On Cracking That Nut, Absolute Space

Author(s): Robert Weingard

Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Jun., 1977), pp. 288-291
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science
Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/187352
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 DISCUSSION

ON CRACKING THAT NUT, ABSOLUTE SPACE*

ROBERT WEINGARD

Rutgers College

In his recent "The Identity of Indiscernibles," Ian Hacking writes

approvingly of Leibniz's use of the Identity of Indiscernibles (I/I)
"as a nutcracker to crush absolute space" ([3], p. 251). Hacking's
point, often made in the literature, is that the familiar spatiotemporal
examples, such as a universe consisting of only two otherwise identical
objects (say two raindrops) at different spatial locations, cannot show
that the I/I is false since they are question begging. They presuppose
absolute (or substantial) space (or space-time) which itself is incompat-
ible with the I/I.
In fact, Hacking concludes that it is not only the familiar examples
that are at fault. Rather, it is simply "vain to contemplate possible
spatiotemporal worlds to refute or establish the identity of indis-
cernibles" ([3], p. 249). Perhaps Hacking is right about this last
point-it depends, I suspect, on what one takes the proper statement
of the I/I to be. The point I want to make here is just that rather
than being a "nutcracker" which crushes absolute space, the I/I
provides no reason for thinking space (or space-time) is not an absolute
or substantial entity. Indeed, I think the situation is reversed. If the
I / I is incompatible with the existence of absolute space (or space-time),
that would provide good reason for thinking the I/I is false.
Consider, then, the Leibnizian argument, using the I/I, against
absolute space: If there were absolute space (space-time), then the
possible world consisting of the totality of the material universe
displaced "rigidly" ten feet in a certain direction would be a different
universe than the actual universe. But, argues the Leibnizian, since
all the properties material entities have, and all the relations they
bear to each other are the same in these two universes, there is
no discernible difference between them. Thus, by the I/I, there are
not two different universes here and so the hypothesis which leads
us to think there are two different universes, namely that there is

*Received June, 1976.

Philosophy of Science, 44 (1977) pp. 288-291.

Copyright ? 1977 by the Philosophy of Science Association.

288

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 ON CRACKING THAT NUT, ABSOLUTE SPACE 289

absolute space, is false. As Hacking puts it in talking about the two-drop

universe:

Nowadays few people would stick their heels in and insist on

absolute space-time . . ., for that would also imply that a two-drop
universe whose drops move 10 yards along the "natural" axis
differs from a universe in which they are still. One should not
commit oneself to such nondifferences to show that a two-drop
universe differs from a one-drop universe. ([3], p. 252)
Now I am tempted just to stick my heels in here and insist that
I am not committed to "nondifferences," that the two universes really
do differ because the same material entities occupy different absolute
positions in the two cases. However, that will not convince the
Leibnizian, for what really impresses him, I think, is that the hypothesis
of absolute space (and thus of absolute position) appears vacuous
because it seems to make no difference concerning the entities we
perceive and observe what their absolute position is.
But are Hacking and the Leibnizian correct in thinking that the
hypothesis of absolute space implies that if the totality of the material
contents of the universe were displaced 10 feet in a certain direction,
there would be no difference except that everything had changed
its absolute position? The answer is clearly no. Only if absolute space
is of constant curvature can there be arbitrary rigid motions, i.e.,
can any geometrical figure be displaced to an arbitrary new position
while remaining congruent to itself at its earlier position: If absolute
space is of sufficiently variable curvature, the possible world consisting
of the totality of the material world displaced 10 feet in a certain
direction will have to differ from the actual universe in more than
just the absolute positions of physical objects. There will also be
deformations in the shapes of material objects. I conclude, then,
that mere change of absolute position can have observable conse-
quences.
It might be objected here that my example is not convincing since
what I am describing as the totality of the material contents of the
universe displaced 10 feet in a variably curved absolute space can
equally well be described as every material object simply becoming
deformed while remaining in the same place. So I haven't given a
case where we would have to conclude there is a change of absolute
position and thus where we would have to conclude there is absolute
space. But this objection misunderstands the point of my example.
The point here is not that there are circumstances which would force
us to conclude that there is absolute space. Rather, it is that if there
were absolute space, change of absolute position would, under certain

