ARATUC V.

COMELEC
G.R. No. L-49705, 09 February 8, 1979

Facts:

Tomatic Aratuc et al. sought the suspension of the canvass then being undertaken by
respondent Board in Cotabato City. A supervening panel headed by Commissioner of
Elections, Hon. Venancio S. Duque, had conducted of the complaints of the petitioners therein of
alleged irregularities in the election records in the voting centers. Before hearing, the canvass
was suspended. After hearing the parties, the Court allowed resumption of the canvass but
issued guidelines to be followed but thereafter modified.

On July 11, 1978, respondent Board terminated its canvass and declared the result of
the voting. The petitioners brought the resolution of respondent Board to the Comelec.
Hearing was held on April 25, 1978, after which , the case was declared submitted for
decision. In order to enable the Commission to decide the appeal properly :

a. It will have to go deeper into the examination of the voting records and registration
records and in the case of voting centers whose voting and registration records which have
not yet been submitted for the Commission to decide to open the ballot boxes; and
b. To interview and get statements under oath of impartial and disinterested persons
from the area to determine whether actual voting took place on April 7, 1978, as well
as those of the military authorities in the areas affected.

On January 13, 1979, the Comelec rendered its resolution being assailed in these
cases, declaring the final result of the canvass.

Issue:

WON there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on

the part of COMELEC.

Held:

Under Section 168 of the Revised Election Code of 1978, "the Commission (on Elections)
shall have direct control and supervision over the board of canvassers" and that related Section 175
of the same Code provides that it "shall be the sole judge of all pre proclamation controversies."
The fact of the matter is that the authority of the Commission in reviewing actuations
of board of Canvassers does not spring from any appellate jurisdiction conferred by any
specific provision of law, for there is none such provision anywhere in the Election Code, but from
the plenary prerogative of direct control and supervision endowed to it by the above quoted
provisions of Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too well settled postulate to need any
supporting citation here, that a superior body or office having supervision and control over
another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done.

We cannot fault respondent COMELEC for its having extended its inquiry beyond that
undertaken by the Board of Canvass On the contrary, it must be stated that COMELEC correctly
and commendably asserted its statutory authority born of its envisaged constitutional duties
vis a vis the preservation of the purity of elections and electoral processes and in doing what
petitioner it should not have done.

Ernesto M. Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory Board, et al.

GR NO. 96266

FACTS:

Upon the outbreak of the Persian Gulf conflict on August 1990, private respondents oil companies filed
with the ERB their respective applications on oil price increases.  ERB then issued an order granting a
provisional increase of P1.42 per liter.  Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition seeking to
nullify said increase. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the decisions of the Energy Regulatory Board should be subject to presidential review.

HELD:

Pursuant to Section 8 of E.O. No. 172, while hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board
from ordering a provisional increase subject to final disposition of whether or not to make it permanent
or to reduce or increase it further or to deny the application.  The provisional increase is akin to a
temporary restraining order, which are given ex-parte.
The Court further noted the Solicitor General’s comments that “the ERB is not averse to the idea of a
presidential review of its decision,” except that there is no law at present authorizing the same.  The
Court suggested that it will be under the scope of the legislative to allow the presidential review of the
decisions of the ERB since, despite its being a quasi-judicial body, it is still “ an administrative body
under the Office of the President whose decisions should be appealed to the President under the
established principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies,” especially on a matter as
transcendental as oil price increases which affect the lives of almost all Filipinos.

Malaga v. Penachos, Jr., G.R. No. 86695, September 3, 1992; J.Cruz

FACTS:

The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids and Awards
Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26 and 28, 1988 issues of the Western
Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The
notice announced that the last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements was on
December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock
in the afternoon.

Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction and Best
Built Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-qualification documents at two o'clock in the
afternoon of December 2, 1988.  Petitioner Occeana submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. 
All three of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding as their documents were considered
late.

On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the officers
of PBAC for their refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to their non-inclusion in the list of
pre-qualified bidders.  They sought to the resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the
acceptance of their documents.  They also asked that if the bidding had already been conducted, the
defendants be directed not to award the project pending resolution of their complaint.

On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting
the bidding and award the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the
ground that the court is prohibited from issuing such order, preliminary injunction and preliminary
mandatory injunction in government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818.  They also
contended that the preliminary injunction had become moot and academic as it was served after the
bidding had been awarded and closed. 

On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for
preliminary injunction.  It declared that the building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF was an
infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of the subject law.  

ISSUE:

Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the provisions of PD 1818?

