ADMIN LAW 2S - Atty.
Bendijo
Case Digests:
P: Tomatic Aratuc vs R: COMELEC
FACTS: On April 7, 1978, elections for the position of
Representative to the Batasang Pambansa were held throughout
the Philippines. The cases at bar concern only the results of the
elections in Region XII.
Petition in G. R. Nos. L-49705-09 for certiorari with restraining
order and preliminary injunction filed by six (6) independent
candidates for representatives to the Interim Batasang Pambansa
who had joined together under the banner of the Kunsensiya ng
Bayan which, however, was not registered as a political party or
group under the 1976 Election Code, P.D. No. 1296, namely
Tomatic Aratuc Sorgio (Tocao, Ciscolario Diaz, Fred Tamula,
Mangontawar Guro and Bonifacio Legaspi) here referred to as
petitioners, to review the decision of the respondent Commission
on Election (Comelec) resolving their appeal from the respondent
Regional Board of Canvasses for Region XII regarding the
canvass of the results of the election in said region for
representatives to the I.B.P. held on April 7, 1978.
Similar petition in G.R. Nos. L49717-21, for certiorari with
restraining order and preliminary injunction filed by Linang
Mandangan, abo a candidate for representative in the same
election in that region, to review the decision of the Comelec
declaring respondent Ernesto Roldan as entitled to be proclaimed
as one of the eight winners in said election.
A supervening panel headed by COMELEC, Hon-Venancio S.
Duque, had conducted the complaints of the petitioners therein of
alleged irregularities in the election records in all the voting centers
in the whole province of Lanao del Sur, the whole City of Marawi,
eight (8) towns of Lanao del Norte.
Before the start of the hearings, the canvass was suspended but
after the supervisory panel presented its report, on May 15, 1978,
the Comelec lifted its order of suspension and directed the
resumption of the canvass to be done in Manila.
Thus respondent Board proceeded with the canvass, with the
herein petitioners presenting objections, most of them supported
by the report of handwriting and finger print experts who had
examined the voting records and lists of voters in 878 voting
centers, out of 2,700 which they specified in their complaints or
petitions in Election Cases 78-8, 78-9, 78-10, 78-11 and 7812 in
the Comelec.
In regard to 501 voting centers, the records of which, consisting of
the voters lists and voting records were not available-and could
not be brought to Manila, petitions asked that the results therein
be completely excluded from the canvass.
ISSUE: WON there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction on the part of COMELEC.
HELD: Under Section 168 of the Revised Election Code of 1978,
"the COMELEC shall have direct control and supervision over
the board of canvassers" and the relatedly, Section 175 of the
same Code provides that it "shall be the sole judge of all
pre-proclamation controversies.
"The fact of the matter is that the authority of the Commission in
reviewing actuations of board of canvassers does not spring
from any appellate jurisdiction conferred by any specific provision
of law, for there is none such provision anywhere in the
Election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct
control and supervision endowed to it by the above-quoted
provisions of Section 168.
And in administrative law, it is a too well settled postulate to
need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or
office having supervision and control over another may do
directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done.
We cannot fault respondent Comelec for having extended its
inquiry beyond that undertaken by the Board of Canvass.
On the contrary, it must be stated that Comelec correctly and
commendably asserted its statutory authority born of its
envisaged constitutional duties vis-a-vis the preservation
of the purity of elections and electoral processes and in
doing what petitioner it should not have done.
MACEDA VS ERB
FACTS: On August 2, 1990, private respondents oil companies
filed with the ERB their respective applications on oil price
increases.
On September 21, 1990, the Energy Regulatory Board issued an
order granting a provisional increase of P1.42 per liter.
Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition on September 26,
1990. Hearing for the presentation of the evidence-in-chief
commenced on November 21, 1990. ERB subsequently outlined
the procedure as follows:
“it has been traditional and it is the intention of the Board to act
on these applications on an industry-wide basis, whether to
accept, reject, modify or whatever, the Board will do it on an
industry wide basis, so, the best way to have the oppositors
and the Board a clear picture of what the applicants are asking
for is to have all the evidence-in-chief to be placed on
record first and then the examination will come later, the
cross-examination will come later.”
Petitioner Maceda maintains that this order of proof deprived
him of his right to finish his cross-examination of Petron's
witnesses and denied him his right to cross-examine each of the
witnesses of Caltex and Shell. He points out that this relaxed
procedure resulted in the denial of due process.
ISSUE: WON the EBR acted in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
HELD: No. Such a relaxed procedure is especially true in
administrative bodies, such as the ERB which in matters of rate or
price fixing is considered as exercising a quasi-legislative, not
quasi-judicial function. As such administrative agency, it is not
bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing
court proceedings.
In fact, Section 2, Rule I of the Rules of Practice and
Procedure Governing Hearings Before the ERB provides that
—These Rules shall govern pleadings, practice and
procedure before the Energy Regulatory Board in all matters
of inquiry, study, hearing, investigation and/or any other
proceedings within the jurisdiction of the Board.
