Constitutional Provisions
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three
Preamble: We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of
Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and
establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations,
promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony,
and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of
independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of
truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and
promulgate this Constitution.
Article 1: National Territory
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all
the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories
over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting
of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial
sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the
islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.
CASE: Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, 16 August 2011
FACTS: Congress passed RA 3046 in 1961 demarcating the
maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State, This
is pursuant to the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 UNCLOS I and UNCLOS II.
RA 5446 was passed to correct the typo errors under RA 3046 and
included reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North
Borneo. In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting
RA 9522, to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the
UNCLOS III, which the Philippines ratified.
The requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to
optimize the location of some basepoints and classify the Kalayaan
Island Group (KIG) and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’.
main reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;
2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes
passages hence undermining our sovereignty and security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would
weaken our claim over those territories, thus may not only result
in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the
livelihood of subsistence fishermen
ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act 9522 is unconstitutional as it
reduces the Philippine Maritime Territory.
HELD: No. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an
archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of
internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its
maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe
for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the
seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the
waters and submarine areas around our archipelago; and second,
it weakens the country’s case in any international dispute over
Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress
wisely avoided.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory.
It is a multilateral treaty regulating sea-use rights over maritime
zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the
baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines],
exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]),
and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.
UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations
among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the
conduct of States in the world’s oceans and submarine areas,
recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’ graduated authority
over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their
 R.A. No. 9522
coasts.
Article II: Declaration of Principles and State
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted
International environmental commitments (Sections 2, 7)
by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along
their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or
Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the
national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity
clearer:
with all nations.
“Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the
Section 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental
its relations with other states, the paramount consideration shall be
shelf. – The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the
national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be
right to self-determination.
measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with
article 47. (Emphasis supplied)”
Right to health (Section 15)
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health
UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of
of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives
notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of
Right to a balanced ecology (Section 16)
the maritime space and submarine areas within which States
parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of
Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the
sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the
rhythm and harmony of nature.
contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and
non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56)
CASE: Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993
and continental shelf (Article 77).

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the
Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA
9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the
breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf.
RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the
Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the
Constitution and our national interest.
FACTS: The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented
and joined by their parents. The first complaint was filed as a
taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of
the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against
defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged
that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the
natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical
forests. They further assert that they represent their generation as
well as generations yet unborn and assert that continued
deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the
ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
respondent, his agents, representatives and other persons acting
in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA)
in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint had no cause of action against him and
that it raises a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that
granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for
certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set aside the
dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge
gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the
impairment of contracts.
HELD: First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their
complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent
Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not
agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal
right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is
incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said
right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the
environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious
management and conservation of the country's forests.
Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the
primary government agency responsible for the governing and
supervising the exploration, utilization, development and
conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy
declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV
Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and
Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will
serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined the
powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, the right of the
petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and
healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and
advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the
correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect or respect the
same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the
granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse
of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful
ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further
TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court
finds it to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed
violation of their rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution
provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme
Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the
decision of the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts
as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.
The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an
instrument by which the state regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due
process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be
invoked. It can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public
interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license
does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or
property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of
obligations of contract is limit by the exercise by the police power
of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and
general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to
the police power of the State.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby
GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.
CASE: Resident Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon
Strait v. Reyes, G.R. No. 189771, 21 April 2015
FACTS: June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting
through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and
Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract
involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait.
May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and
around the Tañon Strait. A multi-channel sub-bottom profiling
covering approximately 751 kilometers was also done to determine
the area's underwater composition.
January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board of the
Tañon Strait (PAMB-Tañon Strait) issued Resolution No. 2007-001,
wherein it adopted the Initial Environmental Examination (IEE)
commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably recommended the approval
of JAPEX's application for an ECC.
March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to
the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas exploration project
in Tañon Strait. Months later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX began
to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near
Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province. This drilling
lasted until February 8, 2008.