HELD:
Yes. ISCOF is covered by the contemplation of a government instrumentality provided by law.
However, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree.
RATIO:
The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:
“Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate
powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter.
This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled
corporations.” (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions). 
The same Code describes a chartered institution thus: “Chartered institution — refers to any
agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to
specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges, and
the monetary authority of the state.” (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions).
Indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality are the following: First, it
was created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority program
of the government to effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the Republic
of the Philippines also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts and expenses to
be audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus
and offices of the National Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the
president of the state college, such apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the services of such
employees as can be spared without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional amount of
P1.5M had been appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also decreed in its
charter that the funds and maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in the General
Appropriations Law. 
Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the
said decree because there are at least two irregularities committed by PBAC that justified injunction of
the bidding and the award of the project. 
First, PBAC set deadlines for the filing of the PRE-C1 and the opening of bids and then
changed these deadlines without prior notice to prospective participants. Under the Rules
Implementing P.D.1594, prescribing policies and guidelines for government infrastructure contracts,
PBAC shall provide prospective bidders with the Notice of Pre-qualification and other relevant
information regarding the proposed work. Prospective contractors shall be required to file their ARC-
Contractors Confidential Application for Registration & Classifications & the PRE-C2 Confidential
Pre-qualification Statement for the Project (referred to as PRE-C1) not later than the deadline set in the
published Invitation to Bid, after which date no PRE-C2 shall be submitted and received. Invitations to
Bid shall be advertised for at least three times within a reasonable period but in no case less than two
weeks in at least two newspapers of general circulations. 
Notably, the petitioners were disqualified because they failed to meet the new deadline and not
because of their expired licenses. The court explained that where the law requires a previous
advertisement before government contracts can be awarded, non-compliance with the requirement will,
as a general rule, render the same void and of no effect.  The facts that an invitation for bids has been
communicated to a number of possible bidders is not necessarily sufficient to establish compliance with
the requirements of the law if it is shown that other public bidders have not been similarly notified. 
Second, PBAC was required to issue to pre-qualified applicants the plans, specifications and
proposal book forms for the project to be bid thirty days before the date of bidding if the estimate
project cost was between P1M and P5M. PBAC has not denied that these forms were issued only on
December 2, 1988, or only ten days before the bidding scheduled for December 12, 1988. At the very
latest, PBAC should have issued them on November 12, 1988, or 30 days before the scheduled bidding.
The present controversy involved here is non-compliance with the procedural rules on bidding which
required strict observance.
P.D.1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by
administrative agencies such as the anomalies above described. Hence, the challenged restraining order
was not improperly issued by the respondent judge and the writ of preliminary injunction should not
have been denied. Annex Q of the private respondent's memorandum, however, that the subject project
has already been "100% completed as to the Engineering Standard." This fait accompli has made the
petition for a writ of preliminary injunction moot and academic.
The liabilities the court attached to private respondents are those for the prejudice sustained by
the petitioners as a result of the anomalies. Petitioners may not be awarded with compensatory damage
as evidence of actual loss is not present and also moral damages. However, the Court cannot close its
eyes to the evident bad faith that characterized the conduct of the private respondents, including the
irregularities in the announcement of the bidding and their efforts to persuade the ISCOF president to
award the project after two days from receipt of the restraining order and before they moved to lift such
order. For such questionable acts, they are liable in nominal damages at least in accordance with Article
2221 of the Civil Code, which states, “Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant may be vindicated or, recognized, and
not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. Thus, each of petitioners
be paid 10,000.The other petitioner, Occeña Builders, is not entitled to relief because it admittedly
submitted its pre-qualification documents on December 5, 1988, or three days after the deadline.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: a) upholding the restraining order dated
December 12, 1988, as not covered by the prohibition in P.D. 1818; b) ordering the chairman and the
members of the PBAC board of trustees, namely Manuel R. Penachos, Jr., Alfredo Matangga, Enrico
Ticar, and Teresita Villanueva, to each pay separately to petitioners Maria Elena Malaga and Josieleen
Najarro nominal damages P10,000.00 each; and c) removing the said chairman and members from the
PBAC board of trustees, or whoever among them is still incumbent therein, for their malfeasance in
office. Costs against PBAC.

Beja Sr. v. Court of Appeals (207 SCRA 689,1992)

G.R. No. 97149 March 31, 1992
ROMERO, J.:

Facts:

On October 21, 1988, the PPA General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan, filed Administrative Case
No. 11-04-88 against petitioner Beja and Hernando G. Villaluz for grave dishonesty, grave misconduct,
willful violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service. Beja and Villaluz allegedly erroneously assessed storage fees resulting in the loss of
P38,150.77 on the part of the PPA. Consequently, they were preventively suspended for the charges.
After a preliminary investigation conducted by the district attorney for Region X, Administrative Case
No. 11-04-88 was "considered closed for lack of merit."

