The Evolutionary Theory of V.

Gordon Childe
Author(s): Henry Orenstein
Source: Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Summer, 1954), pp. 200-214
Published by: University of New Mexico
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3628826
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THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF V. GORDON CHILDE1

HENRY ORENSTEIN

OAS AND HIS STUDENTS were credited,earlierin the presentcentury,

with dethroningthe ideasof culturalevolutionand progressfrom the domi-
nant positionin anthropologywhichthey enjoyedin the latter half of the preced-
ing century.After a period of disgrace,however,these ideas have returned to
prominenceand haverecentlyacquiredconsiderableacceptanceand supportamong
anthropologists.It appears,on looking back at the earlierdispute about the mat-
ter, that the criticismswhichBoas and his associateslevelledat evolutionisttheory
wereneitherthoroughenoughnor constructiveenough to convincea later genera-
tion of students that the theory was untenable. Kenneth Bock remarks,with
referenceto one of the morearticulateof the presentday evolutionists,"The fact
that White's position has not receivedthe summaryrefutation that might have
beenexpectedfor a completelydefunct and disprovedtheorytestifiesthat he raises
issuesthat have not been satisfactorilyexploredand resolved,"2and this observa-
tion applies with equal force to many other contemporarysynthesizers.
Of all the presentday evolutionists,Vere GordonChilde is probablythe most
sophisticated,the most empirical,and among the most insistent.Furthermore,he
is an outstandingprehistorian,and, as such, controls unusuallywell the archae-
ological data of long-rangecultural history.If there is any value in evolutionary
theory, any evidence for the idea of progress,then it should be apparentin his
writings.Primarilythis paperis an attemptto analyzeChilde'suse of the concepts
of evolutionand progressto see to what degreethey are dependenton his data and
to what degreehe has simplyimposedthem on his material.The beliefs of a few
other evolutionistswill also be touched upon, but only lightly and usually paren-
thetically.
Childe's ideas have changed from time to time as those of any productive
scholarpresumablywould,but I shall ignorethese changesand any seemingincon-
sistencieswhichmay resultwith the intentionof concentratingon the evolutionary
ideas as such, ratherthan chroniclingChilde's personalintellectualhistory. The
evolutionaryideas found in Childe'swork are also found in the writingsof other
1 I am indebted very much to John H. Rowe for his many constructivesuggestions on both
theoreticaland stylistic matters in the preparationof this paper.
2 Kenneth E. Bock, Evolution and Historical Process (American Anthropologist, vol. 54,
pp. 486-495, 1952), p. 486.
200

VOL. 10, 1954

 EVOLUTIONARYTHEORY OF V. GORDON CHILDE 201

evolutionists,though often somewhatdifferentlypresented,and this paper is an

evaluationof ideas, not people. Similarly,no discussionof Childe's notable con-
tributionsto prehistoricarchaeologyand the detailedinterpretationof archaeologi-
cal evidenceis relevanthere, although this work is at least as importanta part of
his contributionto anthropologyas his theoreticalformulationsare.

Prehistorianshave traditionallyclassifiedthe archaeologicalcultures they re-

coverinto ages or stages, conceived,since the nineteenthcenturybeginningsof the
discipline,as an evolutionarysequenceof progressivephases through which man
has passedin his "ascentto civilization."Childe follows this practice,incorporating
in differentworksearlierschemestaken from the nineteenthcenturyevolutionists.
Thus, he has suggested reviving the Three-Age system of Thomsen: Stone,
Bronze,and Iron ages,3as well as the seven fold systemput forwardby Morgan.4
He also uses the modifiedand expandedform of the Thomsen system generally
currentamong prehistorians,but with some alterationsof his own. He takes the
Palaeolithic,Neolithic, BronzeAge, and Early Iron Age of this scheme,appends
to it a Feudal period and a phase of bourgeois capitalism,and leaves out the
Mesolithic.5
These categoriesare not meant to be a system of classificationof "historyas
actuality";they are put forward as "generalizedhistory."White describesthis
evolutionistargument:
Of course,a law of culturalevolutionwould describeno actualseriesof eventsany
morethanthe lawof Newtondescribesanyparticularfallingbody.But infinitevariety
of particularsdoesnot precludeuniversals.How quaintthen to expecta scientificlaw,
a statementof the universalto describethis and that particular.6
Childe appearsto agree with him on this point:
White has demonstrated in detailthat Tylor is studyingthe evolutionof religion,not
the historyof any given religion .... The same is true of archaeologists. De Mor-
doesnot purportto set forththe historyof Technologyin France
tillet'sclassification
or anywhereelse,but the developmentof Technologyin the abstract.7
3 Vere Gordon Childe, Archaeological Ages as Technological Stages (Huxley Memorial
Lecture, Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, London, 1944), p.l.
4 V. Gordon Childe, Archaeology and Anthropology (Southwestern Journal of Anthro-
pology, vol. 2, pp. 243-251, 1946), p. 251.
5 V. Gordon Childe, What Happened in History (New York: Penguin Books, 1946), pp.
17-20. His displeasurewith the Mesolithic category may be due in part to its "unprogressive"
features.
6 Leslie A. White, The Science of Culture (New York: Farrar,Strauss, 1949), p. 408.
7 Childe, Archaeology and Anthropology, p. 245.
202 SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY

