Constitutional Law I | Atty. Evecar Cruz (AY.
2023-2024)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Basic References
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary, 2009 Edition.
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 1995
Book: Cruz and Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2022 Edition.
Article I. The National Territory
The national territory comprises of the Philippine archipelago, with all
the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over
which the Philippines have sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its
terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including the territorial sea, the
seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves and other submarine areas.
(Archipelagic Doctrine)
The water around, between and connecting the islands of the archipelago,
regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part the internal waters
of the Philippines.
Validity of R.A. 9522 (New Baselines Law of 2009)
1. Magallona v. Exec. Sec. Ermita, GR No. 187167, August 16, 2011
(valid law)
Doctrine: Baseline laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III only
serve to MARK OUT specific base points from which baselines are drawn
either straight or contoured, and to serve as geographic starting points to
measure the breadth of maritime zones and continental shelf. (Territorial
waters 12 nautical miles from baselines, contiguous zone 24 nautical
miles from the baselines, exclusive economic zones 200 nautical miles
from the baselines.) This baseline delimitation done by states serves to
give notice to the international community of the scope that the states can
exercise treaty based rights.
FNALOLOR NOTES _ Arellano University School of Law
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the
acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of
territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire
(or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession
and prescription, not by executing multilateral treaties on the
regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the
treaty's terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.
Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead
governed by the rules on general international law.||| (Magallona v. Ermita,
G.R. No. 187167, [August 16, 2011], 671 PHIL 243-294)
2. PCA Case No. 2013-19, In the Matter of the South China Sea
Arbitration, 12 July 2016
Definition:
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)- an exclusive economic zone is a sea
zone prescribed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
over which a state has special rights regarding the exploration and use of
marine resources, including energy production from water and wind. It
stretches from the baseline out to 200 nautical miles from its coast. The
difference between the territorial sea and the EEZ is that the first confers
full sovereignty over the waters, whereas the second is merely a sovereign
right which refers to coastal state’s rights below the surface of the sea.
UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas): The
UNCLOS is the international agreement that resulted from the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea which took place
between 1973 and 1982. It defines the rights and responsibilities of nations
with respect to their use of the world’s oceans, establishing guidelines for
businesses, the environment, and the management of marine resources.
UNCLOS was entered into force on 16 November 1994.
Doctrine: UNCLOS establishes a comprehensive maritime zones regime
and allocates rights in these areas to the coastal state and other states: in the
areas of the EEZ and the continental shelf ( CS) , the coastal state enjoys
exclusive sovereign rights to the exploitation of living and non-living
natural resources. Concerning the rights of other states in these areas, the

tribunal found that UNCLOS does not permit the preservation of historic
rights of any state within the EEZ or the CS of another state.
Facts: On 22 January 2013, the Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings
against China primarily regarding maritime rights , entitlements and zones
in the South China Sea specifically on Spratly Islands, Scarborough Shoal,
Mischief Reef, Subi Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron
Reef and Fiery Cross Reef. They also instituted the case for the protection
of the marine life and the environment of the region, under the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982.
China has always argued for historic rights, as demarcated by the ‘Nine
Dash Line’ on its official maps of the region in question. Since 2012, China
considers the Spratly and Paracel Islands, as well as the Scarborough Shoal,
to be part of the Hainan Province; despite repeated requests from the
Philippines, China never clarified the status of the Hainan Regulation.
In response, by a diplomatic note dated 19 February 2013 addressed to the
Philippines, China expressed its rejection of the arbitration. In China’s
view, the Arbitral Tribunal did not have jurisdiction in the case because
China’s acceptance of dispute settlement under the UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea(UNCLOS) – the basis put forward by the Philippines – was
limited and excluded sea boundary delimitations and the determination of
historic titles. While China and Philippines are both parties to the
UNCLOS, China specifically made a declaration in 2006 to exclude
maritime boundary delimitation from its acceptance of compulsory dispute
settlement. In addition, China has shown disagreement with Philippines’
decision to take the matter to arbitration and has decided neither to agree
with the decision of the Tribunal nor to participate in the proceedings.
Issue/s: In particular, the following are the issues in this case.
1. Whether or not the Tribunal has jurisdiction in this case;
2. Whether or not China’s so-called “nine-dash line” and
China’s claim to historic rights in the South China Sea is
tenable and in conformity with the UNCLOS;
3. Whether Chinese’ activities in the South China Sea is valid
specifically its construction and installation of reclamation
work on Scarborough Shoal.
Constitutional Law I | Atty. Evecar Cruz (AY. 2023-2024)
FNALOLOR NOTES _ Arellano University School of Law
Held/Ratio:
1. Whether or not the Tribunal has jurisdiction in this case?
Yes, it has jurisdiction in this case.
In accordance with Article 283 (which deals with the Parties’
obligations to “exchange views regarding [the dispute’s]
settlement by negotiation or other peaceful means) of the
UNCLOS, the Tribunal found that this requirement was met in the
diplomatic communications between the Parties and that
Philippines’ initiation of proceedings under the UNCLOS did not
constitute an abuse of process as claimed by China. On 29 October
2015, the Tribunal delivered its first award finding that it had
jurisdiction, and, on 12 July 2016, its award deciding on the merits
of the dispute.
It concluded that it did indeed have jurisdiction in the case, as
per Philippines’ Final Submissions, and that China’s lack of
participation would not prove to be a bar to its proceedings. It,
further, concluded that the treaties China was relying on were
either political in nature and not legally binding, or that they did
were legally binding and yet did not bar either Party from
alternative means of dispute resolution.
2. Whether or not China’s so-called “nine-dash line” and
China’s claim to historic rights in the South China Sea is
tenable and in conformity with the UNCLOS? No, it is not in
conformity with the UNCLOS. The pre-existing historic right
no longer exist as they are not compatible with UNCLOS and
the geographic limits imposed by it.
The Tribunal observed that this area – in which China claimed
rights, “formed in the long historical course”, to living and non-
living resources (i.e. fisheries and petroleum resources) – partially
overlaps with areas that would otherwise comprise the exclusive
economic zone(EEZ) or the continental shelf (CS) of the
Philippines. In the view of the tribunal, UNCLOS establishes a
comprehensive maritime zones regime and allocates rights in these

