Republic of the Philippines regulations in Rangoon this 5% will be confiscated if the required letter
SUPREME COURT of credit is not received by them before August 4, 1952."
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15645             January 31, 1964
PAZ P. ARRIETA and VITALIADO ARRIETA, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
NATIONAL RICE AND CORN CORPORATION, defendant-appellant,
MANILA UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE CO., INC., defendant-
appellee.
Teehankee and Carreon for plaintiffs-appellees.
The Government Corporate Counsel for defendant-appellant.
Isidro A. Vera for defendant-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal of the defendant-appellant NARIC from the decision
of the trial court dated February 20, 1958, awarding to the plaintiffs-
appellees the amount of $286,000.00 as damages for breach of
contract and dismissing the counterclaim and third party complaint of
the defendant-appellant NARIC.
In accordance with Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3452, "the National
Rice and Corn Administration (NARIC) is hereby abolished and all its
assets, liabilities, functions, powers which are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act, and all personnel are transferred "to the Rice
and Corn Administration (RCA).
All references, therefore, to the NARIC in this decision must
accordingly be adjusted and read as RCA pursuant to the
aforementioned law.
On May 19, 1952, plaintiff-appellee participated in the public bidding
called by the NARIC for the supply of 20,000 metric tons of Burmese
rice. As her bid of $203.00 per metric ton was the lowest, she was
awarded the contract for the same. Accordingly, on July 1, 1952,
plaintiff-appellee Paz P. Arrieta and the appellant corporation entered
into a Contract of Sale of Rice, under the terms of which the former
obligated herself to deliver to the latter 20,000 metric tons of Burmess
Rice at $203.00 per metric ton, CIF Manila. In turn, the defendant
corporation committed itself to pay for the imported rice "by means of
an irrevocable, confirmed and assignable letter of credit in U.S.
currency in favor of the plaintiff-appellee and/or supplier in Burma,
immediately." Despite the commitment to pay immediately "by means
of an irrevocable, confirmed and assignable Letter of Credit," however,
it was only on July 30, 1952, or a full month from the execution of the
contract, that the defendant corporation, thru its general manager, took
the first to open a letter of credit by forwarding to the Philippine
National Bank its Application for Commercial Letter Credit. The
application was accompanied by a transmittal letter, the relevant
paragraphs of which read:
In view of the fact that we do not have sufficient deposit with your
institution with which to cover the amount required to be deposited as
a condition for the opening of letters of credit, we will appreciate it if
this application could be considered special case.
We understand that our supplier, Mrs. Paz P. Arrieta, has a deadline to
meet which is August 4, 1952, and in order to comply therewith, it is
imperative that the L/C be opened prior to that date. We would
therefore request your full cooperation on this matter.
On the same day, July 30, 1952, Mrs. Paz P. Arrieta thru counsel,
advised the appellant corporation of the extreme necessity for the
immediate opening of the letter credit since she had by then made a
tender to her supplier in Rangoon, Burma, "equivalent to 5% of the
F.O.B. price of 20,000 tons at $180.70 and in compliance with the
On August 4, 1952, the Philippine National Bank informed the
appellant corporation that its application, "for a letter of credit for
$3,614,000.00 in favor of Thiri Setkya has been approved by the
Board of Directors with the condition that marginal cash deposit be
paid and that drafts are to be paid upon presentment." (Exh. J-pl.; Exh.
10-def., p. 19, Folder of Exhibits). Furthermore, the Bank represented
that it "will hold your application in abeyance pending compliance with
the above stated requirement."
As it turned out, however, the appellant corporation not in any financial
position to meet the condition. As matter of fact, in a letter dated
August 2, 1952, the NARIC bluntly confessed to the appellee its
dilemma: "In this connection, please be advised that our application for
opening of the letter of credit has been presented to the bank since
July 30th but the latter requires that we first deposit 50% of the value
of the letter amounting to aproximately $3,614,000.00 which we are
not in a position to meet." (Emphasis supplied. Exh. 9-Def.; Exh. 1-Pe.,
p. 18, Folder of Exhibits)
Consequently, the credit instrument applied for was opened only on
September 8, 1952 "in favor of Thiri Setkya, Rangoon, Burma, and/or
assignee for $3,614,000.00," (which is more than two months from the
execution of the contract) the party named by the appellee as
beneficiary of the letter of credit.1äwphï1.ñët
As a result of the delay, the allocation of appellee's supplier in
Rangoon was cancelled and the 5% deposit, amounting to 524,000
kyats or approximately P200,000.00 was forfeited. In this connection, it
must be made of record that although the Burmese authorities had set
August 4, 1952, as the deadline for the remittance of the required letter
of credit, the cancellation of the allocation and the confiscation of the
5% deposit were not effected until August 20, 1952, or, a full half
month after the expiration of the deadline. And yet, even with the 15-
day grace, appellant corporation was unable to make good its
commitment to open the disputed letter of credit.
The appellee endeavored, but failed, to restore the cancelled Burmese
rice allocation. When the futility of reinstating the same became
apparent, she offered to substitute Thailand rice instead to the
defendant NARIC, communicating at the same time that the offer was
"a solution which should be beneficial to the NARIC and to us at the
same time." (Exh. X-Pe., Exh. 25—Def., p. 38, Folder of Exhibits). This
offer for substitution, however, was rejected by the appellant in a
resolution dated November 15, 1952.
On the foregoing, the appellee sent a letter to the appellant,
demanding compensation for the damages caused her in the sum of
$286,000.00, U.S. currency, representing unrealized profit. The
demand having been rejected she instituted this case now on appeal.
At the instance of the NARIC, a counterclaim was filed and the Manila
Underwriters Insurance Company was brought to the suit as a third
party defendant to hold it liable on the performance bond it executed in
favor of the plaintiff-appellee.
We find for the appellee.
It is clear upon the records that the sole and principal reason for the
cancellation of the allocation contracted by the appellee herein in
Rangoon, Burma, was the failure of the letter of credit to be opened
with the contemplated period. This failure must, therefore, be taken as
the immediate cause for the consequent damage which resulted. As it
is then, the disposition of this case depends on a determination of who
was responsible for such failure. Stated differently, the issue is
whether appellant's failure to open immediately the letter of credit in
dispute amounted to a breach of the contract of July 1, 1952 for which
it may be held liable in damages.
Appellant corporation disclaims responsibility for the delay in the
opening of the letter of credit. On the contrary, it insists that the fault
lies with the appellee. Appellant contends that the disputed negotiable capacity to comply with the inevitably requirements in cash to pay for
instrument was not promptly secured because the appellee , failed to such importation. Having announced the bid, it must be deemed to
seasonably furnish data necessary and required for opening the same, have impliedly assured suppliers of its capacity and facility to finance
namely, "(1) the amount of the letter of credit, (2) the person, company the importation within the required period, especially since it had
or corporation in whose favor it is to be opened, and (3) the place and imposed the supplier the 90-day period within which the shipment of
bank where it may be negotiated." Appellant would have this Court the rice must be brought into the Philippines. Having entered in the
believe, therefore, that had these informations been forthwith furnished contract, it should have taken steps immediately to arrange for the
it, there would have been no delay in securing the instrument. letter of credit for the large amount involved and inquired into the
possibility of its issuance.
Appellant's explanation has neither force nor merit. In the first place,
the explanation reaches into an area of the proceedings into which We In relation to the aforequoted observation of the trial court, We would
are not at liberty to encroach. The explanation refers to a question of like to make reference also to Article 11 of the Civil Code which
fact. Nothing in the record suggests any arbitrary or abusive conduct provides:
on the part of the trial judge in the formulation of the ruling. His
conclusion on the matter is sufficiently borne out by the evidence
Those who in the performance of their obligation are guilty of fraud,
presented. We are denied, therefore, the prerogative to disturb that
negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the
finding, consonant to the time-honored tradition of this Tribunal to hold
tenor thereof, are liable in damages.
trial judges better situated to make conclusions on questions of fact.
For the record, We quote hereunder the lower court's ruling on the
point: Under this provision, not only debtors guilty of fraud, negligence or
default in the performance of obligations a decreed liable; in general,
every debtor who fails in performance of his obligations is bound to
The defense that the delay, if any in opening the letter of credit was
indemnify for the losses and damages caused thereby (De la Cruz
due to the failure of plaintiff to name the supplier, the amount and the
Seminary of Manila, 18 Phil. 330; Municipality of Moncada v. Cajuigan,
bank is not tenable. Plaintiff stated in Court that these facts were
21 Phil. 184; De la Cavada v. Diaz, 37 Phil. 982; Maluenda & Co. v.
known to defendant even before the contract was executed because
Enriquez, 46 Phil. 916; Pasumil v. Chong, 49 Phil. 1003; Pando v.
these facts were necessarily revealed to the defendant before she
Gimenez, 54 Phil. 459; Acme Films v. Theaters Supply, 63 Phil. 657).
could qualify as a bidder. She stated too that she had given the
The phrase "any manner contravene the tenor" of the obligation
necessary data immediately after the execution of Exh. "A" (the
includes any illicit act which impairs the strict and faithful fulfillment of
contract of July 1, 1952) to Mr. GABRIEL BELMONTE, General
the obligation or every kind or defective performance. (IV Tolentino,
Manager of the NARIC, both orally and in writing and that she also
Civil Code of the Philippines, citing authorities, p. 103.)
pressed for the opening of the letter of credit on these occasions.
These statements have not been controverted and defendant NARIC,
notwithstanding its previous intention to do so, failed to present Mr. The NARIC would also have this Court hold that the subsequent offer
Belmonte to testify or refute this. ... to substitute Thailand rice for the originally contracted Burmese rice
amounted to a waiver by the appellee of whatever rights she might
have derived from the breach of the contract. We disagree. Waivers
Secondly, from the correspondence and communications which form
are not presumed, but must be clearly and convincingly shown, either
part of the record of this case, it is clear that what singularly delayed
by express stipulation or acts admitting no other reasonable
the opening of the stipulated letter of credit and which, in turn, caused
explanation. (Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, 52 O.G. 779.) In the case
the cancellation of the allocation in Burma, was the inability of the
at bar, no such intent to waive has been established.
appellant corporation to meet the condition importation by the Bank for
granting the same. We do not think the appellant corporation can
refute the fact that had it been able to put up the 50% marginal cash We have carefully examined and studied the oral and documentary
deposit demanded by the bank, then the letter of credit would have evidence presented in this case and upon which the lower court based
been approved, opened and released as early as August 4, 1952. The its award. Under the contract, the NARIC bound itself to buy 20,000
letter of the Philippine National Bank to the NARIC was plain and metric tons of Burmese rice at "$203.00 U.S. Dollars per metric ton, all
explicit that as of the said date, appellant's "application for a letter of net shipped weight, and all in U.S. currency, C.I.F. Manila ..." On the
credit ... has been approved by the Board of Directors with the other hand, documentary and other evidence establish with equal
condition that 50% marginal cash deposit be paid and that drafts are to certainty that the plaintiff-appellee was able to secure the contracted
be paid upon presentment." (Emphasis supplied) commodity at the cost price of $180.70 per metric ton from her supplier
in Burma. Considering freights, insurance and charges incident to its
shipment here and the forfeiture of the 5% deposit, the award granted
The liability of the appellant, however, stems not alone from this failure
by the lower court is fair and equitable. For a clearer view of the equity
or inability to satisfy the requirements of the bank. Its culpability arises
of the damages awarded, We reproduce below the testimony of the
from its willful and deliberate assumption of contractual obligations
appellee, adequately supported by the evidence and record:
even as it was well aware of its financial incapacity to undertake the
prestation. We base this judgment upon the letter which accompanied
the application filed by the appellant with the bank, a part of which Q. Will you please tell the court, how much is the damage you
letter was quoted earlier in this decision. In the said accompanying suffered?
correspondence, appellant admitted and owned that it did "not have
sufficient deposit with your institution (the PNB) with which to cover the
A. Because the selling price of my rice is $203.00 per metric ton, and
amount required to be deposited as a condition for the opening of
the cost price of my rice is $180.00 We had to pay also $6.25 for
letters of credit. ... .
shipping and about $164 for insurance. So adding the cost of the rice,
the freight, the insurance, the total would be about $187.99 that would
A number of logical inferences may be drawn from the aforementioned be $15.01 gross profit per metric ton, multiply by 20,000 equals
admission. First, that the appellant knew the bank requirements for $300,200, that is my supposed profit if I went through the contract.
opening letters of credit; second, that appellant also knew it could not
meet those requirement. When, therefore, despite this awareness that
The above testimony of the plaintiff was a general approximation of the
was financially incompetent to open a letter of credit immediately,
actual figures involved in the transaction. A precise and more exact
appellant agreed in paragraph 8 of the contract to pay immediately "by
demonstration of the equity of the award herein is provided by Exhibit
means of an irrevocable, confirm and assignable letter of credit," it
HH of the plaintiff and Exhibit 34 of the defendant, hereunder quoted
must be similarly held to have bound itself to answer for all and every
so far as germane.
consequences that would result from the representation. aptly
observed by the trial court:
It is equally of record now that as shown in her request dated July 29,
1959, and other communications subsequent thereto for the opening
... Having called for bids for the importation of rice involving millions,
by your corporation of the required letter of credit, Mrs. Arrieta was
$4,260,000.00 to be exact, it should have a certained its ability and
supposed to pay her supplier in Burma at the rate of One Hundred
Eighty Dollars and Seventy Cents ($180.70) in U.S. Currency, per ton
plus Eight Dollars ($8.00) in the same currency per ton for shipping
and other handling expenses, so that she is already assured of a net
profit of Fourteen Dollars and Thirty Cents ($14.30), U.S., Currency,
per ton or a total of Two Hundred and Eighty Six Thousand Dollars
($286,000.00), U.S. Currency, in the aforesaid transaction. ...
Lastly, herein appellant filed a counterclaim asserting that it has
suffered, likewise by way of unrealized profit damages in the total sum
of $406,000.00 from the failure of the projected contract to materialize.
This counterclaim was supported by a cost study made and submitted
by the appellant itself and wherein it was illustrated how indeed had
the importation pushed thru, NARIC would have realized in profit the
amount asserted in the counterclaim. And yet, the said amount of
P406,000.00 was realizable by appellant despite a number of
expenses which the appellee under the contract, did not have to incur.
Thus, under the cost study submitted by the appellant, banking and
unloading charges were to be shouldered by it, including an Import
License Fee of 2% and superintendence fee of $0.25 per metric ton. If
the NARIC stood to profit over P400 000.00 from the disputed
transaction inspite of the extra expenditures from which the herein
appellee was exempt, we are convicted of the fairness of the judgment
presently under appeal.
In the premises, however, a minor modification must be effected in the
dispositive portion of the decision appeal from insofar as it expresses
the amount of damages in U.S. currency and not in Philippine Peso.
Republic Act 529 specifically requires the discharge of obligations only
"in any coin or currency which at the time of payment is legal tender
for public and private debts." In view of that law, therefore, the award
should be converted into and expressed in Philippine Peso.
This brings us to a consideration of what rate of exchange should
apply in the conversion here decreed. Should it be at the time of the
breach, at the time the obligation was incurred or at the rate of
exchange prevailing on the promulgation of this decision.
In the case of Engel v. Velasco & Co., 47 Phil. 115, We ruled that in an
action for recovery of damages for breach of contract, even if the
obligation assumed by the defendant was to pay the plaintiff a sum of
money expressed in American currency, the indemnity to be allowed
should be expressed in Philippine currency at the rate of exchange at
the time of the judgment rather than at the rate of exchange prevailing
on the date of defendant's breach. This ruling, however, can neither be
applied nor extended to the case at bar for the same was laid down
when there was no law against stipulating foreign currencies in
Philippine contracts. But now we have Republic Act No. 529 which
expressly declares such stipulations as contrary to public policy, void
and of no effect. And, as We already pronounced in the case
of Eastboard Navigation, Ltd. v. Juan Ysmael & Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-
9090, September 10, 1957, if there is any agreement to pay an
obligation in a currency other than Philippine legal tender, the same is
null and void as contrary to public policy (Republic Act 529), and the
most that could be demanded is to pay said obligation in Philippine
currency "to be measured in the prevailing rate of exchange at the
time the obligation was incurred (Sec. 1, idem)."
UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with the sole modification that the award should be converted
into the Philippine peso at the rate of exchange prevailing at the time
the obligation was incurred or on July 1, 1952 when the contract was
executed. The appellee insurance company, in the light of this
judgment, is relieved of any liability under this suit. No pronouncement
as to costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION  your duties by taking your oath of office and filing the original thereof
G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees,
vs.
JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Antonio
M. Martinez for plaintiff-appellee.
Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for defendant-appellant.
ANTONIO, J.:p
Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas
(provincial capital), Batangas, in Criminal Case No. 889, finding the
accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty
ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years
imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises in
issue the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of
Our ruling in People v. Mapa.1
The complaint filed against the accused reads:
That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in
the poblacion, Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, a person not authorized by law, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep in his possession,
custody and direct control a revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German Made with
one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shells without first securing
the necessary permit or license to possess the same.
At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a
plea of not guilty, after which trial was accordingly held.
The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in
possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the
complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however,
claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no
license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the
Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential
Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments
expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the
firearm in question.
Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned
officials as claimed by him. His appointment from Governor Feliciano
Leviste, dated December 10, 1962, reads:
Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and trusting
that you will be an effective agent in the detection of crimes and in the
preservation of peace and order in the province of Batangas,
especially with respect to the suppression of trafficking in explosives,
jueteng, illegal cockfighting, cattle rustling, robbery and the detection
of unlicensed firearms, you are hereby appointed a SECRET
AGENT of the undersigned, the appointment to take effect
immediately, or as soon as you have qualified for the position. As such
Secret Agent, your duties shall be those generally of a peace officer
and particularly to help in the preservation of peace and order in this
province and to make reports thereon to me once or twice a month. It
should be clearly understood that any abuse of authority on your part
shall be considered sufficient ground for the automatic cancellation of
your appointment and immediate separation from the service. In
accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-
12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have the right to bear a
firearm, particularly described below, for use in connection with the
performance of your duties.
By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of
with us.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO LEVISTE
Provincial Governor
FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY:
Kind: — ROHM-Revolver
Make: — German
SN: — 64
Cal:— .22
On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC
Provincial Commander of Batangas as Confidential Agent with duties
to furnish information regarding smuggling activities, wanted persons,
loose firearms, subversives and other similar subjects that might affect
the peace and order condition in Batangas province, and in connection
with these duties he was temporarily authorized to possess a ROHM
revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal protection while in the
performance of his duties.
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his
above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential
Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the
prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme
Court's decision in People vs. Macarandang2 and People vs.
Lucero.3 The trial court, while conceding on the basis of the evidence
of record the accused had really been appointed Secret Agent and
Confidential Agent by the Provincial Governor and the PC Provincial
Commander of Batangas, respectively, with authority to possess and
carry the firearm described in the complaint, nevertheless held the
accused in its decision dated December 27, 1968, criminally liable for
illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the ground that the
rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases
of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People
vs. Mapa, supra. The court considered as mitigating circumstances the
appointments of the accused as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent.
Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra,
People v. Lucero, supra, and People v. Mapa, supra. In Macarandang,
We reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction against the
accused because it was shown that at the time he was found to
possess a certain firearm and ammunition without license or permit, he
had an appointment from the Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to
assist in the maintenance of peace and order and in the detection of
crimes, with authority to hold and carry the said firearm and
ammunition. We therefore held that while it is true that the Governor
has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit, nevertheless,
section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace
officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance
of license to possess firearms; and Macarandang's appointment as
Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and
detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace
officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police who
under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are exempted
from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess
firearms. In Lucero, We held that under the circumstances of the case,
the granting of the temporary use of the firearm to the accused was a
necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the batallion
commander to effect the capture of a Huk leader. In Mapa, expressly
abandoning the doctrine in Macarandang, and by implication, that
in Lucero, We sustained the judgment of conviction on the following
ground:
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it
shall be unlawful for any person to ... possess any firearm, detached
parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or
implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms,
parts of firearms, or ammunition." (Sec. 878, as amended by Republic
Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.) The next section provides
that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers,
soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines],
the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau
of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant
governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal
mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered
"when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public
servants for use in the performance of their official duties." (Sec. 879,
Revised Administrative Code.)
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret
agent. As such he is not exempt. ... .
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the
Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the
Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter
was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959)
and People v. Lucero (1958). Our decision in People v.
Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967. The sole
question in this appeal is: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis
of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction
stand in view of the complete reversal of
the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor General
is of the first view, and he accordingly recommends reversal of the
appealed judgment.
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are
nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason
why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system ... ." The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in
a way, a part of the law as of the date that law originally passed, since
this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that law thus construed intends to effectuate. The
settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of
legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.
The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the
jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was
found in possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned
by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in
the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled
and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the
old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the
construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that
the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of
society.
It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his
appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized
to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated
in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would
attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a
license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly,
appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done
was held not to be punishable.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and
appellant is acquitted, with costs de oficio.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 100727 March 18, 1992
COGEO-CUBAO OPERATORS AND DRIVERS
ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, LUNGSOD SILANGAN TRANSPORT
SERVICES, CORP., INC., respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional
Trial Court awarding damages in favor of respondent Lungsod
Silangan Transport Services Corp., Inc. (Lungsod Corp. for brevity).
The antecedents facts of this case are as follows:
It appears that a certificate of public convenience to operate a jeepney
service was ordered to be issued in favor of Lungsod Silangan to ply
the Cogeo-Cubao route sometime in 1983 on the justification that
public necessity and convenience will best be served, and in the
absence of existing authorized operators on the lined apply for . . . On
the other hand, defendant-Association was registered as a non-stock,
non-profit organization with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on October 30, 1985 . . . with the main purpose of representing
plaintiff-appellee for whatever contract and/or agreement it will have
regarding the ownership of units, and the like, of the members of the
Association . . .
Perturbed by plaintiffs' Board Resolution No. 9 . . . adopting a Bandera'
System under which a member of the cooperative is permitted to
queue for passenger at the disputed pathway in exchange for the
ticket worth twenty pesos, the proceeds of which shall be utilized for
Christmas programs of the drivers and other benefits, and on the
strength of defendants' registration as a collective body with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, defendants-appellants, led by
Romeo Oliva decided to form a human barricade on November 11,
1985 and assumed the dispatching of passenger jeepneys . . . This
development as initiated by defendants-appellants gave rise to the suit
for damages.
Defendant-Association's Answer contained vehement denials to the
insinuation of take over and at the same time raised as a defense the
circumstance that the organization was formed not to compete with
plaintiff-cooperative. It, however, admitted that it is not authorized to
transport passengers . . . (pp. 15-16, Rollo)
On July 31, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
respondent Lungsod Corp., the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, the
Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants as follows:
1. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff the amount of P50,000.00 as
actual damages;
2. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED. (P. 39, Rollo)
Not satisfied with the decision, petitioner Association appealed with the
Court of Appeals. On May 27, 1991, respondent appellate court
rendered its decision affirming the findings of the trial court except with
regard to the award of actual damages in the amount of P50,000.00
and attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00. The Court of Appeals
however, awarded nominal damages to petitioner in the amount of
P10,000.00.
Hence, this petition was filed with the petitioner assigning the following
errors of the appellate court:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN MERELY MODIFYING
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT.
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PETITIONER USURPED THE PROPERTY RIGHT OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.
III. AND THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
Since the assigned errors are interrelated, this Court shall discuss
them jointly. The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not
the petitioner usurped the property right of the respondent which shall
entitle the latter to the award of nominal damages.
Petitioner contends that the association was formed not to complete
with the respondent corporation in the latter's operation as a common
carrier; that the same was organized for the common protection of
drivers from abusive traffic officers who extort money from them, and
for the elimination of the practice of respondent corporation of
requiring jeepney owners to execute deed of sale in favor of the
corporation to show that the latter is the owner of the jeeps under its
certificate of public convenience. Petitioner also argues that in
organizing the association, the members thereof are merely exercising
their freedom or right to redress their grievances.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
Under the Public Service Law, a certificate of public convenience is an
authorization issued by the Public Service Commission for the
operation of public services for which no franchise is required by law.
In the instant case, a certificate of public convenience was issued to
respondent corporation on January 24, 1983 to operate a public utility
jeepney service on the Cogeo-Cubao route. As found by the trial court,
the certificate was issued pursuant to a decision passed by the Board
of Transportation in BOT Case No. 82-565.
A certification of public convenience is included in the term "property"
in the broad sense of the term. Under the Public Service Law, a
certificate of public convenience can be sold by the holder thereof
because it has considerable material value and is considered as
valuable asset (Raymundo v. Luneta Motor Co., et al., 58 Phil. 889).
Although there is no doubt that it is private property, it is affected with
a public interest and must be submitted to the control of the
government for the common good (Pangasinan Transportation Co. v.
PSC, 70 Phil 221). Hence, insofar as the interest of the State is
involved, a certificate of public convenience does not confer upon the
holder any proprietary right or interest or franchise in the route covered
thereby and in the public highways (Lugue v. Villegas, L-22545, Nov .
28, 1969, 30 SCRA 409). However, with respect to other persons and
other public utilities, a certificate of public convenience as property,
which represents the right and authority to operate its facilities for
public service, cannot be taken or interfered with without due process
of law. Appropriate actions may be maintained in courts by the holder
of the certificate against those who have not been authorized to
operate in competition with the former and those who invade the rights
which the former has pursuant to the authority granted by the Public
Service Commission (A.L. Ammen Transportation Co. v. Golingco. 43
Phil. 280).
In the case at bar, the trial court found that petitioner association
forcibly took over the operation of the jeepney service in the Cogeo-
Cubao route without any authorization from the Public Service
Commission and in violation of the right of respondent corporation to
operate its services in the said route under its certificate of public
convenience. These were its findings which were affirmed by the
appellate court:
The Court from the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses as well as the
documentary evidences presented is convinced that the actions taken
by defendant herein though it admit that it did not have the authority to
transport passenger did in fact assume the role as a common carrier
engaged in the transport of passengers within that span of ten days
beginning November 11, 1985 when it unilaterally took upon itself the
operation and dispatching of jeepneys at St. Mary's St. The president
of the defendant corporation. Romeo Oliva himself in his testimony
confirmed that there was indeed a takeover of the operations at St.
Mary's St. . . . (p. 36, Rollo)
The findings of the trial court especially if affirmed by the appellate
court bear great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal before this
Court. Although there is no question that petitioner can exercise their
constitutional right to redress their grievances with respondent
Lungsod Corp., the manner by which this constitutional right is to be,
exercised should not undermine public peace and order nor should it
violate the legal rights of other persons. Article 21 of the Civil Code
provides that any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage. The provision covers a
situation where a person has a legal right which was violated by
another in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
It presupposes loss or injury, material or otherwise, which one may
suffer as a result of such violation. It is clear form the facts of this case
that petitioner formed a barricade and forcibly took over the motor