Both authorsspeak as if this distinctionanswersthe objectionsby critics of

evolutionthat evolutionarytheorydoes not fit the facts of cultural histories.But
the anti-evolutionistsare not answered.Abstractionsare made from particulars.If
progressis a "scientificlaw,"if it actuallydescribeshistoricaldevelopments"in the
abstract,"then it must have some relationto the eventsof historyand prehistory.
Childe repeatedlyrefersto discretehistoricalphenomenain expoundingthe theory
of progress.But the questionis whetherthe particularspresentedactuallydo sup-
port the generalization;and whetherso many facts have been ignored that the
"statementof the universal"subsumesonly a very few exceptionalcases. Pro-
ponentsof this type of theorymust point to some body of data, some area of his-
torical reality which can serve as convincingevidencefor it or accept the charge
that it is an a prioriconstruct,attractivechieflybecauseit puts our own cultureat
the top of the pyramid.
In adducingempiricalevidencein supportof their theories,evolutionistsoften
deal with differentunits of study. They sometimesspeak of evolutionas obtaining
in culture as a whole, i.e., their approachis what Steward has called "Universal
Evolutionism."8If the sequenceof stages is meant to apply to the totality of cul-
ture,then its empiricalsupportmust be found in this unit, and it can be applicable
to this unit only.
However,in othercontextswe find evolutionistsreferringnot to the totality of
culturebut to the developmentof particularcultures.When the sequenceis meant
to be applicableto all cultures,we may call the theories"UnilinearEvolutionism."
Such schemes,if they are to be valid for particularculture-histories,must be de-
rivedfrom a comparisonof the historicaldevelopmentsof a sizeablesampleof the
world'scultures.On the other hand, if an evolutionaryschemerefers to a limited
class of cultures,then the data need only refer to a convincingsampleof the class
in question.In such cases we may apply Steward'sterm "MultilinearEvolution-
ism."
Strangeto say, one can discernin the writingsof Childe suggestionsof each of
the three types of evolutionism.As with so many evolutionists,he speaks incon-
sistentlyof one type and then the otherwithoutdistinguishingbetweenthem. Each
of these three types, as Childe employsthem, includessome notion of the idea of
progress,thoughthe idea is muchless noticeablewherehe practicesmultilinearevo-
lutionism.We shall discusseach in turn.

8 Julian H. Steward, "Evolution and Progress" (in A. L. Kroeber, ed., Anthropology To-
day, pp. 313-326, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 315. The body of this paper
was written before reading Steward's article on the subject. We arrived at the same classification
of evolutionismas Steward and will use his terms.
 EVOLUTIONARYTHEORY OF V. GORDON CHILDE 203

At times explicitly and more often implicitly, Childe refers to culture as a

whole for evidence for his theory of progressivestages. Sometimeshe contends
that culturesare not isolable.He speaksof the "illusion... of a multiplicityof
'civilizations,'any of which can be isolated from forerunnersand contemporaries
and still continueto behaveas a living organism."9His position, indeed, empha-
sizes diffusion.
The discoveriesand inventionsimplicitin metalworkingare so abstruseand complex
that independentoriginat severalpoints. .. is excludedas fantasticallyimprobable;
knowledgeof the essentialtechniquesin the Old Worldhavebeendiffusedfromsome
centre.10
All cultures,he insists, are interdependentparts composinga single whole-Cul-
ture.
Even a comparative sociologyaimingat the establishment of generalrulesand a gen-
eral scheme recurrentin many "instances"the differencesbetweenwhich can be
ignored... can make little headway.On the one hand the numberof observedand
observableinstancesis very limited;on the otherhand it is questionablehow far any
humansocietyis reallycomparable to any distinctcorpseand not ratherto someorgan
or memberof one body.1l
There seemslittle questionthat progressis thought of as occurringin culture
as a whole.Each step may be taken by any one of the societieson earth;the inven-
tion can then be diffusedto anothersocietywhich can, in turn, take the next step.
Thus, first labelingthe traditionalthree ages as simply stages in the development
of cultures,as havingno referenceto particulartimes; he goes on:
If the whole long processdisclosedin the archeologicaland literaryrecordsbe sur-
veyed,a singledirectionaltrendis mostobviousin the economicspherein the methods
wherebythe mostprogressive societiessecurea livlihood.In this domainit will be pos-
sibleto recognizeradicaland indeedrevolutionary innovations.... These revolutions
can ... be usedto markoff phasesor stagesin the historicalprocess....12
With our purposesin mind, it would be wise to neglect the vagariesand moral
connotationsof the term "progress."We may then agree that somethinglike this
processhas occurredin the historyof technology-if the unit of study is culture
consideredas a totality. Inventionsoccur in the course of specific historiesand
9 Vere GordonChilde,The Historyof Civilization(Antiquity,vol. 15, pp. 1-14, 1941),
p. 3.
10 VereGordonChilde,The BronzeAge (Cambridge: UniversityPress,1930), p. 10.
11 VereGordonChilde,History (London:CobbettPress,1947), pp. 2-3.
12 Childe,What Happenedin History,p. 17: emphasismine.For a similarstatementsee
Ages as Technological
Childe,Archaeological Stages,p. 1.
204 SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY

