League of Cities v. COMELEC

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176951 November 18, 2008
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY
OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN
S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO,
PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF
TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR;
and MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY,
CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA,
CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO,
CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY
OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF
TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention.
x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 177499 November 18, 2008
S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN, PROVINCE OF BASILAN; MUNICIPALITY OF
TABUK, PROVINCE OF KALINGA; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR;
MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF MATI, PROVINCE OF DAVAO
ORIENTAL; and MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --x
G.R. No. 178056 November 18, 2008
S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS
ORIENTAL, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition 1 with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P.
Treñas2 assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
The Facts
During the 11th Congress,3 Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress
did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress,4 Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), 5 which took effect on 30 June
2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for
conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain,
in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush" of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger
share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. 6
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12 th Congress7 adopted Joint Resolution No.
29,8 which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood
bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint
Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress,9 the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1
and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following
the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills.
The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income
requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood
bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law
(Cityhood Laws10) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's signature. 11
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent
municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. 12 Petitioners also lament that the wholesale
conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because
more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local
Government Code.13
The Issues
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive
application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of
the national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a
municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained
an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting
a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the
exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
Preliminary Matters
Prohibition is the proper action for testing the constitutionality of laws administered by the COMELEC, 14 like the Cityhood
Laws, which direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites in implementation of the Cityhood Laws. Petitioner League of Cities
of the Philippines has legal standing because Section 499 of the Local Government Code tasks the League with the
"primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting city government administration and securing,
through proper and legal means, solutions thereto." 15 Petitioners-in-intervention,16 which are existing cities, have legal
standing because their Internal Revenue Allotment will be reduced if the Cityhood Laws are declared constitutional. Mayor
Jerry P. Treñas has legal standing because as Mayor of Iloilo City and as a taxpayer he has sufficient interest to prevent
the unlawful expenditure of public funds, like the release of more Internal Revenue Allotment to political units than what
the law allows.
Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law
RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the 11th Congress. This law specifically amended Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, which now provides:
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a
component city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years
based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the
National Statistics Office.
The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units at the time
of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The
requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more
islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds,
transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100
million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any exemption from the
increased income requirement.
Prior to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress. Thirty-three
cityhood bills became law before the enactment of RA 9009. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during the
11th Congress.
During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, exempting from the income
requirement of P100 million in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not acted upon during the
11th Congress. This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned without the Senate
approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between
November and December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills containing a
common provision, as follows:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement
prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.
This common provision exempted each of the 16 municipalities from the income requirement of P100 million
prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. These cityhood bills lapsed into
law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them.
Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA 9009. RA 9009 became effective on 30
June 2001 or during the 11th Congress. The 13th Congress passed in December 2006 the cityhood bills which
became law only in 2007. Thus, respondent municipalities cannot invoke the principle of non-retroactivity of laws. 17 This
basic rule has no application because RA 9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws, is not being applied retroactively but
prospectively.
Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. 18 The Constitution requires
Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the
conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation of a city. No other law, not even the
charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and
other political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government
Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from P20 million
to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local
Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income
requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption
from this income requirement.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills
were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA
9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local
Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government Code are essential to implement a fair and
equitable distribution of national taxes to all local government units. Section 6, Article X of the Constitution provides:
Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them. (Emphasis supplied)
If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there can be no fair and just
distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not receive the same share in
national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100 million or more. The criteria of land area, population and income,
as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, must be strictly followed because such criteria, prescribed by
law, are material in determining the "just share" of local government units in national taxes. Since the Cityhood Laws do
not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, they prevent the fair and just distribution of
the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution.
Section 450 of the Local Government Code is Clear,

