization, and
which can be grouped according to their functions. The diversity and termino-
logical inconsistencies observed from one part of Igboland to the other some-
times makes classification attempts beyond the level of the compound or family
(ezi or ama—the basic socio-political unit that constitutes a clearly identifiable
residential unit) a little confusing for some. At the family level the oldest male
exercises authority on the basis of his position as the intermediary between the
family and the ancestors. Basically, several families linked by relatively close
kinship relationships form a village sub-section called a “quarter” or “ward” or
a “kindred.” The ward comprises of about a few hundred people, forming the
680
primary and vital group “for the ordinary affairs of everyday life.” Each of
these semi-autonomous villages has its own assembly or council whose mem-
bers are family heads (elders, called oha in vernacular). Every member of the
ward, including women and children, can attend the ward’s meeting and air
681
their views, but generally the elders’ opinions predominated. Several wards
682
form a village (mba or obodo), which has up to a few thousand inhabitants.
683
Several villages form a village group (obodo) or town, each with a town
council that is under the coordination or leadership of town elders (oha obodo).
678 Sheikh Idris Al-Hassan, Director of the Islamic Center in Enugu, interview, May 2003.
679 F. K. Ekechi, Tradition and Transformation in Eastern Nigeria: A Sociopolitical Histo-
ry of Owerri and its Hinterland, 1902-1947 (Kent: The Kent State University Press,
1989), 142-46; Axel Harneit-Sievers, Making the Igbo ‘Town’: Local Communities and
the State in Southeastern Nigeria since the late 19th Century, Habilitationsschrift, Uni-
versität Hannover, 2001, 44.
680 G. I. Jones, “Dual Organization in Ibo Social Structure,” Africa 19 (1949), 151.
681 F. K. Ekechi, Tradition and Transformation in Eastern Nigeria, p. 143.
682 M. Echeruo, Igbo-English Dictionary (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 269.
683 The Igbo translation of “obodo” as town does not imply urban functionality, centrality,
or infrastructure. Harneit-Sievers, Making the Igbo ‘Town’, 44.

227
The village group, which today comprises of many thousand or even ten thou-
sands of people, is identified as the highest coherent unit of Igbo social and ter-
684
ritorial organization. While much of Igboland has this structure of social or-
ganization, for groups in the old Nsukka Division the highest operational level
is the village (obodo).
Most matters at the village and village group levels are addressed by their
respective councils. General meetings of all sections of the village group were
in the past infrequent and remain so presently. Despite the changes that oc-
curred in the socio-political system of the Igbo during the colonial period, espe-
cially regarding the introduction of warrant chiefs and native courts, the organ-
izational procedure outlined above has survived with few alterations. The obvi-
ous ones are the introduction of a “traditional” ruler at the level of the village
group and chiefs at the village level.
For a case study of the integration of a marginal group within the main-
stream, we will use the village of Obukpa in the old Nsukka Division. Islam
685
was introduced in Obukpa sometime between the late 1930s and 1940s. Until
2003, all members of Obukpa village, irrespective of religious persuasions, inter-
mingled in the public domain in accordance with communal arrangements de-
riving so much from the omenani, which were already in place. At the level of
the ward, members related with each other with as little friction as possible,
achieved more or less by careful avoidance of conflicts. General meetings,
which were the fora for discussing communal welfare, were open to all mem-
bers—Christians and traditionalists, and Muslims. The only departure was in
the manner of participation. Unlike the Christians and traditionalists who parti-
cipated on individual basis, Muslim participation was through a representative.
Muslim members did not directly attend general community meetings. Their
representative did so on their behalf and on the behalf of the migrant Muslim
community in the town. The precedence was set several decades earlier, at the
onset of the burgeoning migrant Muslim community, when a representative
was chosen to represent the migrant community and to act as their spokesper-
686
son in all matters involving them and their hosts. In most cases this repres-
entative was the leader of the migrant community. The present imam at

684 G. I. Jones, “Igbo Land Tenure,” Africa 19 (1949), p. 308; Harneit-Sievers, Making the
Igbo ‘Town,’ p. 44.
685 Imam Hassan Omeh Musa, b. 1937, interview, Obukpa, May 2003.
686 The same circumstance was reported by Ottenberg for Abakaliki: Ottenberg, Farmers
and Townspeople in a Changing Nigeria: Abakaliki during colonial times (Ibadan:
Spectrum Books, 2005).

228
Obukpa, an Igbo, explained the working of the general meeting and the parti-
cipation of Obukpa Muslims:

We have a representative who represents us. He is Mohammed Odo.

The former representative, now late, was an indigene of Nupe. Now,
687
Mohammed Odo represents Muslims at that meeting.

Further enquiry revealed the reason for casting of Obukpa Muslims within the
community of migrants instead of among the hosts, to which they belonged: it
was the outcome of the clientele system introduced by migrant Muslims
through whom they embraced Islam:

If you observe, you will see that many Obukpa Muslims embraced Is-
lam through Ochiaba, Mallam Shehu, and Mallam Ali. It was through
these people that they joined Islam. If a convert comes from the com-
munity to any of these persons and requested to be taught Islam—be-
cause Ochiaba already had a portion of land assigned him by the com-
munity to settle in—they usually invited their converts to remain and
live with them so that they can better learn by observation how they
practiced Islam. That was why most of those early converts moved
away from where the bulk of the community had their homes and
lived with migrants. Personally, I am from Enugu Ezike but I followed
the influence of Mohammadu Jiga Ochiaba and came here. I lived
with him and from his house attended the Qur’anic school in Ibag-
688
wa.

Mallams Ochiaba, Shehu, and Ali, all migrants from Nupe to Obukpa, who
were identified with introducing Islam in the community, had started a clien-
tele arrangement whereby their converts lived with them. Their profiles would
suggest that they were Sufi followers whose settlement served as an integrative
689
social device for converts. Encouraging their converts to live with them be-
came the strategy for integrating the converts into the wider Muslim com-
munity to facilitate a more successful transfer of knowledge about Islam and its
practices to the converts.
The migrant Muslim settlement in Obukpa expanded gradually over the
decades incorporating within it indigenous Muslim converts. Indigenes and mi-

687 Imam Hassan Omeh Musa, interview cited.

688 Ibid.
689 Sheikh Adam Idoko, b. 1958, chief imam, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, mosque, inter-
view, Nsukka, June 2003. Rasmussen, Christian-Muslim Relations in Africa, 21.

229
grants became a group distinguishable from the rest of the community and
were represented to the larger community by one of their choosing, always a
migrant. The right of representation passed on to an Igbo in 1990 when the last
migrant representative, Mohammed Ochiaba, died. Religion, while providing a
690
common sense of purpose for its members, can, as in this case, foster the
emergence of an exclusive sub-community and one that can potentially en-
gender division, if not properly managed. Historically, a normal tendency of
migrant communities deals with living apart from the main community or
forming a community within a community. This tendency was not always de-
termined by the migrants’ ethnic unity. Economic and social considerations
have, on occasion, led to such settlement patterns. Groups that have used this
system have ranged from persons belonging to a specific ethnic community to a
mixture of people of various ethnic backgrounds sharing something in common
such as economic interest, and this allows accommodation within the mini
691
community formed.
The experience of Obukpa, as a case study of the integration of a marginal
group within the mainstream, is by no means uniform to all of Igboland or
even northern Igboland as a whole. A neighboring village, Alor Agu, provides
a different picture altogether. Here, lineage and village meetings are open to all
members whose participation is determined on the basis of their association
with the lineage and village and not based on their religious identity. Alor Agu
Muslims have no need for a mediator or representative in their dealings with
the rest of the community. All members were expected to attend communal
meetings when scheduled and, until the time of this investigation, they did
692
so. In 1981, the village of Alor Agu built a town hall, the expenses of which
were borne by all. The town hall has since remained an important symbol of
communal unity in the town because of its strategic function of servicing the
annual village gatherings at which projects and issues pertinent to the village
are discussed and resolved.

690 H. O. Danmole, “Religion and Politics in Colonial Northern Nigeria: The Case of Ilorin
Emirate,” The Journal of Religious History 16 (1990), 1.
691 In the same fashion as migrants from Northern Nigeria—Hausa, Nupe, and Kakanda,
generations of Igbo migrants to other communities have lived apart from their hosts
and the point of convergence was a unity that was based on shared social circumstan-
ces. P. Ryan, “In My End is My Beginning,” in Benjamin Soares, Muslim Christian En-
counters in Africa, 197-98; Egodi Uchendu, “The growth of Anioma cities,” in Toyin
Falola and S. J. Salm (eds.), Nigerian Cities (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press,
2003), 153–82.
692 Alhaji Idris Okonkwo Eze, b. 1953, interview, Nsukka, May 2003.

230
 The preference for urban areas in Nigeria since the 1960s has been respons-
ible for the discrimination of the rural areas by various Nigerian govern-
693
ments. Consequently, as urban centers were being developed the rural areas
were ignored. After the Nigeria-Biafra war, successive governments have tried
to address the rural isolation through creation of more states in the expectation
that the new states will trigger rural development. Doubtless, state creation,
beyond the elevation of the state capital to an urban center, has not meaning-
fully reversed the neglect of the rural areas or the absence of infrastructures to
boost the living standard and economic circumstances of Nigeria’s rural popu-
lation. The outcome for the Igbo has been the recourse to, and dependence on,
town associations and regular annual village and town meetings as the vehicle
for rural development. It is at these meetings that members of a community
propose, deliberate, and decide on projects to execute that will enhance their
living conditions. Projects agreed upon are accomplished by levied contribu-
tions of all adult members. The social amenities jointly provided in Alor Agu,
by members of its component religious groups, include a primary and a second-
694
ary school, and the village borehole.
Lineage meetings in particular have served religious purposes as well. They
have provided avenues for communicating individual, or group, religious be-
liefs to members and sometimes for influencing actions or decisions along a de-
sired direction. They have therefore given room for the integration of divergent
opinions that derive from religious commitments and convictions, but this can-
not always be guaranteed. An example is this report by Ibrahim Okonkwo Eze
of a 1981 Easter lineage meeting:

I told my relations that I would not like my money to be used for any
other purpose besides what it was meant for. I mentioned specifically
using it for wine or something like that; for instance, the traditional-
ists borrowing it to meet their needs and refund later. My relations
promised that they would use the funds for what it was intended for
and nothing more. They even gave it to one of us, a Muslim, to keep
convincing us that it would not be spent on anything other than the
695
building project we contributed it for.

Conflicting views were on occasion expressed on issues brought before a vil-

693 Ousmane Kane, Muslim Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 50-51.
694 Alhaji Ibrahim Okonkwo Eze, interviewed cited.
695 Ibid. Alor Agu has a Muslim population of about a hundred persons. Although clearly
outnumbered by non-Muslims, they are still a force to be reckoned with.