diffuse to differentculturestaking part in the development.Inventionand diffu-

sion are concretephenomena;and the over-alldirectionin technologyhas been to-
ward greater complexityand efficiency.One could hardly deny this. But the
importantmethodologicaldecisionis what is to be done with the generalproposi-
tion. If it stimulatesinquiryinto the determinantsof technologicalinventionand
diffusion, then the concept of progressin technologymay be said to serve as a
springboardfor scientifichistoricalresearch.It may be said to composeone prob-
lem-centerabout whichnumerousspecifichistoricalinvestigationsmight cluster.13
From this perspectivewe estimateits value as greaterin proportionas the investi-
gations yield pertinent conclusions.Childe does attempt to use the concept of
progressin this way, and we shall reviewhis conclusionsshortly.
But, on the other hand, the definitionof "progress"could be understoodby
some theoristsas one end of research.And Childe appearsto acceptthis position,
too. For example,in advocatingthe ComparativeMethod for ethnology he says
that "this method offers the brightestprospectfor reachinggeneral laws indica-
tive of the directionof historicprogress.""4And again:
One [of the functionsof archaeologyandhistory]is surelyto defineprogress.To ask
"havewe progressed" is of course,meaningless-thequestioncan onlybe answeredin
the affirmative.It is for historyto say whatthis progresshas consistedin and to pro-
vide standardsfor determiningit.15

If this is one of the goals of anthropology,if we are prone to stop when such
informationis gatheredand ordered,then our aspirationsare indeed meager for
the data of history.The "law of progress"when consideredas an end in itself is
little more than a culturalconceit,an ethnocentricrationalization.
Here we come to the nature of such schemes.The "less progressive"societies
of our day are as mucha part of the totality of cultureas is Euroamericanculture.
Each society has changed,each in its own way. Certain changes which have oc-
curredin the historyand prehistoryof mankindas a whole can be consideredas
steps towardthe presentconditionof each and every culture on earth. This must
be grantedif one admitsthat all cultureshave histories.If cultureshave changed
in some respects,then if each society were interested,it could find a "trend"ex-
tending from the beginning of man's history-granted that it were known to
them-to theirpresentstate. For, given the entirelife-historyof the whole of man-
13 This point has been well made by Melville Jacobs (Further Comments on Evolutionism
in Cultural Anthropology, American Anthropologist, vol. 50, pp. 564-568, 1948, p. 565).
14 Childe, Archaeology and Anthropology, p. 251.
15 Vere Gordon Childe, Changing Methods and Aims in Prehistory. Presidential Address
for 1935 (Proceedings,PrehistoricSociety, n.s., vol. 1, pp. 1-15, Cambridge), p. 11.
 EVOLUTIONARYTHEORY OF V. GORDON CHILDE 205

