League of Cities

G.R. No.
176951 November 18, 2008
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP

National President JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by
MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by
MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his
personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE
OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU;
MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR;
MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR;
MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; and
MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO,
CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF
BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF
ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF
PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF
TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF
URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and
CITY OF TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention.
x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 177499 November 18, 2008

personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN, PROVINCE
OF BASILAN; MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK, PROVINCE OF KALINGA;
MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR;
MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF MATI, PROVINCE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL; and
MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS
ORIENTAL, respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --x
G.R. No. 178056 November 18, 2008

personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN,
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR,
PROVINCE OF CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS
ORIENTAL, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition1 with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the
League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry
P. Treñas2 assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and
enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent
municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
The Facts
During the 11th Congress,3 Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33

municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24
other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress,4 Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009
(RA 9009),5 which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section
450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million
to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words
of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush" of municipalities to convert into
cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite
the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.6
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the

12th Congress7 adopted Joint Resolution No. 29,8 which sought to exempt from
the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose
cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the
12thCongress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress,9 the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint

Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for
approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution.
Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed,
through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood
bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from
the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood

bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except
that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills
lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws10) on various dates from March to July 2007
without the President's signature.11
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine
whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion
of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws

unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as
well as for violation of the equal protection clause.12Petitioners also lament
that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share
of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will
share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under
Section 285 of the Local Government Code.13
The Issues
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the

Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution,
and are thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present

case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took
effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria
for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other
law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution

because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local
government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear,
plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain

municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was
never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or

resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the
13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section
450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
Preliminary Matters
Prohibition is the proper action for testing the constitutionality of laws

administered by the COMELEC,14 like the Cityhood Laws, which direct the
COMELEC to hold plebiscites in implementation of the Cityhood Laws.
Petitioner League of Cities of the Philippines has legal standing because
Section 499 of the Local Government Code tasks the League with the
"primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting
city government administration and securing, through proper and legal means,
solutions thereto."15 Petitioners-in-intervention,16 which are existing cities, have
legal standing because their Internal Revenue Allotment will be reduced if the
Cityhood Laws are declared constitutional. Mayor Jerry P. Treñas has legal
standing because as Mayor of Iloilo City and as a taxpayer he has sufficient
interest to prevent the unlawful expenditure of public funds, like the release of
more Internal Revenue Allotment to political units than what the law allows.
Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law
RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the 11th Congress. This

law specifically amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code, which
now provides:
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a cluster of

barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally
generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00)
for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant
prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square

kilometers, as certified by the Land Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand

(150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office.
The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less
than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly

identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not
apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or
more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two
(2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring
income. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a

municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any
exemption from the increased income requirement.
Prior to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood

bills pending in Congress. Thirty-three cityhood bills became law before the
enactment of RA 9009. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during
the 11th Congress.
During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint

Resolution No. 29, exempting from the income requirement of P100 million in
RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not acted upon
during the 11th Congress. This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the
12th Congress adjourned without the Senate approving Joint Resolution
No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the

unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between November and December
of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood
bills containing a common provision, as follows:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be

exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act
No. 9009.
This common provision exempted each of the 16 municipalities from the

income requirement of P100 million prescribed in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. These cityhood bills
lapsed into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them.
Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity

of RA 9009. RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 or during the
11th Congress. The 13th Congress passed in December 2006 the cityhood
bills which became law only in 2007. Thus, respondent municipalities
cannot invoke the principle of non-retroactivity of laws.17 This basic rule has no
application because RA 9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws, is not
being applied retroactively but prospectively.
Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided,

merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow
the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any
other law. There is only one Local Government Code.18 The Constitution
requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria
necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality
into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the
Cityhood Laws.
The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the
creation of a city. No other law, not even the charter of the city, can govern
such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation
of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-
discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. Any
derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government
Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the
income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a
city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the
Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to
become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Section
450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not
contain any exemption from this income requirement.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent

municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress
when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the
effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the
increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be
valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code
and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government

Code are essential to implement a fair and equitable distribution of national
taxes to all local government units. Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
provides:
Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law,

in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
(Emphasis supplied)
If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and
discriminatory, there can be no fair and just distribution of the national taxes to
local government units.
A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal,
should not receive the same share in national taxes as a city with an annual
income of P100 million or more. The criteria of land area, population and
income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, must be
strictly followed because such criteria, prescribed by law, are material in
determining the "just share" of local government units in national taxes. Since
the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, they prevent the fair and just distribution of the
Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the
Constitution.
Section 450 of the Local Government Code is Clear,

Plain and Unambiguous
There can be no resort to extrinsic aids – like deliberations of Congress – if

the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous. Courts determine the
intent of the law from the literal language of the law, within the law's four
corners.19 If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts
simply apply the law according to its express terms. If a literal application of
the law results in absurdity, impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort to
extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the law.20
Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local

Government Code, did not provide any exemption from the increased income
requirement, not even to respondent municipalities whose cityhood bills were
then pending when Congress passed RA 9009. Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contains no exemption
whatsoever. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any
municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income
requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law in applying
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.
The 11th Congress' Intent was not Written into the Local Government
Code
True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent municipalities

from RA 9009, as shown by the various deliberations on the matter during the
11th Congress. However, Congress did not write this intended exemption into
law. Congress could have easily included such exemption in RA 9009 but
Congress did not. This is fatal to the cause of respondent municipalities
because such exemption must appear in RA 9009 as an amendment to
Section 450 of the Local Government Code. The Constitution requires that the
criteria for the conversion of a municipality into a city, including any exemption
from such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code.
Congress cannot prescribe such criteria or exemption from such criteria in any
other law. In short, Congress cannot create a city through a law that does
not comply with the criteria or exemption found in the Local Government
Code.
Section 10 of Article X is similar to Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution

prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations except by a general
law. Section 16 of Article XII provides:
The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations.
Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or
established by special charters in the interest of the common good and
subject to the test of economic viability. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Congress must prescribe all the criteria for the "formation, organization,
or regulation" of private corporations in a general law applicable to all
without discrimination.21 Congress cannot create a private corporation
through a special law or charter.
Deliberations of the 11th Congress on Unapproved Bills Inapplicable
Congress is not a continuing body.22 The unapproved cityhood bills filed

during the 11th Congress became mere scraps of paper upon the adjournment
of the 11th Congress. All the hearings and deliberations conducted during the
11th Congress on unapproved bills also became worthless upon the
adjournment of the 11th Congress. These hearings and deliberations
cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into law in the 13th or
subsequent Congresses.
The members and officers of each Congress are different. All unapproved bills
filed in one Congress become functus officio upon adjournment of that
Congress and must be re-filed anew in order to be taken up in the next
Congress. When their respective authors re-filed the cityhood bills in 2006
during the 13th Congress, the bills had to start from square one again, going
through the legislative mill just like bills taken up for the first time, from the
filing to the approval. Section 123, Rule XLIV of the Rules of the Senate, on
Unfinished Business, provides:
Sec. 123. x x x
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the

expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding
Congress as if presented for the first time. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Section 78 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, on
Unfinished Business, states:
Section 78. Calendar of Business. The Calendar of Business shall

consist of the following:
a. Unfinished Business. This is business being considered by the

House at the time of its last adjournment. Its consideration shall
be resumed until it is disposed of. The Unfinished Business at the
end of a session shall be resumed at the commencement of the
next session as if no adjournment has taken place. At the end of
the term of a Congress, all Unfinished Business are deemed
terminated. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved cityhood

bills, as well as the deliberations during the 12th and 13th Congresses on the
unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain municipalities, have
no legal significance. They do not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing laws
passed by subsequent Congresses.
Applicability of Equal Protection Clause
If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009,

contained an exemption to the P100 million annual income requirement, the
criteria for such exemption could be scrutinized for possible violation of the
equal protection clause. Thus, the criteria for the exemption, if found in the
Local Government Code, could be assailed on the ground of absence of a
valid classification. However, Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption. The exemption is
contained in the Cityhood Laws, which are unconstitutional because such
exemption must be prescribed in the Local Government Code as mandated in
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section
450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, such
exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection
clause. The exemption provision merely states, "Exemption from Republic
Act No. 9009 ─ The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income
requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009." This one sentence
exemption provision contains no classification standards or guidelines
differentiating the exempted municipalities from those that are not exempted.
Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11th Congress that
municipalities with pending cityhood bills should be exempt from the P100
million income requirement, there is still no valid classification to satisfy the
equal protection clause. The exemption will be based solely on the fact
that the 16 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in the 11th Congress
when RA 9009 was enacted. This is not a valid classification between those
entitled and those not entitled to exemption from the P100 million income
requirement.
To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on

substantial distinctions, rationally related to a legitimate government objective
which is the purpose of the law,23 not limited to existing conditions only, and
applicable to all similarly situated. Thus, this Court has ruled:
The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid

classification under the following conditions:
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same

class.24
There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending

cityhood bills in the 11thCongress and municipalities that did not have pending
bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a
material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the
purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the
11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a
municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress
might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have
pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion − mere pendency of
a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress − is not rationally related to the purpose of
the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting
into cities.
Municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills were not informed that a
pending cityhood bill in the 11th Congress would be a condition for exemption
from the increased P100 million income requirement. Had they been informed,
many municipalities would have caused the filing of their own cityhood bills.
These municipalities, even if they have bigger annual income than the 16
respondent municipalities, cannot now convert into cities if their income is less
than P100 million.
The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the

exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009.
That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement
that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. This
requirement is illustrated in Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck,25 where the
challenged law allowed milk dealers engaged in business prior to a fixed date
to sell at a price lower than that allowed to newcomers in the same business.
In Mayflower, the U.S. Supreme Court held:
We are referred to a host of decisions to the effect that a regulatory law

may be prospective in operation and may except from its sweep those
presently engaged in the calling or activity to which it is directed.
Examples are statutes licensing physicians and dentists, which apply
only to those entering the profession subsequent to the passage of the
act and exempt those then in practice, or zoning laws which exempt
existing buildings, or laws forbidding slaughterhouses within certain
areas, but excepting existing establishments. The challenged
provision is unlike such laws, since, on its face, it is not a
regulation of a business or an activity in the interest of, or for the
protection of, the public, but an attempt to give an economic
advantage to those engaged in a given business at an arbitrary
date as against all those who enter the industry after that date. The
appellees do not intimate that the classification bears any relation to the
public health or welfare generally; that the provision will discourage
monopoly; or that it was aimed at any abuse, cognizable by law, in the
milk business. In the absence of any such showing, we have no right to
conjure up possible situations which might justify the discrimination. The
classification is arbitrary and unreasonable and denies the appellant the
equal protection of the law. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16
municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date − the filing of
their cityhood bills before the end of the 11thCongress - as against all other
municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.
Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the

requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated.
Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities
cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly,
as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were
written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and

declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic Act Nos.
9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409,
9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.
SO ORDERED.
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF G.R. No. 176951

THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented
by LCP National President
JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF Present:
ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY
P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented PUNO,* C.J.,
by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. CARPIO,
SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in CORONA,
his personal capacity as taxpayer, CARPIO MORALES,
Petitioners, VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,*
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,

PERALTA,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; BERSAMIN,
MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, DEL CASTILLO,*
PROVINCE OF LEYTE;MUNICIPALITY OF ABAD, and
BOGO,PROVINCE OF VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
CEBU;MUNICIPALITY OF
CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN
SAMAR;MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG,
PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL
SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF
BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN
SAMAR; and MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS
,
PROVINCE OF QUEZON,
Respondents.

CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OFSANTIAGO,
CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF
LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF
SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF
SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS,
CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY
OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY
OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS,
CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF
TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB,
CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF
URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY
OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN,
CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS,
CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM,
Petitioners-In-Intervention.
x-------------------------------------------x

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented
JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF
P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented
by MAYOR MEL SENEN S.
SARMIENTO, and JERRY P.TREAS in
his personal capacity as taxpayer,
Petitioners,

- versus - G.R. No. 177499

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN,
PROVINCE OF BASILAN;
MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK,
PROVINCE OF KALINGA;
MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN,
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL
SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF
BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS
NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF
MATI, PROVINCE OF DAVAO
ORIENTAL; and MUNICIPALITY OF
GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS
ORIENTAL,
Respondents.