Plain and Unambiguous
There can be no resort to extrinsic aids – like deliberations of Congress – if the language of the law is plain, clear and
unambiguous. Courts determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the law, within the law's four corners. 19 If
the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law according to its express terms. If a
literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of
statutory construction like the legislative history of the law. 20
Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local Government Code, did not provide any exemption from
the increased income requirement, not even to respondent municipalities whose cityhood bills were then pending when
Congress passed RA 9009. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contains no exemption
whatsoever. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet
the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law in applying Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.
The 11th Congress' Intent was not Written into the Local Government Code
True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent municipalities from RA 9009, as shown by the various
deliberations on the matter during the 11th Congress. However, Congress did not write this intended exemption into law.
Congress could have easily included such exemption in RA 9009 but Congress did not. This is fatal to the cause of
respondent municipalities because such exemption must appear in RA 9009 as an amendment to Section 450 of the
Local Government Code. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the conversion of a municipality into a city,
including any exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code. Congress cannot prescribe
such criteria or exemption from such criteria in any other law. In short, Congress cannot create a city through a law
that does not comply with the criteria or exemption found in the Local Government Code.
Section 10 of Article X is similar to Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting Congress from creating private
corporations except by a general law. Section 16 of Article XII provides:
The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of
private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special
charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Congress must prescribe all the criteria for the "formation, organization, or regulation" of private corporations in
a general law applicable to all without discrimination.21 Congress cannot create a private corporation through a
special law or charter.
Deliberations of the 11th Congress on Unapproved Bills Inapplicable
Congress is not a continuing body.22 The unapproved cityhood bills filed during the 11th Congress became mere scraps of
paper upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. All the hearings and deliberations conducted during the 11 th Congress
on unapproved bills also became worthless upon the adjournment of the 11 th Congress. These hearings and
deliberations cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into law in the 13 th or subsequent Congresses.
The members and officers of each Congress are different. All unapproved bills filed in one Congress become functus
officio upon adjournment of that Congress and must be re-filed anew in order to be taken up in the next Congress. When
their respective authors re-filed the cityhood bills in 2006 during the 13 th Congress, the bills had to start from square one
again, going through the legislative mill just like bills taken up for the first time, from the filing to the approval. Section 123,
Rule XLIV of the Rules of the Senate, on Unfinished Business, provides:
Sec. 123. x x x
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be
taken by the succeeding Congress as if presented for the first time. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Section 78 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, on Unfinished Business, states:
Section 78. Calendar of Business. The Calendar of Business shall consist of the following:
a. Unfinished Business. This is business being considered by the House at the time of its last
adjournment. Its consideration shall be resumed until it is disposed of. The Unfinished Business at the
end of a session shall be resumed at the commencement of the next session as if no adjournment has
taken place. At the end of the term of a Congress, all Unfinished Business are deemed
terminated. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved cityhood bills, as well as the deliberations during the
12th and 13th Congresses on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain municipalities, have no legal
significance. They do not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing laws passed by subsequent Congresses.
Applicability of Equal Protection Clause
If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contained an exemption to the P100 million
annual income requirement, the criteria for such exemption could be scrutinized for possible violation of the equal
protection clause. Thus, the criteria for the exemption, if found in the Local Government Code, could be assailed on the
ground of absence of a valid classification. However, Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009, does not contain any exemption. The exemption is contained in the Cityhood Laws, which are unconstitutional
because such exemption must be prescribed in the Local Government Code as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution.
Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, such exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. The
exemption provision merely states, "Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 ─ The City of x x x shall be exempted
from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009." This one sentence exemption provision
contains no classification standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities from those that are not
exempted.
Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11th Congress that municipalities with pending cityhood bills should be
exempt from the P100 million income requirement, there is still no valid classification to satisfy the equal protection
clause. The exemption will be based solely on the fact that the 16 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in the
11th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted. This is not a valid classification between those entitled and those not
entitled to exemption from the P100 million income requirement.
To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on substantial distinctions, rationally related to a
legitimate government objective which is the purpose of the law, 23 not limited to existing conditions only, and applicable to
all similarly situated. Thus, this Court has ruled:
The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions:
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class. 24
There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11 th Congress and
municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 th Congress is not a material
difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with
pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have
pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion − mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 th Congress − is not
rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.
Municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills were not informed that a pending cityhood bill in the 11 th Congress
would be a condition for exemption from the increased P100 million income requirement. Had they been informed, many
municipalities would have caused the filing of their own cityhood bills. These municipalities, even if they have bigger
annual income than the 16 respondent municipalities, cannot now convert into cities if their income is less than P100
million.
The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time
of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid
classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. This requirement is illustrated in Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten
Eyck,25 where the challenged law allowed milk dealers engaged in business prior to a fixed date to sell at a price lower
than that allowed to newcomers in the same business. In Mayflower, the U.S. Supreme Court held:
We are referred to a host of decisions to the effect that a regulatory law may be prospective in operation and may
except from its sweep those presently engaged in the calling or activity to which it is directed. Examples are
statutes licensing physicians and dentists, which apply only to those entering the profession subsequent to the
passage of the act and exempt those then in practice, or zoning laws which exempt existing buildings, or laws
forbidding slaughterhouses within certain areas, but excepting existing establishments. The challenged
provision is unlike such laws, since, on its face, it is not a regulation of a business or an activity in the
interest of, or for the protection of, the public, but an attempt to give an economic advantage to those
engaged in a given business at an arbitrary date as against all those who enter the industry after that
date. The appellees do not intimate that the classification bears any relation to the public health or welfare
generally; that the provision will discourage monopoly; or that it was aimed at any abuse, cognizable by law, in the
milk business. In the absence of any such showing, we have no right to conjure up possible situations which might
justify the discrimination. The classification is arbitrary and unreasonable and denies the appellant the equal
protection of the law. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique advantage based on
an arbitrary date − the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11 th Congress - as against all other municipalities
that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.
Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply
to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities,
while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even
if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic Act
Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176951 December 21, 2009
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREÑAS,
CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF
BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR;
MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN,
PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; and MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, Respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF
TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF
ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY
OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA,
CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY
OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, Petitioners-In-Intervention.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 177499 December 21, 2009
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
ORIENTAL; and MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178056 December 21, 2009
vs.
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF CEBU; and
MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS ORIENTAL, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF
CABADBARAN, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR. J.:
Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read according to its spirit or
intent,1 for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is within the
letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. 2 Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the
lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and that which is within the letter of the statute is not
within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. 3 Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not
accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators. 4
So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity of an act of Congress, a co-equal branch of
government, it behooves the Court to have at once one principle in mind: the presumption of constitutionality of
statutes.5 This presumption finds its roots in the tri-partite system of government and the corollary separation of
powers, which enjoins the three great departments of the government to accord a becoming courtesy for each
other’s acts, and not to interfere inordinately with the exercise by one of its official functions. Towards this end,
courts ought to reject assaults against the validity of statutes, barring of course their clear unconstitutionality. To
doubt is to sustain, the theory in context being that the law is the product of earnest studies by Congress to ensure
that no constitutional prescription or concept is infringed. 6 Consequently, before a law duly challenged is nullified, an
unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with, the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be
demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. 7
BACKGROUND
The consolidated petitions for prohibition commenced by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo,
City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas8 assail the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws,9 each converting the
municipality covered thereby into a city (cityhood laws, hereinafter) and seek to enjoin the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to subject laws.
By Decision10 dated November 18, 2008, the Court en banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and nullified the
sixteen (16) cityhood laws for being violative of the Constitution, specifically its Section 10, Article X and the equal
protection clause.
Subsequently, respondent local government units (LGUs) moved for reconsideration, raising, as one of the issues,
the validity of the factual premises not contained in the pleadings of the parties, let alone established, which became
the bases of the Decision subject of reconsideration. 11 By Resolution of March 31, 2009, a divided Court denied the
motion for reconsideration.
A second motion for reconsideration followed in which respondent LGUs prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, respondents respectfully pray that the Honorable Court reconsider its "Resolution" dated March 31,
2009, in so far as it denies for "lack of merit" respondents’ "Motion for Reconsideration" dated December 9, 2008
and in lieu thereof, considering that new and meritorious arguments are raised by respondents’ "Motion for
Reconsideration" dated December 9, 2008 to grant afore-mentioned "Motion for Reconsideration" dated December
9, 2008 and dismiss the "Petitions For Prohibition" in the instant case.
Per Resolution dated April 28, 2009, the Court, voting 6-6, disposed of the motion as follows:
By a vote of 6-6, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 31 March 2009 is DENIED for lack of merit.
The motion is denied since there is no majority that voted to overturn the Resolution of 31 March 2009.
The Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of 18 November 2008 is DENIED for being a prohibited
pleading, and the Motion for Leave to Admit Attached Petition in Intervention x x x filed by counsel for Ludivina T.
Mas, et al. are also DENIED. No further pleadings shall be entertained. Let entry of judgment be made in due
course. x x x
On May 14, 2009, respondent LGUs filed a Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead
that Respondents’ "Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009" and "Motion for Leave to File
and to Admit Attached ‘Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 18, 2008’ Remain
Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings Thereon."
Per its Resolution of June 2, 2009, the Court declared the May 14, 2009 motion adverted to as expunged in light of
the entry of judgment made on May 21, 2009. Justice Leonardo-De Castro, however, taking common cause with
Justice Bersamin to grant the motion for reconsideration of the April 28, 2009 Resolution and to recall the entry of
judgment, stated the observation, and with reason, that the entry was effected "before the Court could act on the
aforesaid motion which was filed within the 15-day period counted from receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution." 12
Forthwith, respondent LGUs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 to which some of
the petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention filed their respective comments. The Court will now rule on this
incident. But first, we set and underscore some basic premises:
(1) The initial motion to reconsider the November 18, 2008 Decision, as Justice Leonardo-De Castro noted,
indeed raised new and substantial issues, inclusive of the matter of the correctness of the factual premises
upon which the said decision was predicated. The 6-6 vote on the motion for reconsideration per the
Resolution of March 31, 2009, which denied the motion on the sole ground that "the basic issues have
already been passed upon" reflected a divided Court on the issue of whether or not the underlying Decision
of November 18, 2008 had indeed passed upon the basic issues raised in the motion for reconsideration of
the said decision;
(2) The aforesaid May 14, 2009 Motion to Amend Resolution of April 28, 2009 was precipitated by the tie
vote which served as basis for the issuance of said resolution. This May 14, 2009 motion––which mainly
argued that a tie vote is inadequate to declare a law unconstitutional–– remains unresolved; and
(3) Pursuant to Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, all cases involving the constitutionality of a law shall
be heard by the Court en banc and decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
The basic issue tendered in this motion for reconsideration of the June 2, 2009 Resolution boils down to whether or
not the required vote set forth in the aforesaid Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII is limited only to the initial vote on the petition or
also to the subsequent voting on the motion for reconsideration where the Court is called upon and actually votes on
the constitutionality of a law or like issuances. Or, as applied to this case, would a minute resolution dismissing, on a
tie vote, a motion for reconsideration on the sole stated ground––that the "basic issues have already been
passed"–– suffice to hurdle the voting requirement required for a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the
cityhood laws in question?
The 6-6 vote on the motion to reconsider the Resolution of March 31, 2009, which denied the initial motion on the
sole ground that "the basic issues had already been passed upon" betrayed an evenly divided Court on the issue of
whether or not the underlying Decision of November 18, 2008 had indeed passed upon the issues raised in the
motion for reconsideration of the said decision. But at the end of the day, the single issue that matters and the vote
that really counts really turn on the constitutionality of the cityhood laws. And be it remembered that the inconclusive
6-6 tie vote reflected in the April 28, 2009 Resolution was the last vote on the issue of whether or not the cityhood
laws infringe the Constitution. Accordingly, the motions of the respondent LGUs, in light of the 6-6 vote, should be
deliberated anew until the required concurrence on the issue of the validity or invalidity of the laws in question is, on
the merits, secured.
It ought to be clear that a deadlocked vote does not reflect the "majority of the Members" contemplated in Sec. 4 (2)
of Art. VIII of the Constitution, which requires that:
All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law shall be heard by the
Supreme Court en banc, x x x shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. (Emphasis added.)
Webster defines "majority" as "a number greater than half of a total." 13 In plain language, this means 50% plus one.
In Lambino v. Commission on Elections, Justice, now Chief Justice, Puno, in a separate opinion, expressed the view
that "a deadlocked vote of six (6) is not a majority and a non-majority cannot write a rule with precedential value." 14
As may be noted, the aforequoted Sec. 4 of Art. VIII, as couched, exacts a majority vote in the determination of a
case involving the constitutionality of a statute, without distinguishing whether such determination is made on the
main petition or thereafter on a motion for reconsideration. This is as it should be, for, to borrow from the late Justice
Ricardo J. Francisco: "x x x [E]ven assuming x x x that the constitutional requirement on the concurrence of the
‘majority’ was initially reached in the x x x ponencia, the same is inconclusive as it was still open for review by way
of a motion for reconsideration."15
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the rule on a tie-vote situation, i.e., Sec. 7, Rule 56 and the complementary
A.M. No. 99-1-09- SC, respectively, providing that:
SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. – Where the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the
necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall again be deliberated on, and if after such deliberation no decision
is reached, the original action commenced in the court shall be dismissed; in appealed cases, the judgment or order
appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.
A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC – x x x A motion for reconsideration of a decision or resolution of the Court En Banc or of a
Division may be granted upon a vote of a majority of the En Banc or of a Division, as the case may be, who actually
took part in the deliberation of the motion.
If the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed denied.
But since the instant cases fall under Sec. 4 (2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, the aforequoted provisions ought to be
applied in conjunction with the prescription of the Constitution that the cases "shall be decided with the concurrence
of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the instant cases and voted
thereon." To repeat, the last vote on the issue of the constitutionality of the cityhood bills is that reflected in the April
28, 2009 Resolution––a 6-6 deadlock.
On the postulate then that first, the finality of the November 18, 2008 Decision has yet to set in, the issuance of the
precipitate16 entry of judgment notwithstanding, and second, the deadlocked vote on the second motion for
reconsideration did not definitely settle the constitutionality of the cityhood laws, the Court is inclined to take another
hard look at the underlying decision. Without belaboring in their smallest details the arguments for and against the
procedural dimension of this disposition, it bears to stress that the Court has the power to suspend its own rules
when the ends of justice would be served thereby. 17 In the performance of their duties, courts should not be
shackled by stringent rules which would result in manifest injustice. Rules of procedure are only tools crafted to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application must be eschewed, if they result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. Substantial rights must not be prejudiced by a rigid and
technical application of the rules in the altar of expediency. When a case is impressed with public interest, a
relaxation of the application of the rules is in order. 18 Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules or
excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. 19
While perhaps not on all fours with the case, because it involved a purely business transaction, what the Court said
in Chuidian v. Sandiganbayan20 is most apropos:
To reiterate what the Court has said in Ginete vs. Court of Appeals and other cases, the rules of procedure should
be viewed as mere instruments designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They are not to be applied with
severity and rigidity when such application would clearly defeat the very rationale for their conception and existence.
Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules, inclusive of the one-
motion rule, can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court has already declared to be
final. The peculiarities of this case impel us to do so now.
The Court, by a vote of 6-4, grants the respondent LGUs’ motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2,
2009, as well as their May 14, 2009 motion to consider the second motion for reconsideration of the November 18,
2008 Decision unresolved, and also grants said second motion for reconsideration.
This brings us to the substantive aspect of the case.
The Undisputed Factual Antecedents in Brief
During the 11th Congress,21 fifty-seven (57) cityhood bills were filed before the House of Representatives. 22 Of the
fifty-seven (57), thirty-three (33) eventually became laws. The twenty-four (24) other bills were not acted upon.
Later developments saw the introduction in the Senate of Senate Bill (S. Bill) No. 2157 23 to amend Sec. 450 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991. The proposed
amendment sought to increase the income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from PhP 20 million
average annual income to PhP 100 million locally generated income.
In March 2001, S. Bill No. 2157 was signed into law as RA 9009 to take effect on June 30, 2001. As thus amended
by RA 9009, Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 now provides that "[a] municipality x x x may be converted into a
component city if it has a [certified] locally generated average annual income x x x of at least [PhP 100 million] for
the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices."
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the Lower House of the 12th Congress adopted in July 2001 House (H.) Joint
Resolution No. 2924 which, as its title indicated, sought to exempt from the income requirement prescribed in RA
9009 the 24 municipalities whose conversions into cities were not acted upon during the previous Congress. The
12th Congress ended without the Senate approving H. Joint Resolution No. 29.
Then came the 13th Congress (July 2004 to June 2007), which saw the House of Representatives re-adopting H.
Joint Resolution No. 29 as H. Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarding it to the Senate for approval.
The Senate, however, again failed to approve the joint resolution. During the Senate session held on November 6,
2006, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. asserted that passing H. Resolution No. 1 would, in net effect, allow a
wholesale exemption from the income requirement imposed under RA 9009 on the municipalities. For this reason,
he suggested the filing by the House of Representatives of individual bills to pave the way for the municipalities to
become cities and then forwarding them to the Senate for proper action. 25
Heeding the advice, sixteen (16) municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills.
Common to all 16 measures was a provision exempting the municipality covered from the PhP 100 million income
requirement.
As of June 7, 2007, both Houses of Congress had approved the individual cityhood bills, all of which eventually
lapsed into law on various dates. Each cityhood law directs the COMELEC, within thirty (30) days from its approval,
to hold a plebiscite to determine whether the voters approve of the conversion.
As earlier stated, the instant petitions seek to declare the cityhood laws unconstitutional for violation of Sec. 10, Art.
X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal-protection clause. The wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities, the petitioners bemoan, will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA), since more cities will partake of the internal revenue set aside for all cities under Sec. 285 of the
LGC of 1991.26
Petitioners-in-intervention, LPC members themselves, would later seek leave and be allowed to intervene.
Aside from their basic plea to strike down as unconstitutional the cityhood laws in question, petitioners and
petitioners-in-intervention collectively pray that an order issue enjoining the COMELEC from conducting plebiscites
in the affected areas. An alternative prayer would urge the Court to restrain the poll body from proclaiming the
plebiscite results.
On July 24, 2007, the Court en banc resolved to consolidate the petitions and the petitions-in-intervention. On
March 11, 2008, it heard the parties in oral arguments.
The Issues
In the main, the issues to which all others must yield pivot on whether or not the cityhood laws violate (1) Sec. 10.
Art. X of the Constitution and (2) the equal protection clause.
In the November 18, 2008 Decision granting the petitions, Justice Antonio T. Carpio, for the Court, resolved the twin
posers in the affirmative and accordingly declared the cityhood laws unconstitutional, deviating as they do from the
uniform and non-discriminatory income criterion prescribed by the LGC of 1991. In so doing, the ponencia veritably
agreed with the petitioners that the Constitution, in clear and unambiguous language, requires that all the criteria for
the creation of a city shall be embodied and written in the LGC, and not in any other law.
After a circumspect reflection, the Court is disposed to reconsider.
Petitioners’ threshold posture, characterized by a strained interpretation of the Constitution, if accorded cogency,
would veritably curtail and cripple Congress’ valid exercise of its authority to create political subdivisions.
By constitutional design27 and as a matter of long-established principle, the power to create political subdivisions or
LGUs is essentially legislative in character.28 But even without any constitutional grant, Congress can, by law,
create, divide, merge, or altogether abolish or alter the boundaries of a province, city, or municipality. We said as
much in the fairly recent case, Sema v. CIMELEC.29 The 1987 Constitution, under its Art. X, Sec. 10, nonetheless
provides for the creation of LGUs, thus:
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
supplied.)
As may be noted, the afore-quoted provision specifically provides for the creation of political subdivisions "in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code," subject to the approval of the voters in the
unit concerned. The criteria referred to are the verifiable indicators of viability, i.e., area, population, and income,
now set forth in Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, as amended by RA 9009. The petitioners would parlay the thesis that
these indicators or criteria must be written only in the LGC and not in any other statute. Doubtless, the code they are
referring to is the LGC of 1991. Pushing their point, they conclude that the cityhood laws that exempted the
respondent LGUs from the income standard spelled out in the amendatory RA 9009 offend the Constitution.
Petitioners’ posture does not persuade.
The supposedly infringed Art. X, Sec. 10 is not a new constitutional provision. Save for the use of the term "barrio" in
lieu of "barangay," "may be" instead of "shall," the change of the phrase "unit or units" to "political unit" and the
addition of the modifier "directly" to the word "affected," the aforesaid provision is a substantial reproduction of Art.
XI, Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution, which reads:
Section 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. (Emphasis supplied.)
It bears notice, however, that the "code" similarly referred to in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions is clearly but a law
Congress enacted. This is consistent with the aforementioned plenary power of Congress to create political units.
Necessarily, since Congress wields the vast poser of creating political subdivisions, surely it can exercise the lesser
authority of requiring a set of criteria, standards, or ascertainable indicators of viability for their creation. Thus, the
only conceivable reason why the Constitution employs the clause "in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code" is to lay stress that it is Congress alone, and no other, which can impose the criteria. The
eminent constitutionalist, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., in his treatise on Constitutional Law, specifically on the
subject provision, explains:
Prior to 1965, there was a certain lack of clarity with regard to the power to create, divide, merge, dissolve, or
change the boundaries of municipal corporations. The extent to which the executive may share in this power was
obscured by Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan. 30 Pelaez v. Auditor General subsequently clarified the Cardona
case when the Supreme Court said that "the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in
nature."31 Pelaez, however, conceded that "the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle
conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature-involving as it
does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities." 32 Pelaez was silent
about division, merger, and dissolution of municipal corporations. But since division in effect creates a new
municipality, and both dissolution and merger in effect abolish a legal creation, it may fairly be inferred that these
acts are also legislative in nature.
Section 10 [Art. X of the 1987 Constitution], which is a legacy from the 1973 Constitution, goes further than the
doctrine in the Pelaez case. It not only makes creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities x x x subject to "criteria established in the local government
code," thereby declaring these actions properly legislative, but it also makes creation, division, merger, abolition
or substantial alteration of boundaries "subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected." 33 x x x (Emphasis added.)
It remains to be observed at this juncture that when the 1987 Constitution speaks of the LGC, the reference cannot
be to any specific statute or codification of laws, let alone the LGC of 1991. 34 Be it noted that at the time of the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 337, the then LGC, was still in effect. Accordingly, had
the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to isolate the embodiment of the criteria only in the LGC, then they
would have actually referred to BP 337. Also, they would then not have provided for the enactment by Congress of a
new LGC, as they did in Art. X, Sec. 335 of the Constitution.
Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can, via either a consolidated set of laws or a
much simpler, single-subject enactment, impose the said verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria need not be
embodied in the local government code, albeit this code is the ideal repository to ensure, as much as possible, the
element of uniformity. Congress can even, after making a codification, enact an amendatory law, adding to the
existing layers of indicators earlier codified, just as efficaciously as it may reduce the same. In this case, the
amendatory RA 9009 upped the already codified income requirement from PhP 20 million to PhP 100 million. At the
end of the day, the passage of amendatory laws is no different from the enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws
specifically exempting a particular political subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in enacting the
exempting law/s, effectively decreased the already codified indicators.
Petitioners’ theory that Congress must provide the criteria solely in the LGC and not in any other law strikes the
Court as illogical. For if we pursue their contention to its logical conclusion, then RA 9009 embodying the new and
increased income criterion would, in a way, also suffer the vice of unconstitutionality. It is startling, however, that
petitioners do not question the constitutionality of RA 9009, as they in fact use said law as an argument for the
alleged unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws.
As it were, Congress, through the medium of the cityhood laws, validly decreased the income criterion vis-à-vis the
respondent LGUs, but without necessarily being unreasonably discriminatory, as shall be discussed shortly, by
reverting to the PhP 20 million threshold what it earlier raised to PhP 100 million. The legislative intent not to subject
respondent LGUs to the more stringent requirements of RA 9009 finds expression in the following uniform provision
of the cityhood laws:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. – The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement
prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.
In any event, petitioners’ constitutional objection would still be untenable even if we were to assume purely ex
hypothesi the correctness of their underlying thesis, viz: that the conversion of a municipality to a city shall be in
accordance with, among other things, the income criterion set forth in the LGC of 1991, and in no other; otherwise,
the conversion is invalid. We shall explain.
Looking at the circumstances behind the enactment of the laws subject of contention, the Court finds that the LGC-
amending RA 9009, no less, intended the LGUs covered by the cityhood laws to be exempt from the PhP 100
million income criterion. In other words, the cityhood laws, which merely carried out the intent of RA 9009, adhered,
in the final analysis, to the "criteria established in the Local Government Code," pursuant to Sec. 10, Art. X of the
1987 Constitution. We shall now proceed to discuss this exemption angle. 36
Among the criteria established in the LGC pursuant to Sec.10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution are those detailed in
Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 under the heading "Requisites for Creation." The section sets the minimum income
qualifying bar before a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be considered for cityhood. Originally, Sec. 164 of
BP 337 imposed an average regular annual income "of at least ten million pesos for the last three consecutive
years" as a minimum income standard for a municipal-to-city conversion. The LGC that BP 337 established was
superseded by the LGC of 1991 whose then Sec. 450 provided that "[a] municipality or cluster of barangays may be
converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, x x x of at least twenty million pesos
(₱20,000,000.00) for at least two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices x x x." RA 9009 in turn
amended said Sec. 450 by further increasing the income requirement to PhP 100 million, thus:
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a
component city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at
least One Hundred Million Pesos (₱100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000
constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
xxxx
transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied.)
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is couched.
Thus, applying a verba legis37 or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to
inconvenience, an absurd situation or injustice. 38 To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that
the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself,39 resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its
letter.40
It is in this respect that the history of the passage of RA 9009 and the logical inferences derivable therefrom assume
relevancy in discovering legislative intent. 41
The rationale behind the enactment of RA 9009 to amend Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 can reasonably be deduced
from Senator Pimentel’s sponsorship speech on S. Bill No. 2157. Of particular significance is his statement
regarding the basis for the proposed increase from PhP 20 million to PhP 100 million in the income requirement for
municipalities wanting to be converted into cities, viz:
Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, I would have wanted this bill to be included in the whole set of proposed
amendments that we have introduced to precisely amend the [LGC]. However, it is a fact that there is a mad rush of
municipalities wanting to be converted into cities. Whereas in 1991, when the [LGC] was approved, there were only
60 cities, today the number has increased to 85 cities, with 41 more municipalities applying for conversion x x x. At
the rate we are going, I am apprehensive that before long this nation will be a nation of all cities and no
municipalities.
It is for that reason, Mr. President, that we are proposing among other things, that the financial requirement, which,
under the [LGC], is fixed at ₱20 million, be raised to ₱100 million to enable a municipality to have the right to be
converted into a city, and the ₱100 million should be sourced from locally generated funds.
Congress to be sure knew, when RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, of the pendency of several bills on cityhood,
wherein the applying municipalities were qualified under the then obtaining PhP 20 million-income threshold. These
included respondent LGUs. Thus, equally noteworthy is the ensuing excerpts from the floor exchange between then
Senate President Franklin Drilon and Senator Pimentel, the latter stopping short of saying that the income threshold
of PhP 100 million under S. Bill No. 2157 would not apply to municipalities that have pending cityhood bills, thus:
THE PRESIDENT. The Chair would like to ask for some clarificatory point. x x x
THE PRESIDENT. This is just on the point of the pending bills in the Senate which propose the conversion of a
number of municipalities into cities and which qualify under the present standard.
We would like to know the view of the sponsor: Assuming that this bill becomes a law, will the Chamber apply the
standard as proposed in this bill to those bills which are pending for consideration?
SENATOR PIMENTEL, Mr. President, it might not be fair to make this bill x x x [if] approved, retroact to the bills that
are pending in the Senate for conversion from municipalities to cities.
THE PRESIDENT. Will there be an appropriate language crafted to reflect that view? Or does it not become a policy
of the Chamber, assuming that this bill becomes a law x x x that it will apply to those bills which are already
approved by the House under the old version of the [LGC] and are now pending in the Senate? The Chair does not
know if we can craft a language which will limit the application to those which are not yet in the Senate. Or is that a
policy that the Chamber will adopt?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Mr. President, personally, I do not think it is necessary to put that provision because what
we are saying here will form part of the interpretation of this bill. Besides, if there is no retroactivity clause, I do not
think that the bill would have any retroactive effect.
THE PRESIDENT. So the understanding is that those bills which are already pending in the Chamber will not be
affected.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. These will not be affected, Mr. President.42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
What the foregoing Pimental-Drilon exchange eloquently indicates are the following complementary legislative
intentions: (1) the then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the minimum income requirement of PhP
100 million that S. Bill No. 2159 proposes; and (2) RA 9009 would not have any retroactive effect insofar as the
cityhood bills are concerned.
Given the foregoing perspective, it is not amiss to state that the basis for the inclusion of the exemption clause of the
cityhood laws is the clear-cut intent of Congress of not according retroactive effect to RA 9009. Not only do the
congressional records bear the legislative intent of exempting the cityhood laws from the income requirement of PhP
100 million. Congress has now made its intention to exempt express in the challenged cityhood laws.
Legislative intent is part and parcel of the law, the controlling factor in interpreting a statute. In construing a statute,
the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the Legislature and to adopt the sense that best
harmonizes with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the policy and objects of the legislature. 43 In fact,
any interpretation that runs counter to the legislative intent is unacceptable and invalid. 44 Torres v. Limjap could not
have been more precise:
The intent of a Statute is the Law. – If a statute is valid, it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of the
lawmaker. The intent is x x x the essence of the law and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and
give effect to that intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced
when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow
the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legislative enactment. In
construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the legislature x x x. 45 (Emphasis
supplied.)
As emphasized at the outset, behind every law lies the presumption of constitutionality. 46 Consequently, to him who
would assert the unconstitutionality of a statute belongs the burden of proving otherwise. Laws will only be declared
invalid if a conflict with the Constitution is beyond reasonable doubt. 47 Unfortunately for petitioners and petitioners-in-
intervention, they failed to discharge their heavy burden.
It is contended that the deliberations on the cityhood bills and the covering joint resolution were undertaken in the
11th and/or the 12th Congress. Accordingly, so the argument goes, such deliberations, more particularly those on
the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain municipalities, are without significance and would not
qualify as extrinsic aids in construing the cityhood laws that were passed during the 13th Congress, Congress not
being a continuing body.
The argument is specious and glosses over the reality that the cityhood bills––which were already being deliberated
upon even perhaps before the conception of RA 9009––were again being considered during the 13th Congress
after being tossed around in the two previous Congresses. And specific reference to the cityhood bills was also
made during the deliberations on RA 9009. At the end of the day, it is really immaterial if Congress is not a
continuing legislative body. What is important is that the debates, deliberations, and proceedings of Congress and
the steps taken in the enactment of the law, in this case the cityhood laws in relation to RA 9009 or vice versa, were
part of its legislative history and may be consulted, if appropriate, as aids in the interpretation of the law. 48 And of
course the earlier cited Drilon-Pimentel exchange on whether or not the 16 municipalities in question would be
covered by RA 9009 is another vital link to the historical chain of the cityhood bills. This and other proceedings on
the bills are spread in the Congressional journals, which cannot be conveniently reduced to pure rhetoric without
meaning whatsoever, on the simplistic and non-sequitur pretext that Congress is not a continuing body and that
unfinished business in either chamber is deemed terminated at the end of the term of Congress.
This brings us to the challenge to the constitutionality of cityhood laws on equal protection grounds.
To the petitioners, the cityhood laws, by granting special treatment to respondent municipalities/LGUs by way of
exemption from the standard PhP 100 million minimum income requirement, violate Sec.1, Art. III of the
Constitution, which in part provides that no person shall "be denied the equal protection of the laws."
Petitioners’ challenge is not well taken. At its most basic, the equal protection clause proscribes undue favor as well
as hostile discrimination. Hence, a law need not operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable
with Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution.
The equal protection guarantee is embraced in the broader and elastic concept of due process, every unfair
discrimination being an offense against the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless come as a
separate clause in Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution to provide for a more specific protection against any undue
discrimination or antagonism from government. Arbitrariness in general may be assailed on the basis of the due
process clause. But if a particular challenged act partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper
weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. 49 This constitutional protection extends to all persons, natural
or artificial, within the territorial jurisdiction. Artificial persons, as the respondent LGUs herein, are, however, entitled
to protection only insofar as their property is concerned. 50
In the proceedings at bar, petitioner LCP and the intervenors cannot plausibly invoke the equal protection clause,
precisely because no deprivation of property results by virtue of the enactment of the cityhood laws. The LCP’s
claim that the IRA of its member-cities will be substantially reduced on account of the conversion into cities of the
respondent LGUs would not suffice to bring it within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. Indeed, it is
presumptuous on the part of the LCP member-cities to already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were their property,
as the IRA is yet to be allocated. For the same reason, the municipalities that are not covered by the uniform
exemption clause in the cityhood laws cannot validly invoke constitutional protection. For, at this point, the
conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect its status as a political unit, but not its property as such.
As a matter of settled legal principle, the fundamental right of equal protection does not require absolute equality. It
is enough that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights or privileges conferred
and responsibilities or obligations imposed. The equal protection clause does not preclude the state from
recognizing and acting upon factual differences between individuals and classes. It recognizes that inherent in the
right to legislate is the right to classify,51 necessarily implying that the equality guaranteed is not violated by a
legislation based on reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply
equally to all members of the same class.52 The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the laws
challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory under the equal protection clause.
As things stand, the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen (16) municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on
substantial distinction. Indeed, respondent LGUs, which are subjected only to the erstwhile PhP 20 million income
criterion instead of the stringent income requirement prescribed in RA 9009, are substantially different from other
municipalities desirous to be cities. Looking back, we note that respondent LGUs had pending cityhood bills before
the passage of RA 9009. There lies part of the tipping difference. And years before the enactment of the
amendatory RA 9009, respondents LGUs had already met the income criterion exacted for cityhood under the LGC
of 1991. Due to extraneous circumstances, however, the bills for their conversion remained unacted upon by
Congress. As aptly observed by then Senator, now Manila Mayor, Alfredo Lim in his speech sponsoring H. Joint
Resolution No. 1, or the cityhood bills, respondent LGUs saw themselves confronted with the "changing of the rules
in the middle of the game." Some excerpts of Senator Lim’s sponsorship speech:
x x x [D]uring the Eleventh Congress, fifty-seven (57) municipalities applied for city status, confident that each has
met the requisites for conversion under Section 450 of the [LGC], particularly the income threshold of ₱20 million. Of
the 57 that filed, thirty-two (32) were enacted into law; x x x while the rest – twenty-four (24) in all – failed to pass
through Congress. Shortly before the long recess of Congress in February 2001, to give way to the May elections x
x x, Senate Bill No. 2157, which eventually became [RA] 9009, was passed into law, effectively raising the income
requirement for creation of cities to a whooping ₱100 million x x x. Much as the proponents of the 24 cityhood bills
then pending struggled to beat the effectivity of the law on June 30, 2001, events that then unfolded were swift and
overwhelming that Congress just did not have the time to act on the measures.
Some of these intervening events were x x x the impeachment of President Estrada x x x and the May 2001
elections.
The imposition of a much higher income requirement for the creation of a city x x x was unfair; like any sport –
changing the rules in the middle of the game.
Undaunted, they came back during the [12th] Congress x x x. They filed House Joint Resolution No. 29 seeking
exemption from the higher income requirement of RA 9009. For the second time, [however], time ran out from them.
For many of the municipalities whose Cityhood Bills are now under consideration, this year, at the closing days of
the [13th] Congress, marks their ninth year appealing for fairness and justice. x x x
I, for one, share their view that fairness dictates that they should be given a legal remedy by which they could be
allowed to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for city status using the criteria set forth under the
[LGC] prior to its amendment by RA 9009. Hence, when House Joint Resolution No. 1 reached the Senate x x x I
immediately set the public hearing x x x. On July 25, 2006, I filed Committee Report No. 84 x x x. On September 6, I
delivered the sponsorship x x x.
x x x By November 14, the measure had reverted to the period of individual amendments. This was when the then
acting majority leader, x x x informed the Body that Senator Pimentel and the proponents of House Joint Resolution
No. 1 have agreed to the proposal of the Minority Leader for the House to first approve the individual Cityhood Bills
of the qualified municipalities, along with the provision exempting each of them from the higher income requirement
of RA 9009. x x x This led to the certification issued by the proponents short-listing fourteen (14) municipalities
deemed to be qualified for city-status.
Acting on the suggestion of Senator Pimentel, the proponents lost no time in working for the approval by the House
of Representatives of their individual Cityhood Bills, each containing a provision of exemption from the higher
income requirement of RA 9009. On the last session day of last year, December 21, the House transmitted to the
Senate the Cityhood Bills of twelve out of the 14 pre-qualified municipalities. Your Committee immediately
conducted the public hearing x x x.
The whole process I enumerated [span] three Congresses x x x.