units and personnel of the respondent corporation. This paralyzed the
usual activities and earnings of the latter during the period of ten days
and violated the right of respondent Lungsod Corp. To conduct its
operations thru its authorized officers.
As to the propriety of damages in favor of respondent Lungsod Corp.,
the respondent appellate court stated:
. . . it does not necessarily follow that plaintiff-appellee is entitled
to actual damages and attorney's fees. While there may have been
allegations from plaintiff-cooperative showing that it did in fact suffer
some from of injury . . . it is legally unprecise to order the payment of
P50,000.00 as actual damages for lack of concrete proof therefor.
There is, however, no denying of the act of usurpation by defendants-
appellants which constituted an invasion of plaintiffs'-appellees'
property right. For this, nominal damages in the amount of P10,000.00
may be granted. (Article 2221, Civil Code). (p. 18, Rollo)
No compelling reason exists to justify the reversal of the ruling of the
respondent appellate court in the case at bar. Article 2222 of the Civil
Code states that the court may award nominal damages in every
obligation arising from any source enumerated in Article 1157, or in
every case where any property right has been invaded. Considering
the circumstances of the case, the respondent corporation is entitled to
the award of nominal damages.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of
the respondent appellate court dated May 27, 1991 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 96914 July 23, 1992
CECILIA U. LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and JOSE T.
DIZON, respondents.
NOCON, J.:
Petitioner Cecilia U. Ledesma prays before this Court for the reversal
of the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals of August 30,
1990 1 ordering the dismissal of her ejectment complaint before the
Manila Metropolitan Trial Court for lack of cause of action due to non-
compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 (Katarungang
Pambarangay Law) as well as the Resolution of January 7,
1991 2 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of said
Decision.
The facts of this case as summarized by the petitioner in her
Memorandum are as follows:
Petitioner is the owner-lessor of an apartment building located at 800-
802 Remedios Street, Malate, Manila. Two (2) units of said apartment
building were leased (now being unlawfully occupied) to private
respondent at monthly rates of P3,450.00 for the unit/apartment
located at 800 Remedios Street, Malate, Manila and P2,300.00 for the
unit/apartment located at 802 Remedios Street, Malate, Manila,
respectively. . . .
Said lease was originally covered by written contracts of lease both
dated December 10, 1984 and except for the rates and duration, the
terms and conditions of said contracts were impliedly renewed on a
"month-to-month" basis pursuant to Article 1670 of the Civil Code.
One of the terms and conditions of the said Contract of Lease, that of
monthly rental payments, was violated by private respondent and that
as of October 31, 1988, said private respondent has incurred arrears
for both units in the total sum of P14,039.00 for which letters of
demand were sent to, and received by, private respondent.
Upon failure of private respondent to honor the demand letters,
petitioner referred the matter to the Barangay for conciliation which
eventually issued a certification to file action. Petitioner was assisted
by her son, Raymond U. Ledesma, (who is not a lawyer) during the
barangay proceeding as she was suffering from recurring
psychological and emotional ailment as can be seen from the receipts
and prescriptions issued by her psychiatrist, copies of which are
attached as Annexes "E-E10" of the said Petition.
Due to the stubborn refusal of the private respondent to vacate the
premises, petitioner was constrained to retain the services of counsel
to initiate this ejectment proceeding. 3
The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 10, Manila, rendered a decision
on June 21, 1989 ordering private respondent to vacate the premises,
to pay rentals falling due after May 1989 and to pay attorney's fees in
the amount of P2,500.00. 4 The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
IX, on appeal, affirmed the MTC ruling except for the award of
attorney's fees which it reduced to P1,000.00. 5
Private respondent, however, found favor with the respondent Court of
Appeals when he elevated the case in a Petition for Review, when it
ruled, thus:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision dated October 13, 1989 of the RTC
of Manila, Br. IX in Civil Case No. 89-49672 is reversed and set aside
and the Complaint for Ejectment against petitioner is dismissed for
lack of cause of action. No costs. 6
Thus, this appeal, raising several assignments of error, namely, that
the Court of Appeals erred —
1. In holding that private respondent raised the issue of non-
compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 in the lower court when
in fact and in truth his answer and position paper failed to do so,
contrary to evidence on record;
2. In failing to consider that private respondent had waived his right to
question the lack of cause of action of the complaint, if there is any,
contrary to law, established jurisprudence, and evidence on record;
3. In giving undue weight and credence to the self-serving allegations
of the private respondent that summons was not served him, contrary
to law, established jurisprudence and evidence on record.
4. In disregarding the well-known principle of law that barangay
authorities are presumed to have performed their official duties and to
have acted regularly in issuing the certificate to file action and grossly
and manifestly erred in making an opposite conclusion to this effect,
contrary to law, established jurisprudence and evidence on record.
5. In not holding that the settlement was repudiated, contrary to law
and evidence on record.
6. In not affirming the judgment rendered by the Metropolitan Trial
Court and Regional Trial Court below.
Petitioner assails private respondent for raising the issue of non-
compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 only in his petition for
review with the appellate court and which mislead the court to
erroneously dismiss her complaint for ejectment.
Section 6 of P.D. 1508 states:
Sec. 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of complaint. — No
complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the
authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or
instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication
unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon
Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been
reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary,
attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement
has been repudiated. . . .
x x x           x x x          x x x
while Section 9 states that:
Sec. 9. Appearance of parties in person. — In all proceedings
provided for herein, the parties must appear in person without the
assistance of counsel/representative, with the exception of minors and
incompetents who may be assisted by their next of kin who are not
lawyers.
Petitioner submits that said issue, not having been raised by private
respondent in the court below, cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal, specially in the Court of Appeals, citing Saludes
vs. Pajarillo. 7 Private respondent had waived said objection, following
the line of reasoning in Royales vs. Intermediate Appelate Court. 8
Private respondent denies having waived the defenses of non-
compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508. His Answer before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, specifically paragraphs 4, 7, & 8, substantially
raised the fact of non-compliance by petitioner with Sections 6 and 9 of
P.D. 1508 and consequently, subjected petitioner's complaint to
dismissal for lack of cause of action, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Answering defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 8, the
truth of the matter being that he was not duly summoned nor
subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman, who issued the alluded
certification, to appear for hearing. 9
xxx xxx xxx
7. Plaintiff has no cause of action against answering defendant.
8. The certification to file action (annex D of the complaint) was
improperly or irregularly issued as the defendant was never
summoned nor subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman to appear for
hearing in connection with the alleged complaint of the plaintiff. In
effect the mandatory provision of P.D. 1508 was not complied with
warranting the dismissal of the instant complaint.
xxx xxx xxx 10
We do not agree with petitioner that the issue of non-compliance with
Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 was raised only for the first time in the
Court of Appeals. When private respondent stated that he was never
summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman, he, in effect,
was stating that since he was never summoned, he could not appear
in person for the needed confrontation of the parties before the Lupon
Chairman for conciliation and/or amicable settlement. Without the
mandatory personal confrontation, no complaint could be filed with the
MTC. Private respondent's allegation in paragraph 4 of his Answer that
he was never summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman;
that plaintiff has no cause of action against him as alleged in
paragraph 7 of the Answer; and that the certification to file action was
improperly issued in view of the foregoing allegations thereby resulting
in non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of P.D. No. 1508,
as stated in paragraph 8 of the Answer are in substantial compliance
with the raising of said issues and/or objections in the court below.
Petitioner would like to make it appear to this Court that she appeared
before the Lupon Chairman to confront private respondent. She stated
in her Petition 11 and her Memorandum 12 that:
Upon failure of private respondent to honor the demand letters,
petitioner referred the matter to the barangay for conciliation which
eventually issued a certification to file action. Petitioner was assisted
by her son, Raymond U. Ledesma, (who is not a lawyer) during the
barangay proceeding as she was suffering from recurring
psychological and emotional ailment as can be seen from the receipt
and prescriptions issued by her psychiatrist copies of which are
attached herewith as Annexes
"E-E10."
However, as found out by the respondent court:
We agree with the petitioner that private respondent Cecile Ledesma
failed to comply with section 6 of P.D. 1508. The record of the case is
barren showing compliance by the private respondent. Indeed, the
documentary evidence of the private respondent herself attached to
the complaint buttresses this conclusion. They show that it is not the
private respondent but her son. Raymund U. Ledesma, and her
lawyer, Atty. Epifania Navarro who dealt with the petitioner regarding
their dispute. Thus, the demand letter dated October 18, 1988 sent to
the petitioner for payment of rentals in the sum of P14,039.00 was
signed by Raymund Ledesma. On the other hand, the demand letter
dated November 14, 1988 was signed by Atty. Epifania Navarro. More
telling is the Certification to File Action signed by Barangay Chairman,
Alberto A. Solis where it appears that the complainant is Raymund U.
Ledesma and not the private respondent. 13
As stated earlier, Section 9 of P.D. 1508 mandates personal
confrontation of the parties because:
. . . a personal confrontation between the parties without the
intervention of a counsel or representative would generate spontaneity
and a favorable disposition to amicable settlement on the part of the
disputants. In other words, the said procedure is deemed conducive to
the successful resolution of the dispute at the barangay level. 14
Petitioner tries to show that her failure to personally appear before the
barangay Chairman was because of her recurring psychological
ailments. But for the entire year of 1988 15 — specifically September to
December 6 — there is no indication at all that petitioner went to see
her psychiatrist for consultation. The only conclusion is that 1988 was
a lucid interval for petitioner. There was, therefore, no excuse then for
her non-appearance at the Lupon Chairman's office.
Petitioner, not having shown that she is incompetent, cannot be
represented by counsel or even by attorney-in-fact who is next of
kin. 16
As explained by the Minister of Justice with whom We agree:
To ensure compliance with the requirement of personal confrontation
between the parties, and thereby, the effectiveness of the barangay
conciliation proceedings as a mode of dispute resolution, the above-
quoted provision is couched in mandatory language. Moreover,
pursuant to the familiar maxim in statutory construction dictating that
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius", the express exceptions made
regarding minors and incompetents must be construed as exclusive of
all others not mentioned. 17
Petitioner's non-compliance with Secs. 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 legally
barred her from pursuing the ejectment case in the MTC of
Manila.18 Having arrived at this conclusion, there is no need for Us to
discuss the other issues involved.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision and resolution of the
respondent Court are affirmed in toto with treble costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City,
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually
convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge
Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on
February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio
respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to
hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme
Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect
of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its
comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his
commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the
death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a
result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General,
relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal
should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by
the lower court on which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the
view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused
while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his
criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel
invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and
Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes
root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if
accused should die before final judgment is rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled
in the affirmative. This same issue posed therein was phrased thus:
Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal responsibility
and his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads,
in part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability
is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The
law is plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability is
extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal import
of the term "final judgment." Is it final judgment as contradistinguished
from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is final and
executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article
89 of the Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is lifted from
Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part,
recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y
respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere
recaido sentencia firme.
xxx xxx xxx
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia
firme." What is "sentencia firme" under the old statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes the ready
answer: It says:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las
definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las partes litigantes recurso
alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos legales concedidos
al efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite.
Because, it is only when judgment is such that, as Medina y Maranon
puts it, the crime is confirmed — "en condena determinada;" or, in the
words of Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes — "una verdad
legal." Prior thereto, should the accused die, according to Viada, "no
hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad
criminal de ninguna clase." And, as Judge Kapunan well explained,
when a defendant dies before judgment becomes executory, "there
cannot be any determination by final judgment whether or not the
felony upon which the civil action might arise exists," for the simple
reason that "there is no party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal
Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same view.
Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the
Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body mention the
term "final judgment" in the sense that it is already enforceable. This
also brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which
states that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final "after the lapse
of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been
partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly
waived in writing his right to appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected
funnel down to one positive conclusion: The term final judgment
employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall.
Really, as long as a judgment has not become executory, it cannot be
truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged
against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason.
For where, as in this case, the right to institute a separate civil action is
not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover
"both the criminal and the civil aspects of the case." People vs. Yusico
(November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs.
Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol.
I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil
action is based solely on the felony committed and of which the
offender might be found guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes
the civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal
liability is out. His civil liability is sought to be enforced by reason of
that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal
action and let the civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the
anomalous situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil
liability in a case where the source thereof — criminal liability — does
not exist. And, as was well stated in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al.,
CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held
criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely would remain if we are to
divorce it from the criminal proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted
by the Supreme Court in the cases of People of the Philippines v.
Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al.
5 and People of the Philippines v. Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal
in view of the death of the accused pending appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been
established, and considering that there is as yet no final judgment in
view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the
said accused-appellant Alison was extinguished by his death (Art. 89,
Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717,
citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045);
consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of
Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar 7 and Lamberto Torrijos
v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the former,
the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability of one
accused of physical injuries who died before final judgment is
extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any claim therefore
against his estate. It was the contention of the administrator-appellant
therein that the death of the accused prior to final judgment
extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense,
in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, this court ruled therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been
extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative eighteen
years after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the Court below,
Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on
account of physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action
for damages was to be considered instituted together with the criminal
action still, since both proceedings were terminated without final
adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may
yet be enforced separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the
extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil
liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently,
where the civil liability does not exist independently of the criminal
responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto
extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death supervenes
before final judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant case
wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor originally from the
crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase and sale. (Emphasis
ours)
xxx xxx xxx
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the
accused who was charged with estafa could likewise trace its genesis
to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said accused had
swindled the first and second vendees of the property subject matter of
the contract of sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the
death of the accused herein extinguished his criminal liability including
fine, his civil liability based on the laws of human relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of
the accused, notwithstanding the extinction of his criminal liability due
to his death pending appeal of his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the
court relied on the following ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money claims against
the defendant whose death occurred prior to the final judgment of the
Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for
recovery of money may continue to be heard on appeal, when the
death of the defendant supervenes after the CFI had rendered its
judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal, "the name of the
offended party shall be included in the title of the case as plaintiff-
appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the deceased-
accused should be substituted as defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to
Torrijos, the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability
depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of
obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil
liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it were
solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10
departed from this long-established principle of law. In this case,
accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower
court of malversation thru falsification of public documents.
Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the appeal of
his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss
Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the extent of his criminal liability. His
civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that such
claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action
already extinguished. The legal import of such decision was for the
court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire
appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's conviction
despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the purpose of determining
if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a Resolution of July
8, 1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability
survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment
was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which
convicted him of three complex crimes of malversation through
falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total sum
of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with
the criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation
in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil
action for the civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal
action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la
Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies
before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be
dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in Rule
87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment
had been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the
action survives him. It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court
of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds
improperly disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs.
Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of
the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is
concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate
jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money claims of the
Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts
complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him,
thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the
Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform
this Court within ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the
decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration
and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or
administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil
action for the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules
of Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained
adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a
reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that a civil liability
solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished
upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-
examination of our decision in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the
old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The
resolution of the civil action impliedly instituted in the criminal action
can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the
Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising
from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted
during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence
shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the
ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there a grant of authority
to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's civil
liability ex delicto when his death supervenes during appeal. What
Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which
may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense
independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the
quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be
that which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of
evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or
invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action despite
extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of
whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal
action due to death of the accused during appeal of his conviction.
This is because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is
extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on
appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability
is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed
intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to
survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted with
the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal
proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil action. This had
the effect of converting such claims from one which is dependent on
the outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new and separate
one, the prosecution of which does not even necessitate the filing of
criminal proceedings. 12 One would be hard put to pinpoint the
statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind
that in recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be
determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the court's
pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to
render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code which provides that "every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal action due
to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the
concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death
dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final
determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the
prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is
extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal
thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability
springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would
constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of
the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal
proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is contemplated
under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a
separate civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal
proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977, however,
failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the
survival of the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by
treating the same as a separate civil action referred to under Article
30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial
pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil action to an
independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply
Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was
held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing
his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his
estate would be liable. 13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability,
concomitantly made a determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the
basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld
Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the source of
his civil liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in
the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a
reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served as
basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as
the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as
another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing
Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made the inference
that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of money
claims, the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant
dies pending appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable
therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant
dies before final judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be
dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided" in Rule
87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment
had been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the
action survives him. It may be continued on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the
standpoint of procedural law, this course taken in Sendaydiego cannot
be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in both Torrijos
and Sendaydiego which, relying on the provisions of Section 21, Rule
3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom that
where the civil liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had
already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of First
Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can
continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the
extinguishment of the component criminal liability of the deceased.
This pronouncement, which has been followed in the Court's
judgments subsequent and consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego,
should be set aside and abandoned as being clearly erroneous and
unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil
actions. There is neither authority nor justification for its application in
criminal procedure to civil actions instituted together with and as part
of criminal actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the summary
conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil action upon the
death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding
for recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an
ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3
enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be
viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims
against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for
Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21 of
Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money
claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may include
even the restitution of personal or real property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86
provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be filed against
the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses for the last illness,
judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or
implied. It is clear that money claims arising from delict do not form
part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal
basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual
money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate
of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon
extinction of the criminal action engendered by the death of the
accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of
the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same
act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111
16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate
civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged
but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which
the separate civil action is premised determines against whom the
same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict
or may, by provision of law, result in an injury to person or property
(real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed against the
executor or administrator 17 of the estate of the accused pursuant to
Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against
executor or administrator. — No action upon a claim for the recovery
of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the
executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal
property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien
thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held
that, in recovering damages for injury to persons thru an independent
civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be
filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased
accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this
rule explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses
for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims
arising from contract, express or implied. Contractual money claims,
we stressed, refers only to purely personal obligations other than those
which have their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from
contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the estate of
the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes
his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused
prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the
death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above,
an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of
filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil
action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the
estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon
which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his
right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where
during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction,
the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action.
In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby
avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death
of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil
liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape.
Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED
with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.
Cruz, J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 200233               JULY 15, 2015
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner, SO ORDERED.
vs.
PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage
to Santos was void ab initio for having been celebrated without
DECISION complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides an
exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the parties
have actually lived together as husband and wife for at least five years
SERENO, CJ:
prior to the celebration of their marriage. In her case, petitioner
asserted that she and Santos had not lived together as husband and
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner wife for five years prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the
Leonila G. Santiago from the Decision and Resolution of the Court of absence of a marriage license effectively rendered their marriage null
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.1 The CA affirmed the and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.
Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case
No. 7232 2 convicting her of bigamy.
The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus: 11