CITY OF IRIGA,
CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY
OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY
OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF
GENERAL SANTOS,
CITY OF
BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS,
CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM,
x-------------------------------------------x

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF
THEPHILIPPINES (LCP) represented
P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented
by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO,
and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity
as taxpayer,
Petitioners,
- versus -
MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN,
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE
OF CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF EL
SALVADOR, MISAMIS ORIENTAL,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 178056
CITY OF IRIGA,
CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY
OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY
OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY,
CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS,
CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS,CITY
OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM,

Promulgated:

December 21, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
VELASCO, JR. J.:

Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be
read according to its spirit or intent,[1] for what is within the spirit is within the
statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not
within the spirit is not within the statute.[2] Put a bit differently, that which is within
the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and
that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within
the intent of the lawmakers.[3] Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not
accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.[4]

So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity of an act of
Congress, a co-equal branch of government, it behooves the Court to have at once
one principle in mind: the presumption of constitutionality of statutes.[5] This
presumption finds its roots in the tri-partite system of government and the corollary
separation of powers, which enjoins the three great departments of the government
to accord a becoming courtesy for each others acts, and not to interfere
inordinately with the exercise by one of its official functions. Towards this end,
courts ought to reject assaults against the validity of statutes, barring of course
their clear unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain, the theory in context being
that the law is the product of earnest studies by Congress to ensure that no
constitutional prescription or concept is infringed.[6] Consequently, before a law
duly challenged is nullified, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with, the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in
such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court.[7]

BACKGROUND

The consolidated petitions for prohibition commenced by the League of
Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P.
Treas[8]assail the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws,[9] each converting the
municipality covered thereby into a city (cityhood laws, hereinafter) and seek to
enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites
pursuant to subject laws.

By Decision[10] dated November 18, 2008, the Court en banc, by a 6-5 vote,
granted the petitions and nullified the sixteen (16) cityhood laws for being
violative of the Constitution, specifically its Section 10, Article X and the equal
protection clause.
Subsequently, respondent local government units (LGUs) moved for
reconsideration, raising, as one of the issues, the validity of the factual premises
not contained in the pleadings of the parties, let alone established, which became
the bases of the Decision subject of reconsideration.[11] By Resolution of March 31,
2009, a divided Court denied the motion for reconsideration.
A second motion for reconsideration followed in which respondent LGUs
prayed as follows:

WHEREFORE, respondents respectfully pray that the Honorable Court
reconsider its Resolution dated March 31, 2009, in so far as it denies for lack of
merit respondents Motion for Reconsideration dated December 9, 2008 and in lieu
thereof, considering that new and meritorious arguments are raised by
respondents Motion for Reconsideration dated December 9, 2008 to grant afore-
mentioned Motion for Reconsideration dated December 9, 2008 and dismiss the
Petitions For Prohibition in the instant case.

Per Resolution dated April 28, 2009, the Court, voting 6-6, disposed of the
motion as follows:

By a vote of 6-6, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 31 March
2009 is DENIED for lack of merit. The motion is denied since there is no majority
that voted to overturn the Resolution of 31 March 2009.

The Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of 18 November
2008 is DENIED for being a prohibited pleading, and the Motion for Leave to
Admit Attached Petition in Intervention x x x filed by counsel for Ludivina T.
Mas, et al. are also DENIED. No further pleadings shall be entertained. Let entry
of judgment be made in due course. x x x

On May 14, 2009, respondent LGUs filed a Motion to Amend the Resolution of
April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead that Respondents Motion for Reconsideration
of the Resolution of March 31, 2009 and Motion for Leave to File and to Admit
Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 18,
2008 Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings Thereon.
Per its Resolution of June 2, 2009, the Court declared the May 14, 2009
motion adverted to as expunged in light of the entry of judgment made on May 21,
2009. Justice Leonardo-De Castro, however, taking common cause with Justice
Bersamin to grant the motion for reconsideration of the April 28, 2009 Resolution
and to recall the entry of judgment, stated the observation, and with reason, that the
entry was effected before the Court could act on the aforesaid motion which was
filed within the 15-day period counted from receipt of the April 28, 2009
Resolution.[12]
Forthwith, respondent LGUs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of June 2, 2009 to which some of the petitioners and petitioners-in-
intervention filed their respective comments. The Court will now rule on this
incident. But first, we set and underscore some basic premises:
(1) The initial motion to reconsider the November 18, 2008 Decision, as
Justice Leonardo-De Castro noted, indeed raised new and substantial issues,
inclusive of the matter of the correctness of the factual premises upon which the
said decision was predicated. The 6-6 vote on the motion for reconsideration per
the Resolution of March 31, 2009, which denied the motion on the sole ground that
the basic issues have already been passed upon reflected a divided Court on the
issue of whether or not the underlying Decision of November 18, 2008 had indeed
passed upon the basic issues raised in the motion for reconsideration of the said
decision;
(2) The aforesaid May 14, 2009 Motion to Amend Resolution of April 28,
2009 was precipitated by the tie vote which served as basis for the issuance of said
resolution. This May 14, 2009 motionwhich mainly argued that a tie vote is
inadequate to declare a law unconstitutional remains unresolved; and
(3) Pursuant to Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, all cases involving
the constitutionality of a law shall be heard by the Court en banc and decided with
the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
The basic issue tendered in this motion for reconsideration of the June 2,
2009 Resolution boils down to whether or not the required vote set forth in the
aforesaid Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII is limited only to the initial vote on the petition or
also to the subsequent voting on the motion for reconsideration where the Court is
called upon and actually votes on the constitutionality of a law or like issuances.
Or, as applied to this case, would a minute resolution dismissing, on a tie vote, a
motion for reconsideration on the sole stated groundthat the basic issues have
already been passed suffice to hurdle the voting requirement required for a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws in question?
The 6-6 vote on the motion to reconsider the Resolution of March 31, 2009,
which denied the initial motion on the sole ground that the basic issues had already
been passed upon betrayed an evenly divided Court on the issue of whether or not
the underlying Decision of November 18, 2008 had indeed passed upon the issues
raised in the motion for reconsideration of the said decision. But at the end of the
day, the single issue that matters and the vote that really counts really turn on the
constitutionality of the cityhood laws. And be it remembered that the inconclusive
6-6 tie vote reflected in the April 28, 2009 Resolution was the last vote on the issue
of whether or not the cityhood laws infringe the Constitution. Accordingly, the
motions of the respondent LGUs, in light of the 6-6 vote, should be deliberated
anew until the required concurrence on the issue of the validity or invalidity of the
laws in question is, on the merits, secured.
It ought to be clear that a deadlocked vote does not reflect the majority of the
Members contemplated in Sec. 4 (2) of Art. VIII of the Constitution, which
requires that:

All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or
executive agreement, or law shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, x x x
shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
(Emphasis added.)

Webster defines majority as a number greater than half of a total.[13] In plain
language, this means 50% plus one. In Lambino v. Commission on Elections,
Justice, now Chief Justice, Puno, in a separate opinion, expressed the view that a
deadlocked vote of six (6) is not a majority and a non-majority cannot write a
rule with precedential value.[14]
As may be noted, the aforequoted Sec. 4 of Art. VIII, as couched, exacts a
majority vote in the determination of a case involving the constitutionality of a
statute, without distinguishing whether such determination is made on the main
petition or thereafter on a motion for reconsideration. This is as it should be, for, to
borrow from the late Justice Ricardo J. Francisco: x x x [E]ven assuming x x x that
the constitutional requirement on the concurrence of the majority was initially
reached in the x x x ponencia, the same is inconclusive as it was still open for
review by way of a motion for reconsideration.[15]
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the rule on a tie-vote situation, i.e.,
Sec. 7, Rule 56 and the complementary A.M. No. 99-1-09- SC, respectively,
providing that:
SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. Where the court en banc
is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case
shall again be deliberated on, and if after such deliberation no decision is reached,
the original action commenced in the court shall be dismissed; in appealed cases,
the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental
matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.

A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC x x x A motion for reconsideration of a decision or
resolution of the Court En Banc or of a Division may be granted upon a vote of a
majority of the En Banc or of a Division, as the case may be, who actually took
part in the deliberation of the motion.

If the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed
denied.

But since the instant cases fall under Sec. 4 (2), Art. VIII of the Constitution,
the aforequoted provisions ought to be applied in conjunction with the prescription
of the Constitution that the cases shall be decided with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues
in the instant cases and voted thereon. To repeat, the last vote on the issue of the
constitutionality of the cityhood bills is that reflected in the April 28, 2009
Resolutiona 6-6 deadlock.

On the postulate then that first, the finality of the November 18, 2008
Decision has yet to set in, the issuance of the precipitate[16] entry of judgment
notwithstanding, and second, the deadlocked vote on the second motion for
reconsideration did not definitely settle the constitutionality of the cityhood laws,
the Court is inclined to take another hard look at the underlying decision. Without
belaboring in their smallest details the arguments for and against the procedural
dimension of this disposition, it bears to stress that the Court has the power to
suspend its own rules when the ends of justice would be served thereby. [17] In the
performance of their duties, courts should not be shackled by stringent rules which
would result in manifest injustice. Rules of procedure are only tools crafted to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application must be
eschewed, if they result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice.Substantial rights must not be prejudiced by a rigid and technical
application of the rules in the altar of expediency. When a case is impressed with
public interest, a relaxation of the application of the rules is in order.[18] Time and
again, this Court has suspended its own rules or excepted a particular case from
their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require.[19]
While perhaps not on all fours with the case, because it involved a purely
business transaction, what the Court said in Chuidian v. Sandiganbayan[20] is most
apropos:

To reiterate what the Court has said in Ginete vs. Court of Appeals and
other cases, the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere instruments designed
to facilitate the attainment of justice. They are not to be applied with severity and
rigidity when such application would clearly defeat the very rationale for their
conception and existence. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The
power to suspend or even disregard rules, inclusive of the one-motion rule, can be
so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court has already
declared to be final. The peculiarities of this case impel us to do so now.

The Court, by a vote of 6-4, grants the respondent LGUs motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009, as well as their May 14, 2009
motion to consider the second motion for reconsideration of the November 18,
2008 Decision unresolved, and also grants said second motion for reconsideration.

This brings us to the substantive aspect of the case.

The Undisputed Factual Antecedents in Brief

During the 11th Congress,[21] fifty-seven (57) cityhood bills were filed before
the House of Representatives.[22] Of the fifty-seven (57), thirty-three (33)
eventually became laws. The twenty-four (24) other bills were not acted upon.
Later developments saw the introduction in the Senate of Senate Bill (S.
Bill) No. 2157[23] to amend Sec. 450 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991. The proposed amendment
sought to increase the income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city
from PhP 20 million average annual income to PhP 100 million locally generated
income.

In March 2001, S. Bill No. 2157 was signed into law as RA 9009 to take
effect on June 30, 2001. As thus amended by RA 9009, Sec. 450 of the LGC of
1991 now provides that [a] municipality x x x may be converted into a component
city if it has a [certified] locally generated average annual income x x x of at least
[PhP 100 million] for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant
prices.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the Lower House of the 12th Congress
adopted in July 2001 House (H.) Joint Resolution No. 29[24] which, as its title
indicated, sought to exempt from the income requirement prescribed in RA 9009
the 24 municipalities whose conversions into cities were not acted upon during the
previous Congress. The 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving H. Joint
Resolution No. 29.

Then came the 13th Congress (July 2004 to June 2007), which saw the House
of Representatives re-adopting H. Joint Resolution No. 29 as H. Joint Resolution
No. 1 and forwarding it to the Senate for approval.

The Senate, however, again failed to approve the joint resolution. During the
Senate session held on November 6, 2006, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. asserted
that passing H. Resolution No. 1 would, in net effect, allow a wholesale exemption
from the income requirement imposed under RA 9009 on the municipalities. For
this reason, he suggested the filing by the House of Representatives of individual
bills to pave the way for the municipalities to become cities and then forwarding
them to the Senate for proper action.[25]

Heeding the advice, sixteen (16) municipalities filed, through their
respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Common to all 16 measures was a
provision exempting the municipality covered from the PhP 100 million income
requirement.

As of June 7, 2007, both Houses of Congress had approved the individual cityhood
bills, all of which eventually lapsed into law on various dates. Each cityhood law
directs the COMELEC, within thirty (30) days from its approval, to hold a
plebiscite to determine whether the voters approve of the conversion.

