Problem Areas in Legal Ethics
Ch. 3 & 4
Chapter 3 (10-13)
Perea v. Almadro, A.C. No. 5246, March 20, 2003
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Edgar O. Perea
against Atty. Ruben Almadro for gross neglect of his duties as
lawyer of herein complainant. Respondent was his counsel
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 99)
where he (complainant Perea) is being charged with the crime
of Frustrated Homicide. RTC issued an order granting Atty.
Almadro’s motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence within
ten (10) days from said date. All the while, complainant thought
that respondent filed said demurrer and the case against him
dismissed. It was only sometime in 1999 that complainant
learned that Atty. Almadro failed to file any demurrer. The trial
court ordered the herein complainant to present evidence in his
defense. Later, a warrant was issued for his arrest prompting
him to surrender to the court and post bail. Complainant
suffered financially and emotionally due to respondent’s
neglect of his duties. Respondent has not attended any of his
hearings which led complainant to plead with respondent to
withdraw formally as his counsel so he could hire another
lawyer. Because of Atty. Almadro’s neglect, complainant is
now facing the loss of his freedom and livelihood.
Respondent filed three motions for extension of time to file
comment. The Court resolved to grant the said motions with a
warning that no further extensions shall be granted.
Respondent, through the law firm Sua and Alambra, filed a
Manifestation and Motion that respondent has not yet received
a copy of the complaint hence it asked the Court to order the
complainant to furnish them a copy.
Respondent through said law firm submitted an Answer to the
complaint, contending that: two days after the RTC granted the
manifestation of defense to file motion for leave to file demurrer
to evidence, he had finished the draft of the motion and the
accompanying pleading which he stored in a magnetic
computer diskette intended for editing prior to its submission in
court; a few days before the deadline, herein respondent tried
to retrieve the draft from the diskette but said drafts were
nowhere to be found despite efforts to retrieve them; this led
him to believe that the drafts must have been finalized and the
edited versions accordingly filed since it is his practice to
expunge from the diskette drafts that were already finalized
and acted upon; meanwhile, the presiding judge of the RTC
retired, as a consequence, actions on pending cases were held
in abeyance; moreover, communications with the herein
complainant had become rarer; thereafter, towards the end of
1997 up to the next five months of 1998, respondent was
preoccupied with the congressional elections in Biliran where
he ran and subsequently lost; then he was offered a position at
the Philippine Stock Exchange as head of the Compliance and
Surveillance Division which he accepted; his time and attention
was spent in the performance of his demanding job at the PSE
as well as in the preparation of his testimony before the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee in connection with the "BW" scam;
anent the case of herein complainant, he offered on several
occasions to withdraw as one of the defense counsel of the
complainant even to the extent of offering to return his
acceptance fee which the latter however refused;6 it is not true
that complainant pleaded with respondent to withdraw as his
counsel, the truth being that it was complainant who refused to
let go of respondent as his counsel; also, while he is a counsel
of complainant in the criminal case before the RTC, he was
merely a collaborating counsel, the lead counsel being Atty.
Solomon Villanueva; finally, he was actually mulling over the
possible procedural steps to take with regard to complainant’s
case when he received instead, a copy of the present
complaint. It is plain from the records that respondent lawyer
failed to submit a demurrer to evidence for which he had earlier
asked permission from the trial court and which his client,
herein complainant was relying on. More than that, he failed to
contact his client and to apprise the latter about the
developments of the case leaving complainant completely
surprised and without any protection when years later, he
received summons from the trial court asking him to present
evidence in his defense and, not long after, the trial court
issued a warrant for his arrest. Respondent’s negligence is
compounded by his attempt to have this tribunal believe the
story of how his draft, stored in a magnetic diskette,
mysteriously disappeared and how the absence of such file in
his diskette led him to believe that the same was already filed
in court. In his Answer, he even tried to depict himself as a
conscientious lawyer by stating that he was actually mulling on
the procedural steps he would undertake regarding
complainant’s case when instead he received a copy of this
complaint for disbarment. Such story, as observed by the IBP,
is not only outrageous but is contemptuous as it makes a
mockery of the Court.
Respondent would have this Court believe a very
preposterous story of how his draft disappeared, all the time
avoiding the simple fact that he failed to submit the necessary
pleading before the trial court. Such behavior cannot be
countenanced and deserves stern penalty therefor. The act of
the IBP in requiring Atty. Kenton Sua and Atty. Alan Alambra to
show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court
for deliberate falsehood and misrepresentation in the
preparation of the Answer for herein respondent is appropriate.
Records reveal that both Attys. Sua and Alambra have filed
their Joint Explanation.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent lawyer is guilty of violation of Code
of Professional Responsibility?
Held:
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that
which has not been proved. A lawyer shall not knowingly
misquote or misrepresent the contents of paper,
language or argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a
decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision
already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or
assert as a fact that which has not been proved. If not faithfully
or exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of the court may
lose their proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other
courts, lawyers and the public who may thereby be misled.
Allied Banking Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 144412, November 18, 2003
Private respondent Potenciano Galanida was hired by
petitioner Allied Banking Corporation on 11 January 1978 and
rose from accountant- book(k)eeper to assistant manager in
1991. His appointment was covered by a Notice of Personnel
Action which provides as one of the conditions of employment
the provision on petitioner’s right to transfer employees:
REGULAR APPOINTMENT: xxx It is understood that the bank
reserves the right to transfer or assign you to other
departments or branches of the bank as the need arises and in
the interest of maintaining smooth and uninterrupted service to
the public.
Private respondent was promoted several times and was
transferred to several branches.
Effecting a rotation/movement of officers assigned in the Cebu
homebase, petitioner listed respondent as second in the order
of priority of assistant managers to be assigned outside of
Cebu City having been stationed in Cebu for seven years
already. Private respondent manifested his refusal to be
transferred to Bacolod City in a letter dated 19 April 1994 citing
as reason parental obligations, expenses, and the anguish that
would result if he is away from his family. He then filed a
complaint before the Labor Arbiter for constructive dismissal.
Subsequently, petitioner bank informed private respondent that
he was to report to the Tagbilaran City Branch effective 23 May
1994. Private respondent refused. In a letter dated 13 June
1994, petitioner warned and required of private respondent
ubsequently, petitioner informed private respondent that he
was to report to the Tagbilaran City Branch, however, private
respondent again refused. As a result, petitioner warned and
required him to follow the said orders; otherwise, he shall be
penalized under the company’s discipline policy.
Furthermore, private respondent was required to explain and
defend himself. The latter replied stating that whether he be
suspended or dismissed, it would all the more establish and
fortify his complaint pending before the NLRC and further
charges petitioner with discrimination and favoritism in ordering
his transfer. He further alleges that the management’s
discriminatory act of transferring only the long staying
accountants of Cebu in the guise of its exercise of
management prerogative when in truth and in fact, the ulterior
motive is to accommodate some new officers who happen to
enjoy favorable connection with management. As a result,
petitioner, through a Memo, informed private respondent that
Allied Bank is terminating him. The reasons given for the
dismissal were: (1) continued refusal to be transferred from the
Jakosalem, Cebu City branch; and (2) his refusal to report for
work despite the denial of his application for additional vacation
leave.
After several hearings, the Labor Arbiter held that Allied Bank
had abused its management prerogative in ordering the
transfer of Galanida to its Bacolod and Tagbilaran branches. In
ruling that Galanida’s refusal to transfer did not amount to
insubordination, the Labor Arbiter misquoted this Courts
decision in Dosch v. NLRC, thus:
“As a general rule, the right to transfer or reassign an
employee is recognized as an employers exclusive right and
the prerogative of management (Abbott Laboratories vs. NLRC,
154 SCRA 713 [1987]). The exercise of this right, is not
however, absolute. It has certain limitations. Thus, in Helmut
Dosch vs. NLRC, et al. 123 SCRA 296 (1983), the Supreme
Court, ruled:
While it may be true that the right to transfer or reassign an
employee is an employers exclusive right and the prerogative
of management, such right is not absolute. The right of an
employer to freely select or discharge his employee is limited
by the paramount police power xxx for the relations between
capital and labor are not merely contractual but impressed with
public interest. xxx And neither capital nor labor shall act
oppressively against each other.
Refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered
insubordination where employee cited reason for said refusal,
such (sic) as that of being away from the family. (Underscoring
supplied by the Labor Arbiter)”
The Labor Arbiter reasoned that Galanida’s transfer was
inconvenient and prejudicial because Galanida would have to
incur additional expenses for board, lodging and travel. On the
other hand, the Labor Arbiter held that Allied Bank failed to
show any business urgency that would justify the transfer.
On appeal, the NLRC likewise ruled that Allied Bank
terminated Galanida without just cause. Citing Dosch v. NLRC,
the Court of Appeals held that Galanida’s refusal to comply
with the transfer orders did not warrant his dismissal. The
appellate court ruled that the transfer from a regional office to
the smaller Bacolod or Tagbilaran branches was effectively a
demotion. The appellate court agreed that Allied Bank did not
afford Galanida procedural due process because there was no from the SCRA syllabus appear as the words of the Supreme
hearing and no notice of termination. The Memo merely stated Court. We admonish them for what is at the least patent
that the bank would issue a notice of termination but there was carelessness, if not an outright attempt to mislead the parties
no such notice. and the courts taking cognizance of this case. Rule 10.02,
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates
ISSUE: that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the
text of a decision or authority. It is the duty of all officers of the
WON the LA and Atty. Durano violated Canon 10, Rule 10.02 court to cite the rulings and decisions of the Supreme Court
accurately.
HELD:
Seludo v. Fineza, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1813,
YES. Labor Arbiter Dominador A. Almirante and Atty. Loreto M. November 21, 2003
Durano are ADMONISHED to be more careful in citing the
decisions of the Supreme Court in the future.
The incident which gave rise to this administrative case
occurred in the course of the proceedings of People of the
The memorandum prepared by Atty. Durano and, worse, the
Philippines vs. Alfonso De Villar, Errol De Villar and Rodeo
assailed Decision of the Labor Arbiter, both misquoted the
Lerio, Criminal Case for attempted murder, before respondent
Supreme Courts ruling in Dosch v. NLRC. The Court held in
Judge Antonio J. Fineza, RTC of Caloocan.
Dosch:
The respondent judge was charged administratively by Atty.
“We cannot agree to Northwests submission that petitioner
Antonio D. Seludo, counsel for the accused, before the Office
was guilty of disobedience and insubordination which
of the Court Administrator of the SC, with the following
respondent Commission sustained. The only piece of evidence
offenses: (1) gross ignorance of the law, (2) oppression in
on which Northwest bases the charge of contumacious refusal
office, (3) grave abuse of authority, and (4) conduct
is petitioners letter dated August 28, 1975 to R.C. Jenkins
unbecoming of a judge.
wherein petitioner acknowledged receipt of the formers
memorandum dated August 18, 1975, appreciated his
It was alleged that on November 27, 2002, respondent judge
promotion to Director of International Sales but at the same
ordered the arrest of complainant for the failure of accused,
time regretted that at this time for personal reasons and
Errol De Villar and Rodeo Lerio, as well as their counsel, Atty.
reasons of my family, I am unable to accept the transfer from
Antonio Seludo, to appear in today’s promulgation of the
the Philippines and thereafter expressed his preference to
decision despite due notice. The Order of Arrest commanded
remain in his position, saying: I would, therefore, prefer to
any officer of the law to arrest complainant and to keep him in
remain in my position of Manager- Philippines until such time
jail until the decision in said Criminal Case shall have been
that my services in that capacity are no longer required by
promulgated.
Northwest Airlines. From this evidence, We cannot discern
even the slightest hint of defiance, much less imply
Complainant averred that he was the defense counsel in two
insubordination on the part of petitioner.”
separate Criminal Cases: (1) before Judge Edwin B. Ramizo
and (2) before respondent judge. On November 11, 2002,
The phrase [r]efusal to obey a transfer order cannot be
complainant received an order from respondent setting the
considered insubordination where employee cited reason for
promulgation of the decision in Criminal Case (before
said refusal, such as that of being away from the family does
respondent judge) on November 18. The promulgation did not
not appear anywhere in the Dosch decision. Galanida’s
push through as respondent judge was confined in a
counsel lifted the erroneous phrase from one of the italicized
hospital. On November 25, complainant received another order
lines in the syllabus of Dosch found in the Supreme Court
setting the promulgation at 8:30 a.m. of November 27.
Reports Annotated (SCRA).
However, upon checking his calendar, complainant noticed
that on the said date and time, he had a previously-set hearing
The syllabus of cases in official or unofficial reports of
of Criminal Case before Judge Ramizo. Due to the conflicting
Supreme Court decisions or resolutions is not the work of the
schedule, he instructed his secretary to inform the office of
Court, nor does it state this Courts decision. The syllabus is
respondent judge that he could not attend the promulgation of
simply the work of the reporter who gives his understanding of
his decision. He was thus surprised to receive on November 28,
the decision. The reporter writes the syllabus for the
the aforementioned order directing his arrest and detention.
convenience of lawyers in reading the reports. A syllabus is not
a part of the courts decision. A counsel should not cite a
Upon his arrest, complainant requested permission to go to the
syllabus in place of the carefully considered text in the decision
court of respondent judge to ask for reconsideration. In court,
of the Court.
respondent judge refused to see him. Complainant waited and
was able to talk to respondent judge when the latter went out
In the present case, Labor Arbiter Almirante and Atty. Durano
of his chambers and walked to his car. Complainant pleaded
began by quoting from Dosch, but substituted a portion of the
with respondent judge, who opened the windows of his car and,
decision with a headnote from the SCRA syllabus, which they
in the presence of the police officers, said, kung gusto mo,
even underscored. In short, they deliberately made the quote
pumunta ka sa harap ng kotse ko at sasagasaan na lang kita.
Complainant spent the night in jail. The next day, he was
brought to court for the promulgation of the decision. However,
Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., the public prosecutor, came
late and was improperly dressed. Respondent judge flared up,
fined him and held the promulgation in abeyance until
Prosecutor Mananquil paid the cashier the one thousand peso
(P1,000.00)-fine meted on him. Atty. Eduardo Rodriguez, the
lawyer assisting complainant, requested for a written order to
be presented to the cashier as basis for the payment of the
imposed fine, but respondent merely told him, If you want an
order, I will sign that order on Monday. Fortunately,
Prosecutor Mananquil was able to pay the fine. The decision
was promulgated on the same afternoon and complainant was
released from jail.
Respondent judge: denied the allegations of the complaint. He
averred that he ordered the incarceration of complainant to
avoid delay in the promulgation of the decision in criminal
case. Allegedly, complainant failed to attend the first scheduled
date of promulgation. He likewise denied the car incident and
alleged that he merely asked complainant, umalis ka diyan at
baka masagasaan iyong paa, since complainant was leaning
on the left side of his car.
Complainant: Replied stating that his secretary called
respondents office on November 18, and was told that all
hearings scheduled for the day were cancelled due to
respondents hospitalization. He denied he was delaying the
case.
OCA: The arrest of the complainant was, therefore, not only
illegal, but also oppressive, and it violated his constitutional
right to due process. Complainant was arrested and detained
without giving him the opportunity to be heard. In so doing,
respondent judge, wittingly or unwittingly, committed arbitrary
detention defined and penalized under Article 124 of the
Revised Penal Code when the order of arrest was issued for
complainant (who) was not committing a crime
In his COMMENT, respondent judge used the words: fact
fabricator, congenital liar, Indian who fails to comply with his
commitment and dim-witted lawyer, as descriptive of the
complainant. These words are inflammatory which should have
been avoided. In explaining why he issued the order of arrest
against the complainant, the use of intemperate and insulting
rhetorics is not necessary, if only to maintain the dignity of, and
respect for, the court as an institution
The OCA recommended that respondent judge be penalized to
pay a FINE in the amount of twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) for gross ignorance of the law, oppression, grave
abuse of authority and violation of Rule 8.01, Canon 8 and
Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
ISSUE:
W/N respondent judge should be fined?
HELD:
YES. The court held respondent judge guilty of gross
ignorance of procedure and impose on him a fine
of P40,000.00, and gross misconduct and impose on him a fine
of P40,000.00, considering his repetition of the offense.
Respondent based his authority in ordering complainants
incarceration on Section 14, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Court (Bail to secure appearance of material witness). The rule
relied upon by the respondent cannot be used as basis for the
detention of complainant since he is a counsel and not a
material witness to a case. Section 6, Rule 120 (Promulgation
of judgment) of the Rules of Court is likewise of no help to the
respondent. It does not require the presence of the counsel
during the promulgation of a judgment.
We hold that respondent violated Rule 3.04, Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, which states:
Rule 3.04. A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous
to lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses,
and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid
consciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are
made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
It is plain that respondent was impatient and discourteous in
dealing with complainant. Judges should respect all people
appearing before their courts, be they lawyers or
litigants. Respondent ordered complainants arrest without
according him the elementary right to challenge the order. The
violation of his right to due process cannot be denied. To be
sure, complainant satisfactorily explained his absence in the
November 18 scheduled promulgation. Before the
promulgation, complainants secretary called respondents office
to verify the schedule and was informed that all hearings for
the day were cancelled due to respondents confinement in the
hospital. It is therefore inaccurate to contend that complainant
was absent twice, and he has to be arrested to prevent delay
in the promulgation of the decision. The Office of the Court
Administrator correctly observed that the respondent should
have followed the following procedure:
What respondent judge should have done under the
circumstances obtaining at the time he issued the order of
arrest of complainant was first to issue an order directing him
(Seludo), within a reasonable time, to show cause why he
should not be punished for indirect contempt of court and,
reset the promulgation of the decision to some other time at
the convenience of the court. If the explanation is not
satisfactory to the court, then and only then, that a penalty
should be imposed upon the contemner.
It is likewise provided in A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC that
administrative cases against judges of lower courts, who are
likewise lawyers, are based on grounds which are also
grounds for disciplinary action of members of the Bar, among
others, for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
We consider respondent judge to have violated: (1) Rule 8.01,
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
prohibits the use of inappropriate language: Rule 8.01. A
lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language of P40,000.00, and gross misconduct and impose on him a fine
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper; and of P40,000.00, considering his repetition of the offense.

