Green Star Express, Inc. v.

Nissin-Universal Robina

DOCTRINE:  The rule now likewise states “general manager” instead of “manager”; “corporate
secretary” instead of merely “secretary”; and “treasurer” instead of “cashier.” It has now become
restricted, limited, and exclusive only to the persons enumerated in the aforementioned provision,
following the rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one person excludes all
others, or expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Service must, therefore, be made only on the
persons expressly listed in the rules.

Facts: A Mitsubishi L-300 van which Universal Robina Corporation (URC) owned figured in a vehicular
accident with petitioner Green Star Express, Inc.’s (Green Star) passenger bus, resulting in the death of the
van’s driver. Thus, the bus driver, petitioner Fruto Sayson, Jr., was charged with the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide.

Thereafter, Green Star sent a demand letter to respondent Nissin- Universal Robina Corporation (NURC) for
the repair of its passenger bus amounting to P567,070.68. NURC denied any liability therefor and argued that
the criminal case shall determine the ultimate liabilities of the parties. Thereafter, the criminal case was
dismissed without prejudice, due to insufficiency of evidence. Sayson and Green Star then filed a complaint for
damages against NURC before the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna. Francis Tinio, one of NURC’s employees, was
the one who received the summons. NURC filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming lack of jurisdiction due to
improper service. RTC issued a Resolution denying NURC’s motion to dismiss. It ruled that there was
substantial compliance because there was actual receipt of the summons by NURC.

Issue: whether or not the summons was properly served on NURC, vesting the trial court with jurisdiction.

Ruling:  No. There was no proper service of summons.

It is a well-established rule that the rules on service of summons upon a domestic private juridical entity must
be strictly complied with. Otherwise, the court cannot be said to have acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant.

Section 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. — If the defendant is a corporation
organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered, service may be made on the
president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors.

The rule now likewise states “general manager” instead of “manager”; “corporate secretary” instead of merely
“secretary”; and “treasurer” instead of “cashier.” It has now become restricted, limited, and exclusive only to the
persons enumerated in the aforementioned provision, following the rule in statutory construction that the
express mention of one person excludes all others, or expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Service must,
therefore, be made only on the persons expressly listed in the rules. If the revision committee intended to
liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. Since
the service of summons was made on a cost accountant, which is not one of the designated persons under
Section 11 of Rule 14, the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over NURC, 14 although the corporation
may have actually received the summons.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), petitioner, vs. THE BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE (BIR), represented herein by HON. JOSE MARIO BUÑAG, in his official capacity
as COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, public respondent,

EN BANC [G.R. No. 172087.

March 15, 2011.] JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, who are persons acting for, in behalf, or under the authority of
Respondent, public and private respondents. Peralta Petitioner Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) seeks for the declaration of nullity of Section 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9337 insofar
as it amends Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, by excluding petitioner from
exemption from corporate income tax for being repugnant to Sections 1 and 10 of Article III of the Constitution.
Petitioner further seeks to prohibit the implementation of Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Revenue
Regulations No. 16-2005 for being contrary to law.

FACTS:

• PAGCOR is exempt from the payment of any type of tax, except a franchise tax of five percent (5%) of the
gross revenue.

• P.D. No. 1399 was issued expanding the scope of PAGCOR's exemption, as follows: Customs Duties, taxes
and other imposts on importations Income and other taxes Dividend Income

• With the enactment of R.A. No. 9337 10 on May 24, 2005. It amended Section 27

(c) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 by excluding PAGCOR from the enumeration of GOCCs
that are exempt from payment of corporate income tax, pay such rate of tax upon their taxable income as are
imposed by this Section upon corporations or associations engaged in similar business, industry, or activity.

• Different groups assailed the validity and constitutionality of the said Republic Act.

• Court dismissed all the petitions and upheld the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337.

• Respondent BIR issued Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 16 2005, specifically identifying PAGCOR as one of
the franchisees subject to 10% VAT imposed under Section 108 of the National Internal Revenue Code of
1997, as amended by R.A. No. 9337.

• Gross Receipts of all other franchisees, other than those covered by Sec. 119 of the Tax Code, regardless of
how their franchisees may have been granted, shall be subject to the 10% VAT imposed under Sec. 108 of
the Tax Code. This includes, among others, the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR),
and its licensees or franchisees.