THE FACTS
Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused
that is null and void as it was celebrated without a valid marriage
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused wants this court to
1997, 3 Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to accused Santos,
Information 4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her something this court cannot do. The best support to her argument
putative husband escaped the criminal suit. 5 would have been the submission of a judicial decree of annulment of
their marriage. Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their
marriage null and void in these proceedings.
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been
married to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974, 6 asked petitioner to
marry him. Petitioner, who 'was a 43-year-old widow then, married THE CA RULING
Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and
parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry, she should choose
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was
someone who was "without responsibility." 7
not based on proof beyond reasonable doubt. She attacked the
credibility of Galang and insisted that the former had not known of the
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be previous marriage of Santos.
included as an accused in the crime of bigamy, because she had been
under the belief that Santos was still single when they got married.
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution
She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his
witnesses' narration. It likewise disbelieved the testimony of Santos.
second marriage to her should be proven valid by the prosecution; but
Anent the lack of a marriage license, the appellate court simply stated
in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of
that the claim was a vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to
a marriage license.
Santos in question. Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for
bigamy. 12
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife,
Estela Galang, testified for the prosecution.1âwphi1 She alleged that
THE ISSUES
she had met petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which
occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos.
Petitioner denied this allegation and averred that she met Galang only Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused
in August and September 1997, or after she had already married in the instant case, because she was not aware of Santos's previous
Santos. marriage. But in the main, she argues that for there to be a conviction
for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
THE RTC RULING