kind,it seemslikelythateachculturecan haveits owncriteriafor progressand

its ownevolution,and can placeitself alwaysat the pinnacleof the cultureson
earth-if it wishes.Societiesinterestedin cycleswouldselect facetsof culture
whichwouldgivethemcyclicalnarratives. Butif theinterestis in "progress,"then
a simple-to-complex development is the outcome;with appropriate definitionsof
"simple"and "complex." The sequenceneedonlypassfromwhatis mostunlike
theirownculture,throughthosethat are similarto it, up to the apex,whether
Hopi,Hottentot,or Hollywood.
But, it mightbe saidthat fromsuchworkone can predictan inexorable fu-
ture-a conditiontowardwhichmanis drawn"againsthis will."'6A discipline
whosepurposewasthiswouldbe quitepeculiar,indeed.Likeastrologyandpalm-
istryit couldamusea fairlylargefollowing;but it wouldadvanceman'sknowl-
edgeof the worldandhis controloverit verylittle,if at all. However,if we do
grantthispurpose,whatkindof predictions canwe make?
Giventhepresentstateof ourknowledge, we cansaypractically nothingabout
the future.Becausetechnologyhasbecomemorecomplex"inthe long run,"and
takingcultureas a whole,we canconcludethatat someundetermined futuredate,
at someunknownplaceon earth,technologywill becomesomewhat morecomplex
thanit is now.For all we knowwe mightbe facedwithanotherthreethousand
year Mesolithicbeforethe processis consummated. And, most important,this
ratheruninformative prediction is not likely to be improveduponso long as we
continueto workin "longruns"and to studythe "progress" of cultureas one
unit.Sucha prediction couldhavebeenmadein Thomsen'stimesor before.The
onlydifference is thatthe predictionmustbe madewithlessprecisionnow;for at
that timeprehistorians did not havethe Mesolithicor otherirregularities to dis-
turbtheirnotionof progressive development. So it seemsthatthe precisionof the
evolutionary prehistorian'spredictionsis likelyto be inverselyproportional to the
magnitude of his accumulated a
data-hardly very"progressive" stateof affairs.
We mustrepeatthat Childedoesnot say that an elucidationof progressive
trendsis the onlygoal for archaeology and history.Therecan be no doubtthat
the statementof technological progressleadshim to ask a furtherquestion.It
leadshimto inquireintothe conditionsunderwhichtechnological advanceshave
takenplace.The Three-Ageschemeservesas a heuristicdevice.In thiscontextthe
discussion of progressin cultureas a wholeis morelegitimateandmoreuseful.
Childeattemptsto solvethe problemwitha Marxiananalysis.He contends

16 This is Leslie White's position (The Science of Culture, pp. 330-359). Childe explicitly
denies that this can be done (History, pp. 82-83).
206 SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY

that each stage in the history of mankindis markedoff by a revolution.17And

"contradictions,"he implies,are necessaryantecedentsof revolutions.
At a certainstage in theirdevelopmentthe productiveforcesof a societycome into
contradictionwith . . the propertyrelationswithinwhichthey have workedbefore.
... In such circumstances, to allow of furthertechnicalprogress,. . . Marx and
Engelsheld, a revolutionwas necessary . in the senseof desirableor essentialfor
furtherprogress.18
In interpretingthe data of historyaccordingto the Marxianformula, Childe
frequentlyemploys a rather common belief involving population and economic
surplus.Behind the "contradictions"constructedby the author,one always finds
the notion that populationwill increaseand continueincreasinguntil limited by
the subsistenceeconomyor other externalfactors. Thus, the Palaeolithiccontra-
diction involved a limitationon the size of the populationimposedby the econ-
omy. Too much wealth was devoted to supportingthe magiciansand too little to
the subsistenceeconomy.l9The Neolithic contradictionentailed in part an in-
creasein population.Geographicalexpansionbecamenecessaryand war was the
inevitableoutcome.20The contradictionin the Bronze Age economy is seen as
the outcomeof a concentrationof wealth in the hands of a few men. The popula-
tion increasedto a size greaterthan could be supportedby the subsistenceeconomy
and again geographicalexpansionand war resulted.21These propositionsare ap-
parentlyintendedto explain the destructionof "high civilizations."
In proposingthese "explanations"Childe has recourseto rathertenuous esti-
mates of fluctuationsin the populationsof prehistorictimes. Actually we know
verylittle aboutthe magnitudeof prehistoricpopulationsand at presenthave few,
if any, accuratemethodsfor making appraisals.Childe's method seems to be, at
times, to infer population size from social and economic conditions, e.g., the
existenceof cities.22Such inferenceslend little credibilityto explanationsof the
destructionof these same social and economicconditionsin terms of population
fluctuation.
However,even if we ignorethe absenceof good evidencefor the computation
of populations,we still havea questionableassumptionboundup in Childe'sefforts
17 Childe, What Happened in History, p. 17.
18 Childe, History, pp. 72-73.
19 Childe, What Happened in History, pp. 37-38.
20 Idem, p. 59.
21 Idem, p. 177.
22 Vere Gordon Childe, "A Prehistorian'sInterpretationof Diffusion" (in Independence,
Convergenceand Borrowing in Institutions, Thought and Art, Harvard Tercentenary Publica-
tions, Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1937), pp. 15-16.
 EVOLUTIONARYTHEORY OF V. GORDON CHILDE 207