• Hence, the present petition for certiorari

ISSUE:

Whether or not PAGCOR is still exempt from corporate income tax and VAT with the enactment of R.A. No.
9337?

HELD:

Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. The burden of proof rests upon the party claiming
exemption to prove that it is, in fact, covered by the exemption so claimed. As a rule, tax exemptions are
construed strongly against the claimant. Exemptions must be shown to exist clearly and categorically, and
supported by clear legal provision. As for the corporate income tax, PAGCOR is not exempt. In this case, it
failed to prove that it is still exempt from the payment of corporate income tax, considering that Section 1 of
R.A. No. 9337 amended Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 by omitting PAGCOR
from the exemption. The legislative

intent, as shown by the discussions in the Bicameral Conference Meeting, is to require PAGCOR to pay
corporate income tax; hence, the omission or removal of PAGCOR from exemption from the payment of
corporate income tax. It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one person,
thing, act, or consequence excludes all others as expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. Thus, the express mention of the GOCCs exempted from payment of corporate income tax excludes
all others. Not being excepted, petitioner PAGCOR must be regarded as coming within the purview of the
general rule that GOCCs shall pay corporate income tax, expressed in the maxim: exceptio firmat regulam in
casibus non exceptis. As for the validity of RR No. 16-2005, the Court holds that the provision subjecting
PAGCOR to 10% VAT is invalid for being contrary to R.A. No. 9337. Nowhere in R.A. No. 9337 is it provided
that petitioner can be subjected to VAT.R.A. No. 9337 is clear only as to the removal of petitioner's exemption
from the payment of corporate income tax It is settled rule that in case of discrepancy between the basic law
and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails, because the said rule or
regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. RR No. 16-2005, therefore, cannot go
beyond the provisions of R.A. No. 9337. Since PAGCOR is exempt from VAT under R.A. No. 9337, the BIR
exceeded its authority in subjecting PAGCOR to 10% VAT under RR No. 16 2005; hence, the said regulatory
provision is hereby nullified. Petition is partly granted – not exempt from corporate income tax but exempt from
paying VAT.

MUTUC vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970
Freedom from Censorship

Facts:
Petitioner Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention. He filed a special civil action
against the respondent COMELEC when the latter informed him through a telegram that his certificate of
candidacy was given due course but he was prohibited from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with
sound systems and loud speakers. The petitioner accorded the order to be violative of his constitutional right to
freedom of speech. COMELEC justified its prohibition on the premise that the Constitutional Convention act
provided that it is unlawful for the candidates “to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or
electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or
materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign
origin.” COMELEC contended that the jingle or the recorded or taped voice of the singer used by petitioner was
a tangible propaganda material and was, under the above statute, subject to confiscation.

Issues: 

Was the prohibition imposed by respondent a violation of the right to freedom of speech of the petitioner?

Ruling: 

Supreme Court ruled that there was absence of statutory authority on the part of respondent to impose such
ban in the light of the doctine of ejusdem generis. The respondent commission failed to manifest fealty to a
cardinal principle of construction that a statute should be interpreted to assure its being consonance with,
rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command or prescription. The Constitution prohibits abridgement
of free speech or a free press. According to the Supreme Court, this preferred freedom calls all the more for
the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful
the equally vital right of suffrage. What the respondent Commission did was to impose censorship on
petitioner, an evil against which this constitutional right is directed.

The respondent Commission is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding
compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of political taped jingles.

PHILIPPINE BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION v. COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, AND

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. G.R. No. 119122. August 8, 2000
FACTS:

The PBA received an assessment letter from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) for the payment of
deficiency amusement tax.

The PBA contested the assessment by filing a protest with the CIR who denied the same. The PBA then filed a
petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), in which they held against the PBA.

The PBA filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which was also denied.

ISSUES: 

Whether the amusement tax on admission tickets to PBA games is a national tax.

Whether the cession of advertising and streamer spaces to Vintage Enterprises, Inc. subject to amusement
tax.

