YUKIYA AMANO

Viewpoint

A Japanese View on Nuclear Disarmament

YUKIYA AMANO

Yukiya Amano is a career diplomat in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His previous postings have
Included Deputy Director General for Arms Control and Science Corporation from 1999 to 2001, Minister at the
Japanese Delegation to the Conference of Disarmament from 1994 to 1997, and Director of Nuclear Energy
Division from 1993 to 1994.

T
he world is changing very rapidly as it enters the
new century and the transitional era following the
end of the Cold War comes to an end. The events
of September 11, 2001, have made clear that a dramati-
cally new international security environment is now at
hand. Among other major changes from the past is that
the nuclear threat from Russia is no longer the highest
danger in the current security agenda.
In the disarmament field, however, negotiations have
been in gridlock for several years. (The term disarmament
here includes arms control, reductions in classes of arma-
ments, and their total elimination.) No negotiations, for
example, are taking place in the Conference on Disarma-
ment, in Geneva. Similarly, the Review Conference of the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Pro-
duction and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention or BWC) was suspended on
December 7, 2001, without adopting a final document,
and talks on developing a verification protocol for the
treaty are in disarray. Despite some intermittent good news,
such as the announcement of U.S. President George W.
Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin on planned
deep cuts in the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, one
month after that announcement, on December 13, 2001,
the United States formally declared that it would with-
draw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, a de-
cision whose impacts are still to be determined.
Looking back at history after World War II, disarma-
ment has always reflected the security trends of the era.
After the end of that war, the world was broken into two
camps, and a fierce arms race took place. At the begin-
ning of 1960s, the international community realized that
it could not continue the arms race endlessly and entered
a period of “competition and arms control.” The achieve-
ments during this period included the Partial Test Ban
Treaty (PTBT) in 1963; the Treaty on the Non-Prolif-
eration of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968; the BWC in
1972; the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 1972;
and the Final Document of the First Special Session of
the UN General Assembly devoted to disarmament
(SSOD I).2
This period came to an abrupt end when the former
Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979. After that
event, there were few significant achievements in disar-
mament for almost a decade. With the weakening and
dissolution of the former Soviet Union, however, the world
entered into the most productive era in the history of dis-
armament. The first signal of change was the conclusion
of the treaty between the United States and the Soviet
Union on the elimination of intermediate-range and short-

132 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2002

 YUKIYA AMANO
range missiles (INF Treaty) in 1987. Other major accom-
plishments during this period were the opening for signa-
ture and entry into force of the Chemical Weapons
Convention, in 1993 and 1997 respectively; the indefinite
extension of the NPT, in 1995; the opening for signature
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), in 1996;
and the completion of the Ottawa Treaty banning anti-
personal landmines in 1997.
The euphoria after the end of the Cold War was gradu-
ally replaced by complacency and immobility, however.
One reason for this stagnation was that the world after
the end of the Cold War was not as safe as people had
expected, and the approaches of countries in seeking to
address the new situation were deeply divided. New threats
have emerged, for example, as a result of the prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to countries
such as the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK) and
Iraq. The United States intends to deploy ballistic mis-
siles defense (BMD) to deal with these threats, but Rus-
sia and China are deeply concerned about the U.S.
initiative. Another reason for the deadlock in disarmament
is that the world has not yet adapted to the new reality
after the Cold War. The agenda now being used in the
Conference on Disarmament, in Geneva, for example, is
the one agreed to at the SSOD I in 1978, and the mode
for conducting business in the Conference is through con-
sultation among three groups—the Western Group, East-
ern Group, and Non-Aligned Group.3 In sum, disarmament
stalemated, and no meaningful progress has been made
for some five years.
If past experience can be applied to the current situa-
tion, the new security environment should shape a new
framework of security and disarmament. While that
framework has not yet taken clear shape, the activities in
the field of disarmament and security have become more
dynamic compared to the past several years. Even look-
ing only at the area of nuclear arms, the plans for deep
cuts newly announced by the United States and Russia
and their ongoing talks on this subject, together with the
U.S. announcement of its plans to withdraw from the ABM
Treaty and to deploy BMD, are events of great impor-
tance. As seen at the Preparatory Committee for the 2005
NPT Review Conference meeting in April 2002, interna-
tional interest in the CTBT remains strong, even though
the United States continues to oppose the pact.
Japan is one of the important players in the field of dis-
armament as a “middle ground voice” and can contribute
in delineating the new disarmament framework. Yet, its
The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2002
position and way of thinking on this subject do not seem
to be well understood in the international community. With
this background in mind, this paper tries to explain the
Japanese approach to disarmament. More precisely, this
viewpoint will explain the factors that Japan considers in
formulating its position on disarmament issues and will
then explain the Japanese view on three major items re-
lated to nuclear disarmament: the CTBT, deep cuts in
nuclear arsenals (including the elimination of nuclear weap-
ons), and BMD.
FACTORS CONSIDERED IN JAPANESE
DISARMAMENT DECISIONMAKING
When Japan makes decisions on a disarmament mea-
sure, it considers the humanitarian value and the security
implications of such a measure for Japan, the Asia Pacific
region, and the world. These two interests are not always
in conflict, but sometimes they do clash. In such cases,
the government of Japan must strike a balance between
them. How the Japanese government weighs these two
elements is difficult to specify in general terms, because
the balance depends on the issue at hand and on the un-
derlying security environment. In most cases, however,
both dimensions—humanitarian and security—have equal
importance for Japan. This principle might seem univer-
sal, seen in all countries, but such an interpretation would
be incorrect. For some countries, security considerations
are far more important than humanitarian objectives. For
others, it is the reverse.
Humanitarian Considerations
Early disarmament treaties were motivated by humani-
tarian concerns. The 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg,
for example, stated, “the employment of such arms (arms
which uselessly aggravate the suffering of disabled men,
or render their death inevitably) would be contrary to the
laws of humanity.” The countries represented at the 1899
International Peace Conference at The Hague, which
agreed to abstain from the use of bullets that expand or
flatten in the human body, were “inspired by the senti-
ments which found expression in the Declaration of St.
Petersburg.”
Humanitarian considerations unquestionably play a role
in decisionmaking on more recent disarmament policy.
The Ottawa Treaty of 1997 banning anti-personnel land
mines is the latest example of a treaty that is motivated
by humanitarian concerns. It goes without saying that
133
 YUKIYA AMANO
many governments, organizations, and citizens oppose
nuclear weapons, because they regard such weapons as
inhumane. For Japan, humanitarian considerations are a
very important motivation for pursuing disarmament. Japa-
nese public opinion expects the government to take initia-
tives to promote humanitarian goals through disarmament,
and the government has made disarmament one of the
pillars of Japanese diplomacy since the end of World War
II. In general, Japanese diplomacy is pragmatic, but in the
case of disarmament, the pursuit of humanitarian values
has been a key justification. Underpinning this orienta-
tion are values instilled in the Japanese education system,
the experience of World War II, and the tragedies in
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Security Considerations
As Japan is located in a region where tensions are very
high, the Japanese government needs to give proper con-
sideration to the security implications that a disarmament
measure has for Japan, the Asia Pacific region, and the
world. The nature of the threat and the Japanese concept
of security is as follows.