areas to the coastal state and other states: in the areas of the EEZ
and the CS, the coastal state enjoys exclusive sovereign rights to
the exploitation of living and non-living natural resources.
Concerning the rights of other states in these areas, the tribunal
found that UNCLOS does not permit the preservation of historic
rights of any state within the EEZ or the CS of another state.
Therefore, after the entry into force of UNCLOS, the historic rights
that might have existed for China within the “nine-dash line” in
areas that would otherwise include the EEZ or the continental shelf
of the Philippines were superseded by the maritime zones regime
created by UNCLOS. That means the pre-existing historic rights
no longer exist as they are not compatible with UNCLOS.
Accordingly, the tribunal concluded that China’s claims were
contrary to UNCLOS and exceeded the geographic limits imposed
by it.
3. Whether Chinese’ activities in the South China Sea are
valid specifically its construction and installation of
reclamation work on Scarborough Shoal? No, it is not valid.
The Tribunal determined the legal status of certain maritime features
occupied by China in the South China Sea. Determining whether these
are “islands", “rocks", “low-tide elevations” (LTEs) or “submerged
banks” is important because, unlike fully entitled islands, rocks which
cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own do not
generate an EEZ and a CS. Consequently, rocks do not give rights to
resource exploitation beyond their territorial sea. Furthermore, LTEs or
submerged banks do not generate any maritime zone.
As identified by the Tribunal, features that are above water at high tide; of
these, those features that have the capacity to sustain human habitation
or economic life of their own are referred to as islands. Low tide
elevations are features that is exposed at low tide, but covered with water at
high tide and do not generate entitlement to a territorial sea, exclusive
economic zone or continental shelf. A rock on the other hand is a high tide
feature that cannot sustain human or economic life of their own; rocks do
not generate entitlement to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone or
continental shelf.
Constitutional Law I | Atty. Evecar Cruz (AY. 2023-2024)
FNALOLOR NOTES _ Arellano University School of Law
The tribunal found most disputed maritime features not to be capable
of generating an EEZ or CS.The Tribunal classified Scarborough Shoal as
a rock, and among those features in the Spratly Islands, it found Mischief
Reef, Subi Reef and Second Thomas Shoal to be LTEs, and Johnson Reef,
Cuarteron Reef and Fiery Cross Reef to be mere rocks. However, contrary
to the Philippines’ position, the tribunal concluded that Gaven Reef (North)
and McKennan Reef are rocks that are not capable of generating an EEZ or
a CS.
The tribunal assessed the status of these features taking into consideration
their natural condition, prior to human modifications. In this respect, the
Tribunal emphasised that China’s construction of installations and
significant reclamation work as well as its maintenance of military or
governmental personnel or civilians CANNOT enhance a feature’s
status from rock or a LTE to a fully entitled island capable of
generating an EEZ and a CS.
The tribunal also ruled on the legality of activities of Chinese officials and
Chinese vessels in the areas of the South China Sea located within the
Philippines’ EEZ and CS. It concluded that China breached the provisions
of UNCLOS, in particular by (a) temporarily prohibiting fishing in areas of
the South China Sea falling within the Philippines’ EEZ, (b) failing to
prevent Chinese vessels from fishing in the Philippines’ EEZ at Mischief
Reef and Second Thomas Shoal and (c) preventing Filipino fishermen from
engaging in traditional fishing at Scarborough Shoal. Regarding China’s
construction of artificial islands, installations and structures at Mischief
Reef – a LTE which is part of the Philippines’ EEZ and CS – without the
authorisation of the Philippines, the tribunal also found China to have
violated UNCLOS.
In addition, with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine
environment in the South China Sea, the tribunal found that China breached
UNCLOS since it failed to prevent fishermen from Chinese flagged vessels
from harvesting (a) endangered species on a significant scale and (b) in such
a manner as to destroy the coral reef ecosystem. Furthermore, the tribunal
held that China’s land reclamation and construction of artificial islands,
installations and structures in the Spratly Islands caused severe, irreparable
harm to the coral reef ecosystem.

Article II. Declaration of Principles and State Policies
Preliminary issue: Legal Value of Article II
As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan vs. Morato, the principles and
state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are
not "self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a
cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation. For instance, read
Sections 5 , 1 2 , 1 3 and 17 as mere "guidelines" which do not yet confer
rights enforceable by the courts but recognized Section 16 as a right
conferring provision because it speaks of the “ right of the people.”
Kilosbayan v. Morato – 246 SCRA 540 [1995] and MR-250 SCRA 130
[1995]
Doctrine: Petitioners invoke the Principles and State Policies set forth in
Art. II of the Constitution. These are not, however, self executing
provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the
courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but
guidelines for legislation.
FACTS: Petitioners filed with the Court a special civil action for
prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction, which seeks to prohibit and restrain the
implementation of the “Contract of Lease” executed by the PCSO and the
Gaming
Management Corporation (PGMC) in connection with the online lottery
system, also known as “ lotto.”
Petitioner Kilosbayan avers that it is a non- stock domestic corporation
composed of civic - spirited citizens, pastors, priests , nuns, and lay leaders
who are committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national renewal. The
rest of the petitioners, except Senators Freddie Webb and Wigberto Tañada
and Representative Joker P. Arroyo, are suing in their capacities as
members
of the Board of Trustees of Kilosbayan and as taxpayers and concerned
citizens.
Constitutional Law I | Atty. Evecar Cruz (AY. 2023-2024)
FNALOLOR NOTES _ Arellano University School of Law
Petitioners invoke the following Principles and State Policies set forth in
Art. II of the Constitution:
“The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty,
and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential
for the employment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
(Sec. 5)
The natural and primary right and duty of the parents in the rearing of
the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character
shall receive the support of the Government. (Sec. 12)
The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall
promote their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being.
It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage
their involvement in public and civic affairs. (Sec. 13)
The state shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts,
culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social
progress, and promote total human liberation and development. (Sec. 17)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.
RULING: The Court ruled that while constitutional policies are invoked,
this case involves basically questions of contract law. More specifically, the
question is whether petitioners have legal right which has been violated.
In action for annulment of contracts such as this action, the real parties are
those who are parties to the agreement or are bound either principally or
subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the
contracting parties and can show the detriment which would positively
result to them from the contract even though they did no intervene in it , or
who claim a right to take part in a public bidding but have been illegally
excluded from it.

These are parties with "a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a
mere expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential
interest . . . . The phrase 'present substantial interest' more concretely is
meant such interest of a party in the subject matter of action as will entitle
him, under the substantive law, to recover if the evidence is sufficient, or
that he has the legal title to demand and the defendant will be protected in a
payment by him."
But petitioners do not have such present substantial interest in the ELA as
would entitle them to bring this suit. Denying to them the right to intervene
will not leave without remedy any perceived illegality in the execution of
government contracts. Question as to the nature or validity of public
contracts or the necessity for a public bidding before they may be made can
be raised in an appropriate case before the Commission on Audit or before
the Ombudsman.
The Court finds the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to
the
public. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest. The
ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and
moral well- being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the
country and the counter -
productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned online lottery system
are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal
standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of
its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier
which the
respondents tried to take advantage of.
Ocampo v. Rear Admiral Enriquez, GR No. 225973, November 8, 2016 (Not
self-executory) (in relation to A2, Secs. 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27 & 28 ; A3, Sec. 1, A7,
Sec. 17, A11, Sec. 1, A14, Sec. 3 (2) & A18, Sec. 26)
Doctrine:
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state
policies." The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called the "basic
political creed of the nation" by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II
are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the
courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its
Constitutional Law I | Atty. Evecar Cruz (AY. 2023-2024)
FNALOLOR NOTES _ Arellano University School of Law
power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in
the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state
policies enumerated in Article II . . . are not "self-executing provisions, the disregard
of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation
Facts: · During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then
candidate Rodrigo R. Duterte publicly announced that he would allow the burial
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani ("LNMB").
Duterte won the May 9, 2016 elections.
· On August 7, 2016, Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum
to AFP Chief of Staff General Ricardo R. Visaya regarding the interment of former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani.
· On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued a directive to
the Philippine Army on the Funeral Honors and Service for President Marcos.
· This also prompted the AFP to review its regulations issued by the AFP Chief of
Staff as to who may and may not be interred at the LNMB underscoring the nature
and purpose of the LNMB as an active military cemetery/gravesite.
· Under AFP Regulations G 161-375, the following are eligible for interment at the
LNMB: (a) Medal of Valor Awardees; (b) Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief,
AFP; (c) Secretaries of National Defense; (d) Chiefs of Staff, AFP; (e) General/Flag
Officers of the AFP; (f) Active and retired military personnel of the AFP to include
active draftees and trainees who died in line of duty, active reservists and CAFGU
Active Auxiliary (CAA) who died in combat operations or combat related activities;
(g) Former members of the AFP who laterally entered or joined the PCG and the
PNP; (h) Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and recognized
guerillas; (i) Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and other
deceased persons whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the
Commander-in-Chief, Congress or the Secretary of National Defense; and G)
Former Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists,
widows of Former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff.
Similar to AFP Regulations G 161-374, the following are not qualified to be
interred in the LNMB: (a) Personnel who were dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from the service; and (b) Authorized personnel
who were convicted by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude.

· Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the petitioners filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition and Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with the Court
challenging the validity of the pronouncement of the Executive.
Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB should not be allowed
because it has the effect of not just rewriting history as to the Filipino people's act of
revolting against an authoritarian ruler but also condoning the abuses committed
during the Martial Law, thereby violating the letter and spirit of the 1987
Constitution, which is a "post-dictatorship charter" and a "human rights
constitution." For them, the ratification of the Constitution serves as a clear
condemnation of Marcos' alleged "heroism." To support their case, petitioners
invoke Sections 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27 and 28 of Article II, Sec. 17 of Art. VII,
Sec. 3 (2) of Art. XIV, Sec. 1 of Art. XI, and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the
Constitution.
Issue/s:
Whether the interment of Pres. Marcos in the LNMB violates the letter and spirit of
the 1987 Constitution which is a post dictatorship charter and human rights
constitution.
Held/Ratio:
1. No, the interment of President Marcos in the LNMB does not violate the
Constitution. As the Office of the Solicitor General(OSG) logically reasoned out,
while the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its entirety
should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about anything
remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the
LNMB.
Tañada v. Angara already ruled that the provisions in Article II of the
Constitution are not self-executing.
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and
state policies." The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called
the "basic political creed of the nation" by Dean Vicente Sinco. These
principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as
guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its
enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs.
Morato, the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II . . . are not "self-
executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the
courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but
guidelines for legislation."
Constitutional Law I | Atty. Evecar Cruz (AY. 2023-2024)
FNALOLOR NOTES _ Arellano University School of Law
The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad
constitutional principles are sourced from basic considerations of due process and
the lack of judicial authority to wade "into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making."
In the same vein, Sec. 1 of Art. XI of the Constitution is not a self-executing
provision considering that a law should be passed by the Congress to clearly
define and effectuate the principle embodied therein. As a matter of fact,
pursuant thereto, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6713 ("Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees"), R.A. No. 6770 ("The Ombudsman
Act of 1989"), R.A. No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder), and Republic Act No. 9485("Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007"). To
complement these statutes, the Executive Branch has issued various orders,
memoranda, and instructions relative to the norms of behavior/code of
conduct/ethical standards of officials and employees; workflow charts/public
transactions; rules and policies on gifts and benefits; whistle blowing and reporting;
and client feedback program.
Petitioners' reliance on Sec. 3 (2) of Art. XIV and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the
Constitution is also misplaced. Sec. 3 (2) of Art. XIV refers to the constitutional
duty of educational institutions in teaching the values of patriotism and nationalism
and respect for human rights, while Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII is a transitory provision on
sequestration or freeze orders in relation to the recovery of Marcos' ill-gotten wealth.
Clearly, with respect to these provisions, there is no direct or indirect prohibition to
Marcos' interment at the LNMB.
The decision of the Pres. Duterte is merely a discretionary act. Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution embodies the faithful execution clause. The
Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed.
Thus, any act pursuant to the faithful execution clause should be deemed a political
question as the President is merely executing the law as it is. There is no question as
to the legality of the act but on its wisdom or propriety. If the law imposes a duty
upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall
be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial
only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official
discretion or judgment.
Sec. 1. Philippines as a Democratic and Republican State.
State- is a community of persons, more or less numerous, permanently
occupying a fixed territory , and possessed of an independent government

organized for political ends to which the great body of inhabitants render
habitual obedience.
Elements:
1. People- a community of persons sufficient in number and capable of
maintaining the continued existence of the community and held together by
a common bond of law.
2. Territory- fixed portion of the surface of the earth inhabited by the
people of the State.
3. Government- It is the agency or instrumentality through which the will
of the State is formulated, expressed and realized.
Functions of Government
Constituent v. Ministrant
Constituent- Those relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention
of crime, those regulating property and property rights, those relating to the
administration of justice and the determination of political duties of citizens,
and those relating to national and foreign relations. Under this traditional
classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as
attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress
and prosperity of the people--these latter functions being ministrant, the
exercise of which is optional on the part of the government.
Ministrant functions are the optional functions of government in- tended for
achieving a better life for the community. "The principles for determining
whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these optional
functions are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare those
things which private capital would not naturally undertake, and (2) that a
government should do those things which by its very nature it is better
equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual
or group of individuals.
Incorporated
Unincorporated
Constitutional Law I | Atty. Evecar Cruz (AY. 2023-2024)
FNALOLOR NOTES _ Arellano University School of Law
ACCFA v. CUGCO – 30 SCRA 649 [1969] (Government; functions;
unincorporated) (read with Bacani v. NACOCO)
Doctrine: The ACA is a government office or agency engaged in
governmental, not proprietary functions. These functions may not be strictly
what President Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished from
"ministrant"), such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the
prevention of crime, those regulating property and property rights, those
relating to the administration of justice and the determination of political
duties of citizens, and those relating to national and foreign relations. Under
this traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the
State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare,
progress and prosperity of the people--these latter functions being
ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of the government.
Facts:
1. ACCFA, a government agency created under RA 821, as
amended was reorganized and its name changed to Agricultural Credit
Administration (ACA) under the RA 3844 or Land Reform Code. While
ACCFA Supervisors' Association (ASA) and the ACCFA Workers'
Association (AWA), are labor organizations (the Unions) composed of
the supervisors and the rank-and-file employees in the ACCFA.
2. A CBA was agreed upon by labor unions (ASA and AWA) and
ACCFA. The said CBA was supposed to be effective on 1 July 1962.
Due to non-implementation of the CBA the unions held a strike. And 5
days later, the Unions, with its mother union, the Confederation of
Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a
complaint against ACCFA before the CIR on ground of alleged acts of
unfair labor practices; violation of the collective bargaining agreement
in order to discourage the members of the Unions in the exercise of their
right to self-organization, discrimination against said members in the
matter of promotions and refusal to bargain.
3. ACCFA moved for a reconsideration but while the appeal was
pending, RA 3844 was passed which effectively turned ACCFA to
ACA. Then, ASA and AWA petitioned that they obtain sole bargaining
rights with ACA. While this petition was not yet decided upon, EO 75
was also passed which placed ACA under the Land Reform Project

