Case Facts
 Aratuc vs. COMELEC  On April 7, 1978, election for the
position of Representative to the
Batasang Pambansa were held
throughout the Philippines.
 The cases at bar concern only
the results of the elections in
Region XII which comprises the
provinces of Lanao Del Sur,
Lanao Del Norte, Maguindanao,
North Cotabato and Sultan
Kudarat, and the cities of
Marawi, Iligan and Cotabato.
 Tomatic Aratuc sought the
suspension of the canvass then
being undertaken by Regional
Board of Canvassers in Cotabato
City and in which, the returns in
1,966 out of 4,107 voting centers
in the whole region had already
been canvassed showing partial
results.
 A Supervening Panel headed by
Commissioner of Election Hon.
Venancio S. Duque had
conducted the hearings of the
complaints of the petitioners
therein of the alleged
irregularities in the election
records of the mentioned
provinces.
 On July 11, 1978, the Regional
Board of Canvassers issued a
resolution, over the objection of
the Konsensiya ng Bayan
candidates, declaring all the
eight Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan
candidates elected.
 Appeal was taken by the KB
candidates to the Comelec.
 On January 13, 1979, the
Comelec issued its questioned
resolution declaring seven KBL
candidates and one KB
candidate as having obtained the
first eight places, and ordering
Issue
 Whether or not respondent
Comelec has committed grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.
Ruling
 As the Superior administrative
body having control over boards
of canvassers, the Comelec may
review the actuations of the
Regional Board of Canvassers,
such as by extending its inquiry
beyond the election records of
the voting centers in questions.
 The authority of the Commission
is in reviewing such actuations
does not spring from any
appellant jurisdiction conferred
by any provisions of the law, for
there is none such provision
anywhere in the election Code,
but from the plenary prerogative
of direct control and supervision
endowed to it by the provisions
in Section 168.
 And in administrative law, it is a
too well settled postulate to need
any supporting citation here, that
a superior body or office having
supervision and control over
another may do directly what the
latter is supposed to do or ought
to have done.

 Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory
Board
the Regional Board of
Canvassers to proclaim the
winning candidates.
 The KB candidates interposed
the present petition.
 In G.R. No. 96266, petitioner
Maceda seeks nullification of the
Energy Regulatory Board (ERB)
Orders dated December 5 and 6,
1990 on the ground that the
hearings conducted on the
second provisional increase in oil
prices did not allow him
substantial cross-examination, in
effect, allegedly, a denial of due
process.
 Upon the outbreak of the Persian
Gulf conflict on August 2, 1990,
private respondents oil
companies filed with the ERB
their respective applications on
oil price increases
 On September 21, 1990, the
ERB issued an order granting a
provisional increase of P1.42 per
liter.
 Petitioner Maceda filed a petition
for Prohibition on September 26,
1990, seeking to nullify the
increase.
 Whether or not the decisions of
the Energy Regulatory Board
should be subject to presidential
review.
 Petitioner Original additionally
claims that if the price increase
will be used to augment the
OPSF this will constitute illegal
taxation.
 In the Maceda case, (G.R. Nos.
95203-05, supra) this Court has
already ruled that "the Board
Order authorizing the proceeds
generated by the increase to be
deposited to the OPSF is not an
act of taxation but is authorized
by Presidential Decree No. 1956,
as amended by Executive Order
No. 137
 Pursuant to Section 8 of E.O.
No. 172, while hearing is
indispensable, it does not
preclude the Board from ordering
a provisional increase subject to
final disposition of whether or not
to make it permanent or to
reduce or increase it further or to
deny the application. 
 The provisional increase is akin
to a temporary restraining order,
which are given ex-parte.
 The Court further noted the
Solicitor General’s comments
that “the ERB is not averse to the
idea of a presidential review of
its decision,” except that there is
no law at present authorizing the
same. 
 The Court suggested that it will
be under the scope of the
legislative to allow the
presidential review of the
decisions of the ERB since,
despite its being a quasi-judicial
body, it is still “ an administrative

 Malaga vs. Penachos Jr.
 The Iloilo State College of
Fisheries (ISCOF) through its
Pre-qualifications, Bids and
Awards Committee (PBAC)
caused the publication in the
November 25, 26 and 28, 1988
issues of the Western Visayas
Daily an Invitation to Bid for the
construction of a Micro
Laboratory Building at ISCOF.  endowed with some if not all
 The notice announced that the
last day for the submission of
pre-qualification requirements
was on December 2, 1988, and
that the bids would be received
and opened on December 12,
1988 at 3 o'clock in the
afternoon.