In essence, the Cityhood Bills now under consideration will have the same effect as that of House Joint Resolution
No. 1 because each of the 12 bills seeks exemption from the higher income requirement of RA 9009. The
proponents are invoking the exemption on the basis of justice and fairness.
Each of the 12 municipalities has all the requisites for conversion into a component city based on the old
requirements set forth under Section 450 of the [LGC], prior to its amendment by RA 9009, namely: x x
x53 (Emphasis supplied.)
In hindsight, the peculiar conditions, as depicted in Senator Lim’s speech, which respondent LGUs found
themselves in were unsettling. They were qualified cityhood applicants before the enactment of RA 009. Because of
events they had absolutely nothing to do with, a spoiler in the form of RA 9009 supervened. Now, then, to impose
on them the much higher income requirement after what they have gone through would appear to be indeed
"unfair," to borrow from Senator Lim. Thus, the imperatives of fairness dictate that they should be given a legal
remedy by which they would be allowed to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for city status, using
the criteria set forth under the LGC of 1991 prior to its amendment by RA 9009. Truly, the peculiar conditions of
respondent LGUs, which are actual and real, provide sufficient grounds for legislative classification.
To be sure, courts, regardless of doubts they might be entertaining, cannot question the wisdom of the
congressional classification, if reasonable, or the motivation underpinning the classification. 54 By the same token,
they do not sit to determine the propriety or efficacy of the remedies Congress has specifically chosen to extend.
That is its prerogative. The power of the Legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is, to
reiterate, neither curtailed nor denied by the equal protection clause. A law can be violative of the constitutional
limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis.
The classification is also germane to the purpose of the law. The exemption of respondent LGUs/municipalities from
the PhP 100 million income requirement was meant to reduce the inequality occasioned by the passage of the
amendatory RA 9009. From another perspective, the exemption was unquestionably designed to insure that
fairness and justice would be accorded respondent LGUs. Let it be noted that what were then the cityhood bills
covering respondent LGUs were part and parcel of the original 57 conversion bills filed in the 11th Congress, 33 of
those became laws before the adjournment of that Congress. The then bills of the challenged cityhood laws were
not acted upon due, inter alia, to the impeachment of then President Estrada, the related jueteng scandal
investigations conducted before, and the EDSA events that followed the aborted impeachment.
While the equal protection guarantee frowns upon the creation of a privileged class without justification, inherent in
the equality clause is the exhortation for the Legislature to pass laws promoting equality or reducing existing
inequalities. The enactment of the cityhood laws was in a real sense an attempt on the part of Congress to address
the inequity dealt the respondent LGUs. These laws positively promoted the equality and eliminated the inequality,
doubtless unintended, between respondent municipalities and the thirty-three (33) other municipalities whose
cityhood bills were enacted during the 11th Congress. Respondent municipalities and the 33 other municipalities,
which had already been elevated to city status, were all found to be qualified under the old Sec. 450 of the LGC of
1991 during the 11th Congress. As such, both respondent LGUs and the 33 other former municipalities are under
like circumstances and conditions. There is, thus, no rhyme or reason why an exemption from the PhP 100 million
requirement cannot be given to respondent LGUs. Indeed, to deny respondent LGUs/municipalities the same rights
and privileges accorded to the 33 other municipalities when, at the outset they were similarly situated, is tantamount
to denying the former the protective mantle of the equal protection clause. In effect, petitioners and petitioners-in-
intervention are creating an absurd situation in which an alleged violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution is remedied by another violation of the same clause. The irony is not lost to the Court.
Then too the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009 is not limited in application only to conditions existing at the time of
its enactment. It is intended to apply for all time, as long as the contemplated conditions obtain. To be more precise,
the legislative intent underlying the enactment of RA 9009 to exclude would-be-cities from the PhP 100 million
criterion would hold sway, as long as the corresponding cityhood bill has been filed before the effectivity of RA 9009
and the concerned municipality qualifies for conversion into a city under the original version of Sec. 450 of the LGC
of 1991.
Viewed in its proper light, the common exemption clause in the cityhood laws is an application of the non-retroactive
effect of RA 9009 on the cityhood bills. It is not a declaration of certain rights, but a mere declaration of prior
qualification and/or compliance with the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009.
Lastly and in connection with the third requisite, the uniform exemption clause would apply to municipalities that had
pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009 and were compliant with then Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991,
which prescribed an income requirement of PhP 20 million. It is hard to imagine, however, if there are still
municipalities out there belonging in context to the same class as the sixteen (16) respondent LGUs. Municipalities
that cannot claim to belong to the same class as the 16 cannot seek refuge in the cityhood laws. The former have to
comply with the PhP 100 million income requirement imposed by RA 9009.
A final consideration. The existence of the cities consequent to the approval of the creating, but challenged,
cityhood laws in the plebiscites held in the affected LGUs is now an operative fact. New cities appear to have been
organized and are functioning accordingly, with new sets of officials and employees. Other resulting events need not
be enumerated. The operative fact doctrine provides another reason for upholding the constitutionality of the
cityhood laws in question.
In view of the foregoing discussion, the Court ought to abandon as it hereby abandons and sets aside the Decision
of November 18, 2008 subject of reconsideration. And by way of summing up the main arguments in support of this
disposition, the Court hereby declares the following:
(1) Congress did not intend the increased income requirement in RA 9009 to apply to the cityhood bills
which became the cityhood laws in question. In other words, Congress intended the subject cityhood laws to
be exempted from the income requirement of PhP 100 million prescribed by RA 9009;
(2) The cityhood laws merely carry out the intent of RA 9009, now Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, to exempt
respondent LGUs from the PhP 100 million income requirement;
(3) The deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are extrinsic aids in
interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress. It is really immaterial if Congress is not a continuing body.
The hearings and deliberations during the 11th and 12th Congress may still be used as extrinsic reference
inasmuch as the same cityhood bills which were filed before the passage of RA 9009 were being considered
during the 13th Congress. Courts may fall back on the history of a law, as here, as extrinsic aid of statutory
construction if the literal application of the law results in absurdity or injustice.
(4) The exemption accorded the 16 municipalities is based on the fact that each had pending cityhood bills
long before the enactment of RA 9009 that substantially distinguish them from other municipalities aiming for
cityhood. On top of this, each of the 16 also met the PhP 20 million income level exacted under the original
Sec. 450 of the 1991 LGC.
And to stress the obvious, the cityhood laws are presumed constitutional. As we see it, petitioners have not
overturned the presumptive constitutionality of the laws in question.
WHEREFORE, respondent LGUs’ Motion for Reconsideration dated June 2, 2009, their "Motion to Amend the
Resolution of April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead that Respondents’ ‘Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of
March 31, 2009’ and ‘Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision Dated November 18, 2008’ Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings," dated May 14,
2009, and their second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated November 18, 2008 are GRANTED. The
June 2, 2009, the March 31, 2009, and April 31, 2009 Resolutions are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The entry of
judgment made on May 21, 2009 must accordingly be RECALLED.
The instant consolidated petitions and petitions-in-intervention are DISMISSED. The cityhood laws, namely Republic
Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491
are declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176951 August 24, 2010
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF
BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR;
MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN,
PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; and MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 177499
CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS,CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR
vs.
ORIENTAL; and MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 178056
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS
ORIENTAL, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
For resolution are (1) the ad cautelam motion for reconsideration and (2) motion to annul the Decision of 21
December 2009 filed by petitioners League of Cities of the Philippines, et al. and (3) the ad cautelam motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners-in-intervention Batangas City, Santiago City, Legazpi City, Iriga City, Cadiz City,
and Oroquieta City.
On 18 November 2008, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a majority vote, struck down the subject 16 Cityhood Laws
for violating Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the equal protection clause. On 31 March 2009, the
Supreme Court En Banc, again by a majority vote, denied the respondents’ first motion for reconsideration. On 28
April 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a split vote, denied the respondents’ second motion for reconsideration.
Accordingly, the 18 November 2008 Decision became final and executory and was recorded, in due course, in the
Book of Entries of Judgments on 21 May 2009.
However, after the finality of the 18 November 2008 Decision and without any exceptional and compelling reason,
the Court En Banc unprecedentedly reversed the 18 November 2008 Decision by upholding the constitutionality of
the Cityhood Laws in the Decision of 21 December 2009.
Upon reexamination, the Court finds the motions for reconsideration meritorious and accordingly reinstates the 18
November 2008 Decision declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional.
A. Violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. 1 The Constitution requires
Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the
conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the
same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation
from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from ₱20 million
to ₱100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local
Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the ₱100 million income
requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption
from this income requirement.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their
cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the
effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section
450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local
RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code. Section 1 of RA 9009 pertinently provides: "Section
450 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, is hereby amended to read
as follows: x x x." RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code. RA 9009, by amending Section
450 of the Local Government Code, embodies the new and prevailing Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Considering the Legislature’s primary intent to curtail "the mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into
cities," RA 9009 increased the income requirement for the creation of cities. To repeat, RA 9009 is not a law
different from the Local Government Code, as it expressly amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
The language of RA 9009 is plain, simple, and clear. Nothing is unintelligible or ambiguous; not a single word or
phrase admits of two or more meanings. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 by
increasing the income requirement for the creation of cities. There are no exemptions from this income requirement.
Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the
increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law. Moreover, where the law does
not make an exemption, the Court should not create one. 2
B. Operative Fact Doctrine
Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional
law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In fact, the
invocation of the operative fact doctrine is an admission that the law is unconstitutional.
However, the minority’s novel theory, invoking the operative fact doctrine, is that the enactment of the Cityhood
Laws and the functioning of the 16 municipalities as new cities with new sets of officials and employees operate to
contitutionalize the unconstitutional Cityhood Laws. This novel theory misapplies the operative fact doctrine and sets
a gravely dangerous precedent.
Under the minority’s novel theory, an unconstitutional law, if already implemented prior to its declaration of
unconstitutionality by the Court, can no longer be revoked and its implementation must be continued despite being
unconstitutional. This view will open the floodgates to the wanton enactment of unconstitutional laws and a mad
rush for their immediate implementation before the Court can declare them unconstitutional. This view is an open
invitation to serially violate the Constitution, and be quick about it, lest the violation be stopped by the Court.
The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be applied as an exception to the general rule that an
unconstitutional law produces no effects. It can never be invoked to validate as constitutional an unconstitutional
act. In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, 3 the Court stated:
The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. It produces no rights, imposes no duties and affords no
protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in legal contemplation, inoperative as if it has not been passed. Being void,
Fertiphil is not required to pay the levy. All levies paid should be refunded in accordance with the general civil code
principle against unjust enrichment. The general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern.
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair
play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always
be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have
relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put
the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating
it. (Emphasis supplied)
The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law. Under the operative fact
doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its
judicial declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In short, the operative fact
doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself.
Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case, the Cityhood Laws remain unconstitutional because
they violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, the effects of the implementation of the Cityhood
Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and supplies by the "new cities" or their
issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be recognized as valid and effective. This does not mean that
the Cityhood Laws are valid for they remain void. Only the effects of the implementation of these unconstitutional
laws are left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play to innocent people who may have relied on the
presumed validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the Court’s declaration of their unconstitutionality.
C. Equal Protection Clause
As the Court held in the 18 November 2008 Decision, there is no substantial distinction between municipalities with
pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of
a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the
purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or
determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress
might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the
classification criterion − mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress − is not rationally related to
the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.
Moreover, the fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition
existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the
requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. In fact, the minority
concedes that "the conditions (pendency of the cityhood bills) adverted to can no longer be repeated."
Further, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique advantage based on an
arbitrary date − the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress – as against all other
municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.
In addition, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must
apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot
convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded, the exemption provision found in
the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
D. Tie-Vote on a Motion for Reconsideration
Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. – Where the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the
necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall again be deliberated on, and if after such deliberation no decision
is reached, the original action commenced in the court shall be dismissed; in appealed cases, the judgment or order
appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be
denied. (Emphasis supplied)
The En Banc Resolution of 26 January 1999 in A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC, reads:
A MOTION FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF A DECISION OR RESOLUTION OF THE COURT EN BANC OR OF A