231
lage meeting. These should be understood as differences in sub-group presenta-
tions. In Enugu Ezike, for instance, Muslim interviewees reported that their
696
members were not allowed to hold chieftaincy positions. There was no overt
legislation to that effect but a 1976 incident—involving the disqualification on
the grounds of age of a Muslim candidate for the local chieftaincy position, Al-
haji Saibou—was cited as evidence that such a ruling existed. Dauda Ojobe, a
member of the selection committee, confirmed the committee’s concerns over
the candidate’s religious identity and their conclusion that if selected “he would
697
impose a jihad and shari’a laws on the community.” The timing of the incid-
ent and the invocation of a shari’a threat for disqualifying the Muslim candid-
ate suggest some feelings of discomfort towards Muslim members of the com-
munity by non-Muslims. For one, the incidence preceded the constitutional de-
bate of 1977 to 1978 on the setting up of a shari‘a court of Appeal for Northern
Nigeria, the ripples of which were felt all over the country. Secondly, since the
shari‘a law pre-dated colonial rule in Northern Nigeria, there was no other lo-
gical reason for the disqualification except that the majority of the people were
uncomfortable with Islam and its formal recognition in that community.
There appears to be other reasons for the social limitations Igbo Muslims
experience in their village communities. In the case of Ibagwa, Ahmed Omeje,
one of the oldest indigenous Muslims, expressed the opinion that Muslims have
kept away from chieftaincy and other traditional positions because of the
rituals required of persons occupying such offices, which Muslims, as enjoined
by the Qur’an, are not to take part in. For him, “a Muslim will not wish to as-
sume such an office because he will not comply with the traditional require-
698
ments for the office.” This view is now refutable, for in the last three years
there have emerged two Muslim traditional rulers in Igboland, one of whom is
699
Eze Emetuma of Akabo autonomous community in Oguta, Imo State. What
is obvious is that the frequency with which Igbo Muslims occupy political posi-
tions in their communities corresponds with their numbers. Non-Muslims have
an advantage by virtue of the fact that they field far more candidates than
Muslims.
696 Mr. Adam Usman and Mrs. Asmau Shittu, interviews, Nsukka, May 2003.
697 Dauda Ojobe, b. 1928, interview, Amufie, May 2003. This incident occurred three years
prior to Dauda’s conversion to Islam.
698 Mallam Ahmed Omeje, interview cited.
699 Engr. Yahaya Dutse, President of the Association of Muslim Professionals of Rivers
State, interview, Port Harcourt, May 2009; and, His Royal Highness (Dr.) C. E. Emetu-
ma of Akabo autonomous community, interview, April 2010. The second is the traditio-
nal ruler of Obuzo Ngwa in Abia State.

232
 The existence in Oguta of a traditional ruler is unique in Igboland where it
is still not common to have Muslim traditional chiefs in charge of entire com-
munities. Notwithstanding, at the lower levels of the socio-political system
Igbo Muslims occupy positions that are hereditary. Hence the oldest man in a
ward in any of the villages in Nsukka Division will normally become the
onyishi and will represent his unit in the village council, which is headed by a
traditional ruler who coordinates all component units of that village. Such posi-
tions are only relinquished at will. In other places, namely Awgu and Mbaise,
Muslims serve as lineage secretaries and retain their membership in the tradi-
700
tional council even after their conversion to Islam.
While the Igbo in many localities admit their religious differences and en-
gage in campaigns against each other’s religions they have at the same time
built a complex network of interactions that mutually tap the benefits of each
sub-religious community. Christians make use of charms produced by Muslims
with no intention of becoming Muslim. Similarly, Muslims request prayers
701
from Christian confidants and friends during moments of intense challenges.
Muslims and Christians alike patronize non-Muslim and Muslim ritual special-
ists. This interdependence is determined by the services and special abilities
found in the various sub-religious groups and also on who needs what from the
other. When needs require very urgent attention, religious differences are ig-
702
nored and help is sought from wherever it could be found. This does not can-
cel the fact that Christian parents shield their children from influences from Is-
lam in the same way that Muslim parents do for their children from Christian-
ity. Adults regard themselves as more immune than children to new ideas, in
this case religious ideas. Two remarks suggestive of this are reproduced below.
The first was by Sheikh Al-Hassan, the Saudi-trained missionary of Ghanaian
origin, who has lived and worked in Igboland for over two decades but all this
while left his family in Kaduna in Northern Nigeria:

I do not know if you have observed the pollution the world is talking
about. The world is talking about environmental pollution. It is re-
stricted to the material aspect. They do not care for the spiritual as-
pect. Children are our responsibility. If you expose them to an envir-
onment hostile to them it will affect them negatively. It is exactly be-

700 Alhaji Musa Ani, b. 1955, interview, Enugu, May 2003, and Alhaji Isa Ugiri, b. 1926,
imam, Aboh Mbaise, interview, January 2006.
701 Mallam Ibrahim Eze, interview cited.
702 Imam Hassan Omeh Musa, interview cited.

233
 cause of this that I took pains to let my children have the better of two
coins. Again, children are products of their environment. Environ-
ments have different theories and different practices and if you are in
the minority it is challenging. Let them see believers who practice our
convictions so that when I talk to them they will understand what I
703
am talking about.

The second remark was by the Christian female principal of the Islamic school
in Enugu whose children, at the time of interview, were attending a secular
(government) school:

My children do not school here. Religion is an issue. If they come here

to study, automatically they will start from primary one to be taught
about Islam and they may forget my own religion and their religious
background. If I bring them here that means changing them automat-
704
ically to Muslims, which I am not.

Another factor affecting Muslim and non-Muslim relationships is the existence

of mutual suspicion over the intentions of the other sub-religious community
and the potential designs of the other for dominance in Igboland. Muslims,
with reason, appear more vulnerable than non-Muslims. Speaking about the es-
tablishment of the Islamic school at Enugu, the Public Relations Officer men-
tioned the careful processes taken because “we did not want Christians to capit-
705
alize on [anything] and cause small trouble for us.” Name-calling is a prom-
inent feature of the interactions of Christians and Muslims in Igboland. Mus-
lims do not question Christians’ numerical and influential advantage. Perhaps,
it may be the reason why many Muslims accidentally or intentionally expend
their energies criticizing Christianity and pointing out its flaws or supposed
theological weaknesses in relation to Islam. Take for instance this explanation
for a few conversions to Islam in parts of Igboland:

Some are tired of monotonous clapping, dancing, and noise making.

Some find out that there are too many false prophets claiming the
703 Sheikh Al-Hassan, interview cited. In a separate interview with Sheikh Adam Idoko,
chief imam of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, mosque, he expressed similar views
about his children. He reported withdrawing his children from their former schools and
enrolling them in Federal Government Colleges and special Islamic institutions where
they will be taught Islamic knowledge, which was not available in their former schools.
704 Mrs. C. Okolie, b. 1963, interview, Enugu, May 2003.
705 Alhaji Mutui Osuji, b. 1937, public relations officer, Islamic Center, Enugu, interview,
May 2003.

234
 ability to perform one miracle or the other but when you go behind
the curtain you discover that it is framed or pre-arranged… Christians
have divorced God from the scheme of things and have replaced Him
706
with Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit.

Poston cautions that attacks on Christian teachings such as the divinity, cruci-
fixion, and the resurrection of Christ may cause some persons to forsake their
beliefs, but may also serve to increase the interest of nominal Christians in the
precepts of their faith and in so doing solidify their commitment to the Christi-
707
an religion. Poston’s argument does not apply only to Christianity, but
should be extended to the Igbo religion as well. Meanwhile, Christians are also
not innocent of verbal attacks on Muslims, emphasizing in particular the Mus-
lim worship pattern of prostration and the concept of the jihad. Poston’s coun-
sel therefore is relevant to Christians as well.
The pattern of interaction that has evolved at the family level indicates clear
signs of religious diversification. Some degree of accommodation of all mem-
708
bers is also emerging. From families that were essentially traditionalists in
the early twentieth century, they progressed to a mixture of traditionalists and
Christians or purely Christians without traditionalists. Since after the Nigeria–
Biafra war, there have been mixtures as diverse as the religions found within
the specific community. The important additional element, in most cases, has
been of Muslim members. Although early converts to Islam in northern Igbo-
land had agreed with their spiritual mentors that they will not allow mixed
marriages among their members and will only permit their children to marry
persons of other faiths on the condition that the non-Muslim partner under-
709
takes to convert to Islam, quite a number of cases can be mentioned in-
volving Muslim men married to non-Muslim wives who never converted to Is-
lam. However, the number of the women clearly falls behind those who con-
verted while the preponderance of men with non-Muslim wives is found
among the very well educated. Two life stories will illustrate this development.
The first is the story of the barrister, Hamza Aduku, the grandson of Ibrahim

706 Sheikh Al-Hassan, interview cited.

707 Larry Poston, Islamic Da‘wah in the West: Muslim Missionary Activity and the Dyna-
mics of Conversion to Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 185.
708 This, again, cannot always be guaranteed. In many instances there is clear denunciati-
on of the convert. Family members begin to accommodate and tolerate a convert after
several attempts to win him back have failed.
709 Mallam Ibrahim Eze (Nsukka) and Mallam Ahmed Omeje (Ibagwa), interviews cited.

235
Aduku the mediator of Islam in Amufie, Enugu Ezike. The second is about
Dauda Ojobe, the local historian of Amufie.
Hamza had his Quranic education and his primary education simultan-
eously. Secular education took place during the day, while the Quranic school
was in the evenings. Born to Muslim parents, Hamza’s upbringing followed the
normal pattern for Muslim children. Thus, he learned to memorize the Quran
under a mallam. He never deviated, according to him, from his Muslim heritage
despite being educated from the primary to the tertiary level in secular schools
with strong Christian (Anglican) bias. In his narrative he explained how he was
only able to make sense of Christian religious practice after taking a course on
comparative religions at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London.

I started my primary school at St. Luke’s here in Amufie. My second-

ary school was at an Anglican school and my High school was at the
Methodist College, Uzuakoli. For my university studies, I went to
England. Naturally, inside me I am a Muslim so going to church—I
never understood what happened there though... When I was in Eng-
land I had to take a course at the School of Oriental Studies, which
was Comparative Religions, to give me greater depth into Christian-
ity, Islam, Hinduism, and other popular religions. It helped me under-
stand Christianity. Now that we are talking about this, from my ori-
entation, there is no difference. But during my tender years it didn’t
mean anything to me and I recall that each time what they did at St.
Luke’s was that on Monday all who did not attend church were called
out and given some cane lashes. I accepted that. The other issue was
the introduction of singing… I never liked singing and it is not part of
Muslim worship… But again there is a twist to my experience. Like I
said I have read so much on religion and, for me, even though I am
Muslim, I respect other people’s faith. My wife is a Christian, I mar-
ried her in the church and my children are baptized. On Sundays, they
710
all go to church.

Hamza Aduku is the only Muslim in his Christian-dominated family. He at-

tends church programmes with his family on special occasions while still main-
taining his Muslim identity and practicing his faith. He ended the interview
with the statement that Islam is the only religion for him and that “Christians

710 Barrister Hamza Aduku, interview, Enugu Ezike, June 2003.

236
themselves are practicing Muslims who are unaware that what they are doing
711
is Islam.”
Dauda Ojobe fulfilled a father’s wish and, at the same time, an Islamic in-
712
junction on multiple marriages. He married the full set of four women en-
joined by Islam. Two are Igbo and two are non-Igbo. One of Dauda’s non-Igbo
wives was a Christian who converted to Islam after their marriage. The two
Igbo wives remained non-Muslim, with one belonging to the Igbo religion and
the other a Christian. The Igbo religion, Christianity, and Islam have members
among the thirteen adult children of Dauda. He summarized his story by say-
ing: “I have the three religions in my home. I gained more Christians than
713
Muslims...” Using the evidence from these histories, it appears that where
Muslim fathers relinquished the right of determination of the spiritual life of
their families, their children naturally followed their mother’s religions. The
stories are also indications of the diversification of religious membership in
Igbo families.
A family of five siblings comprising of three Muslims and two Christians,
all married and with their own families, presents another interesting case of the
nature of interactions emerging among family members belonging to different
religions. The two Muslim brothers report:

We relate well but we keep telling them to join us in Islam and they
also keep telling us to join them in Christianity. But whenever there is
a need in the family we solve it together. We make our contributions
to the community as a family unit, not minding that we are Muslims
and they are Christians. For instance, if there is a burial in the family,
we can eat together if the food is one Islam accepts. If it is not, we will
not eat with them. When it is time to pray, they pray on their own
714
and we pray on our own.

Generally much of the indigenous customs in Igboland are not observed by

Igbo Muslims. Nevertheless, in the old Nsukka Division in particular, Igbo
Muslims do not isolate themselves from those practices that have some paral-
lels with their religious obligations. One of such is the burial ceremony men-
tioned in the extract above. Aspects of the Igbo burial process are unacceptable

711 Ibid.
712 Quran 4: 3. See, “Essence of Islam: Polygamy as a Social Custom,” Daily Times, 6
March 1992, p. 7.
713 Dauda Ojobe, interview cited.
714 Alhaji Idris Okonkwo Eze and Mallam Ibrahim Eze, interviews cited.