 Petitioners Malaga and Najarro,
doing business under the name
of BE Construction and Best
Built Construction, respectively,
submitted their pre-qualification
documents at two o'clock in the
afternoon of December 2, 1988.  charter, and vested by law with
 Petitioner Occeana submitted his
own PRE-C1 on December 5,
1988.  objectives.
 All three of them were not
allowed to participate in the
bidding as their documents were
considered late.
 On December 12, 1988, the
petitioners filed a complaint with
the Iloilo RTC against the officers
of PBAC for their refusal without
 Whether or not ISCOF is a
government instrumentality
subject to the provisions of PD
1818
body under the Office of the
President whose decisions
should be appealed to the
President under the established
principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies,”
especially on a matter as
transcendental as oil price
increases which affect the lives
of almost all Filipinos.
 The 1987 Administrative Code
defines a government
instrumentality as follows:
 Instrumentality refers to any
agency of the National
Government, not integrated
within the department
framework, vested with special
functions or jurisdiction by law,
corporate powers, administering
special funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy, usually
through a charter.
 This term includes regulatory
agencies, chartered institutions,
and government-owned or
controlled corporations. (Sec. 2
(5) Introductory Provisions).
 The same Code describes a
chartered institution thus:
 Chartered institution - refers to
any agency organized or
operating under a special
functions relating to specific
constitutional policies or
 This term includes the state
universities and colleges, and
the monetary authority of the
state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory
Provisions).
 It is clear from the above
definitions that ISCOF is a
chartered institution and is
 just cause to accept them therefore covered by P.D. 1818.
resulting to their non-inclusion in  There are also indications in its
the list of pre-qualified bidders.  charter that ISCOF is a
 They sought to the resetting of government instrumentality.
the December 12, 1988 bidding  First, it was created in pursuance
and the acceptance of their of the integrated fisheries
documents.  development policy of the State,
 They also asked that if the a priority program of the
bidding had already been government to effect the socio-
conducted, the defendants be economic life of the nation.
directed not to award the project  Second, the Treasurer of the
pending resolution of their Republic of the Philippines shall
complaint. also be the ex-officio Treasurer
 On the same date, Judge of the state college with its
Lebaquin issued a restraining accounts and expenses to be
order prohibiting PBAC from audited by the Commission on
conducting the bidding and Audit or its duly authorized
award the project. representative.
 The defendants filed a motion to  Third, heads of bureaus and
lift the restraining order on the offices of the National
ground that the court is Government are authorized to
prohibited from issuing such loan or transfer to it, upon
order, preliminary injunction and request of the president of the
preliminary mandatory injunction state college, such apparatus,
in government infrastructure equipment, or supplies and even
project under Sec. 1 of P.D. the services of such employees
1818.  as can be spared without serious
 They also contended that the detriment to public service.
preliminary injunction had  Lastly, an additional amount of
become moot and academic as it P1.5M had been appropriated
was served after the bidding had out of the funds of the National
been awarded and closed.  Treasury and it was also decreed
 On January 2, 1989, the trial in its charter that the funds and
court lifted the restraining order maintenance of the state college
and denied the petition for would henceforth be included in
preliminary injunction.  the General Appropriations
 It declared that the building Law.  
sought to be constructed at the  Nevertheless, it does not
ISCOF was an infrastructure automatically follow that ISCOF
project of the government falling is covered by the prohibition in
within the coverage of the the said decree as there are
subject law.   irregularities present surrounding
the transaction that justified the
injunction issued as regards to
the bidding and the award of the
project (citing the case of Datiles

 Beja Sr. vs. CA  Petitioner Fidencio Y. Beja,
Sr. was first employed by the
PPA as arrastre supervisor in
1975.
 He became Assistant Port
Operations Officer in 1976 and
Port Operations Officer in 1977.
 In February 1988, as a result of
the reorganization of the PPA, he
was appointed Terminal
Supervisor.
 On October 21, 1988, the PPA
General Manager, Rogelio A.
Dayan, filed Administrative Case
No. 11-04-88 against petitioner
Beja and Hernando G. Villaluz
for grave dishonesty, grave
misconduct, willful violation of
reasonable office rules and
regulations and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of
the service.