Administration. Notwithstanding the latest legislation passed, the trial
court and the appellate court ruled in favor of ASA and AWA.
ISSUE: W/N ACA is a government entity
YES.
It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was
enacted and the various agencies, the ACA among them, established to
carry out its purposes. There can be no dispute as to the fact that the
land reform program contemplated in the said Code is beyond the
capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a
purely governmental function, no less than, the establishment and
maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. And when, aside
from the governmental objectives of the ACA, geared as they are to the
implementation of the land reform program of the State, the law itself
declares that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation of
policies, plans and programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors,
as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the National Land Reform Council,
itself a government instrumentality; and that its personnel are subject to
Civil Service laws and to rules of standardization with respect to
positions and salaries, any vestige of doubt as to the governmental
character of its functions disappears.
The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered
this traditional classification of the functions of government quite
unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private
enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to
enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer
for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of
individuals,"5continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be
absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its
sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the
times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly
towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this
development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the
Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the
promotion of social justice.
Constitutional Law I | Atty. Evecar Cruz (AY. 2023-2024)
FNALOLOR NOTES _ Arellano University School of Law
The Unions have no bargaining rights with ACA. EO 75 placed ACA
under the LRPA and by virtue of RA 3844 the implementation of the
Land Reform Program of the government is a governmental function
NOT a proprietary function. Being such, ACA can no longer step down
to deal privately with said unions as it may have been doing when it was
still ACCFA. However, the growing complexities of modern society
have rendered the classification of the governmental functions as
unrealistic, if not obsolete. Ministerial and governmental functions
continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and are absorbed within
the activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign
capacity if it to meet the increasing social challenges of the times and
move towards a greater socialization of economic forces.
Bacani v. NACOCO
Doctrine: Government” may be defined as “that institution or
aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and
carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to
live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming
that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing
them” (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This institution, when referring to
the national government, has reference to what our Constitution has
established composed of three great departments, the legislative,
executive, and the judicial, through which the powers and functions of
government are exercised. These functions are twofold: constitute and
ministrant. The former are those which constitute the very bonds of
society and are compulsory in nature; the latter are those that are
undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of society,
and are merely optional.
Constituent Functions are:
"(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and
property from violence and robbery.
(2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife
and between parents and children

(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and inter- change of
property, and the determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime.
(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals.
(5) The definition and punishment of crime.
(6) The administration of justice in civil cases
(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of
citizens.
(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state
from external danger or encroachment and the advancement of its
international interest.
Facts: The plaintiffs are court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the
Court of First Instance of Manila. During the pendency of Civil Case No.
2293 of said court, entitled Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut
Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for
defendant, requested said stenographers for copies, of the transcript of the
stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied
with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript
containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the
payment of their fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the amount
of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said
transcript at the rate of P1 per page.
Upon inspecting the books of this corporation, the Auditor General
disallowed the payment of these fees and sought the recovery of the
amounts paid. The respondents argue that National Coconut Corporation
may be considered as included in the term “Government of the Republic of
the Philippines” for the purposes of the exemption of the legal fees provided
for in Rule 1-30 of the Rules of Court.
Issue/s: WON NACOCO is a part of the Government of the Philippines by
virtue of its performance of government functions.
Constitutional Law I | Atty. Evecar Cruz (AY. 2023-2024)
FNALOLOR NOTES _ Arellano University School of Law
Held/Ratio: No, NACOCO does not acquire that status for the simple
reason that it does not come under the classification of municipal or public
corporation. To resolve the issue in this case requires a little digression on
the nature and functions of our government as instituted in our Constitution.
To begin with, we state that the term “Government” may be defined as “that
institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society
makes and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable
men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming
that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing
them” (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This institution, when referring to the
national government, has reference to what our Constitution has established
composed of three great departments, the legislative, executive, and the
judicial, through which the powers and functions of government are
exercised.
These functions are twofold: constitute and ministrant. The former are those
which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature; the
latter are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general
interests of society, and are merely optional.
To this latter class belongs the organization of those corporations
owned or controlled by the government to promote certain aspects of
the economic life of our people such as the National Coconut
Corporation. These are what we call government-owned or controlled
corporations, which may take on the form of a private enterprise or one
organized with powers and formal characteristics of a private corporation
under the Corporation Law. But while NACOCO was organized for the
ministrant function of promoting the coconut industry, however, it was
given a corporate power separate and distinct from our government, for it
was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its
corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned
(sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518).
Government of the Republic of the Philippines” used in section 2 of the
Revised Administrative Code refers only to that government entity through
which the functions of the government are exercised as an attribute of
sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through which political
authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other
form of local government. These are what we call municipal corporations.
They do not include government entities, which are given a corporate
personality, separate and distinct from the government and ‘which are

governed by the Corporation Law. Their powers, duties and liabilities have
to be determined in the light of that law and of their corporate charters.
Examples of government exercising its functions through corporations
or instrumentalities-Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
(MWSS), Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), Local Water
Utilities Administration, Laguna Lake Development
Government owned or controlled corporations- State universities,
Department of Tourism, PAGCOR etc.
VFP v. Reyes – 483 SCRA 526 [2006] (Government; sovereign function)
Doctrine: Supervision and control shall include the authority to act directly
whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate;
direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve,
reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine
priorities in the execution of plans and programs; and prescribe standards,
guidelines, plans and programs.
Facts: On June 10, 2002 respondent Department of National Defense (DND)
Secretary issued the assailed DND Department Circular No. 04 entitled “Further
Implementing the Provisions of Section 12 and 23 of Republic Act No. 2640” which
stipulates the details of the Department’s exercise of control and supervision over
the Veteran’s Federation of the Philippines (VFP)
Issue/s: Whether or not VFP is a public corporation and the secretary of Of national
Defense has the power to control.
Held/Ratio: Yes, in consonance with Rep. Act No. 2640. Petitioner VFP is a
public corporation. As such, it can be placed under the control and supervision
of the Secretary of National Defense, who consequently has the power to
conduct an extensive management audit of petitioner corporation.
Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan – 499 SCRA 375 [2006] (Government;
GOCC; AFP-RSBS)
Doctrine: Armed Forces of the Philippines -Philippine Retirement Benefit
Systems (AFP-RSBS) is a government-owned and controlled
corporation, and that its funds are in the nature of public funds. Under
Section 4(a)(1)(g) of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive
jurisdiction over offenses committed by presidents, directors, trustees or
Constitutional Law I | Atty. Evecar Cruz (AY. 2023-2024)
FNALOLOR NOTES _ Arellano University School of Law
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations. Under Section
4(b) of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over
offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their
office, whether simple or complexed with other crimes.
Facts: Pursuant to the recommendation of the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee as a result of their investigation regarding the alleged modus
operandi of the AFP-RSBS (buying of the lots was to cover the same
transactions with two deeds of sale. One deed of sale would be signed only
by the seller or sellers (unilateral deed). Another deed of sale would be
signed by the seller or seller and the buyer, AFP-RSBS (bilateral deed).
Jose S. Ramiscal Jr., Julian Alzaga, Manuel Satuito, Elizabeth Liang and
Jesus Garcia were charged with Malversation through Falsification of
Public Documents before the Sandiganbayan. The Information alleged that
Ramiscal, et. al. misappropriated and converted the amount of
P250,318,200.00 for their personal use from the funds of AFP-RSBS.
Ramiscal filed with the Sandiganbayan an “Urgent Motion to Declare
Nullity of Information and to Defer Issuance of Warrant of Arrest.” He
argued, that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case because
the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. The said Urgent Motion was later
adopted by Alzaga and Satuito. The Urgent Motion was denied by the
Sandiganbayan. Ramiscal, et. al. filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
Upon denial of its Motion for Reconsideration, the prosecution filed the
present special civil action for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue/s: Whether or not the AFP-RSBS is not a government entity and the
Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of authority in denying the
petitioner’s motion to quash the information.
Held/Ratio: Yes the AFP-RSBS is a government entity and the
Sandiganbayan did not abuse its authority and it has jurisdiction over the
case of the petitioner.
AFP- RBS was created by Presidential Decree 361. Its purpose and
functions are akin to those of the GSIS and the SSS, as in fact it is the
system that manages the retirement and pension funds of those in the
military service. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police are expressly excluded from the coverage of The