Citing People v. De Lara, 13 she contends that her marriage to Santos

The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married
is void because of the absence of a marriage license. She elaborates
Santos during the subsistence of his marriage to Galang. Based on the
that their marriage does not fall under any of those marriages exempt
more credible account of Galang that she had already introduced
from a marriage license, because they have not previously lived
herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the trial
together exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years. She
court rejected the affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not
alleges that it is extant in the records that she married Santos in 1997,
known of the first marriage. It also held that it was incredible for a
or only four years since she met him in 1993. Without completing the
learned person like petitioner to be easily duped by a person like
five-year requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license
Santos. 8
is void.

The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, "her

In the Comment 14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
marriage was celebrated without a need for a marriage license in
respondent advances the argument that the instant Rule 45 petition
accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an admission
should be denied for raising factual issues as regards her husband's
that she cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of their
subsequent marriage. As regards petitioner's denial of any knowledge
marriage." 9Thus, the trial court convicted petitioner as follows: 10
of Santos' s first marriage, respondent reiterates that credible
testimonial evidence supports the conclusion of the courts a quo that
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused petitioner knew about the subsisting marriage.
Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Bigamy, defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
Code and imposes against her the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6)
provides:
months and one (1) day of Prision Correctional as minimum to six ( 6)
years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
No pronouncement as to costs.
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings.
In Montanez v. Cipriano, 15 this Court enumerated the elements of
bigamy as follows:
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been
legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved x x x;
(c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the
second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second
marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for
bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage. (Emphasis supplied)
For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime,
People v. Nepomuceno, Jr. 16 instructs that she should have had
knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. People v.
Archilla 17 likewise states that the knowledge of the second wife of the
fact of her spouse's existing prior marriage constitutes an
indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes
her responsible as an accomplice.
THE RULING OF THE COURT
The penalty for bigamy and petitioner's knowledge of Santos's first
marriage
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two
persons who marry each other while the previous marriage of one of
them is valid and subsisting. As explained in Nepomuceno: 18
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the
offended parties depending on the circumstances, as when the second
spouse married the accused without being aware of his previous
marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous
undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the
information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's
knowledge of Santos's marriage to Galang. Both courts consistently
found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of the
following circumstances: 19 (1) when Santos was courting and visiting
petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they openly showed their
disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person like
petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was
the more credible witness compared with petitioner who had various
inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she had
already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal
wife of Santos.
After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or
modify the factual findings of the R TC, less so in the present case in
which its findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial court's
assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect,
since it had the important opportunity to observe firsthand the
expression and demeanor of the witnesses during the trial. 20
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with
the ruling that she was validly charged with bigamy. However, we
disagree with the lower courts' imposition of the principal penalty on
her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted out to her the
penalty within the range of prision correctional as minimum to prision
mayor as maximum.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla 21 holds
that the second spouse, if indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only
as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an
eminent authority in criminal law, writes that "a person, whether man
or woman, who knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another
already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the crime
of bigamy." 22 Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an
accomplice to the crime.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the
penalty for a principal in the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which
has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years. Since the
criminal participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the
sentence imposable on her is the penalty next lower in
degree, 23 prision correctional, which has a duration of six months and
one day to six years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance, this penalty shall be imposed in its medium period
consisting of two years, four months and one day to four years and two
months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, 24 petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from
the penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a duration
of one month and one day to six months imprisonment.
The criminal liability of petitioner resulting from her marriage to Santos
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of
bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the
essential requisites for validity. 25 If the accused wants to raise the
nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense
during the presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal
case. 26 In this case, petitioner has consistently27 questioned below the
validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that marriages
celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are
void ab initio. 28
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The
RTC stated that it could not pass judgment on the validity of the
marriage.1âwphi1 The CA held that the attempt of petitioner to attack
her union with Santos was in vain.
On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain
issues and facts, 29 and given that an appeal in a criminal case throws
the whole case open for review, 30 this Court now resolves to correct
the error of the courts a quo.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between
petitioner and Santos took place without a marriage license. The
absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their Certificate
of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under
Article 34 of the Family Code. The provision reads as follows:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman
who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years
and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall
also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the
contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage.31
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more
or less in February 1996 32 and that after six months of courtship,33 she
married him on 29 July 1997. Without any objection from the
prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her
in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he never
cohabited with her, as she was residing in the house of her in-
laws,34 and her children from her previous marriage disliked him.35 On
cross examination, respondent did not question the claim of petitioner
that sometime in 1993, she first met Santos as an agent who sold her
piglets.36
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had
only known each other for only less than four years. Thus, it follows
that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least five years
prior to their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this
demonstrable fact. Although the records do not show that they
submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the
Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the
solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually
cohabited for at least five years before they married each other.
Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the
Certificate of Marriage, 37 in which the solemnizing officer stated under
oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the marriage
was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.
The legal effects in a criminal case of a deliberate act to put a flaw in
the marriage
No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State." 45 It must be safeguarded from the whims and
caprices of the contracting parties. 46 in keeping therefore with this
fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for
bigamy

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner

The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained
Leonila G. Santiago is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the
the misrepresentation perpetrated by them that they were eligible to
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED with
contract marriage without a license. We thus face an anomalous
MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby
situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an
her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license
accomplice. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six
despite knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation
months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of prision
requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less
correctional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.
than her marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.

We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a

Republic of the Philippines
bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort to escape criminal
SUPREME COURT
prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an
Manila
individual's deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct
SECOND DIVISION
character of this special bond between spouses.38 In Tenebro v. Court
of Appeals,39 we had the occasion to emphasize that the State's penal
laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing G.R. No. 127263             April 12, 2000
individuals "to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed
in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting
FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner,
multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
vs.
promise of futurity and commitment."
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA,
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO SY, respondents.
acts of feigning a marriage and, in the same breath, adjudge her
innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery of
QUISUMBING, J.:
the sanctity of marriage. 40

For review is the decision1 dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of Appeals
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will "lend its
in CA-G.R. CV No. 44144, which affirmed the decision2 of the Regional
aid to x x x one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to
Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, denying the petition3 for
an illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded." 41 If the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy
cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a
and Fernando Sy.
transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the
courts. 42 As a result, litigants shall be denied relief on the ground that
their conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest or fraudulent, Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy
or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 43 contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady
of Lourdes in Quezon City. 4 Both were then 22 years old. Their union
was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who were
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative
born on July 8, 1975 and February 14, 1978, respectively.5
defense in this criminal case of bigamy, is that her marriage with
Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage license.
But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila,
Certificate of Marriage by misrepresenting that they were exempted then in Apalit, Pampanga, and later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas,
from the license requirement based on their fabricated claim that they Pampanga. They operated a lumber and hardware business in Sto.
had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years prior Tomas, Pampanga.6
their marriage. In violation of our law against illegal
marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while knowing full well that they
On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since
had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under
then, the spouses lived separately, and their two children were in the
Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently, it will be the height of
custody of their mother. However, their son Frederick transferred to his
absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to
father's residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15, 1988, and
escape criminal conviction.
from then on, lived with his father.7

