G.R. No.

201716               January 8, 2013

MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., Petitioner, 

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. VEGA, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

In this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. (Abundo) assails and
seeks to nullify (1) the February 8, 2012 Resolution1 of the Second Division, Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010 and (2) the May 10, 2012 Resolution2 of the
COMELEC en banc affirming that division’s disposition. The assailed issuances, in turn, affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, dated August 9, 2010,
in Election Case No. 55 declaring Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit rule, to run in the
2010 elections for the position of, and necessarily to sit as, Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.

The antecedent facts are undisputed.

For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local
elections, Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001
and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and
accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the
Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in
due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres’ election and
proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest,
paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term
on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month.

Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When
Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy3 for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest,
Torres lost no time in seeking the former’s disqualification to run, the corresponding
petition,4 docketed as SPA Case No. 10-128 (DC), predicated on the three-consecutive term limit
rule. On June 16, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution5 finding for Abundo, who in
the meantime bested Torres by 219 votes6 and was accordingly proclaimed 2010 mayor-elect of
Viga, Catanduanes.

Meanwhile, on May 21, 2010, or before the COMELEC could resolve the adverted disqualification
case Torres initiated against Abundo, herein private respondent Ernesto R. Vega (Vega)
commenced a quo warranto7 action before the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes, docketed as
Election Case No. 55, to unseat Abundo on essentially the same grounds Torres raised in his
petition to disqualify.

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

By Decision8 of August 9, 2010 in Election Case No. 55, the RTC declared Abundo ineligible to serve
as municipal mayor, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, Decision is, hereby, rendered GRANTING the petition and declaring Abelardo
Abundo, Sr. ineligible to serve as municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.

SO ORDERED.9

In so ruling, the trial court, citing Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC,10 found Abundo to have already served
three consecutive mayoralty terms, to wit, 2001-2004, 2004-2007 and 2007-2010, and, hence,
disqualified for another, i.e., fourth, consecutive term. Abundo, the RTC noted, had been declared
winner in the aforesaid 2004 elections consequent to his protest and occupied the position of and
actually served as Viga mayor for over a year of the remaining term, i.e., from May 9, 2006 to June
30, 2007, to be exact. To the RTC, the year and a month service constitutes a complete and full
service of Abundo’s second term as mayor.

Therefrom, Abundo appealed to the COMELEC, his recourse docketed as EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010.

The Ruling of the COMELEC

On February 8, 2012, in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010, the COMELEC’s Second Division rendered the
first assailed Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 73, Virac,
Catanduanes is AFFIRMED and the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.11

Just like the RTC, the COMELEC’s Second Division ruled against Abundo on the strength of
Aldovino, Jr. and held that service of the unexpired portion of a term by a protestant who is declared
winner in an election protest is considered as service for one full term within the contemplation of the
three-term limit rule.

In time, Abundo sought but was denied reconsideration by the COMELEC en banc per its equally
assailed Resolution of May 10, 2012. The fallo of the COMELEC en banc’s Resolution reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.12

In affirming the Resolution of its Second Division, the COMELEC en banc held in essence the
following: first, there was no involuntary interruption of Abundo’s 2004-2007 term service which
would be an exception to the three-term limit rule as he is considered never to have lost title to the
disputed office after he won in his election protest; and second, what the Constitution prohibits is for
an elective official to be in office for the same position for more than three consecutive terms and not
to the service of the term.

Hence, the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
preliminary injunction.

Intervening Events
In the meantime, following the issuance by the COMELEC of its May 10, 2012 Resolution denying
Abundo’s motion for reconsideration, the following events transpired:

1. On June 20, 2012, the COMELEC issued an Order13 declaring its May 10, 2012 Resolution
final and executory. The following day, June 21, 2012, the COMELEC issued an Entry of
Judgment.14

2. On June 25, 2012, Vega filed a Motion for Execution15 with the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac,
Catanduanes.

3. On June 27, 2012, the COMELEC, acting on Vega’s counsel’s motion16 filed a day earlier,
issued an Order17 directing the bailiff of ECAD (COMELEC) to personally deliver the entire
records to said RTC.

On June 29, 2012, the COMELEC ECAD Bailiff personally delivered the entire records of the
instant case to, and were duly received by, the clerk of court of RTC-Br. 43.

4. On June 29, 2012, or on the same day of its receipt of the case records, the RTC-Br. 43 in
Virac, Catanduanes granted Vega’s Motion for Execution through an Order18 of even date.
And a Writ of Execution19 was issued on the same day.

5. On July 2, 2012, Sheriff Q. Tador, Jr. received the Writ of Execution and served the same
at the office of Mayor Abundo on the same day via substituted service.

6. On July 3, 2012, the Court issued a TRO20 enjoining the enforcement of the assailed
COMELEC Resolutions.

7. On July 4, 2012, Vega received the Court’s July 3, 2012 Resolution21 and a copy of the
TRO. On the same day, Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O.
Cervantes of Viga, Catanduanes took their oaths of office22 as mayor and vice-mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes, respectively.

8. On July 5, 2012, Vega received a copy of Abundo’s Seventh (7th) Most Extremely Urgent
Manifestation and Motion23 dated June 28, 2012 praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or
status quo ante Order. On the same day, Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor
Cesar O. Cervantes––who had taken their oaths of office the day before—assumed the
posts of mayor and vice-mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.24

9. On July 6, 2012, Vega interposed a Motion (To Admit Attached Manifestation)25 and

Manifestation with Leave to Admit26 dated July 5, 2012 stating that the TRO thus issued by
the Court has become functus officio owing to the execution of the RTC’s Decision in
Election Case No. 55.

10. On July 10, 2012, Vega filed his Comment/Opposition with Leave to the Petitioner’s
Prayer for the Issuance of a Status Quo Ante Order27 reiterating the argument that since
Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes already assumed the
posts of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, then a Status Quo Ante Order would
serve no purpose.
 11. On July 12, 2012, Abundo filed his Most Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Convert the
July 3, 2012 TRO into a Status Quo Ante Order (In View of the Unreasonable and
Inappropriate Progression of Events).28

It is upon the foregoing backdrop of events that Abundo was dislodged from his post as incumbent
mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. To be sure, the speed which characterized Abundo’s ouster despite
the supervening issuance by the Court of a TRO on July 3, 2012 is not lost on the Court. While it is
not clear whether Vice-Mayor Tarin and First Councilor Cervantes knew of or put on notice about the
TRO either before they took their oaths of office on July 4, 2012 or before assuming the posts of
mayor and vice-mayor on July 5, 2012, the confluence of events following the issuance of the
assailed COMELEC en banc irresistibly tends to show that the TRO––issued as it were to maintain
the status quo, thus averting the premature ouster of Abundo pending this Court’s resolution of his
appeal––appears to have been trivialized.

On September 11, 2012, Vega filed his Comment on Abundo’s petition, followed not long after by
public respondent COMELEC’s Consolidated Comment.29

The Issues

Abundo raises the following grounds for the allowance of the petition:

6.1 The Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it declared the arguments in Abundo’s motion for reconsideration
as mere rehash and reiterations of the claims he raised prior to the promulgation of the
Resolution.

6.2 The Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it declared that Abundo has consecutively served for three terms
despite the fact that he only served the remaining one year and one month of the second
term as a result of an election protest.30

First Issue:

Arguments in Motion for Reconsideration Not Mere Reiteration

The COMELEC en banc denied Abundo’s motion for reconsideration on the basis that his arguments
in said motion are mere reiterations of what he already brought up in his appeal Brief before the
COMELEC Second Division. In this petition, petitioner claims otherwise.

Petitioner’s assertion is devoid of merit.

A comparison of Abundo’s arguments in the latter’s Brief vis-à-vis those in his Motion for
Reconsideration (MR) reveals that the arguments in the MR are elucidations and amplications of the
same issues raised in the brief. First, in his Brief, Abundo raised the sole issue of lack of jurisdiction
of the RTC to consider the quo warranto case since the alleged violation of the three-term limit has
already been rejected by the COMELEC First Division in SPA Case No. 10-128 (DC), while in his
MR, Abundo raised the similar ground of the conclusiveness of the COMELEC’s finding on the issue
of his qualification to run for the current term. Second, in his Brief, Abundo assailed RTC’s reliance
on Aldovino, Jr., while in his MR, he argued that the Court’s pronouncement in Aldovino, Jr., which
dealt with preventive suspension, is not applicable to the instant case as it involves only a partial
service of the term. Abundo argued in his Brief that his situation cannot be equated with the case of
preventive suspension as held in Aldovino, Jr., while in his MR, he argued before that the almost two
years which he did not sit as mayor during the 2004-2007 term is an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term.

Thus, COMELEC did not err in ruling that the issues in the MR are a rehash of those in the Brief.

Core Issue:

Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served three consecutive terms

The pivotal determinative issue then is whether the service of a term less than the full three years by
an elected official arising from his being declared as the duly elected official upon an election protest
is considered as full service of the term for purposes of the application of the three consecutive term
limit for elective local officials.

On this core issue, We find the petition meritorious. The consecutiveness of what otherwise would
have been Abundo’s three successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the
2004-2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and
occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the
rightful choice of the electorate.

The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule, is found in Section 8, Article
X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. (Emphasis
supplied.)

and is reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC)
of 1991, thusly:

Sec. 43. Term of Office. —

xxxx

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was
elected. (Emphasis Ours.)

To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted
constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur:

(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post; and

(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.31

Judging from extant jurisprudence, the three-term limit rule, as applied to the different factual
milieus, has its complicated side. We shall revisit and analyze the various holdings and relevant
pronouncements of the Court on the matter.

As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the LGC,
voluntary renunciation of the office by the incumbent elective local official for any length of time shall
NOT, in determining service for three consecutive terms, be considered an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. In
Aldovino, Jr., however, the Court stated the observation that the law "does not textually state that
voluntary renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that does not affect ‘continuity of
service for a full term’ for purposes of the three-term limit rule."32

As stressed in Socrates v. Commission on Elections,33 the principle behind the three-term limit rule
covers only consecutive terms and that what the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.
Put a bit differently, an elective local official cannot, following his third consecutive term, seek
immediate reelection for a fourth term,34albeit he is allowed to seek a fresh term for the same
position after the election where he could have sought his fourth term but prevented to do so by
reason of the prohibition.

There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of the official after his or her
third term. An interruption usually occurs when the official does not seek a fourth term, immediately
following the third. Of course, the basic law is unequivocal that a "voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall NOT be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official concerned was elected." This qualification was made as a
deterrent against an elective local official intending to skirt the three-term limit rule by merely
resigning before his or her third term ends. This is a voluntary interruption as distinguished from
involuntary interruption which may be brought about by certain events or causes.

While appearing to be seemingly simple, the three-term limit rule has engendered a host of disputes
resulting from the varying interpretations applied on local officials who were elected and served for
three terms or more, but whose terms or service was punctuated by what they view as involuntary
interruptions, thus entitling them to a, but what their opponents perceive as a proscribed, fourth term.
Involuntary interruption is claimed to result from any of these events or causes: succession or
assumption of office by operation of law, preventive suspension, declaration of the defeated
candidate as the winner in an election contest, declaration of the proclaimed candidate as the losing
party in an election contest, proclamation of a non-candidate as the winner in a recall election,
removal of the official by operation of law, and other analogous causes.

This brings us to an examination of situations and jurisprudence wherein such consecutive terms
were considered or not considered as having been "involuntarily interrupted or broken."

(1) Assumption of Office by Operation of Law

In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and Jose T. Capco, Jr.35 (1998) and Montebon v.
Commission on Elections36 (2008), the Court delved on the effects of "assumption to office by
operation of law" on the three-term limit rule. This contemplates a situation wherein an elective local
official fills by succession a higher local government post permanently left vacant due to any of the
following contingencies, i.e., when the supposed incumbent refuses to assume office, fails to qualify,
dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to
discharge the functions of his office.37
In Borja, Jr., Jose T. Capco, Jr. (Capco) was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for
a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, Capco became mayor, by operation of law,
upon the death of the incumbent mayor, Cesar Borja. Capco was then elected and served as mayor
for terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. When Capco expressed his intention to run again for the
mayoralty position during the 1998 elections, Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was then also a candidate
for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification for violation of the three-term limit rule.

Finding for Capco, the Court held that for the disqualification rule to apply, "it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been
elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can
apply."38 There was, the Court ruled, no violation of the three-term limit, for Capco "was not elected
to the office of the mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of
law"39 when a permanent vacancy occurred in that office.

The Court arrived at a parallel conclusion in the case of Montebon. There, Montebon had been
elected for three consecutive terms as municipal councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001, 2001-
2004, and 2004-2007. However, in January 2004, or during his second term, Montebon succeeded
and assumed the position of vice-mayor of Tuburan when the incumbent vice-mayor retired. When
Montebon filed his certificate of candidacy again as municipal councilor, a petition for disqualification
was filed against him based on the three-term limit rule. The Court ruled that Montebon’s assumption
of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an interruption of his continuity of service as councilor.
The Court emphasized that succession in local government office is by operation of law and as such,
it is an involuntary severance from office. Since the law no less allowed Montebon to vacate his post
as councilor in order to assume office as vice-mayor, his occupation of the higher office cannot,
without more, be deemed as a voluntary renunciation of his position as councilor.

(2) Recall Election

With reference to the effects of recall election on the continuity of service, Adormeo v. Commission
on Elections40(2002) and the aforementioned case of Socrates (2002) provide guidance.

In Adormeo, Ramon Talaga, Jr. (Talaga) was elected and served as mayor of Lucena City during
terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. During the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao.
However, before Tagarao’s 1998-2001 term ended, a recall election was conducted in May 2000
wherein Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga ran
for mayor in 2001, his candidacy was challenged on the ground he had already served as mayor for
three consecutive terms for violation of the three term-limit rule. The Court held therein that the
remainder of Tagarao’s term after the recall election during which Talaga served as mayor should
not be considered for purposes of applying the three-term limit rule. The Court emphasized that the
continuity of Talaga’s mayorship was disrupted by his defeat during the 1998 elections.

A similar conclusion was reached by the Court in Socrates. The petitioners in that case assailed the
COMELEC Resolution which declared Edward Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in a recall
election. It appeared that Hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City
for three consecutive terms: in 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-2001. Obviously aware of the three-
term limit principle, Hagedorn opted not to vie for the same mayoralty position in the 2001 elections,
in which Socrates ran and eventually won. However, midway into his term, Socrates faced recall
proceedings and in the recall election held, Hagedorn run for the former’s unexpired term as mayor.
Socrates sought Hagedorn’s disqualification under the three-term limit rule.

In upholding Hagedorn’s candidacy to run in the recall election, the Court ruled:
x x x After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the
recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent,
Socrates.

From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa
was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly
an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn’s service as mayor, not because of his voluntary
renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition.41

The Court likewise emphasized in Socrates that "an elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same
office following the end of the third consecutive term and, hence, any subsequent election, like recall
election, is no longer covered x x x."42

(3) Conversion of a Municipality into a City

On the other hand, the conversion of a municipality into a city does not constitute an interruption of
the incumbent official’s continuity of service. The Court said so in Latasa v. Commission on
Elections43 (2003).

Latasa is cast against the ensuing backdrop: Arsenio A. Latasa was elected and served as mayor of
the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur for terms 1992-1995, 1995-1998, and 1998-2001. During
his third term, Digos was converted into a component city, with the corresponding cityhood law
providing the holdover of elective officials. When Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy as mayor
for the 2001 elections, the Court declared Latasa as disqualified to run as mayor of Digos City for
violation of the three-term limit rule on the basis of the following ratiocination:

This Court believes that (Latasa) did involuntarily relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the
said office has been deemed abolished due to the conversion. However, the very instant he vacated
his office as municipal mayor, he also assumed office as city mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where
petitioner therein, for even just a short period of time, stepped down from office, petitioner Latasa
never ceased from acting as chief executive of the local government unit. He never ceased from
discharging his duties and responsibilities as chief executive of Digos.

(Emphasis supplied.)

(4) Period of Preventive Suspension

In 2009, in the case Aldovino Jr., the Court espoused the doctrine that the period during which a
local elected official is under preventive suspension cannot be considered as an interruption of the
continuity of his service. The Court explained why so:

Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should
not be considered an interruption that allows an elective official’s stay in office beyond three terms. A
preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official
continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the
office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in office
is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no
vacancy exists.44 (Emphasis supplied.)

(5) Election Protest

With regard to the effects of an election protest vis-à-vis the three-term limit rule, jurisprudence
presents a more differing picture. The Court’s pronouncements in Lonzanida v. Commission on
Elections45 (1999), Ong v. Alegre46(2006), Rivera III v. Commission on Elections47 (2007) and Dizon v.
Commission on Elections48 (2009), all protest cases, are illuminating.

In Lonzanida, Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales in terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. However, his proclamation relative to the
1995 election was protested and was eventually declared by the RTC and then by COMELEC null
and void on the ground of failure of elections. On February 27, 1998, or about three months before
the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida vacated the mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC order and writ
of execution it issued. Lonzanida’s opponent assumed office for the remainder of the term. In the
May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent, Efren Muli, filed
a petition for disqualification on the ground that Lonzanida had already served three consecutive
terms in the same post. The Court, citing Borja Jr., reiterated the two (2) conditions which must
concur for the three-term limit to apply: "1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms."49

In view of Borja, Jr., the Court ruled that the foregoing requisites were absent in the case of
Lonzanida. The Court held that Lonzanida cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the
post in the May 1995 elections since his assumption of office as mayor "cannot be deemed to have
been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation." And as a corollary point,
the Court stated that Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term having been ordered
to vacate his post before the expiration of the term, a situation which amounts to an involuntary
relinquishment of office.This Court deviated from the ruling in Lonzanida in Ong v. Alegre50 owing to
a variance in the factual situations attendant.

In that case, Francis Ong (Ong) was elected and served as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte
for terms 1995-1998, 1998-2001, and 2001-2004. During the 1998 mayoralty elections, or during his
supposed second term, the COMELEC nullified Ong’s proclamation on the postulate that Ong lost
during the 1998 elections. However, the COMELEC’s decision became final and executory on July
4, 2001, when Ong had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to
serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente. In 2004, Ong filed his
certificate of candidacy for the same position as mayor, which his opponent opposed for violation of
the three-term limit rule.

Ong invoked the ruling in Lonzanida and argued that he could not be considered as having served
as mayor from 1998-2001 because he was not duly elected to the post and merely assumed office
as a "presumptive winner." Dismissing Ong’s argument, the Court held that his assumption of office
as mayor for the term 1998-2001 constitutes "service for the full term" and hence, should be counted
for purposes of the three-term limit rule. The Court modified the conditions stated in Lonzanida in the
sense that Ong’s service was deemed and counted as service for a full term because Ong’s
proclamation was voided only after the expiry of the term. The Court noted that the COMELEC
decision which declared Ong as not having won the 1998 elections was "without practical and legal
use and value" promulgated as it was after the contested term has expired. The Court further
reasoned:

Petitioner Francis Ong’s contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty
derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His
proclamation as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of
office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should
legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view
would mean that Alegre would – under the three-term rule - be considered as having served a term
by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served such term
pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election.51 (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court did not apply the ruling in Lonzanida and ruled that the case of Ong was different, to wit:

The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once apparent. For one, in
Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty election was declared a nullity for the stated reason of "failure
of election", and, as a consequence thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was
nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the office of mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not
fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance from office as a result
of legal processes. In fine, there was an effective interruption of the continuity of
service.52 (Emphasis supplied.)

Ong’s slight departure from Lonzanida would later find reinforcement in the consolidated cases of
Rivera III v. Commission on Elections53 and Dee v. Morales.54 Therein, Morales was elected mayor of
Mabalacat, Pampanga for the following consecutive terms: 1995-1998, 1998-2001 and 2001-2004.
In relation to the 2004 elections, Morales again ran as mayor of the same town, emerged as
garnering the majority votes and was proclaimed elective mayor for term commencing July 1, 2004
to June 30, 2007. A petition for quo warranto was later filed against Morales predicated on the
ground that he is ineligible to run for a "fourth" term, having served as mayor for three consecutive
terms. In his answer, Morales averred that his supposed 1998-2001 term cannot be considered
against him, for, although he was proclaimed by the Mabalacat board of canvassers as elected
mayor vis-à-vis the 1998 elections and discharged the duties of mayor until June 30, 2001, his
proclamation was later nullified by the RTC of Angeles City and his closest rival, Anthony Dee,
proclaimed the duly elected mayor. Pursuing his point, Morales parlayed the idea that he only served
as a mere caretaker.

The Court found Morales’ posture untenable and held that the case of Morales presents a factual
milieu similar with Ong, not with Lonzanida. For ease of reference, the proclamation of Francis Ong,
in Ong, was nullified, but after he, like Morales, had served the three-year term from the start to the
end of the term. Hence, the Court concluded that Morales exceeded the three-term limit rule, to wit:

Here, respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the
position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period
notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting
him (respondent) as mayor. To reiterate, as held in Ong v. Alegre, such circumstance does not
constitute an interruption in serving the full term.

xxxx

Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously
without any break since July 1, 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been
mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years.55 (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court ruled in Rivera that the fact of being belatedly ousted, i.e., after the expiry of the term,
cannot constitute an interruption in Morales’ service of the full term; neither can Morales, as he
argued, be considered merely a "caretaker of the office" or a mere "de facto officer" for purposes of
applying the three-term limit rule.
In a related 2009 case of Dizon v. Commission on Elections,56 the Court would again find the same
Mayor Morales as respondent in a disqualification proceeding when he ran again as a mayoralty
candidate during the 2007 elections for a term ending June 30, 2010. Having been unseated from
his post by virtue of this Court’s ruling in Rivera, Morales would argue this time around that the
three-term limit rule was no longer applicable as to his 2007 mayoralty bid. This time, the Court ruled
in his favor, holding that for purposes of the 2007 elections, the three-term limit rule was no longer a
disqualifying factor as against Morales. The Court wrote:

Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’ involuntary severance from office with respect to
the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term
provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. Our decision in the Rivera case
was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the
vice mayor’s office of our decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May
2007 up to 30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter
how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales’ continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not
hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007.57 (Emphasis supplied)

To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of

terms and/or involuntary interruption, viz:

1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed
the position pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the
unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as
contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be
counted in the application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for the same
position he held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said
position is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption
(Montebon).

2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the
elective position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an
interruption in the continuity of the official’s service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e.,
from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo and
Socrates).

3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city
does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent official’s continuity of service (Latasa).

4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer’s continued

stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension,
although he is barred from exercising the functions of his office during this period (Aldovino,
Jr.).

5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his
term is interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus
disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of
office had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon). The break or interruption need
not be for a full term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for
any length of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of
service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida).
 6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after
said official had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does
not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His
full service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because
the nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).

The Case of Abundo

Abundo argues that the RTC and the COMELEC erred in uniformly ruling that he had already served
three consecutive terms and is, thus, barred by the constitutional three-term limit rule to run for the
current 2010-2013 term. In gist, Abundo arguments run thusly:

1. Aldovino, Jr. is not on all fours with the present case as the former dealt with preventive
suspension which does not interrupt the continuity of service of a term;

2. Aldovino, Jr. recognizes that the term of an elected official can be interrupted so as to
remove him from the reach of the constitutional three-term limitation;

3. The COMELEC misinterpreted the meaning of "term" in Aldovino, Jr. by its reliance on a
mere portion of the Decision and not on the unified logic in the disquisition;

4. Of appropriate governance in this case is the holding in Lonzanida58 and Rivera III v.

Commission on Elections.59

5. The COMELEC missed the point when it ruled that there was no interruption in the service
of Abundo since what he considered as an "interruption" of his 2004-2007 term occurred
before his term started; and

6. To rule that the term of the protestee (Torres) whose proclamation was adjudged invalid
was interrupted while that of the protestant (Abundo) who was eventually proclaimed winner
was not so interrupted is at once absurd as it is illogical.

Both respondents Vega and the COMELEC counter that the ratio decidendi of Aldovino, Jr. finds
application in the instant case. The COMELEC ruled that Abundo did not lose title to the office as his
victory in the protest case confirmed his entitlement to said office and he was only unable to
temporarily discharge the functions of the office during the pendency of the election protest.

We note that this present case of Abundo deals with the effects of an election protest, for which the
rulings in Lonzanida, Ong, Rivera and Dizon appear to be more attuned than the case of Aldovino
Jr., the interrupting effects of the imposition of a preventive suspension being the very lis mota in the
Aldovino, Jr. case. But just the same, We find that Abundo’s case presents a different factual
backdrop.

Unlike in the abovementioned election protest cases wherein the individuals subject of
disqualification were candidates who lost in the election protest and each declared loser during the
elections, Abundo was the winner during the election protest and was declared the rightful holder of
the mayoralty post. Unlike Mayor Lonzanida and Mayor Morales, who were both unseated toward
the end of their respective terms, Abundo was the protestant who ousted his opponent and had
assumed the remainder of the term.
Notwithstanding, We still find this Court’s pronouncements in the past as instructive, and consider
several doctrines established from the 1998 case of Borja, Jr. up to the most recent case of Aldovino
Jr. in 2009, as potent aids in arriving at this Court’s conclusion.