As earlier stated, the instant petitions seek to declare the cityhood laws
unconstitutional for violation of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution, as well as for
violation of the equal-protection clause. The wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities, the petitioners bemoan, will reduce the share of existing
cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), since more cities will partake of
the internal revenue set aside for all cities under Sec. 285 of the LGC of 1991.[26]

Petitioners-in-intervention, LPC members themselves, would later seek leave and
be allowed to intervene.
Aside from their basic plea to strike down as unconstitutional the cityhood laws in
question, petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention collectively pray that an order
issue enjoining the COMELEC from conducting plebiscites in the affected areas.
An alternative prayer would urge the Court to restrain the poll body from
proclaiming the plebiscite results.

On July 24, 2007, the Court en banc resolved to consolidate the petitions
and the petitions-in-intervention. On March 11, 2008, it heard the parties in oral
arguments.

The Issues

In the main, the issues to which all others must yield pivot on whether or not
the cityhood laws violate (1) Sec. 10. Art. X of the Constitution and (2) the equal
protection clause.

In the November 18, 2008 Decision granting the petitions, Justice Antonio
T. Carpio, for the Court, resolved the twin posers in the affirmative and
accordingly declared the cityhood laws unconstitutional, deviating as they do from
the uniform and non-discriminatory income criterion prescribed by the LGC of
1991. In so doing, the ponencia veritably agreed with the petitioners that the
Constitution, in clear and unambiguous language, requires that all the criteria for
the creation of a city shall be embodied and written in the LGC, and not in any
other law.

After a circumspect reflection, the Court is disposed to reconsider.

Petitioners threshold posture, characterized by a strained interpretation of the
Constitution, if accorded cogency, would veritably curtail and cripple Congress
valid exercise of its authority to create political subdivisions.
By constitutional design[27] and as a matter of long-established principle, the
power to create political subdivisions or LGUs is essentially legislative in
character.[28] But even without any constitutional grant, Congress can, by law,
create, divide, merge, or altogether abolish or alter the boundaries of a province,
city, or municipality. We said as much in the fairly recent case, Sema v. CIMELEC.
[29]
The 1987 Constitution, under its Art. X, Sec. 10, nonetheless provides for the
creation of LGUs, thus:

Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis
supplied.)

As may be noted, the afore-quoted provision specifically provides for the
creation of political subdivisions in accordance with the criteria established in
the local government code, subject to the approval of the voters in the unit
concerned. The criteria referred to are the verifiable indicators of
viability, i.e., area, population, and income, now set forth in Sec. 450 of the LGC
of 1991, as amended by RA 9009. The petitioners would parlay the thesis that
these indicators or criteria must be written only in the LGC and not in any other
statute. Doubtless, the code they are referring to is the LGC of 1991. Pushing their
point, they conclude that the cityhood laws that exempted the respondent LGUs
from the income standard spelled out in the amendatory RA 9009 offend the
Constitution.

Petitioners posture does not persuade.

The supposedly infringed Art. X, Sec. 10 is not a new constitutional
provision. Save for the use of the term barrio in lieu of barangay, may be instead
of shall, the change of the phrase unit or units to political unit and the addition of
the modifier directly to the word affected, the aforesaid provision is a substantial
reproduction of Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution, which reads:

Section 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may
be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. (Emphasis supplied.)

It bears notice, however, that the code similarly referred to in the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions is clearly but a law Congress enacted. This is consistent with
the aforementioned plenary power of Congress to create political units.
Necessarily, since Congress wields the vast poser of creating political subdivisions,
surely it can exercise the lesser authority of requiring a set of criteria, standards, or
ascertainable indicators of viability for their creation. Thus, the only conceivable
reason why the Constitution employs the clause in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code is to lay stress that it is Congress alone,
and no other, which can impose the criteria. The eminent constitutionalist, Fr.
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., in his treatise on Constitutional Law, specifically on the
subject provision, explains:

Prior to 1965, there was a certain lack of clarity with regard to the
power to create, divide, merge, dissolve, or change the boundaries of
municipal corporations. The extent to which the executive may share in
this power was obscured by Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan.
[30]
Pelaez v. Auditor General subsequently clarified the Cardona case
when the Supreme Court said that the authority to create municipal
corporations is essentially legislative in nature.[31] Pelaez, however,
conceded that the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid
or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may
partake of an administrative nature-involving as it does, the adoption of
means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities.
[32]
Pelaez was silent about division, merger, and dissolution of municipal
corporations. But since division in effect creates a new municipality, and
both dissolution and merger in effect abolish a legal creation, it may
fairly be inferred that these acts are also legislative in nature.

Section 10 [Art. X of the 1987 Constitution], which is a legacy from the
1973 Constitution, goes further than the doctrine in the Pelaez case. It
not only makes creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities x x x subject
to criteria established in the local government code, thereby declaring
these actions properly legislative, but it also makes creation, division,
merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected.[33] x x x (Emphasis added.)

It remains to be observed at this juncture that when the 1987 Constitution
speaks of the LGC, the reference cannot be to any specific statute or codification of
laws, let alone the LGC of 1991.[34] Be it noted that at the time of the adoption of
the 1987 Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 337, the then LGC, was still in
effect. Accordingly, had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to isolate
the embodiment of the criteria only in the LGC, then they would have actually
referred to BP 337. Also, they would then not have provided for the enactment by
Congress of a new LGC, as they did in Art. X, Sec. 3[35] of the Constitution.

Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress
can, via either a consolidated set of laws or a much simpler, single-subject
enactment, impose the said verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria need not
be embodied in the local government code, albeit this code is the ideal repository
to ensure, as much as possible, the element of uniformity. Congress can even, after
making a codification, enact an amendatory law, adding to the existing layers of
indicators earlier codified, just as efficaciously as it may reduce the same. In this
case, the amendatory RA 9009 upped the already codified income requirement
from PhP 20 million to PhP 100 million. At the end of the day, the passage of
amendatory laws is no different from the enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws
specifically exempting a particular political subdivision from the criteria earlier
mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting law/s, effectively decreased the
already codified indicators.

Petitioners theory that Congress must provide the criteria solely in the LGC
and not in any other law strikes the Court as illogical. For if we pursue their
contention to its logical conclusion, then RA 9009 embodying the new and
increased income criterion would, in a way, also suffer the vice of
unconstitutionality. It is startling, however, that petitioners do not question the
constitutionality of RA 9009, as they in fact use said law as an argument for the
alleged unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws.

As it were, Congress, through the medium of the cityhood laws, validly
decreased the income criterion vis--vis the respondent LGUs, but without
necessarily being unreasonably discriminatory, as shall be discussed shortly, by
reverting to the PhP 20 million threshold what it earlier raised to PhP 100 million.
The legislative intent not to subject respondent LGUs to the more stringent
requirements of RA 9009 finds expression in the following uniform provision of
the cityhood laws:

Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. The City of x x x shall
be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic
Act No. 9009.

In any event, petitioners constitutional objection would still be untenable
even if we were to assume purely ex hypothesi the correctness of their underlying
thesis, viz: that the conversion of a municipality to a city shall be in accordance
with, among other things, the income criterion set forth in the LGC of 1991, and in
no other; otherwise, the conversion is invalid. We shall explain.

Looking at the circumstances behind the enactment of the laws subject of
contention, the Court finds that the LGC-amending RA 9009, no less, intended the
LGUs covered by the cityhood laws to be exempt from the PhP 100 million
income criterion. In other words, the cityhood laws, which merely carried out the
intent of RA 9009, adhered, in the final analysis, to the criteria established in the
Local Government Code, pursuant to Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987
Constitution. We shall now proceed to discuss this exemption angle.[36]

Among the criteria established in the LGC pursuant to Sec.10, Art. X of the
1987 Constitution are those detailed in Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 under the
heading Requisites for Creation. The section sets the minimum income qualifying
bar before a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be considered for
cityhood. Originally, Sec. 164 of BP 337 imposed an average regular annual
income of at least ten million pesos for the last three consecutive years as a
minimum income standard for a municipal-to-city conversion. The LGC that BP
337 established was superseded by the LGC of 1991 whose then Sec. 450 provided
that [a] municipality or cluster of barangays may be converted into a component
city if it has an average annual income, x x x of at least twenty million
pesos (P20,000,000.00) for at least two (2) consecutive years based on 1991
constant prices x x x. RA 9009 in turn amended said Sec. 450 by further increasing
the income requirement to PhP 100 million, thus:

Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster
of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally
generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of at least One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00) for
the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if
it has either of the following requisites:

xxxx

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing
to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-
recurring income. (Emphasis supplied.)

The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which
the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis[37] or strictly literal
interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an
absurd situation or injustice.[38] To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the
principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself,[39] resort should be
to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.[40]

It is in this respect that the history of the passage of RA 9009 and the logical
inferences derivable therefrom assume relevancy in discovering legislative intent.
[41]

The rationale behind the enactment of RA 9009 to amend Sec. 450 of the
LGC of 1991 can reasonably be deduced from Senator Pimentels sponsorship
speech on S. Bill No. 2157. Of particular significance is his statement regarding
the basis for the proposed increase from PhP 20 million to PhP 100 million in the
income requirement for municipalities wanting to be converted into cities, viz:

Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, I would have wanted this bill to be
included in the whole set of proposed amendments that we have
introduced to precisely amend the [LGC].However, it is a fact that there
is a mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into
cities. Whereas in 1991, when the [LGC] was approved, there were only
60 cities, today the number has increased to 85 cities, with 41 more
municipalities applying for conversion x x x. At the rate we are going, I
am apprehensive that before long this nation will be a nation of all
cities and no municipalities.

It is for that reason, Mr. President, that we are proposing among other
things, that the financial requirement, which, under the [LGC], is fixed
at P20 million, be raised to P100 million to enable a municipality to have
the right to be converted into a city, and the P100 million should be
sourced from locally generated funds.

Congress to be sure knew, when RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, of the
pendency of several bills on cityhood, wherein the applying municipalities were
qualified under the then obtaining PhP 20 million-income threshold. These
included respondent LGUs. Thus, equally noteworthy is the ensuing excerpts from
the floor exchange between then Senate President Franklin Drilon and Senator
Pimentel, the latter stopping short of saying that the income threshold of PhP 100
million under S. Bill No. 2157 would not apply to municipalities that have pending
cityhood bills, thus:

THE PRESIDENT. The Chair would like to ask for some clarificatory point. x
xx

THE PRESIDENT. This is just on the point of the pending bills in the
Senate which propose the conversion of a number of municipalities into
cities and which qualify under the present standard.

We would like to know the view of the sponsor: Assuming that this bill
becomes a law, will the Chamber apply the standard as proposed in this
bill to those bills which are pending for consideration?

SENATOR PIMENTEL, Mr. President, it might not be fair to make
this bill x x x [if] approved, retroact to the bills that are pending in the
Senate for conversion from municipalities to cities.

THE PRESIDENT. Will there be an appropriate language crafted to
reflect that view? Or does it not become a policy of the Chamber,
assuming that this bill becomes a law x x x that it will apply to those bills
which are already approved by the House under the old version of the
[LGC] and are now pending in the Senate? The Chair does not know if we
can craft a language which will limit the application to those which are not
yet in the Senate. Or is that a policy that the Chamber will adopt?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Mr. President, personally, I do not think it
is necessary to put that provision because what we are saying here will
form part of the interpretation of this bill. Besides, if there is no
retroactivity clause, I do not think that the bill would have any retroactive
effect.

THE PRESIDENT. So the understanding is that those bills which
are already pending in the Chamber will not be affected.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. These will not be affected, Mr.
President.[42] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
What the foregoing Pimental-Drilon exchange eloquently indicates are the
following complementary legislative intentions: (1) the then pending cityhood bills
would be outside the pale of the minimum income requirement of PhP 100 million
that S. Bill No. 2159 proposes; and (2) RA 9009 would not have any retroactive
effect insofar as the cityhood bills are concerned.

Given the foregoing perspective, it is not amiss to state that the basis for the
inclusion of the exemption clause of the cityhood laws is the clear-cut intent of
Congress of not according retroactive effect to RA 9009. Not only do the
congressional records bear the legislative intent of exempting the cityhood laws
from the income requirement of PhP 100 million. Congress has now made its
intention to exempt express in the challenged cityhood laws.