The applicability of People v. De Lara

Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an
acquittal for bigamy on the ground that the second marriage lacked the
requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court found that when
Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18
August 1951, the local Civil Registrar had yet to issue their marriage
license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was celebrated
one day before the issuance of the marriage license, the Court
acquitted him of bigamy.
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public
documents in order to contract a second marriage. In contrast,
petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage,
and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking her
exculpation. Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused in De Lara,
this Court cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of the crime.
On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation,
docketed as Civil Case No. 7900 before the Regional Trial Court of
San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of petitioner, the action
was later amended to a petition for separation of property on the
grounds that her husband abandoned her without just cause; that they
have been living separately for more than one year; and that they
voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated
September 29, 1983, containing the rules that would govern the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership.8 Judgment was rendered
dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime
of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement
executed by the spouses.9 The trial court also granted custody of the
children to Filipina. 10
In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide
against her husband, docketed as Criminal Case No. 88-68006, before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina testified that in the
afternoon of May 15, 1988, she went to the dental clinic at Masangkay,
Tondo, Manila, owned by her husband but operated by his mistress, to
fetch her son and bring him to San Fernando, Pampanga. While she
was talking to her son, the boy ignored her and continued playing with
the family computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer away from
her son, and started spanking him. At that instance, Fernando pulled
Filipina away from their son, and punched her in the different parts of
her body. Filipina also claimed that her husband started choking her
when she fell on the floor, and released her only when he thought she
was dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma and contusions on
different parts of her body as a result of the blows inflicted by her
husband, evidenced by a Medical Certificate issued by a certain Dr.
James Ferraren. She said it was not the first time Fernando maltreated
her. 11
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision 12 dated
April 26, 1990, convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight
physical injuries, and sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment.
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private
respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 8273, on the following
grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3)
attempt by respondent against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by
her husband without justifiable cause for more than one year. The
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its
decision 13 dated December 4, 1991, granted the petition on the
grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued
a decree of legal separation. It awarded custody of their daughter
Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son Frederick to respondent.
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition 14 for the declaration of
absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of
psychological incapacity. She points out that the final judgment
rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for
separation of property and legal separation, and Fernando's infliction
of physical violence on her which led to the conviction of her husband
for slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity.
She also cites as manifestations of her husband's psychological
incapacity the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with
her without fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead;
and (3) refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act only to
satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological
incapacity of her husband existed from the time of the celebration of
their marriage and became manifest thereafter. 15
The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its
decision 16 dated December 9, 1993, denied the petition of Filipina Sy
for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando. It
stated that the alleged acts of the respondent, as cited by petitioner,
do not constitute psychological incapacity which may warrant the
declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the trial court. In the decision 17 of the Court of Appeals
dated May 21, 1996, it ruled that the testimony of petitioner concerning
respondent's purported psychological incapacity falls short of the
quantum of evidence required to nullify a marriage celebrated with all
the formal and essential requisites of law. Moreover, the Court of
Appeals held that petitioner failed to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity of respondent had existed at the time of the
celebration of their marriage in 1973. It reiterated the finding of the trial
court that the couple's marital problems surfaced only in 1983, or
almost ten years from the date of the celebration of their marriage. And
prior to their separation in 1983, they were living together
harmoniously. Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
lower court which it found to be in accordance with law and the
evidence on record. 18
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, 19 which the Court of
Appeals denied in its resolution dated November 21, 1996. 20
Hence, this appeal by certiorari 21 wherein petitioner now raises the
following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ON THE DATE OF
THE CELEBRATION OF THE PARTIES' MARRIAGE ON
NOVEMBER 15, 1973, NOT DISPUTED BY RESPONDENT
FERNANDO, THERE WAS NO MARRIAGE LICENSE THERETO;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT
THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY APPELLANT [herein petitioner]
DO NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS WOULD
JUSTIFY NULLIFICATION OF HER MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE
[herein respondent];
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT
APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE ALLEGED
UNDESIRABLE ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE HAD EXISTED OR
WERE PRESENT AT THE TIME THEIR MARRIAGE WAS
CELEBRATED IN 1973;
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE
ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THERE IS A
REDEEMING ATTITUDE SHOWN TO THE COURT BY
RESPONDENT FERNANDO WITH RESPECT TO HIS CHILDREN
AND ALSO BELIEVES THAT RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE
PARTIES IS NOT A REMOTE POSSIBILITY WHICH IS
ERRONEOUS; AND
5. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V. COURT OF
APPEALS (240 SCRA 20) IS APPLICABLE HERETO. 22
In sum, two issues are to be resolved:
1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private
respondent is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license at
the time of the ceremony; and
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated
at the time of said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its
absolute nullity.
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void
for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. It
appears that, according to her, the date of the actual celebration of
their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate
and marriage license are different and incongruous.
Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue
for the first time on appeal, as this would contravene the basic rules of
fair play and justice, 23 in a number of instances, we have relaxed
observance of procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not ends
in themselves but exist to protect and promote substantive rights of
litigants. We said that certain rules ought not to be applied with
severity and rigidity if by so doing, the very reason for their existence
would be defeated. 24 Hence, when substantial justice plainly requires,
exempting a particular case from the operation of technicalities should
not be subject to cavil. 25 In our view, the case at bar requires that we
address the issue of the validity of the marriage between Filipina and
Fernando which petitioner claims is void from the beginning for lack of
a marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply
seated and violent conflict between the parties. Note, however, that
here the pertinent facts are not disputed; and what is required now is a
declaration of their effects according to existing law.
Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her
petition for annulment of marriage before the trial court that the
incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the celebration of
the marriage itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to
Fernando was void from the beginning, she points out that these
critical dates were contained in the documents she submitted before
the court. The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage
certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage contract
which was attached as Annex "A" in her petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter
marked as Exhibit "A" in the course of the trial. 26 The date of
celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita
Parish, on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and
private respondent, as stated in paragraph three of petitioner's petition
for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court,
and private respondent's answer admitting it. 27 This fact was also
affirmed by petitioner, in open court, on January 22, 1993, during her
direct examination, 28 as follows:
ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that you were married on
November 15, 1973?
FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.
November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the
parents in both their son's and daughter's birth certificates, which are
also attached as Annexes "B" and "C" in the petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter
marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course of the trial. 29 These
pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the
day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A
marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the
marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that
the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona,
Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in
Carmona. 30
Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we
find that indeed petitioner did not expressly state in her petition before
the trial court that there was incongruity between the date of the actual
celebration of their marriage and the date of the issuance of their
marriage license. From the documents she presented, the marriage
license was issued on September 17, 1974, almost one year after the
ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable
conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a
marriage license. Nowhere do we find private respondent denying
these dates on record. Article 80 of the Civil Code 31 is clearly
applicable in this case. There being no claim of an exceptional
character, the purported marriage between petitioner and private
respondent could not be classified among those enumerated in
Articles 72-79 32 of the Civil Code. We thus conclude that under Article
80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and private
respondent is void from the beginning.
We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only
photocopies. So are the birth certificates of their son Frederick and
daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents were marked
as Exhibits during the course of the trial below, which shows that these
have been examined and admitted by the trial court, with no objections
having been made as to their authenticity and due execution. Likewise,
no objection was interposed to petitioner's testimony in open court
when she affirmed that the date of the actual celebration of their
marriage was on November 15, 1973. We are of the view, therefore,
that having been admitted in evidence, with the adverse party failing to
timely object thereto, these documents are deemed sufficient proof of
the facts contained therein. 33
The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private
respondent need no longer detain us. It is mooted by our conclusion
that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of
a marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, dated December 9,
1993 as well as the Decision promulgated on May 21, 1996 by the
Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated November 21, 1996 in CA-
G.R. No. 44144 are set aside. The marriage celebrated on November
15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Yap and private respondent
Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of a marriage
license at the time of celebration. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the
two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño,
whose “death benefits” is now the subject of the controversy between
the two Susans whom he married. 1âwphi1.nêt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set
aside the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263,
which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted
two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan
Nicdao Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he
had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the
second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee
Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no
children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in
1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to
diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on
November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his
medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed
claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the
deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao
was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from “MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,” 3 while respondent Susan
Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from “GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and
burial (SSS).” 4
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case
for collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao
praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least
one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00)
collectively denominated as “death benefits” which she (petitioner)
received from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-
ibig.” Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file her answer,
prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased
took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a
judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and
the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of
the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the
funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced
herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection
of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized
without the required marriage license. In support thereof, respondent
presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the
petitioner which bears no marriage license number; 5 and 2) a
certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, Metro Manila, which reads –
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of
the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are
married in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue
as requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage License number
from the records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cariño
for whatever legal purpose it may serve.  6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan
Yee, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the
sum of P73,000.00, half of the amount which was paid to her in the
form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S.
Cariño, plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of
suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.  7
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in
toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition,
contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA.
DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT
BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE
CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE
BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE
ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to
be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from
legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void. 9 However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action
is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties
thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity
of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely
to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage
void. 11
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to
pass upon the validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is
essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject
“death benefits” of the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a
valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, 12 and the absence
thereof, subject to certain exceptions, 13 renders the marriage void ab
initio. 14
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the
license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable
to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records
reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears
no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such
marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court held that
such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a
marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the
present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a
record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then
became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid
and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was
declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely
met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her
pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner
conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an
argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed
validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the
necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages
exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab
initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since
the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio,
the “death benefits” under scrutiny would now be awarded to
respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family
Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a
party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second
marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the
previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does
not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent
Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized
without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage
of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the
separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable
property regime. 16 Considering that the two marriages are void ab
initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community
or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the
provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on “Property
Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property
regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships
in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are
married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married
man, 17 -
“... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ...”
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through
their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership.
Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her
exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home,
children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded
in this regime. 18
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the
deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the
subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid
(between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is
therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit
Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI,
are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental
agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless
respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be
said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition
of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by
respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and
respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate
succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his
legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased
is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies
to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article
147 of the Family Code reads -
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they
lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in
favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any
or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share
shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence
of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all
cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and
salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned
by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between
them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not
contribute thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed “death benefits”
were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee,
Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the
petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad
faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are
presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject “death
benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the
property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall
pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children
with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied
on the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance
System, 20 where the Court awarded one-half of the retirement benefits
of the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife,
holding that:
“... [S]ince the defendant’s first marriage has not been dissolved or
declared void the conjugal partnership established by that marriage
has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as
putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to
share in his estate upon his death should she survive him.
Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting
marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husband’s
share in the property here in dispute....” And with respect to the right of
the second wife, this Court observed that although the second
marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated
while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for
judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal
partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before
judicial declaration of its nullity, “[t]he only just and equitable solution
in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her
share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband,
and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of
the first marriage.”   21
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is
premised on the rule which requires a prior and separate judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in the said
case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance with
their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals,  22 however, the Court, construing
Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified that a prior and separate
declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition
precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is
previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she
has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void,
before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the
second marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the first
marriage is patently void because the parties are not free to determine
for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, for
purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of
sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior
and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party
has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that
would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in
fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the
issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved and
proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the
applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 23 the
Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that
may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to
remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that
such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner
to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorney’s fees in the
amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint
in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
 SECOND DIVISION  children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the
G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998
FE D. QUITA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents.
ELLOSILLO, J.:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the
Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were not however blessed with
children. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured.
Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing
dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from
each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July
1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks
thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but
their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she
married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino
Javier Inciong filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of
Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina
Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the
surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo,
Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the
children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and prayed for the
appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in
favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty.
Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the
oppositors (Blandina and Padlan children) submitted certified
photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment
of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan,
claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo,
intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of
heirs of the decedent and the distribution of his estate. At the
scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent as well as
the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due
notice. On the same day, the trial court required the submission of the
records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on the
declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The
prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being
submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escaño 1 which held that "a
foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought and decreed
after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was
not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction," 2 disregarded the divorce between petitioner and
Arturo. Consecuently, it expressed the view that their marriage
subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider
valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties due to
lack of judicial approval. 3 On the other hand, it opined that there
was no showing that marriage existed between private
respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged
Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased as his
children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a
brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987 4 only petitioner and
Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly,
equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in
favor of the two intestate heirs. 5
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children
were allowed to present proofs that the recognition of the
children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis
who was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in
their respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February
1988 6 partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan
estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the
other half. 7 Private respondent was not declared an heir.
Although it was stated in the aforementioned records of birth that
she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was
clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his
previous marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children
assigned as one of the errors allegedly committed by the trial
court the circumstance that the case was decided without a
hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court,
which provides that if there is a controversy before the court as
to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law,
the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to
sustain the appeal; hence, on 11 September 1995 it declared null
and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988
order of the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the
trial court for further proceedings. 8 On 18 April 1996 it denied
reconsideration. 9
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings? Petitioner insists that there is no need because,
first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to
the heirship of the Padlan children or as to the decedent; and,
second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private
respondent is the proper hier of the decedent is one of law which
can be resolved in the present petition based on establish facts
and admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by
respondent court is clear: If there is a controversy before the
court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as
to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under
the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the
right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from the decedent
because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged
by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of
Arturo Padlan; 10 nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But
controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse
of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than petitioner
failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987
of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and distribution
of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission of the
records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from
receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the
issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for
resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private
respondent raised, among others, the issue as to whether
petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent
considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in
fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted
procedural rule. 11 To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a
Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of
the divorce they obtained. 12 Reading between the lines, the
implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the
time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the
trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The
purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in
issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as
well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or
opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily
settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling
in Tenchavez v. Escaño.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or
reconsider the lower court's decision she stressed that the
citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling
in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. She prayed
therefore that the case be set for hearing. 14 Petitioner opposed
the motion but failed to squarely address the issue on her
citizenship. 15 The trial court did not grant private respondent's
prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the
finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and
were married in the Philippines." 16 It maintained that their divorce
obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not
valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on
their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as
the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine
petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt
persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their
divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the
materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would
become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to
inherit from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's
citizenship; 17 it did not merit enlightenment however from
petitioner. 18 In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is
brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even
furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic notes
taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of
the original of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the
issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another
trial court. When asked whether she was an American citizen
petitioner answered that she was since 1954. 19 Significantly, the
decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the
same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply
memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at
the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be
conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate
court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for
further proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the
trial court should be limited only to the right of petitioner to
inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's
claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and
Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of
petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a
bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under
Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a
surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status
presupposes a legitimate relationship. 20
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and a
her counsel to be declared in contempt of court and that the
present petition be dismissed for forum shopping, 21 the same
lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve
the same transactions and same essential facts and
circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action,
subject matter and issue. 22 The present petition deals with
declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before
the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's
duplicate copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the
estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the
existence of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent
Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the court of
origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its
decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as
intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court
modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the
net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro,
Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of
Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto
Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes
that the reception of evidence by the trial court should he limited
to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of
Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of
court and to dismiss the present petition for forum shopping is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 109975      February 9, 2001
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA MATIAS DAGDAG, respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated
April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378, which affirmed the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 380-0-90
declaring the marriage of Erlinda Matias Dagdag and Avelino Dagdag
void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino
Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent
Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.2 The marriage certificate was issued
by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo,
Nueva Ecija, on October 20, 1988.
Erlinda and Avelino begot two children, namely: Avelyn M. Dagdag,
born on January 16, 1978; and Eden M. Dagdag, born on April 21,
1982.3 Their birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, also on
October 20, 1988.
Erlinda and Avelino lived in a house in District 8, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija,
located at the back of the house of their in-laws.4 A week after the
wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He
would disappear for months, suddenly reappear for a few months, then
disappear again. During the times when he was with his family, he
indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk.
He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she
refused, he would inflict physical injuries on her.5
On October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last they
heard from him. Erlinda was constrained to look for a job in Olongapo
City as a manicurist to support herself and her children. Finally, Erlinda
learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime,6 and that he
escaped from jail on October 22, 1985.7 A certification therefor dated
February 14, 1990, was issued by Jail Warden Orlando S. Limon.
Avelino remains at-large to date.
On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code.8 Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by
publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation,
on September 3, 10, and 17, 1990.9 Subsequently, a hearing was
conducted to establish jurisdictional facts. Thereafter, on December
17, 1990, the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and
her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law,
Virginia Dagdag, as her only witness.
Virginia testified that she is married to the brother of Avelino. She and
her husband live in Olongapo City but they spend their vacations at the
house of Avelino's parents in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. She testified that
Erlinda and Avelino always quarrelled, and that Avelino never stayed
for long at the couple's house. She knew that Avelino had been gone
for a long time now, and that she pitied Erlinda and the children.10
WHEREFORE, and the foregoing considered, the motion for
Reconsideration aforecited is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED"

Thereafter, Erlinda rested her case. The trial court issued an Order
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising the
giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991, to manifest in
sole assignment of error that:
writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and
stating that should he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be
deemed submitted for decision. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING APPELLEE'S
MARRIAGE TO A VELINO DAGDAG NULL AND VOID ON THE
GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE LATTER,
In compliance with the Order, the investigating prosecutor conducted
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE
an investigation and found that there was no collusion between the
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE NATURE
parties. However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid
CONTEMPLATED BY THE LAW NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO
fabrication of evidence.11
EXIST.14

