Challenges and Opportunities

Lt Gen ® Asad Durrani

That they go together is by now amongst those Chinese words of wisdom, which
have so often been quoted that they have lost their sheen. Even then, since the
latest excitement in the Himalayas is so quintessentially Chinese; has followed so
soon on the heels of what Trump called the Chinese Virus; and has alerted us to
yet another threat to our Chinese Corridors – it should still make us think about
the trials and tribulations that come in its wake.

As the contours of this crisis were unravelling, we obviously had to reflect over
the earlier Himalayan Blunders: Indians in NEFA and Pakistanis missing their
chances in Kashmir. So much must have changed in the last six decades but the
lessons from the past can always be put to good use. If Ayub Khan was dissuaded
by the Yanks from taking advantage of Indian troubles in NEFA, or he was getting
cold feet; the American factor remains relevant in the present context as well.

Since the Chinese seem to have the Indians in a bind in Ladakh, it might be good
idea to find out how they intended to play it out. In view of our higher than
Himalaya ties, it should not be too difficult a proposition. In fact we should
assume that the two countries had synchronized their plans. Preventing
American intervention – though no longer as crucial as in the unipolar days –
might well be an agreed element of our bilateral strategy.

There is however one initiative that is entirely up to us to take.

The Great Game of the 19th Century was essentially played by diplomats and
spies (both actually cut from the same cloth). According to the late Yahya Effendi,
probably the best military historian Pakistan has produced, it was the wisdom of
the Afghan emirs that saved Afghanistan from becoming a battlefield between
two imperial powers, Britain and Russia, and won the Country the status of a
buffer. Afghanistan went beyond that role after Pakistan inherited the British
mandate in the North-West of the Subcontinent. It protected our western
borders in our wars against India. We returned the favour by helping the
Afghans defend their sovereignty – and took great risks in the process.

It’s time to replicate that strategy in our North-East. There may even be an
opportunity to do so.

During the early days of the present commotion in Ladakh, an old friend sent me
a message that the Kashmir resolution was now on the cards. I didn’t take it
seriously – we’re a wishful lot with stars in our eyes – but when reminded that
only last year the Chinese President had suggested that this flashpoint at the
confluence of three mighty mountain ranges needed trilateral attention – by
India, Pakistan and China – many parts of the puzzle started falling in place. And
that’s when my thoughts drifted to the other intersection; not only of mountains,
but also of roads, rivals, and regions.
But of course the two places are not alike.

Afghanistan had more than the wisdom of its Emirs going for it – a hostile terrain
and a history of resistance against forceful occupation. And then the two
contending powers, Britain and Russia, preferred to keep each-other at bay, than
to lock horns in a country which had mastered the art of playing one against the
other. Kashmir on the other hand can be a friendly place to stay with a long
history of accommodation. The problem is that both the claimants, India and
Pakistan, would rather turn this paradise on earth into hell than let the archrival
enjoy its forbidden fruit. Nevertheless, there are still some sane voices in the two
countries who believe that since neither side was likely to get its most wishful
outcome, they might look for something less fulfilling. Sounds so Chinese, but is
in fact the age-old principle of compromise. Dangers inherent in glacial conflicts
that never seem to melt away may have convinced some of us that denying the
adversary any claim to outright victory was our least bad option.

There could be a number of ways it could be done, and in the last seven decades
some have of course been mulled over. The Trieste Model came closest to a
bargain that duly dressed-up, might address most of the genuine concerns of the
Indians, the Pakistanis, and the Kashmiris. But such prescriptions are less
important than the trio’s willingness to compromise – what now seems to be
inevitable.

It would not be an easy sell in Pakistan – essentially because all the thinking here
has been outsourced to the think tanks, which in the meantime cannot think out
of tank. The elected lot, ignorant and long ignored, now openly defy the
Country’s locus standi—a free and fair plebiscite—by shouting “Kashmir banega
Pakistan” right in the Parliament. Luckily, we have a history of armed-twisting
and U-Turns.

It will be harder still in India. It has been painting itself in a corner by declaring a
disputed territory as its atut-ang (integral part), and bulldozing provisions that
provided the occupied people a symbolic link with the Union. Their hearts and
minds had already been lost as conceded by no one less than Yashwant Sinha,
once an iconic figure in the BJP hierarchy. It’s now clinging to the real-estate of
Kashmir, which too looks tenuous. But then what good is a hardliner like Modi if
he cannot take some hard decisions to get India out of a situation, best described
as “between the rock and a hard place”.

Kashmiris might not get their independence but the consolation prize of their
acceptance as a bridge, though not a buffer, between the three mighty
neighbours, with all the chances to play one against the other a-la the Afghans,
may not be a bad incentive.

Chinese will not be gloating too much. But securing another front that could be
used to prick their ambitions to provide the much-needed balance of power
would be very gratifying.