(2) Rule 10.03, Canon 10, which mandates the proper SO ORDERED.
observance of the rules of procedure:
Baculi v. Battung, A.C. No. 8920, September 28,
Rule 10.03 A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and
2011
shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
Summary: So mga bes this case stems from a warfreak atty.
We are disappointed by respondents penchant for improper
ewan ko guys pero grabe si koya naglitanya tas tinambangan
words when he called the complainant a fact fabricator, a
niya outside ng courthouse si Judge! Grabe hahaha. Sigaw
congenital liar, an Indian who fails to comply with his
siya ng sigaw hahahaha. Basta sobrang rak nitong abogado na
commitment and dim-witted. We had previously admonished
to hahahaha. So sinuspend siya ng SC for a year, A lawyer
respondent judge for using inappropriate language. In Judge
shall observe and maintain respect sa courts and to the judges.
Antonio J. Fineza vs. Romeo P. Aruelo, where respondent
Kasi nga sigaw siya ng sigaw kahit na ibang tao na yung nag
judge was enjoined to be more circumspect in his
uundergo ng trial sa courtroom ni Baculi. Basta rak kasi si kuya
language. We admonished him to exercise prudence and
hahahaha.
restraint in his language and sternly warned that a repetition of
the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. In
Facts:
a more recent case decided by the Court En Banc, Lim vs.
Judge Antonio J. Fineza, respondent judge was also found
Judge Baculi filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty.
guilty of gross misconduct for failing to execute a judgment
Battung with the Commission on Discipline of the IBP against
which had become final, and was fined P30,000.00, with a
the respondent, alleging that the latter violated Canons 11 and
stern warning that a repetition of the same act will be dealt with
12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
more severely.
Judge Baculi claimed that on July 24, 2008, during the hearing
We consider respondents act of ordering the detention of
on the motion for reconsideration of Civil Case No. 2502, the
complainant without just cause as gross ignorance of the law
respondent was shouting while arguing his motion. Judge
or procedure, and the improper use of words in his Comment
Baculi advised him to tone down his voice but instead, the
as gross misconduct,[15] both under Section 8, Rule 140 of the
respondent shouted at the top of his voice. When warned that
Revised Rules of Court, [16] as amended, viz:
he would be cited for direct contempt, the respondent shouted,
"Then cite me!" Judge Baculi cited him for direct contempt and
Sec. 8. Serious charges Serious charges include:
imposed a fine of P100.00. The respondent then left.