RULING:

YES. The Local Tax Code does not provide for professional basketball games but rather in PD 1959. It is clear
that the "proprietor, lessee or operator of professional basketball games" is required to pay an amusement tax
of 15% of their gross receipts to the BIR, which payment is a national tax. 

YES. The definition of gross receipts is broad enough to embrace the cession of advertising and streamer
spaces as the same embraces all the receipts of the proprietor, lessee or operator of the amusement place.
The law being clear, there is no need for an extended interpretation. 

Parayno vs Jovellanos
G.R. No. 148408
Subject: Public Corporation
Doctrine: Police power

Facts:
Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of
Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer of the station to
another location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer
and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advise, the Sangguniang Bayan recommended
to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioner’s gasoline station. In Resolution No. 50, it declared
that the existing gasoline station is a blatant violation and disregard of existing law.
According to the Resolution, 1) the gasoline filling station is in violation of The Official Zoning Code of
Calasiao, Art. 6, Section 44, the nearest school building which is San Miguel Elementary School and church,
the distances are less than 100 meters. (No neighbors were called as witnesses when actual measurements
were done by HLURB Staff, Baguio City dated 22 June 1989); 2) it remains in thickly populated area with
commercial/residential buildings, houses closed (sic) to each other which still endangers the lives and safety of
the people in case of fire; 3) residents of our barangay always complain of the irritating smell of gasoline most
of the time especially during gas filling which tend to expose residents to illness, and 4) It hampers the flow of
traffic.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but was denied by the SB. Hence she filed a case
before the RTC claiming that the gasoline filling station was not covered under Sec 44 of the mentioned law
but is under Sec 21. Case was denied by the court and by the CA. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the closure/transfer of her gasoline filling station by respondent municipality was an
invalid exercise of the latter’s police powers

HELD:
The respondent is barred from denying their previous claim that the gasoline filling station is not under Sec 44.
The Counsel in fact admitted that : “That the business of the petitioner [was] one of a gasoline filling station as
defined in Article III, Section 21 of the zoning code and not as a service station as differently defined under
Article 42 of the said official zoning code;”
The foregoing were judicial admissions which were conclusive on the municipality, the party making them.
hence, because of the distinct and definite meanings alluded to the two terms by the zoning ordinance,
respondents could not insist that “gasoline service station” under Section 44 necessarily included “gasoline
filling station” under Section 21. Indeed, the activities undertaken in a “gas service station” did not
automatically embrace those in a “gas filling station.”
As for the main issue, the court held that the respondent municipality invalidly used its police powers in
ordering the closure/transfer of petitioner’s gasoline station. While it had, under RA 7160, the power to take
actions and enact measures to promote the health and general welfare of its constituents, it should have given
due deference to the law and the rights of petitioner.
A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the following
requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the interference of the State and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment
of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The first requirement refers to the equal
protection clause and the second, to the due process clause of the Constitution.
Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process clause when it passed Resolution No. 50. While
it maintained that the gasoline filling station of petitioner was less than 100 meters from the nearest public
school and church, the records do not show that it even attempted to measure the distance, notwithstanding
that such distance was crucial in determining whether there was an actual violation of Section 44. The different
local offices that respondent municipality tapped to conduct an investigation never conducted such
measurement either.
Moreover, petitioner’s business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent municipality could
summarily abate in the guise of exercising its police powers. The abatement of a nuisance without judicial
proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station is not a nuisance per se or one affecting
the immediate safety of persons and property, hence, it cannot be closed down or transferred summarily to
another location.
On the alleged hazardous effects of the gasoline station to the lives and properties of the people of Calasiao,
we again note: “Hence, the Board is inclined to believe that the project being hazardous to life and property is
more perceived than factual. For, after all, even the Fire Station Commander.. recommended “to build such
buildings after conform (sic) all the requirements of PP 1185.” It is further alleged by the complainants that the
proposed location is “in the heart of the thickly populated residential area of Calasiao.” Again, findings of the
[HLURB] staff negate the allegations as the same is within a designated Business/Commercial Zone per the
Zoning Ordinance.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed resolution of the Court of the Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Municipality of Calasiao is hereby directed to cease and desist from
enforcing Resolution No. 50 against petitioner insofar as it seeks to close down or transfer her gasoline station
to another location.