On December 27, 1990, without waiting for the investigating

On April 22, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision15 affirming
prosecutor's manifestation dated December 5, 1990, the trial court
the decision of the trial court, disposing thus:
rendered a decision12 declaring the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino
void under Article 36 of the Family Code, disposing thus:
"Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he
failed to perform the duties and obligations of a married person but
"WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing considerations, the
because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic,
Court hereby declares the marriage celebrated at Cuyapo, Nueva
and a criminal. Necessarily, the plaintiff is now endowed with the right
Ecija between Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag on 7 September
to seek the judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article
1975 to be null and void.
36 of the Family Code. Defendant's constant non-fulfillment of any of
such obligations is continously (sic) destroying the integrity or
The Local Civil Registrar of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija is hereby ordered to wholeness of his marriage with the plaintiff. (Pineda, The Family Code
enter into his Book of Marriage this declaration after this decision shall of the Philippines Annotated, 1992 Ed., p. 46)."16
have become final and executory .
Hence, the present petition for review ,17 filed by the Solicitor General.
SO ORDERED."
The Solicitor General contends that the alleged psychological
On January 29, 1991, the investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set incapacity of Avelino Dagdag is not of the nature contemplated by
Aside Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely Article 36 of the Family Code. According to him, the Court of Appeals
rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase
he was presenting controverting evidence. "psychological incapacity" and an incorrect application thereof to the
facts of the case. Respondent, in her Comment, insists that the facts
constituting psychological incapacity were proven by preponderance of
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for
evidence during trial.
Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is not in
accordance with the evidence and the law. After requiring Erlinda to
comment, the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration in an At issue is whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals
Order dated August 21, 1991 as follows:13 correctly declared the marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from
psychological incapacity as he is emotionally immature and
"This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this
irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice.
Honorable Court dated December 27, 1990 filed by the Solicitor-
General. The observation of the movant is to the effect that 'Mere
alcoholism and abusiveness are not enough to show psychological Article 36 of the Family Code provides -
incapacity. Nor is abandonment. These are common in marriage.
There must be showing that these traits, stemmed from psychological
"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
incapacity existing at the time of celebration of the marriage.’
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
In the case at bar, the abandonment is prolonged as the husband left such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
his wife and children since 1983. The defendant, while in jail escaped
and whose present whereabouts are unknown. He failed to support his
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling
family for the same period of time, actuations clearly indicative of the
for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field
failure of the husband to comply with the essential marital obligations
of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on
of marriage defined and enumerated under Article 68 of the Family
the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
Code. These findings of facts are uncontroverted. 1âwphi1.nêt
according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on
Defendant's character traits, by their nature, existed at the time of "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in
marriage and became manifest only after the marriage. In rerum examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as
natura, these traits are manifestations of lack of marital responsibility possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.18
and appear now to be incurable. Nothing can be graver since the
family members are now left to fend for themselves. Contrary to the
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 19 the Court laid down the
opinion of the Solicitor-General, these are not common in marriage.
following GUIDELINES in the interpretation and application of Article
36 of the Family Code:
Let it be said that the provisions of Article 36 of the New Family Code,
to assuage the sensibilities of the more numerous church, is a
"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
substitute for divorce (See: Sempio Diy, New Family Code, p. 36) in
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
order to dissolve marriages that exist only in name.
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13,
1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but
the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them
but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less in will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code20 as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code21 in regard
to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit
to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."22
Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda
failed to comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary requirements.
Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that
the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or
clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no
psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological
incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a
fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for
which he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating
prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present
controverting evidence since the trial court's decision was prematurely
rendered.
In the case of Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 23 we affirmed the
dismissal of the trial court and Court of Appeals of the petition for
annulment on the ground of dearth of the evidence presented. We
further explained therein that -
"Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish
the precise cause of private respondent's psychological incapacity, if
any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage.
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon
petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. (Art. II, Sec.
12, Art. XV, Secs. 1-2) Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the validity of the marriage. (citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals, supra. )"24
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY
No. 34378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION 
G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker,
invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that
respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the
alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void.1
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the
Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been deputized to assist the
Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that
Nolasco did not possess a "well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead,"2 and second, Nolasco's attempt to have his
marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a "cunning attempt" to
circumvent the law on marriage.3
During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and
that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in
England during one of his ship's port calls. From that chance meeting
onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his
ship for six (6) months until they returned to respondent's hometown of
San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman's contract
expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica
Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry
van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage
celebration, he obtained another employment contract as a seaman
and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in
January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter
from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his
son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique.
Respondent claimed he then immediately asked permission to leave
his ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself
whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated
that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena
Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he
and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed
that he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet
Monica.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and
later married Janet Monica Parker despite his lack of knowledge as to
her family background. He insisted that his wife continued to refuse to
give him such information even after they were married. He also
testified that he did not report the matter of Janet Monica's
disappearance to the Philippine government authorities.
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his
witness. She testified that her daughter-in-law Janet Monica had
expressed a desire to return to England even before she had given
birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7 December 1982. When asked why her
daughter-in-law might have wished to leave Antique, respondent's
mother replied that Janet Monica never got used to the rural way of life
in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that she had tried to
dissuade Janet Monica from leaving as she had given birth to her son
just fifteen days before, but when she (Alicia) failed to do so, she gave
Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left on 22
December 1982 for England. She further claimed that she had no
information as to the missing person's present whereabouts.
The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12
October 1988 the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Executive Order No. 209, July 6, 1987, as amended by
Executive Order No. 227, July 17, 1987) this Court hereby declares as
presumptively dead Janet Monica Parker Nolasco, without prejudice to
her reappearance.4
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the
trial court erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead
because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a
well founded belief for such declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that
respondent had sufficiently established a basis to form a belief that his
absent spouse had already died.
The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this Court
on a Petition for Review where the following allegations are made:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that
there existed a well-founded belief on the part of Nolasco that Janet
Monica Parker was already dead; and
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial Court's declaration
that the petition was a proper case of the declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41, Family Code.5
The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is "[w]hether or
not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead."6
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41
of the Family Code which provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of
a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code,
an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance
of the absent spouse. (Emphasis supplied).
When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code,
which it superseded,7 the following crucial differences emerge. Under
Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been
shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to
remarry.8 Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter
standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely
requires either that there be no news that such absentee is still alive;
or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to be
so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article 390 and
391 of the Civil Code.9 The Family Code, upon the other hand,
prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already
dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be
granted.
As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for
the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive
years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where
there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee
is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. 10
Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these
requirements.11
Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that
respondent failed to prove that he had complied with the third
requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the
absent spouse is already dead.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search
for his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-
founded belief" that she is dead.
United States v. Biasbas, 12 is instructive as to degree of diligence
required in searching for a missing spouse. In that case, defendant
Macario Biasbas was charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up the
defense of a good faith belief that his first wife had already died. The
Court held that defendant had not exercised due diligence to ascertain
the whereabouts of his first wife, noting that:
While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries concerning
the whereabouts of his wife, he fails to state of whom he made such
inquiries. He did not even write to the parents of his first wife, who
lived in the Province of Pampanga, for the purpose of securing
information concerning her whereabouts. He admits that he had a
suspicion only that his first wife was dead. He admits that the only
basis of his suspicion was the fact that she had been absent. . . . 13
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly
conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica
Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable
or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in
San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead
of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, 14 he
secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of
many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
Q After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, did you exert efforts to
inquire the whereabouts of your wife?
A Yes, Sir.
Court:
How did you do that?
A I secured another contract with the ship and we had a trip to London
and I went to London to look for her I could not find
her (sic). 15 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused London
for Liverpool and this casts doubt on his supposed efforts to locate his
wife in England. The Court of Appeal's justification of the mistake, to
wit:
. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know the
geographical difference between London and Liverpool, for a humble
seaman like Gregorio the two places could mean one — place in
England, the port where his ship docked and where he found Janet.
Our own provincial folks, every time they leave home to visit relatives
in Pasay City, Kalookan City, or Parañaque, would announce to
friends and relatives, "We're going to Manila." This apparent error in
naming of places of destination does not appear to be fatal. 16
is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its
neighboring cities, on one hand, and London and Liverpool, on the
other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around three
hundred fifty (350) kilometers apart. We do not consider that walking
into a major city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope of
somehow bumping into one particular person there — which is in
effect what Nolasco says he did — can be regarded as a reasonably
diligent search.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to
give any information as to her personal background even after she had
married respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to
locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters
respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all
returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned letters,
under unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare
assertion that he had inquired from their friends of her whereabouts,
considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his
testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed
to rebut this evidence during trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of
evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility
is not synonymous with credibility. 18 As noted before, there are
serious doubts to respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted
as evidence, said testimony merely tended to show that the missing
spouse had chosen not to communicate with their common
acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's
letter sometime in January 1983, he cut short his employment contract
to return to San Jose, Antique. However, he did not explain the delay
of nine (9) months from January 1983, when he allegedly asked leave
from his captain, to November 1983 when be finally reached San Jose.
Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet Monica Parker
without inquiring about her parents and their place of
residence. 19 Also, respondent failed to explain why he did not even try
to get the help of the police or other authorities in London and
Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The circumstances of Janet
Monica's departure and respondent's subsequent behavior make it
very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica was dead a
well-founded one.
In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, 20 the Court stressed that:
. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity the
public is deeply interested. It is a relationship for life and the parties
cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they
make. . . . . 21 (Emphasis supplied)
By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple
expedient of agreeing that one of them leave the conjugal abode and
never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage.
The Court notes that respondent even tried to have his marriage
annulled before the trial court in the same proceeding.
In In Re Szatraw, 22 the Court warned against such collusion between
the parties when they find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds
through existing legal means.
While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son,
Gerry Nolasco, for maternal care, still the requirements of the law must
prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the
law, his petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death must be
denied. The law does not view marriage like an ordinary contract.
Article 1 of the Family Code emphasizes that.
. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man
and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation,
except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during
the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis
supplied)
In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 23 the Court stressed strongly the
need to protect.
. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the
preservation of which the State bas the strongest interest; the public
policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind. In Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the following basic
state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. . . .
The same sentiment bas been expressed in the Family Code of the
Philippines in Article 149:
The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social
institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently,
family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or
agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given
effect. 24
In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded
belief required by law that his absent wife was already dead that would
sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead.
In an order, dated 07 April 1989, the trial court adjudged:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered directing
respondent to allow herein petitioner visitorial rights to his children
during Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no case should he take out
the children without the written consent of the mother or respondent
herein. No pronouncement as to costs.1
Silva appeared somehow satisfied with the judgment for only Gonzales
interposed an appeal from the RTC's order to the Court of Appeals.
In the meantime, Gonzales got married to a Dutch national. The
newlyweds emigrated to Holland with Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23

On 23 September 1993, the appellate tribunal ruled in favor of
February 1990, affirming the trial court's decision declaring Janet
Gonzales; it held:
Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and both
Decisions are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Costs against
respondent. "In all questions, regarding the care, custody, education and property
of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration" — not
the welfare of the parents (Art. 8, PD 603). Under the predicament
and/or status of both petitioner-appellee and respondent-appellant, We
find it more wholesome morally and emotionally for the children if we
put a stop to the rotation of custody of said children. Allowing these
children to stay with their mother on weekdays and then with their
father and the latter's live-in partner on weekends may not be
Republic of the Philippines
conducive to a normal up-bringing of children of tender age. There is
SUPREME COURT
no telling how this kind of set-up, no matter how temporary and/or
Manila
remote, would affect the moral and emotional conditions of the minor
children. Knowing that they are illegitimate is hard enough, but having
FIRST DIVISION  to live with it, witnessing their father living with a woman not their
mother may have a more damaging effect upon them.
G.R. No. 114742 July 17, 1997
Article 3 of PD 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, provides in part:
CARLITOS E. SILVA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SUZANNE T. Art. 3. Rights of the Child. — . . .
GONZALES, respondents.
(1) . . .

VITUG, J.:
(2) . . .

Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to
(3) . . .
care for their children, see to their proper upbringing and safeguard
their best interest and welfare. This authority and responsibility may
not be unduly denied the parents; neither may it be renounced by (4) . . .
them. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for
each other is lost, the attachment and feeling for their offsprings
(5) Every child has the right to be brought up in an atmosphere of
invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this
morality and rectitude for the enrichment and the strengthening of his
affinity to suffer absent, of course, any real, grave and imminent threat
character.
to the well-being of the child.

(6) . . .
The petition bears upon this concern.

(7) . . .
Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales,
an unmarried local actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage.
The union saw the birth of two children: Ramon Carlos and Rica (8) Every child has the right to protection
Natalia. Not very long after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It against exploitation, improper influences, hazards and other conditions
began, according to Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her or circumstances prejudicial to his physical, mental emotional social
acting career over his vigorous objections. The assertion was quickly and moral development.
refuted by Gonzales who claimed that she, in fact, had never stopped
working throughout their relationship. At any rate, the two eventually
xxx xxx xxx
parted ways.