However, in the broader interest of justice, the Board may, in
any particular matter, except itself from these rules and apply
such suitable procedure as shall promote the objectives of the
Order.
We dismissed the petition on December 18, 1990,
reaffirming ERB's authority to grant provisional increase even
without prior hearing, pursuant to Sec. 8 of E.O. No. 172, under
Executive Order No. 172, a hearing is indispensable, it
does not preclude the Board from ordering, ex-parte, a
provisional increase, as it did here, subject to its final
disposition of whether or not:
(1) to make it permanent;
(2) to reduce or increase it further; or
(3) to deny the application
US vs DORR
FACTS: Herein respondents were alleged to have committed an
offense of writing, publishing and circulating scurrilous libel against
the Government of the U.S. and the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands in violation of Section 8, Act 292 of the
Commission.
The alleged libel was published in “Manila Freedom” issue dated
06 April 1902 as an editorial issue. The editorial is about the
appointment of rascal natives (Filipinos) to important Government
positions by the Civil Commission (CC for brevity).
The following are part of the article:
“…the Civil Commission has, in its distribution of offices,
constituted a protectorate over a set of men who should be in jail
or deported…xxx…this kind of foolish work that the Commission is
doing all over the Island, reinstating insurgents and rogues and
turning down the men who have during struggle, at the risk of their
lives, aided the Americans.”
“The commission has exalted to the highest position in the Islands
Filipinos who are alleged to be notoriously corrupt and rascally,
and men of no personal character”.
“it is a notorious fact that many branches of the Government
organized by the Civil Commission are rotten and corrupt…xxx”.
Article 292, section 8 has provided modes for committing an
offense against it. However, albeit the article has a virulent attack
against the policy of the CC, the complaint in question cannot be
regarded as having a tendency to produce anything like what may
be called disaffection or a state of feeling incompatible with a
disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the
laws.
There is a question as how the term “the Insular Government of
the Phil. Islands”, is used in Section 8, Art. 292.
Is it defined as “the existing law and institutions of the Islands” or
“the aggregate of the individuals by whom the government of the
Islands is administered”?
ISSUE: Whether or not the article be regarded as embraced within
the description of scurrilous libel against the Government of the
United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands.
HELD: No. The important question is to determine what is meant
in section 8 of Act No. 292 by the expression "the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands." Does it mean in a general
and abstract sense the “existing laws and institutions of the
Islands, or does it mean the aggregate of the individuals by whom
the Government of the Islands is, for the time being,
administered?” Either sense would doubtless be admissible.
We understand, in modern political science, by the term
"government", that institution or aggregate of institutions by which
an independent society makes and carries out those rules of
action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state,
or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by
those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them.
Government is the aggregate of authorities which rule a society.
By "administration" again, we understand in modern times, and
especially in more or less free countries, the aggregate of those
persons in whose hands the reins of government are for the time
being (the chief ministers or heads of departments)." (Bouvier, Law
Dictionary, 89l.) But the writer adds that the terms "government"
and "administration" are not always used in their strictness, and
that "government" is often used for "administration.
The article in question contains no attack upon the governmental
system of the United States, and it is quite apparent that, though
grossly abusive as respects both the CommissionIas a body and
some of its individual members, it contains no attack upon the
governmental system by which the authority of the United States is
enforced in these Islands.
The form of government by a Civil Commission and a Civil
Governor is not assailed. It is the character of the men who are
entrusted with the administration of the government that the writer
is seeking to bring into disrepute by impugning the purity of their
motives, their public integrity, and their private morals, and the
wisdom of their policy.
The publication of the article, therefore, no seditious tendency
being apparent, constitutes no offense under Act No. 292, section
8.
RATIO: Government is the aggregate of authorities which rule a
society. By "administration" again, we understand in modern times,
and especially in more or less free countries, the aggregate of
those persons in whose hands the reins of government are for the
time being (the chief ministers or heads of departments). The
terms "government" and "administration" are not always used in
their strictness, and that "government" is often used for
"administration”.
P: MALAGA vs R: PENACHOS
FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its
Pre-qualifications, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused
the publication in the November 25, 26 and 28, 1988 issues of the
Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a
Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF.
The notice announced that the last day for the submission of
pre-qualification requirements was on December 2, 1988, and that
the bids would be received and opened on December 12, 1988 at
3 o'clock in the afternoon.
Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of
BE Construction and Best Built Construction, respectively,
submitted their pre-qualification documents at two o'clock in the
afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Oceana submitted his
own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not
allowed to participate in the bidding as their documents were
considered late.
On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the
Iloilo RTC against the officers of PBAC for their refusal without just
cause to accept them resulting to their non-inclusion in the list of
pre-qualified bidders.
They sought to the resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding
and the acceptance of their documents. They also asked that if
the bidding had already been conducted, the defendants be
directed not to award the project pending resolution of their
complaint.
On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order
prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and award the
project.
The defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the
ground that the court is prohibited from issuing such order,
preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction in
government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818.