Petitioners then applied to this Court for redress, via two separate
original petitions both dated December 17, 2007, wherein they
commonly seek that respondents be enjoined from implementing
SC-46 for, among others, violation of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the service contract is prohibited on the
ground that there is no general law prescribing the standard or
uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for service contracts
involving oil exploration and extraction.
HELD: No, the disposition, exploration, development, exploitation,
and utilization of indigenous petroleum in the Philippines are
governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and
Development Act of 1972. This was enacted by then President
Ferdinand Marcos to promote the discovery and production of
indigenous petroleum through the utilization of government and/or
local or foreign private resources to yield the maximum benefit to
the Filipino people and the revenues to the Philippine Government.
Contrary to the petitioners' argument, Presidential Decree No. 87,
although enacted in 1972, before the adoption of the 1987
Constitution, remains to be a valid law unless otherwise repealed.
Moreover, in cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with
the Constitution, but a construction that it is in harmony with the
Constitution is also possible, that construction should be preferred.
This Court, in Pangandaman v. Commission on Elections
expounding on this point, pronounced: It is a basic precept in
statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in
harmony with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the
letter of the law determines its construction; for that reason, a
statute must be read according to its spirit and intent.
Note that while Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the
general law upon which a service contract for petroleum
exploration and extraction may be authorized, as will be discussed
below, the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in
the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by
Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area.
CASE: Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 120865-71, 7 December 1995
FACTS: On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of
Our Lady of Lourdes Parish,Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed
a letter-complaint with the Laguna LakeDevelopment Authority
seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage
dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to
its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the
possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding
area.
The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City
Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the
Camarin area without first securing an EnvironmentalCompliance
Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau
(EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
as required under Presidential DecreeNo. 1586, and clearance
from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927,
series of 1983.
The LLDA found that the water collected from the leachate and
the receiving streams could considerably affect the quality, in turn,
of the receiving waters since it indicates the presence of bacteria,
other than coliform, which may have contaminated the sample
during collection or handling.
On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order
ordering the CityGovernment of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila
Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to completely halt,
stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and
other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite
On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the
Philippine National Police,enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order
by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala
Estate, Camarin area being utilized as a dumpsite
The City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City an action for the declaration of nullity of
the cease and desist order
In its complaint, the City Government of Caloocan sought to be
declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the health
and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to
a balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction
RTC: On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after
hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in the consolidated cases an
order denying LLDA's motion to dismiss and granting the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the LLDA, its agent
and all persons acting for and on its behalf, from enforcing or
implementing its cease and desist order which prevents plaintiff
City of Caloocan from dumping garbage at the Camarin dumpsite
during the pendency of this case and/or until further orders of the
court
CA: On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
decision holding that: (1) the Regional Trial Court has no
jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and decide the action for
annulment of LLDA's cease and desist order, including the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in
relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is within the exclusive and
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9,
par.(3), of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna Lake
Development Authority has no power and authority to issue a
cease and desist order under its enabling law, Republic Act No.
4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive OrderNo. 927,
series of 1983.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the LLDA has the authority to entertain
the complaint against the dumping of garbage in the open
dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City
Government of Caloocan which is allegedly endangering
the health, safety, and welfare of the resident therein and
the sanitation and quality of the water in the area brought
about by exposure to pollution caused by such open
garbage dumpsite
2. Whether or not the LLDA has the power and authority to
issue a "cease and desist" order under Republic Act No.
4850 and its amendatory laws.
HELD: 1. Yes. As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution
cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB),
except in cases where the special law provides for another forum.
It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a
specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and
make effective the declared national policy of promoting and
accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna
Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and
the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with
due regard and adequate provisions for environmental
management and control, preservation of the quality of human life
and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological
disturbances, deterioration and pollution.
Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by
virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to
protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake Region from the
deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of
wastes from the surrounding areas.
In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is
mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove
all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government
offices/agencies within the region, public corporations, and private
persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or
projects are related to those of the LLDAfor the development of
the region.
2. Yes. By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended
by P.D. No. 813 and ExecutiveOrder No. 927, series of 1983,
authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the
discontinuance or pollution." (Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par.