Increasing Threats from Proliferation
The proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles is one
of the serious causes of concern for Japan. In the past,
only a limited number of countries could fabricate such
weapons, but now many others can do so as well. The
rapid progress of science and technology is one of the rea-
sons. The information revolution made it possible for sci-
entists and engineers of any country to have access to
advanced knowledge and technology. Education has be-
come borderless, and those students who wish to acquire
knowledge and technology can study anywhere in the
world. The expansion of trade, both in volume and speed,
and easy access to dual purpose high-tech products have
made it possible to procure sophisticated equipment. There
have been repeated attempts to smuggle fissile materials
and other items that are necessary to fabricate WMD from
the states of the former Soviet Union. The brain drain of
scientists and engineers that were involved in the fabrica-
tion of WMD and ballistic missiles in the former Soviet
Union is a matter of concern. Under these conditions, the
proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles is not merely
a possibility in the future, but a contemporary reality.
134
In Japan, the threats posed by proliferation are felt quite
keenly. For example, the Japan Defense Agency White
Paper, 2001 Defense of Japan, states:
As North Korea is developing and deploying
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic mis-
siles, and also possesses large-scale special op-
erational forces, it is thought that it is continuing
to maintain and strengthen its so-called asym-
metric military forces. By acting in this way,
North Korea increases military tension over the
Korean Peninsula and its behavior constitutes
a serious destabilizing factor for the security of
the entire East Asian region, including Japan.4
Terrorism by Non-State Actors
The events of September 11, 2001, proved that large-
scale attacks by terrorists pose especially grave dangers.
In these events, terrorists passed the psychological bar-
rier of killing thousands of innocent people. Usama Bin
Laden, who claimed responsibility for these events, is
known to be seeking to inflict mass destruction on his
enemies, including through the use of nuclear weapons.
Terrorists can develop and use chemical weapons, as was
proven in the 1995 sarin attack in Japan by the Aum
Shinrikyo cult. The infrastructure of developed countries,
including nuclear power reactors, communication lines,
and urban facilities, is highly vulnerable to attack. In ad-
dition, deterrence does not work against terrorists, espe-
cially when they are prepared to sacrifice their lives. There
is no reason to believe that the successful campaign in
Afghanistan will resolve the threat of terrorist attacks. The
targets of terrorists are not limited to those in some small
group of countries, but include Japan.
Diminished Threat from Russia
The end of the Cold War, the dissolution of former
Soviet Union, and the new Russian orientation toward a
market economy and democracy led to declines in the
quantitative level and readiness of Russian military forces
during the 1990s. Russia seems to avoid confrontation with
and wishes to become a good partner of the United States
and its allies, judging from the cooperative attitude of
Russia in the war in Afghanistan, its announcement on
deep cuts in its nuclear weapons, and its restrained reac-
tion to the U.S. announcement of its planned withdrawal
from the ABM Treaty.
The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2002
 YUKIYA AMANO
These changes do not mean, however, that the strate-
gic threat from Russia has disappeared. Six thousand stra-
tegic nuclear warheads are currently deployed by Russia.
Even after the proposed reductions over the next decade,
Russia will probably retain roughly two thousand strate-
gic warheads. This force will be much smaller than the
ten thousand warheads Russia deployed in the early 1990s,
but it will still represent tremendous destructive power.
Russia must view the U.S. nuclear force in the same way.
Therefore, it is understandable that both the United States
and Russia plan to maintain their nuclear deterrents for
some time into the future.
Since the end of the Cold War, there have also been
changes in the military situation in the Russian Far East
region. The scale of Russian military forces there has de-
clined since 1990, and the current force level remains far
smaller than its historical peak. However, significant mili-
tary forces, including nuclear capabilities, still remain in
the region.5 China has promoted reform and open-door
policies centering on the introduction of a socialist market
economy, and, as a result, has been growing politically
and economically as a major regional power. Also, coun-
tries in the region have paid attention to Chinese move-
ments on the military front.6
Diplomacy and International Regimes Enhance
Security
In the Japanese view, diplomatic efforts, as well as de-
fense efforts, contribute to enhance national security.
Since the end of World War II, Japan has been endeavor-
ing to assure its security through its Self-Defense Force,
the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and diplomacy, in which
disarmament has played a significant role. Japan decided
not to use military capability as a means to resolve inter-
national conflicts, not to become a nuclear weapon state,
not to possess offensive weapons such as aircraft carri-
ers, not to export weapons, and not to enlarge its military
expenditures above a minimal level. In its diplomacy, Ja-
pan has made efforts to maintain good relations with all
countries, including its neighbors, and has extended assis-
tance to those countries with less economic means. At the
same time, Japan has urged other countries to promote
disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament. Japan’s
policy of not becoming a military power and promoting
disarmament has been one of the elements that helped to
assure its security.
International disarmament agreements also play an im-
portant role in the maintenance of peace and security. Some
The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2002
one hundred major disarmament treaties, rules, and com-
mitments have been made since the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury. It is much less costly to maintain peace and security
by law than to do so by force, because negotiations and
implementation are far less expensive than military op-
erations, both in monetary and human terms.
Despite these merits, international laws are not as ef-
fective as domestic ones, and there have been plenty of
acts of non-compliance. The non-compliance to the 1925
Geneva Protocol by Iraq, the alleged non-compliance to
the BWC by the former Soviet Union, and the non-
compliace to the NPT by Iraq and North Korea are only
some examples. However, non-compliance by a few is
not a sound reason to negate the value of laws that are
observed by many. Moreover, the existence of laws and
treaties makes it possible to identify wrongdoers; without
such rules, the world would be governed by the law of
jungle.
Arms control and nonproliferation treaties are not per-
fect, but a treaty like the NPT serves as a restraining in-
fluence on most states, which enhances global stability.
It also looks toward a long-term endpoint of restraint by
all countries, while the alternative—reliance solely on mili-
tary countermeasures—points toward long-term tension,
unpredictability, and turmoil.
CTBT, DEEP CUTS, AND MISSILE DEFENSE
Bearing this background in mind, it is possible to ap-
preciate more fully Japanese thinking on several key arms
control and nonproliferation issues of current concern.
This section will examine Japanese views on three lead-
ing issues, the CTBT, deep cuts in nuclear forces, and
missile defense.
The CTBT
The United States seems to be hardening its position
on the CTBT. On November 5, 2001, for example, the
United States voted against a Japanese-sponsored resolu-
tion submitted to the United Nations General Assembly
because of its language concerning the CTBT, which
“stressed” the importance of early entry into force of the
treaty.7 On the same day, the United States voted against
an even more innocuous procedural resolution calling for
placing the CTBT on the General Assembly agenda the
following year, a resolution that was adopted by a vote of
140-1.8 Similarly, the United States did not attend the
UN Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of
135
 YUKIYA AMANO
the CTBT that was held from November 11-13, 2002, in
New York. Separately, in a January 9, 2002, briefing on
the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), a U.S. Department
of Defense spokesperson made the point that Department
of Energy readiness to recommence nuclear testing should
be improved (to permit testing within one year rather than
three, the current readiness level). The briefer also un-
derscored that there was no change in Bush administra-
tion policy on nuclear testing, in that it opposes CTBT
ratification but will continue to adhere to a testing mora-
torium.9
On the other hand, the broader international commu-
nity, including Japan and other U.S. allies that are under
the U.S. nuclear umbrella, continues to support the CTBT.
In fact, delegates from 108 states, including 44 represen-
tatives at the ministerial level, attended the UN Confer-
ence on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT
and adopted a final document by a consensus on Novem-
ber 13, 2001. The final document urged states to main-
tain existing testing moratoria and called on states that have
not done so to sign and ratify the treaty “as soon as pos-
sible.”