Legislative intent is part and parcel of the law, the controlling factor in
interpreting a statute. In construing a statute, the proper course is to start out and
follow the true intent of the Legislature and to adopt the sense that best harmonizes
with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the policy and objects of the
legislature.[43] In fact, any interpretation that runs counter to the legislative intent is
unacceptable and invalid.[44] Torres v. Limjap could not have been more precise:

The intent of a Statute is the Law. If a statute is valid, it is to have
effect according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent
is x x x the essence of the law and the primary rule of construction is
to ascertain and give effect to that intent. The intention of the
legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when
ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of
the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads
away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to
conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is
the spirit which gives life to a legislative enactment. In construing
statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the
legislature x x x.[45] (Emphasis supplied.)
As emphasized at the outset, behind every law lies the presumption of
constitutionality.[46] Consequently, to him who would assert the unconstitutionality
of a statute belongs the burden of proving otherwise. Laws will only be declared
invalid if a conflict with the Constitution is beyond reasonable doubt.
[47]
Unfortunately for petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention, they failed to
discharge their heavy burden.

It is contended that the deliberations on the cityhood bills and the covering
joint resolution were undertaken in the 11th and/or the 12th Congress. Accordingly,
so the argument goes, such deliberations, more particularly those on the
unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain municipalities, are
without significance and would not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing the
cityhood laws that were passed during the 13th Congress, Congress not being a
continuing body.

The argument is specious and glosses over the reality that the cityhood
billswhich were already being deliberated upon even perhaps before the conception
of RA 9009were again being considered during the 13th Congress after being
tossed around in the two previous Congresses. And specific reference to the
cityhood bills was also made during the deliberations on RA 9009. At the end of
the day, it is really immaterial if Congress is not a continuing legislative body.
What is important is that the debates, deliberations, and proceedings of Congress
and the steps taken in the enactment of the law, in this case the cityhood laws in
relation to RA 9009 or vice versa, were part of its legislative history and may be
consulted, if appropriate, as aids in the interpretation of the law.[48] And of course
the earlier cited Drilon-Pimentel exchange on whether or not the 16 municipalities
in question would be covered by RA 9009 is another vital link to the historical
chain of the cityhood bills. This and other proceedings on the bills are spread in the
Congressional journals, which cannot be conveniently reduced to pure rhetoric
without meaning whatsoever, on the simplistic and non-sequitur pretext that
Congress is not a continuing body and that unfinished business in either chamber is
deemed terminated at the end of the term of Congress.

This brings us to the challenge to the constitutionality of cityhood laws on equal
protection grounds.

To the petitioners, the cityhood laws, by granting special treatment to
respondent municipalities/LGUs by way of exemption from the standard PhP 100
million minimum income requirement, violate Sec.1, Art. III of the Constitution,
which in part provides that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the
laws.

Petitioners challenge is not well taken. At its most basic, the equal protection
clause proscribes undue favor as well as hostile discrimination. Hence, a law need
not operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable with Sec. 1,
Art. III of the Constitution.

The equal protection guarantee is embraced in the broader and elastic concept of
due process, every unfair discrimination being an offense against the requirements
of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless come as a separate clause in Sec. 1, Art.
III of the Constitution to provide for a more specific protection against any undue
discrimination or antagonism from government. Arbitrariness in general may be
assailed on the basis of the due process clause. But if a particular challenged act
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it
down is the equal protection clause.[49] This constitutional protection extends to all
persons, natural or artificial, within the territorial jurisdiction. Artificial persons, as
the respondent LGUs herein, are, however, entitled to protection only insofar as
their property is concerned.[50]
In the proceedings at bar, petitioner LCP and the intervenors cannot
plausibly invoke the equal protection clause, precisely because no deprivation of
property results by virtue of the enactment of the cityhood laws. The LCPs claim
that the IRA of its member-cities will be substantially reduced on account of the
conversion into cities of the respondent LGUs would not suffice to bring it within
the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. Indeed, it is presumptuous on the part of
the LCP member-cities to already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were their
property, as the IRA is yet to be allocated. For the same reason, the municipalities
that are not covered by the uniform exemption clause in the cityhood laws cannot
validly invoke constitutional protection. For, at this point, the conversion of a
municipality into a city will only affect its status as a political unit, but not its
property as such.

As a matter of settled legal principle, the fundamental right of equal protection
does not require absolute equality. It is enough that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights or privileges conferred and
responsibilities or obligations imposed. The equal protection clause does not
preclude the state from recognizing and acting upon factual differences between
individuals and classes. It recognizes that inherent in the right to legislate is the
right to classify,[51] necessarily implying that the equality guaranteed is not violated
by a legislation based on reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable,
must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members
of the same class.[52] The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the
laws challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory under the equal protection clause.

As things stand, the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen (16) municipalities
by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction. Indeed, respondent LGUs,
which are subjected only to the erstwhile PhP 20 million income criterion instead
of the stringent income requirement prescribed in RA 9009, are substantially
different from other municipalities desirous to be cities. Looking back, we note
that respondent LGUs had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009.
There lies part of the tipping difference. And years before the enactment of the
amendatory RA 9009, respondents LGUs had already met the income criterion
exacted for cityhood under the LGC of 1991. Due to extraneous circumstances,
however, the bills for their conversion remained unacted upon by Congress. As
aptly observed by then Senator, now Manila Mayor, Alfredo Lim in his speech
sponsoring H. Joint Resolution No. 1, or the cityhood bills, respondent LGUs saw
themselves confronted with the changing of the rules in the middle of the
game. Some excerpts of Senator Lims sponsorship speech:

x x x [D]uring the Eleventh Congress, fifty-seven (57)
municipalities applied for city status, confident that each has met the
requisites for conversion under Section 450 of the [LGC], particularly
the income threshold of P20 million. Of the 57 that filed, thirty-two (32)
were enacted into law; x x x while the rest twenty-four (24) in all failed
to pass through Congress. Shortly before the long recess of Congress in
February 2001, to give way to the May elections x x x, Senate Bill No.
2157, which eventually became [RA] 9009, was passed into law,
effectively raising the income requirement for creation of cities to a
whooping P100 million x x x. Much as the proponents of the 24
cityhood bills then pending struggled to beat the effectivity of the
law on June 30, 2001, events that then unfolded were swift and
overwhelming that Congress just did not have the time to act on the
measures.

Some of these intervening events were x x x the impeachment of
President Estrada x x x and the May 2001 elections.

The imposition of a much higher income requirement for the
creation of a city x x x was unfair; like any sport changing the rules in
the middle of the game.

Undaunted, they came back during the [12th] Congress x x x. They
filed House Joint Resolution No. 29 seeking exemption from the higher
income requirement of RA 9009. For the second time, [however], time
ran out from them.

For many of the municipalities whose Cityhood Bills are now
under consideration, this year, at the closing days of the [13th] Congress,
marks their ninth year appealing for fairness and justice. x x x

I, for one, share their view that fairness dictates that they should
be given a legal remedy by which they could be allowed to prove that
they have all the necessary qualifications for city status using the criteria
set forth under the [LGC] prior to its amendment by RA 9009. Hence,
when House Joint Resolution No. 1 reached the Senate x x x I
immediately set the public hearing x x x. On July 25, 2006, I filed
Committee Report No. 84 x x x. On September 6, I delivered the
sponsorship x x x.

x x x By November 14, the measure had reverted to the period of
individual amendments. This was when the then acting majority leader, x
x x informed the Body that Senator Pimentel and the proponents of
House Joint Resolution No. 1 have agreed to the proposal of the
Minority Leader for the House to first approve the individual Cityhood
Bills of the qualified municipalities, along with the provision exempting
each of them from the higher income requirement of RA 9009. x x x
This led to the certification issued by the proponents short-listing
fourteen (14) municipalities deemed to be qualified for city-status.

Acting on the suggestion of Senator Pimentel, the proponents lost
no time in working for the approval by the House of Representatives of
their individual Cityhood Bills, each containing a provision of exemption
from the higher income requirement of RA 9009. On the last session day
of last year, December 21, the House transmitted to the Senate the
Cityhood Bills of twelve out of the 14 pre-qualified municipalities. Your
Committee immediately conducted the public hearing x x x.

The whole process I enumerated [span] three Congresses x x x.

In essence, the Cityhood Bills now under consideration will have
the same effect as that of House Joint Resolution No. 1 because each of
the 12 bills seeks exemption from the higher income requirement of RA
9009. The proponents are invoking the exemption on the basis of
justice and fairness.

Each of the 12 municipalities has all the requisites for
conversion into a component city based on the old requirements set
forth under Section 450 of the [LGC], prior to its amendment by RA
9009, namely: x x x[53] (Emphasis supplied.)

In hindsight, the peculiar conditions, as depicted in Senator Lims speech,
which respondent LGUs found themselves in were unsettling. They were qualified
cityhood applicants before the enactment of RA 009. Because of events they had
absolutely nothing to do with, a spoiler in the form of RA 9009 supervened. Now,
then, to impose on them the much higher income requirement after what they have
gone through would appear to be indeed unfair, to borrow from Senator
Lim. Thus, the imperatives of fairness dictate that they should be given a legal
remedy by which they would be allowed to prove that they have all the necessary
qualifications for city status, using the criteria set forth under the LGC of 1991
prior to its amendment by RA 9009. Truly, the peculiar conditions of respondent
LGUs, which are actual and real, provide sufficient grounds for legislative
classification.

To be sure, courts, regardless of doubts they might be entertaining, cannot
question the wisdom of the congressional classification, if reasonable, or the
motivation underpinning the classification.[54] By the same token, they do not sit to
determine the propriety or efficacy of the remedies Congress has specifically
chosen to extend. That is its prerogative. The power of the Legislature to make
distinctions and classifications among persons is, to reiterate, neither curtailed nor
denied by the equal protection clause. A law can be violative of the constitutional
limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis.

The classification is also germane to the purpose of the law. The exemption of
respondent LGUs/municipalities from the PhP 100 million income requirement
was meant to reduce the inequality occasioned by the passage of the amendatory
RA 9009. From another perspective, the exemption was unquestionably designed
to insure that fairness and justice would be accorded respondent LGUs. Let it be
noted that what were then the cityhood bills covering respondent LGUs were part
and parcel of the original 57 conversion bills filed in the 11th Congress, 33 of those
became laws before the adjournment of that Congress. The then bills of the
challenged cityhood laws were not acted upon due, inter alia, to the impeachment
of then President Estrada, the related jueteng scandal investigations conducted
before, and the EDSA events that followed the aborted impeachment.

While the equal protection guarantee frowns upon the creation of a
privileged class without justification, inherent in the equality clause is the
exhortation for the Legislature to pass laws promoting equality or reducing existing
inequalities. The enactment of the cityhood laws was in a real sense an attempt on
the part of Congress to address the inequity dealt the respondent LGUs. These laws
positively promoted the equality and eliminated the inequality, doubtless
unintended, between respondent municipalities and the thirty-three (33) other
municipalities whose cityhood bills were enacted during the 11th
Congress. Respondent municipalities and the 33 other municipalities, which had
already been elevated to city status, were all found to be qualified under the old
Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 during the 11thCongress. As such, both respondent
LGUs and the 33 other former municipalities are under like circumstances and
conditions. There is, thus, no rhyme or reason why an exemption from the PhP 100
million requirement cannot be given to respondent LGUs. Indeed, to deny
respondent LGUs/municipalities the same rights and privileges accorded to the 33
other municipalities when, at the outset they were similarly situated, is tantamount
to denying the former the protective mantle of the equal protection clause. In
effect, petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention are creating an absurd situation in
which an alleged violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution is
remedied by another violation of the same clause. The irony is not lost to the
Court.

Then too the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009 is not limited in application
only to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for
all time, as long as the contemplated conditions obtain. To be more precise, the
legislative intent underlying the enactment of RA 9009 to exclude would-be-cities
from the PhP 100 million criterion would hold sway, as long as the corresponding
cityhood bill has been filed before the effectivity of RA 9009 and the concerned
municipality qualifies for conversion into a city under the original version of Sec.
450 of the LGC of 1991.

Viewed in its proper light, the common exemption clause in the cityhood
laws is an application of the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009 on the cityhood
bills. It is not a declaration of certain rights, but a mere declaration of prior
qualification and/or compliance with the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009.

Lastly and in connection with the third requisite, the uniform exemption
clause would apply to municipalities that had pending cityhood bills before the
passage of RA 9009 and were compliant with then Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991,
which prescribed an income requirement of PhP 20 million. It is hard to imagine,
however, if there are still municipalities out there belonging in context to the same
class as the sixteen (16) respondent LGUs. Municipalities that cannot claim to
belong to the same class as the 16 cannot seek refuge in the cityhood laws. The
former have to comply with the PhP 100 million income requirement imposed by
RA 9009.