The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not only to abrogate the "monopolization of political
power" and prevent elected officials from breeding "proprietary interest in their position"60 but also to
"enhance the people’s freedom of choice."61 In the words of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, "while
people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of power may bring about, care should be
taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed."62

In the present case, the Court finds Abundo’s case meritorious and declares that the two-year period
during which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption,
which effectively removed Abundo’s case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule.

It bears to stress at this juncture that Abundo, for the 2004 election for the term starting July 1, 2004
to June 30, 2007, was the duly elected mayor. Otherwise how explain his victory in his election
protest against Torres and his consequent proclamation as duly elected mayor. Accordingly, the first
requisite for the application of the disqualification rule based on the three-term limit that the official
has been elected is satisfied.

This thus brings us to the second requisite of whether or not Abundo had served for "three
consecutive terms," as the phrase is juridically understood, as mayor of Viga, Catanduanes
immediately before the 2010 national and local elections. Subsumed to this issue is of course the
question of whether or not there was an effective involuntary interruption during the three three-year
periods, resulting in the disruption of the continuity of Abundo’s mayoralty.

The facts of the case clearly point to an involuntary interruption during the July 2004-June 2007
term.

There can be no quibbling that, during the term 2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the decision
of the election protest in his favor, Abundo assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and
served the term until June 30, 2007 or for a period of a little over one year and one month.
Consequently, unlike Mayor Ong in Ong and Mayor Morales in Rivera, it cannot be said that Mayor
Abundo was able to serve fully the entire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise entitled.

A "term," as defined in Appari v. Court of Appeals,63 means, in a legal sense, "a fixed and definite
period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office."64 It also means the "time
during which the officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right, and fixes the interval after which
the several incumbents shall succeed one another."65 It is the period of time during which a duly
elected official has title to and can serve the functions of an elective office. From paragraph (a) of
Sec. 43, RA 7160,66 the term for local elected officials is three (3) years starting from noon of June
30 of the first year of said term.

In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, or from June 30, 2004 until May
8, 2006, Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor
as a matter of right. Neither can he assert title to the same nor serve the functions of the said
elective office. The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold such office and the
corresponding right to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed
election winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually held the office and exercised the functions as mayor
only upon his declaration, following the resolution of the protest, as duly elected candidate in the
May 2004 elections or for only a little over one year and one month. Consequently, since the legally
contemplated full term for local elected officials is three (3) years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully
served the term 2004-2007. The reality on the ground is that Abundo actually served less.

Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during which Abundo’s opponent actually served as
Mayor is and ought to be considered an involuntary interruption of Abundo’s continuity of service. An
involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one
term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold.67

The notion of full service of three consecutive terms is related to the concepts of interruption of
service and voluntary renunciation of service. The word interruption means temporary cessation,
intermission or suspension.68To interrupt is to obstruct, thwart or prevent.69 When the Constitution
and the LGC of 1991 speak of interruption, the reference is to the obstruction to the continuance of
the service by the concerned elected official by effectively cutting short the service of a term or
giving a hiatus in the occupation of the elective office. On the other hand, the word "renunciation"
connotes the idea of waiver or abandonment of a known right. To renounce is to give up, abandon,
decline or resign.70 Voluntary renunciation of the office by an elective local official would thus mean
to give up or abandon the title to the office and to cut short the service of the term the concerned
elected official is entitled to.

In its assailed Resolution, the COMELEC en banc, applying Aldovino, Jr.,71 held:

It must be stressed that involuntary interruption of service which jurisprudence deems an exception
to the three-term limit rule, implies that the service of the term has begun before it was interrupted.
Here, the respondent did not lose title to the office. As the assailed Resolution states:

In the case at bar, respondent cannot be said to have lost his title to the office. On the contrary, he
actively sought entitlement to the office when he lodged the election protest case. And respondent-
appellant’s victory in the said case is a final confirmation that he was validly elected for the mayoralty
post of Viga, Catanduanes in 2004-2007. At most, respondent-appellant was only unable to
temporarily discharge the functions of the office to which he was validly elected during the pendency
of the election protest, but he never lost title to the said office.72 (Emphasis added.)

The COMELEC’s Second Division, on the other hand, pronounced that the actual length of service
by the public official in a given term is immaterial by reckoning said service for the term in the
application of the three-term limit rule, thus:

As emphasized in the case of Aldovino, "this formulation—no more than three consecutive terms—is
a clear command suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule." Therefore we cannot subscribe to
the argument that since respondent Abundo served only a portion of the term, his 2004-2007 "term"
should not be considered for purposes of the application of the three term limit rule. When the
framers of the Constitution drafted and incorporated the three term limit rule, it is clear that reference
is to the term, not the actual length of the service the public official may render. Therefore, one’s
actual service of term no matter how long or how short is immaterial.73

In fine, the COMELEC ruled against Abundo on the theory that the length of the actual service of the
term is immaterial in his case as he was only temporarily unable to discharge his functions as mayor.

The COMELEC’s case disposition and its heavy reliance on Aldovino, Jr. do not commend
themselves for concurrence. The Court cannot simply find its way clear to understand the poll body’s
determination that Abundo was only temporarily unable to discharge his functions as mayor during
the pendency of the election protest.
As previously stated, the declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local
elected official the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Verily, while he was declared
winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundo’s full term has been
substantially reduced by the actual service rendered by his opponent (Torres). Hence, there was
actual involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served
the full 2004-2007 term.

This is what happened in the instant case. It cannot be overemphasized that pending the favorable
resolution of his election protest, Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary constituent since his
opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat. In other
words, for almost two years or from July 1, 2004—the start of the term—until May 9, 2006 or during
which his opponent actually assumed the mayoralty office, Abundo was a private citizen warming his
heels while awaiting the outcome of his protest. Hence, even if declared later as having the right to
serve the elective position from July 1, 2004, such declaration would not erase the fact that prior to
the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayor’s office and, in fact, had no
legal right to said position.

Aldovino Jr. cannot possibly lend support to respondent’s cause of action, or to COMELEC’s
resolution against Abundo. In Aldovino Jr., the Court succinctly defines what temporary inability or
disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective office means, thus:

On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post,
even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not
involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding office; the office holder,
while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided
by law.74

We rule that the above pronouncement on preventive suspension does not apply to the instant case.
Verily, it is erroneous to say that Abundo merely was temporarily unable or disqualified to exercise
the functions of an elective post. For one, during the intervening period of almost two years,
reckoned from the start of the 2004-2007 term, Abundo cannot be said to have retained title to the
mayoralty office as he was at that time not the duly proclaimed winner who would have the legal
right to assume and serve such elective office. For another, not having been declared winner yet,
Abundo cannot be said to have lost title to the office since one cannot plausibly lose a title which, in
the first place, he did not have. Thus, for all intents and purposes, even if the belated declaration in
the election protest accords him title to the elective office from the start of the term, Abundo was not
entitled to the elective office until the election protest was finally resolved in his favor.
1âwphi1

Consequently, there was a hiatus of almost two years, consisting of a break and effective
interruption of his service, until he assumed the office and served barely over a year of the remaining
term. At this juncture, We observe the apparent similarities of Mayor Abundo’s case with the cases
of Mayor Talaga in Adormeo and Mayor Hagedorn in Socrates as Mayors Talaga and Hagedorn
were not proclaimed winners since they were non-candidates in the regularelections. They were
proclaimed winners during the recall elections and clearly were not able to fully serve the terms of
the deposed incumbent officials. Similar to their cases where the Court deemed their terms as
involuntarily interrupted, Abundo also became or was a private citizen during the period over which
his opponent was serving as mayor. If in Lonzanida, the Court ruled that there was interruption in
Lonzanida’s service because of his subsequent defeat in the election protest, then with more reason,
Abundo’s term for 2004-2007 should be declared interrupted since he was not proclaimed winner
after the 2004 elections and was able to assume the office and serve only for a little more than a
year after winning the protest.
As aptly stated in Latasa, to be considered as interruption of service, the "law contemplates a rest
period during which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or
authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government
unit."75 Applying the said principle in the present case, there is no question that during the pendency
of the election protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority over the good people of
Viga, Catanduanes.

Consequently, the period during which Abundo was not serving as mayor should be considered as a
rest period or break in his service because, as earlier stated, prior to the judgment in the election
protest, it was Abundo’s opponent, Torres, who was exercising such powers by virtue of the still then
valid proclamation.

As a final note, We reiterate that Abundo’s case differs from other cases involving the effects of an
election protest because while Abundo was, in the final reckoning, the winning candidate, he was the
one deprived of his right and opportunity to serve his constituents. To a certain extent, Abundo was
a victim of an imperfect election system. While admittedly the Court does not possess the mandate
to remedy such imperfections, the Constitution has clothed it with enough authority to establish a
fortress against the injustices it may bring.

In this regard, We find that a contrary ruling would work damage and cause grave injustice to
Abundo––an elected official who was belatedly declared as the winner and assumed office for only a
short period of the term. If in the cases of Lonzanida and Dizon, this Court ruled in favor of a losing
candidate––or the person who was adjudged not legally entitled to hold the contested public office
but held it anyway––We find more reason to rule in favor of a winning candidate-protestant who, by
popular vote, deserves title to the public office but whose opportunity to hold the same was halted by
an invalid proclamation.

Also, more than the injustice that may be committed against Abundo is the injustice that may
likewise be committed against the people of Viga, Catanduanes by depriving them of their right to
choose their leaders. Like the framers of the Constitution, We bear in mind that We "cannot arrogate
unto ourselves the right to decide what the people want"76 and hence, should, as much as possible,
"allow the people to exercise their own sense of proportion and rely on their own strength to curtail
the power when it overreaches itself."77 For democracy draws strength from the choice the people
make which is the same choice We are likewise bound to protect.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed February 8,
2012 Resolution of the Commission on Elections Second Division and May 10, 2012 Resolution of
the Commission on Elections en banc in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010 and the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, dated August 9, 2010, in Election Case No. 55,
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. is DECLARED ELIGIBLE for the position of Mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes to which he was duly elected in the May 2010 elections and is accordingly ordered
IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED to said position. Withal, Emeterio M. Tarin and Cesar O. Cervantes
are ordered to immediately vacate the positions of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes,
respectively, and shall revert to their original positions of Vice-Mayor and First Councilor,
respectively, upon receipt of this Decision.

The TRO issued by the Court on July 3, 2012 is hereby LIFTED.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR., petitioner vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR., respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This case presents for determination the scope of the constitutional provision barring
elective officials, with the exception of barangay officials, from serving more than three
consecutive terms. In particular, the question is whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office
of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a
term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.
Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988
for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law,
upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor
for a term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected
mayor for another term of three years ending June 30, 1998.[1]
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of
Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a
candidate for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the theory that the latter would have
already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be
ineligible to serve for another term after that.
On April 30, 1998, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of
petitioner and declared private respondent Capco disqualified from running for reelection as
mayor of Pateros.[2] However, on motion of private respondent, the COMELEC en banc, voting
5-2, reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor in the May 11, 1998
elections.[3] The majority stated in its decision:
In both the Constitution and the Local
Government Code, the three-term limitation
refers to the term of office for which the
local official was elected. It made no
reference to succession to an office to which
he was not elected. In the case before the
Commission, respondent Capco was not
elected to the position of mayor in the
January 18, 1988 local elections. He
succeeded to such office by operation of law
 and served for the unexpired term of his
predecessor. Consequently, such succession
into office is not counted as one (1) term for
purposes of the computation of the three-
term limitation under the Constitution and
the Local Government Code.
Accordingly, private respondent was voted for in the elections. He received 16,558 votes
against petitioners 7,773 votes and was proclaimed elected by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers.
This is a petition for certiorari brought to set aside the resolution, dated May 7, 1998, of he
COMELEC and to seed a declaration that private respondent is disqualified to serve another term
as Mayor of Pateros, Metro Manila.
Petitioner contends that private respondent Capcos service as mayor from September 2,
1989 to June 30, 992 should be considered as service for full one term, and since he thereafter
served from 1992 to 1998 two more terms as mayor, he should be considered to have served
three consecutive terms within the contemplation of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution and 43(b) of the
Local Government Code. Petitioner stresses the fact that, upon the death of Mayor Cesar Borja
on September 2, 1989, private respondent became the mayor and thereafter served the remainder
of the term. Petitioner argues that it is irrelevant that private respondent became mayor by
succession because the purpose of the constitutional provision in limiting the number of terms
elective local officials may serve is to prevent a monopolization of political power.
This contention will not bear analysis. Article X, 8 of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected.

This provision is restated in 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160):

Sec. 43. Term of Office - . . .

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms
in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the
full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.

First, to prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only policy embodied in
the constitutional provision in question. The other policy is that of enhancing the freedom of
choice of the people. To consider, therefore, only stay in office regardless of how the official
concerned came to that office whether by election or by succession by operation of law would be
to disregard one of the purposes of the constitutional provision in question.
Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution reveals
that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the
freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political
power. Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after
serving three consecutive terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for local and
legislative officials. Instead, they adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian
Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the same position in the
succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term. [4] Monsod warned
against prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will choose as a result of the
proposed absolute disqualification, considering that the draft constitution provision recognizing
peoples power.[5]
Commissioner Blas F. Ople, who supported the Monsod proposal, said:

The principle involved is really whether this Commission shall impose a temporary or a
perpetual disqualification on those who have served their terms in accordance with the limits on
consecutive service as decided by the Constitutional Commission. I would be very wary about
this Commission exercising a sort of omnipotent power in order to disqualify those who will
already have served their terms from perpetuating themselves in office. I think the Commission
achieves its purpose in establishing safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a
result of consecutive terms. We do put a cap on consecutive service in the case of the President,
six years; in the case of the Vice-President, unlimited; and in the case of the Senators, one
reelection. In the case of the Members of Congress, both from the legislative districts and from
the party list and sectoral representation, this is now under discussion and later on the policy
concerning local officials will be taken up by the Committee on Local Governments. The
principle remains the same. I think we want to prevent future situations where, as a result of
continuous service and frequent reelections, officials from the President down to the municipal
mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest in their position and to accumulate those powers and
perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these posts to members of their
families in a subsequent election. I think that is taken care of because we put a gap on the
continuity or the unbroken service of all of these officials. But where we now decide to put these
prospective servants of the people or politicians, if we want to use the coarser term, under a
perpetual disqualification, I have a feeling that we are taking away too much from the people,
whereas we should be giving as much to the people as we can in terms of their own freedom of
choice.[6]

Other commissioners went on record against perpetually disqualifying elective officials who
have served a certain number of terms as this would deny the right of the people to choose. As
Commissioner Yusup R. Abubakar asked, why should we arrogate unto ourselves the right to
decide what the people want?[7]
Commisioner Felicitas S. Aquino spoke in the same vein when she called on her colleagues
to "allow the people to exercise their own sense of proportion and [rely] on their own strength to
curtail power when it overreaches itself.[8]
 Commissioner Teodoro C. Bacani stressed: Why should we not leave [perpetual
disqualification after serving a number of terms] to the premise accepted by practically
everybody here that our people are politically mature? Should we use this assumption only when
it is convenient for us, and not when it may also lead to a freedom of choice for the people and
for politicians who may aspire to serve them longer?[9]
Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission. The first is the notion of service of term, derived from the concern about the
accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in office. The second is the idea
of election, derived from the concern that the right of the people to choose those whom they wish
to govern them be preserved.
It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did
so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of reelection. This is
clear from the following exchange in the Constitutional Commission concerning term limits,
now embodied in Art. VI 4 and 7 of the Constitution, for members of Congress:
MR. GASCON. I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the second term. We will
allow the Senator to rest for a period of time before he can run again?
MR. DAVIDE. That is correct.
MR. GASCON. And the question that we left behind before if the Gentlemen will remember-
was: How long will that period of rest be? Will it be one election which is three years or one term
which is six years?
MR. DAVIDE. If the Gentlemen will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo expressed the view
that during the election following the expiration of the first 12 years, whether
such election will be on the third year or on the sixth year thereafter, this particular
member of the Senate can run. So it is not really a period of hibernation for six
years. That was the Committees stand.[10]
Indeed, a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people should be
allowed to choose whom they please to govern them.[11] To bar the election of a local official
because he has already served three terms, although the first as a result of succession by
operation of law rather than election, would therefore be to violate this principle.
Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the ruling of
the COMELEC that Art. X, 8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms
as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of the term of office of elective local officials
and bars such official[s] from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second
sentence, in explaining when an elective local official may be deemed to have served his full
term of office, states that voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected. The term served must therefore be one for which [the official concerned] was
elected. The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the
number of terms an elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which
he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such
official cannot be considered to have fully served the term now withstanding his voluntary
renunciation of office prior to its expiration.
 Reference is made to Commissioner Bernas comment on Art. VI, 7, which similarly bars
members of the House of Representatives from serving for more than three terms. Commissioner
Bernas states that if one is elected Representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that
unexpired term, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing
the number of successive terms allowed.[12]
This is actually based on the opinion expressed by Commissioner Davide in answer to a
query of Commissioner Suarez: For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the
Senator newly elected would have to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Would that mean
that serving the unexpired portion of the term is already considered one term? So, half a term,
which is actually the correct statement, plus one term would disqualify the Senator concerned
from running? Is that the meaning of this provision on disqualification, Madam President?
Commissioner Davide said: Yes, because we speak of term and if there is a special election, he
will serve only for the unexpired portion of that particular term plus one more term for the
Senator and two more terms for the Members of the Lower House.[13]
There is a difference, however, between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member of
the House of Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or
is removed from office. The vice-mayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. [14] On the
other hand, the Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. [15] In a real sense, therefore, such
Representative serves a term for which he was elected. As the purpose of the constitutional
provision is to limit the right ot be elected and to serve in Congress, his service of the unexpired
term is rightly counted as his first term. Rather than refute what we believe to be the intendment
of Art. X, 8 with regard to elective local officials, the case of a Representative who succeeds
another confirms the theory.
Petitioner also cites Art. VII, 4 of the Constitution which provides for succession of the
Vice-President to the Presidency in case of vacancy in that office. After stating that The
President shall not be eligible for any reelection, this provision says that No person who has
succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for
election to the same office at any time. Petitioner contends that, by analogy, the vice-mayor
should likewise be considered to have served a full term as mayor if he succeeds to the latters
office and serves for the remainder of the term.
The framers of the Constitution included such a provision because, without it, the Vice-
President, who simply steps into the Presidency by succession would be qualified to run for
President even if he has occupied that office for more than four years. The absence of a similar
provision in Art. X, 8 on elective local officials throws in bold relief the difference between the
two cases. It underscores the constitutional intent to cover only the terms of office to which one
may have been elected for purpose of the three-term limit on local elective officials, disregarding
for this purpose service by automatic succession.
There is another reason why the Vice-President who succeeds to the Presidency and serves
in that office for more than four years is ineligible for election as President. The Vice-President
is elected primarily to succeed the President in the event of the latters death, permanent
disability, removal or resignation. While he may be appointed to the cabinet, his becoming so is
entirely dependent on the good graces of the President. In running for Vice-President, he may
thus be said to also seek the Presidency. For their part, the electors likewise choose as Vice-
President the candidate who they think can fill the Presidency in the event it becomes
vacant. Hence, service in the presidency for more than four years may rightly be considered as
service for a full term.
This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor. Under the local Government Code, he is the
presiding officer of the sanggunian and he appoints all officials and employees of such local
assembly. He has distinct powers and functions, succession to mayorship in the event of vacancy
therein being only one of them. [16] It cannot be said of him, as much as of the Vice-President in
the event of a vacancy in the Presidency, that in running for vice-mayor, he also seeks the
mayorship. His assumption of the mayorship in the event of vacancy is more a matter of chance
than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the application of any
term limit.
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to
be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not
enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must
also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply. This point can be made clearer by considering the following cases or
situations:

Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason of the death of
the incumbent. Six months before the next election, he resigns and is twice elected
thereafter. Can he run again for mayor in the next election.

Yes, because although he has already first served as mayor by succession and
subsequently resigned from office before the full term expired, he has not actually
served three full terms in all for the purpose of applying the term limit. Under Art. X,
8, voluntary renunciation of the office is not considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term only if the term is one for which he was
elected. Since A is only completing the service of the term for which the deceased and
not he was elected. A cannot be considered to have completed one term. His
resignation constitutes an interruption of the full term.

Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected Mayor and, during his first term, he is twice
suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that, can
he run for one more term in the next election?

Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively.

In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two conditions for the
application of the disqualification provisions have not concurred, namely, that the local official
concerned has been elected three consecutive times and that he has fully served three consecutive
terms. In the first case, even if the local official is considered to have served three full terms
notwithstanding his resignation before the end of the first term, the fact remains that he has not
been elected three times. In the second case, the local official has been elected three consecutive
times, but he has not fully served three consecutive terms.
Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by succession involves a
total failure of the two conditions to concur for the purpose of applying Art. X
8. Suppose he is twice elected after that term, is he qualified to run again in the next
election?

Yes, because he was not elected to the office of the mayor in the first term but simply
found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term
because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death , of the deceased
mayor.

To consider C in the third case to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to
run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the
right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. If the vice-mayor turns out to be a
bad mayor, the people can remedy the situation by simply not reelecting him for another
term.But if, on the other hand, he proves to be a good mayor, there will be no way the people can
return him to office (even if it is just the third time he is standing for reelection) if his service of
the first term is counted as one of the purpose of applying the term limit.
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the
Constitutional Commission that while the people should be protected from the evils that a
monopoly of political power may bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice
is not unduly curtailed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
 
 
SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., G.R. No. 184836
DANILO B. FALLER AND  
FERDINAND N. TALABONG, PUNO, C J.,
Petitioners, CARPIO,
   
  CORONA,
  CARPIO MORALES,
  VELASCO, JR.,
-      versus - NACHURA,
  LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
  BRION,
  PERALTA,
   BERSAMIN,
  DEL CASTILLO,
  ABAD, and
  VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS  
AND WILFREDO F. ASILO, Promulgated:
Respondents.  
December 23, 2009
x ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
 
DECISION
 
BRION, J.:
 
 
Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of
his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article
X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the
Local Government Code)?
 
The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive
suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the suspended public
official unable to provide complete service for the full term; thus, such term should
not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
 
The present petition[1] seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
 
THE ANTECEDENTS
 
The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor
of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and
2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of
office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with
a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the
Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of
his office and finished his term.
 
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same
position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand
N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilos certificate of
candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for
three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit
rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.
 
The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilos
favour in its Resolution of November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-term
limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-
2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.
 
The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second Divisions ruling
in its October 7, 2008 Resolution; hence, the PRESENT PETITION raising the
following ISSUES:
 
1.      Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of
the three-term limit rule; and
 
2.      Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as
contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160
 
Thus presented, the case raises the direct issue of whether Asilos preventive
suspension constituted an interruption that allowed him to run for a 4th term.
THE COURTS RULING
 
We find the petition meritorious.
 
General Considerations
 
The present case is not the first before this Court on the three-term limit
provision of the Constitution, but is the first on the effect of preventive suspension
on the continuity of an elective officials term. To be sure, preventive suspension,
as an interruption in the term of an elective public official, has been mentioned as
an example in Borja v. Commission on Elections.[2] Doctrinally, however, Borja is
not a controlling ruling; it did not deal with preventive suspension, but with the
application of the three-term rule on the term that an elective official acquired by
succession.
 
 
 
 
a.     The Three-term Limit Rule:
The Constitutional Provision Analyzed
 
 
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:
 
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
 
 
Section 43 (b) of RA 7160 practically repeats the constitutional provision,
and any difference in wording does not assume any significance in this case.
 
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective
office and limits an elective officials stay in office to no more than three
consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8,
Article X.
  
Significantly, this provision refers to a term as a period of
time three years during which an official has title to office and can serve. Appari
v. Court of Appeals,[3] a Resolution promulgated on November 28, 2007, succinctly
discusses what a term connotes, as follows:
 
The word term in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time
which the law describes that an officer may hold an office. According to
Mechem, the term of office is the period during which an office may be
held. Upon expiration of the officers term, unless he is authorized by law to
holdover, his rights, duties and authority as a public officer must ipso facto cease.
In the law of public officers, the most and natural frequent method by which a
public officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the terms for which he was
elected or appointed. [Emphasis supplied].
 
A later case, Gaminde v. Commission on Audit,[4] reiterated that [T]he term means
the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the
interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another.
 
The limitation under this first branch of the provision is expressed in
the negative no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. This formulation no more than three consecutive terms is a clear command
suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule. While it gives no exact indication of
what to serve. . . three consecutive terms exactly connotes, the meaning is clear
reference is to the term, not to the service that a public official may render. In other
words, the limitation refers to the term.
 
The second branch relates to the provisions express initiative to prevent any
circumvention of the limitation through voluntary severance of ties with the public
office; it expressly states that voluntary renunciation of office shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected. This declaration complements the term limitation mandated
by the first branch.
  
A notable feature of the second branch is that it does not textually state that
voluntary renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that does not affect
continuity of service for a full term for purposes of the three-term limit rule. It is a
pure declaratory statement of what does not serve as an interruption of service for a
full term, but the phrase voluntary renunciation, by itself, is not without
significance in determining constitutional intent.
 