 Beja and Villaluz allegedly
erroneously assessed storage
fees resulting in the loss of
P38,150.77 on the part of the
PPA.
 Consequently, they were
preventively suspended for the
charges.
 After a preliminary investigation
conducted by the district attorney
for Region X, Administrative
Case No. 11-04-88 was
"considered closed for lack of
merit."
 In his petition, Beja assails the
Court of Appeals for having
"decided questions of substance
in a way probably not in accord
with law or with the applicable
decisions" of this Court.  departmental supervision and
 Specifically, Beja contends that
the Court of Appeals failed to
declare that:
 Whether or not the DOTC
Secretary and/or the AAB may
initiate and hear administrative
cases against PPA Personnel
below the rank of Assistant
General Manager
vs. Sucaldito)
 Attachment of an agency to a
Department is one of the three
administrative relationships
mentioned in Book IV, Chapter 7
of the Administrative Code of
1987, the other two being
supervision and control and
administrative supervision.
 "Attachment" is defined in Sec.
38 thereof as follows:
 (3) Attachment. — (a) This refers
to the lateral relationship
between the Department or its
equivalent and the attached
agency or corporation for
purposes of policy and program
coordination.
 The coordination shall be
accomplished by having the
department represented in the
governing board of the attached
agency or corporation, either as
chairman or as a member, with
or without voting rights, if this is
permitted by the charter; having
the attached corporation or
agency comply with a system of
periodic reporting which shall
reflect the progress of programs
and projects; and having the
department or its equivalent
provide general policies through
its representative in the board,
which shall serve as the
framework for the internal
policies of the attached
corporation or agency;
 An attached agency has a larger
measure of independence from
the Department to which it is
attached than one which is under
control or administrative
supervision.
 This is borne out by the "lateral
 (a) he was denied due process;
 (b) the PPA general manager
has no power to issue a
preventive suspension order
without the necessary approval
of the PPA board of directors;
 (c) the PPA general manager
has no power to refer the
administrative case filed against
him to the DOTC-AAB, and
 (d) the DOTC Secretary, the
Chairman of the DOTC-AAB and
DOTC-AAB itself as an
adjudicatory body, have no
jurisdiction to try the
administrative case against him.
 Simply put, Beja challenges the
legality of the preventive
suspension and the jurisdiction
of the DOTC Secretary and/or
the AAB to initiate and hear
administrative cases against
PPA personnel below the rank of
Assistant General Manager.
 Petitioner anchors his contention
that the PPA general manager
cannot subject him to a
preventive suspension on the
following provision of Sec. 8, Art.
V of Presidential Decree No. 857
reorganizing the PPA:
 (d) the General Manager
shall, subject to the approval of
the Board, appoint and remove
personnel below the rank of
Assistant General Manager.
(Emphasis supplied.)
 Petitioner contends that under
this provision, the PPA Board of
Directors and not the PPA
General Manager is the "proper
disciplining authority.
 The PPA was created through
P.D. No. 505 dated July 11,
1974.
 Under that Law, the corporate
relationship" between the
Department and the attached
agency.
 The attachment is merely for
"policy and program
coordination."
 With respect to administrative
matters, the independence of an
attached agency from
Departmental control and
supervision is further reinforced
by the fact that even an agency
under a Department's
administrative supervision is free
from Departmental interference
with respect to appointments and
other personnel actions "in
accordance with the
decentralization of personnel
functions" under the
Administrative Code of 1987. 
 Moreover, the Administrative
Code explicitly provides that
Chapter 8 of Book IV on
supervision and control shall not
apply to chartered institutions
attached to a Department. 
 Hence, the inescapable
conclusion is that with respect to
the management of personnel,
an attached agency is, to a
certain extent, free from
Departmental interference and
control. 

 Eugenio vs. Civil Service
Commission
powers of the PPA were vested
in a governing Board of Directors
known as the Philippine Port
Authority Council.
 Sec. 5(i) of the same decree
gave the Council the power "to
appoint, discipline and remove,
and determine the composition
of the technical staff of the
Authority and other personnel."
 On December 23, 1975, P.D. No.
505 was substituted by P.D. No.
857, Sec. 4(a) thereof created
the Philippine Ports Authority
which would be "attached" to the
then Department of Public
Works, Transportation and
Communication.
 When Executive Order No. 125
dated January 30, 1987
reorganizing the Ministry of
Transportation and
Communications was issued, the
PPA retained its "attached"
status. 