at explanation.What concreteevidencewould lead us to believe that populations

do in fact continuallypress the limits of their available provisions?It is quite
likely that such conditionshave prevailedin many areas at many times. But the
natureof the relationshipbetweendemographicfactors and cultural ones, includ-
ing technics,is not too clear.Before this relationshipcan be used in an explanatory
propositionit must be clarifiedand confirmed.
Not only is the attemptedexplanationof the "declineand fall" of "high civili-
zations"open to doubt, but we find that Childe fails to come to grips with their
ascension.He assertsthat each age of prehistorywas enabledto appearby virtue
of an antecedentrevolution;and these in turn occur when men are faced with
economicand social contradictions.But he does not in fact explainrevolutions.He
seemsto assumesomerelationshipbetweenthe hypotheticalcontradictionsand the
succeedingrevolutions.He nowhereactually attempts to establishsuch relation-
ship. Contradictions,indeed, often have a different locale from associated
revolutions.For example,the Bronze Age contradictionoccurredin Egypt and
Mesopotamiaprimarily,23while the revolutionwhich supposedlyushered in the
Iron Age started in Greece, Phoenicia, and Etruria.24In order to comply with
Childe'stheory,the alleged contradictionin the organizationof Egyptian society
would have had to induce a revolutionin Greece.
In reality,Childe never does explainthe appearanceof the stages of technol-
ogy. He only states that revolutionsare essential in order to "allow of further
technical progress."25But this is the very point: why does technical progress
occur? Is it due to an assumed"instinct"for progress?Is there an instinct im-
pelling men to reorganizetheir society when faced by a contradictionin their
socio-economicorganization,thus permittinga more "progressive"system to pre-
vail? Of course,the authorwould not openly espousesuch an absurdity.
He does argue that major inventionsin the historyof technologyappearin a
necessaryorder.
Progressis an individualwholein whichthe inventionof a new way of hafting an ax
formeda necessarypreludeto the inventionof the steam-engineor the aeroplane.In
the firstinnovationsthe germsof all subsequentimprovementwerelatent... 26
He claims that the "sequenceof historical events" involved in the progression
from the Palaeolithic to our contemporary culture" . . . not only did but also

23 Childe,WhatHappenedin History,Chapter8, pp. 184.185.

24 Idem,Chapter9.
25 For completequotation,see p. 206 of this paper.
26 Vere GordonChilde,The Dawn of EuropeanCivilization(4th ed., New York: Alfred
A. Knopf,1948), p. xv.
 208 SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY

must,succeedoneanotherin justthisorder.""Eachinventionis determined and

conditionedby precedingevents.The sequenceis necessaryand its necessityis
intelligible."27
Firstweshouldnotethatthenecessityof theorderof stagesis a matterof dis-
pute.Eachstepmaynot alwaysbe a necessary precondition for the followingone.
Kroeberhasarguedconvincingly thatthe inventionof bronzecastingbeforeiron
castingwasnot unavoidable; ratherit seemsto havebeenan accidentof history.8
Butevenif weagreethattheorderof theinventions wasnecessary, oneshould
not thinkthatthisgivesan explanation for technological advance.(Childeis not
explicitas to whetherhe believesthis.) For,a necessary sequencecangiveus only
necessary antecedents for inventions; we do not therebyascertainthe sufficient
conditionsfor theiroccurrence. We can only concludethat the causesof tech-
nologicaladvancehavenotyetbeenrevealed.29
Childeis not interestedin explainingonly technicalprogress.He also wishes
to enhanceourunderstanding of somecharacteristics of the non-material aspects
of culture.Havingdiscovered, to hissatisfaction,
theprocesses involvedin thepro-
gressivedevelopment of technologyandthe necessary orderof changetherein,he
goeson to upholdtheprimacyof technology in history.It is, he says,the "founda-
tionof history,"because"thepossibilityof historicalchangedependson ... the
meansof production."30 "All ... so calledspiritualresultsof man'shistorical
activity are in the long run determined by the materialforcesof production."31
The relationsof production, Childeconcedes,mustbe transformed intoideasand
ideals-and whenthustransformed they"acquire a certain independent historical
reality."Sentimentmaythusimpede"progress," and"therelationof ideologyto
the productive forcesmaybe ratherremote."But Childeinsiststhroughoutthat
changesin ideologyare ultimatelybasedon technology.32
27 Childe, History, p. 10.
28 A. L. Kroeber,Anthropology (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1948), pp. 726-728.
29 There is one further type of explanationof technical inventions which may be involved
in some of Childe's assumptions.It is in some respects similar to the explanationof the destruc-
tion of "high civilizations" by reference to population expansion which we discussed on pages
206-207 of this paper. In this instance,the continuouspressureof population growth on economic
resourcesis supposed to create a need for economic innovations. This need, in turn, impels the
invention of technical devices. Such typically functional explanations of inventions have been
fairly popular in anthropology. One of the best refutations was put forward, ironically enough,
by the arch-functionalist,Durkheim (Emile Durkheim, The Rules of SociologicalMethod, G. E.
G. Catlin, ed., S. H. Solovay and J. H. Mueller, translators,8th ed., Glencoe: Free Press, 1938;
reprinted 1950), pp. 90-92.
30 Childe, History, pp. 69-70.
31 Idem, pp. 71-72: emphasis mine.
32 Idem, pp. 75-76.
 EVOLUTIONARYTHEORY OF V. GORDON CHILDE 209