DIVISION MAY BE GRANTED UPON A VOTE OF A MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE EN BANC OR OF A
DIVISION, AS THE CASE MAY BE, WHO ACTUALLY TOOK PART IN THE DELIBERATION OF THE MOTION.
IF THE VOTING RESULTS IN A TIE, THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS DEEMED DENIED. (Emphasis
supplied)
The clear and simple language of the clarificatory en banc Resolution requires no further explanation. If the voting of
the Court en banc results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed denied. The Court’s prior majority
action on the main decision stands affirmed.4 This clarificatory Resolution applies to all cases heard by the
Court en banc, which includes not only cases involving the constitutionality of a law, but also, as expressly stated in
Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution, "all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be
heard en banc."
The 6-6 tie-vote by the Court en banc on the second motion for reconsideration necessarily resulted in the denial of
the second motion for reconsideration. Since the Court was evenly divided, there could be no reversal of the 18
November 2008 Decision, for a tie-vote cannot result in any court order or directive.5 The judgment stands in full
force.6 Undeniably, the 6-6 tie-vote did not overrule the prior majority en banc Decision of 18 November
2008, as well as the prior majority en banc Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying reconsideration. The tie-
vote on the second motion for reconsideration is not the same as a tie-vote on the main decision where there is no
prior decision. Here, the tie-vote plainly signifies that there is no majority to overturn the prior 18 November 2008
Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, and thus the second motion for reconsideration must be denied.
Further, the tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration did not mean that the present cases were left
undecided because there remain the Decision of 18 November 2008 and the Resolution of 31 March 2009 where a
majority of the Court en banc concurred in declaring the unconstitutionality of the sixteen Cityhood Laws. In short,
the 18 November 2008 Decision and the 31 March 2009 Resolution, which were both reached with the
concurrence of a majority of the Court en banc, are not reconsidered but stand affirmed.7 These prior
majority actions of the Court en banc can only be overruled by a new majority vote, not a tie-vote because a
tie-vote cannot overrule a prior affirmative action.
The denial, by a split vote, of the second motion for reconsideration inevitably rendered the 18 November 2008
Decision final. In fact, in its Resolution of 28 April 2009, denying the second motion for reconsideration, the Court en
banc reiterated that no further pleadings shall be entertained and stated that entry of judgment be made in due
course.1âwphi1
The dissenting opinion stated that "a deadlocked vote of six is not a majority and a non-majority does not constitute
a rule with precedential value."8
Indeed, a tie-vote is a non-majority – a non-majority which cannot overrule a prior affirmative action, that is the 18
November 2008 Decision striking down the Cityhood Laws. In short, the 18 November 2008 Decision stands
affirmed. And assuming a non-majority lacks any precedential value, the 18 November 2008 Decision, which was
unreversed as a result of the tie-vote on the respondents’ second motion for reconsideration, nevertheless remains
binding on the parties.9
Conclusion
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that "no x x x city shall be created x x x except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code." This provision can only be interpreted
in one way, that is, all the criteria for the creation of cities must be embodied exclusively in the Local Government
Code. In this case, the Cityhood Laws, which are unmistakably laws other than the Local Government Code,
provided an exemption from the increased income requirement for the creation of cities under Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Clearly, the Cityhood Laws contravene the letter and intent of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Adhering to the explicit prohibition in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution does not cripple Congress’ power to
make laws. In fact, Congress is not prohibited from amending the Local Government Code itself, as what Congress
did by enacting RA 9009. Indisputably, the act of amending laws comprises an integral part of the Legislature’s law-
making power. The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress provided an exemption
contrary to the express language of the Constitution that "[n]o x x x city x x x shall be created except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code." In other words, Congress exceeded and abused its law-
making power, rendering the challenged Cityhood Laws void for being violative of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the motions for reconsideration of the 21 December 2009 Decision and REINSTATE the
18 November 2008 Decision declaring UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389,
9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.
We NOTE petitioners’ motion to annul the Decision of 21 December 2009.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176951 February 15, 2011
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), Represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treñas;
City of Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treñas, in his personal
capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Baybay, Province of Leyte; Municipality of Bogo, Province of
Cebu; Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Western Samar; Municipality of Tandag, Province of Surigao
del Sur; Municipality of Borongan, Province of Eastern Samar; and Municipality of Tayabas, Province of
Quezon, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 177499
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Lamitan, Province of Basilan; Municipality of Tabuk,
Province of Kalinga; Municipality of Bayugan, Province of Agusan del Sur; Municipality of Batac, Province
of Ilocos Norte; Municipality of Mati, Province of Davao Oriental; and Municipality of Guihulngan, Province
of Negros Oriental, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178056
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Cabadbaran, Province of Agusan del Norte; Municipality of
Carcar, Province of Cebu; Municipality of El Salvador, Province of Misamis Oriental; Municipality of Naga,
Cebu; and Department of Budget and Management, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For consideration of this Court are the following pleadings:
1. Motion for Reconsideration of the "Resolution" dated August 24, 2010 dated and filed on September 14,
2010 by respondents Municipality of Baybay, et al.; and
2. Opposition [To the "Motion for Reconsideration of the ‘Resolution’ dated August 24, 2010"].
Meanwhile, respondents also filed on September 20, 2010 a Motion to Set "Motion for Reconsideration of the
‘Resolution’ dated August 24, 2010" for Hearing. This motion was, however, already denied by the Court En Banc.
A brief background —
These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the
Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas, assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen
(16) laws,1 each converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to
enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws.
In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, 2 granted the petitions and struck down
the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the equal protection clause.
In the Resolution dated March 31, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a 7-5 vote, 3 denied the first motion for
reconsideration.
On April 28, 2009, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution, with a vote of 6-6, 4 which denied the second motion for
reconsideration for being a prohibited pleading.
In its June 2, 2009 Resolution, the Court En Banc clarified its April 28, 2009 Resolution in this wise—
As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure which provides that: "No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by
the same party shall be entertained." Thus, a decision becomes final and executory after 15 days from receipt of the
denial of the first motion for reconsideration.
However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for reconsideration is granted by the Court, the
Court therefore allows the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. In such a case, the second motion for
reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading.
In the present case, the Court voted on the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent cities. In effect,
the Court allowed the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. Thus, the second motion for reconsideration
was no longer a prohibited pleading. However, for lack of the required number of votes to overturn the 18 November
2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, the Court denied the second motion for reconsideration in its 28 April
2009 Resolution.5
Then, in another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a vote of 6-4, 6 declared the Cityhood
Laws as constitutional.
On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-6, 7 resolved the Ad Cautelam Motion
for Reconsideration and Motion to Annul the Decision of December 21, 2009, both filed by petitioners, and the Ad
Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners-in-intervention Batangas City, Santiago City, Legazpi City,
Iriga City, Cadiz City, and Oroquieta City, reinstating the November 18, 2008 Decision. Hence, the aforementioned
pleadings.
Considering these circumstances where the Court En Banc has twice changed its position on the constitutionality of
the 16 Cityhood Laws, and especially taking note of the novelty of the issues involved in these cases, the Motion for
Reconsideration of the "Resolution" dated August 24, 2010 deserves favorable action by this Court on the basis of
the following cogent points:
1.
The 16 Cityhood Bills do not violate Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution.
Article X, Section 10 provides—
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
The tenor of the ponencias of the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution is that the
exemption clauses in the 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional because they are not written in the Local
Government Code of 1991 (LGC), particularly Section 450 thereof, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9009,
which took effect on June 30, 2001, viz.—
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. –a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a
component city if it has a locally generated annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least
One Hundred Million Pesos (₱100,000,000.00) for at least two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant
prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
xxxx
transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied)
Prior to the amendment, Section 450 of the LGC required only an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of at least ₱20,000,000.00 for the last two (2) consecutive years, based on 1991 constant
prices.
Before Senate Bill No. 2157, now R.A. No. 9009, was introduced by Senator Aquilino Pimentel, there were 57 bills
filed for conversion of 57 municipalities into component cities. During the 11th Congress (June 1998-June 2001), 33
of these bills were enacted into law, while 24 remained as pending bills. Among these 24 were the 16 municipalities
that were converted into component cities through the Cityhood Laws.
The rationale for the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 can be gleaned from the sponsorship speech of Senator Pimentel
on Senate Bill No. 2157, to wit—
Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, I would have wanted this bill to be included in the whole set of proposed
amendments that we have introduced to precisely amend the Local Government Code. However, it is a fact that
there is a mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities. Whereas in 1991, when the Local
Government was approved, there were only 60 cities, today the number has increased to 85 cities, with 41 more
municipalities applying for conversion to the same status. At the rate we are going, I am apprehensive that before
long this nation will be a nation of all cities and no municipalities.
It is for that reason, Mr. President, that we are proposing among other things, that the financial requirement, which,
under the Local Government Code, is fixed at P20 million, be raised to P100 million to enable a municipality to have
the right to be converted into a city, and the P100 million should be sourced from locally generated funds.
What has been happening, Mr. President, is, the municipalities aspiring to become cities say that they qualify in
terms of financial requirements by incorporating the Internal Revenue share of the taxes of the nation on to their
regularly generated revenue. Under that requirement, it looks clear to me that practically all municipalities in this
country would qualify to become cities.
It is precisely for that reason, therefore, that we are seeking the approval of this Chamber to amend, particularly
Section 450 of Republic Act No. 7160, the requisite for the average annual income of a municipality to be converted
into a city or cluster of barangays which seek to be converted into a city, raising that revenue requirement from ₱20
million to ₱100 million for the last two consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices. 8
While R.A. No. 9009 was being deliberated upon, Congress was well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of
several municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws, desiring to become component cities which
qualified under the ₱20 million income requirement of the old Section 450 of the LGC. The interpellation of Senate
President Franklin Drilon of Senator Pimentel is revealing, thus—
THE PRESIDENT. The Chair would like to ask for some clarificatory point.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT. This is just on the point of the pending bills in the Senate which propose the conversion of a
number of municipalities into cities and which qualify under the present standard.
We would like to know the view of the sponsor: Assuming that this bill becomes a law, will the Chamber apply the
standard as proposed in this bill to those bills which are pending for consideration?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Mr. President, it might not be fair to make this bill, on the assumption that it is approved,
retroact to the bills that are pending in the Senate conversion from municipalities to cities.
THE PRESIDENT. Will there be an appropriate language crafted to reflect that view? Or does it not become a policy
of the Chamber, assuming that this bill becomes a law tomorrow, that it will apply to those bills which are already
approved by the House under the old version of the Local Government Code and are now pending in the Senate?
The Chair does not know if we can craft a language which will limit the application to those which are not yet in the
Senate. Or is that a policy that the Chamber will adopt?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Mr. President, personally, I do not think it is necessary to put that provision because what
we are saying here will form part of the interpretation of this bill. Besides, if there is no retroactivity clause, I do not
think that the bill would have any retroactive effect.
THE PRESIDENT. So the understanding is that those bills which are already pending in the Chamber will not be
affected.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. These will not be affected, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 9
Clearly, based on the above exchange, Congress intended that those with pending cityhood bills during the 11th
Congress would not be covered by the new and higher income requirement of ₱100 million imposed by R.A. No.
9009. When the LGC was amended by R.A. No. 9009, the amendment carried with it both the letter and the intent of
the law, and such were incorporated in the LGC by which the compliance of the Cityhood Laws was gauged.
Notwithstanding that both the 11th and 12th Congress failed to act upon the pending cityhood bills, both the letter
and intent of Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by R.A. No. 9009, were carried on until the 13th Congress, when
the Cityhood Laws were enacted. The exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws are the express
articulation of that intent to exempt respondent municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.
Even if we were to ignore the above quoted exchange between then Senate President Drilon and Senator Pimentel,
it cannot be denied that Congress saw the wisdom of exempting respondent municipalities from complying with the
higher income requirement imposed by the amendatory R.A. No. 9009. Indeed, these municipalities have proven
themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their respective provinces. It is also acknowledged
that they were centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich havens of agricultural,
mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. In this regard, it is worthy to mention the
distinctive traits of each respondent municipality, viz—
Batac, Ilocos Norte – It is the biggest municipality of the 2nd District of Ilocos Norte, 2nd largest and most
progressive town in the province of Ilocos Norte and the natural convergence point for the neighboring towns to
transact their commercial ventures and other daily activities. A growing metropolis, Batac is equipped with amenities
of modern living like banking institutions, satellite cable systems, telecommunications systems. Adequate roads,
markets, hospitals, public transport systems, sports, and entertainment facilities. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No.
5941, introduced by Rep. Imee R. Marcos.]
El Salvador, Misamis Oriental – It is located at the center of the Cagayan-Iligan Industrial Corridor and home to a
number of industrial companies and corporations. Investment and financial affluence of El Salvador is aptly credited
to its industrious and preserving people. Thus, it has become the growing investment choice even besting nearby
cities and municipalities. It is home to Asia Brewery as distribution port of their product in Mindanao. The Gokongwei
Group of Companies is also doing business in the area. So, the conversion is primarily envisioned to spur economic
and financial prosperity to this coastal place in North-Western Misamis Oriental. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No.
6003, introduced by Rep. Augusto H. Bacullo.]
Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte – It is the largest of the eleven (11) municipalities in the province of Agusan del
Norte. It plays strategic importance to the administrative and socio-economic life and development of Agusan del
Norte. It is the foremost in terms of trade, commerce, and industry. Hence, the municipality was declared as the new
seat and capital of the provincial government of Agusan del Norte pursuant to Republic Act No. 8811 enacted into
law on August 16, 2000. Its conversion will certainly promote, invigorate, and reinforce the economic potential of the
province in establishing itself as an agro-industrial center in the Caraga region and accelerate the development of
the area. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3094, introduced by Rep. Ma. Angelica Rosedell M. Amante.]
Borongan, Eastern Samar – It is the capital town of Eastern Samar and the development of Eastern Samar will
depend to a certain degree of its urbanization. It will serve as a catalyst for the modernization and progress of
adjacent towns considering the frequent interactions between the populace. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No.
2640, introduced by Rep. Marcelino C. Libanan.]
Lamitan, Basilan – Before Basilan City was converted into a separate province, Lamitan was the most progressive
part of the city. It has been for centuries the center of commerce and the seat of the Sultanate of the Yakan people
of Basilan. The source of its income is agro-industrial and others notably copra, rubber, coffee and host of income
generating ventures. As the most progressive town in Basilan, Lamitan continues to be the center of commerce
catering to the municipalities of Tuburan, Tipo-Tipo and Sumisip. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 5786,
introduced by Rep. Gerry A. Salapuddin.]
Catbalogan, Samar – It has always been the socio-economic-political capital of the Island of Samar even during the
Spanish era. It is the seat of government of the two congressional districts of Samar. Ideally located at the crossroad
between Northern and Eastern Samar, Catbalogan also hosts trade and commerce activates among the more
prosperous cities of the Visayas like Tacloban City, Cebu City and the cities of Bicol region. The numerous banks
and telecommunication facilities showcases the healthy economic environment of the municipality. The preeminent
and sustainable economic situation of Catbalogan has further boosted the call of residents for a more vigorous
involvement of governance of the municipal government that is inherent in a city government. [Explanatory Note of
House Bill No. 2088, introduced by Rep. Catalino V. Figueroa.]
Bogo, Cebu – Bogo is very qualified for a city in terms of income, population and area among others. It has been
elevated to the Hall of Fame being a five-time winner nationwide in the clean and green program. [Explanatory Note
of House Bill No. 3042, introduced by Rep. Clavel A. Martinez.]
Tandag, Surigao del Sur – This over 350 year old capital town the province has long sought its conversion into a city
that will pave the way not only for its own growth and advancement but also help in the development of its
neighboring municipalities and the province as a whole. Furthermore, it can enhance its role as the province’s trade,
financial and government center. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 5940, introduced by Rep. Prospero A. Pichay,
Jr.]
Bayugan, Agusan del Sur – It is a first class municipality and the biggest in terms of population in the entire
province. It has the most progressive and thickly populated area among the 14 municipalities that comprise the
province. Thus, it has become the center for trade and commerce in Agusan del Sur. It has a more developed
infrastructure and facilities than other municipalities in the province. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 1899,
introduced by Rep. Rodolfo "Ompong" G. Plaza.]
Carcar, Cebu – Through the years, Carcar metamorphosed from rural to urban and now boast of its manufacturing
industry, agricultural farming, fishing and prawn industry and its thousands of large and small commercial
establishments contributing to the bulk of economic activities in the municipality. Based on consultation with multi-
sectoral groups, political and non-government agencies, residents and common folk in Carcar, they expressed their
desire for the conversion of the municipality into a component city. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3990,
introduced by Rep. Eduardo R. Gullas.]
Guihulngan, Negros Oriental – Its population is second highest in the province, next only to the provincial capital
and higher than Canlaon City and Bais City. Agriculture contributes heavily to its economy. There are very good
prospects in agricultural production brought about by its favorable climate. It has also the Tanon Strait that provides
a good fishing ground for its numerous fishermen. Its potential to grow commercially is certain. Its strategic location
brought about by its existing linkage networks and the major transportation corridors traversing the municipality has
established Guihulngan as the center of commerce and trade in this part of Negros Oriental with the first
congressional district as its immediate area of influence. Moreover, it has beautiful tourist spots that are being
availed of by local and foreign tourists. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3628, introduced by Rep. Jacinto V.
Paras.]
Tayabas, Quezon – It flourished and expanded into an important politico-cultural center in [the] Tagalog region. For
131 years (1179-1910), it served as the cabecera of the province which originally carried the cabecera’s own name,
Tayabas. The locality is rich in culture, heritage and trade. It was at the outset one of the more active centers of
coordination and delivery of basic, regular and diverse goods and services within the first district of Quezon
Province. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3348, introduced by Rep. Rafael P. Nantes.]
Tabuk, Kalinga – It not only serves as the main hub of commerce and trade, but also the cultural center of the rich
customs and traditions of the different municipalities in the province. For the past several years, the income of
Tabuk has been steadily increasing, which is an indication that its economy is likewise progressively growing.
[Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3068, introduced by Rep. Laurence P. Wacnang.]
Available information on Baybay, Leyte; Mati, Davao Oriental; and Naga, Cebu shows their economic viability, thus:
Covering an area of 46,050 hectares, Baybay [Leyte] is composed of 92 barangays, 23 of which are in the
poblacion. The remaining 69 are rural barangays. Baybay City is classified as a first class city. It is situated on the
western coast of the province of Leyte. It has a Type 4 climate, which is generally wet. Its topography is generally
mountainous in the eastern portion as it slopes down west towards the shore line. Generally an agricultural city, the
common means of livelihood are farming and fishing. Some are engaged in hunting and in forestall activities. The
most common crops grown are rice, corn, root crops, fruits, and vegetables. Industries operating include the
Specialty Products Manufacturing, Inc. and the Visayan Oil Mill. Various cottage industries can also be found in the
city such as bamboo and rattan craft, ceramics, dress-making, fiber craft, food preservation, mat weaving, metal
craft, fine Philippine furniture manufacturing and other related activities. Baybay has great potential as a tourist
destination, especially for tennis players. It is not only rich in biodiversity and history, but it also houses the campus
of the Visayas State University (formerly the Leyte State University/Visayas State College of Agriculture/Visayas
Agricultural College/Baybay National Agricultural School/Baybay Agricultural High School and the Jungle Valley
Park.) Likewise, it has river systems fit for river cruising, numerous caves for spelunking, forests, beaches, and
marine treasures. This richness, coupled with the friendly Baybayanos, will be an element of a successful tourism
program. Considering the role of tourism in development, Baybay City intends to harness its tourism potential.
(<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baybay City> visited September 19, 2008)
Mati [Davao Oriental] is located on the eastern part of the island of Mindanao. It is one hundred sixty-five (165)
kilometers away from Davao City, a one and a half-hour drive from Tagum City. Visitors can travel from Davao City
through the Madaum diversion road, which is shorter than taking the Davao-Tagum highway. Travels by air and sea
are possible, with the existence of an airport and seaport. Mati boasts of being the coconut capital of Mindanao if
not the whole country. A large portion of its fertile land is planted to coconuts, and a significant number of its
population is largely dependent on it. Other agricultural crops such as mango, banana, corn, coffee and cacao are
also being cultivated, as well as the famous Menzi pomelo and Valencia oranges. Mati has a long stretch of
shoreline and one can find beaches of pure, powder-like white sand. A number of resorts have been developed and
are now open to serve both local and international tourists. Some of these resorts are situated along the coast of
Pujada Bay and the Pacific Ocean. Along the western coast of the bay lies Mt. Hamiguitan, the home of the pygmy
forest, where bonsai plants and trees grow, some of which are believed to be a hundred years old or more. On its
peak is a lake, called "Tinagong Dagat," or hidden sea, so covered by dense vegetation a climber has to hike trails
for hours to reach it. The mountain is also host to rare species of flora and fauna, thus becoming a wildlife sanctuary
for these life forms. (<http://mati.wetpain.com/?t=anon> accessed on September 19, 2008.)
Mati is abundant with nickel, chromite, and copper. Louie Rabat, Chamber President of the Davao Oriental Eastern
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, emphasized the big potential of the mining industry in the province of Davao
Oriental. As such, he strongly recommends Mati as the mining hub in the Region.
(<http://www.pia.gov.ph/default.asp?m=12&sec=reader&rp=1&fi=p080115.htm&no.=9&date, accessed on
September 19, 2008)
Naga [Cebu]: Historical Background—In the early times, the place now known as Naga was full of huge trees locally
called as "Narra." The first settlers referred to this place as Narra, derived from the huge trees, which later simply
became Naga. Considered as one of the oldest settlements in the Province of Cebu, Naga became a municipality
on June 12, 1829. The municipality has gone through a series of classifications as its economic development has
undergone changes and growth. The tranquil farming and fishing villages of the natives were agitated as the
Spaniards came and discovered coal in the uplands. Coal was the first export of the municipality, as the Spaniards
mined and sent it to Spain. The mining industry triggered the industrial development of Naga. As the years
progressed, manufacturing and other industries followed, making Naga one of the industrialized municipalities in the
Province of Cebu.
Class of Municipality 1st class
Province Cebu
Distance from Cebu City 22 kms.
Number of Barangays 28
No. of Registered Voters 44,643 as of May 14, 2007
Total No. of Precincts 237 (as of May 14, 2007)
Ann. Income (as of Dec. 31, 2006) Php112,219,718.35 Agricultural, Industrial, Agro-Industrial, Mining
Product
(<http://www.nagacebu.com/index.php?option=com.content&view=article id=53:naga-facts-and-
figures&catid=51:naga-facts-and-figures&Itemid=75> visited September 19, 2008)
The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative power. Legislative power is the
authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. 10 The Constitution, as the expression
of the will of the people in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of
the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general, and comprehensive. The legislative
body possesses plenary powers for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage
and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except
as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects, and extends to
matters of general concern or common interest.11
Without doubt, the LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers. Congress has the power to alter
or modify it as it did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such power of amendment of laws was again exercised when
Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws. When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable
indicators of economic viability for the creation of local government units—income, population, and land area.
Congress deemed it fit to modify the income requirement with respect to the conversion of municipalities into
component cities when
it enacted R.A. No. 9009, imposing an amount of ₱100 million, computed only from locally-generated sources.
However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities from such a belatedly imposed modified
income requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very intent and thrust of the
LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy, especially accounting for these municipalities as engines for
economic growth in their respective provinces.
Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also true that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws amended R.A.
No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned
municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC
itself. For this reason, we reverse the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution on their
strained and stringent view that the Cityhood Laws, particularly their exemption clauses, are not found in the LGC.
2.
The Cityhood Laws do not violate Section 6, Article X and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Both the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution impress that the Cityhood Laws violate
the equal protection clause enshrined in the Constitution. Further, it was also ruled that Section 6, Article X was
violated because the Cityhood Laws infringed on the "just share" that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention shall
receive from the national taxes (IRA) to be automatically released to them.
Upon more profound reflection and deliberation, we declare that there was valid classification, and the Cityhood
Laws do not violate the equal protection clause.
As this Court has ruled, the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification, provided
that it: (1) rests on substantial distinctions; (2) is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) applies equally to all members of the same class. 12
The petitioners argue that there is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the
11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills, such that the mere pendency of a cityhood bill in
the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the
income requirement. This contention misses the point.
It should be recalled from the above quoted portions of the interpellation by Senate President Drilon of Senator
Pimentel that the purpose of the enactment of R.A. No 9009 was merely to stop the "mad rush of municipalities
wanting to be converted into cities" and the apprehension that before long the country will be a country of cities and
without municipalities. It should be pointed out that the imposition of the ₱100 million average annual income
requirement for the creation of component cities was arbitrarily made. To be sure, there was no evidence or
empirical data, such as inflation rates, to support the choice of this amount. The imposition of a very high income
requirement of ₱100 million, increased from ₱20 million, was simply to make it extremely difficult for municipalities to
become component cities. And to highlight such arbitrariness and the absurdity of the situation created thereby, R.A.
No. 9009 has, in effect, placed component cities at a higher standing than highly urbanized cities under Section 452
of the LGC, to wit—
Section 452. Highly Urbanized Cities. – (a) Cities with a minimum population of two hundred thousand (200,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office, and with the latest annual income of at least Fifty Million
Pesos (₱50,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the city treasurer, shall be classified as
highly urbanized cities.
(b) Cities which do not meet above requirements shall be considered component cities of the province in which they
are geographically located. (Emphasis supplied)
The ₱100 million income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009, being an arbitrary amount, cannot be conclusively
said to be the only amount "sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government
facilities and services and special functions
commensurate with the size of its population," per Section 713 of the LGC. It was imposed merely because it is
difficult to comply with. While it could be argued that ₱100 million, being more than ₱20 million, could, of course,
provide the essential government facilities, services, and special functions vis-à-vis the population of a municipality
wanting to become a component city, it cannot be said that the minimum amount of ₱20 million would be
insufficient. This is evident from the existing cities whose income, up to now, do not comply with the ₱100 million
income requirement, some of which have lower than the ₱20 million average annual income. Consider the
list14 below—
CITY AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME

1. Marawi City 5,291,522.10
2. Palayan City 6,714,651.77
3. Sipalay City 9,713,120.00
4. Canlaon City 13,552,493.79
5. Himamaylan City 15,808,530.00
6. Isabela City 16,811,246.79
7. Munoz City 19,693,358.61
8. Dapitan City 20,529,181.08
9. Tangub City 20,943,810.04
10. Bayawan City 22,943,810.04
11. Island Garden City of Samal 23,034,731.83
12. Tanjay City 23,723,612.44
13. Tabaco City 24,152,853.71
14. Oroquieta City 24,279,966.51
15. Ligao City 28,326,745.86
16. Sorsogon City 30,403,324.59
17. Maasin City 30,572,113.65
18. Escalante City 32,113,970.00
19. Iriga City 32,757,871.44
20. Gapan City 34,254,986.47
21. Candon City 36,327,705.86
22. Gingoog City 37,327,705.86
23. Masbate City 39,454,508.28
24. Passi City 40,314,620.00
25. Calbayog City 40,943,128.73
26. Calapan City 41,870,239.21
27. Cadiz City 43,827,060.00
28. Alaminos City 44,352,501.00
29. Bais City 44, 646,826.48
30. San Carlos City 46,306,129.13
31. Silay City 47,351,730.00
32. Bislig City 47,360,716.24
33. Tacurong City 49,026,281.56
34. Talisay City (Negros
52,609,790.00
Occidental)
35. Kabankalan City 53,560,580.00
36. Malaybalay City 54,423,408.55
37. La Carlota City 54,760,290.00
38. Vigan City 56,831,797.19
39. Balanga City 61,556,700.49
40. Sagay City 64,266,350.00
41. Cavite City 64,566,079.05
42. Koronadal City 66,231,717.19
43. Cotabato City 66,302,114.52
44. Toledo City 70,157,331.12
45. San Jose City 70,309,233.43
46. Danao City 72,621,955.30
47. Bago City 74,305,000.00
48. Valencia City 74,557,298.92
49. Victorias City 75,757,298.92
50. Cauayan City 82,949,135.46
51. Santiago City 83,816,025.89
52. Roxas City 85,397,830.00
53. Dipolog City 85,503,262.85
54. Trece Martires City 87,413,786.64
55. Talisay City (Cebu) 87,964,972.97
56. Ozamis city 89,054,056.12
57. Surigao City 89,960,971.33
58. Panabo City 91,425,301.39
59. Digos City 92,647,699.13
The undeniable fact that these cities remain viable as component cities of their respective provinces emphasizes the
arbitrariness of the amount of ₱100 million as the new income requirement for the conversion of municipalities into
component cities. This arbitrariness can also be clearly gleaned from the respective distinctive traits and level of
economic development of the individual respondent municipalities as above submitted.
Verily, the determination of the existence of substantial distinction with respect to respondent municipalities does not
simply lie on the mere pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. This Court sees the bigger picture.
The existence of substantial distinction with respect to respondent municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws is
measured by the purpose of the law, not by R.A. No. 9009, but by the very purpose of the LGC, as provided in its
Section 2 (a), thus—
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.—(a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals.
Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers,
authority, responsibilities and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the National
Government to the local government units.
Indeed, substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become component
cities of their respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and viability
of respondent municipalities to become the State’s partners in accelerating economic growth and development in
the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during
the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present. Truly, the urgent need to become a
component city arose way back in the 11th Congress, and such condition continues to exist.
Petitioners in these cases complain about the purported reduction of their "just share" in the IRA. To be sure,
petitioners are entitled to a "just share," not a specific amount. But the feared reduction proved to be false when,
after the implementation of the Cityhood Laws, their respective shares increased, not decreased. Consider the
table15 below—
1avvphi1
CY 2008 IRA
CY 2006 IRA
(Actual Release After
CITY (Before Implementation of
Implementation of Sixteen [16]
Sixteen [16] Cityhood Laws)
Cityhood Laws)
Bais 219,338,056.00 242,193,156.00
Batangas 334,371,984.00 388,871,770.00
Bayawan 353,150,158.00 388,840,062.00
Cadiz 329,491,285.00 361,019,211.00
Calapan 227,772,199.00 252,587,779.00
Calbayog 438,603,378.00 485,653,769.00
Cauayan 250,477,157.00 277,120,828.00
Gen. Santos 518,388,557.00 631,864,977.00
Gingoog 314,425,637.00 347,207,725.00
Himamaylan 248,154,381.00 277,532,458.00
Iloilo 358,394,268.00 412,506,278.00
Iriga 183,132,036.00 203,072,932.00
Legaspi 235,314,016.00 266,537,785.00
Ligao 215,608,112.00 239,696,441.00
Oroquieta 191,803,213.00 211,449,720.00
Pagadian 292,788,255.00 327,401,672.00
San Carlos 239,524,249.00 260,515,711.00
San
182,320,356.00 204,140,940.00
Fernando
Santiago 508,326,072.00 563,679,572.00
Silay 216,372,314.00 241,363,845.00
Surigao 233,968,119.00 260,708,071.00
Tacurong 179,795,271.00 197,880,665.00
Tagaytay 130,159,136.00 152,445,295.00
Tarlac 348,186,756.00 405,611,581.00
Tangub 162,248,610.00 180,640,621.00
Urdaneta 187,721,031.00 207,129,386.00
Victorias 176,367,959.00 194,162,687.00
Zamboanga 918,013,016.00 1,009,972,704.00
What these petitioner cities were stating as a reduction of their respective IRA shares was based on a computation
of what they would receive if respondent municipalities were not to become component cities at all. Of course, that
would mean a bigger amount to which they have staked their claim. After considering these, it all boils down to
money and how much more they would receive if respondent municipalities remain as municipalities and not share
in the 23% fixed IRA from the national government for cities.
Moreover, the debates in the Senate on R.A. No. 9009, should prove enlightening:
SENATOR SOTTO. Mr. President, we just want to be enlightened again on the previous qualification and the
present one being proposed. Before there were three…
SENATOR PIMENTEL. There are three requisites for a municipality to become a city. Let us start with the finance.
SENATOR SOTTO. Will the distinguished sponsor please refresh us? I used to be the chairman of the Committee
on Local Government, but the new job that was given to me by the Senate has erased completely my memory as far
as the Local Government Code is concerned.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes, Mr. President, with pleasure. There are three requirements. One is financial.
SENATOR SOTTO. All right. It used to be P20 million.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. It is P20 million. Now we are raising it to P100 million of locally generated funds.
SENATOR SOTTO. In other words, the P20 million before includes the IRA.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. No, Mr. President.
SENATOR SOTTO. It should not have been included?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. The internal revenue share should never have been included. That was not the intention
when we first crafted the Local Government Code. The financial capacity was supposed to be demonstrated by the
municipality wishing to become a city by its own effort, meaning to say, it should not rely on the internal revenue
share that comes from the government. Unfortunately, I think what happened in past conversions of municipalities
into cities was, the Department of Budget and Management, along with the Department of Finance, had included the
internal revenue share as a part of the municipality, demonstration that they are now financially capable and can
measure up to the requirement of the Local Government Code of having a revenue of at least P20 million.
SENATOR SOTTO. I am glad that the sponsor, Mr. President, has spread that into the Record because otherwise, if
he did not mention the Department of Finance and the Department of Budget and Management, then I would have
been blamed for the misinterpretation. But anyway, the gentleman is correct. That was the interpretation given to us
during the hearings.
So now, from P20 million, we make it P100 million from locally generated income as far as population is concerned.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. As far as population is concerned, there will be no change, Mr. President. Still 150,000.
SENATOR SOTTO. Still 150,000?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes.
SENATOR SOTTO. And then the land area?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. As to the land area, there is no change; it is still 100 square kilometers.
SENATOR SOTTO. But before it was "either/or"?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is correct. As long as it has one of the three requirements, basically, as long as it
meets the financial requirement, then it may meet the territorial requirement or the population requirement.
SENATOR SOTTO. So, it remains "or"?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. We are now changing it into AND.