(d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be
necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to
issue an ex-parte cease and desist order" in a language, as
suggested by the City Government of Caloocan, similar to the
express grant to the defunct National Pollution Control Commission
under Section 7 of P.D.No. 984 which, admittedly was not
reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983.
However, it would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion
that there is a denial of the power to issue the order in question
when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the
discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed
upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.
The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of
protecting vital public interests" gives vitality to the statement on
ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies or the 1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which
provides:The State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.
As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries
the correlative duty of non-impairment. This is but in consonance
with the declared policy of the state "to protect and promote the
right to health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them."It is to be borne in mind that the Philippines is party
to the Universal Declaration of HumanRights and the Alma
Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a
fundamental human right.
CASE: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v.
Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. No. 171947-48, 18
December 2008
FACTS: Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC in Imus,
Cavite against several government agencies, among them the
petitioners, for the clean-up, rehabilitation, and protection of the
Manila Bay. The complaint alleged that the water quality of the
Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by
law,specifically the Philippine Environment Code or Presidential
Decree (PD) 1152. As plaintiffs a quo, respondents prayed that
petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the
RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose. The RTC
ruled in the respondents’ favor.
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
Department of Public Works andHighways (DPWH), Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast
Guard(PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and
five (5) other executive departments and agencies filed directly
with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45.
Petitioners were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent
provisions of the Environment Code relate only to the cleaning of
specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general.
Apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds appropriated
for cleaning purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning
of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled
by mandamus.
The CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of the
RTC in toto, stressing that the trial court decision did not require
petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under
existing laws. Thus, the Manila Bay Advisory Committee was
created to receive and evaluate the quarterly progressive reports
on the activities undertaken by the agencies in accordance with
said decision and to monitor the execution phase. In the absence
of specific completion periods, the Committee recommended that
time frames be set for the agencies to perform their assigned
tasks.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioners can be compelled by
mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the bay
2. Whether or not PD 1152 includes a cleanup in general or
is it limited only to the clean-up of specific pollution
incidents
3. Whether or not the recommendation by the Committee is
an encroachment over the powers and functions of the
Executive Branch
HELD: 1. YES. Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to
require the execution of a ministerial duty. A ministerial duty
is one that requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
judgment. It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the
discretion of the person executing it. It is a simple,definite duty
arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed
by law.
Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters
involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or
discretion one way or the other.
While the implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks may
entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or
the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial
in nature and may be compelled by mandamus.
In the instant case, the MMDA’s duty to put up an adequate and
appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste & liquid disposal as
well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial,
its duty being a statutory imposition. Such duty is spelled out in
Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA.
The MMDA’s duty in the area of waste disposal, in this regard, is
set forth not only in the PD1152 and Ecological Solid Waste
Management Act (RA 9003), but in its charter as well.
concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment,
removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident
occurs.
The underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not
conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident. Even
assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically
prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, the same and their
representatives cannot escape their obligation to future
generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean
and clear as humanly as possible.
3. NO. The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is
simply an exercise of judicial power under Art. VIII of the
Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but an
integral part of the adjudicative function of the Court.
While additional activities are required of the agencies like
submission of plans of action, data or status reports, these
directives are but part and parcel of the execution stage of a final
decision under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be In view thereof, the Supreme Court affirmed with modifications
characterized as discretionary fordiscretion presupposes the power incorporating subsequent developments or supervening events the
or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially ruling of CA.
according to their judgment or conscience. A discretionary duty is
one that allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to
Article XII: National Economy and Patrimony
perform or not to perform. Any suggestion that the MMDA has the
option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposal-related
Section 2. Regalian Doctrine:
duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.
All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters or enabling
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
statutes and pertinent laws would yield the conclusion that these
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory
owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all
obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or
other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
indirectly to the clean-up,rehabilitation, protection, and
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the
preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing
full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
not to perform these duties.
undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint
venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
2. The PD does not in any way state that the government agencies
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be
provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water
power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic
waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its
use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural
resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming,
with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers,
lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and
conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the
economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of
local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered
into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its
execution.