They also contended that the preliminary injunction had become
moot and academic as it was served after the bidding had been
awarded and closed.
On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and
denied the petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the
building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF was an
infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage
of the subject law.
ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality
subject to the provisions of PD 1818?
HELD: Yes. The ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore
covered by P.D. 1818. Nevertheless, it does not automatically
follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree.
The Prohibition pertained to the issuance of injunctions or
restraining orders by courts against administrative acts in
controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in
technical cases.
On issues definitely outside of this dimension and involving
questions of law, courts could not be prevented from exercising
their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.
There are at least two irregularities committed by PBAC that
justified injunction of the bidding and the award of the project.
First, PBAC set deadlines for the filing of the PRE-C1 and the
opening of bids and then changed these deadlines without prior
notice to prospective participants.
Second, PBAC was required to issue to pre-qualified applicants
the plans, specifications and proposal book forms for the
project to be bid thirty days before the date of bidding
if the estimated project cost was between P1M and P5M.
PBAC has not denied that these forms were issued only an
December 2, 1988, or only ten days before the bidding scheduled
for December 12, 1988. At the very latest, PBAC should have
issued them on November 12, 1988, or 30 days before the
scheduled bidding.
It is apparent that the present controversy did not arise
from the discretionary acts of the administrative body nor
does it involve merely technical matters. What is involved here is
non-compliance with the procedural rules on bidding which
required strict observance. P.D. 1818 was not intended to shield
from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by administrative
agencies such as the anomalies above described, Hence,
the challenged restraining order was not improperly issued
by the respondent judge and the writ of preliminary injunction
should not have been denied.
RATIO: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government
instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government,
not integrated within the department framework, vested with
special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not
all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy, usually through a charter.
This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and
government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5)
Introductory Provisions).
The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:
Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating
under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating
to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes
the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of
the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions).
It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered
institution and is therefore covered by P.D. 1818.
There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a
government instrumentality. First, it was created in pursuance of
the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority
program of the government to effect the socio-economic life of the
nation.
Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines shall also
be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts
and expenses to be audited by the Commission on Audit or its
duly authorized representative.
Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government
are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the
president of the state college, such apparatus, equipment, or
supplies and even the services of such employees as can be
spared without serious detriment to public service.
Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out
of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also decreed in its
charter that the funds and maintenance of the state college would
henceforth be included in the General Appropriations Law.
 BEJA SR. vs CA
FACTS: Petitioner Beja, Sr. was first employed by the Philippine
Ports Authority as arrastre supervisor then as a result of the
reorganization of the PPA, he was appointed Terminal Supervisor.
The PPA General Manager, Dayan, filed an Administrative Case
against Beja and Villaluz for grave dishonesty, grave misconduct,
willful violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Petitioners in this case allegedly erroneously assessed storage
fees resulting in the loss of P38,150.77 on the part of the
PPA.
After a preliminary investigation conducted by the district attorney
for Region X, Administrative Case No. 11-04-88 was “considered
closed for lack of merit.” After some time, another Administrative
Case was filed against Beja by the PPA General manager also
for dishonesty, grave misconduct, violation of reasonable office
rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and for being notoriously undesirable.
The charge consisted of six (6) different specifications of
administrative offenses including fraud against the PPA in the total
amount of P218,000.00. Dayan endorsed it to the Department
of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and/or its
Administrative Action Board or DOTC-AAB for “appropriate
action.”
At the scheduled hearing, Beja asked for continuance on the
ground that he needed time to study the charges against him. The
AAB proceeded to hear the case and gave Beja an opportunity
to present evidence.
However, on February 20, 1989, Beja filed a petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court
of Misamis Oriental.
Two days later, he filed with the AAB a manifestation and motion
to suspend the hearing of the Administrative Case on account of
the pendency of the certiorari proceeding before the court.
AAB denied the motion and continued with the hearing of the
administrative case. Thereafter, Beja moved for the dismissal
of the certiorari case and proceeded to file before the Court of
Appeals petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order.
Meanwhile, a decision was rendered by the AAB in
Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-049-89. Its dispositive
portion reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered,
adjudging the following, namely:
a)That respondents Geronimo Beja, Jr. and Hernando
Villaluz are exonerated from the charge against them;
b)That respondent Fidencio Y. Beja be dismissed from the
service;
c)That his leave credits and retirement benefits are
declared forfeited;
d)That he be disqualified from re-employment in the
government service;
e)That his eligibility is recommended to be cancelled.
Pasig, Metro Manila, February 28, 1989.”
After appropriate proceedings, the Court of Appeals also
rendered a decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 17270 dismissing the
petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
Hence, Beja elevated the case back to this Court through an
“appeal by certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order.