On December 13, 1988, another charge sheet, docketed as Administrative Case No. 12-01-88,
was filed against Beja by the PPA General Manager also for dishonesty, grave misconduct, violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for
being notoriously undesirable. 

In his petition, Beja assails the Court of Appeals for having "decided questions of substance in a
way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions" of this Court. 5 Specifically,
Beja contends that the Court of Appeals failed to declare that: (a) he was denied due process; (b) the
PPA general manager has no power to issue a preventive suspension order without the necessary
approval of the PPA board of directors; (c) the PPA general manager has no power to refer the
administrative case filed against him to the DOTC-AAB, and (d) the DOTC Secretary, the Chairman of
the DOTC-AAB and DOTC-AAB itself as an adjudicatory body, have no jurisdiction to try the
administrative case against him. Simply put, Beja challenges the legality of the preventive suspension
and the jurisdiction of the DOTC Secretary and/or the AAB to initiate and hear administrative cases
against PPA personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager.

Issue:
 WON DOTC has jurisdiction over administrative cases involving personnel below the rank of
Assistant General Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), an agency attached to the said
Department.

Ruling:

Imposed during the pendency of an administrative investigation, preventive suspension is not a

penalty in itself. It is merely a measure of precaution so that the employee who is charged may be
separated, for obvious reasons, from the scene of his alleged misfeasance while the same is being
investigated.  Thus, preventive suspension is distinct from the administrative penalty of removal from
office such as the one mentioned in Sec. 8(d) of P.D. No 857. While the former may be imposed on a
respondent during the investigation of the charges against him, the latter is the penalty which may only
be meted upon him at the termination of the investigation or the final disposition of the case.

An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to which it is
attached than one which is under departmental supervision and control or administrative supervision.
This is borne out by the "lateral relationship" between the Department and the attached agency. The
attachment is merely for "policy and program coordination." With respect to administrative matters, the
independence of an attached agency from Departmental control and supervision is further reinforced by
the fact that even an agency under a Department's administrative supervision is free from Departmental
interference with respect to appointments and other personnel actions "in accordance with the
decentralization of personnel functions" under the Administrative Code of 1987.  Moreover, the
Administrative Code explicitly provides that Chapter 8 of Book IV on supervision and control shall not
apply to chartered institutions attached to a Department. 

EUGENIO vs CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

242 SCRA 196
Definition of Administrative Relationships Attachment

FACTS:

Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for a
Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank on August 2, 1993, she was given a CES
eligibility. On September 15, 1993, she was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the
Career Executive Service Board. On October 1, 1993, respondent Civil Service Commission passed
Resolution No. 93-4359 which resolves to streamline reorganize and effect changes in its
organizational structure. Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as
the Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing
personnel, budget, properties and equipment of the Career Executive Service Board shall now form part
of the Office for Career Executive Service. The above resolution became an impediment to the
appointment of petitioner as Civil Service Officer, Rank IV. Finding herself bereft of further
administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board which recommended her CESO Rank IV
has been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul, among others, resolution No. 93-
4359.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the CSC usurped the legislative functions of Congress when it abolished CESB,
an office created by law, through the issuance of CSC Resolution No. 93-4359

HELD:

YES. The controlling fact is that the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was created in the
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1 on September 1, 1974 which adopted the Integrated Plan. It cannot be
disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature.
This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily
a legislative function. Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the creation of public
offices is primarily a legislative function. In so far as the legislative power in this respect is not
restricted by constitutional provisions, it supreme, and the legislature may decide for itself what offices
are suitable, necessary, or convenient. When in the exigencies of government it is necessary to create
and define duties, the legislative department has the discretion to determine whether additional offices
shall be created, or whether these duties shall be attached to and become ex-officio duties of existing
offices. An office created by the legislature is wholly within the power of that body, and it may
prescribe the mode of filling the office and the powers and duties of the incumbent, and if it sees fit,
abolish the office. In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the
abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the
legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CESB. Respondent Commission's power to
reorganize is limited to offices under its control. From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an
autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by
the Reorganization Committee "the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of
building up executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive outlook." The essential
autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent Commission. By said
attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of respondent Commission. Under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government
agency to another is to attain "policy and program coordination." RATIO: Attachment. — (a) This
refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and attached agency or
corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished
by having the department represented in the governing board of the attached agency or corporation,
either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter;
having the attached corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall
reflect the progress of programs and projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide
general policies through its representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the
internal policies of the attached corporation or agency.

THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE V. COURT OF APPEALS

GR. NO. 83578, MARCH 16, 1989

Facts:

On March 12, 1985, State Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales, who is assigned with the Presidential
Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force hereinafter referred to as PADS Task Force for purposes of
convenience, issued search warrants Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160 and 161 against the petitioners
Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc., P & B Enterprises Co., Inc., Philippine Veterans Corporation,
Philippine Veterans Development Corporation, Philippine Construction Development Corporation,
Philippine Lauan Industries Corporation, Inter-trade Development (Alvin Aquino), Amelili U.
Malaquiok Enterprises and Jaime P. Lucman Enterprises.