The word renunciation carries the dictionary meaning of abandonment. To
renounce is to give up, abandon, decline, or resign.[5] It is an act that emanates
from its author, as contrasted to an act that operates from the outside. Read with
the definition of a term in mind, renunciation, as mentioned under the second
branch of the constitutional provision, cannot but mean an act that results in
cutting short the term, i.e., the loss of title to office. The descriptive word voluntary
linked together with renunciation signifies an act of surrender based on the
surenderees own freely exercised will; in other words, a loss of title to office by
conscious choice. In the context of the three-term limit rule, such loss of title is not
considered an interruption because it is presumed to be purposely sought to avoid
the application of the term limitation.
 
The following exchanges in the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission on the term voluntary renunciation shed further light on the extent of
the term voluntary renunciation:
 
MR. MAAMBONG. Could I address the clarificatory question to the
Committee? This term voluntary renunciation does not appear in Section 3 [of
Article VI]; it also appears in Section 6 [of Article VI].
 
MR DAVIDE. Yes.
 
MR. MAAMBONG. It is also a recurring phrase all over the Constitution. Could
the Committee please enlighten us exactly what voluntary renunciation mean? Is
this akin to abandonment?
 
 MR. DAVIDE. Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot circumvent
the restriction by merely resigning at any given time on the second term.
 
MR. MAAMBONG. Is the Committee saying that the term voluntary renunciation
is more general than abandonment and resignation?
 
MR. DAVIDE. It is more general, more embracing.[6]
 
From this exchange and Commissioner Davides expansive interpretation of the
term voluntary renunciation, the framers intent apparently was to close all gaps
that an elective official may seize to defeat the three-term limit rule, in the way that
voluntary renunciation has been rendered unavailable as a mode of defeating the
three-term limit rule. Harking back to the text of the constitutional provision, we
note further that Commissioner Davides view is consistent with the negative
formulation of the first branch of the provision and the inflexible interpretation that
it suggests.
 
This examination of the wording of the constitutional provision and of the
circumstances surrounding its formulation impresses upon us the clear intent to
make term limitation a high priority constitutional objective whose terms must be
strictly construed and which cannot be defeated by, nor sacrificed for, values of
less than equal constitutional worth. We view preventive suspension vis--vis term
limitation with this firm mindset.
 
b.     Relevant Jurisprudence on the
Three-term Limit Rule
 
Other than the above-cited materials, jurisprudence best gives us a lead into
the concepts within the provisions contemplation, particularly on the interruption
in the continuity of service for the full term that it speaks of.
 
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections[7] presented the question of whether
the disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the
public official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner of the public
official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final and
executory judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the
disqualification (viz., 1. that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2. that he has fully
served three consecutive terms) were not present. In so ruling, we said:
 
The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to
circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the
same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official full service of
a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not
cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term
limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short
of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral
elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process
of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary
severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the
petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. [Emphasis supplied]
 
Our intended meaning under this ruling is clear: it is severance from office, or to
be exact, loss of title, that renders the three-term limit rule inapplicable.
 
Ong v. Alegre[8] and Rivera v. COMELEC,[9] like Lonzanida, also involved
the issue of whether there had been a completed term for purposes of the three-
term limit disqualification. These cases, however, presented an interesting twist, as
their final judgments in the electoral contest came after the term of the contested
office had expired so that the elective officials in these cases were never effectively
unseated.
 
Despite the ruling that Ong was never entitled to the office (and thus was
never validly elected), the Court concluded that there was nevertheless an election
and service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule based on the
following premises: (1) the final decision that the third-termer lost the election was
without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term
of the contested office had expired; and (2) the official assumed and continuously
exercised the functions of the office from the start to the end of the term. The Court
noted in Ong the absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view that the
official (referring to the winner in the election protest) would, under the three-term
rule, be considered to have served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless
electoral protest ruling, when another actually served the term pursuant to a
proclamation made in due course after an election. This factual variation led the
Court to rule differently from Lonzanida.
 
In the same vein, the Court in Rivera rejected the theory that the official who
finally lost the election contest was merely a caretaker of the office or a mere de
facto officer. The Court obeserved that Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is
violated and its purpose defeated when an official fully served in the same position
for three consecutive terms. Whether as caretaker or de facto officer, he exercised
the powers and enjoyed the perquisites of the office that enabled him to stay on
indefinitely.
 
Ong and Rivera are important rulings for purposes of the three-term
limitation because of what they directly imply. Although the election requisite was
not actually present, the Court still gave full effect to the three-term limitation
because of the constitutional intent to strictly limit elective officials to service for
three terms. By so ruling, the Court signalled how zealously it guards the three-
term limit rule. Effectively, these cases teach us to strictly interpret the term
limitation rule in favor of limitation rather than its exception.
 
Adormeo v. Commission on Elections[10] dealt with the effect of recall on the
three-term limit disqualification. The case presented the question of whether the
disqualification applies if the official lost in the regular election for the supposed
third term, but was elected in a recall election covering that term. The Court upheld
the COMELECs ruling that the official was not elected for three (3) consecutive
terms. The Court reasoned out that for nearly two years, the official was a private
citizen; hence, the continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the
election for the third term.
 
Socrates v. Commission on Elections[11] also tackled recall vis--vis the three-
term limit disqualification. Edward Hagedorn served three full terms as mayor.As
he was disqualified to run for a fourth term, he did not participate in the election
that immediately followed his third term. In this election, the petitioner Victorino
Dennis M. Socrates was elected mayor. Less than 1 years after Mayor Socrates
assumed the functions of the office, recall proceedings were initiated against him,
leading to the call for a recall election. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy
for mayor in the recall election, but Socrates sought his disqualification on the
ground that he (Hagedorn) had fully served three terms prior to the recall election
and was therefore disqualified to run because of the three-term limit rule. We
decided in Hagedorns favor, ruling that:
 
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot
seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the
next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive
term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the
prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is
no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the
intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity
of service.
 
When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective
local officials, the question asked was whether there would be no further election
after three terms, or whether there would be no immediate reelection after three
terms.
x x x x
 

Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a

fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does
not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is
not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-
way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but
not an immediate reelection after the third term.
 
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate
reelection to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of
office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.[12]
  
 
Latasa v. Commission on Elections[13] presented the novel question of
whether a municipal mayor who had fully served for three consecutive terms could
run as city mayor in light of the intervening conversion of the municipality into a
city. During the third term, the municipality was converted into a city; the cityhood
charter provided that the elective officials of the municipality shall, in a holdover
capacity, continue to exercise their powers and functions until elections were held
for the new city officials. The Court ruled that the conversion of the municipality
into a city did not convert the office of the municipal mayor into a local
government post different from the office of the city mayor the territorial
jurisdiction of the city was the same as that of the municipality; the inhabitants
were the same group of voters who elected the municipal mayor for 3 consecutive
terms; and they were the same inhabitants over whom the municipal mayor held
power and authority as their chief executive for nine years. The Court said:
 
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically
included an exception to the peoples freedom to choose those who will govern
them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive
power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay
in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor
after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would
obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this
exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the
City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive
over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of
eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the
Constitution, if not abhorred by it.[14]
 
Latasa instructively highlights, after a review of Lonzanida,
Adormeo and Socrates, that no three-term limit violation results if a rest period or
break in the service between terms or tenure in a given elective post
intervened. In Lonzanida, the petitioner was a private citizen with no title to any
elective office for a few months before the next mayoral elections. Similarly,
in Adormeo and Socrates, the private respondents lived as private citizens for two
years and fifteen months, respectively. Thus, these cases establish that the law
contemplates a complete break from office during which the local elective official
steps down and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the
territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.
 
Seemingly differing from these results is the case of Montebon v.
Commission on Elections,[15] where the highest-ranking municipal councilor
succeeded to the position of vice-mayor by operation of law. The question posed
when he subsequently ran for councilor was whether his assumption as vice-mayor
was an interruption of his term as councilor that would place him outside the
operation of the three-term limit rule. We ruled that an interruption had intervened
so that he could again run as councilor. This result seemingly deviates from the
results in the cases heretofore discussed since the elective official continued to
hold public office and did not become a private citizen during the interim. The
common thread that identifies Montebon with the rest, however, is that the elective
official vacated the office of councilor and assumed the higher post of vice-mayor
by operation of law. Thus, for a time he ceased to be councilor an interruption that
effectively placed him outside the ambit of the three-term limit rule.
 
c.      Conclusion Based on Law
and Jurisprudence
 
From all the above, we conclude that the interruption of a term exempting an
elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the
involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left
his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur.
This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to
be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective officials continuous stay in office to no
more than three consecutive terms, using voluntary renunciation as an example and
standard of what does not constitute an interruption.
 
Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being
involuntary, is an effective interruption of service within a term, as we held
in Montebon. On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise
the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an
effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office
or at least an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining
title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason
provided by law.
 
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder
lost the right to hold on to his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to
render service. The latter occurs during an office holders term when he retains title
to the office but cannot exercise his functions for reasons established by law. Of
course, the term failure to serve cannot be used once the right to office is lost;
without the right to hold office or to serve, then no service can be rendered so that
none is really lost.

To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article X both by

structure and substance fixes an elective officials term of office and limits his stay
in office to three consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no less, by
citing voluntary renunciation as an example of a circumvention. The provision
should be read in the context of interruption of term, not in the context of
interrupting the full continuity of the exercise of the powers of the elective position.
The voluntary renunciation it speaks of refers only to the elective officials
voluntary relinquishment of office and loss of title to this office. It does not speak
of the temporary cessation of the exercise of power or authority that may occur for
various reasons, with preventive suspension being only one of them. To
quote Latasa v. Comelec:[16]
Indeed, [T]he law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective
official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the
inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.
[Emphasis supplied].
 
 
Preventive Suspension and
the Three-Term Limit Rule
 
 
a.  Nature of Preventive Suspension
 
 
Preventive suspension whether under the Local Government Code,[17] the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,[18] or the Ombudsman Act[19] is an interim
remedial measure to address the situation of an official who have been charged
administratively or criminally, where the evidence preliminarily indicates the
likelihood of or potential for eventual guilt or liability.
 
Preventive suspension is imposed under the Local Government Code when
the evidence of guilt is strong and given the gravity of the offense, there is a
possibility that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence. Under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, it is imposed after a
valid information (that requires a finding of probable cause) has been filed in court,
while under the Ombudsman Act, it is imposed when, in the judgment of the
Ombudsman, the evidence of guilt is strong; and (a) the charge involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty;
or (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondents
continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
 
Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is
barred from performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in
the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a
consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.
 
Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates under closely-controlled
conditions and gives a premium to the protection of the service rather than to the
interests of the individual office holder. Even then, protection of the service goes
only as far as a temporary prohibition on the exercise of the functions of the
officials office; the official is reinstated to the exercise of his position as soon as
the preventive suspension is lifted. Thus, while a temporary incapacity in the
exercise of power results, no position is vacated when a public official is
preventively suspended. This was what exactly happened to Asilo.
 
That the imposition of preventive suspension can be abused is a reality that
is true in the exercise of all powers and prerogative under the Constitution and the
laws. The imposition of preventive suspension, however, is not an unlimited
power; there are limitations built into the laws [20] themselves that the courts can
enforce when these limitations are transgressed, particularly when grave abuse of
discretion is present. In light of this well-defined parameters in the imposition of
preventive suspension, we should not view preventive suspension from the extreme
situation that it can totally deprive an elective office holder of the prerogative to
serve and is thus an effective interruption of an election officials term.
 
Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly different aspects
of an elective officials service in office and they do not overlap. As already
mentioned above, preventive suspension involves protection of the service and of
the people being served, and prevents the office holder from temporarily exercising
the power of his office. Term limitation, on the other hand, is triggered after an
elective official has served his three terms in office without any break. Its
companion concept interruption of a term on the other hand, requires loss of title to
office. If preventive suspension and term limitation or interruption have any
commonality at all, this common point may be with respect to the discontinuity of
service that may occur in both. But even on this point, they merely run parallel to
each other and never intersect; preventive suspension, by its nature, is a temporary
incapacity to render service during an unbroken term; in the context of term
limitation, interruption of service occurs after there has been a break in the term.
 
b. Preventive Suspension and
the Intent of the Three-Term
Limit Rule
 
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that
preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an
elective officials stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot
simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in
office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the
office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended officials
continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of
the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.
 
To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and
prohibited term is to close our eyes to this reality and to allow a constitutional
violation through sophistry by equating the temporary inability to discharge the
functions of office with the interruption of term that the constitutional provision
contemplates. To be sure, many reasons exist, voluntary or involuntary some of
them personal and some of them by operation of law that may temporarily prevent
an elective office holder from exercising the functions of his office in the way that
preventive suspension does. A serious extended illness, inability through force
majeure, or the enforcement of a suspension as a penalty, to cite some involuntary
examples, may prevent an office holder from exercising the functions of his office
for a time without forfeiting title to office. Preventive suspension is no different
because it disrupts actual delivery of service for a time within a term. Adopting
such interruption of actual service as the standard to determine effective
interruption of term under the three-term rule raises at least the possibility of
confusion in implementing this rule, given the many modes and occasions when
actual service may be interrupted in the course of serving a term of office. The
standard may reduce the enforcement of the three-term limit rule to a case-to-case
and possibly see-sawing determination of what an effective interruption is.
 
c.      Preventive Suspension and
Voluntary Renunciation
 
 
Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does not
involve a voluntary act on the part of the suspended official, except in the indirect
sense that he may have voluntarily committed the act that became the basis of the
charge against him. From this perspective, preventive suspension does not have the
element of voluntariness that voluntary renunciation embodies. Neither does it
contain the element of renunciation or loss of title to office as it merely involves
the temporary incapacity to perform the service that an elective office demands.
Thus viewed, preventive suspension is by its very nature the exact opposite of
voluntary renunciation; it is involuntary and temporary, and involves only the
actual delivery of service, not the title to the office. The easy conclusion therefore
is that they are, by nature, different and non-comparable.
 
But beyond the obvious comparison of their respective natures is the more
important consideration of how they affect the three-term limit rule.
Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total
incapacity to render service, is disallowed by the Constitution as an effective
interruption of a term. It is therefore not allowed as a mode of circumventing the
three-term limit rule.
 
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective
interruption of a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term
limitation. It can pose as a threat, however, if we shall disregard its nature and
consider it an effective interruption of a term. Let it be noted that a preventive
suspension is easier to undertake than voluntary renunciation, as it does not require
relinquishment or loss of office even for the briefest time. It merely requires an
easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a
preventive suspension has been imposed. In this sense, recognizing preventive
suspension as an effective interruption of a term can serve as a circumvention more
potent than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution expressly disallows as
an interruption.
 
Conclusion
 
To recapitulate, Asilos 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the
Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension
does not interrupt an elective officials term. Thus, the COMELEC refused to apply
the legal command of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution when it granted due
course to Asilos certificate of candidacy for a prohibited fourth term. By so
refusing, the COMELEC effectively committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; its action was a refusal to perform a
positive duty required by no less than the Constitution and was one undertaken
outside the contemplation of law.[21]
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and
accordingly NULLIFY the assailed COMELEC rulings. The private respondent
Wilfredo F. Asilo is declared DISQUALIFIED to run, and perforce to serve, as
Councilor of Lucena City for a prohibited fourth term. Costs against private
respondent Asilo.
 
SO ORDERED.

RAYMUNDO M. ADORMEO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and RAMON Y. TALAGA, JR., respondents.
 DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary

injunction and/or temporary restraining order, to nullify and set aside the
resolution dated May 9, 2001 of public respondent Commission on Elections
in Comelec SPA No. 01-055, which granted the motion for reconsideration
and declared private respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., qualified to run for
Mayor in Lucena City for the May 14, 2001 election. Petitioner prays that
votes cast in private respondents favor should not be counted; and should it
happen that private respondent had been already proclaimed the winner, his
proclamation should be declared null and void.
The uncontroverted facts are as follows:
Petitioner and private respondent were the only candidates who filed their
certificates of candidacy for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14,
2001 elections. Private respondent was then the incumbent mayor.
Private respondent Talaga, Jr. was elected mayor in May 1992. He served
the full term. Again, he was re-elected in 1995-1998. In the election of 1998,
he lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again
won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001.
On March 2, 2001, petitioner filed with the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor, Lucena City a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., on
the ground that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for three
(3) consecutive terms as follows: (1) in the election of May 1992, where he
served the full term; (2) in the election of May 1995, where he again served
the full term; and, (3) in the recall election of May 12, 2000, where he served
only the unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to Tagarao in the 1998
election. Petitioner contended that Talagas candidacy as Mayor constituted a
violation of Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which provides:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected.

On March 9, 2001, private respondent responded that he was not elected

City Mayor for three (3) consecutive terms but only for two (2) consecutive
terms. He pointed to his defeat in the 1998 election by Tagarao. Because of
his defeat the consecutiveness of his years as mayor was interrupted, and
thus his mayorship was not for three consecutive terms of three years each.
Respondent added that his service from May 12, 2001 until June 30, 2001 for
13 months and eighteen (18) days was not a full term, in the contemplation of
the law and the Constitution. He cites Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.
135150, 311 SCRA 602, 611 (1999), as authority to the effect that to apply
disqualification under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, two (2)
conditions must concur, to wit: (a) that the official concerned has been elected
for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (b) that he
has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
On April 20, 2001, the COMELEC, through the First Division, found private
respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. disqualified for the position of city mayor on
the ground that he had already served three (3) consecutive terms, and his
Certificate of Candidacy was ordered withdrawn and/or cancelled.
On April 27, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
reiterating that three (3) consecutive terms means continuous service for nine
(9) years and that the two (2) years service from 1998 to 2000 by Tagarao
who defeated him in the election of 1998 prevented him from having three
consecutive years of service. He added that Tagaraos tenure from 1998 to
2000 could not be considered as a continuation of his mayorship. He further
alleged that the recall election was not a regular election, but a separate
special election specifically to remove incompetent local officials.
On May 3, 2001, petitioner filed his Opposition to private respondents
Motion for Reconsideration stating therein that serving the unexpired term of
office is considered as one (1) term.  Petitioner further contended that Article
[1]

8 of the Constitution speaks of term and does not mention tenure. The fact
that private respondent was not elected in the May 1998 election to start a
term that began on June 30, 1998 was of no moment, according to petitioner,
and what matters is that respondent was elected to an unexpired term in the
recall election which should be considered one full term from June 30, 1998 to
June 30, 2001.
On May 9, 2001, the COMELEC en banc ruled in favor of private
respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr.. It reversed the First Divisions ruling and
held that 1) respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms
because he did not win in the May 11, 1998 elections; 2) that he was installed
only as mayor by reason of his victory in the recall elections; 3) that his victory
in the recall elections was not considered a term of office and is not included
in the 3-term disqualification rule, and 4) that he did not fully serve the three
(3) consecutive terms, and his loss in the May 11, 1998 elections is
considered an interruption in the continuity of his service as Mayor of Lucena
City.
On May 19, 2001, after canvassing, private respondent was proclaimed as
the duly elected Mayor of Lucena City.
Petitioner is now before this Court, raising the sole issue:

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC ACTED WITH GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED ITS RESOLUTION DATED MAY 9, 2001,
DECLARING PRIVATE RESPONDENT RAMON Y. TALAGA, JR., QUALIFIED
TO RUN FOR MAYOR IN LUCENA CITY FOR THE MAY 14, 2001
ELECTIONS. [2]

Stated differently, was private respondent disqualified to run for mayor

of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections?  This issue hinges on whether,
[3]

as provided by the Constitution, he had already served three consecutive

terms in that office.
Petitioner contends that private respondent was disqualified to run for city
mayor by reason of the three-term rule because the unexpired portion of the
term of office he served after winning a recall election, covering the period
May 12, 2000 to June 30, 2001 is considered a full term. He posits that to
interpret otherwise, private respondent would be serving four (4) consecutive
terms of 10 years, in violation of Section 8, Article X of 1987 Constitution  and [4]

Section 43 (b) of R.A. 7160, known as the Local Government Code.

Section 43. Term of Office.

xxx

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in
the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which
the elective official concerned was elected.

Private respondent, in turn, maintains that his service as city mayor of

Lucena is not consecutive. He lost his bid for a second re-election in 1998 and
between June 30, 1998 to May 12, 2000, during Tagaraos incumbency, he
was a private citizen, thus he had not been mayor for 3 consecutive terms.
 In its comment, the COMELEC restated its position that private
respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms having lost his
third bid in the May 11, 1998elections, said defeat is an interruption in the
continuity of service as city mayor of Lucena.
The issue before us was already addressed in Borja, Jr. vs. COMELEC,
295 SCRA 157, 169 (1998), where we held,

To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to
the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective
position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the
same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. This
point can be made clearer by considering the following case or situation:

xxx

Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first term, he is twice
suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that, can
he run for one more term in the next election?

Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively.

xxx

To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of

the Constitutional Commission that while the people should be protected from the
evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about, care should be taken that
their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.

Likewise, in the case of Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602, 611
(1999), we said,

This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must
concur: a) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive
terms.

Accordingly, COMELECs ruling that private respondent was not elected

for three (3) consecutive terms should be upheld. For nearly two years he was
a private citizen.The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in
the 1998 elections.
 Patently untenable is petitioners contention that COMELEC in allowing
respondent Talaga, Jr. to run in the May 1998 election violates Article X,
Section 8 of 1987 Constitution.  To bolster his case, respondent adverts to the
[5]

comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a Constitutional Commission member, stating

that in interpreting said provision that if one is elected representative to serve
the unexpired term of another, that unexpired, no matter how short, will be
considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive
terms allowed. [6]

As pointed out by the COMELEC en banc, Fr. Bernas comment is

pertinent only to members of the House of Representatives. Unlike local
government officials, there is no recall election provided for members of
Congress. [7]

Neither can respondents victory in the recall election be deemed a

violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as voluntary renunciation
for clearly it is not. In Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, we said:

The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. The clear intent
of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit
by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice
and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this
provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for
any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next
mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal
process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary
severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the
petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. [8]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The resolution

of public respondent Commission on Elections dated May 9, 2001, in Comelec
SPA No. 01-055 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES, Mayor of Puerto Princesa

City, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE
PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY (PRA) of Puerto Princesa
 City, PRA Interim Chairman Punong Bgy. MARK DAVID
HAGEDORN, PRA Interim Secretary Punong Bgy. BENJAMIN
JARILLA, PRA Chairman and Presiding Officer Punong Bgy.
EARL S. BUENVIAJE and PRA Secretary Punong Bgy. CARLOS
ABALLA, JR. respondents.

[G.R. No. 154683. November 12, 2002]

VICENTE S. SANDOVAL, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. Nos. 155083-84. November 12, 2002]

MA. FLORES P. ADOVO, MERCY E. GILO and BIENVENIDO OLLAVE,

SR., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and
EDWARD S. HAGEDORN, respondents.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before us are consolidated petitions for certiorari  seeking the reversal of

[1]

the resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC for

brevity) in relation to the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa City,
Palawan.