SENATOR SOTTO. AND?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes.
SENATOR SOTTO. I see.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is the proposal, Mr. President. In other words…
SENATOR SOTTO. Does the gentleman not think there will no longer be any municipality that will qualify, Mr.
President?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. There may still be municipalities which can qualify, but it will take a little time. They will have
to produce more babies. I do not know—expand their territories, whatever, by reclamation or otherwise. But the
whole proposal is geared towards making it difficult for municipalities to convert into cities.
On the other hand, I would like to advert to the fact that in the amendments that we are proposing for the entire
Local Government Code, we are also raising the internal revenue share of the municipalities.
SENATOR SOTTO. I see.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. So that, more or less, hindi naman sila dehado in this particular instance.
SENATOR SOTTO. Well, then, because of that information, Mr. President, I throw my full support behind the
measure.
Thank you, Mr. President.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Thank you very much, Mr. President. (Emphasis supplied) 16
From the foregoing, the justness in the act of Congress in enacting the Cityhood Laws becomes obvious, especially
considering that 33 municipalities were converted into component cities almost immediately prior to the enactment
of R.A. No. 9009. In the enactment of the Cityhood Laws, Congress merely took the 16 municipalities covered
thereby from the disadvantaged position brought about by the abrupt increase in the income requirement of R.A.
No. 9009, acknowledging the "privilege" that they have already given to those newly-converted component cities,
which prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9009, were undeniably in the same footing or "class" as the respondent
municipalities. Congress merely recognized the capacity and readiness of respondent municipalities to become
component cities of their respective provinces.
Petitioners complain of the projects that they would not be able to pursue and the expenditures that they would not
be able to meet, but totally ignored the respondent municipalities’ obligations arising from the contracts they have
already entered into, the employees that they have already hired, and the projects that they have already initiated
and completed as component cities. Petitioners have completely overlooked the need of respondent municipalities
to become effective vehicles intending to accelerate economic growth in the countryside. It is like the elder siblings
wanting to kill the newly-borns so that their inheritance would not be diminished.
Apropos is the following parable:
There was a landowner who went out at dawn to hire workmen for his vineyard. After reaching an agreement with
them for the usual daily wage, he sent them out to his vineyard. He came out about midmorning and saw other men
standing around the marketplace without work, so he said to them, "You too go along to my vineyard and I will pay
you whatever is fair." They went. He came out again around noon and mid-afternoon and did the same. Finally,
going out in late afternoon he found still others standing around. To these he said, "Why have you been standing
here idle all day?" "No one has hired us," they told him. He said, "You go to the vineyard too." When evening came,
the owner of the vineyard said to his foreman, "Call the workmen and give them their pay, but begin with the last
group and end with the first." When those hired late in the afternoon came up they received a full day’s pay, and
when the first group appeared they thought they would get more, yet they received the same daily wage. Thereupon
they complained to the owner, "This last group did only an hour’s work, but you have paid them on the same basis
as us who have worked a full day in the scorching heat." "My friend," he said to one in reply, "I do you no injustice.
You agreed on the usual wage, did you not? Take your pay and go home. I intend to give this man who was hired
last the same pay as you. I am free to do as I please with my money, am I not? Or are you envious because I am
generous?"17
Congress, who holds the power of the purse, in enacting the Cityhood Laws, only sought the well-being of
respondent municipalities, having seen their respective capacities to become component cities of their provinces,
temporarily stunted by the enactment of R.A. No. 9009. By allowing respondent municipalities to convert into
component cities, Congress desired only to uphold the very purpose of the LGC, i.e., to make the local government
units "enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals," which is the very mandate
of the Constitution.
Finally, we should not be restricted by technical rules of procedure at the expense of the transcendental interest of
justice and equity. While it is true that litigation must end, even at the expense of errors in judgment, it is nobler
rather for this Court of last resort, as vanguard of truth, to toil in order to dispel apprehensions and doubt, as the
following pronouncement of this Court instructs:
The right and power of judicial tribunals to declare whether enactments of the legislature exceed the constitutional
limitations and are invalid has always been considered a grave responsibility, as well as a solemn duty. The courts
invariably give the most careful consideration to questions involving the interpretation and application of the
Constitution, and approach constitutional questions with great deliberation, exercising their power in this respect
with the greatest possible caution and even reluctance; and they should never declare a statute void, unless its
invalidity is, in their judgment, beyond reasonable doubt. To justify a court in pronouncing a legislative act
unconstitutional, or a provision of a state constitution to be in contravention of the Constitution x x x, the case must
be so clear to be free from doubt, and the conflict of the statute with the constitution must be irreconcilable, because
it is but a decent respect to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body by which any law is
passed to presume in favor of its validity until the contrary is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, in no
doubtful case will the judiciary pronounce a legislative act to be contrary to the constitution. To doubt the
constitutionality of a law is to resolve the doubt in favor of its validity. 18
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of the "Resolution" dated August 24, 2010, dated and filed on
September 14, 2010 by respondents Municipality of Baybay, et al. is GRANTED. The Resolution dated August 24,
2010 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Cityhood Laws—Republic Acts Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393,
9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491—are declared CONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURTBaguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176951 April 12, 2011
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treñas;
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Baybay, Province of Leyte; Municipality of Bogo, Province of
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 177499
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Lamitan, Province of Basilan; Municipality of Tabuk,
Province of Kalinga; Municipality of Bayugan, Province of Agusan del Sur; Municipality of Batac, Province
of Ilocos Norte; Municipality of Mati, Province of Davao Oriental; and Municipality of Guihulngan, Province
of Negros Oriental, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178056
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Cabadbaran, Province of Agusan del Norte; Municipality of
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
We consider and resolve the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners vis-à-vis the
Resolution promulgated on February 15, 2011.
To recall, the Resolution promulgated on February 15, 2011 granted the Motion for Reconsideration of the
respondents presented against the Resolution dated August 24, 2010, reversed the Resolution dated August 24,
2010, and declared the 16 Cityhood Laws — Republic Acts Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404,
9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491 — constitutional.
Now, the petitioners anchor their Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration upon the primordial ground that the Court
could no longer modify, alter, or amend its judgment declaring the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional due to such
judgment having long become final and executory. They submit that the Cityhood Laws violated Section 6 and
Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as the Equal Protection Clause.
The petitioners specifically ascribe to the Court the following errors in its promulgation of the assailed February 15,
2011 Resolution, to wit:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO PROMULGATE THE RESOLUTION OF 15