ISSUE: In his petition, the PPA general manager has no power to
refer the administrative case filed against him to the DOTC-AAB,
and (d) the DOTC Secretary, the Chairman of the DOTC-AAB and
DOTC-AAB itself as an adjudicatory body, have no jurisdiction to
try the administrative case against him
HELD: With respect to the issue of whether or not the DOTC
Secretary and/or the AAB may initiate and hear administrative
cases against PPA Personnel below the rank of
Assistant General Manager, the Court qualifiedly rules in favor
of petitioner.
The PPA was created through P.D. No. 505 dated July 11, 1974.
Under that Law, the corporate powers of the PPA were vested
in a governing Board of Directors known as the Philippine Port
Authority Council. Sec. 5(i) of the same decree gave the
Council the power “to appoint, discipline and remove, and
determine the composition of the technical staff of the
Authority and other personnel.”
P.D. No. 505 was substituted by P.D. No. 857, Sec. 4(a)
thereof created the Philippine Ports Authority which would be
“attached” to the then Department of Public Works,
Transportation and Communication.
When E.O No. 125 dated January 30, 1987 reorganizing the
Ministry Of Transportation and Communications was issued,
the PPA retained its “attached” status.
Even E.O No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 classified
the PPAas an agency “attached” to the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC). Sec. 24 of Book IV,
Title XV, Chapter 6 of the same Code provides that the agencies
attached to the DOTC “shall continue to operate and function in
accordance with the respective charters or laws creating
them, except when they conflict with this Code.”
Attachment of an agency to a Department is one of the three
administrative relationships mentioned in Book IV, Chapter 7
of the Administrative Code of 1987, the other two being
supervision and control and administrative supervision.
“Attachment” is defined in Sec. 38 thereof as follows:
“(3)Attachment.—(a) This refers to the lateral relationship
between the department or its equivalent and the attached
agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program
coordination. The coordination shall be accomplished by having
the department represented in the governing board of the
attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a
member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by
the charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply
with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress
of programs and projects; and having the department or its
equivalent provide general policies through its representative in
the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal
policies of the attached corporation or agency.
An attached agency has a larger measure of independence
from the Department to which it is attached than one which is
under departmental supervision and control or administrative
supervision. This is borne out by the “lateral relationship” between
the Department and the attached agency.
The attachment is merely for “policy and program coordination.”
With respect to administrative matters, the independence of
an attached agency from Departmental control and supervision
is further reinforced by the fact that even an agency under a
Department’s administrative supervision is free from Departmental
interference with respect to appointments and other personnel
actions “in accordance with the decentralization of personnel
functions” under the Administrative Code of 1987.
Moreover, the Administrative Code explicitly provides that Chapter
8 of Book IV on supervision and control shall not apply to
chartered institutions attached to a Department.
Hence, the inescapable conclusion is that with respect to the
management of personnel, an attached agency is, to a certain
extent, free from Departmental interference and control.
Although the foregoing section does not expressly provide for
a mechanism for an administrative investigation of personnel,
by vesting the power to remove erring employees on the General
Manager, with the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, the law
impliedly grants said officials the power to investigate its
personnel below the rank of Assistant Manager who may be
charged with an administrative offense.
During such investigation, the PPA General Manager, as earlier
stated, may subject the employee concerned to preventive
suspension. The investigation should be conducted in accordance
with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of P.D. No. 807. Only
after gathering sufficient facts may the PPA General Manager
impose the proper penalty in accordance with law. It is the latter
action which requires the approval of the PPA Board of Directors.
From an adverse decision of the PPA General Manager and
the Board of Directors, the employee concerned may elevate
the matter to the Department Head or Secretary. Otherwise, he
may appeal directly to the Civil Service Commission.
It is, therefore, clear that the transmittal of the complaint by the
PPA General Manager to the AAB was premature. The PPA
General Manager should have first conducted an investigation,
made the proper recommendation for the imposable penalty
and sought its approval by the PPA Board of Directors. It
was discretionary on the part of the herein petitioner to elevate the
case to the then DOTC Secretary Reyes. Only then could the AAB
take jurisdiction of the case.
The AAB, which was created during the tenure of Secretary
Reyes under Office Order No. 88-318 dated July 1, 1988, was
designed to act, decide and recommend to him “all cases of
administrative malfeasance, irregularities, grafts and acts of
corruption in the Department.”
Composed of a Chairman and two (2) members, the AAB came
into being pursuant to Administrative Order No. 25 issued by the
President on May 25, 1987. Its special nature as a quasi-judicial
administrative body notwithstanding, the AAB is not exempt from
the observance of due process in its proceedings.
We are not satisfied that it did so in this case the respondents
protestation that petitioner waived his right to be heard
notwithstanding. It should be observed that petitioner was
precisely questioning the AAB’s jurisdiction when it sought judicial
recourse.
EUGENIO VS SCS
FACTS: Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear
Research Institute. She applied for a Career Executive Service
(CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank on August 2, 1993, she was
given a CES eligibility.
On September 15, 1993, she was recommended to the President
for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board.
On October 1, 1993, respondent Civil Service Commission passed
Resolution No. 93-4359 which resolved to streamline, reorganize
and effect changes in its organizational structure. Pursuant
thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known
as the Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil Service
Commission.
Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget, properties and
equipment of the Career Executive Service Board shall now form
part of the Office for Career Executive Service. The above
resolution became an impediment to the appointment of petitioner
as Civil Service Officer, Rank IV.
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career
Executive Service Board which recommended her CESO Rank IV
has been abolished.
Petitioner filed the petition at the bench to annul, among others,
resolution No. 93-4359.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC usurped the legislative functions
of Congress when it abolished CESB, office created by law,
through the issuance of CSC Resolution No. 93-435
HELD: Yes. The controlling fact is that the Career Executive
Service Board (CESB) was created in the Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1 on September 1, 1974 which adopted the Integrated
Plan. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was
created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature.
This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and
abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function.
Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the
creation of public offices is primarily a legislative function. In so far
as the legislative power in this respect is not restricted by
constitutional provisions, it is supreme, and the legislature may
decide for itself what offices are suitable, necessary, convenient.
When in the exigencies of government it is necessary to create
and define duties, the legislative department has the discretion to
determine whether additional offices shall be created, or whether
these duties shall be attached to and become ex-officio duties of
existing offices.
An office created by the legislature is wholly within the power of
that body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the office and
the powers and duties of the incumbent, and if it sees fit, abolish
the office.
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law
authorizing the abolition of the CESB.
On The contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975
to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the operation of
CESB. The Respondent Commission's power to reorganize is
limited to offices under its control. From its inception, the CESB
was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively
attached to the respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the
Reorganization Committee "the CESB shall be autonomous. It is
expected to view the problem of building up executive manpower
in the government with a broad and positive outlook." The
essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its
attachment to the respondent Commission.
By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control
of the respondent Commission.
Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of
attaching a functionally interrelated government agency to another
is to attain "policy and program coordination."
RATIO: Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship
between the department or its equivalent and attached agency or
corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination. The
coordination may be accomplished by having the department
represented in the governing board of the attached agency or
corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without
voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached
corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic reporting
which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and
having the department or its equivalent provide general policies
through its representative in the board, which shall serve as the
framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation or
agency.
LUZON DEVT BANK VS ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVT BANK
FACTS: From a submission agreement of the LDB and the
Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE)
arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue:
Whether or not the company has violated the CBA provision and
the MOA on promotion.
At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their
respective Position Papers. Atty. Garcia, in her capacity as
Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE’s Position Paper ;
LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its Position Paper despite
a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As
of May 23, 1995 no Position Paper had been filed by LDB.
Much better other case
Without LDB’s Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a
decision disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not
adhered to the CBA provision nor the MOA on promotion.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set
aside the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her
from enforcing the same.
ISSUE: WON a voluntary arbiter’s decision is appealable to the
CA and not the SC
HELD: The Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court of
Appeals. YES. The jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary
arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators is quite limited compared to
the original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the appellate
jurisdiction of the NLRC for that matter.
The “(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final
and executory unless appealed to the Commission …” Hence,
while there is an express mode of appeal from the decision of a
labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is silent with respect to an
appeal from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator.
Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntary
arbitrator is, more often than not, elevated to the SC itself on a
petition for certiorari, in effect equating the voluntary arbitrator with
the NLRC or the CA. In the view of the Court, this is illogical and
imposes an unnecessary burden upon it.
In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al., on the settled
premise that the judgments of courts and awards of quasi-judicial
agencies must become final at some definite time, this Court ruled
that the awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights of
parties; hence, their decisions have the same legal effect as
judgments of a court.
In Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Romero, et al., this Court
ruled that “a voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts
in a quasi-judicial capacity.” Under these rulings, it follows that the
voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in
law the status of a quasi-judicial agency but independent of, and
apart from, the NLRC since his decisions are not appealable to the
latter.
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902,
provides that the Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of RTCs and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission,
except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the
Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the
provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third
paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the panel of
voluntary arbitrators may not strictly be considered as a
quasi-judicial agency, board or commission, still both he and the
panel are comprehended within the concept of a “quasi-judicial
instrumentality.”
An “instrumentality” is anything used as a means or agency. Thus,
the terms governmental “agency” or “instrumentality” are
synonymous in the sense that either of them is a means by which
a government acts, or by which a certain government act or
function is performed. The word “instrumentality,” with respect to a
state, contemplates an authority to which the state delegates
governmental power for the performance of a state function. An
individual person, like an administrator or executor, is a judicial
instrumentality in the settling of an estate, in the same manner that
a sub-agent appointed by a bankruptcy court is an instrumentality
of the court, and a trustee in bankruptcy of a defunct corporation is
an instrumentality of the state.
The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant
to a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions
therefore in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the
contemplation of the term “instrumentality” in the aforequoted Sec.
9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his functions and powers are provided
for in the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to
said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as
contemplated therein.
It will be noted that, although the Employees Compensation
Commission is also provided for in the Labor Code, Circular No.