The Antecedents

On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the then incumbent barangay
officials of the Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory
Recall Assembly (PRA for brevity) at the Gymnasium of Barangay San Jose
from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon. The PRA was convened to initiate the recall  of
[2]
Victorino Dennis M. Socrates (Socrates for brevity) who assumed office as
Puerto Princesas mayor on June 30, 2001. The members of the PRA
designated Mark David M. Hagedorn, president of the Association of
Barangay Captains, as interim chair of the PRA.
On the same date, the PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02 (Recall
Resolution for brevity) which declared its loss of confidence in Socrates and
called for his recall. The PRA requested the COMELEC to schedule the recall
election for mayor within 30 days from receipt of the Recall Resolution.
On July 16, 2002, Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition, docketed
as E.M. No. 02-010 (RC), to nullify and deny due course to the Recall
Resolution.
On August 14, 2002, the COMELEC en banc  promulgated a resolution
[3]

dismissing for lack of merit Socrates petition. The COMELEC gave due

course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on
September 7, 2002.
On August 21, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated Resolution No.
5673 prescribing the calendar of activities and periods of certain prohibited
acts in connection with the recall election. The COMELEC fixed the campaign
period from August 27, 2002 to September 5, 2002 or a period of 10 days.
On August 23, 2002, Edward M. Hagedorn (Hagedorn for brevity) filed his
certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election.
On August 17, 2002, Ma. Flores F. Adovo (Adovo for brevity) and Merly E.
Gilo (Gilo for brevity) filed a petition before the COMELEC, docketed as SPA
No. 02-492, to disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall election and to
cancel his certificate of candidacy. On August 30, 2002, a certain Bienvenido
Ollave, Sr. (Ollave for brevity) filed a petition-in-intervention in SPA No. 02-
492 also seeking to disqualify Hagedorn. On the same date, a certain Genaro
V. Manaay filed another petition, docketed as SPA No. 02-539, against
Hagedorn alleging substantially the same facts and involving the same
issues. The petitions were all anchored on the ground that Hagedorn is
disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected
and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms
immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post.
Subsequently, SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539 were consolidated.
In a resolution promulgated on September 20, 2002, the COMELECs First
Division  dismissed for lack of merit SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539. The
[4]

COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. The

COMELEC also reset the recall election from September 7, 2002 to
September 24, 2002.
On September 23, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration of Adovo and Gilo. The COMELEC
affirmed the resolution declaring Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall
election.
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.
G.R. No. 154512
Petitioner Socrates seeks to nullify the COMELEC en banc resolution
dated August 14, 2002 in E.M. No. 02-010 (RC) which gave due course to the
Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
Socrates alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
upholding the Recall Resolution. Socrates cites the following circumstances
as legal infirmities attending the convening of the PRA and its issuance of the
Recall Resolution: (1) not all members of the PRA were notified of the meeting
to adopt the resolution; (2) the proof of service of notice was palpably and
legally deficient; (3) the members of the PRA were themselves seeking a new
electoral mandate from their respective constituents; (4) the adoption of the
resolution was exercised with grave abuse of authority; and (5) the PRA
proceedings were conducted in a manner that violated his and the publics
constitutional right to information.
G.R. No. 154683
Petitioner Vicente S. Sandoval, Jr. seeks to annul COMELEC Resolution
No. 5673 dated August 21, 2002 insofar as it fixed the recall election on
September 7, 2002, giving the candidates only a ten-day campaign period. He
prayed that the COMELEC be enjoined from holding the recall election on
September 7, 2002 and that a new date be fixed giving the candidates at least
an additional 15 days to campaign.
In a resolution dated September 3, 2002, the Court en banc enjoined the
COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 5673 insofar as it fixed the date
of the recall election on September 7, 2002. The Court directed the
COMELEC to give the candidates an additional fifteen 15 days from
September 7, 2002 within which to campaign.
Accordingly, on September 9, 2002, the COMELEC en banc issued
Resolution No. 5708 giving the candidates an additional 15 days from
September 7, 2002 within which to campaign. Thus, the COMELEC reset the
recall election to September 24, 2002.
G.R. Nos. 155083-84
Petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollave assail the COMELECs resolutions
dated September 20, 2002 and September 23, 2002 in SPA Nos. 02-492 and
02-539 declaring Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in the recall
election. They likewise prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order to enjoin the proclamation of the winning candidate in the recall election.
Petitioners argue that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
upholding Hagedorns qualification to run for mayor in the recall election
despite the constitutional and statutory prohibitions against a fourth
consecutive term for elective local officials.
In a resolution dated September 24, 2002, the Court ordered the
COMELEC to desist from proclaiming any winning candidate in the recall
election until further orders from the Court. Petitioners were required to post
a P20,000 bond.
On September 27, 2002, Socrates filed a motion for leave to file an
attached petition for intervention seeking the same reliefs as those sought by
Adovo, Gilo and Ollave.
In the meantime, Hagedorn garnered the highest number of votes in the
recall election with 20,238 votes. Rival candidates Socrates and Sandoval
obtained 17,220 votes and 13,241 votes, respectively.
Hagedorn filed motions to lift the order restraining the COMELEC from
proclaiming the winning candidate and to allow him to assume office to give
effect to the will of the electorate.
On October 1, 2002, the Court granted Socrates motion for leave to file a
petition for intervention.

The Issues

The issues for resolution of the Court are:

1. In G.R. No. 154512, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
giving due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduling the recall election for
mayor of Puerto Princesa.
2. In G.R. Nos.155083-84, whether Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall
election of Puerto Princesa on September 24, 2002.

In G.R. No. 154683, the issue of whether the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in fixing a campaign period of only 10 days has become
moot. Our Resolution of September 3, 2002 and COMELEC Resolution No.
5708 granted an additional 15 days for the campaign period as prayed for by
petitioner.

First Issue: Validity of the Recall Resolution.

Petitioner Socrates argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of

discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution despite the absence of notice to
130 PRA members and the defective service of notice to other PRA
members. The COMELEC, however, found that

On various dates, in the month of June 2002, the proponents for the Recall of
incumbent City Mayor Victorino Dennis M. Socrates sent notices of the
convening of the PRA to the members thereof pursuant to Section 70 of the
Local Government Code. Copies of the said notice are in Volumes I and II
entitled Notices to PRA. Likewise, Proof of Service for each of the said notices
were attached to the Petition and marked as Annex G of Volumes II and III of the
Petition.

Notices were likewise posted in conspicuous places particularly at the Barangay

Hall. Photos establishing the same were attached to the Petition and marked as
Annex H. The proponents likewise utilized the broadcast mass media in the
dissemination of the convening of the PRA.

Notices of the convening of the Puerto Princesa PRA were also sent to the
following: [a list of 25 names of provincial elective officials, print and broadcast
media practitioners, PNP officials, COMELEC city, regional and national
officials, and DILG officials].

xxx

The City Election Officer of Puerto Princesa City in her Certification dated 10
July 2002 certified that upon a thorough and careful verification of the signatures
appearing in PRA Resolution 01-02, x x x the majority of all members of the
PRA concerned approved said resolution. She likewise certified that not a single
member/signatory of the PRA complained or objected as to the veracity and
authenticity of their signatures.

The Provincial Election Supervisor of Palawan, Atty. Urbano Arlando, in his

Indorsement dated 10 July 2002, stated, upon proper review, all documents
submitted are found in order.
 The Acting Director IV, Region IV, in his study dated 30 July 2002 submitted
the following recommendations:

This Office, after evaluating the documents filed, finds the instant Petition sufficient
in form and substance. That the PRA was validly constituted and that the majority of
all members thereof approved Resolution No. 01-02 calling for the recall of Mayor
Victorino Dennis M. Socrates.

xxx.

This Court is bound by the findings of fact of the COMELEC on matters

within the competence and expertise of the COMELEC, unless the findings
are patently erroneous.In Malonzo v. COMELEC,  which also dealt with
[5]

alleged defective service of notice to PRA members, we ruled that

Needless to state, the issue of propriety of the notices sent to the PRA members
is factual in nature, and the determination of the same is therefore a function of
the COMELEC. In the absence of patent error, or serious inconsistencies in the
findings, the Court should not disturb the same. The factual findings of the
COMELEC, based on its own assessments and duly supported by gathered
evidence, are conclusive upon the court, more so, in the absence of a
substantiated attack on the validity of the same.

In the instant case, we do not find any valid reason to hold that the
COMELECs findings of fact are patently erroneous.
Socrates also claims that the PRA members had no authority to adopt the
Recall Resolution on July 2, 2002 because a majority of PRA members were
seeking a new electoral mandate in the barangay elections scheduled on July
15, 2002. This argument deserves scant consideration considering that when
the PRA members adopted the Recall Resolution their terms of office had not
yet expired. They were all de jure sangguniang barangay members with no
legal disqualification to participate in the recall assembly under Section 70 of
the Local Government Code.
Socrates bewails that the manner private respondents conducted the PRA
proceedings violated his constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern.Socrates, however, admits receiving notice of the PRA meeting and
of even sending his representative and counsel who were present during the
entire PRA proceedings. Proponents of the recall election submitted to the
COMELEC the Recall Resolution, minutes of the PRA proceedings, the
journal of the PRA assembly, attendance sheets, notices sent to PRA
members, and authenticated master list of barangay officials in Puerto
Princesa. Socrates had the right to examine and copy all these public records
in the official custody of the COMELEC. Socrates, however, does not claim
that the COMELEC denied him this right. There is no legal basis in Socrates
claim that respondents violated his constitutional right to information on
matters of public concern.
Thus, we rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in upholding the validity of the Recall Resolution and in scheduling
the recall election on September 24, 2002.

Second Issue: Hagedorns qualification to run for mayor

in the recall election of September 24, 2002.

The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution, which states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160,

otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which provides:
Section 43. Term of Office. (a) x x x

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms
in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official was elected.

These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part
provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three
consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in
determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of
service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any
length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before
and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous
service or consecutive terms.
 After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot
seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to
the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no
longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election
like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three
consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary
interruption in the continuity of service.
When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective
local officials, the question asked was whether there would be no further
election after three terms, or whether there would be no immediate
reelection after three terms. This is clear from the following deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission:

THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.

MR. ROMULO:  We are now ready to discuss the two issues, as indicated on the
[6]

blackboard, and these are Alternative No. I where there is no further election
after a total of three terms and Alternative No. 2 where there is no immediate
reelection after three successive terms. [7]

The Journal of the Constitutional Commission reports the following

manifestation on the term of elective local officials:

MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO

Upon resumption of session, Mr. Romulo manifested that the Body would
proceed to the consideration of two issues on the term of Representatives
and local officials, namely: 1) Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection after a
total of three terms), and 2) Alternative No. 2 (no immediate reelection after
three successive terms). [8]

The framers of the Constitution used the same no immediate reelection

question in voting for the term limits of Senators  and Representatives of the
[9]

House. [10]

Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a

fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however,
does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the
reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A
recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a
subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third term.
 Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate
reelection to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of
office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. The
debates in the Constitutional Commission evidently show that the prohibited
election referred to by the framers of the Constitution is the immediate
reelection after the third term, not any other subsequent election.
If the prohibition on elective local officials is applied to any election within
the three-year full term following the three-term limit, then Senators should
also be prohibited from running in any election within the six-year full term
following their two-term limit. The constitutional provision on the term limit of
Senators is worded exactly like the term limit of elective local officials, thus:

No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary

renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.[11]

In the debates on the term limit of Senators, the following exchange in the
Constitutional Convention is instructive:

GASCON:  I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the
[12]

second term. We will allow the Senator to rest for a period of time before he can
run again?

DAVIDE:  That is correct.

[13]

GASCON: And the question that we left behind before - if the Gentleman will
remember - was: How long will that period of rest be? Will it be one election
which is three years or one term which is six years?

DAVIDE: If the Gentleman will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo expressed

the view that during the election following the expiration of the first 12 years,
whether such election will be on the third or on the sixth year thereafter, this
particular member of the Senate can run. So, it is not really a period of
hibernation for six years. That was the Committees stand.

GASCON: So, effectively, the period of rest would be three years at the least.
 (Emphasis supplied)
[14]

The framers of the Constitution thus clarified that a Senator can run after only
three years  following his completion of two terms. The framers expressly
[15]

acknowledged that the prohibited election refers only to

the immediate reelection, and not to any subsequent election, during the six-
year period following the two term limit. The framers of the Constitution did not
intend the period of rest of an elective official who has reached his term limit
to be the full extent of the succeeding term.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September
24, 2002 is not an immediate reelection after his third consecutive term which
ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate reelection that the Constitution
barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in
2001. Hagedorn did not seek reelection in the 2001 elections.
Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992, 1995 and
1998 elections and served in full his three consecutive terms as mayor of
Puerto Princesa. Under the Constitution and the Local Government Code,
Hagedorn could no longer run for mayor in the 2001 elections. The
Constitution and the Local Government Code disqualified Hagedorn, who had
reached the maximum three-term limit, from running for a fourth consecutive
term as mayor. Thus, Hagedorn did not run for mayor in the 2001 elections.
 Socrates ran and won as mayor of Puerto Princesa in the 2001
[16]

elections. After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became

a private citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won
by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the
mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn
was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the
continuity of Hagedorns service as mayor, not because of his voluntary
renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition.Hagedorns three consecutive
terms ended on June 30, 2001. Hagedorns new recall term from September
24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 is not a seamless continuation of his previous three
consecutive terms as mayor. One cannot stitch together Hagedorns previous
three-terms with his new recall term to make the recall term a fourth
consecutive term because factually it is not. An involuntary interruption
occurred from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 which broke the
continuity or consecutive character of Hagedorns service as mayor.
In Lonzanida v. Comelec,  the Court had occasion to explain interruption
[17]

of continuity of service in this manner:

x x x The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states,

Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was
elected. The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to
 circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the
same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official full service
of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not
cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term
provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. x x
x. (Emphasis supplied)

In Hagedorns case, the nearly 15-month period he was out of office, although
short of a full term of three years, constituted an interruption in the continuity
of his service as mayor. The Constitution does not require the interruption or
hiatus to be a full term of three years. The clear intent is that interruption for
any length of time, as long as the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break
an elective local officials continuity of service.
In the recent case of Adormeo v. Comelec and Talaga,  a unanimous
[18]

Court reiterated the rule that an interruption consisting of a portion of a term of

office breaks the continuity of service of an elective local official. In Adormeo,
Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. had served two consecutive full terms as mayor of
Lucena City. In his third bid for election as mayor in 1998, Talaga lost to
Bernard G. Tagarao. However, in the recall election of May 12, 2000, Talaga
won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao from May 12, 2000 to June 30,
2001. When Talaga ran again for mayor in the 2001 elections, Raymundo
Adormeo, the other candidate for mayor, petitioned for Talagas
disqualification on the ground that Talaga had already served three
consecutive terms as mayor.
Thus, the issue in Adormeo was whether Talagas recall term was a
continuation of his previous two terms so that he was deemed to have already
served three consecutive terms as mayor. The Court ruled that Talaga was
qualified to run in the 2001 elections, stating that the period from June 30,
1998 to May 12, 2000 when Talaga was out of office interrupted the continuity
of his service as mayor. Talagas recall term as mayor was not consecutive to
his previous two terms because of this interruption, there having been a break
of almost two years during which time Tagarao was the mayor.
We held in Adormeo that the period an elective local official is out of
office interrupts the continuity of his service and prevents his recall term from
being stitched together as a seamless continuation of his previous two
consecutive terms. In the instant case, we likewise hold that the nearly 15
months Hagedorn was out of office interrupted his continuity of service and
prevents his recall term from being stitched together as a seamless
continuation of his previous three consecutive terms. The only difference
between Adormeo and the instant case is the time of the
interruption. In Adormeo, the interruption occurred after the first two
consecutive terms. In the instant case, the interruption happened after the first
three consecutive terms. In both cases, the respondents were seeking
election for a fourth term.
In Adormeo, the recall term of Talaga began only from the date he
assumed office after winning the recall election. Talagas recall term did not
retroact to include the tenure in office of his predecessor. If Talagas recall
term was made to so retroact, then he would have been disqualified to run in
the 2001 elections because he would already have served three consecutive
terms prior to the 2001 elections. One who wins and serves a recall term does
not serve the full term of his predecessor but only the unexpired term. The
period of time prior to the recall term, when another elective official holds
office, constitutes an interruption in continuity of service. Clearly, Adormeo
established the rule that the winner in the recall election cannot be
charged or credited with the full term of three years for purposes of
counting the consecutiveness of an elective officials terms in office.
In the same manner, Hagedorns recall term does not retroact to include
the tenure in office of Socrates. Hagedorn can only be disqualified to run in
the September 24, 2002 recall election if the recall term is made to retroact to
June 30, 2001, for only then can the recall term constitute a fourth
consecutive term. But to consider Hagedorns recall term as a full term of three
years, retroacting to June 30, 2001, despite the fact that he won his recall
term only last September 24, 2002, is to ignore reality. This Court cannot
declare as consecutive or successive terms of office which historically and
factually are not.
Worse, to make Hagedorns recall term retroact to June 30, 2001 creates a
legal fiction that unduly curtails the freedom of the people to choose their
leaders through popular elections. The concept of term limits is in derogation
of the sovereign will of the people to elect the leaders of their own
choosing. Term limits must be construed strictly to give the fullest possible
effect to the sovereign will of the people. As this Court aptly stated in Borja,
Jr. v. Comelec:

Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8 of the

Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as
much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they
were with preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they
rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after
serving three consecutive terms or nine years there should be no further
 reelection for local and legislative officials. Instead, they adopted the alternative
proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply
barred from running for the same position in the succeeding election following
the expiration of the third consecutive term. Monsod warned against
prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will choose as a result of the
proposed absolute disqualification, considering that the draft constitution
contained provisions recognizing people's power.  (Emphasis supplied)
[19]

A necessary consequence of the interruption of continuity of service is the

start of a new term following the interruption. An official elected in recall
election serves the unexpired term of the recalled official. This unexpired term
is in itself one term for purposes of counting the three-term limit. This is clear
from the following discussion in the Constitutional Commission:

SUAREZ:  For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the
[20]

Senator newly elected would have to serve the unexpired portion of the
term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion of the term is already
considered one term? So, half a term, which is actually the correct statement,
plus one term would disqualify the Senator concerned from running?Is that the
meaning of this provision on disqualification, Madam President?

DAVIDE: Yes, because we speak of term, and if there is a special election, he

will serve only for the unexpired portion of that particular term plus one more
term for the Senator and two more terms for the Members of the Lower House. [21]

Although the discussion referred to special elections for Senators and

Representatives of the House, the same principle applies to a recall election
of local officials.Otherwise, an elective local official who serves a recall term
can serve for more than nine consecutive years comprising of the recall term
plus the regular three full terms. A local official who serves a recall term
should know that the recall term is in itself one term although less than three
years. This is the inherent limitation he takes by running and winning in the
recall election.
In summary, we hold that Hagedorn is qualified to run in the September
24, 2002 recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa because:
1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his three consecutive
terms as mayor which ended on June 30, 2001;
2. Hagedorns continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily interrupted from June 30,
2001 to September 24, 2002 during which time he was a private citizen;
 3. Hagedorns recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 cannot be made
to retroact to June 30, 2001 to make a fourth consecutive term because factually the
recall term is not a fourth consecutive term; and
4. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the right
of the electorate to choose their leaders.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 154512, 154683 and 155083-84

are DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on
September 24, 2002 enjoining the proclamation of the winning candidate for
mayor of Puerto Princesa in the recall election of September 24, 2002 is
lifted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

ARSENIO A. LATASA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

and ROMEO SUNGA, respondents.

DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which

seeks to challenge the resolution issued by the First Division of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated April 27, 2001 in SPA Case No.
01-059 entitled, Romeo M. Sunga, petitioner, versus Arsenio A. Latasa,
respondent, and the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc denying herein
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The assailed Resolution denied due
course to the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, declaring
him disqualified to run for mayor of Digos City, Davao del Sur Province in the
May 14, 2001 elections, ordering that all votes cast in his favor shall not be
counted, and if he has been proclaimed winner, declaring said proclamation
null and void.
The facts are fairly simple.
Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of
the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and
1998. During petitioners third term, the Municipality of Digos was declared a
component city, to be known as the City of Digos. A plebiscite conducted on
September 8, 2000 ratified Republic Act No. 8798 entitled, An Act Converting
the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur Province into a Component City to be
known as the City of Digos or the Charter of the City of Digos. This event also
marked the end of petitioners tenure as mayor of
the Municipality of Digos. However, under Section 53, Article IX of the
Charter, petitioner was mandated to serve in a hold-over capacity as mayor of
the new City of Digos. Hence, he took his oath as the city mayor.
On February 28, 2001, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city
mayor for the May 14, 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible
therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already served for three
consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now running
for the first time for the position of city mayor.
On March 1, 2001, private respondent Romeo M. Sunga, also a candidate
for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a Petition to
Deny Due Course, Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/ or For
Disqualification  against petitioner Latasa. Respondent Sunga alleged therein
[1]

that petitioner falsely represented in his certificate of candidacy that he is

eligible to run as mayor of Digos City since petitioner had already been
elected and served for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001.
On March 5, 2001, petitioner Latasa filed his Answer,  arguing that he did
[2]

not make any false representation in his certificate of candidacy since he fully
disclosed therein that he had served as mayor of the Municipality of Digos for
three consecutive terms. Moreover, he argued that this fact does not bar him
from filing a certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 2001 elections since this
will be the first time that he will be running for the post of city mayor.
Both parties submitted their position papers on March 19, 2001. [3]

On April 27, 2001, respondent COMELECs First Division issued a

Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:

Wherefore, premises considered, the respondents certificate of candidacy should be

cancelled for being a violation of the three (3)-term rule proscribed by the 1987
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. [4]

Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration dated May 4, 2001,  which [5]

remained unacted upon until the day of the elections, May 14, 2001. On May
16, 2001, private respondent Sunga filed an Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order Enjoining the City Board of Canvassers From
Canvassing or Tabulating Respondents Votes, and From Proclaiming Him as
the Duly Elected Mayor if He Wins the Elections.  Despite this, however,
[6]

petitioner Latasa was still proclaimed winner on May 17, 2001, having
garnered the most number of votes. Consequently, private respondent Sunga
filed, on May 27, 2001, a Supplemental Motion  which essentially sought the
[7]

annulment of petitioners proclamation and the suspension of its effects.

On July 1, 2001, petitioner was sworn into and assumed his office as the
newly elected mayor of Digos City. It was only on August 27, 2002 that the
COMELEC en bancissued a Resolution denying  petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
It cannot be denied that the Court has previously held in Mamba-Perez v.
COMELEC  that after an elective official has been proclaimed as winner of the
[8]

elections, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to pass upon his

qualifications. An opposing partys remedies after proclamation would be to file
a petition for quo warranto within ten days after the proclamation.
On the other hand, certain peculiarities in the present case reveal the fact
that its very heart is something which this Court considers of paramount
interest. This Court notes from the very beginning that petitioner himself was
already entertaining some doubt as to whether or not he is indeed eligible to
run for city mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections. In his certificate of
candidacy, after the phrase I am eligible, petitioner inserted a footnote and
indicated:
*
Having served three (3) term[s] as municipal mayor and now running for the first
time as city mayor.
[9]

Time and again, this Court has held that rules of procedure are only tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application
of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court
is empowered to suspend their operation. We will not hesitate to set aside
technicalities in favor of what is fair and just.
[10]

The spirit embodied in a Constitutional provision must not be attenuated

by a rigid application of procedural rules.
The present case raises a novel issue with respect to an explicit
Constitutional mandate: whether or not petitioner Latasa is eligible to run as
candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created City
of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of
the Municipality of Digos.
As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed
freely to choose those who will govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the
Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of choice of
the people.

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.

An examination of the historical background of the subject Constitutional

provision reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as
much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they
were with preventing the monopolization of political power. In fact, they
rejected a proposal set forth by Commissioner Edmundo Garcia that after
serving three consecutive terms or nine years, there should be no further re-
election for local and legislative officials.  The members, instead, adopted the
[11]

alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be

simply barred from running for the same position in the succeeding election
following the expiration of the third consecutive term:

MR. MONSOD: Madam President, I was reflecting on this issue earlier and I asked
to speak because in this draft Constitution, we are recognizing peoples power. We
have said that now there is a new awareness, a new kind of voter, a new kind of
Filipino. And yet at the same time, we are prescreening candidates among whom they
will choose. We are saying that this 48-member Constitutional Commission has
decreed that those who have served for a period of nine years are barred from running
for the same position.

The argument is that there may be other positions. But there are some people who are
very skilled and good at legislation, and yet are not of a national stature to be
Senators. They may be perfectly honest, perfectly competent and with integrity. They
get voted into office at the age of 25, which is the age we provide for
Congressmen. And at 34 years old we put them into pasture.

Second, we say that we want to broaden the choices of the people. We are talking here
only of congressional or senatorial seats. We want to broaden the peoples choice but
we are making prejudgment today because we exclude a certain number of
people. We are, in effect, putting an additional qualification for office that the officials
must have not have served a total of more than a number of years in their lifetime.

Third, we are saying that by putting people to pasture, we are creating a reserve of
statesmen, but the future participation of these statesmen is limited. Their skills may
be only in some areas, but we are saying that they are going to be barred from running
for the same position.

Madam President, the ability and capacity of a statesman depend as well on the day-
to-day honing of his skills and competence, in intellectual combat, in concern and
contact with the people, and here we are saying that he is going to be barred from the
same kind of public service.

I do not think it is in our place today to make such a very important and momentous
decision with respect to many of our countrymen in the future who may have a lot
more years ahead of them in the service of their country.

If we agree that we will make sure that these people do not set up structures that will
perpetuate them, then let us give them this rest period of three years or whatever it
is. Maybe during that time, we would even agree that their fathers or mothers or
relatives of the second degree should not run. But let us not bar them for life after
serving the public for number of years. [12]

The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to

establish some safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a
result of consecutive terms. As Commissioner Blas Ople stated during the
deliberations:

x x x I think we want to prevent future situations where, as a result of continuous

service and frequent re-elections, officials from the President down to the municipal
mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest in their positions and to accumulate these
powers and perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these
posts to members of their families in a subsequent election. x x x [13]

An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for
same local government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local
government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. [14]

In the present case, petitioner states that a city and a municipality have
separate and distinct personalities. Thus they cannot be treated as a single
entity and must be accorded different treatment consistent with specific
provisions of the Local Government Code. He does not deny the fact that he
has already served for three consecutive terms as municipal mayor. However,
he asserts that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it
attained a different juridical personality. Therefore, when he filed his certificate
of candidacy for city mayor, he cannot be construed as vying for the same
local government post.
For a municipality to be converted into a city, the Local Government Code
provides:

SECTION 450. Requisites for Creation. - (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays

may be converted into a component city it has an average annual income, as certified
by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos (20,000,000.00) for
the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of
the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers,

as certified by the Land Management Bureau; or,

(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office.

Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by

metes and bounds. The requirement on land are shall not apply where the city
proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more island. The territory need not
be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. [15]

Substantial differences do exist between a municipality and a city. For

one, there is a material change in the political and economic rights of the local
government unit when it is converted from a municipality to a city and
undoubtedly, these changes affect the people as well.  It is precisely for this
[16]

reason why Section 10, Article X of the Constitution mandates that no

province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, without the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
As may be gleaned from the Local Government Code, the creation or
conversion of a local government unit is done mainly to help assure its
economic viability. Such creation or conversion is based on verified indicators:
Section 7. Creation and Conversion. --- As a general rule, the creation of a local
government unit or its conversion from one level to another shall be based on
verifiable indicators or viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:

(a) Income. --- It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all
essential government facilities and services and special functions commensurate with
the size of its population, as expected of the local government unit concerned;

(b) Population. --- It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the
territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and

(c) Land Area. --- It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islands
or is separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly
identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide
for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.

Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of

Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands Management
Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). [17]

On the other hand, Section 2 of the Charter of the City of Digos provides:

Section 2. The City of Digos --- The Municipality of Digos shall be converted into a

component city to be known as the City of Digos, hereinafter referred to as the City,
which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur
Province. The territorial jurisdiction of the City shall be within the present metes and
bounds of the Municipality of Digos. x x x

Moreover, Section 53 of the said Charter further states:

Section 53. Officials of the City of Digos. --- The present elective officials of
the Municipality of Digos shall continue to exercise their powers and functions until
such a time that a new election is held and the duly-elected officials shall have already
qualified and assumed their offices. x x x.

As seen in the aforementioned provisions, this Court notes that the

delineation of the metes and bounds of the City of Digos did not change even
by an inch the land area previously covered by the Municipality of Digos. This
Court also notes that the elective officials of
the Municipality of Digos continued to exercise their powers and functions until
elections were held for the new city officials.
 True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and
distinct from that of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the
purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the
municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government post
as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial
jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the
municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same
as those in the city.These inhabitants are the same group of voters who
elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive
terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and
authority as their chief executive for nine years.
This Court must distinguish the present case from previous cases ruled
upon this Court involving the same Constitutional provision.
In Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC,  the issue therein was whether a vice-mayor
[18]

who became the mayor by operation of law and who served the remainder of
the mayors term should be considered to have served a term in that office for
the purpose of the three-term limit under the Constitution. Private respondent
in that case was first elected as vice-mayor, but upon the death of the
incumbent mayor, he occupied the latters post for the unexpired term. He
was, thereafter, elected for two more terms. This Court therein held that when
private respondent occupied the post of the mayor upon the incumbents death
and served for the remainder of the term, he cannot be construed as having
served a full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional
provision. The term served must be one for which [the official concerned] was
elected.
It must also be noted that in Borja, the private respondent therein, before
he assumed the position of mayor, first served as the vice-mayor of his local
government unit.The nature of the responsibilities and duties of the vice-
mayor is wholly different from that of the mayor. The vice-mayor does not hold
office as chief executive over his local government unit. In the present case,
petitioner, upon ratification of the law converting the municipality to a city,
continued to hold office as chief executive of the same territorial
jurisdiction. There were changes in the political and economic rights of Digos
as local government unit, but no substantial change occurred as to petitioners
authority as chief executive over the inhabitants of Digos.
In Lonzanida v. COMELEC,  petitioner was elected and served two
[19]

consecutive terms as mayor from 1988 to 1995. He then ran again for the
same position in the May 1995 elections, won and discharged his duties as
mayor. However, his opponent contested his proclamation and filed an
election protest before the Regional Trial Court, which ruled that there was a
failure of elections and declared the position of mayor vacant. The COMELEC
affirmed this ruling and petitioner acceded to the order to vacate the
post.During the May 1998 elections, petitioner therein again filed his certificate
of candidacy for mayor. A petition to disqualify him was filed on the ground
that he had already served three consecutive terms. This Court ruled,
however, that petitioner therein cannot be considered as having been duly
elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and that said petitioner did not
fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary
relinquishment of office.
In the present case, petitioner Latasa was, without a doubt, duly elected
as mayor in the May 1998 elections. Can he then be construed as having
involuntarily relinquished his office by reason of the conversion of Digos from
municipality to city? This Court believes that he did involuntarily relinquish his
office as municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed abolished
due to the conversion. However, the very instant he vacated his office as
municipal mayor, he also assumed office as city mayor.Unlike
in Lonzanida, where petitioner therein, for even just a short period of time,
stepped down from office, petitioner Latasa never ceased from acting as chief
executive of the local government unit. He never ceased from discharging his
duties and responsibilities as chief executive of Digos.
In Adormeo v. COMELEC,  this Court was confronted with the issue of
[20]

whether or not an assumption to office through a recall election should be

considered as one term in applying the three-term limit rule. Private
respondent, in that case, was elected and served for two consecutive terms
as mayor. He then ran for his third term in the May 1998 elections, but lost to
his opponent. In June 1998, his opponent faced recall proceedings and in the
recall elections of May 2000, private respondent won and served for the
unexpired term. For the May 2001 elections, private respondent filed his
certificate of candidacy for the office of mayor. This was questioned on the
ground that he had already served as mayor for three consecutive terms. This
Court held therein that private respondent cannot be construed as having
been elected and served for three consecutive terms. His loss in the May
1998 elections was considered by this Court as an interruption in the
continuity of his service as mayor. For nearly two years, private respondent
therein lived as a private citizen. The same, however, cannot be said of
petitioner Latasa in the present case.
Finally, in Socrates v. COMELEC,  the principal issue was whether or not
[21]

private respondent Edward M. Hagedorn was qualified to run during the recall
elections.Therein respondent Hagedorn had already served for three
consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 until 2001 and did not run in the
immediately following regular elections. On July 2, 2002, the barangay
officials of Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall
Assembly to initiate the recall of the incumbent mayor, Victorino Dennis M.
Socrates. On August 23, 2002, respondent Hagedorn filed his certificate of
candidacy for mayor in the recall election. A petition for his disqualification
was filed on the ground that he cannot run for the said post during the recall
elections for he was disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive
term. This Court, however, ruled in favor of respondent Hagedorn, holding that
the principle behind the three-term limit rule is to prevent consecutiveness of
the service of terms, and that there was in his case a break in such
consecutiveness after the end of his third term and before the recall election.
It is evident that in the abovementioned cases, there exists a rest period or
a break in the service of the local elective official. In Lonzanida, petitioner
therein was a private citizen a few months before the next mayoral
elections. Similarly, in Adormeo and Socrates, the private respondents therein
lived as private citizens for two years and fifteen months respectively. Indeed,
the law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps
down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the
inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically
included an exception to the peoples freedom to choose those who will govern
them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive
power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in
the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor
after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would
obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this
exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of
the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief
executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of
eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by
the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
Finally, respondent Sunga claims that applying the principle in Labo v.
COMELEC,  he should be deemed the mayoralty candidate with the highest
[22]

number of votes. On the contrary, this Court held in Labo that the

disqualification of a winning candidate does not necessarily entitle the
candidate with the highest number of votes to proclamation as the winner of
the elections. As an obiter, the Court merely mentioned that the rule would
have been different if the electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of a
candidates disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the
validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or
throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the
next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. The same, however,
cannot be said of the present case.
This Court has consistently ruled that the fact that a plurality or a majority
of the votes are cast for an ineligible candidate at a popular election, or that a
candidate is later declared to be disqualified to hold office, does not entitle the
candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes to be declared
elected. The same merely results in making the winning candidates election a
nullity.  In the present case, moreover, 13,650 votes were cast for private
[23]

respondent Sunga as against the 25,335 votes cast for petitioner Latasa.
 The second placer is obviously not the choice of the people in that particular
[24]

election. In any event, a permanent vacancy in the contested office is thereby

created which should be filled by succession. [25]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to

costs.
SO ORDERED.

FRANCIS G. ONG, G.R. No. 163295 Petitioner,

Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CARPIO
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
GARCIA, JJ.
 
JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and Promulgated:
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents. January 23, 2006
x---------------------x
 
ROMMEL G. ONG,
Petitioner,
 
 

-         versus - G.R. No. 163354

 
 
JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------x
DECISION
 
 
GARCIA, J.:
 
 
Before the Court are these two separate petitions under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to nullify and set aside certain issuances of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) en banc.
 
The first, docketed as G.R. No. 163295, is a petition for certiorari with
petitioner Francis G. Ong impugning the COMELEC en
banc resolution[1]dated May 7, 2004 in SPA Case No. 04-048, granting
private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre's motion for reconsideration of
the resolution dated March 31, 2004[2] of the COMELECs First Division.
 
The second, G.R. No. 163354, is for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, with application for injunctive relief, filed by petitioner Rommel
Ong, brother of Francis, seeking, among other things, to stop the
COMELEC from enforcing and implementing its aforesaid May 7, 2004 en
banc resolution in SPA Case No. 04-048 pending the outcome of the
petition in G.R. No. 163295.
 
Per its en banc Resolution of June 1, 2004, the Court ordered the
consolidation of these petitions.
 
The recourse stemmed from the following essential and undisputed
factual backdrop:
 
Private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre (Alegre) and
petitioner Francis Ong (Francis) were candidates who filed certificates of
candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10,
2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbent mayor.
 
On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office
a Petition  to Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy[3]of Francis. Docketed as SPA Case No. 04-048, the petition to
disqualify was predicated on the three-consecutive term rule, Francis
having, according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001
mayoralty elections and have assumed office as mayor and discharged the
duties thereof for three (3) consecutive full terms corresponding to those
elections.
 
To digress a bit, the May 1998 elections saw both Alegre and Francis
opposing each other for the office of mayor of San Vicente, Camarines
Norte, with the latter being subsequently proclaimed by COMELEC winner
in that contest. Alegre subsequently filed an election protest, docketed as
Election Case No. 6850  before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Daet,
Camarines Norte. In it, the RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor
in that 1998 mayoralty contest,[4] albeit the decision came out only on July
4, 2001, when Francis had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and
was in fact already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of
the municipality of San Vicente.
Acting on Alegres petition to disqualify and to cancel Francis certificate of
candidacy for the May 10, 2004 elections, the First Division of the
COMELEC rendered on March 31, 2004 a resolution[5] dismissing the said
petition of Alegre, rationalizing as follows:
 
We see the circumstances in the case now before us analogous to those obtaining
in the sample situations addressed by the Highest Court in the Borja case. Herein,
one of the requisites for the application of the three term rule is not present.
Francis Ong might have indeed fully served the mayoral terms of 1995 to 1998;
1998 to 2001 and 2001 to 2004. The mayoral term however, from 1998 to 2001
cannot be considered his because he was not duly elected thereto. The [RTC] of
Daet, Camarines Norte, Branch 41 has voided his election for the 1998 term when
it held, in its decision that Stanley Alegre was the legally elected mayor in the
1998 mayoralty election in San Vicente, Camarines Norte. This disposition
had become final after the [COMELEC] dismissed the appeal filed by Ong, the
case having become moot and academic.
 
xxx xxx xxx
 
On the basis of the words of the Highest Court pronounced in the Lonzanida case
and applicable in the case at bench, Ong could not be considered as having served
as mayor from 1998 to 2001 because he was not duly elected to the post; he
merely assumed office as a presumptive winner; which presumption was later
overturned when [the RTC] decided with finality that [he] lost in the May 1998
elections. (Words in bracket and emphasis in the original).
 
Undaunted, Alegre filed a timely motion for reconsideration, contending, in
the main, that there was a misapplication of the three-term rule, as applied
in the cited cases of Borja vs. Comelec and Lonzanida vs. Comelec, infra.
 
 

On May 7, 2004, the COMELEC en banc issued, in SPA No. 04-048, a

resolution[6] reversing the March 31, 2004 resolution of the COMELECs First
Division and thereby (a) declaring Francis as disqualified to run for mayor
of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004; (b) ordering the
deletion of Francis name from the official list of candidates; and (c)
directing the concerned board of election inspectors not to count the votes
cast in his favor.
The following day, May 8, Francis received a fax machine copy of the
aforecited May 7, 2004 resolution, sending him posthaste to seek the
assistance of his political party, the Nationalist Peoples Coalition, which
immediately nominated his older brother, Rommel Ong (Rommel), as
substitute candidate. At about 5:05 p.m. of the very same day - which is
past the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, Rommel filed his own
certificate of candidacy for the position of mayor, as substitute candidate
for his brother Francis.
 
The following undisputed events then transpired:
 
1. On May 9, 2004, or a day before the May 10 elections, Alegre filed a Petition
to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate  of Rommel Ong.
 
2. Atty. Evillo C. Pormento, counsel for the Ong brothers, addressed a letter [7] to
Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) of Camarines Norte Liza Z. Cario and Acting Election
Officer Emily G. Basilonia in which he appealed that, owing to the COMELECs inaction
on Alegre's petition to cancel Rommels certificate of candidacy, the name Rommel
Ong be included in the official certified list of candidates for mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte. The desired listing was granted by the PES Carino.
 
3. On May 10, 2004, Alegre wrote[8] to then COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio
Garcillano, Commissioner-in-Charge for Regions IV and V, seeking clarification on the
legality of the action thus taken by the PES Cario. Responding, Commissioner Garcillano
issued a Memorandum under date May 10, 2004[9] addressed to PES Liza D. Zabala-
Cario, ordering her to implement the resolution of the COMELEC en banc in SPA No. 04-
048 promulgated on May 7, 2004.[10] Said Memorandum partly stated:
 
The undersigned ADOPTS the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D.
Dalaig [Director IV, Law Department], which he quote your stand, "that
substitution is not proper if the certificate of the substituted candidacy is denied
due course. In the Resolution of the Commission En banc, the Certificate of
candidacy of Francis Ong was denied due course," and elaborated further that:
 
"x x x there is an existing policy of the Commission not to
include the name of a substitute candidate in the certified list of
candidates unless the substitution is approved by the Commission.
  
In view, thereof, it is recommended that 1) the substitute
certificate of candidacy of Rommel Ong Gan Ong, should be
denied due course; and 2) the election officer be directed to delete
his name from the list of candidates."
 
The above position of the Commission was in line with the
pronouncement of Supreme Court in Miranda vs. Abaya (311 SCRA 617) which
states:
 
"There can no valid substitution where a candidate is
excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial and
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy."
 
In view thereof, you are hereby directed to faithfully implement the said
Resolution of the Commission En Banc in SPA No. 04-048 promulgated on May
7, 2004. (Emphasis in the original; words in bracket added].
 
 
4. Owing to the aforementioned Garcillano Memorandum, it would seem that the
Chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvasser of San Vicente issued an order enjoining
all concerned not to canvass the votes cast for Rommel, prompting the latter to file a
protest with that Board.[11]
 
5. On May 11, 2004, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Alegre as the
winning candidate for the mayoralty post in San Vicente, Camarines Norte.[12]
 
 

On May 12, 2004, Francis filed before the Court a petition

for certiorari, presently docketed as G.R. No. 163295. His brother
Rommels petition in G.R. No. 163354 followed barely a week after.
 
In our en banc resolution dated June 1, 2004, G.R. No.
163295 and G.R. No. 163354 were consolidated.[13]
 
Meanwhile, on June 4, 2004, the COMELEC issued an order
dismissing private respondent Alegres Petition to Deny Due Course to or
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Rommel Ong, for being moot and
academic.[14]
 
The issues for resolution of the Court are:
 
In G.R. No. 163295, whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its en
bancresolution dated May 7, 2004 declaring petitioner Francis as
disqualified to run for Mayor of  San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May
10, 2004 elections and consequently ordering the deletion of his name
from the official list of candidates so that any vote cast in his favor shall be
considered stray.
 
In G.R. No. 163354, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied due course to Rommels certificate of candidacy in
the same mayoralty election as substitute for his brother Francis.
 
A resolution of the issues thus formulated hinges on the question of
whether or not petitioner Franciss assumption of office as Mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should be
considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
 
Respondent COMELEC resolved the question in the affirmative.
Petitioner Francis, on the other hand, disagrees. He argues that, while he
indeed assumed office and discharged the duties as Mayor of San Vicente
for three consecutive terms, his proclamation as mayor-elect in the May
1998 election was contested and eventually nullified per the decision of the
RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte dated July 4, 2001. Pressing the point,
petitioner argues, citing Lonzanida vs. Comelec[15],  that a proclamation
subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and one assuming
office on the strength of a protested proclamation does so as a
presumptive winner and subject to the final outcome of the election
protest.
 
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
 
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
 
 
Section 43 (b) of the Local Government Code restates the same rule as
follows:
 
Sec. 43. Term of Office.
 
xxx xxx xxx
 
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive years in
the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term
for which the elective official concerned was elected.
 
 
For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two
conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned
has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local
government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive
terms.[16]
 
With the view we take of the case, the disqualifying requisites are present
herein, thus effectively barring petitioner Francis from running for mayor of
San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. There can be
no dispute about petitioner Francis Ong having been duly elected mayor of
that municipality in the May 1995 and again in the May 2001 elections and
serving the July 1, 1995- June 30, 1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30,
2004 terms in full. The herein controversy revolves around the 1998-2001
mayoral term, albeit there can also be no quibbling that Francis ran for
mayor of the same municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually
served the 1998-2001 mayoral term by virtue of a proclamation initially
declaring him mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente. The
question that begs to be addressed, therefore, is whether or
not Franciss assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be
considered as one full term service in the context of the
consecutive three-term limit rule.
 
We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, service for
the full term, and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation
of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory
provisions, supra, barring local elective officials from being elected and
serving for more than three consecutive term for the same position.
It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in Election Protest Case
No. 6850,[17] that it was Francis opponent (Alegre) who won in the 1998
mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San
Vicente. However, that disposition, it must be stressed, was without
practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term
of the contested office has expired. Petitioner Francis contention that he
was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his
proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected
mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San
Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled
by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions
thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service
for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
 
The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to
discern. Such contrary view would mean that Alegre would under the
three-term rule - be considered as having served a term by virtue of a
veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served
such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an
election.
 
 

Petitioner cites, but, to our mind, cannot seek refuge from the Courts
ruling in, Lonzanida vs. Comelec,[18]  citing Borja vs.
Comelec[19]. In Lonzanida, petitioner Lonzanida was elected and served for
two consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May
8, 1995 elections. He then ran again for the same position in the May 1995
elections, won and discharged his duties as Mayor. However, his opponent
contested his proclamation and filed an election protest before the RTC of
Zambales, which, in a decision dated January 9, 1997, ruled that there was
a failure of elections and declared the position vacant. The COMELEC
affirmed this ruling and petitioner Lonzanida acceded to the order to vacate
the post. Lonzanida assumed the office and performed his duties up to
March 1998 only. Now, during the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again ran
for mayor of the same town. A petition to disqualify, under the three-term
rule, was filed and was eventually granted. There, the Court held that
Lonzanida cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in
the May 1995 election, and that he did not fully serve the 1995-1998
mayoralty term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. As the
Court pointedly observed, Lonzanida cannot be deemed to have served the
May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate [and in fact
vacated] his post before the expiration of the term.
 
The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once
apparent. For one, in Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty election was
declared a nullity for the stated reason of failure of election, and, as a
consequence thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was
nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the office of mayor. For
another, Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there
being an involuntary severance from office as a result of legal processes.
In fine, there was an effective interruption of the continuity of service.
 
On the other hand, the failure-of-election factor does not obtain in
the present case. But more importantly, here, there was actually no
interruption or break in the continuity of Francis service respecting the
1998-2001 term. Unlike Lonzanida, Francis was never unseated during the
term in question; he never ceased discharging his duties and
responsibilities as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the entire
period covering the 1998-2001 term.
 
The ascription, therefore, of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the COMELEC en banc when it disqualified Francis from running in the May
10, 2004 elections for the mayoralty post of San Vicente and denying due
course to his certificate of candidacy by force of the constitutional and
statutory provisions regarding the three-term limit rule for any local
elective official cannot be sustained. What the COMELEC en banc  said in its
May 7, 2004 assailed Resolution commends itself for concurrence:
 
As correctly pointed out by Petitioner-Movant [Alegre]in applying the
ruling in the Borja and Lonzanida cases in the instant petition will be erroneous
because the factual milieu in those cases is different from the one obtaining here.
Explicitly, the three-term limit was not made applicable in the cases
of Borja and Lonzanida because there was an interruption in the continuity of
service of the three consecutive terms. Here, Respondent Ong would have served
continuously for three consecutive terms, from 1995 to 2004. His full term from
1998 to 2001 could not be simply discounted on the basis that he was not duly
elected thereto on account of void proclamation because it would have iniquitous
effects producing outright injustice and inequality as it rewards a legally
disqualified and repudiated loser with a crown of victory. (Word in bracket added;
emphasis in the original)
 
 
Given the foregoing consideration, the question of whether or not then
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano overstepped his discretion when he issued
the May 10, 2004 Memorandum, ordering the implementation of aforesaid
May 7, 2004 COMELEC en banc resolution even before its finality[20] is now
of little moment and need not detain us any longer.
 
Just as unmeritorious as Francis petition in G.R. No. 163295 is Rommels
petition in G.R. No. 163354 in which he (Rommel) challenges the
COMELEC's act of not including his name as a substitute candidate in the
official list of candidates for the May 10, 2004 elections. As it were, existing
COMELEC policy[21] provides for the non-inclusion of the name of substitute
candidates in the certified list of candidates pending approval of the
substitution.
 
Not to be overlooked is the Courts holding in Miranda vs. Abaya,[22]  that a
candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled or not given
due course cannot be substituted by another belonging to the same
political party as that of the former, thus:
 
While there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a
registered or accredited political party may substitute for a candidate of
the same party who had been disqualified for any cause, this does not
include those cases where the certificate of candidacy of the person to be
substituted had been denied due course and cancelled under Section 78
of the Code.
 
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. While the law enumerated
the occasions where a candidate may be validly substituted, there is no
mention of the case where a candidate is excluded not only by
disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy. Under the foregoing rule, there can be no valid substitution
for the latter case, much in the same way that a nuisance candidate
whose certificate of candidacy is denied due course and/or cancelled
may not be substituted. If the intent of the lawmakers were otherwise,
they could have so easily and conveniently included those persons whose
certificates of candidacy have been denied due course and/or cancelled
under the provisions of Section 78 of the Code.
 
xxx xxx xxx
 
A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be
considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not
 filed any certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any stretch of the
imagination, be a candidate at all.
 
xxx xxx xxx
 
After having considered the importance of a certificate of
candidacy, it can be readily understood why in Bautista [Bautista vs.
Comelec, G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998] we ruled that a person
with a cancelled certificate is no candidate at all. Applying this principle
to the case at bar and considering that Section 77 of the Code is clear and
unequivocal that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited
party may be substituted, there demonstrably cannot be any possible
substitution of a person whose certificate of candidacy has been
cancelled and denied due course.
 
 
In any event, with the hard reality that the May 10, 2004 elections were
already pass, Rommel Ongs petition in G.R. No. 163354 is already moot
and academic.
 
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED and the assailed en
banc Resolution dated May 7, 2004 of the COMELEC, in SPA No. 04-
048 AFFIRMED.
 
Costs against petitioners.
 
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 149736. December 17, 2002.]

MELANIO L. MENDOZA and MARIO E. IBARRA, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

LEONARDO B. ROMAN, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

For resolution is a petition for certiorari filed by petitioners Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E.

Ibarra, seeking to set aside the resolution of the Commission on Elections, dated August 15,
2001, in EPC No. 2001-5 and to declare respondent Leonardo B. Roman’s election as governor of
Bataan on May 14, 2001 as null and void for allegedly being contrary to Art. X, §8 of the
Constitution, which provides that:
chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
 The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

After due deliberation, the Court voted 8 to 7 to DISMISS the petition.

VITUG, J., joined by YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., voted to dismiss the petition. He contended that as

revealed by the records of the Constitutional Commission, the Constitution envisions a
continuous and an uninterrupted service for three full terms before the proscription applies.
Therefore, not being a full term, a recall term should not be counted or used as a basis for the
disqualification whether served prior (as in this case) or subsequent (as in the Socrates case) to
the nine-year, full three-term limit.

MENDOZA, J., in whose opinion QUISUMBING, J. joined, voted to dismiss the petition on the
ground that, in accordance with the ruling in Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157 (1998); Arcos
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133639, Oct. 6, 1998 (res.); Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602 (1999);
and Adormeo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147927, Feb. 4, 2002, a term during which succession to a
local elective office takes place or a recall election is held should not be counted in determining
whether an elective local official has served more than three consecutive terms. He argued that
the Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials from serving for more than three
consecutive terms because, in fact, it excludes from the three-term limit interruptions in the
continuity of service, so long as such interruptions are not due to the voluntary renunciation of
the office by an incumbent. Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during which
respondent Leonardo B. Roman served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall election held in
1993, should not be counted. Since on May 14, 2001 respondent had previously served as
governor of Bataan for only two consecutive terms (1995–1998 and 1998–2001), his election on
that day was actually only his third term for the same position.