 Even Executive Order No. 292 or
the Administrative Code of 1987
classified the PPA as an agency
"attached" to the Department of
Transportation and
Communications (DOTC).
 Sec. 24 of Book IV, Title XV,
Chapter 6 of the same Code
provides that the agencies
attached to the DOTC "shall
continue to operate and function
in accordance with the
respective charters or laws
creating them, except when they
conflict with this Code."
 Petitioner is the Deputy Director  Whether or not the CSC usurped  Yes. CESB was created by law
of the Philippine Nuclear the legislative functions of (PD. 1) and can only be
Research Institute. Congress when it abolished abolished by the legislature.
 She applied for a Career CESB, an office created by law,  As read together, the
Executive Service (CES) through the issuance of CSC inescapable conclusion is that
Eligibility and a CESO rank on Resolution No. 93-4359 respondent Commission's power
 August 2, 1993, she was given a
CES eligibility.
 On September 15, 1993, she
was recommended to the
President for a CESO rank by
the Career Executive Service
Board.
 On October 1, 1993, CSC
passed Resolution No. 93-4359
which resolves to reorganize and
effect changes in its
organizational structure.
 The resolution became an
impediment to the appointment
of petitioner.
 Finding herself bereft of further
administrative relief as the
Career Executive Service Board
which recommended her CESO
Rank IV has been abolished,
petitioner filed the petition at
bench to annul.
 Luzon Development Bank vs.  At a conference, the parties
Association of Luzon agreed on the submission of
Development Bank Employees their respective Position Papers
on December 1-15, 1994.
 Atty. Ester S. Garcia, in her
capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator,
received ALDBE's Position
Paper on January 18, 1995.
 LDB, on the other hand, failed to
submit its Position Paper despite
a letter from the Voluntary
Arbitrator reminding them to do
so.
 As of May 23, 1995 no Position
Paper had been filed by LDB.
 In labor law context, arbitration is
the reference of a labor dispute
 Whether or not Voluntary
arbiter’s decision is appealable
to the CA and not the SC
to reorganize is limited to offices
under its control as enumerated
in Section 16, supra.
 From its inception, the CESB
was intended to be an
autonomous entity, albeit
administratively attached to
respondent Commission.
 As conceptualized by the
Reorganization Committee "the
CESB shall be autonomous.
 It is expected to view the
problem of building up executive
manpower in the government
with a broad and positive
outlook." 
 The essential autonomous
character of the CESB is not
negated by its attachment to
respondent Commission.
 By said attachment, CESB was
not made to fall within the control
of respondent Commission.
 Under the Administrative Code of
1987, the purpose of attaching
one functionally inter-related
government agency to another is
to attain "policy and program
coordination." 
 Yes. The jurisdiction conferred
by law on a voluntary arbitrator
or a panel of such arbitrators is
quite limited compared to the
original jurisdiction of the labor
arbiter and the appellate
jurisdiction of the NLRC for that
matter.
 The “(d)ecision, awards, or
orders of the Labor Arbiter are
final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission
…” 
 Hence, while there is an express
mode of appeal from the
decision of a labor arbiter,
Republic Act No. 6715 is silent
 to an impartial third person for with respect to an appeal from
determination on the basis of the decision of a voluntary
evidence and arguments arbitrator.
presented by such parties who
have bound themselves to
accept the decision of the
arbitrator as final and binding.
 Arbitration may be classified, on
the basis of the obligation on
which it is based, as either
compulsory or voluntary.
 Compulsory arbitration is a
system whereby the parties to a
dispute are compelled by the
government to forego their right
to strike and are compelled to
accept the resolution of their
dispute through arbitration by a
third party.
 The essence of arbitration
remains since a resolution of a
dispute is arrived at by resort to
a disinterested third party whose
decision is final and binding on
the parties, but in compulsory
arbitration, such a third party is
normally appointed by the
government.
 Under voluntary arbitration, on
the other hand, referral of a
dispute by the parties is made,
pursuant to a voluntary
arbitration clause in their
collective agreement, to an
impartial third person for a final
and binding resolution. 
 Ideally, arbitration awards are
supposed to be complied with by
both parties without delay, such
that once an award has been
rendered by an arbitrator,
nothing is left to be done by both
parties but to comply with the
same.
 After all, they are presumed to
have freely chosen arbitration as

 De la Llana vs. Alba
 Laguna Lake Development
Authority vs. CA
the mode of settlement for that
particular dispute.