237
to Muslims in this area. The exception is the “burial feast,” which is common in
Nsukka communities whereby extended family members of the bereaved fam-
ily send cooked meals to the family in mourning. Muslim husbands in Enugu
Ezike and its surrounding area allow their wives to fulfil this obligation be-
715
cause “Islam does that, too,” remarked the imam, Mallam Ibrahim Eze.
Religious-induced tensions, which may not often be very obvious to a casu-
al onlooker, appear more noticeable in the cities than in the villages. In the lat-
ter, the various levels of communal interactions and the closeness of life
provide avenues for cooperation along a wide range of issues especially after
the initial shock of a member’s conversion has worn off. The family unit, and,
the lineage and village meetings, allow for accommodation of the marginal
member relatively more readily and quite unlike in the cities where self-ab-
sorbed lifestyles have worn thin the bonds of communal existence. Muslims’
numerical disadvantage continues to inform, as much as possible, the continu-
ation of the strategy of close cooperation very necessary for accessing immedi-
ate assistance from their religious community. This goes together with selective
withdrawal from the public space. Additionally, there is the potential for reli-
gion to engender division in a heterogeneous community by creating sub-cat-
egories that are defined on the basis of religious membership, which in some
cases complicate ethnic and other categorizations.

716
“Multiple people, multiple ignorance:”
Shari‘a implementation in Nigeria

An important issue that engaged Igbo Muslims and Christians in the last dec-
ade and which had national implications for Christian-Muslim relations was
the shari‘a law. In 2000, the state of Zamfara became the first to adopt the
shari‘a as its legal code in Northern Nigeria. Its example was emulated, shortly
after, by ten other states in Northern Nigeria. This, by implication, meant the
relegation to the background of the secular laws. Officials of these states and
the Muslim community of Nigeria have explained that the laws are specific to
Muslims but in reality there were several incidents since 2000 showing the ap-
plication of the law to non-Muslims. The outcome (the shari‘a controversy from
2000 to 2004) was the basis for a number of national and regional academic and

715 Mallam Ibrahim Eze, interview cited.

716 This statement was made during an interview with Sayeed Suleiman on the shari‘a (in-
terview at Ogrute, June 2003).

238
Fig. 21: Nigeria’s population distribution
717
non-academic conferences. It has also preoccupied the Igbo, perhaps more
than it did other ethnic groups in Nigeria. The shari‘a debate had some stra-
tegic relevance to the Igbo in their capacity as Nigeria’s dominant Christian
ethnic group. The Igbo had found themselves caught in the disturbances that
attended the adoption of the shari‘a in Northern Nigeria and had also avenged
the loss of their members in those riots.
The crises over the shari‘a in Northern Nigeria caused Christian and Mus-
lim religious communities to react to what they perceived as deviation in reli-
718
gious claims and practice. The main religious discourse in Igboland from 2000

717 A few of these events include: Conference on “The Shariah Debate and the Shaping of
Muslim and Christian Identities in Northern Nigeria,” a joint project of the University
of Jos (Nigeria) and the University of Bayreuth (Germany), Jos, 2003; Conference on
“Women’s Rights and Access to Justice under the Sharia in Northern Nigeria,” Abuja,
2003; and “Religion and Violence,” a Public Lecture held in Lagos in 2004 under the
auspices of the Muslim Rights Concern, and their Conference on “Peaceful Co-Exis-
tence in a Multi-Religious Nigeria,” University of Lagos, 2007.
718 Danny McCain, “Which Road Leads Beyond the Shari‘ah Controversy,” in Philip Osti-
en, Jamila Nasir, and Franz Kogelmann, Comparative Perspectives on Shari‘ah in Ni-
geria (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 2005), 9.

239
revolved on religion as a vehicle for social peace. Igbo Muslims emphasized
719
their claim that “Islam is peace” or “Islam is the religion of peace.” While
Christians maintained that the peace makers are the sons of God, the Conven-
tionalists (traditionalists), pointing to the Igbo omenani, warned emeruna nso
ala (do not ruin the peace of the land). Each religious community engaged in
polemics over which group was ruining the peace of the land through consist-
ent disturbance of public peace. To lay a clear foundation for the shari‘a dispute
in Nigeria, we go back to 1960.
Before Nigeria’s independence in 1960, Muslims in Northern Nigeria util-
ized the shari‘a for much of their litigations. At independence they were per-
suaded to modify the comprehensive application of the shari‘a in traditional
Muslim courts. Thus, the shari‘a was to be applied to matters related to person-
720
al law such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. There were provisions,
since independence, for cases to be heard in line with the shari‘a at the local
and regional levels. Problems began in 1967 when the regions were abolished in
order to address the challenge posed by Biafra’s secession. Muslim jurists felt
the need for a federal appeal court and suggested same to the constitutional
drafting committee in 1977. Nothing came out of it until the Zamfara State gov-
ernor presented a bill for shari‘a penal code to the state House of Assembly.
The bill was signed into law in January 2000.
The Zamfara example was followed by the remaining states of Northern Ni-
geria almost without incidence, except in Kaduna where the considerable
Christian population protested the implementation, supported by migrant
Christian communities. The clause on which the 12 northern states extended
the jurisdiction of the shari‘a code to embrace criminal matters reads: “The
Shari‘a Court of Appeal of the State shall, in addition to such other jurisdiction
as may be conferred upon it by law of the State, exercise such appellate and su-
pervisory jurisdiction in civil proceedings involving questions of Islamic per-
721
sonal law provisions of subsection (2) of this section.”

719 Sheikh Adam Idoko was very fervent in disseminating this opinion in Enugu State.
Another Muslim who publicly projected the view is Sayeed Suleiman, a trader who
identified himself as a “missionary who propagates Islam;” interview cited.
720 “Report by M. Mangin, Head of the Department of Muslim Affairs on his visit to Nige-
ria in March 1952,” ZARPROF C. 2425 18/6/52, National Archives, Kaduna.
721 Federal Republic of Nigeria, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Certain
Consequential Repeals) Decree No 63 of 1999. It is uncertain how the clause became in-
serted in the constitution but Philip Ostein provides evidence that the clause was not
put there to allow state Houses of Assembly confer any jurisdiction they pleased on
state shari‘a courts of appeal: Philip Ostien, “An Opportunity Missed by Nigeria’s

240
 From hindsight, some scholars have advanced that if the constitutional con-
cession had been granted for a Federal Shari‘a Court of Appeal, the wounds of
the past twenty years would have been avoided. I will also posit that the con-
struction of the decades of military rule as one of official Islamization of Niger-
722
ia would have been unnecessary; for, as Philip Ostein illustrates, it was dur-
ing the era of military rule that much of the lobbying by Muslims for some con-
cessions took place.
723
These unofficial debates can be traced even to the 1980s when Nigeria
progressively found itself divided along religious lines. Deep schisms began to
emerge from the first shari‘a debates at the constitutional review process of
1977-78. The schism was triggered by the proposal, from delegates from North-
ern Nigeria, for extension of aspects of the shari‘a in their part of the country. It
was soon after followed by the Maitatsine uprising, the first major religious up-
rising in the country, which started in Kano in 1980, with subsequent outbreaks
724
in Maiduguri in 1982, Yola in 1984, and Gombe in 1985. These initial troubles
evolved from intra-faith issues among different Muslim groups. The first in-
ter-faith crisis involving Muslims and Christians occurred in 1987 at the Col-
lege of Education, Kafanchan, in southern Kaduna State, over allegations that a
Muslim convert to Christianity “misquoted the Qur’an for his own evangelical
725
purposes” during a Christian outreach programme on the campus. This incid-
ent became the foundation for a series of clashes attributed to religious differ-
ences between Muslims and Christians. There is enough evidence to show that
the religion-coated disturbances in Nigeria between 1982 and 2008 that pitched
Muslims against Christians derive from a multiplicity of factors, sometimes un-
related to religion. They acquire a religious hue because the aggressors end up
falling in either of the two religious categories and subsume the original
cause(s) of conflict under this religious categorization. Meanwhile, the real
causes could be historical, political, social, and economic in nature, even though

Christians,” in Benjamin Soares, (ed.), Muslim-Christian Encounters in Africa, 250. See

also, B. Y. Ibrahim, “Application of the Shari’a penal law and Justice system in Nor-
thern Nigeria: Constitutional Issues and Implications” in Joy Ezeilo, Muhammad La-
dan, and Abiola Afolabi-Akiyode, (eds.), Shari’a Implementation in Nigeria. Issues
and Challenges on Women’s Rights and Access to Justice (Enugu: Women’s Aid Col-
lective, 2003), 128-136.
722 Philip Ostien, “An Opportunity Missed by Nigeria’s Christians,” 245-246.
723 Ramussen, Christian-Muslim Relations, 98-9.
724 Ousmane Kane, 88-9; Rasmussen, 95.
725 Ryan, “In my end is my Beginning,” 216. This incident claimed 19 lives and was re-
sponsible for the destruction of 152 churches and 5 mosques.

241
the simplifying minds attribute the tension to religion, particularly to the di-
726
verse orientations of Islamic and Christian traditions in general.
The Sultan of Sokoto, Mohammed Sa’ad Abubakar III, during a speech at
the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in November 2007, summarized the
727
causes of Muslim-Christian conflicts in Nigeria as follows:
• Growing religious activity and consciousness in Nigeria in the last two dec-
ades.
• The proliferation of mosques and churches and aggressive display of reli-
gious piety, which coincided with intense political polarization in the coun-
try
• Long-term impacts of intense religious debates such as the discourse over
Nigeria’s membership in the OIC in the mid 1980s and the shari‘a debates of
1999
728
• Rise of poverty in the northern states of Nigeria
• Youth restiveness.

According to a publication by the British Press, “Whatever the historical justi-

fications, the conflict is always and everywhere about access to scarce resour-
ces. At their root, these differences are not cultural or religious. They are eco-
729
nomic.”
Some scholars posit that incidents of unrest in Nigeria assumed an unpre-
cedented level with the return to civilian rule in 1999. Bamgbose Adele and
Amos Oloruntele link this development to the democratic nature of the govern-
730
ment in power, which stands in contrast to the military regimes that spanned
from December 1984 to May 1999, that exhibited very low tolerance for agita-
tions that disturbed the public peace. Now, with a civilian democratic govern-
ment in place, smouldering tensions found release in all kinds of ways. Ogoh
Alubo listed eighty-five major cases of civil unrest in just five years of demo-

726 Ibid., 187.

727 Alhaji Mohammed Sa’ad Abubakar III’s speech on “Muslim-Christian Relations in Ni-
geria” at the US Institute of Peace (USIP), 13 November 2007, is stored in audio form at
http://www.usip.org/events/2007/1113_nigeria.html
728 According to the Sultan, 9 of the 12 northern states have the highest incidence of po-
verty in the country and are the areas where crises are most prevalent. His figures for
state poverty levels were as follows: Jigawa State 90%, Kebbi 89%, and Bauchi 86.3%.
Yobe, and Zamfara were also mentioned as having high poverty levels.
729 “Muslims riot in northern Nigeria,” BBC NEWS, Tuesday, 11 May, 2004.
730 Bamgbose Adele and Amos Oloruntele, “Ethnic Agitation and Conflicts in Nigeria,
1999-2000,” Development Policy Management Network Bulletin XIII (3) 2001, 35-6.