The hierarchicalarrangementsof culturesconstructedby the nineteenthcen-

tury anthropologistswere often based on an implicit assumptionof economicor
technologicaldeterminism.Childe has performed for us the service of openly
arguingfor the conception.But he offerslittle evidenceor convincingargumentin
its behalf. He appearsto base his belief on the fact that "to be able to act at all
men must live," and "the 'meansof production'at the disposalof society.. . con-
stitute the equipmentthat enableshumanbeingsto procure[all the things] neces-
sary for life and the reproductionand multiplicationof our species."33
His contentionseems to be that technologyis the most significantcasual ele-
ment in society becauseit is absolutelynecessaryif men are to live. But, it has
neverbeendemonstratedthat the greatestnecessitiesin life are the most efficacious
factorsinducingculturalchangeor stability.Further,we may assumethis, and still
once a necessityis compliedwith, thereis no reasonto assumethat it will dominate
man's social life. What a sociologisthas had to say about economicdeterminism
is pertinenthere:
Certainlywe are justifiedin assuming. . . that some degreeof economicsurplusis
necessaryfor anykindof achievement in culture.But, oncethis minimumconditionis
met we are likelyto find that differentranksof circumstances-moral, social,psycho-
logical-tend to becomecrucialand that these may exist, variably,in settings of
relativeeconomicmiseryor prosperity.34

Even if there were a society living on a sub-humansubsistencelevel, the proposi-

tion would not be relevant.Sexual reproduction,at least, is anotherprerequisite
for societal survival;and one could make a case for sexual determinismon this
logic as easily as for technologicaldeterminism.
Childe's a priori argumentfor economicdeterminismis not convincing.Fur-
ther, we contendthat the positionis one that cannot be validated,even whereem-
pirical documentationis used, if definition is impreciseand methodologylacks
rigor.The ordinarynarrativemethodsof historicaland prehistoricalsynthesiswill
not suffice.For example,Childe and other Marxiansoften state that the technol-
ogy or the economyis the determinantin the long run35-and the long run can be
made just as long as is necessaryto "prove"the proposition.Each change in any
of the aspectsof a culture is always precededby changes in other aspects which
have occurredat some time in the culture'shistory.The aspect which the student
33 Idem, p. 70.
34 Robert A. Nisbet, Review of The Rise and Fall of Civilization: an Inquiry into the Re-
lationship between Economic Development and Civilization by Shepard B. Clough (American
Journal of Sociology, vol. 57, pp. 524-526, 1952), p. 526.
35 See page 208 of this paper.
210 SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY

believesto be causalcan, therefore,alwaysbe "confirmed"as causal by simplyex-

amininga largerportionof the historicalrecord.One can go as far back in time
as one likes to show that the chosenbehavioris ultimatelyprimary.Such methods
neitherprovenor disprove.They are the ritualincantationsof cultists.Their out-
come can not be scientificlaws, but faiths.
Though Childe's Marxian explanationof the stages of prehistorydoes not
measureup to scientificstandards,this does not mean that the questionmust re-
main moot. Furtherinquiry into geographic,demographic,economic,and other
factorsmay eventuallygive a solution.The problemis meaningfuland significant.
But we must understandthat it is but one problemfor scientifichistory.Emphasis
on it to the exclusionof otherhistoricalresearchwill narrowthe scope of historical
inquiryexcessively.Each time any culture of the world takes a step beyond the
technologicallevel achievedby any cultureup until then, it is recordedas progress
for cultureas a whole.Meanwhile,in the historyof this unit innumerablechanges
may have taken place. Some particularculturescan change radicallyas respects
theircosmologies.Some may have violentchangesin art style. Other societiesmay
rearrangetheir kinship systems,alter child-rearingpractices,adopt new religions,
accept differentfoods, alter funerarycustoms,change their patternsof sex rela-
tions; or, in fact, they may accept a basicallynew economy,political system, or
social organization.But if none of these changesis the sort which Childe defines
as "progressive" they are not includedas data for his theory.The scope of histori-
cal inquiryis thus greatly restricted.Researchcannotbe so restrictedif we are to
achievean understandingof the past in its relationto the presentconditionsof life.

