ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18,
COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs
just days after the coming presidential elections
on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the
controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days
after the presidential election. Under Section
4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that
“vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least
three nominees prepared by the Judicial and
Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering
that Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department) of the Constitution prohibits the
President or Acting President from making
appointments within two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of his term, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.
2010, unanimously agreed to start the process
of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC
“automatically considered” for the position of
Chief Justice the five most senior of the
Associate Justices of the Court, namely:
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate
Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice
Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice
Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last
two declined their nomination through letters
dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010,
respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent
President may appoint the next Chief Justice,
because the prohibition under Section 15,
Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to
appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues
that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be
filled within 90 days from its occurrence,
pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution; that had the framers intended the
prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
appointments, they could have easily expressly
stated so in the Constitution, which explains
why the prohibition found in Article VII
(Executive Department) was not written in
Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the
framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample
restrictions or limitations on the President’s
power to appoint members of the Supreme
Court to ensure its independence from “political
vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political
pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for
the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the
specified period within which the President
shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the
Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the
process, there being an insistence from some of
the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could
only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that
is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of
course, whether the JBC may resume its process
until the short list is prepared, in view of the
provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which
unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint
one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an
Associate Justice) within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can
appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno
upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does
not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in
the Supreme Court or to other appointments to
the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in
conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments
to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial
Department), states: Section 4. (1). The
Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief
Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may
sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of
three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII
to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done
so. They could not have ignored the meticulous
ordering of the provisions. They would have
easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally
applicable to the appointment of Members of
the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most
likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two
months before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of the President’s or Acting
President’s term does not refer to the Members
of the Supreme Court.
with reference to the context, i.e. that every
part must be considered together with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to
assume that the framers deliberately situated
Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16,
if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of
presidential appointments. If that was their
intention in respect of appointments to the
Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would
have easily and surely inserted a similar
prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within
Section 4 (1) thereof.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are

obviously of the same character, in that they
affect the power of the President to appoint.
The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer
only to appointments within the Executive
Department renders conclusive that Section 15
also applies only to the Executive Department.
This conclusion is consistent with the rule that
every part of the statute must be interpreted