CASE: Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal
Bay Development Corporation, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002
FACTS: On November 20, 1973, the government, through the
Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines
("CDCP" for brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore
areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of
Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated
itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of
the total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked
PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas,"
and "to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds
of lands."1 On the same date, then President Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands
reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under
the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project
(MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a
memorandum directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so
that "[A]ll future works in MCCRRP shall be funded and owned by
PEA.” Accordingly, PEA and CDCP executed a Memorandum of
Agreement dated December 29, 1981.
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Special Patent No. 351, granting and transferring to PEA "the
parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road
and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one
million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four
(1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the
Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of
PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom
Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road, Parañaque City. The Freedom Islands have a total
land area of One Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand
Four Hundred and Forty One (1,578,441) square meters or
157.841 hectares.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement
("JVA" for brevity) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop
the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an
additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these
islands to complete the configuration in the Master Development
Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and
AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public
bidding. On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its
Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. On June 8, 1995, then
President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben
Torres, approved the JVA.
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda
delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA
as the "grandmother of all scams." As a result, the Senate
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises,
and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The Senate
Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate
Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997. Among the
conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks
to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain
which the government has not classified as alienable lands and
therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of
title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA
itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task
Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of
Senate Committee Report No. 560. The members of the Legal
Task Force were the Secretary of Justice, the Chief Presidential
Legal Counsel, and the Government Corporate Counsel. The Legal
Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the
conclusions reached by the Senate Committees.
On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today
published reports that there were on-going renegotiations
between PEA and AMARI under an order issued by then President
Fidel V. Ramos. According to these reports, PEA Director Nestor
Kalaw, PEA Chairman Arsenio Yulo and retired Navy Officer Sergio
Cruz composed the negotiating panel of PEA.
On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a
Petition for Prohibition with Application for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction docketed
as G.R. No. 132994 seeking to nullify the JVA. The Court dismissed
the petition "for unwarranted disregard of judicial hierarchy,
without prejudice to the refiling of the case before the proper
court."
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for
brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the government
stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed
lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the
terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article
II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right
of the people to information on matters of public concern.
Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain
as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public
domain to private corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts that he
seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of the
State that are of public dominion.
On December 28, 1998, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion: (a) to
require PEA to submit the terms of the renegotiated PEA-AMARI
contract; (b) for issuance of a temporary restraining order; and (c)
to set the case for hearing on oral argument. Petitioner filed a
Reiterative Motion for Issuance of a TRO dated May 26, 1999,
which the Court denied in a Resolution dated June 22, 1999.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint
Venture Agreement ("Amended JVA," for brevity). On May 28,
1999, the Office of the President under the administration of then
President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended JVA.
ISSUES: (a) Whether principal relief prayed for in the petition are
moot and academic because of subsequent events;
(b) Whether the petition merits dismissal for failing to observe the
principle governing the hierarchy of court;
(c) Whether the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies;
(d) Whether petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit;
(e) Whether the constitutional right to information includes official
information on on-going negotiations before a final agreement;
(f) Whether the stipulations in the amended joint venture
agreement for the transfer to Amari of certain lands, reclaimed
and still to be reclaimed, violate the 1987 Constitution; and
(g) Whether the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of
whether the amended joint venture agreement is grossly
disadvantageous to the government.
HELD: On the first issue, the Court has ruled that the signing of
the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval by the
President cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the Court
of its jurisdiction. PEA and AMARI have still to implement the
Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended
JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its
implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have signed
one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioner's principal basis in
assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its violation of Section 3,
Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the government
from alienating lands of the public domain to private corporations.
If the Amended JVA indeed violates the Constitution, it is the duty
of the Court to enjoin its implementation, and if already
implemented, to annul the effects of such unconstitutional
contract.
On the second issue, the Court cannot entertain cases involving
factual issues. The instant case, however, raises constitutional
issues of transcendental importance to the public.22 The Court
can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related
to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus
which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise
primary jurisdiction over the instant case.