3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of

While other cases were being heard, the respondent re-
Judicial Conduct;…
entered the courtroom and shouted, "Judge, I will file gross
ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you!" Judge Baculi
9. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure;
ordered the sheriff to escort the respondent out of the
courtroom and cited him for direct contempt of court for the
Section 11 of the same Rule, provides the following
second time. After his hearings, Judge Baculi went out and
penalty, viz:
saw the respondent at the hall of the courthouse, apparently
waiting for him. The respondent again shouted in a threatening
SEC. 11. Sanctions A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious
tone.
charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
On the alleged violation of Canon 12 of the CPR, according to
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the
Judge Baculi, the respondent filed dilatory pleadings in Civil
benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from
Case No. 2640, an ejectment case. Judge Baculi rendered on
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
October 4, 2007 a decision in Civil Case No. 2640, which he
government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided,
modified on December 14, 2007. After the modified decision
however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include
became final and executory, the branch clerk of court issued a
accrued leave credits;
certificate of finality. The respondent filed a motion to quash
the previously issued writ of execution, raising as a ground the
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
motion to dismiss filed by the defendant for lack of jurisdiction.
more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
Judge Baculi asserted that the respondent knew as a lawyer
that ejectment cases are within the jurisdiction of First Level
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not
Courts and the latter was merely delaying the speedy and
exceeding P40,000.00.
efficient administration of justice. The respondent filed his
Answer, 9 essentially saying that it was Judge Baculi who
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we find respondent judge guilty of gross
disrespected him (wow ganda ka??) [hinuhumiliate daw siya to
ignorance of procedure and impose on him a fine
make it appear in public that he is a negligent lawyer,
incompetent, mumbling, and irresponsible lawyer]
IBP findings: At the first part of the hearing as reflected in the
TSN, it was observed that the respondent was calm. He
politely argued his case but the voice of the complainant
appears to be in high pitch. During the mandatory conference,
it was also observed that indeed, the complainant maintains a
high pitch whenever he speaks. Thereafter, it was observed
that both were already shouting at each other. But after
hearing the tape, the undersigned in convinced that it was Atty.
Battung who shouted first at the complainant.
IBP: (lah ikaw naman pala talaga bes.) respondent failed to
observe Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
that requires a lawyer to observe and maintain respect due the
courts and judicial officers. The respondent also violated Rule
11.03 of Canon 11 that provides that a lawyer shall abstain
from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior
before the courts.
With respect to the charge of violation of Canon 12 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, Commissioner De la Rama
found that the evidence submitted is insufficient to support a
ruling that the respondent had misused the judicial processes
to frustrate the ends of justice. Respondent: Reprimanded
Issue:
WON Atty. Battung violated Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the CPR
Held:
YES. Atty. Battung disrespected Judge Baculi by shouting at
him inside the courtroom during court proceedings in the
presence of litigants and their counsels, and court personnel.
The respondent even came back to harass Judge Baculi. This
behavior, in front of many witnesses, cannot be allowed. We
note that the respondent continued to threaten Judge Baculi
and acted in a manner that clearly showed disrespect for his
position even after the latter had cited him for contempt. In fact,
after initially leaving the court, the respondent returned to the
courtroom and disrupted the ongoing proceedings. These
actions were not only against the person, the position and the
stature of Judge Baculi, but against the court as well whose
proceedings were openly and flagrantly disrupted, and brought
to disrepute by the respondent.
Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of their
position and avowed duty to the courts, cannot be allowed to
publicly ridicule, demean and disrespect a judge, and the court
that he represents.
Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect
due the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 — A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,
offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely
disregards the latter's role, stature and position in our justice
system. When the respondent publicly berated and brazenly
threatened Judge Baculi that he would file a case for gross
ignorance of the law against the latter, the respondent
effectively acted in a manner tending to erode the public
confidence in Judge Baculi's competence and in his ability to
decide cases. Incompetence is a matter that, even if true, must
be handled with sensitivity in the manner provided under the
Rules of Court; an objecting or complaining lawyer cannot act
in a manner that puts the courts in a bad light and bring the
justice system into disrepute.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Melchor A.
Battung is found GUILTY of violating Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year effective
upon the finality of this Decision. He is STERNLY WARNED
that a repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.
Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui, G.R. No. 152072/ G.R.
No. 152104, July 12, 2007
In a Resolution dated 26 September 2006, the Court En Banc
ordered Atty. Romeo G. Roxas to explain in writing why he
should not be held in contempt of court and subjected to
disciplinary action when he, in a letter dated 13 September
2006 addressed to Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario
with copies thereof furnished the Chief Justice and all the other
Associate Justices, intimated that Justice Nazario decided G.R.
No. 152072 and No. 152104 on considerations other than the
pure merits of the case, and called the Supreme Court a
dispenser of injustice.
The decision referred to in the letter is the Courts decision in
these consolidated cases where Attys. Roxas and Santiago N.
Pastor were ordered to return, among others, to Antonio de
Zuzuarregui, Jr., et al. the amount of P17,073,224.84. On 16
November 2006, by way of compliance with the 26 September
2006 resolution, Atty. Roxas submitted his written explanation.
His letter stated that:
“With all due respect to this Honorable Court, and beyond my
personal grievances, I submit that the ruling in the subject
consolidated cases may not have met the standards or
adhered to the basic characteristics of fair and just decision,
such as objectivity, neutrality and conformity to the laws and
the constitution. Quite notably, despite my aggrieved
sentiments and exasperated state, I chose to ventilate my
criticisms of the assailed ruling in a very discreet and private
manner. Accordingly, instead of resorting to public
criticism through media exposure, I chose to write a personal
letter confined to the hallowed halls of the highest tribunal
of the land and within the bounds of decency and propriety.
This was done in good faith with no intention whatsoever to
offend any member, much less tarnish the image of this
Honorable Court. Nonetheless, it is with humble heart and a
repentant soul that I express my sincerest apologies not only to
the individual members of this Honorable Court but also to
the Supreme Court as a revered institution and ultimate
dispenser of j ustice. As earlier explained, I was merely
exercising my right to express a legitimate grievance or
articulate a bona fide and fair criticism of this
Honorable Courts ruling. If the nature of my criticism/comment
or the manner in which it was carried out was perceived to
have transgressed the permissible parameters of free
speech and expression, I am willing to submit myself to the
sound and judicious discretion of this Honorable Court. x x x”
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Roxas should be cited in contempt?
HELD:
Rule 11.04. — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives
not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.
It is the duty of a lawyer as an officer of the court to uphold the
dignity and authority of the courts and to promote confidence in
the fair administration of justice and in the Supreme Court as
the last bulwark of justice and democracy. Respect for the
courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution. Without
such guarantee, the institution would be resting on a very
shaky foundation. When confronted with actions and
statements, from lawyers and non-lawyers alike, that tend to
promote distrust and undermine public confidence in the
judiciary, this Court will not hesitate to wield its inherent power
to cite any person in contempt. In so doing, it preserves its
honor and dignity and safeguards the morals and ethics of the
legal profession.

Yes. We find the explanations of Atty. Roxas unsatisfactory. Re : Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo,
The accusation against Justice Nazario is clearly without basis. Adm. Case No. 7006, October 9, 2007
The attack on the person of Justice Nazario has caused her
pain and embarrassment. His letter is full of contemptuous
This administrative case stemmed from the events of the
remarks tending to degrade the dignity of the Court and erode
criminal case No. 5144 entitled People v. Luis Bucalon Plaza,
public confidence that should be accorded it. To prevent
heard before the sala of Presiding Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan,
liability from attaching on account of his letter, he invokes his
RTC of Surigao City
rights to free speech and privacy of communication. The
invocation of these rights will not, however, free him from
This criminal case was originally raffled to the sala of Judge
liability. As already stated, his letter contained defamatory
Floripinas C. Buyser, RTC of Surigao City. Judge Buyser
statements that impaired public confidence in the integrity of
denied the Demurrer to the Evidence of the accused, declaring
the judiciary. The making of contemptuous statements directed
that the evidence thus presented by the prosecution was
against the Court is not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is
sufficient to prove the crime of homicide and not the charge of
an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of
murder. Consequently, the counsel for the defense filed a
the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise
Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond. Respondent Atty.
of said right cannot be used to impair the independence and
Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, then Senior State Prosecutor and the
efficiency of courts or public respect therefor and confidence
deputized prosecutor of the case, objected thereto mainly on
therein. Free expression must not be used as a vehicle to
the ground that the original charge of murder, punishable with
satisfy ones irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade
reclusion perpetua, was not subject to bail under Sec. 4, Rule
and even destroy this Court and its magistrates.
114 of the Rules of Court.1