With Articles 3 and 8 of PD 603, in mind, We find it to the best interest

The instant controversy was spawned, in February 1986, by the
of the minor children, to deny visitorial and/or temporary custodial
refusal of Gonzales to allow Silva, in apparent contravention of a
rights to the father, even at the expense of hurting said parent. After
previous understanding, to have the children in his company on
all, if indeed his love for the children is genuine and more divine than
weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children
the love for himself, a little self-sacrifice and self-denial may bring
before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 78, of Quezon City.
more benefit to the children. While petitioner-appellee, as father, may
The petition was opposed by Gonzales who averred that Silva often
not intentionally prejudice the children by improper influence, what the
engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect
children may witness and hear while in their father's house may not be
the moral and social values of the children.
in keeping with the atmosphere of morality and rectitude where they
should be brought up.
The children concerned are still in their early formative years of life.
The molding of the character of the child starts at home. A home with
only one parent is more normal than two separate houses — (one
house where one parent lives and another house where the other
parent with another woman/man lives). After all, under Article 176 of
the Family Code, illegitimate children are supposed to use the
surname of and shall be under the parental authority of their mother.
The child is one of the most important assets of the nation. It is thus
important we be careful in rearing the children especially so if they are
illegitimates, as in this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered giving due course to the appeal. The Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City dated April 7, 1989 is hereby reversed.
Petitioner-appellee's petition for visitorial rights is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.2
Silva comes to this Court for relief.
The issue before us is not really a question of child custody; instead,
the case merely concerns the visitation right of a parent over his
children which the trial court has adjudged in favor of petitioner by
holding that he shall have "visitorial rights to his children during
Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no case (could) he take out the
children without the written consent of the mother . . . ." The visitation
right referred to is the right of access of a noncustodial parent to his or
her child or children.3
There is, despite a dearth of specific legal provisions, enough
recognition on the inherent and natural right of parents over their
children. Article 150 of the Family Code expresses that "(f)amily
relations include those . . . (2) (b)etween parents and children; . . . ."
Article 209, in relation to Article 220, of the Code states that it is
the natural right and duty of parents and those exercising parental
authority to, among other things, keep children in their company and to
give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and
understanding. The Constitution itself speaks in terms of the "natural
and primary rights" of parents in the rearing of the youth.4 There is
nothing conclusive to indicate that these provisions are meant to solely
address themselves to legitimate relationships. Indeed, although in
varying degrees, the laws on support and successional rights, by way
of examples, clearly go beyond the legitimate members of the family
and so explicitly encompass illegitimate relationships as well.5 Then,
too, and most importantly, in the declaration of nullity of marriages, a
situation that presupposes a void or inexistent marriage, Article 49 of
the Family Code provides for appropriate visitation rights to parents
who are not given custody of their children.
There is no doubt that in all cases involving a child, his interest and
welfare is always the paramount consideration. The Court shares the
view of the Solicitor General, who has recommended due course to
the petition, that a few hours spent by petitioner with the children,
however, could not all be that detrimental to the children. Similarly,
what the trial court has observed is not entirely without merit; thus:
The allegations of respondent against the character of petitioner, even
assuming as true, cannot be taken as sufficient basis to render
petitioner an unfit father. The fears expressed by respondent to the
effect that petitioner shall be able to corrupt and degrade their children
once allowed to even temporarily associate with petitioner is but the
product of respondent's unfounded imagination, for no man, bereft of
all moral persuasions and goodness, would ever take the trouble and
expense in instituting a legal action for the purpose of seeing his
illegitimate children. It can just be imagined the deep sorrows of a
father who is deprived of his children of tender ages.6
The Court appreciates the apprehensions of private respondent and
their well-meant concern for the children; nevertheless, it seems
unlikely that petitioner would have ulterior motives or undue designs
more than a parent's natural desire to be able to call on, even if it were
only on brief visits, his own children. The trial court, in any case, has
seen it fit to understandably provide this precautionary measure, i.e.,
"in no case (can petitioner) take out the children without the written
consent of the mother."
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is REINSTATED,
reversing thereby the judgment of the appellate court which is hereby
SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 106169 February 14, 1994
SAMSON T. SABALONES, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and REMEDIOS GAVIOLA-
SABALONES, respondents.
Leven S. Puno for petitioner.
Benigno M. Puno for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The subject of this petition is the preliminary injunction issued by the
respondent court pending resolution of a case on appeal. We deal only
with this matter and not the merits of the case.
As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries
during his successive tours of duties, petitioner Samson T. Sabalones
left to his wife, herein respondent Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones, the
administration of some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen years.
Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the
Philippines but not to his wife and their children. Four years later, he
filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot located
at
#17 Eisenhower St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, belonging to
the conjugal partnership. He claimed that he was sixty-eight years old,
very sick and living alone without any income, and that his share of the
proceeds of the sale to defray the prohibitive cost of his hospitalization
and medical treatment.
In her answer, the private respondent opposed the authorization and
filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She alleged that the house in
Greenhills was being occupied by her and their six children and that
they were depending for their support on the rentals from another
conjugal property, a building and lot in Forbes Park which was on
lease to Nobumichi Izumi. She also informed the court that despite her
husband's retirement, he had not returned to his legitimate family and
was instead maintaining a separate residence in Don Antonio Heights,
Fairview, Quezon City, with Thelma Cumareng and their three
children.
In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of legal
separation and order the liquidation of their conjugal properties, with
forfeiture of her husband's share therein because of his adultery. She
also prayed that it enjoin the petitioner and his agents from a)
disturbing the occupants of the Forbes Park property and b) disposing
of or encumbering any of the conjugal properties.
After trial, Judge Mariano M. Umali, found that the petitioner had
indeed contracted a bigamous marriage on October 5, 1981, with
Thelma Cumareng, to whom he had returned upon his retirement in
1985 at a separate residence. The court thus decreed the legal
separation of the spouses and the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in
the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was not entitled to
support from his respondent wife.1
This decision was appealed to the respondent court. Pendente lite, the
respondent wife filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the petitioner from interfering with the
administration of their properties in Greenhills and Forbes Park. She
alleged inter alia that he had harassed the tenant of the Forbes Park
property by informing him that his lease would not be renewed. She
also complained that the petitioner had disposed of one of their
valuable conjugal properties in the United States in favor of his
paramour, to the prejudice of his legitimate wife and children.
The petitioner opposed this motion and filed his own motion to prevent
his wife from entering into a new contract of lease over the Forbes
Park property with its present tenant, or with future tenants, without his
consent.
After hearing, the Court of Appeals, in an order dated April 7, 1992,
granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by his wife.2
The petitioner now assails this order, arguing that since the law
provides for a joint administration of the conjugal properties by the
husband and wife, no injunctive relief can be issued against one or the
other because no right will be violated. In support of this contention, he
cites Art. 124 of the Family Code, reading as follows:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement,
the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by
the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years
from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of the administration. These powers
do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by
the other spouse or the authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.
He further notes that the respondent court failed to appoint an
administrator of the conjugal assets as mandated by Art. 61 of the
Code, thus:
Art. 61 After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses
shall be entitled to live separately from each other.
The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the
spouses, shall designate either of them or a third person to administer
the absolute community or conjugal partnership property. The
administrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers and
duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court.
The Court has carefully considered the issues and the arguments of
the parties and finds that the petition has no merit.
We agree with the respondent court that pending the appointment of
an administrator over the whole mass of conjugal assets, the
respondent court was justified in allowing the wife to continue with her
administration. It was also correct, taking into account the evidence
adduced at the hearing, in enjoining the petitioner from interfering with
his wife's administration pending resolution of the appeal.
The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the
conjugal properties as clearly provided in the above-cited Article 124 of
the Family Code. However, Article 61, also above quoted, states that
after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall,
in the absence of a written agreement between the couple, appoint
either one of the spouses or a third person to act as the administrator.
While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has
been made, such designation was implicit in the decision of the trial
court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and
thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation
was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor
of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction now under challenge.
The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to
preserve the status quo of the things subject of the action or the
relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the plaintiff
respecting these matters during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise,
the defendant may, before final judgment, do or continue doing the act
which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain and thus make ineffectual
the final judgment that may be rendered afterwards in favor of the
plaintiff.3
As observed by Francisco, "Injunction is primarily a preventive
remedy. Its province is to afford relief against future acts which are
against equity and good conscience and to keep and preserve the
thing in the status quo, rather than to remedy what is past or to punish
for wrongful acts already committed. It may issue to prevent future
wrongs although no right has yet been violated."4
The Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject
properties for almost nineteen years now, apparently without complaint
on the part of the petitioner. He has not alleged, much less shown, that
her administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal partnership.
What he merely suggests is that the lease of the Forbes Park property
could be renewed on better terms, or he should at least be given his
share of the rentals.
In her motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the
respondent wife alleged that the petitioner's harassment of their tenant
at Forbes Park
would jeopardize the lease and deprive her and her children of the
income therefrom on which they depend for their subsistence. She
also testified the numerous . . . including various dollar accounts, two
houses in Quezon City and Cebu City, and a Mercedes Benz. The
private respondent also complained that on June 10, 1991, the
petitioner executed a quitclaim over their conjugal property in Apple
Valley, San Bernardino, California, U.S.A., in favor of Thelma
Cumareng, to improve his paramour's luxurious lifestyle to the
prejudice of his legitimate family.
These allegations, none of which was refuted by the husband, show
that the injunction is necessary to protect the interests of the private
respondent and her children and prevent the dissipation of the
conjugal assets.
The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right
and its actual or threatened violation.5 Regardless of the outcome of
the appeal, it cannot be denied that as the petitioner's legitimate wife
(and the complainant and injured spouse in the action for legal
separation), the private respondent has a right to a share (if not the
whole) of the conjugal estate. There is also, in our view, enough
evidence to raise the apprehension that entrusting said estate to the
petitioner may result in its improvident disposition to the detriment of
his wife and children. We agree that inasmuch as the trial court had
earlier declared the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal
properties, it would be prudent not to allow him in the meantime to
participate in its management.
Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanently installed the
respondent wife as the administrator of the whole mass of conjugal
assets. It has merely allowed her to continue administering the
properties in the meantime without interference from the petitioner,
pending the express designation of the administrator in accordance
with Article 61 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. It is so
ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23002             July 31, 1967
CONCEPCION FELIX VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GERONIMO RODRIGUEZ., ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for plaintiff-appellant.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna and Associates and Carolina C. Griño-
Aquino for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is an appeal by Concepcion Felix Vda. de Rodriguez from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case No.
2565, which she commenced on May 28, 1962, to secure declaration,
of nullity of two contracts executed on January 24, 1934 and for
recovery of certain properties.
The facts of this case may be briefly stated as follows:
Concepcion Felix, widow of the late Don Felipe Calderon and with
whom she had one living child, Concepcion Calderon, contracted a
second marriage on June 20, 1929, with Domingo Rodriguez, widower
with four children by a previous marriage, named Geronimo,
Esmeragdo, Jose and Mauricio, all surnamed Rodriguez. There was
no issue in this second marriage.
Prior to her marriage to Rodriguez, Concepcion Felix was the
registered owner of 2 fishponds located in the barrio of Babañgad,
municipality of Bulacan, Bulacan province. with a total area of 557,711
square meters covered by OCT Nos. 605 and 807. Under date of
January 24, 1934, Concepcion Felix appeared to have executed a
deed of sale conveying ownership of the aforesaid properties to her
daughter, Concepcion Calderon, for the sum of P2,500.00, which the
latter in turn appeared to have transferred to her mother and
stepfather by means of a document dated January 27, 1934. Both
deeds, notarized by Notary Public Jose D. Mendoza, were registered
in the office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on January 29, 1934,
as a consequence of which, the original titles were cancelled and TCT
Nos. 13815 and 13816 were issued in the names of the spouses
Domingo Rodriguez and Concepcion Felix.
On March 6, 1953, Domingo Rodriguez died intestate, survived by the
widow, Concepcion Felix, his children Geronimo Esmeragdo and
Mauricio and grandchildren Oscar, Juan and Ana, surnamed
Rodriguez, children of a son, Jose, who had predeceased him.
On March 16, 1953, the above-named widow, children and
grandchildren of the deceased entered into an extra-judicial settlement
of his (Domingo's) estate, consisting of one-half of the properties
allegedly belonging to the conjugal partnership. Among the properties
listed as conjugal were the two parcels of land in Bulacan, Bulacan,
which, together with another piece of property, were divided among
the heirs in this manner:
WHEREAS, the parties have furthermore agreed that the fishpond
covered by TCT Nos. 13815, 13816 and 24109 of the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan, containing an area of 557,971 sq. m.,
which is likewise the conjugal property of the deceased and his
surviving spouse; 1/2 of the same or 278,985.5 sq. m. belongs to said
Concepcion Felix Vda. de Rodriguez, as her share in the conjugal
property; and 3/4 of the remaining half or 209,239.125 sq. m. are
transferred in full ownership to Geronimo Rodriguez, Esmeragdo
Rodriguez and Mauricio Rodriguez, share and share alike, while the
other 1/4 or 69,746.375 sq. m. of the said remaining half goes in equal
shares to Oscar Rodriguez, Juan Rodriguez and Ana Rodriguez.
As a result of this partition, TCT Nos. 13815 and 13816 were cancelled
and TCT Nos. T-11431 and T-14432 were issued in the names of the
said heirs of the deceased.
On March 23, 1953, in a power of attorney executed by the children
and grandchildren of Domingo Rodriguez, Concepcion Felix Vda. de
Rodriguez was named their attorney in-fact, authorized to manage
their shares in the fishponds (Exh. 4).
On July 2, 1954, the heirs ended their co-ownership by executing a
deed of partition, dividing and segregating their respective shares in
the properties, pursuant to a consolidation and subdivision plan (PCS-
3702), in accordance with which, Concepcion Felix Vda. de Rodriguez
obtained TCT No. T-12910, for the portion pertaining to her (Exh. L),
while TCT No. T-12911 was issued to the other heirs, for their shares.
This latter title was subsequently replaced by TCT No. 16660 (Exh. M).
On October 12, 1954, the Rodriguez children executed another
document granting unto the widow lifetime usufruct over one-third of
the fishpond which they received as hereditary share in the estate of
Domingo Rodriguez, which grant was accepted by Concepcion Felix
Vda. de Rodriguez.
Then, in a contract dated December 15, 1961, the widow appeared to
have leased from the Rodriguez children and grandchildren the
fishpond (covered by TCT No. 16660) for a period of 5 years
commencing August 16, 1962, for an annual rental of P7,161.37 (Exh.
5).1äwphï1.ñët
At about this time, it seemed that the relationship between the widow
and her stepchildren had turned for the worse. Thus, when she failed
to deliver to them the balance of the earnings of the fishponds, in the
amount of P3,000.00, her stepchildren endorsed the matter to their
lawyer who, on May 16, 1962, sent a letter of demand to the widow for
payment thereof. On, May 28, 1962, Concepcion Felix Vda. de
Rodriguez filed the present action in the Court of First Instance of
Manila naming as defendants, Geronimo Rodriguez, Esmeragdo
Rodriguez, Oscar Rodriguez, Concepcion Bautista Vda. de Rodriguez,
as guardian of the minors Juan and Ana Rodriguez, and Antonio Diaz
de Rivera and Renato Diaz de Rivera, as guardians of the minors
Maria Ana, Mercedes, Margarita, Mauricio, Jr. and Domingo (Children
of Mauricio Rodriguez who had also died).
The action to declare null and void the deeds of transfer of plaintiff's
properties to the conjugal partnership was based on the alleged
employment or exercise by plaintiff's deceased husband of force and
pressure on her; that the conveyances of the properties — from
plaintiff to her daughter and then to the conjugal partnership of plaintiff
and her husband — are both without consideration; that plaintiff
participated in the extrajudicial settlement of estate (of the deceased
Domingo Rodriguez) and in other subsequent deeds or instruments
involving the properties in dispute, on the false assumption that the
said properties had become conjugal by reason of the execution of the
deeds of transfer in 1934; that laboring under the same false
assumption, plaintiff delivered to defendants, as income of the
properties from 1956 to 1961, the total amount of P56,976.58. As
alternative cause of action, she contended that she would claim for her
share, as surviving widow, of 1/5 of the properties in controversy,
should such properties be adjudged as belonging to the conjugal
partnership. Thus, plaintiff prayed that the deeds of transfer mentioned
in the complaint be declared fictitious and simulated; that the
"Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate" be also declared null and void; that
TCT No. 16660 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan be cancelled and
another one be issued in the name of plaintiff, Concepcion Felix Vda.
de Felix; that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of
P56,976.58, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the
complaint, and for appropriate relief in connection with her alternative
cause of action.
In their separate answers, defendants not only denied the material
allegations of the complaint, but also set up as affirmative defenses
lack of cause of action, prescription, estoppel and laches. As
counterclaim, they asked for payment by the plaintiff of the unpaid
balance of the earnings of the land up to August 15, 1962 in the sum
of P3,000.00, for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
On October 5, 1963, judgment was rendered for the defendants. In
upholding the validity of the contracts, the court found that although
the two documents, Exhibits A and B, were executed for the purpose
of converting plaintiff's separate properties into conjugal assets of the
marriage with Domingo Rodriguez, the consent of the parties thereto
was voluntary, contrary to the allegations of plaintiff and her witness.
The court also ruled that having taken part in the questioned
transactions, plaintiff was not the proper party to plead lack of
consideration to avoid the transfers; that contracts without
consideration are not inexistent, but are only voidable, following the
ruling in the case of Concepcion vs. Sta. Ana (87 Phil. 787); that there
was ratification or confirmation by the plaintiff of the transfer of her
property, by her execution (with the other heirs) of the extrajudicial
settlement of estate; that being a voluntary party to the contracts,
Exhibits A and B, plaintiff cannot recover the properties she gave
thereunder. Plaintiff's alternative cause of action was also rejected on
the ground that action for rescission of the deed of extrajudicial
settlement should have been filed within 4 years from its execution (on
March 16, 1953).
From the decision of the Court of First Instance, plaintiff duly appealed
to this Court, insisting that the conveyances in issue were obtained
through duress, and were inexistent, being simulated and without
consideration.
We agree with the trial Court that the evidence is not convincing that
the contracts of transfer from Concepcion Felix to her daughter, and
from the latter to her mother and stepfather were executed through
violence or intimidation. The charge is predicated solely upon the
improbable and biased testimony of appellant's daughter, Concepcion
C. Martelino, whom the trial court, refused to believe, considering that
her version of violence and harassment was contradicted by
Bartolome Gualberto who had lived with the Rodriguez spouses from
1917 to 1953, and by the improbability of Rodriguez threatening his
stepdaughter in front of the Notary Public who ratified her signature.
Furthermore, as pointed out by the appealed decision, the charge of
duress should be treated with caution considering that Rodriguez had
already died when the suit was brought, for duress, like fraud, is not to
be lightly paid at the door of men already dead. (Cf. Prevost vs. Gratz,
6 Wheat. [U.S.] 481, 498; Sinco vs. Longa, 51 Phil. 507).
What is more decisive is that duress being merely a vice or defect of
consent, an action based upon it must be brought within four years
after it has ceased;1 and the present action was instituted only in 1962,
twenty eight (28) years after the intimidation is claimed to have
occurred, and no less than nine (9) years after the supposed culprit
died (1953). On top of it, appellant entered into a series of subsequent
transactions with appellees that confirmed the contracts that she now
tries to set aside. Therefore, this cause of action is clearly barred.
Appellant's main stand in attacking the conveyances in question is that
they are simulated or fictitious, and inexistent for lack of consideration.
We shall examine each purported defect separately.
The charge of simulation is untenable, for the characteristic of
simulation is the fact that the apparent contract is not really desired or
intended to produce legal effects or in way alter the juridical situation
of the parties. Thus, where a person, in order to place his property
beyond the reach of his creditors, simulates a transfer of it to another,
he does not really intend to divest himself of his title and control of the
property; hence, the deed of transfer is but a sham. But appellant
contends that the sale by her to her daughter, and the subsequent
sale by the latter to appellant and her husband, the late Domingo
Rodriguez, were done for the purpose of converting the property from
paraphernal to conjugal, thereby vesting a half interest in Rodriguez,
and evading the prohibition against donations from one spouse to
another during coverture (Civil Code of 1889, Art. 1334). If this is true,
then the appellant and her daughter must have intended the two
conveyance to be real and effective; for appellant could not intend to
keep the ownership of the fishponds and at the same time vest half of
them in her husband. The two contracts of sale then could not have
been simulated, but were real and intended to be fully operative, being
the means to achieve the result desired.
Nor does the intention of the parties to circumvent by these contracts
the law against donations between spouses make them simulated
ones.
Ferrara, in his classic book, "La Simulacion de los Negocios Juridicos"
(Sp. trans, 1926), pp. 95, 105, clearly explains the difference between
simulated transactions and transactions in fraudem legis:
Otra figura que debe distinguirse de la simulacion es el fraus legis.
Tambien aqui se da una gran confusion que persiste aun en la
jurisprudencia, apegada tenazmente a antiguos errores. Se debe a
Bahr el haber defendido con vigor la antitesis teorica que existe entre
negocio fingido y negocio fraudulento y haber atacado la doctrina
comun que hacia una mescolanza con los dos conceptos.
Se confunde — dice (2) —, el negocio in fraudem legis con el negocio
simulado; aunque la naturaleza de ambos sea totalmente diversa. El
negocio fraudulento no es, en absolute, un negocio aparente. Es
perfectamente serio: se quiere realmente. Es mas, se quiere tal como
se ha realizado, con todas las consecuencias que correspondent a la
forma juridica elegida. Muchas veces, estas consecuencias con
incomodas para una u otra de las partes, aunque serian mucho mas
incomodas las consecuencias que lievaria consigo el acto prohibido.
xxx     xxx     xxx
El resultado de las precedentes investigaciones es el siguiente el
negocio simulado quiere producir una apariencia; el negocio
fraudulente, una realidad; los negocios simulados son ficticios, no
queridos; los negocios in fraudem son serios, reales, y realizados en
tal forma por las partes para consequir un resultado prohibido: la
simulacion nunca es un medio para eludir la ley sino para ocultar su
violation. La transgresion del contenido verbal e inmediato de la norma
se encubre bajo el manto de un negocio licito, lo cual no altera el
caracter del contra legem agere. Tan verdad es, que si se ha
redactado una contra-escritura que documentary y declara la
verdadera naturaleza del negocio realizado, no queda mas que aplicar
pura y simplementela prohibicion.
Tambien el fraude quiere perjudicar la ley, pero emplea para ello
medios diversos y sigue distintos caminus. No oculta el acto exterior,
sino que lo deja claro y visible, tratando de huir sesgadamente de la
aplicacion de la ley merced a una artistica y sabia combinacion de
varios medios juridicos no reprobados.
Appellant invokes our decision in Vasquez vs. Porta, 98 Phil. 490, but
to no purpose. The mortgage and foreclosure sale involved in that
case were typical simulations merely apparent but not really intended
to produce legal effects, as approved by the Court's finding that the
alleged creditor and buyer at the foreclosure sale "Porta himself
ostensibly acknowledged by his inertia in allowing the doctor (alleged
mortgagor debtor) to exercise dominical power thereon without any
protest on his part." (cas. cit., p. 495). Not only this, but the
mortgagor's wife, when her husband died, "found among his papers
Porta's cancellation of the mortgage in his favor and the draft of the
complaint for foreclosure." Plainly, the precedent cited is here
inapplicable.
Were the two conveyances from appellant to her daughter and from
the latter to the spouses Rodriguez void ab initio or inexistent for lack
of consideration? We do not find them to be so. In the first transaction,
the price of P2,500.00 is recited in the deed itself (Exh. A); in the
second (Exh. B), the consideration set forth is P3,000.00. Now, Article
1274 of the Civil Code of 1889 (in force when the deeds were
executed) provided that —
In onerous contracts the cause is understood to be, for each
contracting party, the prestation or promise of a thing or service by the
other. (emphasis supplied.)
Since in each conveyance the buyer became obligated to pay a
definite price in money, such undertaking constituted in themselves
actual causa or consideration for the conveyance of the fishponds.
That the prices were not paid (assuming ad arguendo that Concepcion
Martelino's testimony, to this effect is true) does not make the sales
inexistent for want of causa. As ruled in Enriquez de la Cavada vs.
Diaz, 37 Phil. 982, "the consideration (causa) need not pass from one
(party) to the other at the time the contract is entered into x x x . The
consideration need not be paid at the time of the promise. The one
promise is a consideration for the other."
What would invalidate the conveyances now under scrutiny is the fact
that they were resorted to in order to circumvent the legal prohibition
against donations between spouses contained in Article 1334,
paragraph 1, of the Civil Code of 1889, then prevailing. That illegal
purpose tainted the contracts, for as held by the Spanish Tribunal
Supreme in its decision of 2 April 1941.
ha de ser reputado ineficaz, por exigencias includibles del caracter
social y moral del Derecho, todo contrato que persiga un fin ilicito o
immoral, sea cualquiera el medio empleado por los contratantes para
lograr esa finalidad, no justificada por un interes digno de ser
socialmente protegido.
The illicit purpose then becomes illegal causa within the terms of the
old Civil Code, for as declared by the same Spanish Court in its
decision of 14 December 1940 —
toda vez que lo que caracteriza fundamentalmente la ilicitud de la
causa es la lesion de un interos general juridica 6 moral.
a ruling reiterated in the decision of 2 April 1941 when the Court ruled:
El concepto de la causa ilicita, tal como la desenvuelve y aplica con
gran amplitud y flexibilidad la doctrina moderna, permite cobijar, no
solo las convenciones ilicitas por razon de su objeto o de su motivo ...
sino tambien multiples convenciones que no encerrando en si ningun
elemento de directa antijuricidad son ilicitas por el matiz immoral que
reviste la operation en su conjunto x x x .
Unfortunately for herein appellant, in contracts invalidated by illegal
subject matter or illegal causa, Articles 1305 and 1306 of the Civil
Code then in force apply rigorously the rule in pari delicto non oritur
action, denying all recovery to the guilty parties inter se. And appellant
is clearly as guilty as her husband in the attempt to evade the legal
interdiction of Article 1334 of the Code, already cited. Wherefore, her
present action to reivindicate the, conveyed properties was correctly
repulsed by the Court below.
Art. 1306. If the act which constitutes the illicit consideration is neither
a crime nor a misdemeanor, the following rules shall be observed:
1. When both parties are guilty, neither of them can recover what he
may have given by virtue of the contract, or enforce the performance
of the undertaking of the other party;
xxx     xxx     xxx
That Article 1306 applies to cases where the nullity arises from the
illegality of the consideration or the purpose of the contract was
expressly recognized by this Supreme Court in Gustilo vs. Maravilla,
48 Phil. 449-450.2
Finally, it cannot be denied that plaintiff-appellant had knowledge of
the nullity of the contract for the transfer of her properties in 1934,
because she was even a party thereto. And yet, her present action
was filed only on May 28, 1962 and after the breaking up of friendly
relations between her and defendants-appellees. Appellant's inaction
to enforce her right, for 28 years, cannot be justified by the lame
excuse that she assumed that the transfer was valid. Knowledge of the
effect of that transaction would have been obtained by the exercise of
diligence. Ignorance which is the effect of inexcusable negligence, it
has been said, is no excuse for laches. (Go Chi Gun, etc., et al. vs. Co
Cho, et al., G.R. No. L-5208, Feb. 28, 1955). Even assuming for the
sake of argument that appellant held her peace, during the lifetime of
her husband, out of legitimate fear for her life, there is no justification
for her future to bring the proper action after his death in 1953.
Instead, she entered into a series of agreements with herein
appellees, the children of her husband by a prior marriage, of partition,
usufruct and lease of their share in the fishponds, transactions that
necessarily assumed that Rodriguez had acquired one-half of the
litigated fishponds. In the circumstances, appellant's cause has
become a stale demand and her conduct placed her in estoppel to
question the Validity of the transfer of her properties. (Manila, et al. vs.
Galvan, et al., G.R. No. L-23507, May 24, 1967; Perez vs. Herranz, 7
Phil. 695-696).
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed. Costs
against appellant Concepcion Felix Vda. de Rodriguez. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-32425 November 21, 1984
THE IMPERIAL INSURANCE, INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EMILIA T. DAVID, defendant-appellant.
RELOVA, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision rendered by the then
Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 67713, sustaining
the money claims of plaintiff-appellee, The Imperial Insurance, Inc.
against defendant-appellant Emilia T. David, based on three (3)
different causes of action in the complaint.
The first two causes of action involve the indemnity agreements which
defendant-appellant and her deceased husband, Felicisimo V. Reyes,
jointly and severally, executed in favor of herein appellee, for and in
consideration of two (2) surety bonds underwritten by it to lift the lift the
writs of attachment in Civil Case No. 5213 of the Rizal Court of First
Instance for the amount of P60,000.00, and in Civil Case No. Q-5214,
also with the same court for the amount of P40,000.00
The third cause of action involves accrued premiums and documentary
stamps for four (4) years with legal interest therein from the filing of the
complaint also underwritten by appellee.
Records show that Felicisimo V. Reyes and his wife, herein appellant,
executed two (2) indemnity agreements in favor of appellee jointly and
severally to assure indemnification of the latter for whatever liability it
may incur in connection with its posting the security bonds to lift the
attachments in Civil Case No. Q-5213 for the amount of P60,000.00,
and in Civil Case No. Q-5214 for the amount of P40,000.00, for the
benefit of Felicisimo V. Reyes.
Later, Felicisimo V. Reyes and his wife, jointly and severally, executed
another indemnity agreement in favor of appellee to assure
indemnification of the latter under a homestead bond for the sum of
P7,500.00 it had executed jointly and severally with them in favor of
the Development Bank of the Philippines. On the same date, failed to state a cause of action; that the writ of attachment was
Felicisimo V. Reyes and his wife paid to appellee the sum of P153.33 improvidently issued; and, that the lower court should have discharged
covering the premium and other expenses for the homestead bond on the writs. Further, she argues that the judgment on attorney's fees has
the first year. neither legal nor factual basis.