242
 731
cratic rule, from May 1999 until March 2003. Much can be learnt from the so-
ciology of these conflicts. Twenty-six of the eighty-five incidents listed assum-
ed a religious coloration simply because they involved members of the two reli-
gious communities, Muslims and Christians, yet their underlying factors were
socioeconomic in origin. Of these twenty-six cases, one pitted Conventionalists
against Christians in a crisis over the annual festival of sacrifices, preparatory
to the new yam festival. Another involved rival Muslim groups, while the rest
were between Muslims and Christians. A quarter of the incidents recorded by
Alubo were recurrences of previous tensions that went unresolved, thus recur-
ring few months or even a year later. From Alubo’s list, incidents of religious
clashes in Nigeria before 2003 were, indeed, few when compared with the wide
range of conflicts that are recorded in the country thereafter. The categoriza-
tion of some of these conflicts as religious crisis was traced to their sensational-
ization as religious issues by both local and international media.
Between 2000 and 2006, incidents of unrest associated with Nigeria’s major
religious communities, having direct or indirect link with the shari‘a legislation
in Northern Nigeria, received the greatest attention, nationally and internation-
ally. It was over this issue that the major religious communities wrangled over
who practised or did not practice its religious claims. Sayeed Suleiman, a fer-
vent Igbo Muslim, identified the fundamental reason for the shari‘a outburst by
both its protagonists, Muslims, and its antagonists, Christians, as deriving from
732
ignorance. On the part of Christians, their lack of familiarity with the func-
tioning of the shari‘a was displayed in their unease over the shari‘a; while, on
the part of Muslims, in their attacks on Christians, which in itself heightened
the fears entertained by Christians over its possible application to non-Mus-
lims. Faced with Christian antagonism, the shari‘a became the reason for Mus-
lims’ defence of this religious heritage. Majority of Igbo Muslims extol the mer-
its of the shari‘a in its present state of implementation, as a formula for
Muslims to attain social discipline.
The implementation of the shari‘a in 2001 was largely the consequence of
the long history of debates and negotiations over its adoption in Northern Ni-
733
geria since the constitutional amendment of the 1970s. Thus, central to this
outburst was Muslim displeasure over years of denial of their demand for a fed-

731 Ogoh Alubo, “Citizenship and Nation Making in Nigeria: New Challenges and Contes-
tations,” Identity, Culture and Politics 5 (1&2) 2004, 135-161.
732 Sayeed Suleiman, interview cited.
733 It was also widely rumored that the shari‘a implementation was in part a protest by the
Muslim North to the Presidency of a Southerner, Olusegun Obasanjo.

243
eral shari‘a Court of Appeal proposed during the 1977-8 constitutional amend-
ment. The federal shari‘a Court of Appeal was understood by Muslims as an in-
dication of their freedom to practice their religion within a constitutional frame,
thereby upholding their identity and dignity in a secular state. Christians op-
posed it because they saw it as a move towards state recognition of a particular
religion. What many Christians were obviously unaware of was the Muslim
world-view that moral individuals are produced when social structures are in
place mandating their morality. It is on this basis that the proposal for a federal
Shari‘a court of Appeal was made as well as subsequent efforts to redress the
lapse caused by its denial.

Issues at the core of the shari‘a dispute

Two issues have emerged in the debate over shari‘a implementation in parts of
Nigeria: the political nature of the introduction of the shari‘a law and the one-
sidedness of its application. In the first, the introduction of the law was neither
through the mosques nor by Muslim religious leaders, but by politicians on the
floor of state houses of assembly. This fuelled the imagination of many Christi-
ans who thought that it was meant as an instrument through which Muslims
734
will marginalize and intimidate Christians in Muslim-dominated states. Some
Muslims also faulted the introduction on this ground, besides, also, identifying
it as a political weapon to undermine the incumbent administration. Put dir-
ectly: as an attempt to assert the north’s Islamic identity, and to provide evid-
735
ence of the failure of the state and the collapse of governance. Abubakar
Abugu, an Igbo Muslim, is among that group of Muslims who argued that the
process of implementing shari‘a law in Nigeria was not based “on the stipula-
736 737
tions in the Qur‘an.” Ibraheem Zakzaky, the leader of the Shi‘a or Muslim
Brothers, and an avowed advocate of an Islamic Republic of Nigeria, for in-

734 See the following newspaper reports on the implementation of the shari‘a in Northern
Nigeria: “Sharia must only be for Moslems,” and “Kaduna Crisis Shows Sharia Is Unpo-
pular,” Weekend Vanguard, 26 February 2000, p.7; “Our Sharia Implementation will af-
fect all parts of Kano State,” Insider Weekly, 24 November 2003, p. 27. Also, Danny Mc-
Cain, “Which Road Leads beyond the Shari‘ah Controversy,” 8.
735 Muhammad S. Umar, “Islam in Nigeria’s Political Arena during Chief Olusegun Oba-
sanjo’s Presidency (1999-2007): Assessing Continuities and Changes,” Lecture at the
Afrikakolloquium of the Institute für Asien-und Afrikawissenschaften, Humboldt-Uni-
versität zu Berlin, 10 January 2007.
736 Abubakar Abugu, b. 1974, interview, Enugu Ezike, March 2003.
737 Kane, Muslim Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria, 95-96.

244
stance, said in an interview that the conditions in Nigeria were not right for the
introduction of shari’a law because shari‘a can only be implemented by an Is-
lamic government in an Islamic state. His remarks were not well received, in-
738
stead Muslims in the opposition, called for public affirmation for it. Gener-
ally, various reports and individual expressions revealed a strong opposition in
Northern Nigeria in particular, and among Muslims, to voice any unflattering
remark about the shari‘a and its implementation. Hence, most of the responses
against the shari‘a were voiced by Christians in Southern Nigeria and North
Central Nigeria.
The second issue for contention over the shari‘a relates to the practice of
punishing the poor while the rich are immune to punishment. Observes
Saudatu Mahdi, “The personal status law as currently practiced in Nigeria
739
breach both the letter and the spirit of shari‘a.” A newspaper editorial reports
on the implementation:

Criticisms against the Sharia system of justice have been widespread.

Primarily, it is seen as a discriminatory legal system that has consist-
ently caught in its traps only the poor and turned a blind eye to the
740
misdemeanour of the rich.
741
In addition to the above, is the application of shari‘a laws to Christians, the
closure of churches, and refusal to teach Christian Religious Knowledge in pub-
742
lic schools. One scholar of Islam in Nigeria examined the implementation and
remarked:

The proponents of Sharî‘a in the north are loud in emphasising that

Sharî‘a is only for Muslims. They cannot be sincere, because it is well
known that the Sharî`a, which they propose, contains many provi-
sions discriminatory against Christians. Harassment of Christians in

738 “Human Rights and Islamic Law in Northern Nigeria,” Human Rights Watch 16 (9A),
September 2004.
739 Saudatu Shehu Mahdi, “Women’s Rights in Shariah: A Case for codification of Islamic
Personal Law in Nigeria,” Ostein et al. eds., Comparative Perspectives, 4.
740 “Sharia with human face,” The Comet, 1 February 2002, p. 13.
741 “On ‘The first Igbo Sharia victim,” Daily Champion, 18 January 2001, p. 11.
742 See Ryan, “In my end is my Beginning;” Danny McCain, “Which Road Leads beyond
the Shari‘ah Controversy,” 21; “Political Shari’a”? Human Rights and Islamic Law in
Northern Nigeria,” Human Rights Watch 16 (9A); “Analysis: Nigeria's Sharia split,”
BBC News, 7 January, 2003, and Joy Ezeilo, Muhammad Ladan, and Abiola Afolabi-A-
kiyode, (eds.), Shari’a Implementation in Nigeria. Issues and Challenges on Women’s
Rights and Access to Justice (Enugu: Women’s Aid Collective, 2003).

245
 the North has been on the increase. Christians are fully sensitized to
the danger Sharî`a poses for them, since full Sharî‘a puts them firmly
in a second-class status in society. The case of St. Dominic's Church,
Dashi, outside of Gusau, is a case in point. The governor broke into
the church and declared it an Islamic school. Under criticism from
CAN, he denied that he did so. Then the church was quietly destroyed
one night. The Zamfara government defended this action on the false
743
basis that all the people there had become Muslims.

The shari‘a implementation process in Northern Nigeria came to a head in the

744
riots in Kaduna State in 2000. Underlying the opposition by Kaduna State
Hausa Christians against the implementation of the shari‘a was an old land
squabble that became overshadowed in the shari‘a agenda. The major victims
of the Kaduna riots were Kaduna indigenous Christians and then the Igbo.
(Christians of other ethnic groups, such as the Igbo and Yoruba, became em-
broiled by their participation in a rally at the government house to protest the
proposed shari‘a law.) The Igbo lost lives but also businesses and homes. There
was a massive exodus of survivors back to Igboland, with many returnees
claiming that they will never go back to the places they left. But, after two
years, some began to return to the north. Reports by witnesses bear evidence
that Igbo migrants were equally aggressive in confronting the rioting mob in
Kaduna city in particular:

The mob ran round the town in vehicles cutting down people with
sickles, hayaka or gariyu, as if reaping a farm…Then the Igbo from

743 Joseph Kenny, “The Spread of Islam in Nigeria: A Historical Survey,” paper given at
Conference on Sharî‘a in Nigeria, Spiritan Institute of Theology, Enugu, 22-24 March
2001. The Dashi Church incident was reported in The Punch, 23 February 2001, p. 9.
744 It may be useful stating that Kaduna State had a populous non-Muslim indigene com-
munity prior to independence. Its territorial expanse before independence incorporated
significant Muslim communities. It was its position as the headquarters of the Northern
Region prior to Nigeria’s independence, and eventually the capital of North Central
State from 1967, which attracted many Muslims from the core north—from Sokoto
through Kano to Borno—most of whom settled permanently in the state upturning the
ethno-religious balance and placing Muslim Hausa almost at par with the non-Muslim
population. The northern section of the state is dominated by Hausa Muslims and Mus-
lim immigrants, while the southern part is populated largely by Kaduna Christians. A
considerable proportion of rural dwellers are strictly “Maguzawas”—non-Muslims and
members of the indigenous religions. Kaduna Christians range from militant born-a-
gain proselytizers to less militant Christians. See, Shobana Shankar, “A Fifty-Year Mus-
lim Conversion to Christianity,” in Benjamin Soares, (ed.), Muslim-Christian Encoun-
ters in Africa.

246
 town [Ahmadu Bello way] regrouped. You know the usual war song.
Wherever you are and hear “nzogbu nzogbu…” you join in … Even if
you were escaping for your life and hear that song, you stand still
knowing that your own team has come and you join them to fight.
That was how the Igbo managed to defend themselves. If not, I doubt
how many Igbo would have escaped death. Like in my own area the
rampage was such that the mob had a field day. It was around I p.m.
after the rally that we were able to assemble and fight back. We
fought the final battle when we all met around 3 p.m. That was how
we pushed them off Kano Road up to Kotangora and dominated that
area. At Nassarawa Road the Igbo coming from Junction Road sur-
745
rounded them and they were caught in the middle.