Japan’s attitude towards the CTBT is firm and consis-
tent. Japan recognizes that the treaty has certain limita-
tions, but believes that on balance the CTBT will enhance
Japanese security and international stability. The princi-
pal elements of Japanese thinking on this subject are dis-
cussed below.
The CTBT and Nuclear Proliferation
The CTBT will help to curb the proliferation of nuclear
weapons, and, in particular, will restrain their technical
advancement, thereby supporting Japanese security inter-
ests. Although the view that the CTBT will help to curb
proliferation is widely shared internationally, it is a con-
tested issue in the United States. A March 2001 report
published by the National Institute for Public Policy, for
example, argues:
• Nations do not need to test to develop a “simple”
nuclear fission weapon.
• Most nations are already bound by the NPT not to
develop nuclear weapons. An additional treaty is redun-
dant.
• Those countries that are outside the NPT could refuse
to join the CTBT. 10
These points are true, in themselves, but do not tell the
whole story. First, countries may not need tests to de-
136
velop crude nuclear weapons, but without tests, they will
have difficulty in developing advanced nuclear warheads
that can be delivered by ballistic missiles.11 Whether a
nearby country has such an advanced nuclear weapon
capability makes a fundamental difference for a non-
nuclear weapon state like Japan. Japan has a substantial
interest in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons. It does not have its own means to deter and/or de-
fend against the threats posed by ballistic missiles equipped
with nuclear warheads. If a neighboring country develops
nuclear weapons and improves them so that they can be
delivered by ballistic missiles to the Japanese homeland,
the capability will pose a serious problem for Japan.12
Therefore, the entry into force of the CTBT, in conjunc-
tion with other measures, will advance Japanese security
interests.
Second, it is true that most states are prohibited from
developing nuclear weapons because they are parties to
the NPT. The CTBT, however, not only prohibits nuclear
tests, but also establishes an International Monitoring Sys-
tem to detect them, thereby helping to deter tests by any
state.
Third, it is true that those countries that are not parties
to the NPT could refuse to join the CTBT, but it should
not be assumed fatalistically that they will never join the
test ban. For example, Indian Prime Minister Shri Atal
Bahari Vajpayee has repeatedly stated that India will not
block the entry into force of the CTBT. Since India’s rati-
fication is essential to achieve this result, Vajpayee’s state-
ment indicates that India has not ruled out taking this step.
At this stage, it is premature to speculate whether certain
countries will join the CTBT or not, particularly if the
group of ratifying states continues to grow.
If the emergence of a new nuclear weapon state is one
concern, the re-emergence of the nuclear arms race among
existing nuclear weapon states is a second. Today any
nuclear weapon state can build up a significant nuclear
arsenal by enhancing the quality and/or increasing the
number of nuclear weapons it possesses.13 In order to
prevent this possibility, it is necessary to restrain both
paths, namely qualitative improvement and quantitative
increase. The CTBT, in conjunction with other measures,
could at least place an obstacle on the path to qualitative
improvement of nuclear weapons. The cessation of the
nuclear arms race is one of the fundamental objectives of
the NPT. Prevention of the re-emergence of the nuclear
arms race is the strong desire and in the security interests
The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2002
 YUKIYA AMANO
of the international community, including Japan. More-
over, the emergence of a competitor that has a significant
nuclear force would also be against the security interest
of the United States.
The CTBT and the NPT
The CTBT is an important mechanism for buttressing
the operation of the NPT: the entry into force of the
CTBT will strengthen the NPT, but the failure of the
CTBT may weaken it. The “Principles and Objectives
for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament” adopted
by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, re-
affirmed the support of the Conference for the full real-
ization and effective implementation of the NPT provisions
that cover nonproliferation, disarmament, and safe-
guards.14 More recently, the 2000 NPT Review Confer-
ence in its final document, called for the early entry into
force of the CTBT and endorsed many other measures
to strengthen the NPT, including strengthening the IAEA
safeguards and pursuing the universal acceptance by NPT
non-nuclear weapon states of the IAEA Model Additional
Protocol.15 If the United States continues to oppose to
the ratification of the CTBT, other countries may find a
good excuse not to implement other important commit-
ments contained in the 2000 Review Conference Final
Document, although Japan certainly will not take such a
position.
Moreover, the CTBT is an important issue in the NPT
Review process. As an example, the 1990 NPT Review
Conference failed to adopt a final document owing to dis-
agreement on the CTBT. Without the commitment to
conclude the CTBT by 1996, the indefinite extension of
the NPT might have been endangered. The CTBT will
continue to be an important issue at the 2005 NPT Re-
view Conference, and serious disagreement on this issue
will jeopardize the adoption of a final document. (The rules
of procedure of the review conference require consen-
sus.) Failure to adopt a final document or similar declara-
tion supporting the NPT at the 2005 Review Conference
would mean losing a chance to bolster the NPT and the
nonproliferation regime, more generally.
Finally, the United States is one of a small minority of
states that oppose the CTBT. Other countries whose rati-
fication is still required for the treaty to enter into force,
but which are known to have the greatest reservations are
Algeria, China, Colombia, Congo, North Korea, Egypt,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and Vietnam.16
The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2002
U.S. Concerns About Stockpile Reliability
While the Bush Administration fears that the CTBT
would adversely affect the U.S. nuclear deterrent, the
United States has a robust nuclear deterrent now, a so-
phisticated program to maintain the safety and reliability
of its nuclear arsenal, and would retain the right to with-
draw from the treaty if confronted by extraordinary events
that necessitated a resumption of nuclear testing. Some in
the United States argue that the CTBT would adversely
affect the U.S. nuclear deterrent. For example, the Na-
tional Institute of Public Policy contends that “ The CTBT
ban on nuclear testing would adversely impact the U.S.
nuclear deterrent in at least three ways, by:
• Denying use of the one sure tool of ascertaining nuclear
weapons reliability;
• Preventing safety upgrades; and
• Impeding U.S. nuclear weapon modernization.17
Among these points, the question of reliability seems
to be the most serious concern. U.S. Under Secretary of
State John Bolton, for example, declared in an August 14,
2001, interview that “concerns about the safety and reli-
ability of nuclear stockpile remain” and “if the reliability
of the deterrent itself came into question, then you’d have
a dramatic change in the structure of the world order, and
we want to be sure that doesn’t happen.”18
Other authoritative observers in the United States dis-
pute this view, however. General John Shalikashvili, for
example, stated in his January 5, 2001, review of the
CTBT (undertaken at the request of former President Bill
Clinton after the the U.S. Senate rejected the treaty), “In
my judgment, the challenges facing the Stockpile Stew-
ardship Program can be managed, and the safety and re-
liability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent can be maintained
indefinitely, so long as future administrations and Con-
gresses provide high standards of accountability and suf-
ficient resources to keep uncertainty as an acceptable
level.”19
As complex as these issues may be, it is possible to
offer some judgments. First, the United States apparently
believes it has a robust nuclear deterrent at the moment
and that it has been able to maintain that deterrent suc-
cessfully for the past ten years without additional tests.