The application for the issuance of said search warrants was filed by Atty. Napoleon Gatmaytan
of the Bureau of Customs who is a deputized member of the PADS Task Force. Attached to the said
application is the affidavit of Josefin M. Castro who is an operative and investigator of the PADS Task
Force.

Shortly thereafter, the private respondent (the petitioner below) went to the RTC on a petition to
enjoin the implementation of the search warrants in question. On March 13, 1985, the trial court issued
a temporary restraining order effective "for a period of five (5) days’ notice" and set the case for
hearing.

In disposing of the petition, the said court found the material issues to be:

1) Competency of this Court to act on petition filed by the petitioners;

2) Validity of the search warrants issued by respondent State Prosecutor;
3) Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic because all the search warrants sought
to be quashed had already been implemented and executed.

On April 16, 1985, the lower court issued the first of its challenged Orders, and held that the
Search Warrants are null and void.

The PADS Task Force went to the respondent Court of Appeals to contest, on certiorari, the
twin Order(s) of the lower court. In ruling initially for the Task Force, the Appellate Court held: (1)
Herein petitioner is a special quasi-judicial body with express powers enumerated under PD 1936 to
prosecute foreign exchange violations defined and punished under P.D. No. 1883; (2) The petitioner, in
exercising its quasi-judicial powers, ranks with the Regional Trial Courts, and the latter in the case at
bar had no jurisdiction to declare the search warrants in question null and void; (3) Besides as correctly
pointed out by the Assistant Solicitor General the decision of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task
Force is appealable to the Office of the President.

On November 12, 1986, Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc. sought a reconsideration. The Court
of Appeals, on Karamfil's motion, reversed itself and issued its Resolution, dated September 1987, and
subsequently, its Resolution, dated May 20, 1988, denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Issue/s:

(iv)Is the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force a quasi-judicial body, and one co-equal in rank
and standing with the Regional Trial Court, and accordingly, beyond the latter's jurisdiction; and

(v) May the said presidential body be said to be "such other responsible officer as may be authorized
by law" to issue search warrants under the 1973 Constitution

Ruling:

Petition is DISMISSED.
(vi)This Court finds the Appellate Court to be in error, since what the petitioner puts to question is the
Regional Trial Court's act of assuming jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition below and
its subsequent countermand of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's orders of search
and seizure, for the reason that the presidential body, as an entity (allegedly) coordinate and co-
equal with the Regional Trial Court, was (is) not vested with such a jurisdiction. An examination of
the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's petition shows indeed its recognition of judicial
review (of the acts of Government) as a basic privilege of the courts. Its objection, precisely, is
whether it is the Regional Trial Court, or the superior courts, that may undertake such a review.

As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain administrative bodies
to the Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts, in
terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter.

A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and other
than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule
making.” As may be seen, it is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate claims and/or to
determine rights, and unless its decision is seasonably appealed to the proper reviewing authorities,
the same attain finality and become executory. A perusal of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting
Task Force's organic act, Presidential Decree No. 1936, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
2002, convinces the Court that the Task Force was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions,
that is, to try and decide claims and execute its judgments. As the President's arm called upon to
combat the vice of "dollar salting" or the black-marketing and salting of foreign exchange, it is
tasked alone by the Decree to handle the prosecution of such activities, but nothing more. Sec. 1 of
PD 1936 will reveal a legislative intendment to confer it with quasi-judicial responsibilities relative
to offenses punished by Presidential Decree No. 1883. Its undertaking, as we said, is simply, to
determine whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the filing of charges with the proper
court, meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry preliminary to a judicial recourse, and to recommend
action "of appropriate authorities”.
If the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is not, hence, a quasi-judicial body, it cannot be
said to be co-equal or coordinate with the Regional Trial Court. There is nothing in its enabling
statutes that would demonstrate its standing at par with the said court. In that respect, we do not find
error in the respondent Court of Appeal's resolution sustaining the assumption of jurisdiction by the
court a quo.

(vii) We agree that the PADS Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers,
and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence
of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally
interested in the success of his case. Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not
necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused," he stands, invariably, as the accused's
adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is
to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes, to our mind and
to that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002,
unconstitutional.