Massive looting of migrants’ businesses and homes occurred alongside the riots
in Kaduna State. Eye witnesses reported that the mob that rioted in Kaduna
State in 2000 was composed of non-Nigerians, particularly persons from Niger
Republic, and Nigerians from other states in the north. Confessions exacted
from apprehended insurgents show that rioters were remunerated, their pays
ranging from 50 naira (0.34USD) to 400 naira (2.7USD). Out-of-state rioters ar-
rived nearly three days before the rampage. However, the involvement of non-
Nigerians raised issues of border patrol and external interference in, and ex-
acerbation of, Nigeria’s internal problems as indicated in this report:

What I discovered about Nigeria’s problems, during the riots, is that

majority of those who are Muslims here in the north are actually from
Niger Republic. In every four Hausa Muslim, for instance, three are
from Niger. The real Nigerian Hausa did not fight. Many Igbo, during
that crisis, were saved by the genuine Nigerian Hausa… If I am asked,
I would say that we have no border patrol and no immigration of-
ficers. They are not protecting our borders. Right now in Kaduna a
new set of immigrants from Niger has entered the state. Gradually,
before you know it… Again, the problem of the northern Muslim is
that as long as an individual is united with them in religion and speak
their language, he is their brother and wherever they are in the major-
746
ity they take as their home…

745 Rose Nduka, interview, Kaduna, January 2006.

746 Nkiru Ezenagu, interview, Kaduna, January 2006. This sounds reminiscent of the Mai-
tatsine uprising of 1982 to 1985 in which the main actor—Alhaji Muhammad Marwa
(Maitatsine)—was a Cameroonian migrant who settled in Kano in the 1940s and even-

247
Death of Igbo Muslims in the riots

The Kaduna incident is striking for its impact on Igbo Muslim community in
Kaduna state in particular. There was no discrimination in the killings. Con-
sequently, Igbo Muslims perished alongside non-Muslim Igbo. One observer re-
ports:

The shari‘a was in two phases: I and II. During phase I Muslims did
not touch Igbo Muslims. During phase II they killed Igbo Muslims.
747
Those killed were killed in their houses…

Igbo Muslims in Igboland said little about the killing of Igbo Muslims in North-
ern Nigeria. The imam, Ibrahim Eze, and Alhaji Mutui Osuji, both felt it was a
mistake. But, Dauda Ojobe denounced it as an expression of religious arrogance
that shows that northern Muslims have little estimation for Muslims of other
748
ethnic groups because “their great grand fathers were not Muslims.”
In addition to the killing of Igbo Muslims in Kaduna, Igbo Muslims in Igbo-
land lost relatives in the rampage, some of whom were beaten to death by
Muslim rioters. Thus, the riots negatively impacted on persons it should other-
wise have protected. Non-Muslim relatives, bereaved in the riots, blamed their
Muslim relatives for their misfortune. Alhaji Mutui Osuji, had his home taken
over by relatives displaced in the Kaduna riots, who blamed him for their plight
749
at the hand of his fellow Muslims.
The impacts of the Kaduna crisis were widespread, affecting, in this order,
the state of Kaduna, inter-ethnic relations in the country, and Islamic proselyt-
ization among the Igbo. The most unfortunate legacy of the last decade is the
emergence of a pattern of revenge that has colored inter-ethnic relations in Ni-
geria. Reports of inter-ethnic clashes in one part of the country provoked repris-
als elsewhere. Christian Igbo retaliated on Hausa Muslims in Igboland because
other Hausa Muslims in Kaduna, Kano, Abuja, Maiduguri, Bauchi, and Katsina

tually became powerful, commanding a large following drawn from all social classes
including the political class. Further, mobility along Nigeria’s northern borders has
been difficult to control since colonial times. Occasionally indigenous rulers controlled
population movements into their territories but this was not always easy because of af-
final links of some Nigerian families with family groups in Niger and Chad: Kane,
Muslim Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria, 100-103, and Shobana Shankar, “A Fifty-Ye-
ar Muslim Conversion to Christianity.”
747 Nathan Okeke, interview, Kaduna, January 2006.
748 Ibrahim Eze, Alhaji Mutui Osuji, and Dauda Ojobe, interviews cited.
749 Alhaji Mutui Osuji.

248
killed Igbo Christians. Kano Muslims killed Christians including those from Ig-
boland in Kano because some Christian Tarok community in Plateau State
killed some Hausa-Fulani in Yelwa. (See the table on pages 258-59)
The indigenes of Kaduna state came out of the crisis scarred, as hurts were
not assuaged. Population displacements occurred and became linked with a
sharp segregation of population along religious lines. Christians and Muslims
moved to areas dominated by people of their own faith, with some abandoning
their original residential areas. The result was the unofficial delineation of the
city’s territory and re-definition of religious spheres of influence into Kaduna
north, for Muslims, and Kaduna south, for Christians. Sabon gari in the south
of the city remained the stronghold of non-Muslim migrant community in the
city, while Tudun Wada emerged as the stronghold of the Muslim community.
Non-Muslims began to demand for the creation of a Southern Kaduna State. A
resident of Kaduna stated as follows:

After the Sharia-induced massacres of February and May 2000, the

metropolitan city has been effectively divided into two, the River
Kaduna marking the dividing line. Christians moved away from the
Muslim-dominated northern flank of Tudun Wada, Angwa Sariki,
Angwa Sanusi, Rigasa, Mando, Kabala and Kawo, and joined their fel-
lows in the southern flank of Barnawa, Narayi, Sabo, Kakuri, where
they now constitute the overwhelming majority, forcing some of the
Muslims in the area to move-away from there. In fact some indigenes
of Kaduna are actually asking that two different towns be created
from the old Kaduna, one for Muslims, with a Muslim (Sharia) gov-
ernment, if the inhabitants so wish, and the other part for Christians,
under the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. And since a
large proportion of the entire state, south of the city of Kaduna is
Christian, many are actually asking for a Southern Kaduna State to be
750
created out of the present one.

The actual application of the shari‘a in Kaduna was momentarily stalled be-
cause of the violence, but in 2001 the state governor, Alhaji Makarfi, introduced
a modified version of the laws as a compromise for the state’s large Christian
population. He restricted the application to the Muslim quarters of Tudunwada,
Angwa Sariki, Angwa Ndosa, among others, in order to guard against any im-
position of it on Christians. This middle-of-the-road action failed to satisfy
750 Rev. Fr. George Ehusani, “Nigeria and the Challenge of Religious Fanatics.” From:
http://www.fides.org/eng/vita_chiesa/nigeria_25112002.html

249
Christian and Muslim citizens of the state. However, migrant communities, es-
pecially the Igbo, welcomed it. Igbo migrants were considerably impressed that,
those interviewed, said that they will support the governor in his next election
bid. Having been assured, by the state governor, of their safety, Igbo residents,
in 2003, determinedly declined to join in the nation-wide demonstration for the
actualization of Biafra by MASSOB—Movement for the Actualization of the
751
Sovereign State of Biafra.
There were divergent reactions to the governor’s handling of the shari‘a ri-
ots by residents of Kaduna State. Muslims and Christians saw it as a sell-out.
Muslim indigenes denounced the governor for not implementing a proper
shari‘a like other governors and nicknamed him “John Makarfi” and “Pastor
Makarfi.” For Franz Kogelman, Makarfi’s handling of the sharia and sub-
sequent ethno-religious clashes were instrumental to his re-election in 2003:

Many election analysts believe that Makarfi’s skilful handling of the

sharia crisis and other turbulence was decisive in persuading the non-
indigenous residents of Kaduna City and the Christian majority in the
south of the state to vote for him. Whereas his closest ANPP rival
promised to complete the introduction of sharia in Kaduna State,
“Makarfi promoted the implementation of a judicial reform which en-
ables the Muslims, Christians and others to be tried in law courts ac-
752
cording to either Sharia or Customary laws.”

The Kaduna crisis provided the first incidence in which the Igbo retaliated to
753
an inter-faith conflict since the first incident occurred in 1987. As news of at-
tacks on Christians filtered through the media and from displaced persons, a vi-
754
gilante organization operating in Southeast Nigeria, the Bakassi Boys, un-

751 Nkiru Ezenagu, interview cited.

752 Franz Kogelmann, “The “Sharia Factor” in Nigeria’s 2003 Elections,” in Soares, (ed.),
Muslim-Christian Encounters, 273.
753 The retaliatory killings marked a new turn in Muslim-Christian interactions in Nigeria
by setting a new trend whereby any act of violence against Christians in Northern Ni-
geria calls forth similar act of violence in Southeast Nigeria against Muslims. In 2006, it
was extensively applied in many towns in Igboland, even spreading to Asaba in Delta
State, which geographically lies west of the Niger River and in Southwest Nigeria. See:
“Crisis: Enugu govt donates relief materials,” Sunday Vanguard, 26 February 2006;
“Riots spread to Nnewi, Makurdi, govt urges calm,” and “Protests escalate in Onitsha,”
The Guardian, 23 February 2006, pp. 1-2; “Fear of Reprisal Attack Grips Asaba,” This
Day, 23 February 2006, p. 3, and “Before the Next Riot,” The Guardian, 26 February
2006, p. 33.
754 The group took its name from the disputed Bakassi peninsular, which Nigeria eventual-

250
leashed a hunt for migrant Hausa in Abia and Imo States. In Umuahia, the cap-
ital of Abia State, an Igbo Muslim was killed in the retaliation attacks. The gov-
ernments of Ebonyi, Enugu, and Rivers States, prevented the Bakassi Boys from
avenging, in their states, the death of Christians killed in Northern Nigeria. Yet,
a mob composed of local youths succeeded in entering the premises of the Is-
lamic Center in Enugu, where they attempted to burn down their mosque, and
were disbanded by a group of armed Muslim Youth Corpers in the premises of
the Islamic Center. These were joined by a mobile police team that mounted
guard in the premises for many days until the disturbances in Northern Nigeria
subsided and further threats to the Center died out. Meanwhile, the riots af-
fected attendance at the Islamic school within the Center. Student attendance
dropped dramatically as parents withdrew their children. Those who continued
attending classes had parents or guardians in the service of the Nigerian Police
755
Force and the Nigerian Army. These officers arranged for military personnel
756
to guard the school while in session.
There was no consensual support in the country for the two widespread ri-
ots in Kaduna in 2000 (and again in 2002), nor for the retaliatory killings in Ig-
boland. Both actions had supporters and critics. In Igboland, Muslim migrants
bewailed both actions; pointing out the difficult position it put them in. They
had the sympathy of mostly Igbo Muslims and some Christians. In Northern
Nigeria, leaders of the Igbo communities in Kano, Katsina, and Kaduna States
dialogued in 2000 after the shari‘a disturbances and put forward the view that
757
the Igbo had no business with local politics in their host communities.
Reactions in Igboland to the shari‘a and the crises it generated varied
widely. At one end are persons, mostly non-Muslims, who are uncompromising
in their avocations against it; and, at the other, are those whose stand is more

ly returned to Cameroun. It originated in Aba, Abia State, in response to wide scale

anti-social behaviors especially theft, but eventually extended their operations to
Anambra and Imo States. The group’s popularity first stemmed from its acclaimed non-
concern for ethnic interests. This may be considered to have changed in 2000 when it
retaliated for the killing of Igbo Christians during the shari‘a riots. Source: ACCORD/
UNHCR, “Final Report of the 8th European Country of Origin Information Seminar,”
Vienna, 28-29 June, 2002.
755 Information provided by the principal of the school, Mrs. C. Okolie, interviewed in
May 2003.
756 Alhaji Mutui Osuji.
757 Igbo Muslims in Igboland condemned, as confrontational, Christian Igbo participation
with Kaduna indigenes to protest the shari‘a in Kaduna State, and also the retaliatory
killing of “helpless Hausa Muslims” in Igboland. Sheikh Adam Idoko and Alhaji Mutui
Osuiji, interviews cited.

251
conciliatory. Igbo Muslims who mostly welcomed the shari‘a were scholars
trained in Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries. In some cases remarks on
the shari‘a were stretched to derive from, or imply, a jihad but in different con-
texts. An example is provided by Adam Usman who praised the virtues of the
shari‘a law in a lawless society, describing it as a jihad against social ills. It
does not appear that the nuances of the jihad in Muslim teachings are fully
grasped by majority of the non-Muslim Igbo because many imagine it as refer-
ring to a military struggle aimed at enforcing conversion on non-Muslims.
Within the extended meaning of the military jihad—by which Muslims both
defend their faith and avenge unacceptable treatments from persons displaying
lack of support or sympathy for their religious convictions and practices—there
were clear divergences of opinions voiced by Igbo Muslims: should there be or
not be a jihad? Is a jihad acceptable? These considerations were debated by
Igbo Muslims sometimes at formal settings at mosques and at non-formal gath-
erings. The discourse is complicated by other considerations, namely the re-
wards for killing an infidel during a jihad and for dying in the process of parti-
758
cipating in one. What became obvious is the influence of prior religious
teachings (previous Christian or Conventional associations) on these debates.
This extract from an interview with a 73-year old Muslim, which veered off to
759
the jihad, illustrates this:

Q: Now that you mentioned the civil war, and even though you were
not a Muslim then, was there anything you observed that happened to
Muslims during the civil war? How did these affect Igbo Muslims?

A: During the war the Igbo witnessed, including those from Enugu
Ezike, that those who fought us were Muslims. It made many Igbo not
to have interest in the Islamic religion. Another part of it was the
word jihad, i.e. the holy war. So many Igbo did not like the way and
manner the Hausa treated us during the war. It did not complement
Islam. It did not make the Igbo understand the religion as a true reli-
gion… I cannot believe in man’s inhumanity to man. How can some-
one be holy when he kills his neighbors? ... I have been opposing it
even in the mosque… “Thou shall not kill,” I think that is the law of
God? Anytime there is a crisis Muslims kill Christians and even Igbo

758 Ibrahim Eze, interview cited.

759 Dauda Ojobe, interview cited. (I interviewed Dauda on two issues: the introduction of
Islam in his village and Biafran handling of Muslims during the civil war. He veered
off these topics to speak extensively on Islam and jihad.)