A final consideration. The existence of the cities consequent to the approval
of the creating, but challenged, cityhood laws in the plebiscites held in the affected
LGUs is now an operative fact. New cities appear to have been organized and are
functioning accordingly, with new sets of officials and employees. Other resulting
events need not be enumerated. The operative fact doctrine provides another
reason for upholding the constitutionality of the cityhood laws in question.

In view of the foregoing discussion, the Court ought to abandon as it hereby
abandons and sets aside the Decision of November 18, 2008 subject of
reconsideration. And by way of summing up the main arguments in support of this
disposition, the Court hereby declares the following:

(1) Congress did not intend the increased income requirement in RA 9009 to
apply to the cityhood bills which became the cityhood laws in question. In other
words, Congress intended the subject cityhood laws to be exempted from the
income requirement of PhP 100 million prescribed by RA 9009;

(2) The cityhood laws merely carry out the intent of RA 9009, now Sec. 450
of the LGC of 1991, to exempt respondent LGUs from the PhP 100 million income
requirement;

(3) The deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or
resolutions are extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress. It is
really immaterial if Congress is not a continuing body. The hearings and
deliberations during the 11th and 12th Congress may still be used as extrinsic
reference inasmuch as the same cityhood bills which were filed before the passage
of RA 9009 were being considered during the 13th Congress. Courts may fall back
on the history of a law, as here, as extrinsic aid of statutory construction if the
literal application of the law results in absurdity or injustice.

(4) The exemption accorded the 16 municipalities is based on the fact that
each had pending cityhood bills long before the enactment of RA 9009 that
substantially distinguish them from other municipalities aiming for cityhood. On
top of this, each of the 16 also met the PhP 20 million income level exacted under
the original Sec. 450 of the 1991 LGC.

And to stress the obvious, the cityhood laws are presumed constitutional. As
we see it, petitioners have not overturned the presumptive constitutionality of the
laws in question.
WHEREFORE, respondent LGUs Motion for Reconsideration dated June
2, 2009, their Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009 by Declaring
Instead that Respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of March
31, 2009 and Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached Second Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 18, 2008 Remain Unresolved
and to Conduct Further Proceedings, dated May 14, 2009, and their second Motion
for Reconsideration of the Decision dated November 18, 2008 are GRANTED.
The June 2, 2009, the March 31, 2009, and April 31, 2009 Resolutions
are REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. The entry of judgment made on May 21, 2009
must accordingly be RECALLED.

The instant consolidated petitions and petitions-in-intervention
are DISMISSED. The cityhood laws, namely Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390,
9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436,
and 9491 are declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.

SO ORDERED.

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE G.R. No. 176951
ILOILO represented by
MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS,
CITY OF CALBAYOG
represented by MAYOR
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO,
and JERRY P. TREAS in his
personal capacity as taxpayer,
Petitioners,

- versus -
MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY,
PROVINCE OF LEYTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO,
PROVINCE OF CEBU;
MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN,
PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR;
MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG,
PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR;
MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN,
PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR;
and MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS,
PROVINCE OF QUEZON,
Respondents.

CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO,
CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO,
CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF
TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO,
CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF
CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF
GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN,
CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF
SAN CARLOS, CITY OF
SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF
URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS,
CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF
CITY OF CADIZ, and
CITY OF TAGUM,
x-----------------------------x

ILOILO represented by
MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS,
CITY OF CALBAYOG
represented by MAYOR
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO,
and JERRY P. TREAS in his
personal capacity as taxpayer,
Petitioners,

- versus -

MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN,
PROVINCE OF BASILAN;
MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK,
PROVINCE OF KALINGA;
MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN,
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR;
MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC,
PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF MATI,
PROVINCE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL;
and MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN,
PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL,
Respondents.

CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF
SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA,
CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI,
CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO,
CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF
SAN CARLOS, CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF
CITY OF CADIZ, and
CITY OF TAGUM,
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --x

by LCP National President Present:
ILOILO represented by CORONA, C.J.,
MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CARPIO,
CITY OF CALBAYOG CARPIO MORALES,
represented by MAYOR VELASCO, JR.,
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, NACHURA,
and JERRY P. TREAS in his LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
personal capacity as taxpayer, BRION,
Petitioners, PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
- versus - ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; SERENO, JJ.
MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN,
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN
DEL NORTE; MUNICIPALITY
OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF
CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF
EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS
ORIENTAL,
Respondents.

CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF
SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA,
CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI,
CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO,
CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY,
CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS,
SAN CARLOS, CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF
CITY OF CADIZ, and Promulgated:
CITY OF TAGUM,
Petitioners-In-Intervention. August 24, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:
For resolution are (1) the ad cautelam motion for reconsideration and (2) motion to
annul the Decision of 21 December 2009 filed by petitioners League of Cities of
the Philippines, et al. and (3) the ad cautelam motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners-in-intervention Batangas City, Santiago City, Legazpi City, Iriga City,
Cadiz City, and Oroquieta City.
On 18 November 2008, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a majority vote, struck

down the subject 16 Cityhood Laws for violating Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution and the equal protection clause. On 31 March 2009, the Supreme
Court En Banc, again by a majority vote, denied the respondents first motion for
reconsideration. On 28 April 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a split vote,
denied the respondents second motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, the 18
November 2008 Decision became final and executory and was recorded, in due
course, in the Book of Entries of Judgments on 21 May 2009.

However, after the finality of the 18 November 2008 Decision and without any
exceptional and compelling reason, the Court En Banc unprecedentedly reversed
the 18 November 2008 Decision by upholding the constitutionality of the Cityhood
Laws in the Decision of 21 December 2009.

Upon reexamination, the Court finds the motions for reconsideration meritorious
and accordingly reinstates the 18 November 2008 Decision declaring the 16
Cityhood Laws unconstitutional.

A. Violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided,

merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)

The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow
the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other
law. There is only one Local Government Code.[1] The Constitution requires
Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for
the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city.
Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.

The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other
political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found
solely in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the
criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution.

RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the
income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a
city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local
Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city
must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from
this income requirement.

In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent
municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when
Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of
RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income
requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be
written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the
Cityhood Laws.

RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code. Section 1 of RA
9009 pertinently provides: Section 450 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991, is hereby amended to read as
follows: x x x. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code. RA
9009, by amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code, embodies the
new and prevailing Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Considering
the Legislatures primary intent to curtail the mad rush of municipalities wanting to
be converted into cities, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for the
creation of cities. To repeat, RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local
Government Code, as it expressly amended Section 450 of the Local Government
Code.

The language of RA 9009 is plain, simple, and clear. Nothing is unintelligible or
ambiguous; not a single word or phrase admits of two or more meanings. RA 9009
amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 by increasing the
income requirement for the creation of cities. There are no exemptions from this
income requirement. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any
municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income
requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law. Moreover, where
the law does not make an exemption, the Court should not create one.[2]

B. Operative Fact Doctrine
Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the
effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left
undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the
operative fact doctrine is an admission that the law is unconstitutional.

However, the minoritys novel theory, invoking the operative fact doctrine, is that
the enactment of the Cityhood Laws and the functioning of the 16 municipalities as
new cities with new sets of officials and employees operate to contitutionalize
the unconstitutional Cityhood Laws. This novel theory misapplies the operative
fact doctrine and sets a gravely dangerous precedent.

Under the minoritys novel theory, an unconstitutional law, if already implemented
prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality by the Court, can no longer be
revoked and its implementation must be continued despite being
unconstitutional. This view will open the floodgates to the wanton enactment of
unconstitutional laws and a mad rush for their immediate implementation before
the Court can declare them unconstitutional. This view is an open invitation to
serially violate the Constitution, and be quick about it, lest the violation be stopped
by the Court.

The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be applied as an
exception to the general rule that an unconstitutional law produces no
effects. It can never be invoked to validate as constitutional an unconstitutional
act. In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation,[3] the Court stated:

The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. It produces
no rights, imposes no duties and affords no protection. It has no legal
effect. It is, in legal contemplation, inoperative as if it has not been
passed. Being void, Fertiphil is not required to pay the levy. All levies
paid should be refunded in accordance with the general civil code
principle against unjust enrichment. The general rule is supported by
Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their

violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or
custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the

Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule,
only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects
of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a
statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative
fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored.
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will

impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law.
Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of
unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would
put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law
creating it.(Emphasis supplied)
The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an

unconstitutional law. Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law
remains unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its
judicial declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair
play. In short, the operative fact doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of the
unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself.

Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case, the Cityhood Laws
remain unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. However, the effects of the implementation of the Cityhood
Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and
supplies by the new cities or their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts,
may be recognized as valid and effective. This does not mean that the Cityhood
Laws are valid for they remain void. Only the effects of the implementation of
these unconstitutional laws are left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play
to innocent people who may have relied on the presumed validity of the Cityhood
Laws prior to the Courts declaration of their unconstitutionality.

C. Equal Protection Clause

As the Court held in the 18 November 2008 Decision, there is no substantial
distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress
and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one
municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine
the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills
in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that
did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion − mere
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 th Congress − is not rationally related to
the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities
from converting into cities.

Moreover, the fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the
exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That
specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that
a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. In fact, the
minority concedes that the conditions (pendency of the cityhood bills) adverted to
can no longer be repeated.

Further, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities
a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date − the filing of their cityhood bills
before the end of the 11th Congress as against all other municipalities that want to
convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.

In addition, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the
requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated.
Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot
convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded,
the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for
violation of the equal protection clause.

D. Tie-Vote on a Motion for Reconsideration
Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. Where the court en
banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be
had, the case shall again be deliberated on, and if after such deliberation
no decision is reached, the original action commenced in the court shall
be dismissed; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from
shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the petition or
motion shall be denied. (Emphasis supplied)

The En Banc Resolution of 26 January 1999 in A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC, reads:
A MOTION FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF A DECISION OR
RESOLUTION OF THE COURT EN BANC OR OF A DIVISION
MAY BE GRANTED UPON A VOTE OF A MAJORITY OF THE
MEMBERS OF THE EN BANC OR OF A DIVISION, AS THE CASE
MAY BE, WHO ACTUALLY TOOK PART IN THE DELIBERATION
OF THE MOTION.

IF THE VOTING RESULTS IN A TIE, THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IS DEEMED DENIED. (Emphasis supplied)

The clear and simple language of the clarificatory en banc Resolution requires no
further explanation. If the voting of the Court en banc results in a tie, the motion
for reconsideration is deemed denied. The Courts prior majority action on the
main decision stands affirmed.[4] This clarificatory Resolution applies to all cases
heard by the Court en banc, which includes not only cases involving the
constitutionality of a law, but also, as expressly stated in Section 4(2), Article VIII
of the Constitution, all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required
to be heard en banc.

The 6-6 tie-vote by the Court en banc on the second motion for reconsideration
necessarily resulted in the denial of the second motion for reconsideration. Since
the Court was evenly divided, there could be no reversal of the 18 November 2008
Decision, for a tie-vote cannot result in any court order or directive.[5] The
judgment stands in full force.[6] Undeniably, the 6-6 tie-vote did not overrule the
prior majority en banc Decision of 18 November 2008, as well as the prior
majority en banc Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying reconsideration. The
tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration is not the same as a tie-vote on
the main decision where there is no prior decision. Here, the tie-vote plainly
signifies that there is no majority to overturn the prior 18 November 2008 Decision
and 31 March 2009 Resolution, and thus the second motion for reconsideration
must be denied.

Further, the tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration did not mean that the
present cases were left undecided because there remain the Decision of 18
November 2008 and the Resolution of 31 March 2009 where a majority of the
Court en banc concurred in declaring the unconstitutionality of the sixteen
Cityhood Laws. In short, the 18 November 2008 Decision and the 31 March
2009 Resolution, which were both reached with the concurrence of a majority
of the Court en banc, are not reconsidered but stand affirmed.[7] These prior
majority actions of the Court en banc can only be overruled by a new
majority vote, not a tie-vote because a tie-vote cannot overrule a prior
affirmative action.

The denial, by a split vote, of the second motion for reconsideration inevitably
rendered the 18 November 2008 Decision final. In fact, in its Resolution of 28
April 2009, denying the second motion for reconsideration, the Court en
banc reiterated that no further pleadings shall be entertained and stated that entry
of judgment be made in due course.