It is our ruling, thus, that when the 1973 Constitution spoke of "responsible officer" to whom the
authority to issue arrest and search warrants may be delegated by legislation, it did not furnish the
legislator with the license to give that authority to whomsoever it pleased. It is to be noted that the
Charter itself makes the qualification that the officer himself must be "responsible". We are not
saying, of course, that the PADS Task Force (or any similar prosecutor) is or has been irresponsible
 in discharging its duty. Rather, we take "responsibility", as used by the Constitution, to mean not
only skill and competence but more significantly, neutrality and independence comparable to the
impartiality presumed of a judicial officer. A prosecutor can in no manner be said to be possessed
of the latter qualities.

DE LA LLANA v. ALBA
G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982

FACTS:

Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled "An Act
Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefore and for other Purposes," the same being
contrary to the security of tenure provision of the Constitution as it separates from the judiciary Justices
and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts except the occupants
of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established
by such Act. They likewise impute lack of good faith in its enactment and characterize as undue
delegation of legislative power to the President his authority to fix the compensation and allowances of
the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when the reorganization
shall be deemed completed. The Solicitor General maintains that there is no valid justification for the
attack on the constitutionality of the statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the power vested in the
Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the allegations of absence of good faith as well as the
attack on the independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and devoid of any support in law

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices and judges as
provided for under the Constitution.

2. Whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President giving him
authority to fix the compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed
and the determination of the date when the reorganization shall be deemed completed
HELD:

1. No. The reorganization is not unconstitutional.

What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and justices from
their services. What is important is the validity of the abolition of their offices.

Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of
its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There
can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case
of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that
 sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure
does not arise.

2. No. There is no undue delegation.

The basic postulate that underlies the doctrine of non-delegation is that it is the legislative body
which is entrusted with the competence to make laws and to alter and repeal them, the test being
the completeness of the statue in all its terms and provisions when enacted.

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very
least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental
policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public
agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the
executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied.
If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to
be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act
considered as a whole." 89 The undeniably strong links that bind the executive and legislative
departments under the amended Constitution assure that the framing of policies as well as their
implementation can be accomplished with unity, promptitude, and efficiency.

They ignore the categorical language of this provision: "The Supreme Court shall submit to the
President, within thirty (30) days from the date of the effectivity of this act, a staffing pattern
for all courts constituted pursuant to this Act which shall be the basis of the implementing order
to be issued by the President in accordance with the immediately succeeding section." 93 The
first sentence of the next section is even more categorical: "The provisions of this Act shall be
immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President."
94 Certainly petitioners cannot be heard to argue that the President is insensible to his
constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 95 In the meanwhile, the
existing inferior courts affected continue functioning as before, "until the completion of the
reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said
courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold
office." 96 There is no ambiguity. The incumbents of the courts thus automatically abolished
"shall cease to hold office." No fear need be entertained by incumbents whose length of service,
quality of performance, and clean record justify their being named anew, 97 in legal
contemplation without any interruption in the continuity of their service.

There is accordingly more receptivity to laws leaving to administrative and executive agencies
the adoption of such means as may be necessary to effectuate a valid legislative purpose.
 LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC. VS. JOSE PAÑO, ET. AL., G.R. NO. L-27811, 27
NOVEMBER 1967

Facts:

In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture land
situated in Davao. On 1953, Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a portion of the above public
land to the plaintiff. It was on year 1955, when Jose Paño and nineteen other claimants applied for the
purchase of 90 hectares of the released area. Plaintiff in turn filed its own sales application covering
the entire released area. The Director of Lands, following an investigation of the conflict, rendered a
decision on 1956 giving due course to the application of plaintiff corporation. When the case was
elevated to the President of the Philippines, Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, by authority of the
president, declared that it would be for public interest that appellants, who are mostly landless farmers,
be allocated that portion on which the petitioner have made improvements.

Issue:

Whether or not the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, may reverse a
decision of the Director of Lands that had been affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.

Ruling:

YES. The President’s duty to execute the law and control of all executive departments are of
constitutional origin. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go
over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. It may also be stated
that the right to appeal to the President reposes upon the President’s power of control over the
executive departments. He may delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does
not command that he perform in person. As the Executive Secretary acts by authority of the President,
his decision is that of the President’s. Such decision is to be given full faith and credit by our courts,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive.

MEDALLA vs. SAYO

103 SCRA 587

FACTS:

Dr. Medalla is the Chief of Clinics of Caloocan City General Hospital and respondent Dr.
Mackay was the Resident Physician thereat.
 When the position of Assistant, hospital Administrator became vacant, former Mayor Fider
designated and subsequently appointed Dr. Mackay. Dr. Medalla protested alleging he was next-in-
rank. Then acting Mayor Robles who succeeded Mayor Fider sustained Mackay’s appointment.

Medalla elevated his case to the Civil Service Commisssion on appeal. On December 29, 1978,
the Civil Service Merit Systems Board sustained Medalla's appeal and revoked Mackay's appointment
as Assistant Hospital Administrator.