252
 Muslims, too. This has made it difficult for Islam to grow in Igbo-
land…

The more versed in Islamic knowledge, among Igbo Muslims, elevated personal
struggles for purity over military jihads. The shari‘a-induced crises have
dimmed the prospects for the spread of Islam in Igboland, as will be shown
later, and contributed to making the jihad concept more unpopular in Igboland.
The retaliatory attacks were one aspect of the Igbo reaction to this form of so-
cial restiveness in Nigeria. A second reaction was in the form of interrogations
of Igbo Muslim religious leaders, by non-Muslim Igbo, on “why Muslims love
760
to fight or wage war,” reported an imam.
But, how far involved and aware are Igbo Muslims and Christians in Igbo-
land with national issues that divide Christians and Muslims, which consider-
ably affect Igbo Christians? Sani M. Audu, who described himself as “one of the
strongest members of the Nsukka Muslim community,” reports on the cause of
the 2001 Kano riot in an interview on causes of religious violence in Nigeria:

Religious violence is caused by misunderstanding through preaching.

Like the Kano incident where a woman dressed indecently and an
Igbo man said she resembled the wife of Prophet Mohammed. A
761
Hausa man said he was wrong and from there they started to fight.

Supposing this to be true, the “fight” became a city-wide affair that led to the
death of hundreds of people and the destruction of much property. The origin
of Audu’s account is unidentifiable, but aspects of it show that it was pieced to-
gether from a host of unrelated incidents some of which were purely fictional.
On record, however, the Kano riot of 2001 degenerated from “a peaceful an-
ti-US demonstration by local Muslims, angry at the bombing of Afghanistan.”
762
In essence Nigeria suffers not just from clashes and tensions of different ori-
gins but also from the rumor that derive from these incidents, which merely
feeds the imagination, and end up worsening the original problem. The retaliat-
ory attacks in Enugu in particular in 2001, in response to this incident, also res-
763
ulted from rumors.

760 Ibrahim Eze, interview cited.

761 S. M. Audu, b. 1966, tailor, interview, Nsukka, March 2003.
762 “Analysis: Behind Nigeria’s Violence,” BBC News, 5 May 2004. Source: http://news.bb-
c.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1630089.stm
763 Alhaji Mutui Osuji, interview, Enugu, May 2003.

253
Further insurrection and the progress of Islam in Igboland

Among the outcomes of the killing of Igbo Muslims in 2000 was the relocation
of Igbo Muslim survivors outside Kaduna State. These preferred Abuja which,
on account of its being the center of the country, is closer to the south and less
likely to be invaded by disgruntled mobs. But this assumption was proved
wrong when in November 2002 a riot broke out again in Kaduna and spread to
Abuja. In this instance, Muslims in Kaduna were protesting the hosting of the
Miss World Pageant in Abuja and this publication by a female journalist:

As the idea became a reality, it also aroused dissent from many

groups of people. The Muslims thought it was immoral to bring
ninety-two women to Nigeria and ask them to revel in vanity. What
would Mohammed think? In all honesty, he would probably have
chosen a wife from one of them. The irony is that Algeria, an Islamic
764
country, is one of the countries participating in the contest.

The Miss World 2002 riots further stretched the tension from the shari‘a (I and
II) episodes of 2000, and the Kano riots of October 2001 over the United States
bombing of Afghanistan. The severity of the Abuja mayhem earned it the title:
“Shari‘a III.” Igbo Muslim women married to Muslims of Northern Nigeria ori-
gin went into hiding, feeling as threatened as non-Muslims by this further in-
cident. (In effect, the anticipation of protection from marriages with Muslims
was not guaranteed.) Igbo Muslim men were in an ambiguous situation during
this incident, too:

The situation of Igbo Muslims in the north is such that when there is
trouble, the Igbo will hunt their fellow Igbo who had joined Islam be-
cause they suspect that they will be telling on them to favor the
Hausa. On the other hand, the Hausa will also hunt Igbo Muslims on
the same suspicion that they will side other Igbo against them. So
765
whenever there is crisis Igbo Muslims are not safe.

Southern Nigerians interpreted the implied messages from the Miss World pa-

764 Isioma Daniel, “Miss World 2002: The World at their Feet,” This Day Newspaper, 17
November 2002. For Muslims, the journalist’s remarks were out of taste. However, the
mayhem and extreme loss of lives and property by which Muslims answered that pu-
blication all belong together as irresponsible social actions. Why the riots should start
in Kaduna instead of Abuja was never satisfactorily explained, except to link it to the
outcome of rumor: Kogelmann, “The “Sharia Factor” in Nigeria’s 2003 Elections,” 273.
765 Nathan Okeke, interview cited.

254
geant in Abuja as showing that Abuja does not belong to all Nigerians equally,
and “that Abuja may not be the home of peace and security that the founders
766
thought it would be for Nigerians of all creeds and ethnic nationalities.”
Widespread opinion in the country, and from all quarters, emphasized the need
for decisive action against perpetrators of these atrocities. Such disciplinary ac-
tion was markedly unobserved in these incidents, both at the state and national
levels. The indifference of the central government to such civil disobedience
baffled many Nigerians, and gave rise to eloquent condemnations. Politicians,
in particular, were blamed for the silence because of their need to retain the
support of their constituencies in the next national elections.
The killing of Igbo Muslims in the shari‘a riots undermined the interest of
potential converts to Islam in Igboland. Alhaji Mutui Osuji summarized wide-
spread opinion toward Islam in Igboland after these occurrences: “The Igbo be-
lieves that if you join them, they would kill you. If they do not kill you they
make you a killer. The Igbo man wants to remain Christian. He does not want
767
to kill and he does not want to be killed.” The chief imam in Nsukka town
added regretfully that since after the riots “Igbo parents regard their sons who
want to join Islam as going to participate in the many crises for which Hausa
768
Muslims were famous and so they try to prevent them from shedding blood.”
From Kaduna, a former Muslim Igbo remarked:

The riots over the shari‘a worked against Muslims... When the crisis
deepened and the Igbo rallied together to fight back, the Hausa were
forced to kill some Igbo Muslims. Seeing what happened, some others
converted back to Christianity. It was the same among the Igala, some
Yoruba, and others from the Benue. That was where the riots seri-
769
ously backfired against them.

Suggestions for lasting peace in Nigeria

There were discussions since 2000 on how Christians should respond to future
insurgencies and how other constituencies—Muslims, Conventionalists, and
others—should act together to broker peace. Within the Christian community,
majority called for a tooth-for-tooth policy. Others appealed for peace and mu-

766 Rev. Fr. George Ehusani, “Nigeria and the Challenge of Religious Fanatics.”
767 Alhaji Mutui Osuji, interview cited.
768 Mallam Ibrahim Eze, interview cited.
769 Nathan Okeke, interview cited.

255
tual cooperation, with Muslims, on issues of joint interest. The tooth-for-tooth
proponents, among whom are some influential religious leaders, saw it as their
onus to stop the attacks since the federal government has failed via inaction.
Two of them, Reverend Ndu, President of the Plateau chapter of the Pentecostal
Fellowship of Nigeria (PAN) whose church was burnt, and Bishop David
Oyedepo, of Living Faith Church a.k.a Winners’ Chapel congregation, were in
favor of self-defence.
The second group of Christians who campaigned for peace with Muslims in-
cluded among them expatriate religious workers. The leading advocate of this
group is the Reverend Danny McCain. Scholars like Patrick Ryan, once a reli-
gious worker in Yorubaland, and Philip Ostein might on the strength of their
writings be categorized with this group, otherwise they have no other identifi-
able connection with the group. What these advocates share in common is the
perception that Nigeria’s unity is paramount and advantageous to its peoples
than its disunity and disintegration. Indeed Muslim-Christian conflict has been
770
an increasing worry for those concerned with Nigerian unity. In Ryan’s per-
spective the current tensions between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria derive
much of their force from the considerable misunderstanding from their very
different orientations to society and personality. Muslims seek the good society
by the enactment of a legal and political system that guarantees ethical stand-
ards; while Christians seek the good society from the improvement or develop-
771 772
ment of the individuals who make up that society. Both positions, argues
McCain, have points of convergence capable of uniting the two religious com-
munities:

Even from a radical Christian point of view, not everything about

shari‘ah is bad. In fact, shari‘ah is consistent with Christianity. For
example, both Christianity and Islam (shari‘ah) condemn drunken-
ness and immorality. Both promote strong family values. Both en-
courage compassion toward the poor and needy. Both practice prayer
770 William Miles, “Religious Pluralism in Northern Nigeria,” in N. Letzion and Randall
Pouwels (eds.), The History of Islam in Africa (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000),
219.
771 Ryan, “In my end is my Beginning,” 218.
772 In his examination of Amadou Hampâté Bâ’s ecumenical interests during his adult
years, Ralph Austen summarized Ba’s views on the differences between Islam and
Christianity: “The various religions are to understand one another from their distinct
positions rather than attempting to merge into some new common doctrine. See, Ralph
Austen, “Christianity as seen by an African Muslim intellectual: Amadou Hampâté
Bâ,” in Benjamin Soares, (ed.), Muslim-Christian Encounters in Africa, 145.

256
 and fasting. If Christians and Muslims refused to listen to the gossip
of their members and focused on the positive elements their religions
773
share, it would be easier to reconcile the areas of disagreement.

A tooth-for-a-tooth approach may be a politically acceptable strategy for deal-

774
ing with opponents but McCain argues that Christ’s teachings in the gospels
did not sanction such a solution for Christians’ handling of difference and ag-
gression. McCain summarized five options the shari‘a riots have thrown on Ni-
gerians: aggressive evangelism by Christians and Muslims to win over the
country; the recourse to confrontations as has been the case in repeated clashes
since 2000 with Muslims and Christian variously acting as aggressors; social se-
775
gregation with Christians and Muslims moving to predominantly Christian
and Muslim areas including those moving away completely from parts of the
country where they had resided for decades; secularism by which religious
practices are separated from public life with its potential for becoming anti-reli-
gion; and consensus, deciding to work together on those issues common to both
776
religions and useful for progress. Having passed the first three stages, Nigeria
is currently approaching the fourth: a probable march to secularism by which
religious practices are separated from public life. This may not go with “becom-
ing anti-religion,” as McCain suggests. But, definitely, it will be a most wel-
comed development to majority of Nigerians. And when it is in place, the at-
mosphere will be most conducive for McCain’s fifth option: “deciding to work
together on those issues common to both religions and useful for progress.”

773 McCain, “Which Road Leads Beyond The Shariah Controversy?” 18-19.
774 See, David Fielding and Anja Shortland, “An Eye for an Eye, A Tooth for a Tooth. A
study of Political Violence and Counter-Insurgency in Egypt,” paper provided by De-
partment of Economics, University of Leicester in its series Discussion Papers in Econo-
mics. No. 05/11, May 2005. http://www.le.ac.uk/economics/research/dpseries.html Ogoh
Alubo’s list of major civil unrests from 1999 to 2003 carries many instances of retaliato-
ry attacks between ethnic groups representing different religious communities: Ogoh
Alubo, “Citizenship and Nation Making in Nigeria,” 152-161.
775 Segregation has a political side, which manifested in political realignment and in the
launching of political parties that were religiously defined.
776 Danny McCain, “Which Road Leads Beyond the Shari‘ah Controversy,” 7-16.

257
Fig. 22: Major riots with religious coloration, 2000–2006, and 2008777
Location Date Details Remarks
(States)
Kaduna 21-25 Feb. March Shari‘a I About 5000 persons, comprising
2000 Christians and Muslims, were
killed but official figures claim
almost 2000.