While the new Nuclear Posture Review proposes the ac-
celeration of test preparedness by the Department of En-
ergy and reaffirms that the Bush administration opposes
the CTBT, the review also reaffirms that the administra-
tion will continue to adhere to the global nuclear testing
137
 YUKIYA AMANO
moratorium. Japan appreciates the moratorium and hopes
that the United States will continue to adhere to it, pend-
ing the entry into force of the CTBT. The fact that the
United States has not conducted tests since 1992 and con-
tinues to adhere to the moratorium is strong evidence that
the U.S. nuclear force remains in good shape at this time.
Otherwise the United States should have conducted tests
by now.
Second, although possibility of deterioration of reliabil-
ity because of aging cannot be ruled out, it will not come
as a bolt out of the blue.20 It is likely to take place gradu-
ally, over a long period of time, if at all. As the U.S. Stock-
pile Stewardship Program progresses, it will provide a
better understanding of the problems related to reliability,
improve the ability of the United States to predict when
and how such problems might emerge, and offer new ca-
pabilities for preventing and fixing such problems by means
other than tests. In the meantime, there are likely to be
changes in other dimensions of reliability and deterrence,
such as overall advances in technology, adjustments in
U.S. relationships with countries of concern, new roles
for nuclear and conventional weapons, revisions in the
offense-defense balance, and the like. Given these un-
certainties, it is premature to say that if the CTBT enters
into force, the possible deterioration of reliability will take
place in a manner that would undermine the U.S. deter-
rent. Time and successful implementation of the Stock-
pile Stewardship Program will provide better perspectives.
Third, from a legal point of view, a state party has the
right to withdraw from the CTBT. Should the CTBT en-
ter into force, and should a state party decide that extraor-
dinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty
have jeopardized its supreme interests, that state has the
right to withdraw from the CTBT. To be sure it would be
politically difficult for the United States to withdraw from
the CTBT, but it is not impossible. The United States has
decided to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, and the with-
drawal clause of that treaty is similar to that of the CTBT.
There were considerable disagreements in the United
States regarding this move and objections from Russia,
but after all was considered, the United States exercised
its sovereign right and decided to withdraw from the ABM
Treaty. What was possible with the ABM Treaty would
be possible with the CTBT.
CTBT Verification
Although the CTBT is criticized for not being verifi-
able, in fact, the International Monitoring System (IMS)
138
established by the treaty can detect nuclear explosions of
one kiloton and above and its effectiveness can be im-
proved if necessary, without seeking perfect detectability,
which does not seem sensible. What the IMS cannot do
is often highlighted, but it is also important to know what
the IMS can do. By the end of 2001, 164 states had signed
the CTBT, and 89 of those had ratified it.21 Site surveys
of monitoring facilities were almost completed, and in-
stallation had been completed in some 105 stations.22
When it is completed, the IMS primary seismic system
will provide three-station 90 percent detection thresholds
below 500 tons on all continents and below 200 tons for
all historic test sites in the Northern Hemisphere. The IMS
hydro-acoustic system will be able to detect explosions
with yields equivalent to a few pounds of dynamite in most
of the Southern oceans.23
That said, it is true that the international monitoring
system of the CTBT cannot detect very small nuclear
explosions. During the negotiation of the treaty, the nego-
tiators made the point that it is especially difficult to de-
tect the detonations that take place inside cavities, in soft
earth structures like sand, just above the ocean surface
under thunderstorms, or that take place simultaneously at
the same location. Technically it would have been pos-
sible to establish an IMS that is more effective than the
current one, but considering cost-effectiveness, the nego-
tiators agreed to the current level of the detectability.
Views are divided in the United States on the question
of how serious the inability to detect small explosions and
evasive tests may be. The Shalikashvili report states,
“Nuclear weapon states could not make a major qualita-
tive breakthrough without testing above several kilo-
tons.”24 The National Institute for Public Policy Report
says, “On the contrary, there are two tremendous mili-
tary advantages that could be obtained through clandes-
tine nuclear testing by Russia or China—advantages which
could undermine the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear
deterrent.”25
On balance, it would appear that while the IMS cannot
always detect a very small secret test, it is the best com-
promise from the point of cost- effectiveness. Moreover,
the effectiveness of the IMS can be improved after the
entry into force of the CTBT, but seeking absolute de-
tectability is not realistic.
Even without any modification, the CTBT and the IMS
may function as a deterrent to prevent small tests. The
IMS may be able to detect a small secret test when the
The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2002
 YUKIYA AMANO
conditions are favorable or when camouflage efforts by
the violator do not work as effectively as planned. While
the IMS cannot always detect a secret small test, other
means such as human intelligence, disclosure by internal
informers, and satellite imagery may do so. In short, there
is no guarantee that a small secret test will never be de-
tected. Moreover, a violation of the CTBT is likely to be
treated very seriously by the international community and
to trigger painful consequences for the violator. Thus, the
risk of secret tests being detected and of a violator facing
the grave consequences should work as a deterrent against
such testing.
In addition, the argument that small undetected tests
can have dire consequences for the United States does
not correspond well with recent experience. The reason
is that if the IMS and other measures cannot detect a small
secret test by definition, a state cannot know whether an
adversary is conducting them or not. If one state believes
that such tests offer great military advantage to an adver-
sary, the state cannot but assume that its adversary is con-
ducting them, a conclusion that would then drive a state
to conduct at least similar tests itself, to offset the advan-
tages that its adversary had gained. Yet with the ability to
rely only on verification systems that are weaker than those
that will be in place under the CTBT, the United States
has not conducted any nuclear tests for a decade—strong
evidence that, at least to date, small secret tests by poten-
tial adversaries have not been a major source of concern
for Washington.
If one believes that the current level of detectability is
unsatisfactory, one can propose to improve it rather than
reject the CTBT. In principle, the effectiveness of the IMS
depends on the money invested, while agreement would
be needed for any changes. During the negotiations on
the treaty, several options were proposed to establish a
more effective IMS than the current one. For example,
China proposed to include satellites and electro-magnetic
pulse monitoring as elements of the IMS, and Russia pro-
posed to include around-the-clock airborne monitoring.
These measures were believed to enhance the effective-
ness of the monitoring system, but negotiating parties did
not support them because they are expensive. Improving
the effectiveness of the IMS is achievable, if countries
agree to spend more money and to amend the treaty after
its entry into force. At the UN Conference on Facilitating
the Entry into Force of the CTBT in November 2001,
former Russian Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev sug-
gested that Russia is interested in “considering the possi-
The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2002
bility to develop additional verification measures for
nuclear test range going far beyond the existing provisions”
once the CTBT enters into force. Sergeyev said such
measures could include “exchange of geological data” or
installation of additional sensors.” 26
Finally, it is impossible to obtain absolute detectability.
As is true for everything in real life, reducing the risk of
failure to zero or guaranteeing 100 percent success is im-
possible. In case of the IMS, the real problem is to achieve
a reasonably satisfactory level of detectability. During the
negotiations on the CTBT, the parties found it reasonable
to draw the line at one kiloton and above. Should that no
longer be acceptable, it would be more productive to dis-
cuss what must be done to reach an acceptable level rather
than to reject the treaty altogether.
Japan and the U.S. Nuclear Umbrella
Reflecting its historical experience, Japan has been pro-
moting the CTBT as one of its highest disarmament and
nonproliferation priorities, a stance that is not in contra-
diction with Japan receiving protection under the U.S.
nuclear umbrella.27 While most observers abroad believe
that Japan can fabricate nuclear weapons, Japan is firmly
committed not to become a nuclear weapon state.28 Japa-
nese public opinion is strongly against nuclear weapons.