Upon automatic review by the Office of the President, Dr. Mackay’s appointment was revoked
and the position was awarded to Dr. Medalla. The Acting City Mayor, on behalf of Mackay, moved for
reconsideration. Totally disregarding the Decision of the Office of the President, the same Acting City
Mayor appointed Mackay, this time as Hospital Administrator, and designated Dr. Tantoco as his
Assistant, thereby again completely bypassing Medalla. The Civil Service Commission disapproved
Mackay's appointment. The City Mayor invoked the privileged of an appointing authority to determine
who can best fulfill the functions of an office. As to his readiness to issue an appointment to Medalla,
he manifested his preference to withhold action pending Mackay’s unresolved Motion for
Reconsideration.

Petitioner Medalla submits that the Trial Court erred in not dismissing Mackay’s Petition before
it, there being a clear showing of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, and that said Court was
devoid of jurisdiction in reviewing on Certiorari deciosions of the Office of the President and of the
Civil Service Commission rendered in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions.

ISSUE:

W/n the appointment of Dr. Mackay is valid.

HELD:

No. Under the Revised Charter of the City of Caloocan RA 5502, it is clear that the power of
appointment by the City Mayor of heads of offices entirely paid out of city funds is subject to Civil
Service law, rules and regulations. The Caloocan City General Hospital is one of the city departments
provided for in the said law. The Hospital Administrator is the head of the City General hospital
empowered to administer, direct and coordinate all activities of the hospital to carry out its objectives
as to the care of the sick and the injured. Under PD 807 (Civil Service Decree) the recruitment or
selection of employees for promotions is drawn from the next-in-rank.

Lianga Bay Logging, Co., Inc. vs. J. Manuel Lopez Enage and Ago Timber Corp.

G.R. No. L-30637

July 16, 1987

FACTS:
 Lianga Bay Logging Co. and Ago Timber Corp., are both forest concessionaries whose licensed
areas are adjacent to each other. Since the concessions of petitioner and respondent are adjacent to each
other, they have a common boundary-the Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary-whereby the eastern
boundary of respondent Ago's concession is petitioner Lianga's western boundary. Because of reports
of encroachment by both parties on each other's concession areas, the Director of Forestry ordered a
survey to establish on the ground the common boundary of their respective concession areas. The
Director of Forestry ruled in favor of Lianga Bay Logging Co. The Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, on appeal, reversed the Director of Forestry. Lianga Bay Co., appealed to the Office
of the President who affirmed the ruling of the SENR. However, upon Motion for Reconsideration, the
OP issued another decision reversing its first ruling and affirming the Director of Forestry. Ago Timber
then commenced an action before the CFI of Agusan Branch II against Lianga Bay Logging Co, the
Director of Forestry, the SENR, and AES Leido and Duavit. Lianga Bay moved to dismiss the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction and cause of action which the lower court denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

WON the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the case
notwithstanding the rulings already issued by the administrative agencies concerned.

RULING:

YES. It is abundantly clear that respondent court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
Civil Case No. 1253 of the Court of First Instance of Agusan nor has it jurisdiction to decide on the
common boundary of the licensed areas of petitioner Lianga and respondent Ago, as determined by
respondents public officials against whom no case of grave abuse of discretion has been made. Absent
a cause of action and jurisdiction, respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and excess, if
not lack, of jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss the case under review and in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the final decision dated August 9, 1968 and the
order affirming the same dated October 2, 1968 of the Office of the President.

A doctrine long recognized is that where the law confines in an administrative office the power
to determine particular questions or matters, upon the facts to be presented, the jurisdiction of such
office shall prevail over the courts.

In giving due course to the complaint, the respondent court would necessarily have to assess
and evaluate anew all the evidence presented in the administrative proceedings, which is beyond its
competence and jurisdiction.

Hence, such a posture cannot be entertained, for it is a well-settled doctrine that the courts of
justice will generally not interfere with purely administrative matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies and their expertise unless there is a clear showing that the latter
acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when they have acted in a capricious and
whimsical manner such that their action may amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.

TIO VS VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD

 151 SCRA 80 GR. No. L-75697, June 18, 1987

FACTS:

Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board” with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The
Presidential Decree was also reinforced by Presidential Decree 1994 which amended the National
Internal Revenue Code.

The amendment provides that “there shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready
for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, that locally manufactured or
imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.”

The said law was brought about by the need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse
effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened the revenue
being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be
taxed. Sec10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs. Tio countered,
among others, that the tax imposition provision is a rider and is not germane to the subject matter of the
PD.PD 1994 issued a month thereafter reinforced PD 1987 and in effect amended the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC).Petitioner's attack on the constitutionality of the DECREE on the ground that
there is undue delegation of power and authority.