The dissenting opinion stated that a deadlocked vote of six is not a majority and a
non-majority does not constitute a rule with precedential value.[8]

Indeed, a tie-vote is a non-majority a non-majority which cannot overrule a prior
affirmative action, that is the 18 November 2008 Decision striking down the
Cityhood Laws. In short, the 18 November 2008 Decision stands affirmed. And
assuming a non-majority lacks any precedential value, the 18 November 2008
Decision, which was unreversed as a result of the tie-vote on the respondents
second motion for reconsideration, nevertheless remains binding on the parties.[9]

Conclusion

Section 10, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that no x x x city shall
be created x x x except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code. This provision can only be interpreted in one way, that is, all
the criteria for the creation of cities must be embodied exclusively in the Local
Government Code. In this case, the Cityhood Laws, which are unmistakably laws
other than the Local Government Code, provided an exemption from the increased
income requirement for the creation of cities under Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Clearly, the Cityhood Laws
contravene the letter and intent of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

Adhering to the explicit prohibition in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
does not cripple Congress power to make laws. In fact, Congress is not prohibited
from amending the Local Government Code itself, as what Congress did by
enacting RA 9009. Indisputably, the act of amending laws comprises an integral
part of the Legislatures law-making power. The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood
Laws lies in the fact that Congress provided an exemption contrary to the express
language of the Constitution that [n]o x x x city x x x shall be created except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code. In other
words, Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power, rendering the
challenged Cityhood Laws void for being violative of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the motions for reconsideration of the 21 December
2009 Decision and REINSTATE the 18 November 2008 Decision
declaring UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic Act
Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409,
9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.

We NOTE petitioners motion to annul the Decision of 21 December 2009.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176951 February 15, 2011

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), Represented by LCP National
President Jerry P. Treñas; City of Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S.
Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treñas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Baybay, Province of Leyte;
Municipality of Bogo, Province of Cebu; Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of
Western Samar; Municipality of Tandag, Province of Surigao del Sur; Municipality
of Borongan, Province of Eastern Samar; and Municipality of Tayabas, Province
of Quezon, Respondents.
x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x
G.R. No. 177499

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Lamitan, Province of Basilan;
Municipality of Tabuk, Province of Kalinga; Municipality of Bayugan, Province of
Agusan del Sur; Municipality of Batac, Province of Ilocos Norte; Municipality of
Mati, Province of Davao Oriental; and Municipality of Guihulngan, Province of
Negros Oriental,Respondents.
x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x
G.R. No. 178056

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Cabadbaran, Province of Agusan
del Norte; Municipality of Carcar, Province of Cebu; Municipality of El Salvador,
Province of Misamis Oriental; Municipality of Naga, Cebu; and Department of
Budget and Management, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For consideration of this Court are the following pleadings:
1. Motion for Reconsideration of the “Resolution” dated August 24, 2010 dated and filed
on September 14, 2010 by respondents Municipality of Baybay, et al.; and
2. Opposition [To the “Motion for Reconsideration of the ‘Resolution’ dated August 24,
2010”].
Meanwhile, respondents also filed on September 20, 2010 a Motion to Set “Motion for
Reconsideration of the ‘Resolution’ dated August 24, 2010” for Hearing. This motion
was, however, already denied by the Court En Banc.
A brief background—
These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the
League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P.
Treñas, assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws,1 each converting the
municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to
enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant
to the subject laws.
In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, 2 granted
the petitions and struck down the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating
Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the equal protection clause.
In the Resolution dated March 31, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a 7-5 vote,3 denied the
first motion for reconsideration.
On April 28, 2009, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution, with a vote of 6-6,4 which
denied the second motion for reconsideration for being a prohibited pleading.
In its June 2, 2009 Resolution, the Court En Banc clarified its April 28, 2009 Resolution
in this wise—
As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading pursuant to

Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that: “No second
motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be
entertained.” Thus, a decision becomes final and executory after 15 days from receipt of
the denial of the first motion for reconsideration.
However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for reconsideration
is granted by the Court, the Court therefore allows the filing of the second motion for
reconsideration. In such a case, the second motion for reconsideration is no longer a
prohibited pleading.
In the present case, the Court voted on the second motion for reconsideration filed by
respondent cities. In effect, the Court allowed the filing of the second motion for
reconsideration. Thus, the second motion for reconsideration was no longer a prohibited
pleading. However, for lack of the required number of votes to overturn the 18
November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, the Court denied the second
motion for reconsideration in its 28 April 2009 Resolution.5
Then, in another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a vote of 6-
4,6 declared the Cityhood Laws as constitutional.
On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-

6,7 resolved the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Annul the
Decision of December 21, 2009, both filed by petitioners, and the Ad Cautelam Motion
for Reconsideration filed by petitioners-in-intervention Batangas City, Santiago City,
Legazpi City, Iriga City, Cadiz City, and Oroquieta City, reinstating the November 18,
2008 Decision. Hence, the aforementioned pleadings.
Considering these circumstances where the Court En Banc has twice changed its
position on the constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws, and especially taking note of
the novelty of the issues involved in these cases, the Motion for Reconsideration of the
“Resolution” dated August 24, 2010 deserves favorable action by this Court on the basis
of the following cogent points:
1.
The 16 Cityhood Bills do not violate Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution.
Article X, Section 10 provides—
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,

merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
The tenor of the ponencias of the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24,
2010 Resolution is that the exemption clauses in the 16 Cityhood Laws are
unconstitutional because they are not written in the Local Government Code of 1991
(LGC), particularly Section 450 thereof, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9009,
which took effect on June 30, 2001, viz.—
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. –a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may
be converted into a component city if it has a locally generated annual income, as
certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One Hundred Million Pesos
(P100,000,000.00) for at least two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant
prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
xxxx
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied)
Prior to the amendment, Section 450 of the LGC required only an average annual
income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least P20,000,000.00 for the
last two (2) consecutive years, based on 1991 constant prices.
Before Senate Bill No. 2157, now R.A. No. 9009, was introduced by Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, there were 57 bills filed for conversion of 57 municipalities into component
cities. During the 11th Congress (June 1998-June 2001), 33 of these bills were enacted
into law, while 24 remained as pending bills. Among these 24 were the 16 municipalities
that were converted into component cities through the Cityhood Laws.
The rationale for the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 can be gleaned from the sponsorship
speech of Senator Pimentel on Senate Bill No. 2157, to wit—
Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, I would have wanted this bill to be included in the
whole set of proposed amendments that we have introduced to precisely amend the
Local Government Code. However, it is a fact that there is a mad rush of municipalities
wanting to be converted into cities. Whereas in 1991, when the Local Government was
approved, there were only 60 cities, today the number has increased to 85 cities, with
41 more municipalities applying for conversion to the same status. At the rate we are
going, I am apprehensive that before long this nation will be a nation of all cities and no
municipalities.
It is for that reason, Mr. President, that we are proposing among other things, that the
financial requirement, which, under the Local Government Code, is fixed at P20 million,
be raised to P100 million to enable a municipality to have the right to be converted into
a city, and the P100 million should be sourced from locally generated funds.
What has been happening, Mr. President, is, the municipalities aspiring to become cities
say that they qualify in terms of financial requirements by incorporating the Internal
Revenue share of the taxes of the nation on to their regularly generated revenue. Under
that requirement, it looks clear to me that practically all municipalities in this country
would qualify to become cities.
It is precisely for that reason, therefore, that we are seeking the approval of this
Chamber to amend, particularly Section 450 of Republic Act No. 7160, the requisite for
the average annual income of a municipality to be converted into a city or cluster of
barangays which seek to be converted into a city, raising that revenue requirement
from P20 million to P100 million for the last two consecutive years based on 2000
constant prices.8
While R.A. No. 9009 was being deliberated upon, Congress was well aware of the
pendency of conversion bills of several municipalities, including those covered by the
Cityhood Laws, desiring to become component cities which qualified under the P20
million income requirement of the old Section 450 of the LGC. The interpellation of
Senate President Franklin Drilon of Senator Pimentel is revealing, thus—
THE PRESIDENT. The Chair would like to ask for some clarificatory point.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT. This is just on the point of the pending bills in the Senate which
propose the conversion of a number of municipalities into cities and which qualify under
the present standard.
We would like to know the view of the sponsor: Assuming that this bill becomes a law,
will the Chamber apply the standard as proposed in this bill to those bills which are
pending for consideration?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Mr. President, it might not be fair to make this bill, on the
assumption that it is approved, retroact to the bills that are pending in the Senate
conversion from municipalities to cities.
THE PRESIDENT. Will there be an appropriate language crafted to reflect that view? Or
does it not become a policy of the Chamber, assuming that this bill becomes a law
tomorrow, that it will apply to those bills which are already approved by the House under
the old version of the Local Government Code and are now pending in the Senate? The
Chair does not know if we can craft a language which will limit the application to those
which are not yet in the Senate. Or is that a policy that the Chamber will adopt?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Mr. President, personally, I do not think it is necessary to put

that provision because what we are saying here will form part of the interpretation of this
bill. Besides, if there is no retroactivity clause, I do not think that the bill would have any
retroactive effect.
THE PRESIDENT. So the understanding is that those bills which are already pending in
the Chamber will not be affected.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. These will not be affected, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT. Thank you Mr. Chairman.9
Clearly, based on the above exchange, Congress intended that those with pending
cityhood bills during the 11th Congress would not be covered by the new and higher
income requirement of P100 million imposed by R.A. No. 9009. When the LGC was
amended by R.A. No. 9009, the amendment carried with it both the letter and the intent
of the law, and such were incorporated in the LGC by which the compliance of the
Cityhood Laws was gauged.
Notwithstanding that both the 11th and 12th Congress failed to act upon the pending
cityhood bills, both the letter and intent of Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by R.A.
No. 9009, were carried on until the 13th Congress, when the Cityhood Laws were
enacted. The exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws are the express
articulation of that intent to exempt respondent municipalities from the coverage of R.A.
No. 9009.
Even if we were to ignore the above quoted exchange between then Senate President
Drilon and Senator Pimentel, it cannot be denied that Congress saw the wisdom of
exempting respondent municipalities from complying with the higher income
requirement imposed by the amendatory R.A. No. 9009. Indeed, these municipalities
have proven themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their
respective provinces. It is also acknowledged that they were centers of trade and
commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral,
and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. In this regard, it is worthy to
mention the distinctive traits of each respondent municipality, viz—
Batac, Ilocos Norte – It is the biggest municipality of the 2nd District of Ilocos Norte, 2nd
largest and most progressive town in the province of Ilocos Norte and the natural
convergence point for the neighboring towns to transact their commercial ventures and
other daily activities. A growing metropolis, Batac is equipped with amenities of modern
living like banking institutions, satellite cable systems, telecommunications systems.
Adequate roads, markets, hospitals, public transport systems, sports, and entertainment
facilities. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 5941, introduced by Rep. Imee R.
Marcos.]
El Salvador, Misamis Oriental – It is located at the center of the Cagayan-Iligan

Industrial Corridor and home to a number of industrial companies and corporations.
Investment and financial affluence of El Salvador is aptly credited to its industrious and
preserving people. Thus, it has become the growing investment choice even besting
nearby cities and municipalities. It is home to Asia Brewery as distribution port of their
product in Mindanao. The Gokongwei Group of Companies is also doing business in the
area. So, the conversion is primarily envisioned to spur economic and financial
prosperity to this coastal place in North-Western Misamis Oriental. [Explanatory Note of
House Bill No. 6003, introduced by Rep. Augusto H. Bacullo.]
Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte – It is the largest of the eleven (11) municipalities in the
province of Agusan del Norte. It plays strategic importance to the administrative and
socio-economic life and development of Agusan del Norte. It is the foremost in terms of
trade, commerce, and industry. Hence, the municipality was declared as the new seat
and capital of the provincial government of Agusan del Norte pursuant to Republic Act
No. 8811 enacted into law on August 16, 2000. Its conversion will certainly promote,
invigorate, and reinforce the economic potential of the province in establishing itself as
an agro-industrial center in the Caraga region and accelerate the development of the
area. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3094, introduced by Rep. Ma. Angelica
Rosedell M. Amante.]
Borongan, Eastern Samar – It is the capital town of Eastern Samar and the
development of Eastern Samar will depend to a certain degree of its urbanization. It will
serve as a catalyst for the modernization and progress of adjacent towns considering
the frequent interactions between the populace. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No.
2640, introduced by Rep. Marcelino C. Libanan.]
Lamitan, Basilan – Before Basilan City was converted into a separate province, Lamitan
was the most progressive part of the city. It has been for centuries the center of
commerce and the seat of the Sultanate of the Yakan people of Basilan. The source of
its income is agro-industrial and others notably copra, rubber, coffee and host of income
generating ventures. As the most progressive town in Basilan, Lamitan continues to be
the center of commerce catering to the municipalities of Tuburan, Tipo-Tipo and
Sumisip. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 5786, introduced by Rep. Gerry A.
Salapuddin.]
Catbalogan, Samar – It has always been the socio-economic-political capital of the