On the third issue, PEA claims petitioner's direct resort to the
Court violates the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. It also violates the rule that mandamus may issue only
if there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Hence, The principal issue in the instant
case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in view
of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the
public domain to private corporations. We rule that the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in the
instant case.
On the fourth issue, the rule that since the instant petition,
brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional
rights - to information and to the equitable diffusion of natural
resources - matters of transcendental public importance, the
petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
On the fifth issue, Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains
the people's right to information on matters of public concern. The
court has held that the constitutional right to information includes
official information on on-going negotiations before a final
contract. The information, however, must constitute definite
propositions by the government and should not cover recognized
exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic
secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public
order.40 Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the
right to information in several legislations.
On the sixth issue, the Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in
our legal system. The court has summarized in their conclusions
as follows:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA,
are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these
lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer
ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only
sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership
limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain
inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified
as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared
no longer needed for public service. The government can make
such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed
these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as
agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural
resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the
592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside
the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private
corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom
Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI
ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still submerged areas of
Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation
of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public
domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the
government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or
disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public
service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article
XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
On the last issue, Considering that the Amended JVA is null and
void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on this last issue.
Besides, the Court is not a trier of facts, and this last issue
involves a determination of factual matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates
Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are
PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint
Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab
initio.
CASE: La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos,
[G.R. No. 127882, 27 January 2004]; 1 December 2004; 1
February 2005
FACTS: The constitutional provision allowing the President to
enter into FTAA is an exception to the rule that participation in the
nation’s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos.
Provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by
non-Filipinos.
RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995.
Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the
President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
(FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized under Philippine laws,
covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato,
Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.
On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos
issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed
by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20,
1996.
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the
FTAA between the government and WMCP be declared
unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned
corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and develop Philippine
mineral resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2
paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.
In January 2001, WMC – a publicly listed Australian mining and
exploration company – sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius
Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is
owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian company. DENR
approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius‘
name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case
is still pending before the Court of Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987,
authorizes the DENR to accept, consider and evaluate proposals
from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts
or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for
large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals
which upon appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary,
the President may execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP
likewise contended that the annulment of the FTAA would violate
a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which provides for
the protection of Australian investments.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is
unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned
corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
2. Whether or not the FTAA between the government and
WMCP is a ―service contract that permits fully foreign
owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral
resources.
HELD: First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional
for permitting fully foreign owned corporations to exploit the
Philippine natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian
Doctrine which states that ―All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. The same section also
states that, ―the exploration and development and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of
the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and
1973 Constitution authorizing the State to grant licenses,
concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation,
development, or utilization of natural resources. By such omission,
the utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain through
license, concession or lease is no longer allowed under the 1987
Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct
equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural
resource within a given area. The concession amounts to complete
control by the concessionaire over the country‘s natural resource,
for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular
resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase
―management or other forms of assistance in the 1973 Charter.
The present Constitution now allows only ―technical and financial
assistance. The management and the operation of the mining
activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the service
contracts, was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987
Constitution sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into
FTAAs is an exception to the rule that participation in the nation‘s
natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly,
such provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment
by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the said
act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the
phrase ―financial and technical agreements in accordance with
the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat these
agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to
foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the
foreign contractor manages the mineral resources just like the
foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign
contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining
operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial ownership
over the nation‘s mineral resources to these contractors, leaving
the State with nothing but bare title thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a
circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 60-40%
CASE: Bayan Muna v. Arroyo (Joint Marine Exploration case),
capitalization requirement for corporations or associations
10 January 2023
engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of
Philippine natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected
as conditions, considerations, inducements or compensations for
each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended
them as a whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all
provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected,
must fail with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned
corporations are limited only to merely technical or financial
assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development
and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.
Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service
Contract. The FTAA between the WMCP and the Philippine
government is likewise unconstitutional since the agreement itself
is a service contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP, a fully foreign owned
corporation, the exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize and
dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced
from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same agreement
provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology,
management, and personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA
taken together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural
resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for
the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the
1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the
fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress.