ISSUE

Whether or not the PD 1987 is unconstitutional due to the tax provision included.

HELD
No.

The title of the decree, which calls for the creation of the VRB is comprehensive enough to
include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covered in all its provisions. It is
unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the
decree. The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the general object of the decree, which is the regulation of the video industry
through the VRB as expressed in its title.

The tax provision is not inconsistent with nor foreign to the general subject and title. As a tool
for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout
the decree.The express purpose of PD 1987 to include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate
and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videos is evident from Preambles 2 and 5.
Those preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the measure. Neither can it be
successfully argued that the DECREE contains an undue delegation of legislative power.The grant in
Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to the BOARD to "solicit the direct assistance of other
agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or
personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is not a
delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its
execution, enforcement, and implementation.
 "The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to
be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid
objection can be made."

RABOR VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Summary:

Rabor, upon reaching the age of 68 years old, was advised to retire from work. Since he was
short of 2 years for the 15 year service requirement, he asked for an extension to be able to avail of the
retirement benefits. CSC denied his request. Rabor went to SC, invoking the ruling in Cena v CSC
which declared that the extension limit of only 1 year under MC 27 is invalid. SC modified Cena and
upheld the validity of MC 27 (1 year extension limit). All that may be reasonably demanded is a
showing that the delegated legislation consisting of administrative regulations are germane to the
general purposes projected by the governing or enabling statute

Doctrine:

All that may be reasonably demanded is a showing that the delegated legislation consisting of
administrative regulations are germane to the general purposes projected by the governing or enabling
statute.

Facts:

 Rabor, a Utility Worker in the Office of the Mayor in Davao City, reached the age of 68 years
and 7 months, with thirteen 13 years and 1 month of government service.
 He was advised to apply for retirement.
 Rabor presented a Certificate of Membership from GSIS, indicating that his “service [is]
extended to comply [with] 15 years service [requirement to be able to avail of the full benefits
of retirement law, Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146[1]].”
 The Director of CSC Region XI told Rabor that such extension was contrary to M.C. No.
65 [2]of the Office of the President. Consequently, Mayor Duterte sent a letter to Rabor asking
him to stop reporting to work.
 Rabor sent a letter to the Director of CSC R-XI asking for extension; request denied. Rabor
sought reconsideration by invoking a ruling in Cena v CSC; still denied
 Rabor went to SC averring that he was entitled to an extension of 3 years, 3 months and 24 days
to complete the fifteenyear service requirement, invoking as basis for his extension the ruling in
Cena v CSC.
o Cena v CSC: Court held that a government employee who has reached the compulsory
retirement age of sixtyfive (65) years, but at the same time has not yet completed fifteen
(15) years of government service required under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 to
qualify for the OldAge Pension Benefit, may be granted an extension of his government
service for such period of time as may be necessary to “fillup” or comply with the
fifteen (15)year service requirement.
 o Considered as invalid Memorandum Circular 27 as invalid for having no connection
with PD 1146
 SolGen stressed that in Cena, SC ruled that the employer agency, the Land Registration
Authority of the Department of Justice, was vested with discretion to grant to Cena the
extension requested by him. The Land Registration Authority had chosen not to exercise its
discretion to grant or deny such extension. In contrast, in the instant case, the Davao City
Government did exercise its discretion on the matter and decided to deny the extension sought
by petitioner Rabor for legitimate reasons.
 SC re-examined the doctrine laid out in Cena

[1] “Sec. 11. Conditions for OldAge Pension.—(a) OldAge Pension shall be paid to a member who has
at least fifteen (15) years of service is at least sixty (60) years of age and is separated from the service.

unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be compulsory for an
employee at sixtyfive (65) years of age with at least fifteen (15) years of service Provided, that if he has
less than fifteen (15) years of service, he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the
fifteen (15) years.”

[2] ‘Officials and employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years shall not be
retained in the service, except for extremely meritorious reasons in which case the retention shall not
exceed six (6) months.’

ISSUE

WON Civil Service Commission’s promulgation of MC 27 was within its authority. –

YES.

Section 12 of Civil Service Law provides for its powers and functions. Given this, the
Commission was acting as “the central personnel agency of the government empowered to
promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for efficient, responsive and effective personnel
administration in the government.”

It was also discharging its function of “administering the retirement program for government
officials and employees” and of “evaluat[ing] qualifications for retirement.”

Conclusion:

That the doctrine of Cena should be and is hereby modified to this extent: that Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, more specifically paragraph (1) thereof, is hereby
declared valid and effective. Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 must, accordingly, be read together
with Memorandum Circular No. 27. We reiterate, however, the holding in Cena that the head of
the government agency concerned is vested with discretionary authority to allow or disallow
extension of the service of an official or employee who has reached sixty five (65) years of age
without completing fifteen (15) years of government service; this discretion is, nevertheless, to be
exercised conformably with the provisions of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series
of 1990.