PANGANIBAN, J., joined by PUNO, J., also voted to dismiss the petition. He argued that a recall
term should not be considered as one full term, because a contrary interpretation would in effect
cut short the elected official’s service to less than nine years and shortchange his constituents.
The desire to prevent monopoly of political power should be balanced against the need to uphold
the voters’ obvious preference who, in the present case, is Roman who received 97 percent of the
votes cast. He explained that, in Socrates, he also voted to affirm the clear choice of the
electorate, because in a democracy the people should, as much as legally possible, be governed
by leaders freely chosen by them in credible elections. He concluded that, in election cases, when
two conflicting legal positions are of almost equal weight, the scales of justice should be tilted in
favor of the people’s overwhelming choice.

AZCUNA, J., joined by BELLOSILLO, J., also voted to dismiss, arguing that it is clear from the
constitutional provision that the disqualification applies only if the terms are consecutive and the
service is full and continuous. Hence, service for less than a term, except only in case of
voluntary renunciation, should not count to disqualify an elective local official from running for
the same position. This case is different from Socrates, where the full three consecutive terms
had been continuously served so that disqualification had clearly attached.

On the other hand, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., with whom DAVIDE, C.J., and AUSTRIA-

MARTINEZ, CORONA, and CALLEJO, SR., JJ., concurred, holds the view that the recall term served
by respondent Roman, comprising the period June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, should be
considered as one term. Since he thereafter served for two consecutive terms from 1995 to 1998
and from 1998 to 2001, his election on May 14, 2001 was actually his fourth term and
contravenes Art. X, §8 of the Constitution. For this reason, she voted to grant the petition and to
declare respondent’s election on May 14, 2001 as null and void.

CARPIO, J., joined by CARPIO-MORALES, J., also dissented and voted to grant the petition. He
held that a recall term constitutes one term and that to totally ignore a recall term in determining
the three-term limit would allow local officials to serve for more than nine consecutive years
contrary to the manifest intent of the framers of the Constitution. He contended that respondent
Roman’s election in 2001 cannot exempt him from the three-term limit imposed by the
Constitution. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
 WHEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS DISMISSED.

ATTY. VENANCIO Q. RIVERA III G.R. No. 167591

and ATTY. NORMANDICK DE  
GUZMAN,  
Petitioners,  
   
-versus-  
   
COMELEC and MARINO BOKING  
MORALES,  
Respondents.  
x---------------------------------------------x  
ANTHONY D. DEE, G.R. No. 170577
Petitioner,  
  Present:
   
  PUNO, C.J.,
  QUISUMBING,
  YNARES-SANTIAGO,
  SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
  CARPIO,
-versus- *
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
*
  CORONA,
  CARPIO MORALES,
  AZCUNA,
  TINGA,
  CHICO-NAZARIO,
  GARCIA,
  VELASCO, JR., and
**
  NACHURA, JJ.
COMELEC and MARINO BOKING  
MORALES,  
Promulgated:
Respondents.
 
 
 

May 9, 2007
 
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
 
 

 
DECISION
  

 
 

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

For our resolution are two consolidated petitions for certiorari under Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Resolutions
dated March 14, 2005 and November 8, 2005 of the COMELEC En Banc.
 
G.R. No. 167591
 
ATTY. VENANCIO Q. RIVERA III and ATTY. NORMANDICK
DE GUZMAN v. COMELEC and MARINO BOKING
MORALES
 
 
In the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections,
respondent Marino Boking Morales ran as candidate for mayor of Mabalacat,
Pampanga for the term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. Prior thereto or
on January 5, 2004, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy.
 
On January 10, 2004, Attys. Venancio Q. Rivera and Normandick De
Guzman, petitioners, filed with the Second Division of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) a petition to cancel respondent Morales Certificate of
Candidacy on the ground that he was elected and had served three previous
consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat. They alleged that his candidacy
violated Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7160, also known as the Local Government Code.
 
In his answer to the petition, respondent Morales admitted that he was
elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term commencing July 1, 1995 to June 30,
1998 (first term) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 (third term), but he served the
second term from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 only as a caretaker of the office or
as a de facto officer because of the following reasons:
 
a. He was not validly elected for the second term 1998 to 2001
since his proclamation as mayor was declared void by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57, Angeles City in its Decision dated
 April 2, 2001 in Election Protest Case (EPC) No. 98-131. The
Decision became final and executory on August 6, 2001; and
 
b. He was preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an
anti-graft case from January 16, 1999 to July 15, 1999.
On May 6, 2004, the COMELEC Second Division rendered its Resolution
finding respondent Morales disqualified to run for the position of municipal mayor
on the ground that he had already served three (3) consecutive
terms. Accordingly, his Certificate of Candidacy was cancelled. On May 7, 2004,
he filed with the COMELEC En Banc a motion for reconsideration.
 
On March 14, 2005, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution granting
respondent Morales motion for reconsideration and setting aside that of the Second
Division. The COMELEC En Banc held that since the Decision in EPC No. 98-
131 of the RTC, Branch 57, Angeles City declared respondent Morales
proclamation void, his discharge of the duties in the Office of the Mayor in
Mabalacat is that of a de facto officer or a de facto mayor. Therefore, his
continuous service for three consecutive terms has been severed.
 
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
 
G.R. No. 170577
 
ANTHONY DEE v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
MARIO BOKING MORALES
 
On May 24, 2004, after respondent Morales was proclaimed the duly elected
mayor of Mabalacat for the term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007,
petitioner Anthony Dee, also a candidate for mayor, filed with the RTC, Branch
61, Angeles City a petition for quo warranto against the said respondent. Petitioner
alleged that respondent Morales, having served as mayor for three consecutive
terms, is ineligible to run for another term or fourth term. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 11503.
 
In his answer, respondent Morales raised the following defenses:
 
 a. He was not validly elected for the term 1998 to 2001 since the
RTC, Branch 57, Angeles City declared in its Decision that his
proclamation as mayor of Mabalacat was void. Petitioner Dee was then
proclaimed the duly elected mayor; and
b. He was preventively suspended for six months by the
Ombudsman, during the same term in an anti-graft case, an interruption
in the continuity of his service as municipal mayor of Mabalacat.[1]
 
In its Decision dated November 22, 2004, the RTC dismissed petitioner
Dees petition for quo warranto on the ground that respondent Morales did not
serve the three-term limit since he was not the duly elected mayor of Mabalacat,
but petitioner Dee in the May 1998 elections for the term 1998 to 2001, thus:
 
Respondent, Marino Morales, was not the duly elected mayor of
Mabalacat, Pampanga in the May 1998 elections for the term 1998 to
2001 because although he was proclaimed as the elected mayor of
Mabalacat, Pampanga by the Municipal Board of Canvassers, had
assumed office and discharged the duties of mayor, his close rival, the
herein petitioner, Anthony D. Dee, was declared the duly elected Mayor
of Mabalacat, Pampanga in the Decision promulgated on April 2, 2001
in Election Protest EPC No. 98-131 filed by Anthony Dee against herein
respondent, Marino Morales, and decided by RTC, Br. 57, Angeles
City. x x x.
 
Petitioner Dee interposed an appeal to the COMELEC First Division,
alleging that respondent Morales violated the three-term limit rule when he ran for
re-election (fourth time) as mayor in the 2004 elections. Consequently, his
proclamation as such should be set aside. In a Resolution dated July 29, 2005 the
COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal. It held that
respondent Morales cannot be deemed to have served as mayor of Mabalacat
during the term 1998 to 2001 because his proclamation was declared void by the
RTC, Branch 57 of Angeles City. He only served as a caretaker, thus, his service
during that term should not be counted.
 
On August 12, 2005, petitioner Dee filed with the COMELEC En Banc a
motion for reconsideration. In a Resolution dated November 8, 2005, the
COMELEC En Banc affirmed the questioned Resolution of the Second Division.
  
Hence, petitioner Dees instant petition for certiorari.
 
Both cases may be decided based on the same facts and issues.
 
It is undisputed that respondent Morales was elected to the position of mayor
of Mabalacat for the following consecutive terms:
 
a)                 July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998
b)                July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001
c)                 July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004
d)                July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007
 
THE PRINCIPAL ISSUE.
 
Respondent Morales argued and the Comelec held that the July 1,
2003 to June 30, 2007 term is not his fourth because his second term, July 1,
1998 to June 30, 2001 to which he was elected and which he served, may not be
counted since his proclamation was declared void by the RTC, Branch 57 of
Angeles City.
 
Respondent Morales is wrong. This Court, through Mr. Justice Cancio C.
Garcia, resolved the same issue in Ong v. Alegre[2] with identical facts, thus:
 
To digress a bit, the May 1998 elections saw both Alegre and
Francis opposing each other for the office of mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte, with the latter being subsequently proclaimed by the
COMELEC winner in the contest. Alegre subsequently filed an election
protest, docketed as Election Case No. 6850 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) at Daet, Camarines Norte. In it, the RTC declared Alegre as
the duly elected mayor in that 1998 mayoralty contest, albeit the decision
came out only on July 4, 2001, when Francis had fully served the 1998-
2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to serve the 2001-
2004 term as mayor-elected for the municipality of San Vicente.

x x x
 A resolution of the issues thus formulated hinges on the question
of whether or not petitioner Francis assumption of office as mayor of
San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001
should be considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term
limit rule.

Respondent COMELEC resolved the question in the

affirmative. Petitioner Francis, on the other hand, disagrees. He argues
that, while he indeed assumed office and discharged the duties as Mayor
of San Vicente for three consecutive terms, his proclamation as mayor-
elected in the May 1998 election was contested and eventually nullified
per the Decision of the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte dated July 4,
2001. Pressing the point, petitioner argues, citing Lonzanida v. Comelec,
that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all
and one assuming office on the strength of a protested proclamation does
so as a presumptive winner and subject to the final outcome of the
election protest.

x x x

For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to

apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the
same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3)
consecutive terms.

With the view we take of the case, the disqualifying requisites are
present herein, thus effectively barring petitioner Francis from running
for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10,
2004 elections. There can be no dispute about petitioner Francis Ong
having been duly elected mayor of that municipality in the May 1995
and again in the May 2001 elections and serving the July 1, 1995-
June 30, 1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in full. The
herein controversy revolves around the 1998-2001 mayoral term, albeit
there can also be no quibbling that Francis ran for mayor of the same
municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually served the 1998-
2001 mayoral term by virtue of a proclamation initially declaring him
mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente. The question that begs
to be addressed, therefore, is whether or not Francis assumption of
office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to
June 30, 2001, may be considered as one full term service in the context
of the consecutive three-term limit rule.
 We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for
Francis, service for the full term, and should be counted as a full term
served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the
constitutional and statutory provisions, supra, barring local elective
officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive
terms for the same position.

It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in Election

Protest Case No. 6850, that it was Francis opponent (Alegre) who won in
the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected mayor of
San Vicente. However, that disposition, it must be stressed, was without
practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term
of the contested office has expired. Petitioner Francis contention that he
was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his
proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly
elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers
of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election
coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the
functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken
as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.

The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not

hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean that Alegre would-
under the three-term rule-be considered as having served a term by
virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another
actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course
after an election.

Petitioner cites, but, to our mind, cannot seek refuge from the
Courts ruling in Lonzanida v. Comelec, citing Borja v.
Comelec. In Lonzanida, petitioner Lonzanida was elected and served for
two consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to
the May 8, 1995 elections. He then ran again for the same position in the
May 1995 elections, won and discharged his duties as Mayor. However,
his opponent contested his proclamation and filed an election protest
before the RTC of Zambales, which, in a decision dated January 8, 1997,
ruled that there was a failure of elections and declared the position
vacant. The COMELEC affirmed this ruling and petitioner Lonzanida
acceded to the order to vacate the post. Lonzanida assumed the office
and performed his duties up to March 1998 only. Now, during the May
1998 elections, Lonzanida again ran for mayor of the same town. A
petition to disqualify, under the three-term rule, was filed and was
 eventually granted. There, the Court held that Lonzanida cannot be
considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995
election, and that he did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoralty term
by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. As the Court
pointedly observed, Lonzanida cannot be deemed to have served the
May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate [and in fact
vacated] his post before the expiration of the term.

The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at

once apparent. For one, in Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty
elections was declared a nullity for the stated reason of failure of
election, and, as a consequence thereof, the proclamation
of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was nullified, followed by an order for him
to vacate the office of the mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not fully
serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance
from office as a result of legal processes. In fine, there was an effective
interruption of the continuity of service.

On the other hand, the failure-of-election factor does not obtain in

the present case. But more importantly, here, there was actually no
interruption or break in the continuity of Francis service respecting the
1998-2001 term. Unlike Lonzanida, Francis was never unseated during
the term in question; he never ceased discharging his duties and
responsibilities as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the entire
period covering the 1998-2001 term.

 
 
It bears stressing that in Ong v. Alegre cited above, Francis Ong was
elected and assumed the duties of the mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for
three consecutive terms. But his proclamation as mayor in the May 1998 election
was declared void by the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte in its Decision dated July
4, 2001. As ruled by this Court, his service for the term 1998 to 2001 is for the full
term. Clearly, the three-term limit rule applies to him. Indeed, there is no reason
why this ruling should not also apply to respondent Morales who is similarly
situated.
 
Here, respondent Morales invoked not only Lonzanida v. COMELEC,[3] but
also Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections[4] which is likewise inapplicable. The
facts in Borja are:
  
Private respondent Jose T. Capco was elected  vice-mayor of
Pateros on January 18, 1998 for a term ending June 30,
1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law,
upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he
ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on June
30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of
three years ending June 30, 1998.
 
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of
candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections,
Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor,
sought Capcos disqualification on the theory that the latter would have
already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998
and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.
 
On April 30, 1998, the Second Division of the Commission on
Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private respondent
Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of
Pateros. However, on motion of private respondent, the COMELEC en
banc, voting 5-2, reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to
run for mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections. x x x
 
 
This Court held that Capcos assumption of the office of mayor upon the
death of the incumbent may not be regarded as a term under Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government
Code). He held the position from September 2, 1989 to June 30, 1992, a period of
less than three years. Moreover, he was not elected to that position.
 
Similarly, in Adormeo v. COMELEC,[5] this Court ruled that assumption of
the office of mayor in a recall election for the remaining term is not the term
contemplated under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of
R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code). As the Court observed, there was a
break in the service of private respondent Ramon T. Talanga as mayor. He was a
private citizen for a time before running for mayor in the recall elections.
 
Here, respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30,
2001. He assumed the position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was
mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the
electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as
mayor. To reiterate, as held in Ong v. Alegre,[6] such circumstance does not
constitute an interruption in serving the full term.
 
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution can not be more clear and explicit
 
The term of the office of elected local officials x x x, shall be three years
and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. x
xx
Upon the other hand, Section 43 (b) of R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government
Code) clearly provides:
 
No local official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same
position. x x x
 
 
Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of
Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1, 1995. In just over a month,
by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12)
continuous years.
 
In Latasa v. Comelec,[7] the Court explained the reason for the maximum term
limit, thus:
The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to
establish some safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power
as a result of consecutive terms. As Commissioner Blas Ople stated
during the deliberations:
 
x x x I think we want to prevent future situations where, as a result of
continuous service and frequent re-elections, officials from
the President down to the municipal mayor tend to develop
a proprietary interest in their positions and to accumulate
these powers and prerequisites that permit them to stay on
indefinitely or to transfer these posts to members of their
families in a subsequent election. x x x
 
xxx
 
It is evident that in the abovementioned cases, there exists a rest period or a
break in the service of local elective official. In Lonzanida, petitioner
therein was a private citizen a few months before the next mayoral
elections. Similarly, in Adormeo and Socrates, the private respondents
therein lived as private citizens for two years and fifteen months
respectively. Indeed, the law contemplates a rest period during which the
local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise
power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a
particular local government unit.
 
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically
included an exception to the peoples freedom to choose those who
will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person
accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial
jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To
allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having
served for three consecutive terms as municipal mayor would obviously
defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this
exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive term as
mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding
office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and
inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very
scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
 
 
This is the very situation in the instant case. Respondent Morales maintains that he
served his second term (1998 to 2001) only as a caretaker of the office or as a de
facto officer. Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated and its purpose
defeated when an official serves in the same position for three consecutive
terms.Whether as caretaker or de facto officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys
the prerequisites of the office which enables him to stay on indefinitely.
 
Respondent Morales should be promptly ousted from the position of mayor of
Mabalacat.
 
 
G.R. No. 167591
 
Having found respondent Morales ineligible, his Certificate of Candidacy
dated December 30, 2003 should be cancelled. The effect of the cancellation of a
Certificate of Candidacy is provided under Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. No. 6646,
thus:
 
SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong.
 
SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy. The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to
petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as
provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
 
 
in relation to Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides:
 
SEC. 211. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. In the reading and appreciation
of ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there is clear
and good reason to justify its rejection. The board of election inspectors
shall observe the following rules, bearing in mind that the object of the
election is to obtain the expression of the voters will:
xxx
 
19. Any vote in favor of a person who has not filed a certificate of
candidacy or in favor of a candidate for an office for which he did not
present himself shall be considered as a stray vote but it shall not
invalidate the whole ballot.
 
xxx
 
 
 In the light of the foregoing, respondent Morales can not be considered a
candidate in the May 2004 elections. Not being a candidate, the votes cast for
himSHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be considered stray votes.
G.R. No. 170577
 
Since respondent Morales is DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as
mayor of Mabalacat, the instant petition for quo warranto has become moot.
 
Going back to G.R. No. 167591, the question now is whether it is the vice-
mayor or petitioner Dee who shall serve for the remaining portion of the 2004 to
2007 term.
 
In Labo v. Comelec,[8] this Court has ruled that a second place candidate
cannot be proclaimed as a substitute winner, thus:
 
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving
majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated
candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
 
xxx
 
It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been
disqualified, the votes intended for the disqualified candidate should, in
effect, be considered null and void. This would amount to
disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. At the risk
of being repetitious, the people of Baguio City opted to elect petitioner
Labo bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in
the honest belief that Labo was then qualified to be the person to whom
they would entrust the exercise of the powers of the
government. Unfortunately, petitioner Labo turned out to be disqualified
and cannot assume the office.
 
Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can or
cannot be installed, under no circumstances can minority or defeated
candidate be deemed elected to the office. Surely, the 12,602 votes cast
for petitioner Ortega is not a larger number than the 27,471 votes cast for
petitioner Labo (as certified by the Election Registrar of Baguio City;
rollo, p. 109; GR No. 105111).
  
xxx
 
As a consequence of petitioners ineligibility, a permanent vacancy
in the contested office has occurred. This should now be filled by the
vice-mayor in accordance with Section 44 of the Local Government
Code, to wit:
 
Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the Offices of the
Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor and Vice-Mayor. (a) If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or
mayor, the vice-governor or the vice-mayor concerned shall
become the governor or mayor. x x x
 
 
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 167591
is GRANTED. Respondent Morales Certificate of Candidacy dated December 30,
2003 is cancelled. In view of the vacancy in the Office of the Mayor
in Mabalacat, Pampanga, the vice-mayor elect of the said municipality in the May
10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections is hereby declared mayor and
shall serve as such for the remaining duration of the term July 1, 2004 to June 30,
2007. The petition in G.R. No. 170577 is DISMISSED for being moot.
 
This Decision is immediately executory.
 
SO ORDERED.
 

ROBERTO L. DIZON, G.R. No. 182088

Petitioner,
Present:
*
PUNO, C.J.,
**
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,***
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
****
- versus - AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION, and
PERALTA, JJ.
 
 
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Promulgated:
and MARINO P. MORALES,
Respondents. January 30, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------x
 
DECISION
 
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
 
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The present petition seeks the reversal of the
Resolution dated 27 July 2007 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Second Division which dismissed the petition to disqualify and/or to cancel Marino
P. Morales (Morales) certificate of candidacy, as well as the Resolution dated 14
February 2008 of the COMELEC En Banc which denied Roberto L. Dizons
(Dizon) motion for reconsideration.
 
The Facts
 
The COMELEC Second Division stated the facts as follows:
 
Roberto L. Dizon, hereinafter referred to as petitioner, is a resident and
taxpayer of the Municipality of Mabalacat, Pampanga. Marino P.
 Morales, hereinafter referred to as respondent, is the incumbent Mayor
of the Municipality of Mabalacat, Pampanga.

Petitioner alleges respondent was proclaimed as the municipal mayor of

Mabalacat, Pampanga during the 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 elections
and has fully served the same.Respondent filed his Certificate of
Candidacy on March 28, 2007 again for the same position and same
municipality.

Petitioner argues that respondent is no longer eligible and qualified to

run for the same position for the May 14, 2007 elections under Section
43 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Under the said provision, no
local elective official is allowed to serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms for the same position.

Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that he is still eligible and

qualified to run as Mayor of the Municipality of Mabalacat, Pampanga
because he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. He
avers that the Commission en banc in SPA Case No. A-04-058, entitled
Atty. Venancio Q. Rivera III and Normandick P. De Guzman vs. Mayor
Marino P. Morales, affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City declaring Anthony D. Dee as the duly elected Mayor of
Mabalacat, Pampanga in the 1998 elections.

Respondent alleges that his term should be reckoned from 2001 or when
he was proclaimed as Mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga. Respondent
further asserts that his election in 2004 is only for his second term.
Hence, the three term rule provided under the Local Government Code is
not applicable to him.

Respondent further argues that the grounds stated in the instant petition
are not covered under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Respondent further contend [sic] that even if it is covered under the
aforementioned provision, the instant petition failed to allege any
material misrepresentation in the respondents Certificate of Candidacy. [1]

 
The Ruling of the COMELEC Second Division
 
In its Resolution dated 27 July 2007, the COMELEC Second Division took judicial
notice of this Courts ruling in the consolidated cases of Atty. Venancio Q. Rivera
III v. COMELEC and Marino Boking Morales in G.R. No. 167591 and Anthony
Dee v. COMELEC and Marino Boking Morales in G.R. No. 170577 (Rivera case)
promulgated on 9 May 2007. The pertinent portions of the COMELEC Second
Divisions ruling read as follows:
 
Respondent was elected as mayor of Mabalacat from July 1, 1995 to
June 30, 1998. There was no interruption of his second term from 1998
to 2001. He was able to exercise the powers and enjoy the position of a
mayor as caretaker of the office or a de facto officer until June 30, 2001
notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in an electoral protest case. He
was again elected as mayor from July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2003 [sic].

It is worthy to emphasize that the Supreme Court ruled that respondent

has violated the three-term limit under Section 43 of the Local
Government Code. Respondent was considered not a candidate in the
2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections. Hence, his failure to
qualify for the 2004 elections is a gap and allows him to run again for
the same position in the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as

it hereby RESOLVES to DENY the instant Petition to Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy and/or Petition for the Disqualification of
Marino P. Morales for lack of merit.[2]

 
 
Dizon filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc.
 

The Ruling of the COMELEC En Banc

 
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division.
 
The pertinent portions of the COMELEC En Bancs Resolution read as follows:
 

Respondents certificate of candidacy for the May 2004 Synchronized

National and Local Elections was cancelled pursuant to the above-
mentioned Supreme Court decision which was promulgated on May 9,
2007. As a result, respondent was not only disqualified but was also not
considered a candidate in the May 2004 elections.

Another factor which is worth mentioning is the fact that respondent has
relinquished the disputed position on May 16, 2007. The vice-mayor
elect then took his oath and has assumed office as mayor of Mabalacat
on May 17, 2007 until the term ended on June 30, 2007. For failure to
serve for the full term, such involuntary interruption in his term of office
should be considered a gap which renders the three-term limit
inapplicable.

The three-term limit does not apply whenever there is an involuntary

break. The Constitution does not require that the interruption or hiatus to
be a full term of three years. What the law requires is for an interruption,
break or a rest period from a candidates term of office for any length of
time. The Supreme Court in the case of Latasa v. Comelec ruled:

Indeed, the law contemplates a rest period during which the

local elective official steps down from office and ceases to
exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the
territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.

In sum, the three-term limit is not applicable in the instant case for lack
of the two conditions: 1) respondent was not the duly-elected mayor of
Mabalacat for the July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007 term primordially
because he was not even considered a candidate thereat; and 2)
respondent has failed to serve the entire duration of the term of office
because he has already relinquished the disputed office on May 16, 2007
which is more than a month prior to the end of his supposed term.

xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as

it hereby RESOLVES, to DENY the instant Motion for Reconsideration
for LACK OF MERIT. The Resolution of the Commission Second
Division is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[3]

 
The Issues
 
Dizon submits that the factual findings made in the Rivera case should still be
applied in the present case because Morales had, except for one month and 14
days, served the full term of 2004-2007. Morales assumption of the mayoralty
position on 1 July 2007 makes the 2007-2010 term Morales fifth term in
office. Dizon raises the following grounds before this Court:
 
1.      THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION
WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT MORALES DID
NOT VIOLATE THE THREE-YEAR TERM LIMIT WHEN HE
RAN AND WON AS MAYOR OF MABALACAT,
PAMPANGA DURING THE MAY 14, 2007 ELECTION.
 
2.      THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT RULED THAT DUE TO THIS HONORABLE
COURTS RULING IN THE AFORESAID CONSOLIDATED
CASES, RESPONDENT MORALES FOURTH TERM IS
CONSIDERED A GAP IN THE LATTERS SERVICE WHEN
HE FILED HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY FOR THE
2007 ELECTIONS.
 