In the case at bar, we find the statements made by Atty. Roxas

In an Order, Judge Buyser inhibited himself from further trying
to have been made mala fides and exceeded the boundaries of
the case because of the "harsh insinuation" of Senior
decency and propriety. By his unfair and unfounded accusation
Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo that he "lacks the cold
against Justice Nazario, and his mocking of the Court for
neutrality of an impartial magistrate," by allegedly suggesting
allegedly being part of a wrongdoing and being a dispenser of
the filing of the motion to fix the amount of bail bond by counsel
injustice, he abused his liberty of speech. With his
for the accused.
contemptuous and defamatory statements, With his
contemptuous and defamatory statements,
The case was transferred to RTC of Surigao City, presided by
Atty. Roxas likewise violated Canon 11 of the Code of
Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan. In an Order dated November 12,
Professional Responsibility, particularly Canons 11.03 and
2002, Judge Tan favorably resolved the Motion to Fix the
11.04. These provisions read:
Amount of Bail Bond, and fixed the amount of the bond at
P40,000.
CANON 11 — A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN
THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA); instead of
OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT
availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused
BY OTHERS
the publication of an article regarding the Order granting bail to
the accused in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao
xxx xxx xxx
Gold Star Daily. The article, entitled "Senior prosecutor
lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail
Rule 11.03. — A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,
out,"
offensive and menacing language or behavior before the
Courts.
The RTC of Surigao City directed respondent and the writer of
the article, Mark Francisco of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, to
appear in court on September 20, 2003 to explain why they
should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for the
publication of the article which degraded the court and its
presiding judge with its lies and misrepresentation.
The said Order stated that contrary to the statements in the
article, Judge Buyser described the evidence for the
prosecution as not strong, but sufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused only for homicide. Moreover, it was not true that
Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an unclear
reason. Judge Buyser, in an Order dated August 30, 2002,
declared in open court in the presence of respondent that he
was inhibiting himself from the case due to the harsh
insinuation of respondent that he lacked the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge.
Mark Francisco admitted that the Mindanao Gold Star Daily
caused the publication of the article. He disclosed that
respondent stated that the crime of murder is non-bailable.
When asked by the trial court why he printed such lies, Mr.
Francisco answered that his only source was respondent. Mr.
Francisco clarified that in the statement alleging that Judge
Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an unclear reason,
the phrase "for an unclear reason," was added by the
newspaper's Executive Editor Herby S. Gomez.
Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press
conference, but refused to answer whether he made the
statements in the article until after he shall have filed a motion
to dismiss. For his refusal to answer, the trial court declared
him in contempt of court pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court.
After this, respondent still entertained media interview in a
radio station, and in said interview, again attacked the integrity
of Judge Tan, calling him a judge who does not know the law,
a liar, and a dictator who does not accord due process to the
people. He was ordered by the trial cause to show cause why
he should not be held in contempt and not be suspended from
the practice of law for violating Canon 11 and 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. However, on scheduled hearing
respondent did not appear or informed the court of his absence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Prosec. Bagabuyo violated the canons?
HELD: Yas!
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are
empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom
peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by
law as a consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon
them certain obligations. Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates a lawyer to observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [he]
should insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.05 of Canon
11 states that a lawyer shall submit grievances against a judge
to the proper authorities only.
Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he
admittedly caused the holding of a press conference where he
made statements against the Order dated November 12, 2002
allowing the accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released on
bail.
Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated
that Judge Tan was displaying judicial arrogance in the article
entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing
murder suspect to bail out, which appeared in the August 18,
2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. Respondents
statements in the article, which were made while Crim. Case
No. 5144 was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of
Canon 13, which states that a lawyer shall not make public
statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to
arouse public opinion for or against a party.
In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing,
respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper
authorities only for redress of his grievances against Judge
Tan. Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his disrespect of
the court and its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was
ignorant of the law, that as a mahjong aficionado, he was
studying mahjong instead of studying the law, and that he was
a liar.
Respondent also violated the Lawyers Oath, as he has sworn
to conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his]
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to [his] clients.
As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court,
respondent should have set the example of observing and
maintaining the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers.
Montecillo v. Gica held: It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain
towards the courts a respectful attitude. As an officer of the
court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the
court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has
taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our
democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be
resting on a very shaky foundation.
Gabriel v. Court of Appeals 72 SCRA 272
The petition in the cases at bar for review of the CA decision
which affirmed in toto the Manila CFI’s judgment convicting,
after joint trial, the two petitioners accused of the crime of theft,
was denied for lack of merit. The court further noted that a first
petition for the same purpose filed through another lawyer had
been previously denied and final judgment entered, and cited
Atty. Cornelio Orteza who filed the second petition at bar for
contempT and/or disciplinary action.
Respondent Atty. Orteza still filed without leave of court a
motion for reconsideration of the Court’s resolution denying his
petition for review and after having secured for the purpose an
extension (on the ground of pressure of work) filed on July 12,
1976 his explanation.
The Burden of both pleading is that the first petition to set
aside the CA affirmance of petitioner’s conviction was a special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, while the second petition
was one for review under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Orteza should be cited in contempt
RULING:
YES. The explanation is manifestly unsatisfactory. However
zealous may be counsel's concern and belief in the alleged
innocence of the petitioners, it is elementary that counsel may
not split their appeal into one to set aside the appellate court's
denial of petitioners appellants' motion for reconsideration of its
decision affirming the trial court's judgment of conviction and/or
for new trial (the first petition) and into another to set aside the
appellate court's decision itself, which affirmed the trial court's
conviction of the petitioners-appellants (the second petition).
Such filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the Court's
processes and improper conduct that tends to impede obstruct
and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished
as contempt of court. Needless to add, the lawyer who filed
such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays
the execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects
himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing
any better or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to
act with all good fidelity to the courts and to maintain only such
actions as appear to him to be just and are consistent with
truth and honor.
Respondent Atty. Orteza is therefore adjudged guilty of
contempt of court and is ordered to pay a fine of Five Hundred
(P500.00) pesos with ten (10) days from notice hereof failing
which, he shall be imprisoned for a period of (50) days.
Petitioners' purported motion for reconsideration of the Court's
resolution of June 11, 1976 denying their second petition is
ordered expunged from the records as a sham motion, (as is
the second petition itself), since the decision sought, to be
reviewed has long become final and executory with the entry
on May 10, 1976 of final judgment of denial of the first petition.
Santiago v. Rafanan 440 SCRA 91
Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology filed for the disbarment of Atty.
Edison V. Rafanan. Than Complaint was filed with the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. The petition stated that respondent, in notarizing
several document on different dates failed and/or refused to: a)
make the proper notation regarding the cedula or community
tax certificate of the affiants. B) enter the details of the
notarized documents in the notarial register and c) make and
execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in
the documents he had notarized, all in violation of the notarial
provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.
Complainant likewise alleged that respondent executed an
affidavit in favor of his client and offered the same as evidence
in the case wherein he was actively representing his client. The
IBP Board of Governors modigied the disbarment proposal and
instead imposed a penalty of PHP 3000 wih a warning that any
repetition of the violation will be dealt with a heavier penalty.
Issue:
WON the penalty imposed by the IBP is proper.
Held:
Yes. Atty. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law
and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries
public. They are required to certify that the party to every
document acknowleged before them has presented the proper
Residence certificate or exemption from the residence tax. And
to enter its number, place of issue, and date as part of such
certification. They are also required to maintain and keep a
notarial registed; to enter therein all insruments notarized by
the; and to “give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before them a number corresponding to the one
in their register and to state therein the page or pages of their
register, on which the same is recorded. Failure to perform
these duties would result in the revocation of their commission
as notaries public.
Canon 5 is also violated because the canon state the
obligation of lawyers to be well-informed of the existing laws
and to keep abreast with the legal developments, recent
enactments and jurisprudence which the respondent failed to
satisfy.
Hence, the penalty imposed by the IBP is proper.
Foodsphere v. Mauricio 593 SCRA 367
Foodsphere, Inc, corporation engaged in the business of meat
processing and manufacture and distribution of canned goods
and grocery products under the brand name CDO, filed a
Verified Complaint for disbarment before the Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) against Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio, Jr., popularly known as
Batas Mauricio (respondent), a writer/columnist of tabloids
including Balitang Patas BATAS, Bagong TIKTIK, TORO and
HATAW!, and a host of a television program KAKAMPI MO
ANG BATAS telecast over UNTV and of a radio program
Double B-BATAS NG BAYAN aired over DZBB, for (1) grossly
immoral conduct; (2) violation of lawyers oath and (3)
disrespect to the courts and to investigating prosecutors.
On June 22, 2004, Cordero purportedly bought from a grocery
in Valenzuela City canned goods including a can of CDO Liver
spread. On June 27, 2004, as Cordero and his relatives were
eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they found the spread
to be sour and soon discovered a colony of worms inside the
can. Corderos wife thus filed a complaint with the Bureau of
Food and Drug Administration (BFAD). Laboratory examination
confirmed the presence of parasites in the Liver spread.
Complainant instead offered to return actual medical and
incidental expenses incurred by the Corderos as long as they
were supported by receipts, but the offer was turned down.
And the Corderos threatened to bring the matter to the
attention of the media. Respondent sent complainant via fax a
copy of the front page of the would-be August 10-16, 2004
issue of the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS, Vol. 1, No. 12
which complainant found to contain articles maligning,
discrediting and imputing vices and defects to it and its
products. Respondent threatened to publish the articles unless
complainant gave in to the P150,000 demand of the Corderos.
Complainant thereupon reiterated its counter-offer earlier
conveyed to the Corderos, but respondent turned it down.
The Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN seeking the
withdrawal of their complaint before the BFAD. The BFAD thus
dismissed the complaint. Respondent, who affixed his
signature to the KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one
of his articles/columns in a tabloid that he prepared the
document.
And respondent wrote in his columns in the tabloids articles
which put complainant in bad light. Thus, in the August 31-
September 6, 2004 issue of Balitang Patas BATAS, he wrote
an article captioned KADIRI ANG CDO LIVER SPREAD! In
another article, he wrote IBA PANG PRODUKTO NG CDO
SILIPIN! which appeared in the same publication in its
September 7-13, 2004 issue. And still in the same publication,
its September 14-20, 2004 issue, he wrote another article
entitled DAPAT BANG PIGILIN ANG CDO.
Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against respondent
and several others for Libel and Threatening to Publish Libel
under Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal Code before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and
Valenzuela City. The complaints were pending at he time of
the filing of the present administrative complaint.
The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution No. XVIII-2006-
114 dated March 20, 2006, adopted the findings and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner to suspend
respondent from the practice of law for two years.The Court
finds the findings/evaluation of the IBP well-taken. The Court,
once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the necessity for
every lawyer to act and comport himself in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession, which confidence may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Mauricio violated several
provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility
RULLING:
YES. Respondent suspended for three (3) years from the
practice of law.
By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers
to refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged in
deceitful conduct by, inter alia, taking advantage of the
complaint against CDO to advance his interest to obtain funds
for his BATAS Foundation and seek sponsorships and
advertisements for the tabloids and his television program.
He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which mandates: A lawyer shall not make public
statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to
arouse public opinion for or against a party.
Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which mandate, viz:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and
shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper, by
using intemperate language.
By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting
standards of the legal profession, respondent also violated
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
directs a lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity and the
dignity of the legal profession.
Wherefore, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the
lawyers oath and breach of ethics of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility,
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three years effective
upon his receipt of this Decision. He is WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Jimenez v. Verano/ Lozamo v Verano, A.C. No.
8108/ A.C. No. 10299, July 15, 2014
Brodett and Tecson (identified in media reports attached to the
Complaint as the "Alabang Boys") were the accused in cases
filed by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for
the illegal sale and use of dangerous drugs. 3 In a Joint
Inquest Resolution issued on 2 December 2008, the charges
were dropped for lack of probable cause. 4 Because of the
failure of Prosecutor John R. Resado to ask clarificatory
questions during the evaluation of the case, several media
outlets reported on incidents of bribery and "cover-up"
allegedly prevalent in investigations of the drug trade. This
prompted the House Committee on Illegal Drugs to conduct its
own congressional hearings. It was revealed during one such
hearing that respondent had prepared the release order for his
three clients using the letterhead of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) and the stationery of then Secretary Raul Gonzales.
Jimenez and Vizconde, in their capacity as founders of
Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC), sent a letter
of complaint to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. They stated
that respondent had admitted to drafting the release order, and
had thereby committed a highly irregular and unethical act.
They argued that respondent had no authority to use the DOJ
letterhead and should be penalized for acts unbecoming a
member of the bar.
For his part, Atty. Lozano anchored his Complaint on
respondent's alleged violation of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which states that a lawyer shall
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and
promote respect for legal processes. Atty. Lozano contended
that respondent showed disrespect for the law and legal
processes in drafting the said order and sending it to a high-
ranking public official, even though the latter was not a
government prosecutor.
RESPONDENT'S VERSION
In his Comment, respondent alludes to the Joint Inquest
Resolution dropping the charges against his clients for lack of
probable cause, arguing that the resolution also ordered the
immediate release of Brodett and Tecson. He reasoned that
the high hopes of the accused, together with their families,
came crashing down when the PDEA still refused to release
his clients. Sheer faith in the innocence of his clients and
fidelity to their cause prompted him to prepare and draft the