Dispositive:
 DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Philippine Airlines vs. Civil Aeronautics Board

G.R. No. 119528, March 26, 1997

Facts: 

Grand Air applied for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity with the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB). The Chief Hearing Officer issued a notice of hearing directing Grand Air to
serve a copy of the application and notice to all scheduled Philippine Domestic operators. Grand Air
filed its compliance and requested for a Temporary Operating Permit (TOP). PAL filed an opposition
to the application on the ground that the CAB had no jurisdiction to hear the application until Grand
Air first obtains a franchise to operate from Congress. The Chief Hearing Officer denied the opposition
and the CAB approved the issuance of the TOP for a period of 3 months. The opposition for the TOP
was likewise denied. The CAB justified its assumption of jurisdiction over Grand Air’s application on
the basis of Republic Act 776 which gives it the specific power to issue any TOP or Certificate of
Public Convenience and Necessity. 

Issue: 

Whether or not the CAB can issue a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity or TOP
even though the prospective operator does not have a legislative franchise.

Held: 

Yes, as mentioned by the CAB, it is duly authorized to do so under Republic Act 776 and a
legislative franchise is not necessary before it may do so, since Congress has delegated the authority to
authorize the operation of domestic air transport services to the CAB, an administrative agency. The
delegation of such authority is not without limits since Congress had set specific standard and
limitations on how such authority should be exercised. 

Public convenience and necessity exists when the proposed facility will meet a reasonable want
of the public and supply a need which the existing facilities do not adequately afford. 

Thus, the Board should be allowed to continue hearing the application, since it has jurisdiction
over it provided that the applicant meets all the requirements of the law.

US vs Ang Tang Ho
GR No 17122

Facts
 The Philippine Legislatire passed Act No 2869. “An Act penalizing and holding of palay, rice, and corn
under extraordinary circumstances. Regulating the distribution and sales thereof, and authorizing the
Governor-General to issue the necessary rules and regulations thereof”.
The Governor-General issued EO53 fixing the price at which rice should be sold. Ang Tang Ho found
guilty of violating EO53 by selling rice at a price higher than what is set by EO EO53. He contested the
validity of the EO.

Issue
Whether Act 2068 invalidly delegate legislative power to the Gov-Gen.

Ruling
Yes.
When Act 2868 left the legislative branch , it should have been completed in all its terms and provision
and nothing is left to the judgment of the delegate of the legislative.
By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and
enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote of the people of the
Philippine Islands. As to the question here involved, the authority of the Governor-General to fix the
maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be sold in the manner power in violation of the
organic law.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the defendant is discharged.

Y N O T V. I A C | P O W E R S O F A D M I N I T R AT I V E   A G E N C I E S

G.R. No. 74457, 148 SCRA 659, March 20, 1987

FACTS:
 Pres. Marcos issued EO 626-A to strengthen EO 626, which prohibits the interprovincial movement
of carabaos.
 Ynot transported 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they were confiscated by
the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. Ynot sued for recovery, and the Iloilo’s RTC
issued a writ of replevin.
 After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation. The court also declined
to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for 1) lack of
authority and 2) EO’s presumed validity. (Later affirmed by IAC)
ISSUE: Whether EO 626-A is constitutional. – NO.
RULING:
EO 626-A did not pass the lawful means test. (Sufficient Standard Test)
 To strengthen the original measure, EO 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the
carabaos but on their movement, providing that “no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another.” The
object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and
the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
 We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one
 province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their
slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them
there.
 The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by
the executive authorities, usually the police only.
 In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and
imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the
challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is
immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the
government.
 In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander,
were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a
supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the
carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the
petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old
guaranty of elementary fair play.
 In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner’s
peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their
instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order
should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights
safeguarded to him under the Constitution.
 Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, EO 626-A is penal in nature, the violation
thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone
would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of
the accused.
 The phrase “may see fit” is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is.
It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One
searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the
limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution.

G.R. No. L-23825      December 24, 1965

EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner, vs. THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:

Facts:

The President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three
(33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the
Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and
agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive
orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.

Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section
68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1, 1960 and constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370,
reads: “Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under
the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.”

Issues:

Whether or not Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code constitutes an undue delegation of

legislative power.

Ruling:

Yes.

Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.

The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the
exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power
is denied  by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With
respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking
whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory
enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its
officers act within the scope of their authority.

It did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers. The alleged power of the President to
create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even
greater than that of control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other
words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the
constitutional mandate. Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than that
vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does
the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he
has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.