 Pursuant thereto, they have
chosen a mutually acceptable
arbitrator who shall hear and
decide their case.
 Above all, they have mutually
agreed to de bound by said
arbitrator's decision.
 Batasang Pambansa Blg. 129
entitled, “An act reorganizing the
Judiciary, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and for Other
Purposes” was passed, providing
for the separation of Justices and
judges of inferior courts from the
Court of Appeals to municipal
circuit courts (except the
occupants of the Sandiganbayan
and the Court of Tax appeals).
 The honorable petitioner sought
to prohibit the respondents from
implementing BP 129, alleging
that the security of tenure
provision of the Constitution has
been ignored and disregarded.
 Furthermore, they assert that the
reorganization was done in lack
of good faith.
 However, the Solicitor General
denies his claim and maintains
that the allegation of lack of good
faith is unwarranted and devoid
of any support in law, and that
BP 129 was a legitimate exercise
of the power vested in the
Batasang Pambansa to
reorganize the judiciary.
 The clash between the
responsibility of the City
Government of Caloocan to
dispose off the 350 tons of
garbage it collects daily and the
growing concern and sensitivity
to a pollution-free environment of
the residents of Barangay
 Whether or not there was lack of
good faith in reorganizing the
judiciary
 Whether or not the LLDA have
the power and authority to issue
a "cease and desist" order under
Republic Act No. 4850 and its
amendatory laws, on the basis of
the facts presented in this case,
enjoining the dumping of
garbage in Tala Estate,
 No. The Court held that there
was good faith in reorganizing
the judiciary.
 Citing the separate opinion of
Justice Laurel in the case of
Zandueta v. De La Costa, the
Court similarly maintains that the
passage of BP 129 was in good
faith seeing as its purpose was
for the fulfillment of what was
considered a great public need
by the legislative department, not
intended to adversely affect the
tenure of judges or any particular
judge.
 While it is possible that the
legislature could deliberately
abuse the power to reorganize
the judiciary, thus lacking good
faith, the Court is unconvinced
that such was the case in this
situation.
 Thus, where the Court holds that
the reorganization of the judiciary
by virtue of BP 129 was done in
good faith, the “separation” of the
petitioner due to the abolition of
his office is valid and
constitutional.
 Yes. The cease and desist order
issued by the LLDA requiring the
City Government of Caloocan to
stop dumping its garbage in the
Camarin open dumpsite found by
the LLDA to have been done in
violation of Republic Act No.
4850, as amended, and other
 Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan Barangay Camarin, Caloocan relevant environment laws,
City where these tons of garbage City. cannot be stamped as an
are dumped everyday is the hub unauthorized exercise by the
of this controversy elevated by LLDA of injunctive powers. 
the protagonists to the Laguna  While it is a fundamental rule
Lake Development Authority that an administrative agency
(LLDA) for adjudication. has only such powers as are
 On March 8, 1991, the Task expressly granted to it by law, it
Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our is likewise a settled rule that an
Lady of Lourdes Parish, administrative agency has also
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan such powers as are necessarily
City, filed a letter-complaint with implied in the exercise of its
the Laguna Lake Development express powers.
Authority seeking to stop the  In the exercise, therefore, of its
operation of the 8.6-hectare express powers under its charter
open garbage dumpsite in Tala as a regulatory and quasi-judicial
Estate, Barangay Camarin, body with respect to pollution
Caloocan City due to its harmful cases in the Laguna Lake region,
effects on the health of the the authority of the LLDA to
residents and the possibility of issue a "cease and desist order"
pollution of the water content of is, perforce, implied.
the surrounding area.  Otherwise, it may well be
 After a public hearing conducted reduced to a "toothless" paper
on December 4, 1991, the LLDA, agency.
acting on the complaint of Task
Force Camarin Dumpsite, found
that the water collected from the
leachate and the receiving
streams could considerably
affect the quality, in turn, of the
receiving waters since it
indicates the presence of
bacteria, other than coliform,
which may have contaminated
the sample during collection or
handling.
 On December 5, 1991, the LLDA
issued a Cease and Desist
Order ordering the City
Government of Caloocan,
Metropolitan Manila Authority,
their contractors, and other
entities, to completely halt, stop
and desist from dumping any
form or kind of garbage and
other waste matter at the

 Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory
Board
 US vs. Ang Tang Ho
Camarin dumpsite.