release order. Respondent admits that perhaps he was
overzealous; yet, "if the Secretary of Justice approves it, then
everything may be expedited." In any case, respondent
continues, the drafted release order was not signed by the
Secretary and therefore remained "a mere scrap of paper with
no effect at all."
FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER
The Commissioner noted that both complaints remained
unsubstantiated, while the letter-complaint of Jimenez and
Vizconde had not been verified. Therefore, no evidence was
adduced to prove the charges. However, by his own
admissions in paragraphs 11 and 12 of his Comment,
respondent drafted the release order specifically for the
signature of the DOJ Secretary. This act of "feeding" the draft
order to the latter was found to be highly irregular, as it tended
to influence a public official. Hence, Commissioner Abelita
found respondent guilty of violating Canon 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommended that he be
issued a warning not to repeat the same or any similar action.
ISSUE:
whether or not the attorney is administratively liable for the
violation of the code of professional responisibility
RULING:
After a careful review of the records, we agree with the IBP in
finding reasonable grounds to hold respondent administratively
liable. Canon 13, the provision applied by the Investigating
Commissioner, states that "a lawyer shall rely upon the merits
of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to
influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court."
We believe that other provisions in the Code of Professional
Responsibility likewise prohibit acts of influence-peddling not
limited to the regular courts, but even in all other venues in the
justice sector, where respect for the rule of law is at all times
demanded from a member of the bar.
During the mandatory hearing conducted by the Committee on
Bar Discipline, respondent stated that the PDEA refused to
release his clients unless it received a direct order from the
DOJ Secretary. This refusal purportedly impelled him to take
more serious action. He personally visited Secretary Gonzales
and according to him he ( Gonzales) was entertaining us, and
we were discussing the case.
Respondent likewise stated that his "experience with Secretary
Gonzales is, he is very open;" and that "because of my
practice and well, candidly I belong also to a political family, my
father was a Congressman. So, he (Gonzalez) knows of the
family and he knows my sister was a Congresswoman of
Pasay and they were together in Congress. In other words, I
am not a complete stranger to him." Upon questioning by
Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco, respondent admitted that he
was personally acquainted with the Secretary; however, they
were not that close.
These statements and others made during the hearing
establish respondent's admission that 1) he personally
approached the DOJ Secretary despite the fact that the case
was still pending before the latter; and 2) respondent caused
the preparation of the draft release order on official DOJ
stationery despite being unauthorized to do so, with the end in
view of "expediting the case."
The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear
intent to gain special treatment and consideration from a
government agency. This is precisely the type of improper
behavior sought to be regulated by the codified norms for the
bar. Respondent is duty-bound to actively avoid any act that
tends to influence, or may be seen to influence, the outcome of
an ongoing case, lest the people's faith in the judicial process
is diluted. The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but
to the administration of justice. To that end, their clients'
success is wholly subordinate. Rule 1.02 states: "A lawyer
shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal system." Further,
according to Rule 15.06, "a lawyer shall not state or imply that
he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative
body." The succeeding rule, Rule 15.07, mandates a lawyer "to
impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the
principles of fairness."
Zeal and persistence in advancing a client's cause must
always be within the bounds of the law. Given the import of the
case, a warning is a mere slap on the wrist that would not
serve as commensurate penalty for the offense.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Felisberto L.
Verano, Jr. is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.02 and 15.07,
in relation to Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for six (6) months effective immediately. This also
serves as an emphatic WARNING that repetition of any similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be appended to the respondent's
bar records. The Court Administrator is hereby directed to
inform the different courts of this suspension.
SO ORDERED.
Chapter 4 (14-15) Attorney Client
Relationship
Uy v. Gonzales, A.C. No. 5280
William S. Uy filed before this Court an administrative case
against Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales for violation of the
confidentiality of their lawyer-client relationship. The
complainant alleges:
Sometime in April 1999, he engaged the services of
respondent lawyer to prepare and file a petition for the
issuance of a new certificate of title. After confiding with
respondent the circumstances surrounding the lost title and
discussing the fees and costs, respondent prepared, finalized
and submitted to him a petition to be filed before the RTC.
When the petition was about to be filed, respondent went to his
(complainants) office and demanded a certain amount from
him other than what they had previously agreed upon. The
petitioner was shocked to find out later that instead of filing the
petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title, respondent
filed a letter-complaint against him with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor for Falsification of Public Documents.
The letter-complaint contained facts and circumstances
pertaining to the transfer certificate of title that was the subject
matter of the petition which respondent was supposed to have
filed.
Respondent maintains that the lawyer-client relationship
between him and complainant was terminated when he gave
the handwritten letter to complainant; that there was no longer
any professional relationship between the two of them when he
filed the letter-complaint for falsification of public document;
that the facts and allegations contained in the letter-complaint
for falsification were culled from public documents procured
from the Office of the Register of Deeds in Tayug, Pangasinan.
In a Resolution dated October 18, 2000, the Court referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. Commissioner
Villanueva-Maala ordered both parties to appear before the
IBP. On said date, complainant did not appear despite due
notice. There was no showing that respondent received the
notice for that days hearing and so the hearing was reset.
On April 29, 2003, Commissioner received a letter from one
Atty. Augusto M. Macam, stating that his client, William S. Uy,
had lost interest in pursuing the complaint he filed against Atty.
Gonzales and requesting that the case against Atty. Gonzales
be dismissed.
On June 2, 2003, Commissioner submitted her report and
recommendation, portions of which read as follows:
When respondent filed the Letter-Complaint to the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, he violated Canon 21 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which expressly provides that A
lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client
even after the attorney-client relation is terminated.
Respondent cannot argue that there was no lawyer-client
relationship between them when he filed the Letter-Complaint.
The duty to maintain inviolate the clients confidences and
secrets is not temporary but permanent. It is in effect perpetual
for it outlasts the lawyers employment (Canon 37, Code of
Professional Responsibility) which means even after the
relationship has been terminated, the duty to preserve the
clients confidences and secrets remains effective. Likewise
Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Rules of Professional
Responsibility provides that A lawyer shall not, to the
disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the
course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own
advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with the
full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
On 29 April 2003, the Commission received a letter dated 24
April 2003 from Atty. Augusto M. Macam, who claims to
represent complainant, William S. Uy, alleging that
complainant is no longer interested in pursuing this case and
requested that the same be dismissed. The aforesaid letter
hardly deserves consideration as proceedings of this nature
cannot be interrupted by reason of desistance, settlement,
compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of
the complainant to prosecute the same. (Section 5, Rule 139-B,
Rules of Court). Moreover, in Boliver vs. Simbol, 16 SCRA 623,
the Court ruled that any person may bring to this Courts
attention the misconduct of any lawyer, and action will usually
be taken regardless of the interest or lack of interest of the
complainant, if the facts proven so warrant.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty.
Fermin L. Gonzales to have violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility and it is hereby recommended that he be
SUSPENDED for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS from receipt
hereof, from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and
member of the Bar.[10]
On June 21, 2003, the Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines issued Resolution No. XV-2003-365
adopted and approved the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.
A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense
a civil action. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private
interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They
are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice
from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them.
The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as
an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who
called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in
the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on
record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or
disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his
withdrawal of the charges.
ISSUE:
WON the suspension was valid?
HELD:
No. A scrutiny of the records reveals that the relationship
between complainant and respondent stemmed from a
personal transaction or dealings between them rather than the
practice of law by respondent. Respondent dealt with
complainant only because he redeemed a property which
complainant had earlier purchased from his (complainants) son.
It is not refuted that respondent paid complainant P340,000.00
and gave him ample time to produce its title and execute the
Deed of Redemption. However, despite the period given to him,
complainant failed to fulfill his end of the bargain because of
the alleged loss of the title which he had admitted to
respondent as having prematurely transferred to his children,
thus prompting respondent to offer his assistance so as to
secure the issuance of a new title to the property, in lieu of the
lost one, with complainant assuming the expenses therefor.
As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a
lawyer voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation
of a person, who in respect to a business or trouble of any kind,
consults a lawyer with a view of obtaining professional advice
or assistance. It is not essential that the client should have
employed the attorney on any previous occasion or that any
retainer should have been paid, promised or charged for,
neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not
afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was
had, for as long as the advice and assistance of the attorney is
sought and received, in matters pertinent to his profession.
Considering the attendant peculiar circumstances, said rule
cannot apply to the present case. Evidently, the facts alleged in
the complaint for Estafa Through Falsification of Public
Documents filed by respondent against complainant were
obtained by respondent due to his personal dealings with
complainant. Respondent volunteered his service to hasten the
issuance of the certificate of title of the land he has redeemed
from complainant. Respondents immediate objective was to
secure the title of the property that complainant had earlier
bought from his son. Clearly, there was no attorney-client
relationship between respondent and complainant. The
preparation and the proposed filing of the petition was only
incidental to their personal transaction.
The alleged secrets of complainant were not specified by him
in his affidavit-complaint. Whatever facts alleged by
respondent against complainant were not obtained by
respondent in his professional capacity but as a redemptioner
of a property originally owned by his deceased son and
therefore, when respondent filed the complaint for estafa
against herein complainant, which necessarily involved
alleging facts that would constitute estafa, respondent was not,
in any way, violating Canon 21. There is no way we can equate
the filing of the affidavit-complaint against herein complainant
to a misconduct that is wanting in moral character, in honesty,
probity and good demeanor or that renders him unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court. To hold otherwise would be
precluding any lawyer from instituting a case against anyone to
protect his personal or proprietary interests.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XV-2003-365 dated June 21,
2003 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the administrative case filed against Atty.
Fermin L. Gonzales, docketed as A.C. No. 5280, is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Regala v. Sandinganbayan, G.R. No. 105938.
September 20, 1996
The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of
the Complaint on July 31, 1987 before the Sandiganbayan by
the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government against Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the
recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of
stocks in the named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil
Case No. 0033), entitled "Republic of the Philippines versus
Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."1
Among the dependants named in the case are herein
petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V.
Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P.
Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and
herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then
partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala
and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA
Law Firm). ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its
clients, which included, among others, the organization and
acquisition of business associations and/or organizations, with
the correlative and incidental services where its members
acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. More
specifically, in the performance of these services, the members
of the law firm delivered to its client documents which
substantiate the client's equity holdings, i.e., stock certificates
endorsed in blank representing the shares registered in the
client's name, and a blank deed of trust or assignment covering
said shares. In the course of their dealings with their clients,
the members of the law firm acquire information relative to the
assets of clients as well as their personal and business
circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm,
petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they
assisted in the organization and acquisition of the companies
included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the office
practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of
the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings.2
On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential Commission on
Good Government (hereinafter referred to as respondent
PCGG) filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and
"Third Amended Complaint" which excluded private
respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case
No. 33 as party-defendant.3 Respondent PCGG based its
exclusion of private respondent Roco as party-defendant on
his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s
for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies
involved in PCGG Case No. 33.
Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their
"COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October 8, 1991
with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the
same treatment to them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as
accorded private respondent Roco.8 The Counter-Motion for
dropping petitioners from the complaint was duly set for
hearing on October 18, 1991 in accordance with the
requirements of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following
conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, namely:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of
documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c)
the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners
executed in favor of its client covering their respective
shareholdings.9
Consequently, respondent PCGG presented supposed proof to
substantiate compliance by private respondent Roco of the
conditions precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as party-
defendant in PCGG Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to
respondent PCGG of the counsel of respondent Roco dated
May 24, 1989 reiterating a previous request for reinvestigation
by the PCGG in PCGG Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit dated March
8, 1989 executed by private respondent Roco as Attachment to
the letter aforestated in (a); and (c) Letter of the Roco, Bunag,
and Kapunan Law Offices dated September 21, 1988 to the
respondent PCGG in behalf of private respondent Roco
originally requesting the reinvestigation and/or re-examination
of the evidence of the PCGG against Roco in its Complaint in
PCGG Case No. 33. 10
It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private
respondent Roco did not refute petitioners' contention that he
did actually not reveal the identity of the client involved in
PCGG Case No. 33, nor had he undertaken to reveal the
identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.
Held:
I But the lawyer-client relationship is more than that of the
It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the
PCGG as co-defendants to force them to disclose the identity
of their clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after
petitioners but the "bigger fish" as they say in street parlance.
This ploy is quite clear from the PCGG's willingness to cut a
deal with petitioners — the names of their clients in exchange
for exclusion from the complaint. The statement of the
Sandiganbayan in its questioned resolution dated March 18,
1992 is explicit:
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing
the identity of the client for whom they have acted, i.e, their
principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do identify
their clients, considerations of whether or not the privilege
claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to be
debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from
the consequences of their acts until they have begun to
establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence
and identity of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been