Nor would becoming a nuclear weapon state serve Japa-
nese economic, diplomatic, and security interests. Japa-
nese non-nuclear weapon policy is solidly established
through adherence to international treaties, codifying do-
mestic laws, and policy declarations at the highest level.
In the international arena, Japan has consistently advo-
cated nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. In par-
ticular, the CTBT has been one of the highest priorities
for Japan. The Japanese public has a strong resentment
against nuclear testing, and the strong protests triggered
in Japan by the resumption of nuclear tests by France and
China in 1995 are still a fresh memory.
Some may argue that Japanese dependence on the
nuclear umbrella of the United States on the one hand
and pursuing the CTBT on the other hand is a contradic-
tion. It should first be recalled, however, that the funda-
mental reason for Japan being under the U.S. nuclear
umbrella is to ensure Japanese national security. There-
fore, the question that should be addressed is whether the
entry into force of the CTBT will have a negative impact
on the security of Japan or on that of the Asia-Pacific re-
gion more generally. In fact, it is not the entry into force
139
 YUKIYA AMANO
of the CTBT, but rather its failure to enter into force that
will adversely impact the Japanese security, because of
the chain reaction of nuclear test resumption this could
trigger and its ensuing consequences. If the CTBT does
not enter into force, sooner or later nuclear explosive tests
will be resumed. If one country resumes tests, most prob-
ably the other nuclear weapon states will do the same.
Japan is surrounded by three nuclear weapon states,
and the resumption of tests by each country may adversely
affect Japanese security in a different way. Although, for
example, Russia is not perceived today as a threat to Ja-
pan, during the Cold War, the former Soviet Union was
such a threat; if Russia resumed tests and strengthened
its nuclear forces the situation would look all too much
like a return to the past. China is a nuclear weapon state,
but most Japanese do not view it as a threat for now. If
China resumed nuclear tests and strengthened its nuclear
forces, however, it would raise concerns in Japan, and
bilateral relations could deteriorate. The United States is
the closest ally of Japan, but its resumption of nuclear
tests could cause widespread protest in Japan. Such dis-
cord between the two countries would not be beneficial
for the strength of their alliance. It is difficult to specu-
late on how serious the problem might become, because
it would depend very much on the situation in which the
resumption of tests took place. In any event, however, it
would adversely affect the security environment in the
Asia-Pacific region.
Finally, it should be noted that Japan believes that en-
try into force of the CTBT will provide Japan concrete
security benefits by restraining the nuclear arsenals of both
the larger and the lesser nuclear powers. In contrast, many
Japanese observers believe that the possible erosion of
confidence in the technical reliability of the U.S. nuclear
umbrella is far more speculative—and they point out that
several safeguards are available to address the reliability
question, including the right of the United States to with-
draw from the CTBT if its supreme national interests are
jeopardized. Entry into force of the CTBT would thus
offer new security benefits for Japan without damaging
long-standing security guarantees. In sum, while recog-
nizing the arguments of CTBT critics, Japan remains
strongly committed to the treaty.
Deep Cuts in Nuclear Forces
On November 13, 2001, U.S. President Bush an-
nounced that over the next ten years, the United States
would reduce its strategic nuclear arsenal to between 1,700
140
and 2,200 deployed strategic warheads. Russian President
Putin responded that Russia would reduce its forces to
1,500 to 2,200 deployed strategic warheads. The U.S.
Nuclear Posture Review submitted to Congress on Janu-
ary 9, 2002, gave some details of the reductions prom-
ised by President Bush. Talks between the United States
and Russia are now taking place on the reductions prom-
ised by the two presidents.
Japan welcomes the deep cuts announced by Presidents
Bush and Putin. Two points are of particular salience. One
is that this step is the first concrete move to downsize
U.S. and Russian nuclear forces since the early 1990s. In
the intervening years, there were attempts to accelerate
such reductions, but they were not realized. In 1993, for
example, the United States and Russia agreed to reduce
deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,000 to 3,500 in
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II, but the
ratification of the pact by the United States in 1997 and
by Russia in 2000 were conditional, and, as a result, the
treaty has not yet entered into force. In 1997, Presidents
Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to start negotiations on START
III to reduce deployed strategic warheads to 2,000-2,500,
but the negotiations never began. Thus, the recent an-
nouncement on deep cuts by Presidents Bush and Putin
is the first concrete move since the early 1990s.
The second point of importance to Japan is that the
new Nuclear Posture Review seems to advocate a decreas-
ing role for nuclear forces in the U.S. deterrent strategy.
In a letter to Congress, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld wrote that the review establishes a “New Triad,”
to replace the preexisting U.S. nuclear triad consisting of
land-based missiles, submarine-based missiles, and stra-
tegic bomber forces. The new triad, wrote Rumsfeld, con-
sists of offensive strike systems (both nuclear and
conventional); defenses (both active and passive); and a
revitalized defense infrastructure that will provide new
capabilities in a timely fashion to meet emerging threats.”
Rumsfeld continued, “The establishment of the New Triad
can both reduce our dependence on nuclear weapons and
improve our ability to deter attack in face of proliferating
WMD capabilities.”29
Reducing the dependence on nuclear force is a sensible
option for the United States, because nuclear deterrence
is not effective to deter some threats, such as that posed
by terrorists; because the United States has the strongest
comparative advantage in its conventional forces; and
because there is a need to distribute U.S. resources in the
most efficient way. It will be necessary to follow future
The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2002
 YUKIYA AMANO
developments carefully, but the reduction in dependence
on nuclear weapons meets the commitment made in the
final document adopted by the 2000 NPT Review
Conference30 and Japanese disarmament policy objectives.
Although it is possible to identify shortcomings in the
planned deep cuts announced by the United States, they
represent realistic progress for the coming ten years. Some
have criticized the deep cuts announced by President Bush,
and the January 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, stressing
the following points.31
• The downloaded U.S. warheads removed from op-
erational deployment will be preserved for what the U.S.
Department of Defense calls the “responsive force.”
Some warheads removed from strategic delivery ve-
hicles will be dismantled, but the others will be main-
tained in the stockpile. These warheads in “the hedge,”
whose exact numbers will not be disclosed, can be up-
loaded onto the delivery vehicles in a short period of
time. This approach undercuts the principles of “trans-
parency and irreversibility” in nuclear arms reductions.
• The deep cuts do not address the issue of non-strate-
gic nuclear weapons. Thousands of non-strategic weap-
ons are held in the U.S. and Russian arsenals and none
are subject to bilateral monitoring or controls under
existing treaties or agreements. These systems pose a
serious danger of theft or diversion by terrorists or other
countries.
• Despite the dramatic rhetoric, the triad of land-based,
sea-based, and aircraft-based strategic delivery systems
from the Cold War period is to be retained, as is the
doctrine for nuclear use. The U.S. nuclear triad will
not differ significantly from the force structure estab-
lished under the Clinton administration. President Bush
has repeatedly said the United States and Russia are
no longer enemies, but the U.S. nuclear arms are still
balanced against those of Russia.
• Reducing to 1,700-2,200 deployed strategic warheads
is equivalent to the reduction to 2,000-2,500 consid-
ered by the Clinton administration, because the Bush
administration has changed certain counting rules. Pre-
vious administrations counted all strategic warheads that
were deployed as forces in the active inventory, even
if the systems on which they were deployed were in
the process of refurbishment, but the Bush administra-
tion counts only “operationally deployed warheads,” ex-
cluding systems undergoing major overhaul. For these
reasons, reduction to 1,700-2,200 is not a deeper cut
than the one agreed in 1997 as the goal of START III.