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290 ROBERT WEINGARD

circumstances, have observable consequences. And to show this clearly

does not require showing that only change of absolute position could
have these consequences.
In addition, familiar relational arguments to the effect that curvature
properties of space or space-time are properly understood only in
terms of properties and relations of the material entities in space
or space-time might be adduced to show that my example is incoherent,
because it takes curvature to be a property of absolute spatial position
(or space-time position). But as I have already argued in [4], general
relativity shows us that such arguments do not work. Since in general
relativity, we must understand the metric tensor field as a fundamental
physical field that is not 'reducible' to relations holding between the
material entities in space-time, general relativity provides us with
the means for understanding how we can make sense of the metrical
relations of space or space-time in terms other than the traditional
relational doctrines.
Indeed, general relativity does much more than this. It shows us
how to make sense of absolute space-time (whether of constant or
variable curvature) by showing how many features of the universe
can be explained if space-time is an absolute or substantial entity
with a certain intrinsic metrical structure.' That Hacking does not
realize this is not surprising, for he thinks that it has been indicated
by the history of physics in this century that, "There can be no
determination of spatial relations without a study of the laws of nature
attributed to objects in space." ([3], p. 250) But this is a completely
mistaken assessment of the history of physics in this century, which
has witnessed the intensive development and investigation of a plethora
of theories about the geometry of space-time. General relativity,
Cartan's 4-dimensional formulation of Newton's theory of gravitation,
Schrodinger's affine theory, Weyl's nonReimanian theory of electro-
magnetism and many others show us the seriousness with which
physicists have taken the idea that the laws of physics (or some
of them, at least) are laws about the geometric structure of an entity,
space-time, and that material entities behave the way they do because
of the geometrical structure of this entity. And the continued develop-
ment of general relativity, among others, shows us the fruitfulness
of this idea. For an example, the general relativity field equation
for regions of empty space-time

Rmp = Agmp

R mp being the ricci tensor, gmp the metric tensor, A a constant, specifies

For example, see [4] and [1].

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 ON CRACKING THAT NUT, ABSOLUTE SPACE 291

a condition on the metrical geometry in regions of space-time devoid

of matter-energy and thus it is not a "law of nature attributed to
objects in space-time." Yet contained in this equation (at least in
part) is Einstein's revolutionary account of the planetary orbits.
Thus, far from being a nutcracker which crushes absolute space
or space-time, I think it is fair to conclude that to be a true logical
or metaphysical principle, the I / I must be compatible with the existence
of absolute space or space-time.
One final remark: I have argued that we can understand how the
mere change of position in absolute space or space-time can have
observable consequences in order to show that a "difference" in
absolute position is a real difference. But I think we can do more.
We can understand not only how absolute space or space-time can
be indirectly observable through its consequences for the things we
normally observe, we can understand how it could be directly observ-
able. Namely, if at least some material objects were nothing but
regions of "empty" space-time with certain distinctive topological
and metrical properties. That this is conceivable I take to be one
of the principal philosophical consequences of contemporary work
in geometrodynamics.2

REFERENCES

[ 1 ] Earman, J. "Who's Afraid of Absolute Space?" Australasian Journal of Philosophy

40 (1970): 287-318.
[2] Geroch, R. "Electromagnetism as an Aspect of Geometry." Annals of Physics
36 (1966): 147-187.
[3] Hacking, I. "The Identity of Indiscernibles." Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975);
249-256.
[4j Weingard, R. "On the Ontological Status of the Metric in General Relativity."
Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975): 426-431.

2This does not mean that I think geometrodynamics, in its present form, can give
a satisfactory account of even classical (i.e., nonquantum) physics. For difficulties
with even its successes, see Geroch's treatment of null electromagnetic fields in [2].
What I think geometrodynamics shows is how we can make sense of the idea that
some physical objects are nothing more than geometrically distinctive regions of empty
space-time.

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