FEBRUARY 2011 BECAUSE THERE IS NO LONGER ANY ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY TO
SETTLE.
II. THE RESOLUTION CONTRAVENES THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND RELEVANT
SUPREME COURT ISSUANCES.
III. THE RESOLUTION UNDERMINES THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN ITS DISREGARD OF THE
PRINCIPLES OF RES JUDICATA AND THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY OF FINAL JUDGMENTS.
IV. THE RESOLUTION ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE SIXTEEN (16) CITYHOOD BILLS DO NOT
VIOLATE ARTICLE X, SECTIONS 6 AND 10 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
V. THE SIXTEEN (16) CITYHOOD LAWS VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE RIGHT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO A JUST SHARE IN THE NATIONAL
TAXES.
Ruling
Upon thorough consideration, we deny the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration for its lack of merit.
I.
Procedural Issues
With respect to the first, second, and third assignments of errors, supra, it appears that the petitioners assail the
jurisdiction of the Court in promulgating the February 15, 2011 Resolution, claiming that the decision herein had
long become final and executory. They state that the Court thereby violated rules of procedure, and the principles of
res judicata and immutability of final judgments.
The petitioners posit that the controversy on the Cityhood Laws ended with the April 28, 2009 Resolution denying
the respondents’ second motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the November 18, 2008 Decision for being a prohibited
pleading, and in view of the issuance of the entry of judgment on May 21, 2009.
The Court disagrees with the petitioners.
In the April 28, 2009 Resolution, the Court ruled:
By a vote of 6-6, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 31 March 2009 is DENIED for lack of merit.
The motion is denied since there is no majority that voted to overturn the Resolution of 31 March 2009.
The Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of 18 November 2008 is DENIED for being a prohibited
pleading, and the Motion for Leave to Admit Attached Petition in Intervention dated 20 April 2009 and the Petition in
Intervention dated 20 April 2009 filed by counsel for Ludivina T. Mas, et al. are also DENIED in view of the denial of
the second motion for reconsideration. No further pleadings shall be entertained. Let entry of judgment be made in
due course.
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. wrote a Dissenting Opinion, joined by Justices Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Renato
C. Corona, Minita Chico-Nazario, Teresita Leonardo-De Castro, and Lucas P. Bersamin. Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno and Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura took no part. Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing is on leave. 1
Within 15 days from receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution, the respondents filed a Motion To Amend Resolution
Of April 28, 2009 By Declaring Instead That Respondents’ "Motion for Reconsideration Of the Resolution Of March
31, 2009" And "Motion For Leave To File, And To Admit Attached ‘Second Motion For Reconsideration Of The
Decision Dated November 18, 2008’ Remain Unresolved And To Conduct Further Proceedings Thereon, arguing
therein that a determination of the issue of constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws upon a motion for
reconsideration by an equally divided vote was not binding on the Court as a valid precedent, citing the separate
opinion of then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Lambino v. Commission on Elections. 2
Thus, in its June 2, 2009 Resolution, the Court issued the following clarification of the April 28, 2009 Resolution, viz:
As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure which provides that: "No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by
the same party shall be entertained." Thus, a decision becomes final and executory after 15 days from receipt of the
denial of the first motion for reconsideration.
However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for reconsideration is granted by the Court, the
Court therefore allows the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. In such a case, the second motion for
reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading.
In the present case, the Court voted on the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent cities. In effect,
the Court allowed the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. Thus, the second motion for reconsideration
was no longer a prohibited pleading. However, for lack of the required number of votes to overturn the 18 November
2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, the Court denied the second motion for reconsideration in its 28 April
2009 Resolution.3
As the result of the aforecited clarification, the Court resolved to expunge from the records several pleadings and
documents, including respondents’ Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc.
The respondents thus filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009, asseverating that
their Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc. was not another motion for reconsideration of the
November 18, 2008 Decision, because it assailed the April 28, 2009 Resolution with respect to the tie-vote on the
respondents’ Second Motion For Reconsideration. They pointed out that the Motion To Amend Resolution Of April
28, 2009 etc. was filed on May 14, 2009, which was within the 15-day period from their receipt of the April 28, 2009
Resolution; thus, the entry of judgment had been prematurely made. They reiterated their arguments with respect to
a tie-vote upon an issue of constitutionality.
In the September 29, 2009 Resolution, 4 the Court required the petitioners to comment on the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 within 10 days from receipt.
As directed, the petitioners filed their Comment Ad Cautelam With Motion to Expunge.
The respondents filed their Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached "Reply to Petitioners’ ‘Comment Ad
Cautelam With Motion to Expunge’", together with the Reply.
On November 17, 2009, the Court resolved to note the petitioners’ Comment Ad Cautelam With Motion to Expunge,
to grant the respondents’ Motion for Leave to File and Admit Reply to Petitioners’ Comment Ad Cautelam with
Motion to Expunge, and to note the respondents’ Reply to Petitioners’ Comment Ad Cautelam with Motion to
Expunge.
On December 21, 2009, the Court, resolving the Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc. and voting
anew on the Second Motion For Reconsideration in order to reach a concurrence of a majority, promulgated its
Decision granting the motion and declaring the Cityhood Laws as constitutional, 5 disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, respondent LGUs’ Motion for Reconsideration dated June 2, 2009, their "Motion to Amend the
Resolution of April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead that Respondents’ ‘Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of
March 31, 2009’ and ‘Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision Dated November 18, 2008’ Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings," dated May 14,
2009, and their second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated November 18, 2008 are GRANTED. The
June 2, 2009, the March 31, 2009, and April 31, 2009 Resolutions are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The entry of
judgment made on May 21, 2009 must accordingly be RECALLED.
The instant consolidated petitions and petitions-in-intervention are DISMISSED. The cityhood laws, namely Republic
Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491
are declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
On January 5, 2010, the petitioners filed an Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration against the December 21,
2009 Decision.6 On the same date, the petitioners also filed a Motion to Annul Decision of 21 December 2009. 7
On January 12, 2010, the Court directed the respondents to comment on the motions of the petitioners. 8
On February 4, 2010, petitioner-intervenors City of Santiago, City of Legazpi, and City of Iriga filed their separate
Manifestations with Supplemental Ad Cautelam Motions for Reconsideration. 9 Similar manifestations with
supplemental motions for reconsideration were filed by other petitioner-intervenors, specifically: City of Cadiz on
February 15, 2010;10 City of Batangas on February 17, 2010; 11 and City of Oroquieta on February 24, 2010. 12 The
Court required the adverse parties to comment on the motions. 13 As directed, the respondents complied.
On August 24, 2010, the Court issued its Resolution reinstating the November 18, 2008 Decision. 14
On September 14, 2010, the respondents timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the "Resolution" Dated August
24, 2010.15 They followed this by filing on September 20, 2010 a Motion to Set "Motion for Reconsideration of the
‘Resolution’ dated August 24, 2010" for Hearing. 16 On November 19, 2010, the petitioners sent in their Opposition
[To the "Motion for Reconsideration of ‘Resolution’ dated August 24, 2010"]. 17 On November 30, 2010,18 the Court
noted, among others, the petitioners’ Opposition.
On January 18, 2011,19 the Court denied the respondents’ Motion to Set "Motion for Reconsideration of the
‘Resolution’ dated August 24, 2010" for Hearing.
Thereafter, on February 15, 2011, the Court issued the Resolution being now challenged.
It can be gleaned from the foregoing that, as the June 2, 2009 Resolution clarified, the respondents’ Second Motion
For Reconsideration was not a prohibited pleading in view of the Court’s voting and acting on it having the effect of
allowing the Second Motion For Reconsideration; and that when the respondents filed their Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 questioning the expunging of their Motion To Amend Resolution
Of April 28, 2009 etc. (which had been filed within the 15-day period from receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution),
the Court opted to act on the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 by directing the adverse
parties through its September 29, 2009 Resolution to comment. The same permitting effect occurred when the
Court, by its November 17, 2009 Resolution, granted the respondents’ Motion for Leave to File and Admit Reply to
Petitioners’ Comment Ad Cautelam with Motion to Expunge, and noted the attached Reply.
Moreover, by issuing the Resolutions dated September 29, 2009 and November 17, 2009, the Court: (a) rendered
ineffective the tie-vote under the Resolution of April 28, 2009 and the ensuing denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009 for lack of a majority to overturn; (b), re-opened the Decision of
November 18, 2008 for a second look under reconsideration; and (c) lifted the directive that no further pleadings
would be entertained. The Court in fact entertained and acted on the respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of June 2, 2009. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to deliberate anew on the respondents’ Second Motion
for Reconsideration and ended up with the promulgation of the December 21, 2009 Decision (declaring the Cityhood
Laws valid and constitutional).
It is also inaccurate for the petitioners to insist that the December 21, 2009 Decision overturned the November 18,
2008 Decision on the basis of the mere Reflections of the Members of the Court. To be sure, the Reflections were
the legal opinions of the Members and formed part of the deliberations of the Court. The reference in the December
21, 2009 Decision to the Reflections pointed out that there was still a pending incident after the April 28, 2009
Resolution that had been timely filed within 15 days from its receipt, 20 pursuant to Section 10, Rule 51,21 in relation to
Section 1, Rule 52,22 of the Rules of Court. Again, the Court did act and deliberate upon this pending incident,
leading to the issuance of the December 21, 2009 Decision (declaring the Cityhood Laws free from constitutional
infirmity). It was thereafter that the Court rendered its August 24, 2010 Resolution (reinstating the November 18,
2008 Decision), to correct which the respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration of the "Resolution" Dated August 24,
2010 was filed. And, finally, the Court issued its February 15, 2011 Resolution, reversing and setting aside the
August 24, 2010 Resolution.
It is worth repeating that the actions taken herein were made by the Court en banc strictly in accordance with the
Rules of Court and its internal procedures. There has been no irregularity attending or tainting the proceedings.
It also relevant to state that the Court has frequently disencumbered itself under extraordinary circumstances from
the shackles of technicality in order to render just and equitable relief. 23
On whether the principle of immutability of judgments and bar by res judicata apply herein, suffice it to state that the
succession of the events recounted herein indicates that the controversy about the 16 Cityhood Laws has not yet
been resolved with finality. As such, the operation of the principle of immutability of judgments did not yet come into
play. For the same reason is an adherence to the doctrine of res judicata not yet warranted, especially considering
that the precedential ruling for this case needed to be revisited and set with certainty and finality.
II.
Substantive Issues
The petitioners reiterate their position that the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6 and Section 10 of Article X of the
Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause, and the right of local governments to a just share in the national taxes.
The Court differs.
Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the
coverage of R.A. No. 9009. The apprehensions of the then Senate President with respect to the considerable
disparity between the income requirement of ₱20 million under the Local Government Code (LGC) prior to its
amendment, and the ₱100 million under the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 9009 were definitively articulated in
his interpellation of Senator Pimentel during the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157. The then Senate President
was cognizant of the fact that there were municipalities that then had pending conversion bills
during the 11th Congress prior to the adoption of Senate Bill No. 2157 as R.A. No. 9009, 24 including the
municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws. It is worthy of mention that the pertinent deliberations on Senate Bill
No. 2157 occurred on October 5, 2000 while the 11th Congress was in session, and the conversion bills were then
pending in the Senate. Thus, the responses of Senator Pimentel made it obvious that R.A. No. 9009 would not
apply to the conversion bills then pending deliberation in the Senate during the 11th Congress.
R.A. No. 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear
legislative intent to exempt the municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th
Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt
Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act
No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on Joint Resolution No. 29. Even so, the House of Representatives
readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as
Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress,25 and forwarded Joint Resolution No. 1 to the Senate for approval.
Again, the Senate failed to approve Joint Resolution No. 1.
At this juncture, it is worthwhile to consider the manifestation of Senator Pimentel with respect to Joint Resolution
No. 1, to wit:
MANIFESTATION OF SENATOR PIMENTEL
House Joint Resolution No. 1 seeks to exempt certain municipalities seeking conversion into cities from the
requirement that they must have at least P100 million in income of locally generated revenue, exclusive of the
internal revenue share that they received from the central government as required under Republic Act No. 9009.
The procedure followed by the House is questionable, to say the least. The House wants the Senate to do away
with the income requirement of P100 million so that, en masse, the municipalities they want exempted could now file
bills specifically converting them into cities. The reason they want the Senate to do it first is that Cong. Dodo Macias,
chair of the House Committee on Local Governments, I am told, will not entertain any bill for the conversion of
municipalities into cities unless the issue of income requirement is first hurdled. The House leadership therefore
wants to shift the burden of exempting certain municipalities from the income requirement to the Senate rather than
do it itself.
That is most unusual because, in effect, the House wants the Senate to pass a blanket resolution that would qualify
the municipalities concerned for conversion into cities on the matter of income alone. Then, at a later date, the
House would pass specific bills converting the municipalities into cities. However, income is not only the requirement
for municipalities to become cities. There are also the requirements on population and land area.
In effect, the House wants the Senate to tackle the qualification of the municipalities they want converted into cities
piecemeal and separately, first is the income under the joint resolution, then the other requirements when the bills
are file to convert specific municipalities into cities. To repeat, this is a most unusual manner of creating cities.
My respectful suggestion is for the Senate to request the House to do what they want to do regarding the
applications of certain municipalities to become cities pursuant to the requirements of the Local Government Code.
If the House wants to exempt certain municipalities from the requirements of the Local Government Code to become
cities, by all means, let them do their thing. Specifically, they should act on specific bills to create cities and cite the
reasons why the municipalities concerned are qualified to become cities. Only after the House shall have completed
what they are expected to do under the law would it be proper for the Senate to act on specific bills creating cities.
In other words, the House should be requested to finish everything that needs to be done in the matter of converting
municipalities into cities and not do it piecemeal as they are now trying to do under the joint resolution.
In my long years in the Senate, this is the first time that a resort to this subterfuge is being undertaken to favor the
creation of certain cities. I am not saying that they are not qualified. All I am saying is, if the House wants to pass
and create cities out of certain municipalities, by all means let them do that. But they should do it following the
requirements of the Local Government Code and, if they want to make certain exceptions, they can also do that too.
But they should not use the Senate as a ploy to get things done which they themselves should do.
Incidentally, I have recommended this mode of action verbally to some leaders of the House. Had they followed the
recommendation, for all I know, the municipalities they had envisioned to be covered by House Joint Resolution No.
1 would, by now – if not all, at least some – have been converted into cities. House Joint Resolution No. 1, the
House, in effect, caused the delay in the approval in the applications for cityhood of the municipalities concerned.
Lastly, I do not have an amendment to House Joint Resolution No. 1. What I am suggesting is for the Senate to
request the House to follow the procedure outlined in the Local Government Code which has been respected all
through the years. By doing so, we uphold the rule of law
and minimize the possibilities of power play in the approval of bills converting municipalities into cities. 26
Thereafter, the conversion bills of the respondents were individually filed in the House of Representatives, and were
all unanimously and
favorably voted upon by the Members of the House of Representatives. 27 The bills, when forwarded to the Senate,
were likewise unanimously approved by the Senate. 28 The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the
exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the clear
legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. Thereby, R.A.
No. 9009, and, by necessity, the LGC, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions being
embodied in the exemption clauses.
The petitioners further contend that the new income requirement of ₱100 million from locally generated sources is
not arbitrary because it is not difficult to comply with; that there are several municipalities that have already complied
with the requirement and have, in fact, been converted into cities, such as Sta. Rosa in Laguna (R.A. No 9264),
Navotas (R.A. No. 9387) and San Juan (R.A. No. 9388) in Metro Manila, Dasmariñas in Cavite (R.A. No. 9723), and
Biñan in Laguna (R.A. No. 9740); and that several other municipalities have supposedly reached the income of
₱100 million from locally generated sources, such as Bauan in Batangas, Mabalacat in Pampanga, and Bacoor in
Cavite.
The contention of the petitioners does not persuade.
As indicated in the Resolution of February 15, 2011, fifty-nine (59) existing cities had failed as of 2006 to post an
average annual income of ₱100 million based on the figures contained in the certification dated December 5, 2008
by the Bureau of Local Government. The large number of existing cities, virtually 50% of them, still unable to comply
with the ₱100 million threshold income five years after R.A. No. 9009 took effect renders it fallacious and probably
unwarranted for the petitioners to claim that the ₱100 million income requirement is not difficult to comply with.
In this regard, the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157 may prove enlightening, thus:
Senator Osmeña III. And could the gentleman help clarify why a municipality would want to be converted into a city?
Senator Pimentel. There is only one reason, Mr. President, and it is not hidden. It is the fact that once converted into
a city, the municipality will have roughly more than three times the share that it would be receiving over the internal
revenue allotment than it would have if it were to remain a municipality. So more or less three times or more.
Senator Osmeña III. Is it the additional funding that they will be able to enjoy from a larger share from the internal
revenue allocations?
Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Osmeña III. Now, could the gentleman clarify, Mr. President, why in the original Republic Act No. 7160,
known as the Local Government Code of 1991, such a wide gap was made between a municipality—what a
municipality would earn—and a city? Because essentially, to a person’s mind, even with this new requirement, if
approved by Congress, if a municipality is earning P100 million and has a population of more than 150,000
inhabitants but has less than 100 square kilometers, it would not qualify as a city.
Senator Pimentel. Yes.
Senator Osmeña III. Now would that not be quite arbitrary on the part of the municipality?
Senator Pimentel. In fact, Mr. President, the House version restores the "or". So, this is a matter that we can very
well take up as a policy issue. The chair of the committee does not say that we should, as we know, not listen to
arguments for the restoration of the word "or" in the population or territorial requirement.
Senator Osmeña III. Mr. President, my point is that, I agree with the gentleman’s "and", but perhaps we should bring
down the area. There are certainly very crowded places in this country that are less than 10,000 hectares—100
square kilometers is 10,000 hectares. There might only be 9,000 hectares or 8,000 hectares. And it would be unfair
if these municipalities already earning P100,000,000 in locally generated funds and have a population of over
150,000 would not be qualified because of the simple fact that the physical area does not cover 10,000 hectares.
Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, in fact, in Metro Manila there are any number of municipalities. San Juan is a
specific example which, if we apply the present requirements, would not qualify: 100 square kilometers and a
population of not less than 150,000.
But my reply to that, Mr. President, is that they do not have to become a city?
Senator Osmeña III. Because of the income.
Senator Pimentel. But they are already earning a lot, as the gentleman said. Otherwise, the danger here, if we
become lax in the requirements, is the metropolis-located local governments would have more priority in terms of
funding because they would have more qualifications to become a city compared to far-flung areas in Mindanao or
in the Cordilleras, or whatever.
Therefore, I think we should not probably ease up on the requirements. Maybe we can restore the word "or" so that
if they do not have the 100 square kilometers of territory, then if they qualify in terms of population and income, that
would be all right, Mr. President.
Senator Osmeña III. Mr. President, I will not belabor the point at this time. I know that the distinguished gentleman is
considering several amendments to the Local Government Code. Perhaps this is something that could be further
refined at a later time, with his permission.
So I would like to thank the gentleman for his graciousness in answering our questions.
Senator Pimentel. I also thank the gentleman, Mr. President. 29
The Court takes note of the fact that the municipalities cited by the petitioners as having generated the threshold
income of ₱100 million from local sources, including those already converted into cities, are either in Metro Manila or
in provinces close to Metro Manila. In comparison, the municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws are spread out
in the different provinces of the Philippines, including the Cordillera and Mindanao regions, and are considerably
very distant from Metro Manila. This reality underscores the danger the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 sought to
prevent, i.e., that "the metropolis-located local governments would have more priority in terms of funding because
they would have more qualifications to become a city compared to the far-flung areas in Mindanao or in the
Cordilleras, or whatever," actually resulting from the abrupt increase in the income requirement. Verily, this result is
antithetical to what the Constitution and LGC have nobly envisioned in favor of countryside development and
national growth. Besides, this result should be arrested early, to avoid the unwanted divisive effect on the entire
country due to the local government units closer to the National Capital Region being afforded easier access to the
bigger share in the national coffers than other local government units.
There should also be no question that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws belong to a class of
their own. They have proven themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their respective
provinces. They are and have been centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich
havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. In his speech delivered
on the floor of the Senate to sponsor House Joint Resolution No. 1, Senator Lim recognized such unique traits, 30 viz:
It must be noted that except for Tandag and Lamitan, which are both second-class municipalities in terms of income,
all the rest are categorized by the Department of Finance as first-class municipalities with gross income of at least
P70 million as per Commission of Audit Report for 2005. Moreover, Tandag and Lamitan, together with Borongan,
Catbalogan, and Tabuk, are all provincial capitals.
The more recent income figures of the 12 municipalities, which would have increased further by this time, indicate
their readiness to take on the responsibilities of cityhood.
Moreover, the municipalities under consideration are leading localities in their respective provinces. Borongan,
Catbalogan, Tandag, Batac and Tabuk are ranked number one in terms of income among all the municipalities in
their respective provinces; Baybay and Bayugan are number two; Bogo and Lamitan are number three; Carcar,
number four; and Tayabas, number seven. Not only are they pacesetters in their respective provinces, they are also
among the frontrunners in their regions – Baybay, Bayugan and Tabuk are number two income-earners in Regions
VIII, XIII, and CAR, respectively; Catbalogan and Batac are number three in Regions VIII and I, respectively; Bogo,
number five in Region VII; Borongan and Carcar are both number six in Regions VIII and VII, respectively. This
simply shows that these municipalities are viable.
Petitioner League of Cities argues that there exists no issue with respect to the cityhood of its member cities,
considering that they became cities in full compliance with the criteria for conversion at the time of their creation.
The Court considers the argument too sweeping. What we pointed out was that the previous income requirement of
₱20 million was definitely not insufficient to provide the essential government facilities, services, and special
functions vis-à-vis the population of a component city. We also stressed that the increased income requirement of
₱100 million was not the only conclusive indicator for any municipality to survive and remain viable as a component
city. These observations were unerringly reflected in the respective incomes of the fifty-nine (59) members of the
League of Cities that have still failed, remarkably enough, to be compliant with the new requirement of the ₱100
million threshold income five years after R.A. No. 9009 became law.
Undoubtedly, the imposition of the income requirement of ₱100 million from local sources under R.A. No. 9009 was
arbitrary. When the sponsor of the law chose the specific figure of ₱100 million, no research or empirical data
buttressed the figure. Nor was there proof that the proposal took into account the after-effects that were likely to
arise. As already mentioned, even the danger the passage of R.A. No. 9009 sought to prevent might soon become
a reality. While the Constitution mandates that the creation of local government units must comply with the criteria
laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to
the LGC despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to
promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant national growth.
Moreover, if we were now to adopt the stringent interpretation of the Constitution the petitioners are espousing, we
may have to apply the same restrictive yardstick against the recently converted cities cited by the petitioners, and
find two of them whose conversion laws have also to be struck down for being unconstitutional. The two laws are
R.A. No. 938731 and R.A. No. 9388,32 respectively converting the municipalities of San Juan and Navotas into highly
urbanized cities. A cursory reading of the laws indicates that there is no indication of compliance with the
requirements imposed by the LGC, for, although the two local government units concerned presumably complied
with the income requirement of ₱50 million under Section 452 of the LGC and the income requirement of ₱100
million under the amended Section 450 of the LGC, they obviously did not meet the requirements set forth under
Section 453 of the LGC, to wit:
Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status.—It shall be the duty of the President to declare a city as
highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in the
immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified
voters therein.
Indeed, R.A. No. 9387 and R.A. No. 9388 evidently show that the President had not classified San Juan and
Navotas as highly urbanized cities upon proper application and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters
therein. A further perusal of R.A. No. 9387 reveals that San Juan did not qualify as a highly urbanized city because it
had a population of only 125,558, contravening the required minimum population of 200,000 under Section 452 of
the LGC. Such non-qualification as a component city was conceded even by Senator Pimentel during the
deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157.
The petitioners’ contention that the Cityhood Laws violated their right to a just share in the national taxes is not
acceptable.
In this regard, it suffices to state that the share of local government units is a matter of percentage under Section
285 of the LGC, not a specific amount. Specifically, the share of the cities is 23%, determined on the basis of
population (50%), land area (25%), and equal sharing (25%). This share is also dependent on the number of
existing cities, such that when the number of cities increases, then more will divide and share the allocation for
cities. However, we have to note that the allocation by the National Government is not a constant, and can either
increase or decrease. With every newly converted city becoming entitled to share the allocation for cities, the
percentage of internal revenue allotment (IRA) entitlement of each city will decrease, although the actual amount
received may be more than that received in the preceding year. That is a necessary consequence of Section 285
and Section 286 of the LGC.
As elaborated here and in the assailed February 15, 2011 Resolution, the Cityhood Laws were not violative of the
Constitution and the LGC. The respondents are thus also entitled to their just share in the IRA allocation for cities.
They have demonstrated their viability as component cities of their respective provinces and are developing
continuously, albeit slowly, because they had previously to share the IRA with about 1,500 municipalities. With their
conversion into component cities, they will have to share with only around 120 cities.
Local government units do not subsist only on locally generated income, but also depend on the IRA to support their
development. They can spur their own developments and thereby realize their great potential of encouraging trade
and commerce in the far-flung regions of the country. Yet their potential will effectively be stunted if those already
earning more will still receive a bigger share from the national coffers, and if commercial activity will be more or less
concentrated only in and near Metro Manila.
III.
Conclusion
We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion
bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the LGC prescribed prior to
its amendment by R.A. No. 9009. Congress undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair
play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable
legislative intent and by duly recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress.
WHEREFORE, the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011) is denied
with finality.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176951 June 28, 2011
League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treñas; City of
Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treñas, in his personal capacity as
Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
Commission on Elections; Municipality of Baybay, Province of Leyte; Municipality of Bogo, Province of
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 177499
vs.
Commission on Elections; Municipality of Lamitan, Province of Basilan; Municipality of Tabuk, Province of
Kalinga; Municipality of Bayugan, Province of Agusan del Sur; Municipality of Batac, Province of Ilocos
Norte; Municipality of Mati, Province of Davao Oriental; and Municipality of Guihulngan, Province of Negros
Oriental, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178056
vs.
Commission on Elections; Municipality of Cabadbaran, Province of Agusan del Norte; Municipality of
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
We hereby consider and resolve:– (a) the petitioners’ Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of 12 April 2011, attached to which is a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 12 April 2011
dated April 29, 2011 (Motion For Reconsideration), praying that the resolution of April 12, 2011 be reconsidered and
set aside; and (b) the respondents’ Motion for Entry of Judgment dated May 9, 2011.
After thorough consideration of the incidents, we deny the Motion for Reconsideration and grant the Motion for
Entry of Judgment.
As its prayer for relief shows, the Motion for Reconsideration seeks the reconsideration, reversal, or setting aside of
the resolution of April 12, 2011.1 In turn, the resolution of April 12, 2011 denied the petitioners’ Ad Cautelam Motion
for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011).2 Clearly, the Motion for Reconsideration is really a
second motion for reconsideration in relation to the resolution dated February 15, 2011. 3
Another indicium of its being a second motion for reconsideration is the fact that the Motion for
Reconsideration raises issues entirely identical to those the petitioners already raised in their Ad Cautelam Motion
for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011). The following tabulation demonstrates the sameness
of issues between the motions, to wit:
Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam Motion for