The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2002
• The reductions could be deeper in size and faster in
pace.
There is considerable merit to these arguments, par-
ticularly those concerning “the hedge” and non-strategic
nuclear weapons. It would be far better if warheads now
intended to be preserved for the responsive force were
dismantled and the fissile materials removed from them
burned as nuclear power plant fuel or otherwise made
unusable for military purposes. Without such measures,
these warheads might be uploaded in a short period of
time or used to make new bombs, creating the risk of a
destabilizing arms race in a time of crisis. In the past, the
United States destroyed a large number of its own
decomissioned warheads, and helped Russia to do the
same. If the United States discontinues the destruction of
warheads removed from service, Russia will lose the in-
centive to destroy its own. Such a decision would increase
the Russian stockpile, for which enhanced security mea-
sures are known to be needed and, in turn, increase the
risk of theft or diversion by terrorists or other countries.
Moreover, if the warheads in “the hedge,” both in the
United States and Russia, were uploaded again, the trend
of reduction in nuclear weapons would be reversed. It
should be recalled that the 2000 NPT Review Confer-
ence agreed that “the principle of irreversibility to apply
to nuclear disarmament, and to nuclear and other related
arms control and reduction measures.”32
Concerning non-strategic nuclear weapons, which are
not addressed in the planning for deep cuts, the United
States is estimated to possess over 1,600 tactical nuclear
weapons, while Russia is estimated to possess some 4,000
to 5,000 of these weapons, although estimates are uncer-
tain and conflicting. As these weapons are more suscep-
tible to theft and unauthorized or accidental use than
deployed strategic systems, this issue needs to be addressed
in the future.33
That said, it must be recognized that what may be de-
sirable is not always achievable in a limited amount of
time. All things considered, it is understandable that the
Bush administration has taken a cautious approach to re-
ducing the U.S. strategic nuclear force to 1,700-2,200 de-
ployed warheads by 2012. This is not “too little, too slow,”
because it will take time to implement disarmament, the
more so if warheads are to be destroyed and fissile mate-
rial made unusable for weapons, as argued above. It should
be recalled that the deployed strategic nuclear arsenals of
the United States and Russia have been decreasing in size
141
 YUKIYA AMANO
respectively, from their peak in the late 1980s to around
10,000 warheads for each in the early 1990s, and to the
current level of 6,000 each. From an historical and realis-
tic point of view, around 2,000 deployed strategic war-
heads in 2012 would not be too bad.
U.S.-Russian deep cuts should serve as an example for
other nuclear weapon states to reduce their nuclear forces.
The U.S., Russia, France, and the United Kingdom have
been reducing their nuclear forces since the end of the
1980s. But China is believed to be modernizing its nuclear
force, and India and Pakistan, which conducted nuclear
weapon tests in 1998, might increase theirs depending on
the regional situation. As explained earlier, two measures
should be taken to slow the nuclear arms race and de-
crease dependence on nuclear forces: curbing qualitative
improvement of nuclear weapons and increases in their
quantity. The CTBT is a measure to prevent qualitative
improvement. To limit the quantity of nuclear weapons,
several options are possible, including legally binding agree-
ments, political arrangements, and unilateral measures.
Probably it is best not to be too ambitious at the begin-
ning of such an effort, but to start with a modest step.
Such an approach would be for the United States and
Russia to urge all other nuclear weapon states that have
not yet done so to downsize their nuclear arsenals. Now
that these two countries have decided to reduce their
nuclear forces by two-thirds, they should have the moral
high ground to influence other nuclear weapon states.
Japanese Position on the Elimination of
Nuclear Weapons
Japan recognizes the role of nuclear weapons in the
current world, and is under the nuclear umbrella of the
United States, but it urges all nuclear weapon states to
reduce their nuclear forces, with the objective of the total
elimination of nuclear weapons. Japan has been pursuing
the goal of creating a safe world without nuclear weap-
ons, based on its historical experience of nuclear tragedy.
In particular, Japan has been pursuing this objective by
proposing a practical and realistic approach to nuclear dis-
armament.
Nevertheless, nuclear deterrence still continues to play
an important role in maintaining security in the contem-
porary world. Japan is located in a region where tension
is high, and it would be highly imprudent for Japan to
depend solely on the good will of other countries to en-
sure its security. Moreover, leaving Japan without cred-
ible means of defense would create a power vacuum that
142
could cause further instability in Asia-Pacific region. That
is the reason why Japan places itself under the nuclear
umbrella of the United States.
In this regard, some may argue that the Japanese policy
of calling on the nuclear-weapon states to reduce their
arsenals on the one hand and being under the U.S. nuclear
umbrella on the other is a contradiction. In the Japanese
view, however, these approaches to national security are
not in contradiction, just as Japan does not see its support
for the CTBT and simultaneous reliance on U.S. nuclear
security guarantees to be a contradiction.
First of all, one should recognize that the reduction in
nuclear weapons itself does not necessarily undermine
deterrence and security. There are historical examples
showing that a properly designed and well-implemented
reductions in nuclear forces do not undermine security
but, rather, enhances it. A leading example is the 1987
INF Treaty, which eliminated an entire category of nuclear
weapons and contributed to enhanced security in Europe.
The United States and Russia (and, previously, the So-
viet Union) have been reducing their nuclear forces since
the end of the 1980s, but their security and that of the
world has not been compromised by this reduction. It goes
without saying that a hasty and/or poorly planned reduc-
tion that does not pay appropriate attention to the secu-
rity needs of the parties involved may undermine their
security. It is easy to imagine such a case, but it is hard to
find one, historically, because countries actively protect
their interests in negotiations on such important matters.
The point is that the reduction in nuclear weapons is not
a problem in itself; how to do it is the problem. Being
well aware of the potential negative implications of re-
ductions, Japan has never made an unrealistic proposal,
but always fostered a practical and realistic approach that
does not jeopardize security for itself or others.
Proposals such as “the elimination of nuclear weapons
with a time bound framework” or a “nuclear abolition
treaty” may undermine security, because one cannot fore-
see the security environment in which abolition will take
place. For this reason, Japan does not support these ideas,
even though it shares the objective of the elimination of
the nuclear weapons.
The Japanese proposal is different from these. It sets
the elimination of nuclear weapon as a goal, but recom-
mends concrete and practical steps leading to that goal.
In its latest UN General Assembly resolution entitled, “A
Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,” sub-
mitted in 2001, Japan proposed 24 concrete steps towards
The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2002
 YUKIYA AMANO
this objective. They include the early ratification of the
CTBT, the commencement of Fissile Material Cut-Off
Treaty negotiations, deeper reductions in nuclear weap-
ons by all nuclear weapon states, strengthened efforts to
prevent and curb the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, safe custody and physical protection against
the theft of sensitive materials, and promotion of the rati-
fication by NPT non-nuclear weapon states of the Addi-
tional Protocol to their IAEA safeguards agreements. In
the Japanese view, all of all these steps are concrete mea-
sures that work towards the goal of the total elimination
of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, as noted earlier, the
United States voted against this resolution because it was
opposed to the language on the CTBT, but the United
States does not oppose to the Japanese approach to the
elimination of the nuclear weapons itself. Notably, the
United States voted in favor of a Japanese-sponsored reso-
lution in 2000 that had a similar content to that of 2001.