Island of Samar even during the Spanish era. It is the seat of government of the two
congressional districts of Samar. Ideally located at the crossroad between Northern and
Eastern Samar, Catbalogan also hosts trade and commerce activates among the more
prosperous cities of the Visayas like Tacloban City, Cebu City and the cities of Bicol
region. The numerous banks and telecommunication facilities showcases the healthy
economic environment of the municipality. The preeminent and sustainable economic
situation of Catbalogan has further boosted the call of residents for a more vigorous
involvement of governance of the municipal government that is inherent in a city
government. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 2088, introduced by Rep. Catalino V.
Figueroa.]
Bogo, Cebu – Bogo is very qualified for a city in terms of income, population and area
among others. It has been elevated to the Hall of Fame being a five-time winner
nationwide in the clean and green program. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3042,
introduced by Rep. Clavel A. Martinez.]
Tandag, Surigao del Sur – This over 350 year old capital town the province has long
sought its conversion into a city that will pave the way not only for its own growth and
advancement but also help in the development of its neighboring municipalities and the
province as a whole. Furthermore, it can enhance its role as the province’s trade,
financial and government center. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 5940, introduced
by Rep. Prospero A. Pichay, Jr.]
Bayugan, Agusan del Sur – It is a first class municipality and the biggest in terms of
population in the entire province. It has the most progressive and thickly populated area
among the 14 municipalities that comprise the province. Thus, it has become the center
for trade and commerce in Agusan del Sur. It has a more developed infrastructure and
facilities than other municipalities in the province. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No.
1899, introduced by Rep. Rodolfo “Ompong” G. Plaza.]
Carcar, Cebu – Through the years, Carcar metamorphosed from rural to urban and now
boast of its manufacturing industry, agricultural farming, fishing and prawn industry and
its thousands of large and small commercial establishments contributing to the bulk of
economic activities in the municipality. Based on consultation with multi-sectoral groups,
political and non-government agencies, residents and common folk in Carcar, they
expressed their desire for the conversion of the municipality into a component city.
[Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3990, introduced by Rep. Eduardo R. Gullas.]
Guihulngan, Negros Oriental – Its population is second highest in the province, next
only to the provincial capital and higher than Canlaon City and Bais City. Agriculture
contributes heavily to its economy. There are very good prospects in agricultural
production brought about by its favorable climate. It has also the Tanon Strait that
provides a good fishing ground for its numerous fishermen. Its potential to grow
commercially is certain. Its strategic location brought about by its existing linkage
networks and the major transportation corridors traversing the municipality has
established Guihulngan as the center of commerce and trade in this part of Negros
Oriental with the first congressional district as its immediate area of influence. Moreover,
it has beautiful tourist spots that are being availed of by local and foreign tourists.
[Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3628, introduced by Rep. Jacinto V. Paras.]
Tayabas, Quezon – It flourished and expanded into an important politico-cultural center

in [the] Tagalog region. For 131 years (1179-1910), it served as the cabecera of the
province which originally carried the cabecera’s own name, Tayabas. The locality is rich
in culture, heritage and trade. It was at the outset one of the more active centers of
coordination and delivery of basic, regular and diverse goods and services within the
first district of Quezon Province. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3348, introduced
by Rep. Rafael P. Nantes.]
Tabuk, Kalinga – It not only serves as the main hub of commerce and trade, but also
the cultural center of the rich customs and traditions of the different municipalities in the
province. For the past several years, the income of Tabuk has been steadily increasing,
which is an indication that its economy is likewise progressively growing. [Explanatory
Note of House Bill No. 3068, introduced by Rep. Laurence P. Wacnang.]
Available information on Baybay, Leyte; Mati, Davao Oriental; and Naga, Cebu shows
their economic viability, thus:
Covering an area of 46,050 hectares, Baybay [Leyte] is composed of 92 barangays, 23

of which are in the poblacion. The remaining 69 are rural barangays. Baybay City is
classified as a first class city. It is situated on the western coast of the province of Leyte.
It has a Type 4 climate, which is generally wet. Its topography is generally mountainous
in the eastern portion as it slopes down west towards the shore line. Generally an
agricultural city, the common means of livelihood are farming and fishing. Some are
engaged in hunting and in forestall activities. The most common crops grown are rice,
corn, root crops, fruits, and vegetables. Industries operating include the Specialty
Products Manufacturing, Inc. and the Visayan Oil Mill. Various cottage industries can
also be found in the city such as bamboo and rattan craft, ceramics, dress-making, fiber
craft, food preservation, mat weaving, metal craft, fine Philippine furniture manufacturing
and other related activities. Baybay has great potential as a tourist destination,
especially for tennis players. It is not only rich in biodiversity and history, but it also
houses the campus of the Visayas State University (formerly the Leyte State
University/Visayas State College of Agriculture/Visayas Agricultural College/Baybay
National Agricultural School/Baybay Agricultural High School and the Jungle Valley
Park.) Likewise, it has river systems fit for river cruising, numerous caves for
spelunking, forests, beaches, and marine treasures. This richness, coupled with the
friendly Baybayanos, will be an element of a successful tourism program. Considering
the role of tourism in development, Baybay City intends to harness its tourism potential.
(<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baybay City> visited September 19, 2008)
Mati [Davao Oriental] is located on the eastern part of the island of Mindanao. It is one
hundred sixty-five (165) kilometers away from Davao City, a one and a half-hour drive
from Tagum City. Visitors can travel from Davao City through the Madaum diversion
road, which is shorter than taking the Davao-Tagum highway. Travels by air and sea
are possible, with the existence of an airport and seaport. Mati boasts of being the
coconut capital of Mindanao if not the whole country. A large portion of its fertile land is
planted to coconuts, and a significant number of its population is largely dependent on
it. Other agricultural crops such as mango, banana, corn, coffee and cacao are also
being cultivated, as well as the famous Menzi pomelo and Valencia oranges. Mati has a
long stretch of shoreline and one can find beaches of pure, powder-like white sand. A
number of resorts have been developed and are now open to serve both local and
international tourists. Some of these resorts are situated along the coast of Pujada Bay
and the Pacific Ocean. Along the western coast of the bay lies Mt. Hamiguitan, the
home of the pygmy forest, where bonsai plants and trees grow, some of which are
believed to be a hundred years old or more. On its peak is a lake, called “Tinagong
Dagat,” or hidden sea, so covered by dense vegetation a climber has to hike trails for
hours to reach it. The mountain is also host to rare species of flora and fauna, thus
becoming a wildlife sanctuary for these life forms. (<http://mati.wetpain.com/?t=anon>
accessed on September 19, 2008.)
Mati is abundant with nickel, chromite, and copper. Louie Rabat, Chamber President of
the Davao Oriental Eastern Chamber of Commerce and Industry, emphasized the big
potential of the mining industry in the province of Davao Oriental. As such, he strongly
recommends Mati as the mining hub in the Region.
(<http://www.pia.gov.ph/default.asp?
m=12&sec=reader&rp=1&fi=p080115.htm&no.=9&date, accessed on September 19,
2008)
Naga [Cebu]: Historical Background—In the early times, the place now known as Naga
was full of huge trees locally called as “Narra.” The first settlers referred to this place as
Narra, derived from the huge trees, which later simply became Naga. Considered as
one of the oldest settlements in the Province of Cebu, Naga became a municipality on
June 12, 1829. The municipality has gone through a series of classifications as its
economic development has undergone changes and growth. The tranquil farming and
fishing villages of the natives were agitated as the Spaniards came and discovered coal
in the uplands. Coal was the first export of the municipality, as the Spaniards mined and
sent it to Spain. The mining industry triggered the industrial development of Naga. As
the years progressed, manufacturing and other industries followed, making Naga one of
the industrialized municipalities in the Province of Cebu.
Class of Municipality 1st class
Province Cebu
Distance from Cebu City 22 kms.
Number of Barangays 28
No. of Registered Voters 44,643 as of May 14, 2007
Total No. of Precincts 237 (as of May 14, 2007)
Ann. Income (as of Dec. 31, 2006) Php112,219,718.35 Agricultural, Industrial, Agro-
Industrial, Mining Product
(<http://www.nagacebu.com/index.php?option=com.content&view=article id=53:naga-
facts-and-figures&catid=51:naga-facts-and-figures&Itemid=75> visited September 19,
2008)
The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative power.
Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and
repeal them.10 The Constitution, as the expression of the will of the people in their
original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the
Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general, and
comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary powers for all purposes of civil
government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily
possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except
as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces
all subjects, and extends to matters of general concern or common interest.11
Without doubt, the LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers.
Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009.
Such power of amendment of laws was again exercised when Congress enacted the
Cityhood Laws. When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable
indicators of economic viability for the creation of local government units—income,
population, and land area. Congress deemed it fit to modify the income requirement
with respect to the conversion of municipalities into component cities when it enacted
R.A. No. 9009, imposing an amount of P100 million, computed only from locally-
generated sources. However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent
municipalities from such a belatedly imposed modified income requirement in order to
uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very intent and thrust of the
LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy, especially accounting for these
municipalities as engines for economic growth in their respective provinces.
Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also true that, in effect, the
Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found therein.
Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from the
amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the
LGC itself. For this reason, we reverse the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August
24, 2010 Resolution on their strained and stringent view that the Cityhood Laws,
particularly their exemption clauses, are not found in the LGC.
2.
The Cityhood Laws do not violate Section 6, Article X and the equal protection clause of
the Constitution.
Both the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution impress that
the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause enshrined in the Constitution.
Further, it was also ruled that Section 6, Article X was violated because the Cityhood
Laws infringed on the “just share” that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention shall
receive from the national taxes (IRA) to be automatically released to them.
Upon more profound reflection and deliberation, we declare that there was valid
classification, and the Cityhood Laws do not violate the equal protection clause.
As this Court has ruled, the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a
valid classification, provided that it: (1) rests on substantial distinctions; (2) is germane
to the purpose of the law; (3) is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) applies
equally to all members of the same class.12
The petitioners argue that there is no substantial distinction between municipalities with
pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending
bills, such that the mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a
material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the
income requirement. This contention misses the point.
It should be recalled from the above quoted portions of the interpellation by Senate
President Drilon of Senator Pimentel that the purpose of the enactment of R.A. No 9009
was merely to stop the “mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities”
and the apprehension that before long the country will be a country of cities and without
municipalities. It should be pointed out that the imposition of the P100 million average
annual income requirement for the creation of component cities was arbitrarily made. To
be sure, there was no evidence or empirical data, such as inflation rates, to support the
choice of this amount. The imposition of a very high income requirement of P100
million, increased from P20 million, was simply to make it extremely difficult for
municipalities to become component cities. And to highlight such arbitrariness and the
absurdity of the situation created thereby, R.A. No. 9009 has, in effect, placed
component cities at a higher standing than highly urbanized cities under Section 452 of
the LGC, to wit—
Section 452. Highly Urbanized Cities. – (a) Cities with a minimum population of two
hundred thousand (200,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office,
and with the latest annual income of at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) based
on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the city treasurer, shall be classified as highly
urbanized cities.
(b) Cities which do not meet above requirements shall be considered component cities
of the province in which they are geographically located. (Emphasis supplied)
The P100 million income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009, being an arbitrary
amount, cannot be conclusively said to be the only amount “sufficient, based on
acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government facilities and services and
special functions commensurate with the size of its population,” per Section 7 13 of the
LGC. It was imposed merely because it is difficult to comply with. While it could be
argued that P100 million, being more than P20 million, could, of course, provide the
essential government facilities, services, and special functions vis-à-vis the population
of a municipality wanting to become a component city, it cannot be said that the
minimum amount of P20 million would be insufficient. This is evident from the existing
cities whose income, up to now, do not comply with the P100 million income
requirement, some of which have lower than the P20 million average annual income.
Consider the list14 below—
CITY
1. Marawi City 5,291,5
2. Palayan City 6,714,6
3. Sipalay City 9,713,1
4. Canlaon City 13,552
5. Himamaylan City 15,808
6. Isabela City 16,811
7. Munoz City 19,693
8. Dapitan City 20,529
9. Tangub City 20,943
10. Bayawan City 22,943
11. Island Garden City of Samal 23,034
12. Tanjay City 23,723
13. Tabaco City 24,152
14. Oroquieta City 24,279
15. Ligao City 28,326
16. Sorsogon City 30,403
17. Maasin City 30,572
18. Escalante City 32,113
19. Iriga City 32,757
20. Gapan City 34,254
21. Candon City 36,327
22. Gingoog City 37,327
23. Masbate City 39,454
24. Passi City 40,314
25. Calbayog City 40,943
26. Calapan City 41,870
27. Cadiz City 43,827
28. Alaminos City 44,352
29. Bais City 44, 646
30. San Carlos City 46,306
31. Silay City 47,351
32. Bislig City 47,360
33. Tacurong City 49,026
34. Talisay City (Negros Occidental) 52,609
35. Kabankalan City 53,560
36. Malaybalay City 54,423
37. La Carlota City 54,760
38. Vigan City 56,831
39. Balanga City 61,556
40. Sagay City 64,266
41. Cavite City 64,566
42. Koronadal City 66,231
43. Cotabato City 66,302
44. Toledo City 70,157
45. San Jose City 70,309
46. Danao City 72,621
47. Bago City 74,305
48. Valencia City 74,557
49. Victorias City 75,757
50. Cauayan City 82,949
51. Santiago City 83,816
52. Roxas City 85,397
53. Dipolog City 85,503
54. Trece Martires City 87,413
55. Talisay City (Cebu) 87,964
56. Ozamis city 89,054
57. Surigao City 89,960
58. Panabo City 91,425
59. Digos City 92,647
The undeniable fact that these cities remain viable as component cities of their
respective provinces emphasizes the arbitrariness of the amount of P100 million as the
new income requirement for the conversion of municipalities into component cities. This
arbitrariness can also be clearly gleaned from the respective distinctive traits and level
of economic development of the individual respondent municipalities as above
submitted.
Verily, the determination of the existence of substantial distinction with respect to