Abia, Imo 22-23 May 2000 Shari‘a II About 100 Hausa killed.
Reprisal attacks

Plateau Sept. 2001 Contest over land between Over 1000 killed in Jos. Tensions
Plateau indigenes and Hausa and killings intermittently occurred
migrants. in 2002 and 2003.

Kano Oct. 2001 Anti-US demonstration by Over 1000 killed, mostly

local Muslims angry at the Christians.
bombing of Afghanistan.

Kaduna, Nov. 2002 Furore over Miss World Over 2000 killed in Kaduna.
Abuja, Bauchi Pageant in Abuja. The insurgence in Abuja, where
Riots in Kaduna named the contest took place, was less
Shari‘a III. destructive of lives and property.

Abia and Imo Reprisal attacks on Hausa

Muslims.

Plateau May 2004 Unresolved tension from Between 600 and 700 killed.
clashes since 2001 between
Plateau indigenes and Hausa
migrants. Fighting was
triggered by an armed Fulani
attack in February that killed
48 Christians.

Kano May 2004 Reprisal attacks on Christians Non-Plateau Christians were the
in Kano for the killing of Hausa bulk of the victims in Kano.
in Yelwa, Plateau State.

Borno, Feb. 2006 Protest rally against About 70 killed,

Katsina publication of cartoons of 11 churches burnt.
Prophet Mohammed in
September 2005 degenerated
into riots on Christians in
Maiduguri in particular
following efforts of the state
police team to disband the
crowd.

Enugu, Feb. 2006 Reprisal attacks on Hausa

Anambra, Muslims for killings in
Delta Maiduguri over cartoons.

Bauchi Feb. 2008 “A love affair.”* A young One casualty according to State
woman spurned the advances Police report. Police and Christian
of a young Muslim man. In a targets were destroyed.
last effort the man appealed to
her to speak to him “in the
name of the Messenger” to
which she responded that she
knew no messenger. Next
day, she was sought out by a
mob on charges of blasphemy
against the Prophet.

258
* This was the description of the incident given by Adanaya Talman-Gaya, the State Po-
lice Commissioner. Riots and mob action resulting from inter-faith love relationships
were also reported for Plateau State in 2002. The New Nigeria newspaper and News-
watch magazine carried two cases that occurred in Yelwa and Wuse respectively: “An
elicit love affair between a Hausa and a female indigene. 20 people reported dead.
Many people injured. Worship centers, 6 petrol stations and 22 vehicles burned.” New
Nigeria, 30 June 2002, 1-2. And, “Sectarian clash as a result of June 27 communal crisis
between Hausa Fulani and Tarok. 20 people killed and property worth millions des-
troyed. The crisis re-occurred as a result of allegation that Christians in the area passed
a law prohibiting their daughters from going out with Moslems.” Newswatch, 5 Au-
777
gust 2002, p. 3.

777 Numerous other cases of attacks occurred from 2000 until 2008, with casualties in sin-
gle and double digits but those mentioned here were incidents of national concern and
attacks that extended beyond their original locality. Figures of the dead were pooled
from reports by BBC News and Human Rights Watch. See “Analysis: Nigeria's Sharia
split,” BBC News, Tuesday, 7 January 2003; Human Rights Watch, “The “Miss World
Riots”: Continued Impunity for Killings in Kaduna,” Vol. 15, No. 13 (A) July 2003. The
figure I gave for the Bauchi 2008 incident came from the State Commissioner of Police.
Nigerian Tribune, 5 February 2008.

259
CONCLUSION

The phenomenon of Islam in Igboland promises an interesting field of investig-

ation to any scholar. This study has shown that Islam has chances of being in-
troduced in supposedly unlikely environments and reveals the multilevel
factors driving conversions to Islam in Igboland. This attempt, which built on
studies by Ottenberg and Doi, should provoke further inquiries. Very little is
known about the implantation of Islam in this part of Nigeria. There are gaps in
our knowledge of events between 1910 and the decade of the 1930s, both with
respect to northern Igboland and other parts of Igboland. The years 1940 until
the eve of the civil war in 1967 require more indepth investigation. How were
the early communities that emerged in northern Igboland and at Owerri man-
aged and integrated within the mainstream? In what specific ways did the non-
Muslim majority relate with the small and fledging Muslim communities?
There is some uncomfortable silence, even in oral testimonies, and much specu-
lation about these years. Although we have mentioned the likely process of the
development of Islam, we know quite little to claim that what is documented is
exhaustive. On the first Igbo convert to Islam, the question is: how did he com-
municate his faith to others? Was he able to get others to join him in Islam?
About Nwagui: what exactly were the influences that brought about his con-
version? Why did he prefer to revert to Islam outside the shores of Nigeria
when all around him, or in close proximity to him, were Muslim acquaintances
and colleagues? A few other issues will be taken up in the remaining pages.
In Igboland, Islam is by far succeeding in the cities than in the villages. Igbo
Muslims and clerics are divided on the question of their growth and numbers.
Most interviewees, including Muslims from other parts of Nigeria living in Ig-
boland, reported that the number of Igbo Muslims on the whole is appreciating
very slowly. Wartime prejudice against the Hausa topped the list of factors in-
hibiting a quick success for Islam in the study area. The others include the ap-
parent lack of assistance in proselytization from other Nigerian Muslim com-
munities, and the Igbo social environment, which in their estimation has
proved harsh to Islam. It was observed, though, that the furor over the shari‘a
law and its implementation in Northern Nigeria de-motivated Igbo Muslim res-
ulting in some cases of reconversion, but certainly no remarkable desertion
from Islam.
One problem affecting the population of Igbo converts is the preponderance
of adventure seekers—persons whose primary interest in taking Islam is to

260
solve a need at the end of which they lose their interest in Islam and they re-in-
tegrate within their original religious community. While efforts have been de-
vised to nurture their interest into fruition and ensure genuine conversion to Is-
lam, the success rate with this category has remained low.
The introduction of Islam brought changes in Igbo social and religious cul-
ture. It deepened the diversification of Igbo religious communities, thus giving
the Igbo an additional worldview that is both linked to the Conventional (tradi-
tional) and Christian worldviews, and yet different, in many respects, from
them. Hence, the Igbo can engage with life and pursue issues through one of
three main religious philosophies: the Conventional, the Christian, and the Is-
lamic. Surrounding these three are other sects whose philosophies are observed
by a few other Igbo. The dominance of Christianity now appears contested by
the presence of Muslim Igbo. In this wise, Islam presents a challenge to every
other religious community, but especially to Christianity, to prove its relevance
to the people in their present circumstances. There is the need for institutional
self-evaluation for Igbo Christianity. (Yoruba Islam did this after some decades
of successful Christian mission activity in Yorubaland that led to conversions
from Islam to Christianity. Yoruba Muslims re-evaluated their tactics and their
offers to their members, and devised new strategies with which they curbed the
778
switches to Christianity. ) With respect to Islam in Igboland and the Igbo
claims of its threat on the dominance of Christianity, it is hereby proposed that
the free market principle should be allowed. Individuals should sample all of-
fers and decide which religion best suits their needs. This should make religious
communities to market their “product” in the most advantageous way possible
It is obvious, from henceforth, that political unity can no longer be taken for
granted in Igboland. Political support is now known to run through religious
and ethnic lines. Many Igbo Muslims confirmed support for the All Nigeria
People’s Party (ANPP), one of the major national parties, on the grounds that
“Islam encourages Muslims to unite among themselves and to support fellow
779
Muslims.” Meanwhile, the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA), the fore-
most ethnic-based party in Igboland, has just few Igbo Muslim supporters
Nevertheless, Islam has served as the vehicle through which some Igbo
widened their economic ties beyond the Nigerian space, incorporating countries
in the Middle East and Asia. They have also derived other supports from these
places, such as sponsorship for projects like the building of schools and civic

778 Peter Clarke, West Africa and Islam: A Study of Religious Development from the 8th to
the 20th Century (London: Edward Arnold Publishers, 1982).
779 Mrs. Asmau Shittu, interview, Nsukka, May 2003.

261
centers, which have improved lives in some communities beyond just the group
of Muslims intended. Further, the inclusion of the Igbo within the Muslim com-
munity of Nigeria has promoted the study of Arabic by Igbo Muslims, and
therefore diversification in language competence, necessary for national and in-
ternational political appointments.
Igbo Muslim commitment to building of schools and their proposed estab-
lishment of Islamic banking and free health centers, if accomplished, will diver-
sify social services in Igboland. Although at the moment these projects are
geared towards proselytization, yet their relevance cannot be ignored especially
given the decline in recent years in government spending on these services; a
decline that is at variance with population growth. In this wise, Islam may
provide the impetus for expanding the essential services’ sector in Igboland.
The Igbo and the Hausa have much in common, an interviewee told me.
Both are hard working and both are devoutly committed to causes they ap-
prove of. The Hausa derive their driving force from Islam and the Igbo from
their omenani—traditional worldview. This similarity impelled those Igbo in fa-
vor of Islam as the rightful religion of the Igbo to argue that if these two ethnic
groups will share same religious affiliation, Nigeria’s problems will be over.
What one may perceive from this argument is a form of avocation for ethnic re-
alignment in 21st century Nigeria since individualism did not foster socio-polit-
ical and economic growth in the country during nearly a century in which the
Hausa, the Igbo, and the Yoruba pursued tangential ethnic-based programmes.
This recent idea for ethnic realignment through religious unity can be inter-
preted thus: if these two who seem to have more in common and, who, despite
their differences, still work together, should team up, they will together provide
leadership for the rest of the country. The following statement captures the es-
sence of this projection:

I am looking at the Hausa man. The typical Igbo man hated the Hausa
man because he is Muslim. If the Hausa man and the Igbo man can
come together—mind you in Nigeria the two closest ethnic groups are
Igbo and Hausa even though the Igbo hates the Hausa to the core yet
they are closer to each other in everything even in business—if that
mutual trust is what will remain and the suspicion is off, I do not
think that all the trouble we are having today in Nigeria will contin-
ue. … An Igbo man is ready to act. An Hausa man is ready to act. …

262
 So, if these two groups can meet and become one…not only through
780
religion, but yes through religion, there will be no problem.

Whether these calculations take cognizance of the numerical advantage such an

alignment will give to these two ethnic groups, in contrast to the myriad other
ethnic groups, is unclear; but given that numbers have historically determined
the deposition of political and economic power in Nigeria, it to be expected that
this advantage must have been taken into consideration.
Coming to the current religious composition of the Igbo, an elderly Igbo
Muslim remarked that there is no distinction between Conventionalists and
Christians because members of these faiths always agree and are opposed to Is-
781
lam. While Igbo Christians and Igbo Muslims may think that the gulf
between them is wide, and this applies also at the national level, it is indeed not
as assumed. The basic social dissimilarity between them has revolved around
manner of religious observances and the level of submission to own faiths. In
this aspect Muslims have shown amazing commitment to their sacred teachings
and a tall resistance to destabilizing modern secular values. They have also op-
posed secularism more strongly than Christians. These issues, however, call for
some dialogue aimed at an acceptable option suitable to members of both reli-
gions. A watchword for inter-religious dialogue in Nigeria is Achebe’s remarks
in 1972: “I never will take the stand that the Old must win or that the New
must win. … No single man can be correct all the time, no single idea can be
782
totally correct.”

780 Alhaji Musa Ani, interview, Enugu, May 2003.

781 Mallam Omeje, interview, Ibagwa, May 2003.
782 Rose Ure Mezu, Chinua Achebe: The Man and His Works (London: Adonis & Abbey
Publishers Ltd., 2006), 161-62.

263
ANNEX

List of interviewees

Abdullahi Chinedu Igboama, b. 1961, Enugu, 2006.