Quite often, opponents to the elimination of nuclear
weapons argue that it is not feasible in the foreseeable
future to create a safe world without nuclear weapons.
But this stance is contradictory to the observation that the
future is so uncertain. Moreover, one should not confuse
the attainability of a goal with the desirability of setting a
goal. It is definitely possible to make concrete steps to-
ward that goal even now. The reduction in nuclear forces
just announced by the United States and Russia, or pro-
moting the additional protocols to IAEA safeguards
agrrments are some practical steps leading to that goal.
Ballistic Missile Defense
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) can mean two things
in the Japanese context: one is BMD that the United States
is pursuing; the other is BMD that Japan may or may not
introduce in Japan. Japan and the United States are closely
consulting each other in this area. 34
U.S. BMD
The official Japanese position on U.S. BMD can be
summarized in three sentences. Japan shares the recogni-
tion with the United States that the proliferation of ballis-
tic missiles is causing a serious threat to U.S. security. It
expresses understanding that the United States is consid-
ering a missile defense program. It also hopes that the is-
sue will be dealt with in a manner conducive to the
improvement of international security environment, includ-
ing in the areas of arms control and disarmament.
The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2002
First, Japan shares the sense of threat with the United
States, because Japanese security is affected by ballistic
missiles. According to 2001 Defense of Japan, published
by the Japanese Defense Agency, North Korea has long
been suspected of developing nuclear weapons. The is-
sue of suspected North Korean development of nuclear
weapons affects not just the security of Japan; in terms
of the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, it
is a crucial matter for the entire international community.
It is believed that North Korea has been producing and
deploying Scud-B missiles and their variant Scud-C mis-
siles, and exporting these ballistic missiles to countries in
the Middle East and elsewhere since the mid-1980s. North
Korea is thought to have embarked on the development
of long-range ballistic missiles, starting with Nodong and
others, by the 1990s. In 1993, it carried out a missile test
over the Sea of Japan, and that missile is likely to have
been a Nodong. The Nodong is thought to have a range
of about 1,300 km and is able to reach almost all of Ja-
pan. North Korea is also believed to have been working
on the development of a longer-range missile, the Taepo
Dong-1, and to be in the process of developing the Taepo
Dong-2. Taken together with its suspected nuclear weap-
ons program, ballistic missile development and deploy-
ment by North Korea constitutes a destabilizing factor not
only for the Asia-Pacific region, but also for the entire
international community, prompting strong concerns.35
Second, Japan views the ABM Treaty as essentially a
matter between the United States and Russia, while fully
recognizing that it has implications for the security of the
international community. Based on this thinking, Japan
abstained on the UN resolution on the ABM Treaty spon-
sored by Russia in 2000 and 2001. It hoped that the United
States and Russia would intensify their talks on this issue,
which they actually did, to find a mutually satisfactory
solution. It turned out that the United States announced
its withdrawal from the treaty on December 13, 2001.
Thanks to the intensified talks, the negative impact seems
to have been held to a minimum.
Third, BMD can affect disarmament both positively and
negatively. Theoretically, it has a potential for diminish-
ing the role of offense by increasing that of defense, and
Japan hopes that it would function in this way. On the
other hand, BMD may disturb the disarmament process.
Russia and China may strengthen their nuclear arsenals
as a response to the U.S. decision to withdraw from the
ABM Treaty and its future deployments of BMD. But,
insofar as the United States can demonstrate that BMD is
143
 YUKIYA AMANO
clearly targeted only against the threat from countries of
concern, Russia and China do not have a strong case for
strengthening their nuclear forces. Seeing developments
after the U.S. decision to withdraw from ABM Treaty,
the reaction from these countries has been relatively re-
strained. But it is premature to judge the future course of
events. It is a welcoming sign that the United States is
conducting a strategic dialogue with China. But Japan
hopes that this dialogue will not end with the recognition
by the United States that China should consider itself free
to strengthen its nuclear forces to compensate for BMD.
Finally the United States does not seem to be moving
toward an open-ended deployment of BMD, but rather
trying to deal with the strategic threat it faces, by the re-
duction of nculear weapons and by the maintenance of
an appropriate deterrent. Japan welcomes this course of
action and hopes that the reductions will further improve
relations between the United States, Russia, and China.
Japanese BMD
The Japanese government decided in 1999 to conduct
cooperative research with the United States on the Navy
Theater-Wide Defense system. However, the government
of Japan has not yet reached the point of deciding whether
or not to introduce BMD. This decision is an extremely
important one for Japan, and it will be taken at the high-
est political level at an appropriate time, after considering
technical, financial, security, diplomatic, and other fac-
tors.
From the defense point of view, Japan is concerned
about the threat posed by the ballistic missiles, as explained
earlier. The Japan Defense Agency makes interesting points
on this issue. Its report, 2001 Defense of Japan states,
“BMD is an important issue for Japan’s defense policy,
which is exclusively defense oriented” and “Japan has
continued its BMD study to date, with the understanding
that it is necessary to make efforts to tackle the issue in-
dependently, since BMD is purely a defensive measure
and thus well suited for its defense policy.”36 From the
diplomatic point of view, it is important to take up this
issue in the talks between Japan and China that are cur-
rently taking place, because China has concerns about the
eventual introduction of BMD in Japan. Through the talks
thus far, China seems to have understood that the even-
tual introduction of BMD by Japan will not affect China’s
strategic nuclear force. Yet China continues to have con-
cerns that a future Japanese BMD might adversely im-
144
pact Chinese missile capability in the context of its rela-
tions with Taiwan. Further talks are needed to eliminate
this concern, but whatever decision Japan may take, Japa-
nese BMD will have the sole objective of defending Ja-
pan.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has sought to explain the Japanese position
on a number of key nonproliferation and disarmament is-
sues, based on the author’s familiarity with official think-
ing on these matters. Stated simply, the main objectives
of Japanese disarmament policy are to promote the cause
of disarmament, as much as possible, while carefully paying
attention not to unravel security and stability in the Asia-
Pacific region and the world.
In the field of nuclear disarmament, Japan urges nuclear
weapon states to take concrete steps to come closer to a
world without nuclear weapons, but Japan does not ad-
vocate measures that may undermine its security or inter-
national security more broadly. Some criticize the Japanese
position as too conciliatory toward the nuclear weapon
states, but this argument misses the mark. For several
decades, Japan has been urging the nuclear weapon states
to agree to the CTBT, even when they have been reluc-
tant to do so. In recent years, Japan has firmly protested
against nuclear tests by France, China, India, and Paki-
stan, even though all of them are very important coun-
tries for Japan. Others criticize the Japanese position as
too idealistic. In fact, Japan is very realistic. Japan recog-
nizes the role of nuclear weapons in the current world. It
has expressed its understanding of the American missile
defense program at a time when almost all other coun-
tries criticized it. Japan, moreover, has never supported
unrealistic approaches to the abolition of nuclear weap-
ons, even though it shares this objective.
From the earlier discussion, it is clear that the main
characteristics of the Japanese disarmament policy are
balance between idealism and realism. As happens quite
often in our daily lives, extreme views attract attention
and get the spotlight. Yet, the role of sound middle-ground
views should not be underestimated in dealing with sensi-
tive issues such as nuclear disarmament. Japan can con-
tribute, in cooperating with both nuclear weapon states
and non-nuclear weapon states, to promote the cause of
nuclear disarmament without undermining security rela-
tionships.