3.      THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE FOURTH TERM OF MORALES
WAS INTERRUPTED WHEN HE RELINQUISHED HIS
POSITION FOR ONE MONTH AND 14 DAYS PRIOR TO THE
MAY 14, 2007 ELECTION.[4]
 
 
 
The Ruling of the Court
 
The petition has no merit.
 
The present case covers a situation wherein we have previously ruled that Morales
had been elected to the same office and had served three consecutive terms, and
wherein we disqualified and removed Morales during his fourth term. Dizon
claims that Morales is currently serving his fifth term as mayor. Is the 2007-2010
term really Morales fifth term?
 
The Effect of our Ruling in the Rivera Case
 
In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court unseated Morales during
his fourth term. We cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy dated 30 December
2003.This cancellation disqualified Morales from being a candidate in the May
2004 elections. The votes cast for Morales were considered stray votes. The
dispositive portion in the Rivera case reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 167591 is GRANTED.
Respondent Morales Certificate of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003
is cancelled. In view of the vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of
Mabalacat, Pampanga, the vice-mayor elect of the said municipality in
the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections is hereby
declared mayor and shall serve as such for the remaining duration of the
term July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. The petition in G.R. No. 170577 is
DISMISSED for being moot.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.[5]

Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution reads:

 
The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.

Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code restated Article X, Section 8 of the
1987 Constitution as follows:
 

No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive
terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was
elected.

For purposes of determining the resulting disqualification brought about by the

three-term limit, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive
terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same
position for the same number of times.[6] There should be a concurrence of two
conditions for the application of the disqualification: (1) that the official concerned
has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.[7]
 
In the Rivera case, we found that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat for
four consecutive terms: 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998, 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001,
1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. We disqualified
Morales from his candidacy in the May 2004 elections because of the three-term
limit. Although the trial court previously ruled that Morales proclamation for the
1998-2001 term was void, there was no interruption of the continuity of Morales
service with respect to the 1998-2001 term because the trial courts ruling was
promulgated only on 4 July 2001, or after the expiry of the 1998-2001 term.
 
Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales involuntary severance from office
with respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any
length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service.[8] Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May
2007 and was effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice
mayors office of our decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor
from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of the
office of the mayor, no matter how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted
Morales continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of
1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007.
 
2007-2010: Morales Fifth Term?
 
Dizon claims that the 2007-2010 term is Morales fifth term in office. Dizon asserts
that even after receipt of our decision on 10 May 2007, Morales waited for the
election to be held on 14 May 2007 to ensure his victory for a fifth term.[9]
 
We concede that Morales occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the
following periods: 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998, 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001, 1
July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007. However, because of
his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected mayor for the 2004-2007
term.Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full
term. Morales cannot be deemed to have served the full term of 2004-2007 because
he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Morales
occupancy of the position of mayor of Mabalacat from 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007
cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three-term
limit. Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap for
purposes of the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010
term is effectively Morales first term for purposes of the three-term limit rule.
 
Dizon alleges that Morales was able to serve his fourth term as mayor through
lengthy litigations. x x x In other words, he was violating the rule on three-term
limit with impunity by the sheer length of litigation and profit from it even more by
raising the technicalities arising therefrom.[10] To this, we quote our ruling
in Lonzanida v. COMELEC:
 

The respondents harp on the delay in resolving the election protest

between petitioner and his then opponent Alvez which took roughly
about three years and resultantly extended the petitioners incumbency in
an office to which he was not lawfully elected. We note that such delay
cannot be imputed to the petitioner. There is no specific allegation nor
proof that the delay was due to any political maneuvering on his part to
prolong his stay in office. Moreover, protestant Alvez, was not without
legal recourse to move for the early resolution of the election protest
while it was pending before the regional trial court or to file a motion for
the execution of the regional trial courts decision declaring the position
of mayor vacant and ordering the vice-mayor to assume office while the
 appeal was pending with the COMELEC. Such delay which is not here
shown to have been intentionally sought by the petitioner to prolong his
stay in office cannot serve as basis to bar his right to be elected and to
serve his chosen local government post in the succeeding mayoral
election.[11]

 
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolution of the
Commission on Elections En Banc dated 14 February 2008 as well as the
Resolution of the Commission on Elections Second Division dated 27 July 2007.
 
SO ORDERED.

NICASIO BOLOS, JR., G.R. No. 184082

Petitioner,
Present:
 
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
- versus - CARPIO-MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,* and
PERALTA, JJ.
 
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Promulgated:
and REY ANGELES CINCONIEGUE,
Respondents. March 17, 2009
x--------------------------------------------------x
 
 
DECISION
 
 
PERALTA, J.:
 
 
This is a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, alleging that
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Resolutions promulgated
on March 4, 2008 and August 7, 2008 holding that petitioner Nicasio Bolos, Jr. is
disqualified as a candidate for the position
of Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol in the October 29,

2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections on the ground that he has

served the three-term limit provided in the Constitution and Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.
The facts are as follows:
For three consecutive terms, petitioner was elected to the position of Punong
Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol in the Barangay Elections held in
1994, 1997 and 2002.
 
In May 2004, while sitting as the incumbent Punong Barangay of Barangay
Biking, petitioner ran for Municipal Councilor of Dauis, Bohol and
won. He assumedoffice as Municipal Councilor on July 1, 2004, leaving his post
as Punong Barangay. He served the full term of the Sangguniang Bayan position,
which was untilJune 30, 2007.
Thereafter, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol in the October 29,
2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
Respondent Rey Angeles Cinconiegue, the incumbent Punong Barangay and
candidate for the same office, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the
disqualification of petitioner as candidate on the ground that he had already served
the three-term limit. Hence, petitioner is no longer allowed to run for the same
position in accordance with Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43
(b) of R.A. No. 7160.
 
Cinconiegue contended that petitioners relinquishment of the position
of Punong Barangay in July 2004 was voluntary on his part, as it could be
presumed that it was his personal decision to run as municipal councilor in the
May 14, 2004 National and Local Elections. He added that petitioner knew that if
he won and assumed the position, there would be a voluntary renunciation of his
post as Punong Barangay.
 
In his Answer, petitioner admitted that he was elected
as Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol in the last three
consecutive elections of 1994, 1997 and 2002. However, he countered that in
the May 14, 2004 National and Local Elections, he ran and won as Municipal
Councilor of Dauis, Bohol. By reason of his assumption of office as Sangguniang
Bayan member, his remaining term of office as Punong Barangay, which would
have ended in 2007, was left unserved. He argued that his election and assumption
of office as Sangguniang Bayan member was by operation of law; hence, it must
be considered as an involuntary interruption in the continuity of his last term of
service.
 
Pursuant to Section 10 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8297 dated September 6,
2007, the petition was heard by the Provincial Election Supervisor of Bohol. Upon
completion of the proceedings, the evidence, records of the case, and the Hearing
Officers action on the matter were endorsed to and received by the Commission
on November 21, 2007.
 
The issue before the COMELEC was whether or not petitioners election,
assumption and discharge of the functions of the Office of Sangguniang
Bayan member can be considered as voluntary renunciation of his office
as Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol which will render
unbroken the continuity of his service as Punong Barangay for the full term of
office, that is, from 2004 to 2007. If it is considered a voluntary
renunciation, petitioner will be deemed to have served three consecutive terms and
shall be disqualified to run for the same position in the October 29,
2007 elections. But if it is considered as an involuntary
renunciation, petitioners service is deemed to have been interrupted; hence, he is
not barred from running for another term.
In a Resolution[1] dated March 4, 2008, the First Division of the COMELEC
ruled that petitioners relinquishment of the office of Punong Barangay of Biking,
Dauis, Bohol, as a consequence of his assumption of office as Sangguniang
Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, on July 1, 2004, was a voluntary renunciation of
the Office of Punong Barangay. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
 
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (First Division) GRANTS the
petition. Respondent NICASIO BOLOS, JR., having already served as Punong
Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol for three consecutive terms is
hereby DISQUALIFIED from being a candidate for the same office in the
October 29, 2007 Barangay and SK Elections. Considering that respondent had
already been proclaimed, said proclamation is hereby ANNULLED. Succession
to said office shall be governed by the provisions of Section 44 of the Local
Government Code.[2]
 
 
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC en
banc in a Resolution[3] dated August 7, 2008.
 
Hence, this petition for certiorari raising this lone issue:
 
 
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN DISQUALIFYING [PETITIONER] AS A CANDIDATE FOR
PUNONG BARANGAY IN THE OCTOBER 29, 2007 BARANGAY AND
SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN ELECTIONS AND, SUBSEQUENTLY,
ANNULLING HIS PROCLAMATION.[4]
 
 
The main issue is whether or not there was voluntary renunciation of the
Office of Punong Barangay by petitioner when he assumed office as Municipal
Councilor so that he is deemed to have fully served his third term as Punong
Barangay, warranting his disqualification from running for the same position in the
October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
Petitioner contends that he is qualified to run for the position of Punong
Barangay in the October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections
since he did not serve continuously three consecutive terms. He admits that in the
1994, 1997 and 2002 Barangay elections, he was elected as Punong Barangay for
three consecutive terms. Nonetheless, while serving his third term as Punong
Barangay, he ran as Municipal Councilor of Dauis, Bohol, and won. On July 1,
2004, he assumed office and, consequently, left his post as Punong Barangay by
operation of law. He averred that he served the full term as member of
the Sangguniang Bayan until June 30, 2007. On October 29, 2007, he filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for Punong Barangay and won. Hence, the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in disqualifying him as a candidate
for Punong Barangay since he did not complete his third term by operation of law.
 
The argument does not persuade.
 
The three-term limit for elective local officials is contained in Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
 
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years, and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
 
 
David v. Commission on Elections[5] elucidates that the Constitution did not
expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office for barangay officials,
thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in accordance
with the exigencies of public service. The discussions in the Constitutional
Commission showed that the term of office of barangay officials would be [a]s
may be determined by law, and more precisely, [a]s provided for in the Local
Government Code.[6] Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code provides
that barangay officials are covered by the three-term limit, while Section 43(c)
[7]
thereof states that the term of office of barangay officials shall be five (5)
years. The cited provisions read, thus:
 
Sec. 43. Term of Office. x x x
 
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
 
 (c) The term of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan
shall be for five (5) years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay
officials on the second Monday of May 1997: Provided, That the sangguniang
kabataan members who were elected in the May 1996 elections shall serve until
the next regular election of barangay officials.
 
Socrates v. Commission on Elections[8] held that the rule on the three-term
limit, embodied in the Constitution and the Local Government Code, has two parts:
 
x x x The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for
more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive
terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that
voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the
continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office
for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service
before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous
service or consecutive terms.
 
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular
election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. [9]
 
In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections,[10] the Court stated that the
second part of the rule on the three-term limit shows the clear intent of the framers
of the Constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a
voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice
and grant their elected official full service of a term. The Court held that two
conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: (1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same
government post; and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.[11]
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay for
three consecutive terms, satisfying the first condition for disqualification.
What is to be determined is whether petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily
renounced his position as Punong Barangay during his third term when he ran for
and won as Sangguniang Bayan member and assumed said office.
The Court agrees with the COMELEC that there was voluntary
renunciation by petitioner of his position as Punong Barangay.
The COMELEC correctly held:
 
 It is our finding that Nicasio Bolos, Jr.s relinquishment of the office of
Punong Barangay of Biking, Dauis, Bohol, as a consequence of his assumption to
office as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, on July 1, 2004, is a
voluntary renunciation.
 
As conceded even by him, respondent (petitioner herein) had already
completed two consecutive terms of office when he ran for a third term in the
Barangay Elections of2002. When he filed his certificate of candidacy for the
Office of Sangguniang Bayan of Dauis, Bohol, in the May 10, 2004 [elections],
he was not deemed resigned.Nonetheless, all the acts attending his pursuit of his
election as municipal councilor point out to an intent and readiness to give up his
post as Punong Barangay once elected to the higher elective office, for it was very
unlikely that respondent had filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
Sangguniang Bayan post, campaigned and exhorted the municipal electorate to
vote for him as such and then after being elected and proclaimed, return to his
former position. He knew that his election as municipal councilor would entail
abandonment of the position he held, and he intended to forego of
it. Abandonment, like resignation, is voluntary.[12]
 
 
Indeed, petitioner was serving his third term as Punong Barangay when
he ran for Sangguniang Bayan member and, upon winning, assumed the position
of Sangguniang Bayan member, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his office
as Punong Barangay which the Court deems as a voluntary renunciation of said
office.
Petitioner erroneously argues that when he assumed the position
of Sangguniang Bayan member, he left his post as Punong Barangay by
operation of law; hence, he did not fully serve his third term as Punong Barangay.
The term operation of law is defined by the Philippine Legal
Encyclopedia[13] as a term describing the fact that rights may be acquired or lost by
the effect of a legal rule without any act of the person affected. Black's Law
Dictionary also defines it as a term that expresses the manner in which rights, and
sometimes liabilities, devolve upon a person by the mere application to the
particular transaction of the established rules of law, without the act or cooperation
of the party himself.[14]
 
An interruption in the service of a term of office, by operation of law, is
exemplified in Montebon v. Commission on Elections. [15] The respondent therein,
Sesinando F. Potencioso, Jr., was elected and served three consecutive terms as
Municipal Councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-
2007. However, during his second term, he succeeded as Vice-Mayor of Tuburan due to
the retirement of the Vice-Mayor pursuant to Section 44 of R.A. No. 7160. [16] Potenciosos
assumption of office as Vice-Mayor was considered an involuntary severance from his
office as Municipal Councilor, resulting in an interruption in his second term of service.
[17]
 The Court held that it could not be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary
renunciation because it was by operation of law. [18] Hence, Potencioso was qualified to
run as candidate for municipal councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu in the
May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections.
 
Further, in Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,[19] respondent therein, Jose
T. Capco, Jr., was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term
ending on June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, Capco became Mayor, by
operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco
was elected and served as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to
1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of
Pateros in the May 11, 1998 election. Capcos disqualification was sought on the
ground that he would have already served as Mayor for three consecutive terms
by June 30, 1998; hence, he would be ineligible to serve for another term. The
Court declared that the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer
to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve the same elective position.
[20]
 The Court held that Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the next
election because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but
simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. [21] Neither had he served
the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the
deceased mayor.[22] The vice-mayors assumption of the mayorship in the event of
the vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. [23] Hence, his service in that
office should not be counted in the application of any term limit.[24]
 
In this case, petitioner did not fill in or succeed to a vacancy by operation of
law. He instead relinquished his office as Punong Barangay during his third term
when he won and assumed office as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol,
which is deemed a voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong Barangay.
 
 
In fine, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Resolutions dated March 4, 2008 and
August 7, 2008, disqualifying petitioner from being a candidate for Punong
Barangay in the October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections.
 
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The COMELEC Resolutions
dated March 4, 2008 and August 7, 2008 are hereby AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
 
SO ORDERED.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 186616

Petitioner,  
 
-         versus - Present:
   
CONRADO CRUZ, SANTIAGO P. GO, PUNO, C.J.,
RENATO F. BORBON, LEVVINO CHING, CARPIO,
CARLOS C. FLORENTINO, RUBEN G. CORONA,*
BALLEGA, LOIDA ALCEDO, MARIO M. CARPIO MORALES,
CAJUCOM, EMMANUEL M. CALMA, CHICO-NAZARIO,
MANUEL A. RAYOS, WILMA L. CHUA, VELASCO, JR.,I**
EUFEMIO S. ALFONSO, JESUS M. NACHURA,
LACANILAO, BONIFACIO N. ALCAPA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
JOSE H. SILVERIO, RODRIGO DEVELLES, BRION,
NIDA R. PAUNAN, MARIANO B. ESTUYE, PERALTA,***
JR., RAFAEL C. AREVALO, ARTURO T. BERSAMIN,
MANABAT, RICARDO O. LIZARONDO, DEL CASTILLO,
LETICIA C. MATURAN, RODRIGO A. ABAD, and
ALAYAN, LEONILO N. MIRANDA, VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
DESEDERIO O. MONREAL, FRANCISCO  
M. BAHIA, NESTOR R. FORONDA,  
VICENTE B. QUE, JR., AURELIO A.  
BILUAN, DANILO R. GATCHALIAN,  
LOURDES R. DEL MUNDO, EMMA O.  
 CALZADO, FELIMON DE LEON, TANY V.  
CATACUTAN, AND CONCEPCION P. JAO,  
Respondents.  
Promulgated:
 
 
November 20, 2009
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
 
BRION, J.:
 
We resolve in this Decision the constitutional challenge, originally filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 128 (RTC), against the
following highlighted portion of Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9164 (entitled
An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections,
amending RA No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991):
 
Sec. 2. Term of Office. The term of office of
all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of
this Act shall be three (3) years.
 
No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position: Provided, however, That the
term of office shall be reckoned from the
1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was
elected.
 
The RTC granted the petition and declared the challenged proviso constitutionally
infirm. The present petition, filed by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
seeks a review of the RTC decision.[1]
 
THE ANTECEDENTS
 
 Before the October 29, 2007
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections, some of the
then incumbent officials of several barangays of Caloocan City[2] filed with the RTC
a petition for declaratory relief to challenge the constitutionality of the above-
highlighted proviso, based on the following arguments:
 
I.                   The term limit of Barangay officials should be applied
prospectively and not retroactively.
 
II.                Implementation of paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No. 9164
would be a violation of the equal protection of the law.
 
III.             Barangay officials have always been apolitical.
 
 
The RTC agreed with the respondents contention that the challenged
proviso retroactively applied the three-term limit for barangay officials under the
following reasoning:
 
When the Local Government Code of 1991 took effect abrogating
all other laws inconsistent therewith, a different term was
ordained. Here, this Court agrees with the position of the petitioners
that Section 43 of the Code specifically exempted barangay elective
officials from the coverage of the three (3) consecutive term limit rule
considering that the provision applicable to these (sic) class of elective
officials was significantly separated from the provisions of paragraphs
(a) and (b) thereof. Paragraph (b) is indeed intended to qualify
paragraph (a) of Section 43 as regards to (sic) all local elective officials
except barangay officials. Had the intention of the framers of the Code
is (sic) to include barangay elective officials, then no excepting proviso
should have been expressly made in paragraph (a) thereof or, by
implication, the contents of paragraph (c) should have been stated
ahead of the contents of paragraph (b).
 
xxxx
 
Clearly, the intent of the framers of the constitution (sic) is to exempt
the barangay officials from the three (3) term limits (sic) which are
otherwise applicable to other elected public officials from the Members
of the House of Representatives down to the members of
the sangguniang bayan/panlungsod. It is up for the Congress whether
the three (3) term limit should be applied by enacting a law for the
purpose.
 
The amendment introduced by R.A. No. 8524 merely increased the
term of office of barangay elective officials from three (3) years to five
(5) years. Like the Local Government Code, it can be noted that no
consecutive term limit for the election of barangay elective officials was
fixed therein.
 
The advent of R.A. 9164 marked the revival of the consecutive
term limit for the election of barangay elective officials after the Local
Government Code took effect.Under the assailed provision of this Act,
the term of office of barangay elective officials reverted back to three
(3) years from five (5) years, and, this time, the legislators expressly
declared that no barangay elective official shall serve for more than
three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. The petitioners are
very clear that they are not assailing the validity of such provision fixing
the three (3) consecutive term limit rule for the election
of barangay elective officials to the same position. The particular
provision the constitutionality of which is under attack is that portion
providing for the reckoning of the three (3) consecutive term limit
of barangay elective officials beginning from the
1994 barangay elections.
 
xxx
 
Section 2, paragraph 2 of R.A. 9164 is not a mere restatement of
Section 43(c) of the Local Government Code. As discussed above,
Section 43(c) of the Local Government Code does not provide for the
consecutive term limit rule of barangay elective officials. Such specific
provision of the Code has in fact amended the previous enactments
(R.A. 6653 and R.A. 6679) providing for the consecutive term limit rule
of barangay elective officials. But, such specific provision of the Local
Government Code was amended by R.A. 9164, which reverted back to
the previous policy of fixing consecutive term limits
of barangay elective officials. [3]
 
In declaring this retroactive application unconstitutional, the RTC explained
that:
 
By giving a retroactive reckoning of the three (3) consecutive term limit
rule for barangay officials to the 1994 barangay elections, Congress has
violated not only the principle of prospective application of statutes but
also the equal protection clause of the Constitution inasmuch as
the barangay elective officials were singled out that their consecutive
term limit shall be counted retroactively. There is no rhyme or reason
why the consecutive limit for these barangay officials shall be counted
retroactively while the consecutive limit for other local and national
elective officials are counted prospectively. For if the purpose of
Congress is [sic] to classify elective barangay officials as belonging to
the same class of public officers whose term of office are limited to
three (3) consecutive terms, then to discriminate them by applying the
proviso retroactively violates the constitutionally enshrined principle of
equal protection of the laws.
 
Although the Constitution grants Congress the power to determine such
successive term limit of barangay elective officials, the exercise of the
authority granted shall not otherwise transgress other constitutional
and statutory privileges.
 
This Court cannot subscribe to the position of the respondent that the
legislature clearly intended that the provision of RA No. 9164 be made
effective in 1994 and that such provision is valid and constitutional. If
we allow such premise, then the term of office for those officials
elected in the 1997 barangay elections should have ended in year 2000
and not year 2002 considering that RA No. 9164 provides for a three-
year term of barangay elective officials. The amendment introduced by
R.A. No. 8524 would be rendered nugatory in view of such retroactive
application. This is absurd and illusory.
 
True, no person has a vested right to a public office, the same not being
property within the contemplation of constitutional
guarantee. However, a cursory reading of the petition would show that
the petitioners are not claiming vested right to their office but their
right to be voted upon by the electorate without being burdened by the
 assailed provision of the law that, in effect, rendered them ineligible to
run for their incumbent positions. Such right to run for office and be
voted for by the electorate is the right being sought to be protected by
assailing the otherwise unconstitutional provision.
 
Moreover, the Court likewise agrees with the petitioners that the law
violated the one-act-one subject rule embodied in the Constitution. x x
x x The challenged laws title is AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE
SYNCHRONIZED BARANGAY AND SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN ELECTIONS
, AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT 7160 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. x x x x
 
xxxx
 
To this court, the non-inclusion in the title of the act on the retroactivity
of the reckoning of the term limits posed a serious constitutional
breach, particularly on the provision of the constitution [sic] that every
bill must embrace only one subject to be expressed in the title thereof.
 
x x x the Court is of the view that the affected barangay officials were
not sufficiently given notice that they were already disqualified by a
new act, when under the previous enactments no such restrictions
were imposed.
 
Even if this Court would apply the usual test in determining the
sufficiency of the title of the bill, the challenged law would still be
insufficient for how can a retroactivity of the term limits be germane to
the synchronization of an election x x x x.[4]
 
 
The COMELEC moved to reconsider this decision but the RTC denied the
motion. Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law.
 
The Petition
 
The COMELEC takes the position that the assailed law is valid and
constitutional. RA No. 9164 is an amendatory law to RA No. 7160 (the Local
Government Code of 1991 or LGC) and is not a penal law; hence, it cannot be
considered an ex post facto law. The three-term limit, according to the COMELEC,
has been specifically provided in RA No. 7160, and RA No. 9164 merely restated
the three-term limitation. It further asserts that laws which are not penal in
character may be applied retroactively when expressly so provided and when it
does not impair vested rights. As there is no vested right to public office, much
less to an elective post, there can be no valid objection to the alleged retroactive
application of RA No. 9164.
 
The COMELEC also argues that the RTCs invalidation of RA No. 9164
essentially involves the wisdom of the law the aspect of the law that the RTC has
no right to inquire into under the constitutional separation of powers
principle. The COMELEC lastly argues that there is no violation of the one subject-
one title rule, as the matters covered by RA No. 9164 are related; the assailed
provision is actually embraced within the title of the law.
 
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition meritorious. The RTC legally erred when it declared the
challenged proviso unconstitutional.
 
Preliminary Considerations
 
We find it appropriate, as a preliminary matter, to hark back to the pre-
1987 Constitution history of the barangay political system as outlined by this
Court in David v. COMELEC,[5]  and we quote:
 
As a unit of government, the barangay antedated the Spanish
conquest of the Philippines. The word barangay is derived from the
Malay balangay, a boat which transported them (the Malays) to these
shores. Quoting from Juan de Plasencia, a Franciscan missionary in
1577, Historian Conrado Benitez wrote that the barangay was ruled by
a dato who exercised absolute powers of government. While the
Spaniards kept the barangay as the basic structure of government, they
stripped the dato or rajah of his powers. Instead, power was centralized
nationally in the governor general and locally in the encomiendero and
later, in the alcalde mayor and
the gobernadorcillo. The dato or rajah was much later renamed cabeza
de barangay, who was elected by the local citizens possessing
property. The position degenerated from a title of honor to that of a
mere government employee. Only the poor who needed a salary, no
matter how low, accepted the post.
 