1-91, which is the forerunner of the present Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95, laid down the procedure for the appealability of
its decisions to the CA under the foregoing rationalization, and this
was later adopted by Republic Act No. 7902 in amending Sec. 9 of
B.P. 129. A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator
or panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the CA, in
line with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular
No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and
commissions enumerated therein.
In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of
Republic Act No. 876, also known as the Arbitration Law,
arbitration is deemed a special proceeding of which the court
specified in the contract or submission, or if none be specified, the
RTC for the province or city in which one of the parties resides or
is doing business, or in which the arbitration is held, shall have
jurisdiction.
In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary
arbitrator with that of the RTC. Consequently, in a petition for
certiorari from that award or decision, the CA must be deemed to
have concurrent jurisdiction with the SC. As a matter of policy, this
Court shall henceforth remand to the Court of Appeals petitions of
this nature for proper disposition.
DE LA LLANA VS ALBA
FACTS: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefore and for other Purposes," the same
being contrary to the security of tenure provision of the
Constitution as it separates from the judiciary Justices and judges
of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit
courts except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court
of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established
by such Act.
They likewise impute lack of good faith in its enactment and
characterize as undue delegation of legislative power to the
President his authority to fix the compensation and allowances of
the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the
determination of the date when the reorganization shall be
deemed completed. The Solicitor General maintains that there is
no valid justification for the attack on the constitutionality of the
statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the power vested in the
Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the allegations of
absence of good faith as well as the attack on the independence
of the judiciary being unwarranted and devoid of any support in
law.
ISSUE: W/O Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 should be declared
unconstitutional for colliding with the security of tenure enjoyed by
justices and judges. no.
HELD: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, the
unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been
shown. It held that the enactment thereof was in answer to a
pressing and urgent need for a major reorganization of the
judiciary. It is a fundamental proposition that the legislative power
to create courts ordinarily includes the power to organize and to
reorganize them, and that the power to abolish courts is generally
coextensive with the power to create them.
The power to abolish was not intended to be qualified by the
permanence of tenure. The right of Judges to hold office during
good behavior until they reach the age of 70 years, or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, does not
deprive Congress of its power to abolish, organize or reorganize
inferior courts.
A legislature is not bound to give security of tenure to courts.
Courts can be abolished. In fact, the entire judicial system can be
changed. To hold that the tenure of judges is superior to the
legislative power to reorganize is to render impotent the exercise
of that power. Under Section 7, Article X, Judges are entailed to
their count, from which they cannot be separated before retirement
age except as a disciplinary action for bad behavior. Under
Section 1, Courts are not entitled to their judges, because the
power of the legislature to establish inferior courts presupposes
the power to abolish those courts. If an inferior court is abolished,
the judge presiding that court will necessarily have to lose his
position because the abolished court is not entailed to him.
Section 1, Article X refers to the "Judiciary" as a fundamental
department of Government, Section 7 of the same Article refers to
the tenure of office of "individual" Judges (inclusive of Justices of
inferior Courts); that is to say, tenure of office is a matter
concerning the individual Judge. This "individuality" character of
Section 7 is supported by the clause that the Supreme Court has
the power to discipline individual judges of inferior courts.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVT AUTHORITY VS CA
FACTS:On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of
Our Lady of Lourdes Parish,Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed
a letter-complaint with the Laguna LakeDevelopment Authority
seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage
dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to
its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the
possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding
area.
The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City
Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the
Camarin area without first securing an EnvironmentalCompliance
Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau
(EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
as required under Presidential DecreeNo. 1586, and clearance
from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927,
series of 1983.
The LLDA found that the water collected from the leachate and
the receiving streams could considerably affect the quality, in turn,
of the receiving waters since it indicates the presence of bacteria,
other than coliform, which may have contaminated the sample
during collection or handling.
On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order
ordering the CityGovernment of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila
Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to completely halt,
stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and
other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite
On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the
Philippine National Police,enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order
by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala
Estate, Camarin area being utilized as a dumpsite
The City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City an action for the declaration of nullity of
the cease and desist order
In its complaint, the City Government of Caloocan sought to be
declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the health
and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to
a balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction
RTC: On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after
hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in the consolidated cases an
order denying LLDA's motion to dismiss and granting the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the LLDA, its agent
and all persons acting for and on its behalf, from enforcing or
implementing its cease and desist order which prevents plaintiff
City of Caloocan from dumping garbage at the Camarin dumpsite
during the pendency of this case and/or until further orders of the
court
CA: On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
decision holding that: (1) the Regional Trial Court has no
jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and decide the action for
annulment of LLDA's cease and desist order, including the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in
relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is within the exclusive and
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9,
par.(3), of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna Lake
Development Authority has no power and authority to issue a
cease and desist order under its enabling law, Republic Act No.