The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2002
 YUKIYA AMANO
1
The views expressed here are strictly personal, and do not represent those of
the Japanese Government.
2 19
The SSOD I is formally named, “The Tenth Special Session of the General
Assembly.” The meeting adopted a final document that is considered, “the
Bible in disarmament.” The names of treaties and agreements are taken from
Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control: A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements, (Oslo:
PRIO, 1994; London, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994).
3
China does not belong to any of these groups, but works as a group consist-
ing of one country.
4
Japan Defense Agency, 2001 Defense of Japan (Tokyo, 2001), p. 34.
5 22
Ibid., p. 42.
6
Ibid., p. 27.
7 23
The related paragraph of the Japanese-sponsored resolution from 2001 is as
follows: “[The General Assembly Stresses] 3.(a) the importance and urgency
of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in
accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force
of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as well as a moratorium on
nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending en-
try into force of the Treaty.”
8
The procedural rule of the UN First Main Committee and the General Assem-
bly is to adopt resolutions by the simple majorities, rather than by consensus.
9
Walter Pincus, “U.S. to Cut Arsenal to 3,800 Warheads,” Washington Post,
January 9, 2002, p. 10.
10
Kathleen Bailey, The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: An Update on the
Debate (Fairfax, VA: National Institute of Public Policy, March, 2001). <http://
www.nipp.org/Adobe/CTBT%20Update.pdf>
11
In his January 5, 2001, report addressing concerns raised during the Senate’s
deliberations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, General John M.
Shalikashvili, acting as Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of
State, stated: “From a technical standpoint, it is true that a state could have
some degree of confidence that an unsophisticated fission device would work
without testing it, as the United States did with the bomb used against
Hiroshima...The main technical constraints that the Test Ban Treaty places on
nuclear weapon development involve the vertical progression from first-gen-
eration fission designs to more advanced fission weapons….” John M.
Shalikashvili, Findings and Recommendations Concerning the Comprehen-
sive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, (Washington, DC: United States Department of
State, January 2001), pp. 6-7. Other analysts have argued: “Nuclear testing is
necessary for the development of sophisticated, new types of nuclear war-
heads. Although crude nuclear devices can be produced without testing,
nuclear warheads small enough to be delivered by missiles would require
nuclear test explosions.” See Rebecca Johnson and Daryl G. Kimball, “Briefing
Paper on the Status and International Security Value of the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban,” Arms Control Association, September 24, 2001, p. 1, <http:/
/www.armscontrol.org/subject/ctbt/ctbtbrief01.asp>.
12
In this regard, it is important to note the disclosure by the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency that “[t]he Intelligence Community judged in the mid-
1990s that North Korea had produced one, [or] possibly two, nuclear weap-
ons, although the North has frozen plutonium production activities at
Yongbyong in accordance with the Agreed Framework of 1994.” National
Intelligence Council, “Foreign Missile Developments and Ballistic Missile
Threats through 2015,” unclassified summary of the December 2001 National
Intelligence Estimate, (Washington, DC, January, 2001, <http://
www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/031102witness.htm>
13
Historically, nuclear weapon states have done both.
14
“Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,”
NPT/CONF.1995/L.5, <http://www.mcis.soton.ac.uk/Bb2secC.pdf>
15
According to the NPT, its parties are to hold a review conference every five
years. In that conference, the parties review the operation of the treaty and
agree on specific objectives for advancing the purposes of the treaty in the
coming years. The conclusions of the parties gathered at the review confer-
ences are reflected in the final documents of each conference, which are adopted
by consensus.
16
The ratification of the 44 countries, which in 1996 possessed nuclear power
or research reactors, is required for entry into force of the CTBT.
17
Bailey, The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
18
United States Department of State, “Interview: Under Secretary John Bolton
The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2002
on U.S. Arms Control Policy,” Washington File, August 14, 2001, < http://
usinfo.state.gov/products/washfile/>.
Shalikashvili, Findings and Recommendations, p. 19.
20
Ibid. On this point, the General Shalikashvili states, “Few nuclear weapon
experts view sudden catastrophic failure of the nuclear deterrence more than a
remote theoretical possibility.”
21
Anthony H. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Global
Nuclear Balance: A Quantitative and Arms Control Analysis, (Washington,
D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 4, 2001),
<http://www.csis.org/burke/mb/nuclear.pdf>.
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, Press Release, “Com-
prehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—Five Years On,” September 24, 2001.
Shalikashvili, Findings and Recommendations, p. 12.
24
Ibid, p. 14.
25
Bailey, The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
26
ITAR-TASS, “Russia May Offer Extra Control on Nuclear Testing Grounds,”
November 11, 2001; in FBIS Document CEP20011111000088.
27
During the negotiations, there was a long and heated debate about whether
the CTBT is a disarmament treaty or a nonproliferation treaty. The compromise
was the language in the preamble that reads, “Recognizing that the cessation
of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by
constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weap-
ons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons,
constitutes an effective measure for nuclear disarmament and nonprolifera-
tion in all its aspects.” The general sense of the negotiators was that the CTBT
has both characters.
28
This view is not held by the Japanese government. As it has never tried to
develop nuclear weapons since the end of World War II, it is not possible to
say whether Japan can fabricate nuclear weapons or not.
29
Letter of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to the U.S. Congress on the
2002 Nuclear Posture Review, January 9, 2002, p. 1, <http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/Jan2002/d20020109npr.pdf >.
30
“A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the
risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their
total elimination” was agreed to by the Conference. Report of the 2000 Re-
view Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons. (New York, April 24 -May 19, 2000). Copies available through
the United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library.
31
For commentary prior to and after the announcement of the reductions, see
Hans M. Kristensen, “The Unruly Hedge: Cold War Thinking at the Crawford
Summit,” Arms Control Today 31 (December, 2001), <http://www.armscontrol.
org/act/2001_12/kristensennov01.asp>; Ivo H. Daalder and James Lindsay,
“A New Agenda for Nuclear Weapons,” Brookings Institution, January 9,
2002, <http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb94.pdf>; and Richard
Sokolsky, “Nuclear Underachievers,” Washington Post, January 17, 2002.
32
Report of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
33
Alistair Miller and Brian Alexander, Uncovered Nukes: Arms Control and
the Challenge of Tactical Nuclear Weapons, (Washington, D.C.: Fourth Free-
dom Forum, November 30, 2001).
34
The Japanese position on BMD in early 2002 was as follows: (1) The Gov-
ernment of Japan (GOJ) shares the recognition with the United States that the
proliferation of ballistic missiles is causing a serious threat to our security.
(2) The GOJ expresses the understanding that the United States is considering
the missile defense program, while making various diplomatic efforts to ad-
dress the proliferation of ballistic missiles. (3) The GOJ welcomes President
Bush’s reference to further cuts in nuclear weapons in his recent speech. (4)
Japan and the United States are conducting cooperative research on ballistic
missile defense technologies. As such bilateral cooperation is important for
the security of Japan, we will continue to cooperate on the research. (5) The
GOJ hopes that the missile defense issue will be dealt with in a manner condu-
cive to the improvement of the international security environment, including
in the areas of arms control and disarmament, and welcomes the United States’
renewed announcement of conducting close consultation on this issue with
allies, and such other interested states as Russia and China.
35
Japan Defense Agency, 2001 Defense, pp. 37-39.
36
Ibid., pp. 183-184.
145