A crucialambiguityin the theory of progressinvolvesthe nature of the unit

of observationto which the abstract"law of progress"allegedly refers. We have
just reviewedChilde'scase for the idea of progressconceivedas pertainingto the
whole of culture.In differentparts of his writingshe refersnot to Culture,but to
the historiesof particularculturesor regions.When he takes this position he of
courseacceptsculturesas isolable.
Mankinddoes not form one societytodaybut is dividedinto manydistinctsocieties;
all the availableevidencesuggeststhat the divisionwasnot lessbut evengreaterin the
past as far as archaeologycan penetrate.Eachsociety. . has preserved,transmitted
and builtup its ownpeculiartraditions.36
The systemof progressiveages is now intendedto refer to many distincthistories.
have built up a classificationof cul-
On the basisof materialremainsarchaeologists
36 Childe, What Happened in History, p. 12.
 EVOLUTIONARYTHEORY OF V. GORDON CHILDE 211

turesin technologicalstagesthat do follow one anotherin the sameorderin quite a

numberof regions;theyareeverywhere homotaxialbut not necessarilycontemporary.37
The concept of homotaxis,borrowedfrom biology, is meant to indicate that the
sequencesare the same "all over the globe";but "it did not follow that they must
everywhereoccupy the same positions if aligned accordingto the series of solar
years."38
Such statementsas these are not quite clear; one could possiblyconstruethem
as a type of unilinearevolutionismnot much differentfrom that practicedby the
theoristsof the precedingcentury.CertainlyChilde has nowhereexplicitlydistin-
guished this position from the earliertheorists'beliefs. And yet, when we keep in
mind that Childe is intimatelyacquaintedwith the data of prehistory,it seems in-
conceivablethat he should believe that any of the suggestedsequencesare actu-
ally ubiquitousand invariable.His positiononly becomesclear when we consider
furtherstatements.
The key to the difficultylies in his interpretationof the conceptof homotaxis.
In Social Evolutionhe says that ages are everywherehomotaxialin that "each...
always occupiesthe same relative position in the sequencewhereverthe full se-
quence is available. (In New Zealand, for example,the sequenceis incomplete,
sincethe BronzeAge is missing.)"39
In this light we can see that the derivationof the Three-Ageor any otherclassi-
fication from a comparisonof many cultural historiesis not meant in the same
senseas that intendedby the earlyunilinearevolutionists.The Three-Agesequence
may be confirmedwithout our having to observethe passage of each and every
"civilized"culture through all three ages-because "incompletesequences"are
excepted.One may phrasethe argumentas follows: that wheneverboth the Bronze
and Iron Ages obtainedin the historyof a culture, then the Bronze Age always
precededthe Iron Age. Similarlywith all of the categories:wheneverany two, or
all three, of the stages in the Stone-Bronze-Ironhierarchyhave obtained in the
historyof a culture,then the lowerstage alwaysprecedesthe higherone. Thus only
when substantiallymodifiedcan we say that the sequenceis a valid historicalgen-
eralization.If we are to avoid ambiguityand unnecessarydissidence,we must be
careful clearly to differentiatesuch generalizationsfrom those proposedby the
nineteenthcenturysystematizers.

37 Childe, Archaeology and Anthropology, p. 249.

38 Childe, ArchaeologicalAges as TechnologicalStages, p. 1.
39 Vere Gordon Childe, Social Evolution (London: Watts, 1951), p. 20: emphasis mine.
For a similar statement see page 29, same book.
212 SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY

There is one point in his theoreticalwork whereChilde turns to inductiveem-

piricism;he actually comparescultural histories.Here the approachis that of
multilinearevolutionism.He does not deal with the alleged order of the major
stages of culture growth. Rather, he examinesinformationavailable on culture
changewithinstages or, if you will, types of culturesand attemptsto discernregu-
larities.He firstsummarizes"in a very abstractway successivesteps throughwhich
barbarianculturesactuallypassedon the roadto civilizationin contrastedenviron-
ments."40The sequencesare compared,and he finds that the start and finish of
each display some similarities;e.g., the same species of cereals were used at the
start, and an effectiveconcentrationof economicand political power obtainedin
the final result."But the interveningsteps in developmentdo not exhibiteven ab-
stractparallelism..... They cannotthereforebe used to definestages commonto
all sequencesexamined."41However, they do display what Childe calls the pro-
cesses of divergenceand convergence.Divergence is explainedas adaptationsof
one type of rural economyto differentnatural environments.Convergenceis ex-
plained by the facts of diffusion.42It involves the addition of similar traits to
differentsocieties and the integrationof the traits into the respectivesocieties.
Thus, the societiesbecomemore alike without losing their distinctiveindividuali-
ties.43
When the authordoes not attemptto defend a thesis,and insteadempirically
attemptsto derivea hypothesis,his conclusionsare muchmorein keepingwith the
data to whichthey pertain.Here we have revealedno sequences,no regularitiesin
the accumulationof traits,but ratherrepetitiveprocessesof history.
However,there are some deficiences.For one, his interpretationof divergence
requiresmodification.Childe contendsthat the processis due to variationin habi-
tat, a surprisingoversimplificationfor one so well versed in archaeologicalfact.
Some differencesbetweencultureswhichdisplayover-allsimilaritiescan be under-
stood by examiningvariationin naturalenvironment;but certainlythe entirepro-
cess of divergencein art style, religion,social organization,etc. cannot be so un-
derstood.It is probablethat some aspectsof divergenceare due to diffusionfrom
differentsources.And further,we may state with confidencethat therewill remain

40 Idem, Chapters VI-XI. For one area Childe does not have an actual sequence. The cul-
tures were more or less contemporary,but are arranged in a series in accordancewith their com-
plexity. See pages 119-120 for this unfortunate methodological lapse in an otherwise acceptable
study.
41 Idem, pp. 161, 162.
42 Idem, pp. 161-163, 173.
43 Idem, pp. 166-167.
 EVOLUTIONARYTHEORY OF V. GORDON CHILDE 213

a residue of differencesafter diffusion and the environmentalfactor have ac-

countedfor theirshareof culturaldifferentiation;this too will requireexplanation.
A further defect of Childe's generalizationsis their vagueness.Greater spe-
cificitywould be much more enlightening.For example:Can the two processesbe
distinguishedin terms of the types of cultural milieux in which they take place?
Are there differencesin and between the rates of convergenceand divergence
underdifferentconditions?These questions,if answered,will help to place histori-
cal anthropologyon firm theoreticalfoundations.

Our examinationof Vere GordonChilde'sevolutionismhas yielded both posi-

tive and negative results. The Thomsen categories,the Morgan scheme,and the
more common archaeologicalclassificationcan be applied to the past without
qualificationonly if the historiesof all culturesare consideredas a single unit. In
this case, the classificatorysystem acts as a guide for investigators.It sets up a
specificproblemfor solution: "Under what conditionsdid the particularstages in
questioncome to be"?Though Childe'sdialecticalmaterialistapproachis unsatis-
factory, the problem is an importantone which requires further research and
analysis.Thus, the presentpracticeof classifyingculture as a whole into ages or
stages is valuableheuristicallyand should be maintained.
None of the systemsis valid, however,if they are intendedas summariesof all
or most of the historiesof the world'scultures.For in this case, the historiesdo not
conformto the classificatoryschemes.The Three-Agesystemcan be construedas
a historicalgeneralizationonly when substantiallymodified,only when "incom-
plete sequences"are excluded.But neitherthis nor the other sequentialclassifica-
tions are tenableas statementsof invariantsequence-or for that matter, as uni-
versalgeneralizationsto which only a few exceptionscan be attributed.
Childe's comparisonof culture histories within the "Barbarian"stage is
another matter. The elucidationof such processesas these is one of the major
goals of historicalanthropology.
There is one overallobjectionto Childe'swork;the informationupon whichhe
relies in theory constructionis unfortunatelyrestrictedas to area. He tends to
slight historicalsequencesin the Far East and almost totally ignores the facts of
New World culturaldevelopments.Whatever the evolutionaryframework-uni-
versal, unilinear,or multilinear-these data are pertinent,particularlyso in the
case of the Americaswhichgive us presumablyindependentinstancesof historical
sequences.
In spite of their faults, Childe's evolutionarytheoriescan be said to contain
valuableinsightsand useful hypotheses.But we must keep in mind that there are
214 SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY

otherproblemsto be solved and otherapproachesto employin the scientificstudy

of history.The workof Crawfordand Fox on ecologicalfactorsin culturehistory
is illustrative.The methodologicalsuggestionsof Taylor appearvaluablein many
respects.Hodgen's studiesof diffusionare excellenthistoricalanthropology.Kroe-
ber and Richardson'swork on fashionchangeand the acculturationstudies of the
ethnohistorians,Herskovitsfor instance,are otherexamplesof promisingmethods.
These methods,involving rigorousinductivework in the historicand prehistoric
records,should be pursuedalongsidethe more intensiveshort-rangestudiesby the
social anthropologists.It is by these meansthat we will achievean adequategen-
eral theoryof culturechange.

BERKELEY,CALIFORNIA