Consequently, the contract from which they spring must be struck
down.
The Supreme Court En Banc, voting 12-2-1, today declared
unconstitutional and void the Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine
Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) by and among China National
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), Vietnam Oil and Gas
Corporation (PETROVIETNAM), and Philippine National Oil
Company (PNOC) involving an area in the South China Sea
covering 142,886 square kilometers (“Agreement Area”).
The Court ruled that the JSMU is unconstitutional for allowing
wholly-owned foreign corporations to participate in the exploration
of the country‟s natural resources without observing the
safeguards provided in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
The case stemmed from the original action for certiorari and
prohibition assailing the constitutionality of the JMSU filed by
petitioners Bayan Muna Party-List Representatives Satur C.
Ocampo and Teodoro A. Casiño, et al.
The constitutionality of the JMSU, which was signed on March 14,
2005, was assailed on the ground that it violated Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution which mandates that the exploration,
development, and utilization (EDU) of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State.
Petitioners argued that the JMSU was illegal as it allowed foreign
corporations wholly-owned by China and Vietnam to undertake
large- scale exploration of the country‟s petroleum resources, in
violation of the Constitutional provision which reserves the EDU of
natural resources to Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty (60%) percent of whose capital is
owned by such citizens.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintained that Section 2, Article
XII of the Constitution was inapplicable as the said provision
contemplates EDU of natural resources, whereas the JMSU only
involves pre-exploration activities.
The Court, noting that the term “exploration” pertains to a search
or discovery of something in both its ordinary or technical sense,
ruled that the JMSU involves the exploration of the country‟s
natural resources, particularly petroleum.
Citing the text of the fifth whereas clause of the JMSU, which
states the Parties‟ “expressed desire to engage in a joint
research of petroleum resource potential of a certain area of the
South China Sea as a pre-exploration activity,” the Court said that
it is clear that the JMSU was executed for the purpose of
determining if petroleum exists in the Agreement Area.
“That the Parties designated the joint research as a „pre-
exploration activity‟ is of no moment,” said the Court. “Such
designation does not detract from the fact that the intent and aim
of the agreement is to discover petroleum which is tantamount to
„exploration.‟”
The Court further held that as the JMSU involves the exploration
of the country‟s petroleum resources, it falls within the ambit of
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan wrote the Decision, which
was concurred in by Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo and 10
other Associate Justices. Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier
and Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda dissented, while Associate
Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando was on leave and did not take
part.
The SC Public Information Office will upload in the SC website a
copy of the Decision once available. (Courtesy of the Supreme
Court Public Information Office)
Section 5: Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities
The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national
development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of
indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure
their economic, social, and cultural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws
governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership
and extent of ancestral domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 (IPRA)
CASE: Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources, G.R. No. 135385, 6 December 2000
FACTS: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for
prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The
petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the
ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and
other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of theConstitution
ISSUE: Whether the provisions of IPRA contravene the
Constitution?
HELD: No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the
Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that
grants to theICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within
their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in
the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights
granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in
their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and
occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right
to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same
time, a priority in their large scale development and
exploitation.Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are
not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands
and belong to theICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of
private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from
the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the
ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership
and does not include the right to alienate the same.IPRA Law vis a
vis RegalianDoctrineCruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the
validity of the RA8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act on
the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of
the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein,in violation of the
regalia doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include
natural resources. Cruz et al content that, by providing for an
all-encompassing definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral
lands” which might even include private lands found within said
areas, Sections 3(a) and3(b) of said law violate the rights of
private landowners. ISSUE:Whether or not the IPRA law is
unconstitutional.
The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted
andreached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same
result transpired. Since there was no majority
vote, Cruz’s petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was
sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include natural
resources–somehow against the regalian doctrine.
Social Justice and Human Rights (Article XIII)
Section 7: Preferential use of marine resources for
subsistence farmers
The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially
of local communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine
and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide
support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and
research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance,
and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and
conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore
fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion.
Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the
utilization of marine and fishing resources.