4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive OrderNo. 927,
series of 1983.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the LLDA has the authority to entertain
the complaint against the dumping of garbage in the open
dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City
Government of Caloocan which is allegedly endangering
the health, safety, and welfare of the resident therein and
the sanitation and quality of the water in the area brought
about by exposure to pollution caused by such open
garbage dumpsite
2. Whether or not the LLDA has the power and authority to
issue a "cease and desist" order under Republic Act No.
4850 and its amendatory laws.
HELD: 1. Yes. As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution
cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB),
except in cases where the special law provides for another forum.
It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a
specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and
make effective the declared national policy of promoting and
accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna
Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and
the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with
due regard and adequate provisions for environmental
management and control, preservation of the quality of human life
and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological
disturbances, deterioration and pollution.
Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by
virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to
protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake Region from the
deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of
wastes from the surrounding areas.
In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is
mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove
all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government
offices/agencies within the region, public corporations, and private
persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or
projects are related to those of the LLDAfor the development of
the region.
2. Yes. By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended
by P.D. No. 813 and ExecutiveOrder No. 927, series of 1983,
authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the
discontinuance or pollution." (Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par.
(d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be
necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to
issue an ex-parte cease and desist order" in a language, as
suggested by the City Government of Caloocan, similar to the
express grant to the defunct National Pollution Control Commission
under Section 7 of P.D.No. 984 which, admittedly was not
reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983.
However, it would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion
that there is a denial of the power to issue the order in question
when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the
discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed
upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.
The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of
protecting vital public interests" gives vitality to the statement on
ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies or the 1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which
provides:The State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.
As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries
the correlative duty of non-impairment. This is but in consonance
with the declared policy of the state "to protect and promote the
right to health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them."It is to be borne in mind that the Philippines is party
to the Universal Declaration of HumanRights and the Alma
Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a
fundamental human right.
TIO VS VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD
FACTS: This petition was filed on September 1, 1986 by petitioner
on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of other videogram
operators adversely affected. It assails the constitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and
supervise the videogram industry (hereinafter briefly referred to as
the BOARD).
The Decree was promulgated on October 5, 1985 and took effect
on April 10, 1986, fifteen (15) days after completion of its
publication in the Official Gazette.
On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of the
abovementioned decree, Presidential Decree No. 1994 amended
the National Internal Revenue Code providing, inter alia:
SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on each
processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of
length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally
manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to
sales tax.
On October 23, 1986, the Greater Manila Theaters Association,
Integrated Movie Producers, Importers and Distributors
Association of the Philippines, and Philippine Motion Pictures
Producers Association, hereinafter collectively referred to as the
Intervenors, were permitted by the Court to intervene in the case,
over petitioner's opposition, upon the allegations that intervention
was necessary for the complete protection of their rights and that
their "survival and very existence is threatened by the unregulated
proliferation of film piracy." The Intervenors were thereafter
allowed to file their Comment in Intervention.
ISSUE: WON it is unconstitutional
HELD: The Supreme Court held that PD No. 1987 is constitutional.
The tax provision of PD No. 1987 is not a rider.
In fact, said provision is not allied and germane to, and is
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general
object of the decree, which is the regulation of the video industry
through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title.
The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that
general subject and title.
The tax imposed is not harsh and oppressive, confiscatory, and in
restraint of trade.
The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed
primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry,
particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant
violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of
pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the
Decree to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid
imposition. That being said, the rate of tax is a matter better
addressed to the taxing legislature.
The Decree does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative
power.
The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to the BOARD
to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the
government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads
or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement
functions for the Board" is not a delegation of the power to
legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its
execution, enforcement, and implementation.
The Decree is not an ex post facto law.
An ex post facto law is one which alters the legal rules of
evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of
the offense. Applied to the challenged provision, there is no
question that there is a rational connection between the fact
proved, which is non-registration, and the ultimate fact presumed
which is violation of the DECREE, besides the fact that the prima
facie presumption of violation of the DECREE attaches only after a
forty-five-day period counted from its effectivity and is, therefore,
neither retrospective in character.
The video industry is not being over-regulated.
The video industry being a relatively new industry, the need for its
regulation was apparent. While the underlying objective of the
DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no
question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment,
considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy;
the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about
by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes
containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent
sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the drop in
theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of
video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of
Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to engage
in business.
US VS ANG TANG HO
FACTS: At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature
passed Act No. 2868, entitled “An Act penalizing the monopoly
and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under
extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale
thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of
the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations
therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose”.
Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding of
palay, rice or corn within the meaning of this Act, but does not
specify the price of rice or define any basis for fixing the price.
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation
fixing the price at which rice should be sold.
Then, on August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the
defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at an
excessive price. Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and
sentenced.
The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its
approval; that it was approved July 30, 1919; that the
Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st of August,
1919; and that the law was first published on the 13th of August,
1919; and that the proclamation itself was first published on the
20th of August, 1919.
ISSUE: WON the delegation of legislative power to the Governor
General was valid.
HELD: No. By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in
the Legislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature to
make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-General, or
anyone else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative
power to enact any law.