After the Americans colonized the Philippines,
the barangays became known as barrios. For some time, the laws
governing barrio governments were found in the Revised
Administrative Code of 1916 and later in the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917. Barrios were granted autonomy by the original Barrio
Charter, RA 2370, and formally recognized as quasi-municipal
corporations by the Revised Barrio Charter, RA 3590. During the martial
law regime, barrios were declared or renamed barangays -- a reversion
really to their pre-Spanish names -- by PD. No. 86 and PD No. 557. Their
basic organization and functions under RA 3590, which was expressly
adopted as the BarangayCharter, were  retained. However, the titles of
the officials were changed
to barangay captain, barangay councilman, barangay secretary
and barangay treasurer.
 
Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 222,
a Punong Barangay (Barangay Captain) and
six Kagawads ng Sangguniang Barangay (Barangay Councilmen), who
shall constitute the presiding officer and members of the Sangguniang
Barangay (Barangay Council) respectively were first elected on May 17,
1982. They had a term of six years which began on June 7, 1982.
 
The Local Government Code of 1983 also fixed the term of office
of local elective officials at six years. Under this Code, the chief officials
of the barangay were the punong barangay, six
elective sangguniang barangay members,
the kabataang barangay chairman, a barangay secretary and
a barangay treasurer.
 
B.P. Blg. 881, the Omnibus Election Code, reiterated
that barangay officials shall hold office for six years, and stated that
their election was to be held on the second Monday of May nineteen
hundred and eighty eight and on the same day every six years
thereafter. [Emphasis supplied.]
 
  
The 1987 Philippine Constitution extended constitutional recognition
to barangays under Article X, Section 1 by specifying barangays as one of the
territorial and political subdivisions of the country, supplemented by Section 8 of
the same Article X, which provides:
 
SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected. [Emphasis
supplied.]
 
 
The Constitutional Commissions deliberations on Section 8 show that the
authority of Congress to legislate relates not only to the fixing of the term of
office of barangay officials, but also to the application of the three-term limit. The
following deliberations of the Constitutional Commission are particularly
instructive on this point:
 
MR. NOLLEDO: One clarificatory question, Madam
President. What will be the term of the office
of barangay officials as provided for?
 
MR. DAVIDE: As may be determined by law.
 
MR. NOLLEDO: As provided for in the Local Government Code?
 
MR. DAVIDE: Yes.
 
x x x x x x x x x
 
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other comment? Is there any
objection to this proposed new section as
submitted by Commissioner Davide and
accepted by the Committee?
 
 MR. RODRIGO: Madam President, does this prohibition to serve
for more than three consecutive terms apply
to barangay officials?
 
MR. DAVIDE: Madam President, the voting that we had on the
terms of office did not include
the barangay officials because it was then
the stand of the Chairman of the Committee
on Local Governments that the term
of barangay officials must be determined by
law. So it is now for the law to determine
whether the restriction on the number of
reelections will be included in the Local
Government Code.
 
MR. RODRIGO: So that is up to Congress to decide.
 
MR. DAVIDE: Yes.
 
MR. RODRIGO: I just wanted that clear in the record. [6] [Emphasis
supplied.]
 
 
After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, the barangay election
originally scheduled by Batas Pambansa Blg. 881[7] on the second Monday of May
1988 was reset to the second Monday of November 1988 and every five years
thereafter by RA No. 6653.[8] Section 2 of RA No. 6653 changed the term of office
of barangay officials and introduced a term limitation as follows:
 
SEC. 2. The term of office of barangay officials shall be for five (5)
years from the first day of January following their election. Provided,
however, That no kagawad shall serve for more than two (2)
consecutive terms. [Emphasis supplied]
 
 
Under Section 5 of RA No. 6653, the punong barangay was to be chosen by
seven kagawads  from among themselves, and they in turn, were to be elected at
large by the barangay electorate. The punong barangay, under Section 6 of the
law, may be recalled for loss of confidence by an absolute majority vote of
the Sangguniang Barangay,  embodied in a resolution that shall necessarily
include the punong barangays successor.
 
The election date set by RA No. 6653 on the second Monday of November
1988 was postponed yet again to March 28, 1989 by RA No. 6679 whose
pertinent provision states:
 
SEC. 1. The elections of barangay officials set on the second
Monday of November 1988 by Republic Act No. 6653 are hereby
postponed and reset to March 28, 1989.They shall serve a term which
shall begin on the first day of May 1989 and ending on the thirty-first
day of May 1994.
 
There shall be held a regular election of barangay officials on the
second Monday of May 1994 and on the same day every five (5) years
thereafter. Their term shall be for five (5) years which shall begin on the
first day of June following the election and until their successors shall
have been elected and qualified: Provided, That no barangayofficial
shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms.
 
The barangay elections shall be nonpartisan and shall be
conducted in an expeditious and inexpensive manner.
 
Significantly, the manner of election of the punong barangay  was changed
Section 5 of the law provided that while the seven kagawads were to be elected
by the registered voters of the barangay, (t)he candidate who obtains the highest
number of votes shall be the punong barangay and in the event of a tie, there
shall be a drawing of lots under the supervision of the Commission on Elections.
 
More than two (2) years after the 1989 barangay elections, RA No.
7160 (the LGC) introduced the following changes in the law:
 
SEC. 41. Manner of Election. -- (a) The x x
x punong barangay shall be elected at large x x x by the qualified voters
therein.
 
 SEC. 43. Term of Office. - (a) The term of office of all local
elective officials elected after the effectivity of this Code shall be three
(3) years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as may be
provided for by law, except that of elective barangay officials: Provided,
That all local officials first elected during the local elections immediately
following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution shall serve until noon
of June 30, 1992.
 
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.
 
(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of
the sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3) years, which shall
begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second
Monday of May 1994.
 
 
SEC. 387. Chief Officials and Offices. -- (a) There shall be in
each barangay a punong barangay, seven (7) sangguniang
barangay members, the sangguniang kabataan chairman,
a barangay secretary and a barangay treasurer.
 
x x x x x x x x x
 
SEC. 390. Composition. -- The Sangguniang barangay, the
legislative body of the barangay, shall be composed of the punong
barangay as presiding officer, and the seven (7) regular sanguniang
barangay members elected at large and the sanguniang
kabataan chairman as members. [Emphasis supplied.]
 
 
This law started the direct and separate election of
the punong barangay by the qualified voters in the barangay and not by the
seven (7) kagawads from among themselves.[9]
 
 Subsequently or on February 14, 1998, RA No. 8524 changed the three-year
term of office of barangay officials under Section 43 of the LGC to five (5)
years.On March 19, 2002, RA No. 9164 introduced the following significant
changes: (1) the term of office of barangay officials was again fixed at three years
on the reasoning that the barangay officials should not serve a longer term than
their supervisors;[10] and (2) the challenged proviso, which states that the 1994
election shall be the reckoning point for the application of the three-term limit,
was introduced. Yet another change was introduced three years after or on July
25, 2005 when RA No. 9340 extended the term of the then
incumbent barangay officials due to expire at noon of November 30, 2005 under
RA No. 9164 to noon of November 30, 2007. The three-year term limitation
provision survived all these changes.
 
 
 

Congress Plenary Power to

Legislate Term Limits for Barangay
Officials and Judicial Power
 
 
In passing upon the issues posed to us, we clarify at the outset the
parameters of our powers.
 
As reflected in the above-quoted deliberations of the 1987 Constitution,
Congress has plenary authority under the Constitution to determine by legislation
not only the duration of the term of barangay officials, but also the application to
them of a consecutive term limit. Congress invariably exercised this authority
when it enacted no less than six (6) barangay-related laws since 1987.
 
Through all these statutory changes, Congress had determined at its
discretion both the length of the term of office of barangay officials and their
term limitation. Given the textually demonstrable commitment by the 1987
Constitution to Congress of the authority to determine the term duration
and limition of barangay officials under the Constitution, we consider it
established that whatever Congress, in its wisdom, decides on these matters
are political questions beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny,[11] subject only to
the certiorari jurisdiction of the courts provided under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution and to the judicial authority to invalidate any law contrary to the
Constitution.[12]
 
Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government; it is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.[13] These questions, previously
impervious to judicial scrutiny can now be inquired into under the limited window
provided by Section 1, Article VIII. Estrada v. Desierto[14] best describes this
constitutional development, and we quote:
 
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the
political doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this
court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable but also
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on
the thou shalt nots of the Constitution directed against the exercise of
its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are given a
greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new
provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync
and symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987
Constitution trimming the so called political thicket. xxxx
 
Thus, we can inquire into a congressional enactment despite the political question
doctrine, although the window provided us is narrow; the challenge must show
grave abuse of discretion to justify our intervention.
 
Other than the Section 1, Article VIII route, courts can declare a law invalid
when it is contrary to any provision of the Constitution. This requires the appraisal
of the challenged law against the legal standards provided by the Constitution,
not on the basis of the wisdom of the enactment. To justify its nullification, the
breach of the Constitution must be clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful or
equivocal one, as every law enjoys a strong presumption of constitutionality.
[15]
 These are the hurdles that those challenging the constitutional validity of a law
must overcome.
 
The present case, as framed by the respondents, poses no challenge on the
issue of grave abuse of discretion. The legal issues posed relate strictly to
compliance with constitutional standards. It is from this prism that we shall
therefore resolve this case.
 
The Retroactive Application Issue
 
a. Interpretative / Historical Consideration
 
The respondents first objection to the challenged provisos constitutionality
is its purported retroactive application of the three-term limit when it set the
1994 barangay elections as a reckoning point in the application of the three-term
limit.
 
The respondents argued that the term limit, although present in the
previous laws, was not in RA No. 7160 when it amended all
previous barangay election laws. Hence, it was re-introduced for the first time by
RA No. 9164 (signed into law on March 19, 2002) and was applied retroactively
when it made the term limitation effective from the 1994 barangay elections. As
the appealed ruling quoted above shows, the RTC fully agreed with the
respondents position.
 
Our first point of disagreement with the respondents and with the RTC is on
their position that a retroactive application of the term limitation was made
under RA No. 9164. Our own reading shows that no retroactive application was
made because the three-term limit has been there all along as early as the
second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the 1987 Constitution took effect; it
was continued under the LGC and can still be found in the current law. We find
this obvious from a reading of the historical development of the law.
 
The first law that provided a term limitation for barangay officials was RA
No. 6653 (1988); it imposed a two-consecutive term limit. After only six months,
Congress, under RA No. 6679 (1988), changed the two-term limit by providing for
a three-consecutive term limit. This consistent imposition of the term limit gives
no hint of any equivocation in the congressional intent to provide a term
limitation. Thereafter, RA No. 7160 the LGC followed, bringing with it the issue of
whether it provided, as originally worded, for a three-term limit
for barangay officials. We differ with the RTC analysis of this issue.
Section 43 is a provision under Title II of the LGC on Elective Officials. Title II
is divided into several chapters dealing with a wide range of subject
matters, all relating to local elective officials, as follows: a. Qualifications and
Election (Chapter I); b. Vacancies and Succession (Chapter II), c. Disciplinary
Actions (Chapter IV) and d. Recall (Chapter V). Title II likewise contains a chapter
on Local Legislation (Chapter III).
 
These Title II provisions are intended to apply to all local elective
officials, unless the contrary is clearly provided. A contrary application is provided
with respect to the length of the term of office under Section 43(a); while it
applies to all local elective officials, it does not apply to barangay officials whose
length of term is specifically provided by Section 43(c). In contrast to this clear
case of an exception to a general rule, the three-term limit under Section 43(b)
does not contain any exception; it applies to all local elective officials who must
perforce include barangay officials.
 
An alternative perspective is to view Sec. 43(a), (b) and (c) separately from
one another as independently standing and self-contained provisions, except to
the extent that they expressly relate to one another. Thus, Sec. 43(a) relates to
the term of local elective officials, except barangay officials whose term of office
is separately provided under Sec. 43(c). Sec. 43(b), by its express terms, relates to
all local elective officials without any exception. Thus, the term limitation applies
to all local elective officials without any exclusion or qualification.
 
Either perspective, both of which speak of the same resulting
interpretation, is the correct legal import of Section 43 in the context in which it is
found in Title II of the LGC.
 
To be sure, it may be argued, as the respondents and the RTC did, that
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 43 are the general law for elective officials
(other than barangay officials); and paragraph (c) is the specific law
on barangay officials, such that the silence of paragraph (c) on term limitation
for barangay officials indicates the legislative intent to exclude barangay officials
from the application of the three-term limit. This reading, however, is flawed for
two reasons.
 
First, reading Section 43(a) and (b) together to the exclusion of Section
43(c), is not justified by the plain texts of these provisions. Section 43(a) plainly
refers to local elective officials, except elective barangay officials. In comparison,
Section 43(b) refers to all local elective officials without exclusions or
exceptions. Their respective coverages therefore vary so that one cannot be said
to be of the same kind as the other. Their separate topics additionally strengthen
their distinction; Section 43(a) refers to the term of office while Section 43(b)
refers to the three-term limit. These differences alone indicate that Sections 43(a)
and (b) cannot be read together as one organic whole in the way the RTC
suggested. Significantly, these same distinctions apply between Sec. 43(b) and (c).
 
Second, the RTC interpretation is flawed because of its total disregard of
the historical background of Section 43(c) a backdrop that we painstakingly
outlined above.
 
From a historical perspective of the law, the inclusion of Section 43(c) in the
LGC is an absolute necessity to clarify the length of term
of barangay officials.Recall that under RA No. 6679, the term of office
of barangay officials was five (5) years. The real concern was how Section 43
would interface with RA No. 6679.Without a categorical statement on the length
of the term of office of barangay officials, a general three-year term for all local
elective officials under Section 43(a), standing alone, may not readily and
completely erase doubts on the intended abrogation of the 5-year term
for barangay officials under RA No. 6679. Thus, Congress added Section 43(c)
which provided a categorical three-year term for these officials. History tells us, of
course, that the unequivocal provision of Section 43(c) notwithstanding, an issue
on what is the exact term of office of barangay officials was still brought to
us via a petition filed by no less than the President of the Liga ng Mga
Barangay in 1997. We fully resolved the issue in the cited David v. Comelec.
 
 Section 43(c) should therefore be understood in this context and not in the
sense that it intended to provide the complete rule for the election
of barangayofficials, so that in the absence of any term limitation proviso under
this subsection, no term  limitation applies to barangay officials. That Congress
had the LGCs three-term limit in mind when it enacted RA No. 9164 is clear from
the following deliberations in the House of Representatives (House) on House Bill
No. 4456 which later became RA No. 9164:
 
MARCH 5, 2002:
 
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.). Majority Leader.
 
REP. ESCUDERO. Mr. Speaker, next to interpellate is the Gentleman
from Zamboanga City. I ask that the Honorable Lobregat be recognized.
 
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.). The Honorable Lobregat is
recognized.
 
REP. LOBREGAT. Thank you very much, Mr. Speaker. Mr. Speaker, this is
just
 
REP. MACIAS. Willingly to the Gentleman from Zamboanga City.
 
REP. LOBREGAT. points of clarification, Mr. Speaker, the term of
office. It says in Section 4, The term of office of all Barangay
and sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act shall
be three years. Then it says, No Barangay elective official shall serve for
more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
 
Mr. Speaker, I think it is the position of the committee that the first
term should be reckoned from election of what year, Mr. Speaker?
 
REP. MACIAS. After the adoption of the Local Government Code, Your
Honor. So that the first election is to be reckoned on, would be May 8,
1994, as far as the Barangayelection is concerned.
 
REP. LOBREGAT. Yes, Mr. Speaker. So there was an election in 1994.
 
 REP. MACIAS. Then an election in 1997.
 
REP. LOBREGAT. There was an election in 1997. And there will be an
election this year
 
REP. LOBREGAT. election this year.
 
REP. MACIAS. That is correct. This will be the third.
 
xxx xxx
 
REP. SUMULONG. Mr. Speaker.
 
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.) The Honorable Sumulong is
recognized.
 
REP. SUMULONG. Again, with the permission of my Chairman, I would
like to address the question of Congressman Lobregat.
 
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.). Please proceed.
 
REP. SUMULONG. With respect to the three-year consecutive term
limits of Barangay Captains that is not provided for in the Constitution
and that is why the election prior to 1991 during the enactment of the
Local Government Code is not counted because it is not in the
Constitution but in the Local Government Code where the three
consecutive term limits has been placed. [Emphasis supplied.]
 
which led to the following exchanges in the House Committee on Amendments:
 
March 6, 2002
 
COMMITTEE ON AMENDMENTS
 
REP. GONZALES. May we now proceed to committee
amendment, if any, Mr. Speaker.
 
 THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Gonzalez). The Chair recognizes the
distinguished Chairman of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms.
 
REP. SYJUCO. Mr. Speaker, on page 2, line 7, after the word position,
substitute the period (.) and add the following: PROVIDED HOWEVER
THAT THE TERM OF OFFICE SHALL BE RECKONED FROM THE 1994
BARANGAY ELECTIONS. So that the amended Section 4 now reads as
follows:
 
SEC. 4. Term of Office. The term of office of all barangay
and sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of this
Act shall be three (3) years.
 
No barangay elective local official shall serve for more
than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position COLON (:)
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE TERM OF OFFICE SHALL BE
RECKONED FROM THE 1994 BARANGAY ELECTIONS. Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the
full term for which the elective official was elected.
 
The House therefore clearly operated on the premise that the LGC imposed a
three-term limit for barangay officials, and the challenged proviso is its way of
addressing any confusion that may arise from the numerous changes in the law.
 
All these inevitably lead to the conclusion that the challenged proviso has been
there all along and does not simply retroact the application of the three-term
limit to the barangay elections of 1994. Congress merely integrated the past
statutory changes into a seamless whole by coming up with the challenged
proviso.
 
With this conclusion, the respondents constitutional challenge to the
proviso based on retroactivity must fail.
 
b.     No Involvement of Any
Constitutional Standard
 
 
Separately from the above reason, the constitutional challenge must fail for
a more fundamental reason the respondents retroactivity objection does not
involve a violation of any constitutional standard.
 
Retroactivity of laws is a matter of civil law, not of a constitutional law, as
its governing law is the Civil Code,[16] not the Constitution. Article 4 of the Civil
Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is
provided. The application of the Civil Code is of course self-explanatory laws
enacted by Congress may permissibly provide that they shall have retroactive
effect. The Civil Code established a statutory norm, not a constitutional standard.
 
The closest the issue of retroactivity of laws can get to a genuine
constitutional issue is if a laws retroactive application will impair vested
rights. Otherwise stated, if a right has already vested in an individual and a
subsequent law effectively takes it away, a genuine due process issue may
arise. What should be involved, however, is a vested right to life, liberty or
property, as these are the ones that may be considered protected by the due
process clause of the Constitution.
 
In the present case, the respondents never raised due process as an
issue. But even assuming that they did, the respondents themselves concede that
there is no vested right to public office.[17] As the COMELEC correctly pointed out,
too, there is no vested right to an elective post in view of the uncertainty inherent
in electoral exercises.
 
Aware of this legal reality, the respondents theorized instead that they had
a right to be voted upon by the electorate without being burdened by a law that
effectively rendered them ineligible to run for their incumbent positions. Again,
the RTC agreed with this contention.
 
We do not agree with the RTC, as we find no such right under the
Constitution; if at all, this claimed right is merely a restatement of a claim of
vested right to a public office. What the Constitution clearly provides is the power
of Congress to prescribe the qualifications for elective local posts;[18] thus, the
question of eligibility for an elective local post is a matter for Congress, not for the
courts, to decide. We dealt with a strikingly similar issue in Montesclaros v.
Commission on Elections[19] where we ruled that SK membership which was
claimed as a property right within the meaning of the Constitution is a mere
statutory right conferred by law. Montesclaros instructively tells us:
 
Congress exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for
SK membership. One who is no longer qualified because of an
amendment in the law cannot complain of being deprived of a
proprietary right to SK membership. Only those who qualify as SK
members can contest, based on a statutory right, any act disqualifying
them from SK membership or from voting in the SK elections. SK
membership is not a property right protected by the Constitution
because it is a mere statutory right conferred by law. Congress may
amend at any time the law to change or even withdraw the statutory
right.
 
A public office is not a property right. As the Constitution
expressly states, a [P]ublic office is a public trust. No one has a vested
right to any public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of
holding a public office. In Cornejo v. Gabriel, decided in 1920, the Court
already ruled:
 
Again, for this petition to come under the due
process of law prohibition, it would be necessary to
consider an office a property. It is, however, well settledx 
x x that a public office is not property within the sense of
the constitutional guaranties of due process of law, but is
a public trust or agency. x x x The basic idea of the
government x x x is that of a popular representative
government, the officers being mere agents and not rulers
of the people, one where no one man or set of men has a
proprietary or contractual right to an office, but where
every officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of
the law and holds the office as a trust for the people he
represents.
 
 Petitioners, who apparently desire to hold public office, should
realize from the very start that no one has a proprietary right to public
office. While the law makes an SK officer an ex-officio member of a local
government legislative council, the law does not confer on petitioners a
proprietary right or even a proprietary expectancy to sit in local
legislative councils. The constitutional principle of a public office as a
public trust precludes any proprietary claim to public office. Even the
State policy directing equal access to opportunities for public service
cannot bestow on petitioners a proprietary right to SK membership or a
proprietary expectancy to ex-officio public offices.
 
Moreover, while the State policy is to encourage the youths
involvement in public affairs, this policy refers to those who belong to
the class of people defined as the youth. Congress has the power to
define who are the youth qualified to join the SK, which itself is a
creation of Congress. Those who do not qualify because they are past
the age group defined as the youth cannot insist on being part of the
youth. In government service, once an employee reaches mandatory
retirement age, he cannot invoke any property right to cling to his
office. In the same manner, since petitioners are now past the
maximum age for membership in the SK, they cannot invoke any
property right to cling to their SK membership. [Emphasis supplied.]
To recapitulate, we find no merit in the respondents retroactivity
arguments because: (1) the challenged proviso did not provide for the retroactive
application to barangay officials of the three-term limit; Section 43(b) of RA No.
9164 simply continued what had been there before; and (2) the constitutional
challenge based on retroactivity was not anchored on a constitutional standard
but on a mere statutory norm.
 
The Equal Protection Clause Issue
 
The equal protection guarantee under the Constitution is found under its
Section 2, Article III, which provides: Nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws. Essentially, the equality guaranteed under this clause is
equality under the same conditions and among persons similarly situated. It is
equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are different
from one another on the basis of substantial distinctions related to the objective of
the law; when things or persons are different in facts or circumstances, they may be
treated differently in law.[20]
 
Appreciation of how the constitutional equality provision applies inevitably
leads to the conclusion that no basis exists in the present case for an equal
protection challenge. The law can treat barangay officials differently from other
local elective officials because the Constitution itself provides a significant
distinction between these elective officials with respect to length of term and term
limitation. The clear distinction, expressed in the Constitution itself, is that while
the Constitution provides for a three-year term and three-term limit for local
elective officials, it left the length of term and the application of the three-term
limit or any form of term limitation for determination by Congress through
legislation. Not only does this disparate treatment recognize substantial
distinctions, it recognizes as well that the Constitution itself allows a non-uniform
treatment. No equal protection violation can exist under these conditions.
 
From another perspective, we see no reason to apply the equal protection
clause as a standard because the challenged proviso did not result in any
differential treatment between barangay officials and all other elective
officials. This conclusion proceeds from our ruling on the retroactivity issue that
the challenged proviso does not involve any retroactive application.
 
 
Violation of the Constitutional
One Subject- One Title Rule
 
Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof. Farias v. Executive Secretary[21]  provides the
reasons for this constitutional requirement and the test for its application, as
follows:
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called
omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious and/or
unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an
act relating to its subject finding expression in its title.
 
 To determine whether there has been compliance with the
constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed
in its title, the Court laid down the rule that
 
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and
titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or
impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an
act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a
technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive
enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks
to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary
or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need
not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
 
xxxx
 
x x x This Court has held that an act having a single general subject,
indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter
how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of
such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the
general subject.
 
xxxx
 
x x x Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that
the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the
legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and
prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the
notice, action and study of the legislators and the public.
 
We find, under these settled parameters, that the challenged proviso does not
violate the one subject-one title rule.
 
First, the title of RA No. 9164, An Act Providing for
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataang Elections, amending
Republic Act No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, states the laws general subject matter the amendment of the LGC
to synchronize the barangayand SK elections and  for other purposes. To achieve
synchronization of the barangay and SK elections, the reconciliation of the varying
lengths of the terms of office of barangay officials and SK officials is
necessary. Closely related with length of term is term limitation which defines the
total number of terms for which a barangay official may run for and hold
office. This natural linkage demonstrates that term limitation is not foreign to the
general subject expressed in the title of the law.
 
Second, the congressional debates we cited above show that the legislators
and the public they represent were fully informed of the purposes, nature and
scope of the laws provisions. Term limitation therefore received the notice,
consideration, and action from both the legislators and the public.
 
Finally, to require the inclusion of term limitation in the title of RA No. 9164
is to make the title an index of all the subject matters dealt with by law; this is not
what the constitutional requirement contemplates.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and
accordingly AFFIRM the constitutionality of the challenged proviso under Section
2, paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 9164. Costs against the respondents.
 
SO ORDERED.