GSIS Act of 1997. Therefore, soldiers and military personnel, who are
incidentally employees of the Government, rely on the administration of the
AFP-RSBS for their retirement, pension and separation benefits. Its
enabling law further mandates that the System shall be administered by the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines through an agency,
group, committee or board, which may be created and organized by him and
subject to such rules and regulations governing the same as he may, subject
to the approval of the Secretary of National Defense, promulgate from time
to time. Moreover, the investment of funds of the System shall be decided
by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with the
approval of the Secretary of National Defense.
The funds of the AFP-RSBS, except for the initial seed money, come
entirely from contributions and that no part thereof come from
appropriations. While it may be true that there have been no appropriations
for the contribution of funds to the AFP-RSBS, the Government is not
precluded from later on adding to the funds in order to provide additional
benefits to them. The above considerations indicate that the character and
operations of the AFP-RSBS are imbued with public interest. As such, we
hold that the same is a government entity and its funds are in the nature of
public funds.
As the AFP-RSBS is a government-owned and controlled corporation, and
that its funds are in the nature of public funds. Under Section 4(a)(1)(g) of
R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses
committed by presidents, directors, trustees or managers of government
owned or controlled corporations. Under Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 8249, the
Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed by
public officers and employees in relation to their office, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes.
As gleaned from the material averments of the Information in Criminal
Case No. 28023, the charge against petitioner is estafa through falsification
of public document in the performance of his duties and in relation to his
position as president of the AFP-RSBS.
Instrumentalities- Administrative Code defines a government "instrumentality" as
follows:
Constitutional Law I | Atty. Evecar Cruz (AY. 2023-2024)
FNALOLOR NOTES _ Arellano University School of Law
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. –– . . .
(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not
integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers , administering
special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
MIAA v. CA – 495 SCRA 591 [2006] (Government instrumentality vested with
corporate powers; not GOCC)
Doctrine: MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers. It
may exercise the governmental powers of eminent domain, police authority, and
the levying of fees and charges. At the same time, it may exercise “all the powers of
a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as these powers are not
inconsistent
with the provisions of EO 903.”
Being a government instrumentality, petitioner falls under Section 133 of
the Local Government Code.
Facts: Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) Complex in Parañaque City under Executive Order
No. 903, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the Manila International
Airport Authority ("MIAA Charter") which was already amended by Executive
Orders 909 and 298.
As operator of the international airport, MIAA administers the land, improvements
and equipment within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA
approximately 600 hectares of land, including the runways and buildings ("Airport
Lands and Buildings") then under the Bureau of Air Transportation. 4The MIAA
Charter further provides that no portion of the land transferred to MIAA shall be
disposed of through sale or any other mode unless specifically approved by the
President of the Philippines.
In 1997, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion
No. 061. The OGCC opined that the Local Government Code of 1991 withdrew the
exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21 of the MIAA
Charter. Thus, MIAA negotiated with respondent City of Parañaque to pay the real
estate tax imposed by the City. MIAA then paid some of the real estate tax already
due. MIAA then received Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of

Paranaque from 1992 until 2001. Should MIAA failed to pay the real estate tax,
then the Airport Land and buildings will be sold in an auction.
In an opinion, the OGCC said that Section 21 of MIAA is a proof that it is
exempted from real estate taxes. Thus MIAA filed with the CA a petition of
injunction and prohibition to restrain the City of Parañaque from imposing real
estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and
Buildings. The CA granted the restraining order. However, respondents only
received the TRO three hours after the public auction.
Respondents invoke Section 193 of the Local Government Code, whichexpressly
withdrew the tax exemption privileges of "government-owned and-controlled
corporations" upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code. Respondents
further argue that since MIAA has already paid some of the real estate tax
assessments, it is now estopped from claiming that the Airport Lands and Buildings
are exempt from real estate tax.
Issue/s: Whether or not MIAA is a government owned and controlled corporation
and as such not exempted from tax.
Held/Ratio: The Supreme Court ruled that MIAA was not a government-owned or
-controlled corporation (GOCC), but an instrumentality of the national government
and thus exempt from local taxation. Second, the real properties of MIAA were
owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax.
MIAA Not a Government-Owned or -Controlled Corporation
Under Section 2(13) of the “Introductory Provisions” of the Administrative Code of
1987, (13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency
organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to
public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the
Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where
applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51)
percent of its capital stock: . . . .
A government-owned or controlled corporation must be "organized as a stock or
non-stock corporation."
Petitioner, however, had no capital stock divided into shares. Neither did it have
stockholders or voting shares. Hence, it was not a stock corporation.
Constitutional Law I | Atty. Evecar Cruz (AY. 2023-2024)
FNALOLOR NOTES _ Arellano University School of Law
MIAA had no members. Even assuming that its sole member was the government,
this fact did not make MIAA a nonstock corporation. Although nonstock
corporations could not distribute any part of their income to their members, Section
11 of EO 903 mandated MIAA to remit 20 percent of its annual gross operating
income to the national treasury.
Section 3 of the Corporation Code10 defines a stock
corporation as one whose "capital stock is divided into shares
and . . . authorized to distribute to the holders of such
shares dividends . . . ." MIAA has capital but it is not divided
into shares of stock. MIAA has no stockholders or voting
shares. Hence, MIAA is not a stock corporation.
Moreover, the Court noted, Section 88 of the Corporation Code provided that
nonstock corporations were “organized for charitable, religious, educational,
professional, cultural, recreational, fraternal, literary, scientific, social, civil
service, or similar purposes, like trade, industry, agriculture and like
chambers.” Being a public utility, petitioner had not been organized for any of
these purposes, but for the operation of the Manila international and domestic
airports for public use.
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the
instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the government
instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a
government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also
corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent
domain, police authority and the levying of fees and charges. At the same time,
MIAA exercises "all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law,
insofar as these powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Executive Order."
Likewise, when the law makes a government instrumentalityoperationally
autonomous, the instrumentality remains part of the National Government
machinery although not integrated with the department framework. The MIAA
Charter expressly states that transforming MIAA into a "separate and autonomous
body" will make its operation more "financially viable."
The fact alone that MIAA is endowed with corporate powers does not make MIAA a
government-owned or controlled corporation. Without a change in its capital
structure, MIAA remains a government instrumentality under Section 2(10) of the
Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code. More importantly, as long as