Felicisimo V.Reyes died and Special Proceedings No. 12948 of the
then Court of First Instance of Bulacan, entitled "In the Matter of the
Instestate of Felicisimo V. Reyes," was commenced. His wife, herein
appellant, qualified and took her oath of office as the administratrix of
said intestate estate. Corresponding notices to creditors were issued
and published for three (3) consecutive weeks in the "Manila
Chronicle" and were duly posted in the required places.
Meanwhile, judgment was rendered in the aforesaid two cases (Civil
Cases Nos. Q-5213 and Q-5214) against the spouses Felicisimo V.
Reyes and appellant Emilia T. David which has become final and
executory. Writs of execution of the decision on the said cases were
returned unsatisfied. As a consequence, judgment was rendered
against the surety bonds for the sum of P60,000.00 in Civil Case No.
Q-5213 and for the sum of P40,000.00 in Civil Case No. Q-5214.
Appellee made demands on Emilia T. David to pay the amounts of
P60,000.00 and P40,000.00 under the surety bonds and arrears in
premiums thereon. When appellant David failed to make payments,
appellee filed Civil Case No. 67713 in the then Court of First Instance
of Manila, Branch 1, for collection of sums of money under three (3)
different causes of action.
We find no merit in this appeal. Under the law and well settled
jurisprudence, when the obligation is a solidary one, the creditor may
bring his action in toto against any of the debtors obligated in solidum.
Thus, if husband and wife bound themselves jointly and severally, in
case of his death her liability is independent of and separate from her
husband s; she may be sued for the whole debt and it would be error
to hold that the claim against her as well as the claim against her
husband should be made in the decedent's estate. (Agcaoili vs. Vda.
de Agcaoili, 90 Phil. 97)
In the case at bar, appellant signed a joint and several obligation with
her husband in favor of herein appellee; as a consequence, the latter
may demand from either of them the whole obligation. As
distinguished from a joint obligation where each of the debtor is liable
only for a proportionate part of the debt and the creditor is entitled only
to a proportionate part of the credit, in a solidary obligation the creditor
may enforce the entire obligation against one of the debtors.
Where the obligation assumed by several persons is joint and several,
each of the debtors is answerable for the whole obligation with the
right to seek contribution from his co-debtors. (Philippine International
Surety Co., Inc. vs. Gonzales, 3 SCRA 391)

A motion to dismiss was filed by herein appellant on the following
grounds. to wit: (1) the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the
action or suit; (2) the complaint states no cause of action; and (3) the
plaintiff's causes of action, if there be any, have been barred for its
failure to file its claims against the estate of the deceased Felicisimo V.
Reyes in due time.
The lower court denied the motion for lack of merit. Thereafter,
appellant, as defendant in said Civil Case No. 67713, filed her answer.
After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering defendant Emilia T.
David (herein appellant)
1. to pay the plaintiff under the first cause of action, the amount of
P60,000.00 with interest at legal rate from the filing of the complaint
until fun payment shall be effected; and a further sum of P1,522.50
annually from June 20, 1961 until termination of this case, said amount
representing premiums and documentary stamps in the surety bond,
Exh. "B", with interest at legal rate from the filing of the complaint until
full payment is made;
And, in Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Villarama, et al., 107
Phil. 891, this Court ruled that the Rules of Court provide the
procedure should the creditor desire to go against the. deceased
debtor, "but there is noting in the aid provision making compliance with
such procedure a condition precedent an ordinary action against the
solidary debtors. should the creditor choose to demand payment from
the latter, could be entertained to the extent that failure to observe the
same would deprive the court jurisdiction to make cognizance of the
action against the surviving debtors. Upon lie other hand, the Civil
Code expressly allows the creditor to proceed against any one of the
solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. Hence, there is
nothing improper in the creditor's filing of an action against the
surviving solidary debtors alone, instead of instituting a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor wherein his claim
could be filed.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the court a quo is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto with costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

2. to pay the plaintiff under the second cause of action, the amount of
P40,000.00 with interest at the legal rate from the filing of the
complaint until full payment shag be made; and a further sum of
P1,105.00 annually from June 20, 1961 until termination of this case,
said amount representing premiums and documentary stamps on the
surety bond Exh. "B", with interest at the legal rate from the filing of the
complaint until full payment is made;

3. to pay the plaintiff under the third cause of action the amount of
P153.33 annually for a period of 4 years from June 29, 1962
representing premiums and documentary stamps on the Homestead
Bond Exh. "C-1" with interest at the legal rate from the filing of the
complaint until full payment is made;

4. to pay the plaintiff in concept of attorney's fees the sum of

P20,000.00, representing 20% of the principal claim of plaintiff; plus
cost. (pp. 39-40, Rollo)

The principal issue raised by appellant Emilia T. David in this appeal is

whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction over plaintiff's causes of
action. She contends that appellee's claim should have been
presented according to Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court and its
failure to do so operates to bar its claim forever; that the complaint