The case of the United States Supreme Court, supra dealt with
rules and regulations which were promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture for Government land in the forest reserve.
These decisions hold that the legislative only can enact a law, and
that it cannot delegate it legislative authority.
The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation
of legislative power is pointed out and clearly defined. As the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin says:
That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the
legislature to any other department of the government, executive
or judicial, is a fundamental principle in constitutional law, essential
to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government
established by the constitution.
Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete
in and of itself, it may be provided that it shall become operative
only upon some certain act or event, or, in like manner, that its
operation shall be suspended.
The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can
make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of
things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own
action to depend.
It must be conceded that, after the passage of Act No. 2868, and
before any rules and regulations were promulgated by the
Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, even
at a peso per “ganta,” and that he would not commit a crime,
because there would be no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale
of it at any price would not be a crime.
That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime
to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant
committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General issued
the proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making it a
crime to sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the
sale of it at any price was to a crime.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the
proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the crime.
Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price.
In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the
Governor-General to say what was and what was not “any cause”
for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not “an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn,” and under
certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be
sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a
proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the
law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when
the law should be suspended.
The Legislature did not specify or define what was “any cause,” or
what was “an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn,”
Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the
proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation
no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at
all, because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The
act or proclamation does not say anything about the different
grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the
sale “of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80)
which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53.”
We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far
as it undertakes to authorized the Governor-General in his
discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to
make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make
the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is
unconstitutional and void.

YNOT VS INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
FACTS: The case challenges the constitutionality of Executive
Order 626-A which amends EO 626 and states that:
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such
that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from
one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in
violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to
confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to
charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay
see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the
case of carabaos.
On January 13, 1984, petitioner Restituto Ynot had transported six
carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo,
Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. The petitioner sued for
recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of
replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00.
After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the
confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be
produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also
declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as
raised by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its
presumed validity.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate
Court, which upheld the trial court, and now Ynot comes before
the SC through a petition for review on certiorari.
Ynot’s petition assails that the questioned EO is unconstitutional
insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or
carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries.
Petitioner claims that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed
without according the owner a right to be heard before a
competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He
complains that the measure should not have been presumed, and
so sustained, as constitutional.
ISSUE: WON EO 626-A constitutional.
HELD: NO. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily
confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the
petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given
a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered
confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when
ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck
at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a
chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty
of elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when
notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding
the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due
process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly
taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is
not necessarily judicial only.
In the exceptional cases accepted, however there is a justification
for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the
immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency
of the need to correct it.
In the case at bar, there was no such pressure of time or action
calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties
involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant
destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense
prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved
first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the
rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution.

Considering that, as the Court held in Pesigan v. Angeles,
Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof
should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court
of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the
prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the
accused.
To sum up, then, the SC finds that the challenged measure is an
invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed
to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
Due process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions
and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There
is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the
officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in
the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these
reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A
unconstitutional.
PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL
FACTS: In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive
orders creating 33 municipalities – this was purportedly pursuant
to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides
in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary… of
any… municipality… and may change the seat of government
within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare
may require…
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a
special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing
funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims
that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the
RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which
provides that barrios may “not be created or their boundaries
altered nor their names changed” except by Act of Congress.
Pelaez argues: “If the President, under this new law, cannot even
create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is
composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of
municipalities?”
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that
only barrios were barred from being created by the President.
Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can
be created without creating barrios. He further maintains that
through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power
to create municipalities to the President.
ISSUE: WON the provision in question constitutes an undue
delegation.
HELD: Yes. The authority to create municipal corporations is
essentially legislative in nature. As the Supreme Court of
Washington has put it "municipal corporations are purely the
creatures of statutes." It is obvious, however, that, whereas the
power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle
conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may
partake of an administrative nature - involving, as it does, the
adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating
said municipalities - the authority to create municipal corporations
is essentially legislative in nature.
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the
Government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a)
be complete in itself - it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a
standard - the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable - to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions fact. it is "purely a legislative question”.

Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate

would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the
essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard,
there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty,
whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority. Hence, he could thereby delegate upon himself the
power, not only to make the law, but, also - and this is worse - to
unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought
to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle
of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances,
and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our
Republican system.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet

these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power
to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate
any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President.
Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil
effects above referred to. In this connection, we do not overlook
the fact that, under the last clause of the first sentence of Section
68, the President:... may change the seat of the government within
any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may
require.

It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the

phrase "as the public welfare may require" qualified, not the
clauses preceding the one just quoted, but only the place to which
the seat of the government may be transferred. At any rate, the
conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is
concerned, even if we assumed that the phrase "as the public
welfare may require," in said Section 68, qualifies all other clauses
thereof.

In Section 68, as above indicated, the creation of municipalities, is

not an administrative function, but one which is essentially and
eminently legislative in character. The question of whether or not
"public interest" demands the exercise of such power is not one of