 This petition was filed on
September 1, 1986 by petitioner
on his own behalf and
purportedly on behalf of other
videogram operators adversely
affected.
 It assails the constitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 1987
entitled "An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board"
with broad powers to regulate
and supervise the videogram
industry.
 During a special session, the
Philippine Legislature passed
and approved Act No. 2868
 Whether or not the decree is
unconstitutional
 Whether or not there was an
undue delegation of power to the
Governor General.
 No. Neither can it be
successfully argued that the
DECREE contains an undue
delegation of legislative power.
 The grant in Section 11 of the
DECREE of authority to the
BOARD to "solicit the direct
assistance of other agencies and
units of the government and
deputize, for a fixed and limited
period, the heads or personnel of
such agencies and units to
perform enforcement functions
for the Board" is not a delegation
of the power to legislate but
merely a conferment of authority
or discretion as to its execution,
enforcement, and
implementation.
 The true distinction is between
the delegation of power to make
the law, which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it
shall be, and conferring authority
or discretion as to its execution
to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law.
 The first cannot be done; to the
latter, no valid objection can be
made.
 Besides, in the very language of
the decree, the authority of the
BOARD to solicit such
assistance is for a "fixed and
limited period" with the deputized
agencies concerned being
"subject to the direction and
control of the BOARD."
 That the grant of such authority
might be the source of graft and
corruption would not stigmatize
the DECREE as unconstitutional.
 Yes. When Act No. 2868 was
analyzed, it is the violation of the
proclamation of the Governor-
 entitled An Act Penalizing the
Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice,
Palay and Corn.
 The said act under extraordinary
circumstances authorizes the
Governor General to issue the
necessary Rules and
Regulations in regulating the
distribution of such products.
 Pursuant to this Act, the
Governor General issued
Executive Order 53 fixing the
price at which rice should be
sold.
 Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer,
voluntarily, criminally and illegally
sold a ganta of rice to Pedro
Trinidad at the price of eighty
centavos.
 The said amount was way higher
than that prescribed by the
Executive Order.
 He was charged in violation of
the said Executive Order and
was found guilty as charged and
was sentenced to 5 months
imprisonment plus a P500.00
fine.
 He appealed the sentence
countering that there was an
undue delegation of power to the
Governor General.
General which constitutes the
crime.
 Without that proclamation, it was
no crime to sell rice at any price.
 In other words, the Legislature
left it to the sole discretion of the
Governor-General to say what
was and what was not “any
cause” for enforcing the act, and
what was and what was not “an
extraordinary rise in the price of
palay, rice or corn,” and under
certain undefined conditions to
fix the price at which rice should
be sold, without regard to grade
or quality, also to say whether a
proclamation should be issued, if
so, when, and whether or not the
law should be enforced, how
long it should be enforced, and
when the law should be
suspended.
 The Legislature did not specify or
define what was “any cause,” or
what was “an extraordinary rise
in the price of rice, palay or
corn,”
 Neither did it specify or define
the conditions upon which the
proclamation should be issued.
 In the absence of the
proclamation no crime was
committed.
 The alleged sale was made a
crime, if at all, because the
Governor-General issued the
proclamation.
 The act or proclamation does not
say anything about the different
grades or qualities of rice, and
the defendant is charged with the
sale “of one ganta of rice at the
price of eighty centavos (P0.80)
which is a price greater than that
fixed by Executive order No. 53.”
 The law is thus incomplete as a

 Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court
 The essence of due process is
distilled in the immortal cry of
Themistocles to Alcibiades
"Strike — but hear me first!"
 It is this cry that the petitioner in
effect repeats here as he
challenges the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 626-A.
 13 Jan 1984: Petitioner Restituto
Ynot had transmitted 6 carabaos
in a pump boat from Masbate to
Iloilo when they were confiscated
by the police station commander
of Barotac for violating Executive
Order No. 626-A
 Executive Order No. 626-A
prohibits the interprovincial
movement of carabaos and the
slaughtering of carabaos.
 Carabao/carabeef transported in
violation of E.O. 626-A shall be
subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the govt, to be
distributed to charitable
institutions as Chairman of
National Meat Inspection may
see fit (carabeef) and to
deserving farmers as the
Director of Animal Industry may
see fit (carabao).
 This amended E.O. 626; the
latter prohibiting only the
slaughter of carabaos of age.