MIAA renders essential public services, it need not comply with the test of
economic viability. Thus, MIAA is outside the scope of the phrase "government-
owned or controlled corporations" under Section 16, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
Funa v. MECO and COA, GR No. 193462, February 4, 2014 (MECO
not GOCC); sui generis
Doctrine:
Three attributes make an entity a GOCC: first, its organization as
stock or non-stock corporation; second, the public character of its
function; and third, government ownership over the same. Possession
of all three attributes is necessary to deem an entity a GOCC.
Possession of all three attributes is necessary to deem an entity a GOCC.
In this case, there is not much dispute that the MECO possesses the first
and second attributes. It is the third attribute, which the MECO lacks.
mThe MECO Is Organized as a Non-Stock Corporation
The MECO is not a GOCC or government instrumentality. It is a sui generis private
entity especially entrusted by the government with the facilitation of unofficial
relations with the people in Taiwan without jeopardizing the country’s faithful
commitment to the One China policy of the PROC. However, despite its non-
governmental character, the MECO handles government funds in the form of the
“verification fees” it collects on behalf of the DOLE and the “consular fees” it
collects under Section 2 (6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001. Hence, under existing laws, the
accounts of the MECO pertaining to its collection of such “verification fees” and
“consular fees” should be audited by the COA.
Facts: The Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO) was organized
on 16 December 1997 as a non-stock, non- profit corporation under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 68 or the Corporation Code. One of the purposes
underlying the incorporation of MECO, as stated in its articles of
incorporation, is to establish and develop the commercial and
industrial interests of Filipino nationals here and abroad, and assist
on all measures designed to promote and maintain the trade relations
of the country with the citizens of other foreign countries.
MECO became the corporate entity "entrusted" by the Philippine
government with the responsibility of fostering "friendly" and "unofficial"
Constitutional Law I | Atty. Evecar Cruz (AY. 2023-2024)
FNALOLOR NOTES _ Arellano University School of Law
relations with the people of Taiwan, particularly in the areas of trade,
economic cooperation, investment, cultural, scientific and educational
exchanges. To enable it to carry out such responsibility, the MECO was
"authorized" by the government to perform certain "consular and other
functions" that relates to the promotion, protection and facilitation of
Philippine interests in Taiwan.
On August 23, 2010, petitioner Funa sent a letter to the COA requesting
for a “copy of the latest financial and audit report” of the MECO invoking,
for that purpose, his “constitutional right to information on matters of
public concern.” The petitioner made the request on the belief that the
MECO, being under the “operational supervision” of the Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI), is a government owned and controlled
corporation (GOCC) and thus subject to the audit jurisdiction of the COA.
Petitioner’s letter was received by COA Assistant Commissioner Jaime P.
Naranjo, the following day. On August 25, 2010, Assistant Commissioner
Naranjo issued a memorandum referring the petitioner’s request to COA
Assistant Commissioner Emma M. Espina for “further disposition.” In this
memorandum, however, Assistant Commissioner Naranjo revealed that
the MECO was “not among the agencies audited by any of the three
Clusters of the Corporate Government Sector.”
The petitioner, upon learning of the memorandum and its contents filed
the instant petition for mandamus dated September 8, 2010, impleading
both MECO and COA. According to the petitioner, the MECO possesses
all the essential characteristics of a GOCC and an instrumentality under
the Executive Order No. (EO) 292, s. 1987 or the Administrative Code: it
is a non-stock corporation vested with governmental functions relating to
public needs; it is controlled by the government thru a board of directors
appointed by the President of the Philippines; and while not integrated
within the executive departmental framework, it is nonetheless under the
operational and policy supervision of the DTI.
Issue/s:
Whether or not MECO is a GOCC covered by the auditing power of COA.
Held/Ratio:
No. Government instrumentalities are agencies of the national government
that, by reason of some “special function or jurisdiction” they perform or
exercise, are allotted “operational autonomy” and are “not integrated
within the department framework.” Subsumed under the rubric

“government instrumentality” are: regulatory agencies, Chartered
institutions, government instrumentality are the following entites:
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, government corporate entities
or government instrumentalities with corporate powers (GCE/GICP), and
GOCCs.
Under Republic Act No. 10149 or the GOCC Governance Act of 2011
(Sec. 3) GOCCs are defined as:
(o) Government-Owned or -Controlled Corporation (GOCC) refers to
any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with
functions relating to public needs whether governmental or
proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines directly or through its instrumentalities either
wholly or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the
extent of at least a majority of its outstanding capital stock: . . . .
GOCCs, therefore, are “stock or non-stock” corporations “vested with functions
relating to public needs” that are “owned by the Government directly or through its
instrumentalities.” By definition, three attributes thus make an entity a GOCC: first,
its organization as stock or non-stock corporation; second, the public character of its
function; and third, government ownership over the same.
Possession of all three attributes is necessary to deem an entity a GOCC.
In this case, there is not much dispute that the MECO possesses the first and second
attributes. It is the third attribute, which the MECO lacks.
The MECO is not a GOCC or government instrumentality. It is a sui generis private
entity especially entrusted by the government with the facilitation of unofficial
relations with the people in Taiwan without jeopardizing the country’s faithful
commitment to the One China policy of the PROC. However, despite its non-
governmental character, the MECO handles government funds in the form of the
“verification fees” it collects on behalf of the DOLE and the “consular fees” it
collects under Section 2 (6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001. Hence, under existing laws, the
accounts of the MECO pertaining to its collection of such “verification fees” and
“consular fees” should be audited by the COA.
Quasi-public corporations- This class of corporations may be considered
quasi-public corporations, which are private corporations that render
public service, supply public wants, or pursue other eleemosynary
objectives. While purposely organized for the gain or benefit of its
members, they are required by law to discharge functions for the public
benefit. Examples of these corporations are utility, railroad, warehouse,
telegraph, telephone, water supply corporations and transportation
companies. It must be stressed that a quasi-public corporation is a species
Constitutional Law I | Atty. Evecar Cruz (AY. 2023-2024)
FNALOLOR NOTES _ Arellano University School of Law
of private corporations, but the qualifying factor is the type of service the
former renders to the public: if it performs a public service, then it becomes
a quasi- public corporation.
Phil Society v. COA – 534 SCRA 112 [2007] (Quasi-public corporation;
private but with public character; charter test not applicable)
Doctrine: Essentially, the “charter test” provides that the test to determine whether
a corporation is government owned or controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it
created by its own charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation
under the general corporation law? Those with special charters are government
corporations subject to its provisions, and its employees are under the jurisdiction of
the CSC, and are compulsory members of the GSIS.
Facts: The petitioner was incorporated as a juridical entity over one hundred years
ago by virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted on January 19, 1905, by the Philippine
Commission. The petitioner, at the time it was created, was composed of animal
aficionados and animal propagandists. The objects of the petitioner, as stated in
Section 2 of its charter, shall be to enforce laws relating to cruelty inflicted upon
animals or the protection of animals in the Philippine Islands, and generally, to do
and perform all things which may tend in any way to alleviate the suffering of
animals and promote their welfare.
At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1285, the original Corporation Law, Act
No. 1459, was not yet in existence. Act No. 1285 antedated both the Corporation
Law and the constitution of the SEC.
For the purpose of enhancing its powers in promoting animal welfare and enforcing
laws for the protection of animals, the petitioner was initially imbued under its
charter with the power to apprehend violators of animal welfare laws. In
addition, the petitioner was to share 1/2 of the fines imposed and collected through
its efforts for violations of the laws related thereto.
Subsequently, however, the power to make arrests as well as the privilege to retain a
portion of the fines collected for violation of animal-related laws were recalled by
virtue of C.A. No. 148. Whereas, the cruel treatment of animals is now an offense
against the State, penalized under our statutes, which the Government is duty bound
to enforce;
The COA was to perform an audit on them they refuse to do so, by the reason that
they are a private entity and not under the said commission. It argued that COA