impleaded by the PCGG as defendants herein. (Emphasis ours)
In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of the
Sandiganbayan, Third Division, entitled "Primavera Farms, Inc.,
et al. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government"
respondent PCGG, through counsel Mario Ongkiko,
manifested at the hearing on December 5, 1991 that the
PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA that their "so
called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco;" that "it was Mr.
Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to those
subscription payments in corporations included in Annex "A" of
the Third Amended Complaint; that the ACCRA lawyers
executed deeds of trust and deeds of assignment, some in the
name of particular persons; some in blank.
It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their
clients as defendants in the complaint. Petitioners are being
prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services
performed in the course of their duties as lawyers. Quite
obviously, petitioners' inclusion as co-defendants in the
complaint is merely being used as leverage to compel them to
name their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to
nail these clients. Such being the case, respondent PCGG has
no valid cause of action as against petitioners and should
exclude them from the Third Amended Complaint.
II
The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the
Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio operarum (contract
of lease of services) where one person lets his services and
another hires them without reference to the object of which the
services are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services may
be compensated by honorarium or for hire, 17 and mandato
(contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could
be placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that
he gained by the contract to the person who requested him. 18
principal-agent and lessor-lessee.
In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an
attorney is more than a mere agent or servant, because he
possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on
him by his client. 19 A lawyer is also as independent as the
judge of the court, thus his powers are entirely different from
and superior to those of an ordinary agent.20 Moreover, an
attorney also occupies what may be considered as a "quasi-
judicial office" since he is in fact an officer of the Court 21 and
exercises his judgment in the choice of courses of action to be
taken favorable to his client.
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are
rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among
those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate,
exacting and confidential character, requiring a very high
degree of fidelity and good faith, 22 that is required by reason
of necessity and public interest 23 based on the hypothesis
that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is
an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice.
In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of
Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine Commission on
August 7, 1901. Section 383 of the Code specifically "forbids
counsel, without authority of his client to reveal any
communication made by the client to him or his advice given
thereon in the course of professional employment." 28 Passed
on into various provisions of the Rules of Court, the attorney-
client privilege, as currently worded provides:
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be
examined as to any communication made by the client to him,
or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to,
professional employment, can an attorney's secretary,
stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the
client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of
which has been acquired in such capacity.
The question now arises whether or not this duty may be
asserted in refusing to disclose the name of petitioners' client(s)
in the case at bar. Under the facts and circumstances obtaining
in the instant case, the answer must be in the affirmative.
As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be
shrouded in mystery 30 Under this premise, the general rule in
our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer
may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or
identity of this client. 31
The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose
privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and
blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-
client relationship has been established. The attorney-client
privilege does not attach until there is a client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of
the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing
party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. "A party
suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is." 32 He
cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces.
33
Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is
however qualified by some important exceptions.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists
that revealing the client's name would implicate that client in
the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.
2) 2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability;
his identity is privileged. For instance, the peculiar facts and
circumstances of Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corporation,37
prompted the New York Supreme Court to allow a lawyer's
claim to the effect that he could not reveal the name of his
client because this would expose the latter to civil litigation.
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an
attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the said
name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of
testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the
client's name is privileged.
Aninon v. Sabitsana, 669 SCRA 46
In her complaint, Josefina M. Aniñon (complainant) related that
she previously engaged the legal services of Atty. Sabitsana in
the preparation and execution in her favor of a Deed of Sale
over a parcel of land owned by her late common-law husband,
Brigido Caneja, Jr. Atty. Sabitsana allegedly violated her
confidence when he subsequently filed a civil case against her
for the annulment of the Deed of Sale in behalf of Zenaida L.
Cañete, the legal wife of Brigido Caneja, Jr. The complainant
accused Atty. Sabitsana of using the confidential information
he obtained from her in filing the civil case. Atty. Sabitsana
admitted having advised the complainant in the preparation
and execution of the Deed of Sale. However, he denied having
received any confidential information. Atty. Sabitsana asserted
that the present disbarment complaint was instigated by one
Atty. Gabino Velasquez, Jr., the notary of the disbarment
complaint who lost a court case against him (Atty. Sabitsana)
and had instigated the complaint for this reason. The
disbarment complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report and
Recommendation, IBP Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo Jr.
found Atty. Sabitsana administratively liable for representing
conflicting interests. The IBP Commissioner opined that, In the
case of Bautista vs. Barrios, it was held that a lawyer may not
handle a case to nullify a contract which he prepared and
thereby take up inconsistent positions. Granting that Zenaida L.
Cañete, respondent's present client in Civil Case did not
initially learn about the sale executed by Bontes in favor of
complainant thru the confidences and information divulged by
complainant to respondent in the course of the preparation of
the said deed of sale, respondent nonetheless has a duty to
decline his current employment as counsel of Zenaida Cañete
in view of the rule prohibiting representation of conflicting
interests. Also, in support of IBP’s Resolution, it cited then
case, In re De la Rosa and it clearly suggests that a lawyer
may not represent conflicting interests in the absence of the
written consent of all parties concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts. IBP Commisser said that In the present
case, no such written consent was secured by respondent
before accepting employment as Mrs. Cañete's counsel-of-
record. The former ruled that, Complainant and respondent's
present client, being contending claimants to the same
property, the conflict of interest is obviously present. There is
said to be inconsistency of interest when on behalf of one
client, it is the attorney's duty to contend for that which his duty
to another client requires him to oppose. The IBP
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Sabitsana be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
The case was transmitted to the IBP Board of Governors, it
resolved to adopt and approve the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner after finding it to be
fully supported by the evidence on record, the applicable laws
and rules. Atty. Sabitsana moved to reconsider the above
resolution, but the IBP Board of Governors denied his motion
in a resolution dated July 30, 2004.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of misconduct for
representing conflicting interests.
HELD:
After a careful study of the records, the court agree with the
findings and recommendations of the IBP Commissioner and
the IBP Board of Governors. The relationship between a
lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the
highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of
confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of
the client's most confidential information to his/her lawyer for
an unhampered exchange of information between them.
Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential
information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the
lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part,
is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all
dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the lawyer's
duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests,
a matter covered by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, saying that, “A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.” "The
proscription against representation of conflicting interests
applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present
clients in the same action or in an unrelated action." The
prohibition also applies even if the "lawyer would not be called
upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to
oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion
to use the confidential information acquired from one to the
disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly
unrelated." To be held accountable under this rule, it is
"enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom
would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or
conditions of the lawyer's respective retainers with each of
them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided
fidelity to both clients."
Three tests in determining whether a violation of the above rule
is present in a given case.
1.) One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an
issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to
oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyer's
argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer
in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.
2.) Test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance
of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the
lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance of that duty.
3.) Another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in
the new relation to use against a former client any confidential
information acquired through their connection or previous
employment.
The court found that, Atty. Sabitsana's violation of the above
rule, as established by the following circumstances on
record:One, his legal services were initially engaged by the
complainant to protect her interest over a certain property. The
records show that upon the legal advice of Atty. Sabitsana, the
Deed of Sale over the property was prepared and executed in
the complainant's favor.Two, Atty. Sabitsana met with Zenaida
Cañete to discuss the latter's legal interest over the property
subject of the Deed of Sale. At that point, Atty. Sabitsana
already had knowledge that Zenaida Cañete's interest clashed
with the complainant's interests.Three, despite the knowledge
of the clashing interests between his two clients, Atty.
Sabitsana accepted the engagement from Zenaida
Cañete.Four, Atty. Sabitsana's actual knowledge of the
conflicting interests between his two clients was demonstrated
by his own actions: first, he filed a case against the
complainant in behalf of Zenaida Cañete; second, he
impleaded the complainant as the defendant in the case; and
third, the case he filed was for the annulment of the Deed of
Sale that he had previously prepared and executed for the
complainant.
By his acts, not only did Atty. Sabitsana agree to represent one
client against another client in the same action; he also
accepted a new engagement that entailed him to contend and
oppose the interest of his other client in a property in which his
legal services had been previously retained.
To be sure, Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides an exception to the above prohibition.
However, we find no reason to apply the exception due to Atty.
Sabitsana's failure to comply with the requirements set forth
under the rule. Atty. Sabitsana did not make a full disclosure of
facts to the complainant and to Zenaida Cañete before he
accepted the new engagement with Zenaida Cañete. The
records likewise show that although Atty. Sabitsana wrote a
letter to the complainant informing her of Zenaida Cañete's
adverse claim to the property covered by the Deed of Sale and,
urging her to settle the adverse claim; Atty. Sabitsana however
did not disclose to the complainant that he was also being
engaged as counsel by Zenaida Cañete. Moreover, the
records show that Atty. Sabitsana failed to obtain the written
consent of his two clients, as required by Rule 15.03, Canon
15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, we find — as the IBP Board of Governors did —
Atty. Sabitsana guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting
interests. We likewise agree with the penalty of suspension for
one (1) year from the practice of law recommended by the IBP
Board of Governors. This penalty
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to
ADOPT the findings and recommendations of the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty.
Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is found GUILTY of misconduct for
representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03,
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law.
Atty. Sabitsana is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of
his receipt of this Decision so that we can determine the
reckoning point when his suspension shall take effect.
SO ORDERED.
Santiago v. Fojas, 248 SCRA 68
Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma.
Socorro Manas, and Trinidad Nordista were the President,
Vice-President, Treasurer, and Auditor, respectively, of the
FEUFA. They allegedly expelled from the union Paulino
Salvador. The latter then commenced with the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) a complaint to declare illegal
his expulsion from the union.
In his resolution, Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin declared illegal
Salvador's expulsion and directed the union and all its officers
to reinstate Salvador's name in the roll of union members with
all the rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. This resolution
was affirmed in toto by the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, a complaint against the
complainants herein for actual, moral, and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees, under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil
Code. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3526-V-91.
As the complainants' counsel, the respondent filed a motion to
dismiss the said case on grounds of (1) res judicata by virtue of
the final decision of the Med-Arbiter and (2) lack of jurisdiction,
since what was involved was an intra-union issue cognizable
by the DOLE. Later, he filed a supplemental motion to dismiss.
The trial court, per Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, granted
the motion and ordered the dismissal of the case. Upon
Salvador's motion for reconsideration, however, it reconsidered
the order of dismissal, reinstated the case, and required the
complainants herein to file their answer within a nonextendible
period of fifteen days from notice.
Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration and dismissal of the case. This motion having
been
denied, the respondent filed with this Court a petition for
certiorari, which was later referred to the Court of Appeals.
Although that petition and his subsequent motion for
reconsideration were both denied, the respondent still did not
file the complainants' answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91.
Hence, upon plaintiff Salvador's motion, the complainants were
declared in default, and Salvador was authorized to present his
evidence ex-parte.
The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order of
default and to stop the ex-parte reception of evidence before
the Clerk of Court, but to no avail.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the
complainants herein to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff
Salvador the amounts of moral damages, exemplary damages
or corrective damages; and attorney's fees; plus cost of suit.
The complainants, still assisted by the respondent, elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals, which, however, affirmed in
toto the decision of the trial court.
The respondent asserts that he was about to appeal the said
decision to this Court, but his services as counsel for the
complainants and for the union were illegally and unilaterally
terminated by complainant Veronica Santiago.
ISSUE: W
hether the respondent committed culpable negligence, as
would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the
complainants an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 for which
reason the latter were declared in default and judgment was
rendered against them on the basis of the plaintiff's evidence,
which was received ex-parte.
HELD:
Yes. It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as
adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become
his client. He has the right to decline employment, subject,
however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client,
the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must
serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion
the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion.
This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any
and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of
the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such
remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is
because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it
the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court,
to the bar, and to the public.
on the final decision of the Med-Arbiter declaring the
complainants' act of expelling Salvador from the union to be
illegal. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility expressly provides: A lawyer, when advising his
client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and
probable results of the client's case, neither overstating nor
understanding the prospects of the case.
WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby
REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be, henceforth, more
careful in the performance of his duty to his clients.