of April 29, 2011 Reconsideration (of the
Decision dated 15 February
2011) dated March 8, 2011
I. With due respect, neither II. The
the Rules of Court nor Resolution Contravenes The
jurisprudence allows the 1997 Rules Of Civil
Honorable Court to take Procedure And Relevant
cognizance of Respondent Supreme Court Issuances.
Municipalities multiple
motions. By doing so, the
Honorable Court therefore
acted contrary to the Rules of
Court and its internal
procedures.
II. Contrary to the ruling of the I. The Honorable Court Has No
Honorable Court in the Jurisdiction To Promulgate The
Assailed Resolution, the Resolution Of 15 February
controversy involving the 2011, Because There is No
Sixteen (16) Cityhood Longer Any Actual Case Or
laws had long been Controversy To Settle.
resolved with finality; thus,
the principles of immutability III. The Resolution Undermines
of judgment and res The Judicial System In Its
judicata are applicable and Disregard Of The Principles
operate to deprive the Of Res Judicata And The
Honorable Court of Doctrine of Immutability of
jurisdiction. Final Judgments.
III. Contrary to the Assailed IV. The Resolution Erroneously
Resolution of the Honorable Ruled That The Sixteen (16)
Court, the sixteen (16) Cityhood Bills Do Not
Cityhood laws neither Violate Article X, Sections 6
repealed nor amended the and 10 Of The 1987
Local Government Code. The Constitution.
Honorable Court committed
an error when it failed to rule V. The Sixteen (16) Cityhood
in the Assailed Resolution Laws Violate The Equal
that the Sixteen (16) Protection Clause Of The
Cityhood Laws violated Constitution And The Right Of
Article X, Sections 6 and 10 Local Government Units To
of the Constitution. A Just Share In The National
Taxes.
IV. With due respect, the
constitutionality of R.A. 9009
is not an issue in this case. It
was error on the part of the
Honorable Court to consider
the law arbitrary.
That Issue No. IV (i.e., the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9009) appears in the Motion for Reconsideration but
is not found in the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011) is of no
consequence, for the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9009 is neither relevant nor decisive in this case, the reference to
said legislative enactment being only for purposes of discussion.
The Motion for Reconsideration, being a second motion for reconsideration, cannot be entertained. As to that,
Section 24 of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court is unqualified. The Court has firmly held that a second motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading,5 and only for extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only after an express
leave has been first obtained may a second motion for reconsideration be entertained. 6 The restrictive policy against
a second motion for reconsideration has been re-emphasized in the recently promulgated Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court, whose Section 3, Rule 15 states:
Section 3. Second motion for reconsideration. – The Court shall not entertain a second motion for
reconsideration, and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by the
Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration "in the
higher interest of justice" when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and
potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for
reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by
operation of law or by the Court’s declaration.
In the Division, a vote of three Members shall be required to elevate a second motion for reconsideration to the
Court En Banc.
We observe, too, that the prescription that a second motion for reconsideration "can only be entertained before the
ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Court’s declaration" even renders the
denial of the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration more compelling. As the resolution of April 12, 2011 bears
out,7 the ruling sought to be reconsidered became final by the Court’s express declaration. Consequently, the denial
of the Motion for Reconsideration is immediately warranted.
Still, the petitioners seem to contend that the Court had earlier entertained and granted the respondents’ own
second motion for reconsideration. There is no similarity between then and now, however, for the Court en banc
itself unanimously declared in the resolution of June 2, 2009 that the respondents’ second motion for
reconsideration was "no longer a prohibited pleading." 8 No similar declaration favors the petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration.
Finally, considering that the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration merely rehashes the issues previously put
forward, particularly in the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011), the
Court, having already passed upon such issues with finality, finds no need to discuss the issues again to avoid
repetition and redundancy.
Accordingly, the finality of the resolutions upholding the constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws now absolutely
warrants the granting of respondents’ Motion for Entry of Judgment.
WHEREFORE, the Court denies the petitioners’ Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of 12 April 2011 and the attached Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 12 April 2011; grants
the respondents’ Motion for Entry of Judgment dated May 9, 2011; and directs the Clerk of Court to forthwith issue
the Entry of Judgment in this case.
No further pleadings or submissions by any party shall be entertained.
SO ORDERED.

League of Cities v. COMELEC

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League of Cities v. COMELEC

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 176951 November 18, 2008

G.R. No. 177499 November 18, 2008

G.R. No. 178056 November 18, 2008

The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:

2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petitions.

Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law

Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria

Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution

Section 450 of the Local Government Code is Clear,

Deliberations of the 11th Congress on Unapproved Bills Inapplicable

Applicability of Equal Protection Clause

1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;

2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;

3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

G.R. No. 176951 December 21, 2009

G.R. No. 177499 December 21, 2009

G.R. No. 178056 December 21, 2009

This brings us to the substantive aspect of the case.

The Undisputed Factual Antecedents in Brief

After a circumspect reflection, the Court is disposed to reconsider.

Petitioners’ posture does not persuade.

The whole process I enumerated [span] three Congresses x x x.

G.R. No. 176951 August 24, 2010

G.R. No. 177499

G.R. No. 178056

A. Violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution

Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

B. Operative Fact Doctrine

C. Equal Protection Clause

D. Tie-Vote on a Motion for Reconsideration

Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court provides:

The En Banc Resolution of 26 January 1999 in A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC, reads:

A MOTION FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF A DECISION OR RESOLUTION OF THE COURT EN BANC OR OF A

We NOTE petitioners’ motion to annul the Decision of 21 December 2009.

G.R. No. 176951 February 15, 2011

G.R. No. 177499

G.R. No. 178056

For consideration of this Court are the following pleadings:

The 16 Cityhood Bills do not violate Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution.

Article X, Section 10 provides—

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes, Mr. President.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. These will not be affected, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 9

Class of Municipality 1st class

Distance from Cebu City 22 kms.

No. of Registered Voters 44,643 as of May 14, 2007

Total No. of Precincts 237 (as of May 14, 2007)

CITY AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME

SENATOR SOTTO. All right. It used to be P20 million.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. No, Mr. President.

SENATOR SOTTO. It should not have been included?

SENATOR SOTTO. Still 150,000?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes.

SENATOR SOTTO. And then the land area?

SENATOR SOTTO. But before it was "either/or"?

SENATOR SOTTO. So, it remains "or"?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. We are now changing it into AND.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes.

SENATOR SOTTO. I see.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is the proposal, Mr. President. In other words…