 The thrust of his petition is that
the executive order is
unconstitutional insofar as it
authorizes outright confiscation
of the carabao or carabeef being
transported across provincial
boundaries.
 His claim is that the penalty is
invalid because it is imposed
without according the owner a
right to be heard before a
competent and impartial court as
 Whether or not EO 626-A is
constitutional
legislation.
 No. We also mark, on top of all
this, the questionable manner of
the disposition of the confiscated
property as prescribed in the
questioned executive order.
 It is there authorized that the
seized property shall "be
distributed to charitable
institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of
the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the
case of carabeef, and to
deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of
Animal Industry may see fit, in
the case of carabaos."
(Emphasis supplied.) The
phrase "may see fit" is an
extremely generous and
dangerous condition, if condition
it is. It is laden with perilous
opportunities for partiality and
abuse, and even corruption. One
searches in vain for the usual
standard and the reasonable
guidelines, or better still, the
limitations that the said officers
must observe when they make
their distribution. There is none.
Their options are apparently
boundless. Who shall be the
fortunate beneficiaries of their
generosity and by what criteria
shall they be chosen? Only the
officers named can supply the
answer, they and they alone may
choose the grantee as they see
fit, and in their own exclusive
discretion. Definitely, there is
here a "roving commission," a
wide and sweeping authority that
is not "canalized within banks
that keep it from overflowing," in
short, a clearly profligate and

 Pelaez vs. Auditor General
guaranteed by due process.
 He complains that the measure
should not have been presumed,
and so sustained, as
constitutional.
 There is also a challenge to the
improper exercise of the
legislative power by the former
President under Amendment No.
6 of the 1973 Constitution.
 The President of the Philippines,
purporting to act pursuant to
Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, issued
Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121,
124 and 126 to 129; creating
thirty-three (33) municipalities
enumerated in the margin.
 Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as
Vice President of the Philippines
and as taxpayer, instituted the
present special civil action, for a
writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction, against
the Auditor General, to restrain
him, as well as his
representatives and agents, from
passing in audit any expenditure
of public funds in implementation
of said executive orders and/or
any disbursement by said
municipalities.
 Petitioner alleges that said
executive orders are null and
void, upon the ground that said
Section 68 has been impliedly
repealed by Republic Act No.
2370 effective January 1, 1960
and constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power.
 The third paragraph of Section 3
of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
“Barrios shall not be created or
their boundaries altered nor their
names changed except under
the provisions of this Act or by
 Whether or not Section 68 of
Revised Administrative Code
constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power.
therefore invalid delegation of
legislative powers.
 Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our
fundamental law ordains:
 The President shall have control
of all the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices, exercise
general supervision over all local
governments as may be
provided by law, and take care
that the laws be faithfully
executed.
 The power of control under this
provision implies the right of the
President to interfere in the
exercise of such discretion as
may be vested by law in the
officers of the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices
of the national government, as
well as to act in lieu of such
officers.
 This power is denied by the
Constitution to the Executive,
insofar as local governments are
concerned.
 With respect to the latter, the
fundamental law permits him to
wield no more authority than that
of checking whether said local
governments or the officers
thereof perform their duties as
provided by statutory
enactments.
 Hence, the President cannot
interfere with local governments,
so long as the same or its
officers act within the scope of
Act of Congress.” their authority.
 Although Congress may
delegate to another branch of
the Government the power to fill
in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of
a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said
law: (a) be complete in itself — it
must set forth therein the policy
to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate —
and (b) fix a standard — the
limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable —
to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of
his functions.
 Indeed, without a statutory
declaration of policy, the
delegate would in effect, make or
formulate such policy, which is
the essence of every law; and,
without the aforementioned
standard, there would be no
means to determine, with
reasonable certainty, whether
the delegate has acted within or
beyond the scope of his
authority.
 Hence, he could thereby
arrogate upon himself the power,
not only to make the law, but,
also — and this is worse — to
unmake it, by adopting measures
inconsistent with the end sought
to be attained by the Act of
Congress, thus nullifying the
principle of separation of powers
and the system of checks and
balances, and, consequently,
undermining the very foundation
of our Republican system.
 Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code does not
 meet these well-settled
requirements for a valid
delegation of the power to fix the
details in the enforcement of a
law.
 It does not enunciate any policy
to be carried out or implemented
by the President.
 Neither does it give a standard
sufficiently precise to avoid the
evil effects above referred to.