In his motion for reconsideration of the default order, the Castro-Justo v. Galing, A.C. No. 6174,
respondent explained his non-filing of the required answer by
November 16, 2011
impliedly invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume
and pressure of legal work, while in his Comment in this case
In 2003, complainant Lydia Castro-Justo engaged the services
he attributes it to honest mistake and excusable neglect due to
of respondent Atty. Rodolfo Galing in connection with
his overzealousness to question the denial order of the trial
dishonored checks issued by Manila City Councilor Arlene W.
court.
Koa (Ms. Koa). After she paid his professional fees, the
respondent drafted and sent a letter to Ms. Koa demanding
Certainly, "overzealousness" on the one hand and "volume and
payment of the checks.Respondent advised complainant to
pressure of legal work" on the other are two distinct and
wait for the lapse of the period indicated in the demand letter
separate causes or grounds. The first presupposes the
before filing her complaint. complainant filed a criminal
respondent's full and continuing awareness of his duty to file
complaint against Ms. Koa for estafa and violation of Batas
an answer which, nevertheless, he subordinated to his
Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
conviction that the trial court had committed a reversible error
Manila. Complainant then received a copy of Motion for
or grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order reconsidering
Consolidation that was filed for the respondent on behalf of the
its previous order of dismissal of Salvador's complaint and in
opposing party. Complainant submits that by representing
denying the motion to reconsider the said order. The second
conflicting interests, respondent violated the Code of
ground is purely based on forgetfulness because of his other
Professional Responsibility.He admitted that he drafted a
commitments.
demand letter for complainant but argued that it was made only
in deference to their long standing friendship and not by reason
Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains
of a professional engagement as professed by complainant.
that the respondent did not comply with his duty to file an
He denied receiving any professional fee for the services he
answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. His lack of diligence was
rendered. It was allegedly their understanding that complainant
compounded by his erroneous belief that the trial court
would have to retain the services of another lawyer. He alleged
committed such error or grave abuse of discretion and by his
that complainant, based on that agreement, engaged the
continued refusal to file an answer even after he received the
services of Atty. Manuel A. Ao.respondent stated that the
Court of Appeals' decision in the certiorari case. There is no
movants in these cases are mother and daughter while
showing whatsoever that he further assailed the said decision
complainants are likewise mother and daughter and that these
before this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
cases arose out from the same transaction. Thus, movants and
Rules of Court to prove his claim of overzealousness to
complainants will be adducing the same sets of evidence and
challenge the trial court's order. Neither was it shown that he
witnesses. Respondent argued that no lawyer-client
alleged in his motion to lift the order of default that the
relationship existed between him and complainant because
complainants had a meritorious defense. And, in his appeal
there was no professional fee paid for the services he rendered.
from the
Complainant filed filed the instant administrative complaint
against Atty.Galing seeking his disbarment from the practice of
judgment by default, he did not even raise as one of the errors
law for violation of Canon 15 of Code of Professional
of the trial court either the impropriety of the order of default or
Responsibility and conflict of interest.
the court's grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to
lift that order. The respondent committed a breach of Canon 18
ISSUE:
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires him
to serve his clients, the complainants herein, with diligence and,
Whether or not the respondent violated Canon 15 Rule 15.03
more specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof which provides: "A lawyer
of Code of Professional Responsibility.
shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."
HELD:

The respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that

Yes, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a "losing cause" for the
Philippines (IBP) found respondent guilty of violating Canon 15,
complainants since the claims therein for damages were based
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by
representing conflicting interests and for his daring audacity
and for the pronounced malignancy of his act. Under Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that [a]
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of the facts. Respondent was therefore bound to refrain from
representing parties with conflicting interests in a controversy.
The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is
founded on principles of public policy and good taste. A lawyer-
client relationship can exist notwithstanding the close
friendship between complainant and respondent. The
relationship was established the moment complainant sought
legal advice from respondent regarding the dishonored checks.
By drafting the demand letter respondent further affirmed such
relationship. The fact that the demand letter was not utilized in
the criminal complaint filed and that respondent was not
eventually engaged by complainant to represent her in the
criminal cases is of no moment. In the course of the lawyer-
client relationship, the lawyer learns of the facts connected with
the clients case, including the weak and strong points of the
case. The nature of the relationship is, therefore, one of trust
and confidence
of the highest degree.It behooves lawyers not only to keep
inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers,
which is of paramount importance in the administration of
justice.The excuse proffered by respondent that it was not him
but Atty. Ao who was eventually engaged by complainant will
not exonerate him from the clear violation of Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The take- over of a clients
cause of action by another lawyer does not give the former
lawyer the right to represent the opposing party. It is not only
malpractice but also constitutes a violation of the confidence
resulting from the attorney-client relationship.Considering that
it is respondents first infraction, the disbarment sought in the
complaint is deemed to be too severe. As recommended by
the Board of Governors of the IBP,respondent is suspended
from the practice of law for one (1) year.
Jimenez v. Francisco, A.C. No. 10548,
December 10, 2014
Summary: Eto, yung mark Jimenez, may stocks siya na
binigay niya sa common law partner niya siguro para di kunin
kasi madami siya cases for fraud talaga (pinaextradite pa nga
siya ni US eh.) ngayon, nagkaonsehan na sa corp.,so nagfile
sila mark and atty. Francisco ng complaint for estafa against
numerous people. NGAYON omg juicy part: etong Atty.
Francisco pala binibigyan ni hunny bunch Caroline ng chika
chika about the company. Sila nagdraft and legal counsel ng
corp tapos shookt af si ate gurl nung kinasuhan na siya for
estafa (Pipiliin mo kasi itatrust mo in life.) Walang atty-client
relationship so hindi privilege yung communication.
Facts:
Mario Crespo, otherwise known as Mark Jimenez (Jimenez),
filed a complaint for estafa against complainant, her sister
Rosemarie Flaminiano, Marcel Crespo, Geraldine Antonio,
Brenda Heffron, Magdalena Cunanan, and Isabel Gonzalez.
Jimenez alleged that he was the true and beneficial owner of
the shares of stock in Clarion Realty and Development
Corporation. On November 5, 2002, Jimenez transferred all his
shares to complainant by another deed of assignment, making
her the holder of Clarion shares amounting to P1,249,997.00.
According to Jimenez's complaint, while he was in prison in the
United States in 2004(Naextradite na kasi siya dun [Sec. of
Justice vs. Lantion]), he learned from Atty. Francisco that his
son, Marcel Crespo (Marcel), approached the complainant and
threatened her, claiming that the United States Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) was about to go after their properties.
Marcel succeeded in persuading complainant to transfer her
nominal shares in Clarion to Geraldine Antonio, through
another deed of assignment. Again, this was reflected in
Clarion's GIS for the year 2004.
Thereafter, Jimenez was informed by Atty. Francisco that,
through fraudulent means, complainant and her co-
respondents in the estafa case, put the Forbes property for
sale sometime in August 2004. The said property was
eventually sold to Philmetro Southwest Enterprise, Inc.
(Philmetro) for the amount of P118,000,000.00 without
Jimenez's knowledge. This sale was again undervalued at
P78,000,000.00 per the deed of sale. Atty. Francisco relayed
to Jimenez that he was the one who received the payment for
the sale of the Forbes property and that he handed all the
proceeds thereof to Rosemarie Flaminiano in the presence of
complainant.
Jimenez's complaint for estafa was based on complainant's
alleged participation in the fraudulent means in selling the
Forbes property which was acquired by Clarion with Jimenez's
money. Complainant was duty-bound to remit all the proceeds
of the sale to Jimenez as the true and beneficial owner.
Complainant and her co-respondents, however,
misappropriated and converted the funds for their personal use
and benefit.
Complainant was shocked upon reading the allegations in the
complaint for estafa filed by Jimenez against her. She felt even
more betrayed when she read the affidavit of Atty. Francisco,
on whom she relied as her personal lawyer and Clarion's
corporate counsel and secretary of Clarion. This prompted her
to file a disciplinary case against Atty. Francisco for
representing conflicting interests. According to her, she usually
conferred with Atty. Francisco regarding the legal implications
of Clarion's transactions. More significantly, the principal
documents relative to the sale and transfer of Clarion's
property were all prepared and drafted by Atty. Francisco or
the members of his law office. 7 Atty. Francisco was the one
who actively participated in the transactions involving the sale
of the Forbes property. Without admitting the truth of the
allegations in his affidavit, complainant argued that its
execution clearly betrayed the trust and confidence she
reposed on him as a lawyer. For this reason, complainant
prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Francisco.
Atty. Francisco mainly argued that he violated neither the rule
on disclosures of privileged communication nor the proscription
against representing conflicting interests, on the ground that
complainant was not his client. He was the lawyer of Jimenez
and the legal counsel of Clarion, but never of the complainant.
He might have assisted her in some matters, but these were all
under the notion that Jimenez had given him authority to do so.
Further, though he acted as legal counsel for Clarion, no
attorney-client relationship between him and complainant was
formed, as a corporation has a separate and distinct
personality from its shareholders.
Investigating Commissioner: Guilty of violations of CPR,
suspended for 1 year. Andami kasi niyang inamin na
kagaguhan (as alluded to by Atty. Francisco, the report stated
that it would appear that the latter permitted
misrepresentations as to Clarion's ownership to be reported to
the SEC through its GIS.)
IBP: Suspended for 1 year.
Atty. Francisco appealed to the compassion of the IBP-BOG,
reasoning out that the penalty of suspension of one (1) year is
too severe considering that in his more than three decades of
practice, he had never been involved in any act that would
warrant the imposition of disciplinary action upon him.
MR: denied by IBP
Issue:
WON Atty. Francisco had violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Canon 1, 10, 15 and lawyers oath)
Held:
Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to
laws and legal processes. To the best of his ability, a lawyer is
expected to respect and abide by the law and, thus, avoid any
act or omission that is contrary thereto. A lawyer's personal
deference to the law not only speaks of his character but it also
inspires respect and obedience to the law, on the part of the
public. Rule 1.0, on the other hand, states the norm of conduct
to be observed by all lawyers.
Any act or omission that is contrary to, or prohibited or
unauthorized by, or in defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards
the law is "unlawful.""Unlawful" conduct does not necessarily
imply the element of criminality although the concept is broad
enough to include such element. 16 To be "dishonest" means
the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; be
unworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in
principle, fairness and straightforwardness 17 while conduct
that is "deceitful" means the proclivity for fraudulent and
deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used
upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice
and damage of the party imposed upon. 18
Membership in the legal profession is bestowed upon
individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to
possess good moral character. Lawyers should act and
comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach, in order to promote the public's faith in the
legal profession.
In the facts obtaining in this case, Atty. Francisco clearly
violated the canons and his sworn duty. He is guilty of
engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct when he admitted
to having allowed his corporate client, Clarion, to actively
misrepresent to the SEC, the significant matters regarding its
corporate purpose and subsequently, its corporate
shareholdings.
RULE ON CONFLICTING INTEREST AND DISCLOSURE OF
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION:
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR provides that, "[a] lawyer
shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts." 24 "The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client
should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and
confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must
prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client's most
confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered
exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a
client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer
based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy
and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to
observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with the client. Part of the lawyer's duty in this
regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests. . ." 25 Thus,
even if lucrative fees offered by prospective clients are at stake,
a lawyer must decline professional employment if the same
would trigger a violation of the prohibition against conflict of
interest.
From the foregoing, it is obvious that the rule on conflict of
interests presupposes a lawyer-client relationship. The
purpose of the rule is precisely to protect the fiduciary nature of
the ties between an attorney and his client. Conversely, a
lawyer may not be precluded from accepting and representing
other clients on the ground of conflict of interests, if the lawyer-
client relationship does not exist in favor of a party in the first
place.
Markedly, Atty. Francisco could have prevented his
entanglement with this fiasco among the members of
Jimenez's family by taking an upfront and candid stance in
dealing with Jimenez's children and complainant. He could
have been staunch in reminding the latter that his tasks were
performed in his capacity as legal counsel for Clarion and
Jimenez. Be that as it may, Atty. Francisco's indiscretion does
not detract the Court from finding that the totality of evidence
presented by the complainant miserably failed to discharge the
burden of proving that Atty. Francisco was her lawyer. At most,
he served as the legal counsel of Clarion and, based on the
affirmation presented, of Jimenez. Suffice it to say,
complainant failed to establish that Atty. Francisco committed a
violation of the rule on conflict of interests.

FACTORS ESSENTIAL TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF

LAWYER-CLIENT PRIVILEGE:

1. There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective

attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of this
relationship that the client made the communication.

2. The client made the communication in confidence. The mere

relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of
confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be
confidential.

3. The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his

professional capacity.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Edgar B. Francisco

GUILTY of violation of Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for which he is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon
receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a
commission of the same or similar offense in the future will
result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.