respondent municipalities does not simply lie on the mere pendency of their cityhood
bills during the 11th Congress. This Court sees the bigger picture. The existence of
substantial distinction with respect to respondent municipalities covered by the Cityhood
Laws is measured by the purpose of the law, not by R.A. No. 9009, but by the very
purpose of the LGC, as provided in its Section 2 (a), thus—
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.—(a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that
the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful
local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals.
Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local
government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources.
The process of decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the local
government units.
Indeed, substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent

municipalities to become component cities of their respective provinces. Congress, by
enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and viability of respondent
municipalities to become the State’s partners in accelerating economic growth and
development in the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested
by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their relentless
pursuit for cityhood up to the present. Truly, the urgent need to become a component
city arose way back in the 11th Congress, and such condition continues to exist.
Petitioners in these cases complain about the purported reduction of their “just share” in
the IRA. To be sure, petitioners are entitled to a “just share,” not a specific amount. But
the feared reduction proved to be false when, after the implementation of the Cityhood
Laws, their respective shares increased, not decreased. Consider the table15 below—
CITY (B
Six
Bais 219,3
Batangas 334,3
Bayawan 353,1
Cadiz 329,4
Calapan 227,7
Calbayog 438,6
Cauayan 250,4
Gen. Santos 518,3
Gingoog 314,4
Himamaylan 248,1
Iloilo 358,3
Iriga 183,1
Legaspi 235,3
Ligao 215,6
Oroquieta 191,8
Pagadian 292,7
San Carlos 239,5
San Fernando 182,3
Santiago 508,3
Silay 216,3
Surigao 233,9
Tacurong 179,7
Tagaytay 130,1
Tarlac 348,1
Tangub 162,2
Urdaneta 187,7
Victorias 176,3
Zamboanga 918,0
What these petitioner cities were stating as a reduction of their respective IRA shares
was based on a computation of what they would receive if respondent municipalities
were not to become component cities at all. Of course, that would mean a bigger
amount to which they have staked their claim. After considering these, it all boils down
to money and how much more they would receive if respondent municipalities remain
as municipalities and not share in the 23% fixed IRA from the national government for
cities.
Moreover, the debates in the Senate on R.A. No. 9009, should prove enlightening:
SENATOR SOTTO. Mr. President, we just want to be enlightened again on the previous
qualification and the present one being proposed. Before there were three…
SENATOR PIMENTEL. There are three requisites for a municipality to become a city.
Let us start with the finance.
SENATOR SOTTO. Will the distinguished sponsor please refresh us? I used to be the
chairman of the Committee on Local Government, but the new job that was given to me
by the Senate has erased completely my memory as far as the Local Government Code
is concerned.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes, Mr. President, with pleasure. There are three
requirements. One is financial.
SENATOR SOTTO. All right. It used to be P20 million.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. It is P20 million. Now we are raising it to P100 million of locally
generated funds.
SENATOR SOTTO. In other words, the P20 million before includes the IRA.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. No, Mr. President.
SENATOR SOTTO. It should not have been included?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. The internal revenue share should never have been included.
That was not the intention when we first crafted the Local Government Code. The
financial capacity was supposed to be demonstrated by the municipality wishing to
become a city by its own effort, meaning to say, it should not rely on the internal
revenue share that comes from the government. Unfortunately, I think what happened in
past conversions of municipalities into cities was, the Department of Budget and
Management, along with the Department of Finance, had included the internal revenue
share as a part of the municipality, demonstration that they are now financially capable
and can measure up to the requirement of the Local Government Code of having a
revenue of at least P20 million.
SENATOR SOTTO. I am glad that the sponsor, Mr. President, has spread that into the
Record because otherwise, if he did not mention the Department of Finance and the
Department of Budget and Management, then I would have been blamed for the
misinterpretation. But anyway, the gentleman is correct. That was the interpretation
given to us during the hearings.
So now, from P20 million, we make it P100 million from locally generated income as far
as population is concerned.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. As far as population is concerned, there will be no change, Mr.

President. Still 150,000.
SENATOR SOTTO. Still 150,000?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes.
SENATOR SOTTO. And then the land area?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. As to the land area, there is no change; it is still 100 square
kilometers.
SENATOR SOTTO. But before it was “either/or”?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is correct. As long as it has one of the three requirements,
basically, as long as it meets the financial requirement, then it may meet the territorial
requirement or the population requirement.
SENATOR SOTTO. So, it remains “or”?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. We are now changing it into AND.
SENATOR SOTTO. AND?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes.
SENATOR SOTTO. I see.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is the proposal, Mr. President. In other words…
SENATOR SOTTO. Does the gentleman not think there will no longer be any
municipality that will qualify, Mr. President?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. There may still be municipalities which can qualify, but it will
take a little time. They will have to produce more babies. I do not know—expand their
territories, whatever, by reclamation or otherwise. But the whole proposal is geared
towards making it difficult for municipalities to convert into cities.
On the other hand, I would like to advert to the fact that in the amendments that we are
proposing for the entire Local Government Code, we are also raising the internal
revenue share of the municipalities.
SENATOR SOTTO. I see.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. So that, more or less, hindi naman sila dehado in this particular
instance.
SENATOR SOTTO. Well, then, because of that information, Mr. President, I throw my
full support behind the measure.
Thank you, Mr. President.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Thank you very much, Mr. President. (Emphasis supplied)16
From the foregoing, the justness in the act of Congress in enacting the Cityhood Laws
becomes obvious, especially considering that 33 municipalities were converted into
component cities almost immediately prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9009. In the
enactment of the Cityhood Laws, Congress merely took the 16 municipalities covered
thereby from the disadvantaged position brought about by the abrupt increase in the
income requirement of R.A. No. 9009, acknowledging the “privilege” that they have
already given to those newly-converted component cities, which prior to the enactment
of R.A. No. 9009, were undeniably in the same footing or “class” as the respondent
municipalities. Congress merely recognized the capacity and readiness of respondent
municipalities to become component cities of their respective provinces.
Petitioners complain of the projects that they would not be able to pursue and the
expenditures that they would not be able to meet, but totally ignored the respondent
municipalities’ obligations arising from the contracts they have already entered into, the
employees that they have already hired, and the projects that they have already initiated
and completed as component cities. Petitioners have completely overlooked the need of
respondent municipalities to become effective vehicles intending to accelerate
economic growth in the countryside. It is like the elder siblings wanting to kill the newly-
borns so that their inheritance would not be diminished.
Apropos is the following parable:
There was a landowner who went out at dawn to hire workmen for his vineyard. After
reaching an agreement with them for the usual daily wage, he sent them out to his
vineyard. He came out about midmorning and saw other men standing around the
marketplace without work, so he said to them, “You too go along to my vineyard and I
will pay you whatever is fair.” They went. He came out again around noon and mid-
afternoon and did the same. Finally, going out in late afternoon he found still others
standing around. To these he said, “Why have you been standing here idle all day?” “No
one has hired us,” they told him. He said, “You go to the vineyard too.” When evening
came, the owner of the vineyard said to his foreman, “Call the workmen and give them
their pay, but begin with the last group and end with the first.” When those hired late in
the afternoon came up they received a full day’s pay, and when the first group appeared
they thought they would get more, yet they received the same daily wage. Thereupon
they complained to the owner, “This last group did only an hour’s work, but you have
paid them on the same basis as us who have worked a full day in the scorching heat.”
“My friend,” he said to one in reply, “I do you no injustice. You agreed on the usual
wage, did you not? Take your pay and go home. I intend to give this man who was hired
last the same pay as you. I am free to do as I please with my money, am I not? Or are
you envious because I am generous?”17
Congress, who holds the power of the purse, in enacting the Cityhood Laws, only
sought the well-being of respondent municipalities, having seen their respective
capacities to become component cities of their provinces, temporarily stunted by the
enactment of R.A. No. 9009. By allowing respondent municipalities to convert into
component cities, Congress desired only to uphold the very purpose of the LGC, i.e., to
make the local government units “enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to
enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals,” which is the very
mandate of the Constitution.
Finally, we should not be restricted by technical rules of procedure at the expense of the
transcendental interest of justice and equity. While it is true that litigation must end,
even at the expense of errors in judgment, it is nobler rather for this Court of last resort,
as vanguard of truth, to toil in order to dispel apprehensions and doubt, as the following
pronouncement of this Court instructs:
The right and power of judicial tribunals to declare whether enactments of the legislature
exceed the constitutional limitations and are invalid has always been considered a
grave responsibility, as well as a solemn duty. The courts invariably give the most
careful consideration to questions involving the interpretation and application of the
Constitution, and approach constitutional questions with great deliberation, exercising
their power in this respect with the greatest possible caution and even reluctance; and
they should never declare a statute void, unless its invalidity is, in their judgment,
beyond reasonable doubt. To justify a court in pronouncing a legislative act
unconstitutional, or a provision of a state constitution to be in contravention of the
Constitution x x x, the case must be so clear to be free from doubt, and the conflict of
the statute with the constitution must be irreconcilable, because it is but a decent
respect to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body by which
any law is passed to presume in favor of its validity until the contrary is shown beyond
reasonable doubt. Therefore, in no doubtful case will the judiciary pronounce a
legislative act to be contrary to the constitution. To doubt the constitutionality of a law is
to resolve the doubt in favor of its validity.18
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of the “Resolution” dated August 24,
2010, dated and filed on September 14, 2010 by respondents Municipality of Baybay, et
al. is GRANTED. The Resolution dated August 24, 2010 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Cityhood Laws—Republic Acts Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394,
9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491—are declared
CONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No.

176951 November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP

G.R. No. 177499 November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP

G.R. No. 178056 November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP

During the 11th Congress,3 Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the

During the 13th Congress,9 the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws

The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:

1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the

2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petitions.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution

Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or

Prohibition is the proper action for testing the constitutionality of laws

Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law

RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the 11th Congress. This

Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a cluster of

(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square

(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly

Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a

Prior to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood

During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint

During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the

Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be

This common provision exempted each of the 16 municipalities from the

Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity

Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria

Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided,

In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent

Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution

Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government

Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law,

Section 450 of the Local Government Code is Clear,

There can be no resort to extrinsic aids – like deliberations of Congress – if

Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local

True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent municipalities

Section 10 of Article X is similar to Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution

Deliberations of the 11th Congress on Unapproved Bills Inapplicable

Congress is not a continuing body.22 The unapproved cityhood bills filed

All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the

Section 78. Calendar of Business. The Calendar of Business shall

a. Unfinished Business. This is business being considered by the

Thus, the deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved cityhood

Applicability of Equal Protection Clause

If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009,

To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on

The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid

1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;

2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;

3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same

There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending

The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the