Abdullahi Chukwudi, b. 1966, Oguta, 2006.
Abdullahi Umaru, b. 1961, inspector of police, Akokwa, 2006.
Abdulaziz Ahmed Anosike, b. 1966, Islamic scholar, Nnewi, 2003.
Abubakar Abugu, b. 1974, Enugu Ezike, 2003.
Abubakar Sadiq, b. 1967, Jos, 2003.
Abubakar Shuaib, b. 1988, undergraduate student of University of Nigeria, Nsukka,
2010.
Adam Usman, c. 1953, Nsukka, 2003.
Adamma Mohammed, b. 1971, Onitsha, 2006.
Ahmed Etim Bassey, b. 1985, assistant chief imam of MOPOL mosque, Calabar,
2009.
Aisha Audu, b. 1983, food vendor, Aba, 2006.
Aishatu Chioma Jubril, b. 1977, Owerri, 2006.
Alfa Jamir Abdukareem, b. 1970, Aba, 2003.
Alhaji Abdulaziz Ude, business tycoon, Lagos, 2006.
Alhaji Abubakar Asabi, b. 1954, chairman, Rivers State council of imams and
scholars, Port Harcourt, 2009.
Alhaji Ahmed Adekola, chief imam, Asaba, 2005.
Alhaji Ahmed Onyema, b. 1941, Ezzamgbo, 2003.
Alhaji Ahmed Ozurumba, secretary-general, Imo State Muslim Council, Owerri,
2006.
Alhaji Ali Ukiwo, b. 1950, Umuahia, 2006.
Alhaji Baba Jaro, b. 1951, chairman, Muslim Pilgrims’ Board, Uyo, 2009.
Alhaji Badaru Eze, b. c. 1931, Nsukka, 2006.
Alhaji Buba Abdullahi Kedemure, b. 1971, cattle merchant, Lokpanta, 2006.
Alhaji Danladi, b. 1950, Owerri, 2006.
Alhaji Dauda Onyeagocha, chief imam of Owerri central mosque, 2006.
Alhaji Haruna Sule, Sarikin Hausa of Enugu, 2003.
Alhaji Ibrahim Iwuanyanwu, b. 1934, Mbaitoli, 2006.

264
Alhaji Ibrahim Musa, b. 1948, Uga, 2006.
Alhaji Idris Bashiri, b. 1976, imam of Aba central mosque, 2006.
Alhaji Idris Okonkwo Eze, b. 1953, tailor, Nsukka, 2003.
Alhaji Isa Ugiri, b. 1926, imam, Aboh Mbaise, 2006.
Alhaji Maikano Mohammed, b. c. 1950, Lokpanta, 2006.
Alhaji Mairiga Diko, b. 1946, grandson of Diko—first Muslim settler in Eastern
Nigeria, Elele, 2009.
Alhaji Mohammed Umar, b. 1972, itinerant trader, Aba, 2006.
Alhaji Musa Ani, b. 1955, secretary to the Islamic Center in Enugu, 2003.
Alhaji Mutalib, b. 1940, Ibagwa, 2003.
Alhaji Mutui Osuji, b. 1937, public relations officer, Islamic Center, Enugu, 2003.
Alhaji Nuhu Lebele, b. 1966, Aba, 2006.
Alhaji Omar Farouk, b. 1949, secretary-general of Rivers State Islamic Council, Port
Harcourt, 2009.
Alhaji S. Okah, b. 1956, Islamic teacher, Amasiri, 2003.
Alhaji Sadauki, b. 1966, Sarikin Hausa of Uyo, 2009.
Alhaji Sani Ibrahim, b. 1957, tailor, Amaji, 2003.
Alhaji Umaru, Enugu Ezike, 2004.
Aminatu Nze, b. 1977, Owerri, 2006.
Audu Munagoro, b. 1946, Nnewi, 2006.
Baba Ibrahim, Sarikin Hausa of Aba, 2005.
Barrister Hamza Aduku, Enugu Ezike, 2003.
Bilikisu Adamma Ibrahim, b. 1954, Owerri, 2006.
Charity Kolawole, Nsukka, 2006.
Chiamaka Ibrahim, b. 1952, Onitsha, 2006.
Chief Abubakar Bello, Sarkin Hausa of Aba, 2003.
Chief Ani Nwoke, b. c. 1930, village head of Akanu Ohafia, 2005.
Chief B. C. Nwosu, b. c. 1937, Umuahia, 2006.
Chief Chris Osuagwu, b. 1959, Abia State Commissioner for Public Utilities,
Umuahia, 2006.
Chief F. A. Ibe, b. 1941, Mbano, 2003.
Chief Godwin Ngwuli, Umuahia, 2006.
Chief Nnamdi Obi, Nnewi, 2004.
Chief P. E. Nwainyinya, b. 1951, Abakaliki 2003.

265
Chika Abdul, b. 1974, Owerri, 2006.
Cynthia Audu, b. 1983, undergraduate of University of Nigeria, Nsukka, 2006.
Dauda Arua, Abakaliki, 2003.
Dauda Ojobe, b. 1928, Enugu Ezike, 2003.
Dr. Chidiebere Ude, b. 1967, Umunneochi Local Government Chairman, Lokpanta,
2006.
Dr. John O. Alutu, Nnewi, 2004.
Dr. Mrs. Mary Igwe, b. 1955, Lecturer, Isuochi, 2006.
Dr. Oluyemi Akinloye, b. 1968, Berlin, 2008.
Dr. P. A. Ezema, Lecturer, Nsukka, 2003.
Engr. Yahaya Dutse, President, Association of Muslim Professionals of Rivers State,
Port Harcourt, 2009.
Garba Oheme, b. c. 1908, Enugu Ezike, 2003.
Garuba Haruna, b. c. 1964, Awka, 2006.
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Hajia Maimana Yankwero, b. 1976, Onitsha, 2006.
Hajia Sayatu Aja, b. 1960, granddaughter of Sheikh Ibrahim Nwagui and president
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Hamza Garuba, b. 1982, Ogrute, 2006.
Harun Eze, b. 1979, president of the Muslim Students Society, University of Abuja,
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Haruna Danjuma, b. 1972, Owa, 2006.
Haruna Sule jnr, Enugu, 2003.
Hayatu Adamu, b. c. 1944, cattle merchant and Sarikin Hausa of Lokpanta, 2006.
His Royal Highness, (Dr.) C. E. Emetuma, of Akabo autonomous community, b.
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His Royal Highness, Odogwu Eze, of Umurido Okigwe, b. 1944, 2006.
Ibrahim Agbedo, b. 1951, Enugu Ezike, 2004.
Imam Hassan Omeh Musa, c. 1947, tailor and the imam of Obukpa mosque, 2003.
Imam Ibrahim Eze, c. 1938, chief imam of Nsukka town central mosque, 2003.
Ismaila Ngwu, b. 1971, radio mechanic, Amaoda, 2003.
Jabir Osuji, b. 1977, undergraduate student of University of Maiduguri, Enugu,
2003.
Jameel Okoroama, b. 1983, Asaba, 2005.

266
Jenini Lawal, b. 1968, Enugu, 2003.
Justus Jacob, Enugu, 2003.
Kabiru Hudu, Lokpanta, 2006.
Mallam Abubakr, chief imam, Awka, 2003.
Mallam Ahmed Omeje, b. c. 1936, Ibagwa, 2003.
Mallam Ibrahim, 1950, Islamic preacher, Umuahia, 2006.
Mallam Ibrahim, b. 1938, trader, Port Harcourt, 2006.
Mallam Ibrahim, chief imam of Hausa mosque, Ontisha, 2005.
Mallam Isa Ekeji, b. 1938, Mbaise, 2006.
Mallam Lawal Wakili, b. 1966, Nsukka, 2003.
Mallam Mohammed Ibeh, b. 1959, mosque keeper, Mbaise, 2006.
Mallam Omada, imam, Enugu Ezike, 2004.
Mallam S. M. Suberu, leader of the Yoruba Muslim community, Onitsha, 2005.
Mallam Yusuf Ude, b. c. 1930, Amaukpo Afikpo, 2006.
Michael Mmadu, b. 1964, Enugu, l 2006.
Miss Halima Umaru, b. 1989, Onitsha, 2006.
Miss Sefiyat Abdullahi, b. 1977, assistant director of an Islamic nursery school,
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Monsurat Ego Kareem, b. 1968, Owerri, 2006.
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Mr. Abdullahi Shehu, Secretary of the Hausa Community in Nnewi, 2004.
Mr. Abubakar Abugu, b. 1974, an apprentice, Amufie, 2003.
Mr. C. Ogbodo, b. 1971, Nkanu, 2003.
Mr. Eze Ezekiel, b. 1966, civil servant, Abakaliki, 2003.
Mr. I. Ala, b. 1941, Mbaise, 2006.
Mr. Ikechukwu Ileka, Nnewi, 2004.
Mr. Innocent Okeke, b. c. 1954, Lokpanta, 2006.
Mr. Inusa, Alor Agu, 2003.
Mr. J. Igwe, b. 1969, banker, Port Harcourt, 2003.
Mr. John Ade, b. 1971, Ijebu Ode, 2003.
Mr. John Azi, Awgu, 2003.
Mr. John Ezeama, b. 1953, Adani, 2006.

267
Mr. Jubril Ocha, b. 1958, Kaduna, 2003.
Mr. Nnamdi Okonkwo, b. 1977, yam trader, Aba, 2006.
Mr. Nnamdi Uzoigwe, politician, Enugu, 2003.
Mr. Obele Maduegbunam, b. 1969, Umulokpa, 2006.
Mr. U. Nwosu, b. 1977, Police Inspector, Aba, 2006.
Mr. Ugonoh S. Mohammed, Enugu, 2003.
Mr. Vincent Okezie, c. 1936, a retired teacher, Ezinifite, February 2006.
Mr. William Uche Ohia, b. 1934, retired principal, Isiokpo, 2006.
Mrs. Aishat Adenikan, b. 1973, Port Harcourt, 2009.
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Mrs. Maria Nwachukwu, b. 1937, Enohia Itim, 2006.
Mrs. Memuna Eze, b. 1958, Nsukka, 2003.
Mrs. Ramatu Mohammed Omeje, b. c. 1930, Enugu Ezike, 2003.
Mrs. Ribbihabib Sheriff, b. 1966, Enugu, 2003.
Mrs. Veronica Nwoga, b. c. 1946, Lopkanta, 2006.
Musa Abdullah, b. 1972, yam trader, Aba, 2006.
Nathan Okeke, b. 1969, Kaduna, 2006.
Nkiru Ezenagu, Kaduna, 2006.
Nkiru Nduka, b. 1971, Kaduna, 2006.
Obiageli Yakubu, b. 1974, interview, Onitsha, 2006.
Olayi Saibou, b. 1967, Izza, 2006.
Rose Nduka, b. 1975, Kaduna, 2006.
S. M. Audu, b. 1966, tailor, Nsukka, 2003.
S. O. Okocha, b. c. 1920, Asaba, 2003.
Saka Adekunle, b. 1974, Akokwa, 2006.
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268
Sheikh Adam Idoko, b. 1958, chief imam, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, mosque,
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Sheikh Haroun Aja, b. 1958, Islamic instructor, Abakaliki, 2003.
Sheikh Idris Al-Hassan, b. 1959, director of the Islamic Centre in Enugu, 2003.
Sheikh Obini Ekpe, b. 1958, lecturer, Abakiliki, 2004.
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Shittu Nwabueze, b. 1955, Ukpani, 2006.
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ONDIST 12/1/709 (October 1934), National Archives, Enugu.
“Intelligence Report on Eteh Clan, Nsukka Division, Onitsha Province,” File: EP
9262a/CSE 1/85/4782, National Archives, Enugu.
“A Report on the History and Organization of the Ikwerri People living in the Elele
and Nkarahia Native Court Areas: Ahoada Division.” File: AHODIST 14/1/217
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“Hausa Chiefs,” File CSE 1/85/9798, National Archives, Enugu.

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“Headship of the Hausa and Nupe Communities at Enugu, Onitsha Province,” File:
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“Population Statistics,” File: KANOPROF 3530, National Archives, Kaduna.
“Kolanut Trade,” SOKPROF 260, National Archives, Kaduna
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Nigeria in March 1952,” ZARPROF C. 2425 18/6/52, National Archives, Kaduna.
“The Position of Non-Northerners in the Service of the Northern Regional
Government,” KANOPROF 8237, National Archives, Kaduna.
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1904.” G3A3/09-10 Niger Misson, and G3A3/011-12, Niger Mission, November
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