covers only government entities. On the other hand the COA decided that it is a
government entity.
Issue/s: The essential question before this Court is whether the petitioner qualifies
as a government agency that may be subject to audit by respondent COA.
Held/Ratio: NO. 1st, the Court agrees with the petitioner that the “charter test”
cannot be applied. Essentially, the “charter test” provides that the test to determine
whether a corporation is government owned or controlled, or private in nature is
simple.
Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public function, or by
incorporation under the general corporation law? Those with special charters are
government corporations subject to its provisions, and its employees are under the
jurisdiction of the CSC, and are compulsory members of the GSIS. And since the
“charter test” had been introduced by the 1935 Constitution and not earlier, it
follows that the test cannot apply to the petitioner, which was incorporated by virtue
of Act No. 1285, enacted on January 19, 1905. Settled is the rule that laws in general
have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
2nd, a reading of petitioner’s charter shows that it is not subject to control or
supervision by any agency of the State, unlike GOCCs. No government
representative sits on the board of trustees of the petitioner. Like all private
corporations, the successors of its members are determined voluntarily and
solely by the petitioner in accordance with its bylaws, and may exercise those
powers generally accorded to private corporations, such as the powers to hold
property, to sue and be sued, to use a common seal, and so forth. It may adopt
by-laws for its internal operations: the petitioner shall be managed or operated by its
officers “in accordance with its by-laws in force.”
3rd, the employees of the petitioner are registered and covered by the SSS at
the latter’s initiative, and not through the GSIS, which should be the case if the
employees are considered government employees. This is another indication of
petitioner’s nature as a private entity.
4th, the respondents contend that the petitioner is a “body politic” because its
primary purpose is to secure the protection and welfare of animals which, in turn,
redounds to the public good. This argument, is not tenable. The fact that a certain
juridical entity is impressed with public interest does not, by that circumstance
alone, make the entity a public corporation, inasmuch as a corporation may be
private although its charter contains provisions of a public character, incorporated
solely for the public good. This class of corporations may be considered quasi-
public corporations, which are private corporations that render public service, supply
Constitutional Law I | Atty. Evecar Cruz (AY. 2023-2024)
FNALOLOR NOTES _ Arellano University School of Law
public wants, or pursue other eleemosynary objectives. While purposely organized
for the gain or benefit of its members, they are required by law to discharge
functions for the public benefit. Examples of these corporations are utility, railroad,
warehouse, telegraph, telephone, water supply corporations and transportation
companies. It must be stressed that a quasi-public corporation is a species of private
corporations, but the qualifying factor is the type of service the former renders to the
public: if it performs a public service, then it becomes a quasi-public corporation.
5th, the respondents argue that since the charter of the petitioner requires the latter
to render periodic reports to the Civil Governor, whose functions have been
inherited by the President, the petitioner is, therefore, a government instrumentality .
State Universities
De Jure and De Facto Government
Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh – 75 PHIL. 113 [1945] (Government;
de facto)
Doctrine: There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or
government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government that gets
possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the
majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself against the will
of the latter, such as the government of Eng- land under the
Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later by Cromwell as Protector. The
second is that which is established and maintained by military forces who
invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which
is denominated a government of paramount force, as the cases of Castine, in
Maine, which was reduced to British possession in the war of 1812, and of
Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of
the United States. And the third is that established as an independent
government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against
the parent state, such as the government of the Southern Confederacy in
revolt against the Union during the war of seccession.
Facts:
The respondent judge of the lower court refused to take cognizance of and
continue the proceeding of civil case No. 3012 of said court which was initiated
under
the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the
Japanese
military occupation of the Philippines. He argued that the proclamation issued by
Gen.

Douglas MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial
proceedings
and judgements of the courts of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese
military occupation, and that, furthermore, the lower court courts have no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the
courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law
granting such authority.
He also argued that the said governments during the Japanese occupation were not
de facto governments.
Issue/s: Whether or not the proclamation of Gen. McArthur rendered null and void
all
judgments and judicial proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines
during
the Japanese military occupation
Held/Ratio:
No. The word “processes” in the proclamation that “all laws, regulations
and
processes” of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese
occupation
of the country are “null and void and without legal effect” may not be construed to
embrace judicial processes because to adopt such construction great inconvenience
and
public hardship would result and great public interest would be endangered and
sacrificed, for disputes or suits already adjudged would have to be again settled,
accrued or vested rights nullified, sentences passed on criminals set aside, and
criminals might easily become immune for evidence against them may have
already disappeared.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 104768, July 21, 2003 (Rights
during interregnum)
Doctrine: During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government were the supreme law because no constitution
limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the
abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was
no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any
exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a
constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum.
Constitutional Law I | Atty. Evecar Cruz (AY. 2023-2024)
FNALOLOR NOTES _ Arellano University School of Law
Facts: Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful
EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive
Order No. 1 ("EO No. 1") creating the Presidential Commission on Good
Government ("PCGG"). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all
ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. EO No. 1 vested the
PCGG with the power "(a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary in
order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order" and the power
"(h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the purpose of this order." Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then
Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board ("AFP
Board") tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt
practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired. One of
the respondents in this case is Major General Ramas and his alleged
mistress, Elizabeth Dimaano.
Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the
Philippine Army until 1986. On the other hand, Dimaano was a confidential
agent of the Military Security Unit, Philippine Army, assigned as a clerk-
typist at the office of Ramas from 1 January 1978 to February 1979. The
Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas "acquired funds, assets and
properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and
his other income from legitimately acquired property by taking undue
advantage of his public office and/or using his power, authority and
influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a
subordinate and close associate of the deposed President Ferdinand
Marcos."
The Sandiganbayan amended the complaint on the Ground that
PCGG’s actions are not in accordance with the rulings of the Supereme
court in other cases and PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate the
respondents.
Issue/s: whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause the
filing of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained
wealth under RA No. 1379.
Whether or not

Held/Ratio: PCGG has no such jurisdiction. he PCGG, through the AFP
Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of
AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in
Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated
ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former President Marcos by
being the latter's immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate,
taking undue advantage of their public office or using their powers,
influence . . .; or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and
corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG.
The PCGG should have recommended Ramas' case to the Ombudsman who
has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of ordinary
unexplained wealth and graft cases.
As stated in Migrino:
[But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and
cause the prosecution of private respondent for violation of Rep. Acts Nos.
3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined from proceeding with the
case, without prejudice to any action that may be taken by the proper
prosecutory agency. The rule of law mandates that an agency of
government be allowed to exercise only the powers granted to it.
4. Sovereignty -is the supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a
State by which a State is governed.
Sec. 2. International Law and Philippine Municipal Law
Adoption of International Law and the doctrine of incorporation as applied
to:
Treaties and agreements
Kuroda v. Jalandoni – 83 PHIL. 171 (International humanitarian law
and generally accepted principles of international law)
Doctrine:
Constitutional Law I | Atty. Evecar Cruz (AY. 2023-2024)
FNALOLOR NOTES _ Arellano University School of Law
Facts: Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese
Imperial Forces in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was charged
before the Philippine Military Commission of war crimes. He questioned the
constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the National War Crimes Office and
prescribed rules on the trial of accused war criminals. He contended the Philippines
is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land
Warfare and therefore he is charged of crimes not based on law, national and
international.
Issue/s: Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?
Held/Ratio: [The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and
constitutionality of E.O. No. 68.]
YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.
Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 2, that –
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of
the present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and
significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the United
Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning
preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and
offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of
war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in the
promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the
Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of
international law which are part of the our Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction
to try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the
Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed
the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the
Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the
generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and
principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations the United State and Japan
who were signatories to the two Convention. Such rule and principles therefore
form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to
the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately

general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule
and principle of international law as contained in treaties to which our
government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Tañada v. Angara – 272 SCRA 18 [1997] (GATT-WTO)
Doctrine:
Facts:
This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other lawmakers,
taxpayers, and various NGO’s to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement.
Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National Economy
and against to the “Filipino First” policy. The WTO opens access to foreign markets,
especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports,
particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the
service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the
country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by
the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.
Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, since
the said Agreement is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because it
meant that Congress could not pass legislation that would be good for national interest
and general welfare if such legislation would not conform to the WTO Agreement.
Issue/s: Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization and the Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes
one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement’ cited by petitioners directly contravene
or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Held/Ratio: While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods,
services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business
exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits
protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that
are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy.
It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the
Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of
foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either.
In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on
foreign competition that is unfair.
Constitutional Law I | Atty. Evecar Cruz (AY. 2023-2024)
FNALOLOR NOTES _ Arellano University School of Law
Bayan v. Zamora, GR No. 138570, October 10, 2000 (VFA)
Doctrine:
Facts:
Issue/s:
Held/Ratio:
Saguisag v. Exec. Secretary, GR No. 212426, January 12, 2016 and MR,
July 26, 2016 affirming 1st judgment. (EDCA)
Doctrine:
Doctrine: Under international law, the distinction between a treaty and an
international agreement or even an executive agreement is irrelevant for
purposes of determining international rights and obligations.
Facts: The petitions before this Court question the constitutionality of the
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America (U.S.). Petitioners allege that
respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when they entered into EDCA with the U.S., claiming that the
instrument violated multiple constitutional provisions. In reply, respondents argue
that petitioners lack standing to bring the suit. To support the legality of their
actions, respondents invoke the 1987 Constitution, treaties, and judicial precedents.
Issue/s: Whether or not EDCA is a treaty.
Held/Ratio: Yes. The Court held that EDCA fully conforms to the
Philippines’ legal regime through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms
to the government’s continued policy to enhance our military capability in
the face of various military and humanitarian issues that may arise. The
court added that EDCA has remained within the parameters set in these two
treaties.
The special nature of an executive agreement is not just a domestic variation
in international agreements. International practice has accepted the use of
various forms and designations of international agreements, ranging from
the traditional notion of a treaty - which connotes a formal, solemn
instrument - to engagements concluded in modem, simplified forms that no
longer necessitate ratification. An international agreement may take
different forms: treaty, act, protocol, agreement, concordat, compromis
d'arbitrage, convention, covenant, declaration, exchange of notes, statute,
pact, charter, agreed minute, memorandum of agreement, modus vivendi, or
some other form. Consequently, under international law, the distinction
213

between a treaty and an international agreement or even an executive
agreement is irrelevant for purposes of determining international rights and
obligations.
However, this principle does not mean that the domestic law distinguishing
treaties, international agreements, and executive agreements is relegated to
a mere variation in form, or that the constitutional requirement of Senate
concurrence is demoted to an optional constitutional directive. There remain
two very important features that distinguish treaties from executive
agreements and translate them into terms of art in the domestic setting.
First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an express or implied
authorization under the Constitution, statutes, or treaties. Second, treaties
are, by their very nature, considered superior to executive agreements.
Treaties are products of the acts of the Executive and the Senate unlike 215
executive agreements, which are solely executive actions. Because of
216
legislative participation through the Senate, a treaty is regarded as being on
the same level as a statute. If there is an irreconcilable conflict, a later law
217
or treaty takes precedence over one that is prior. An executive agreement
218
is treated differently. Executive agreements that are inconsistent with either
a law or a treaty are considered ineffective. Both types of international
219
agreement are nevertheless subject to the supremacy of the Constitution. 220
This rule does not imply, though, that the President is given carte blanche to
exercise this discretion. Although the Chief Executive wields the exclusive authority
to conduct our foreign relations, this power must still be exercised within the context
and the parameters set by the Constitution, as well as by existing domestic and
international laws.
International Law in relation to Municipal Law
- From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over
municipal law pursuant to the principle of pacta sunct servanda. Further, a
party to a treaty is not allowed to invoke provisions of its internal law as
justification for its failure to perform a treaty. However it must be taken into
account that provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification or
amendment by a subsequent law, or that it is subject to the police power of
the state.
Lim v. Exec. Secretary, GR No. 151445, April 11, 2002 (Balikatan
Exercises)
Doctrine: From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is
favored over municipal law pursuant to the principle of pacta sunct
Constitutional Law I | Atty. Evecar Cruz (AY. 2023-2024)
FNALOLOR NOTES _ Arellano University School of Law
servanda. Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed to invoke provisions of
its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. However it
must be taken into account that provisions of a treaty are always subject to
qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, or that it is subject to the
police power of the state.
Facts: The last “Balikatan” was held in 1995. This was due to the paucity
of any formal agreement relative to the treatment of US personnel visiting
the PH. In the meantime, the two countries agreed to hold joint exercises on
a reduced scale. PH and US concluded the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA) in 1999. Beginning January 2002, personnel from the Armed Forces
of US started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the PH
military, in “Balikatan 02-1”. The said training was a simulation of joint
military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral
defense agreement entered into by the PH and US in 1951. On February 7,
2002 the Senate conducted a hearing on the “Balikatan” exercise wherein
VP Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., who is concurrently Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, presented the Draft Terms of Reference (TOR). Five days later, he
approved the TOR (it contained the matters of policy level and exercise
level including the training, administration & logistics, and public affairs).
Under the TOR, the Exercise is said to be a mutual counter-terrorism
advising, assisting and training Exercise relative to Philippine efforts
against the ASG (Abu Sayyaf Group), and will be conducted on the Island
of Basilan. Further advising, assisting and training exercises shall be
conducted in Malagutay and the Zamboanga area. Related activities in Cebu
will be for support of the Exercise.
Issue/s: Whether the PH and US signed the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)
in 1951 to provide mutual military assistance only in the case of an armed
attack by an external aggressor, meaning a third country against one of
them.
Held/Ratio: The holding of “Balikatan 02-1” must be studied in the
framework of MDT. It is this treaty to which the VFA adverts and the
obligations thereunder which it seeks to reaffirm. The VFA provided the
“regulatory mechanism” which permits US personnel to engage, on an
impermanent basis, in “activities” approved by the PH Government. The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties signed is used to determine how
treaties should be interpreted and in this case it says: (1) Interpreted in good
faith and use ordinary meaning, (2) Take into account the context (context

means: any past interpretation and application of treaties between parties
and the use of international law, if it is applicable) Thus “activities” is
interpreted to give leeway for US and PH to engage in purposes other than
military (combat related) practices e.g. training, giving legitimacy for the
Balikatan exercises. Also; both the history and intent of the MDT and VFA
support the conclusion that combat-related activities (as opposed to combat
itself), such as the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.
Recognition of foreign judgments: general principles of law
Mijares v. Ranada, GR No. 139325, April 12, 2005 (Alien Torts Act)
Doctrine: [G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of
the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the
land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical
formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as
binding result from the combination [of] two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistentpractice on the part of States; and a
psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates
(opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is abelief that
the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule
of law requiring it.
Facts: In this case, a complaint was filed with the United States District
Court by ten Filipino citizens against Marcos Estate. They alleged that they
suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture and rape in
the hands of police or military forces during the Marcos regime. The Alien
Tort Act was invoked as basis for the US District Court's jurisdiction over
the complaint, as it involved a suit by aliens for tortious violations of
international law. These plaintiffs brought the action on their own behalf
and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, particularly
consisting of all current civilian citizens of the Philippines, their heirs and
beneficiaries, who between 1972 and 1987 were tortured, summarily
executed or had disappeared while in the custody of military or paramilitary
groups.
Trial ensued, and subsequently a jury rendered a verdict and an award of
compensatory and exemplary damages in favor of the plaintiff class. On 20
May 1997, the present petitioners filed a Complaint with the Regional Trial
Constitutional Law I | Atty. Evecar Cruz (AY. 2023-2024)
FNALOLOR NOTES _ Arellano University School of Law
Court, City of Makati (Makati RTC) for the enforcement of the Final
Judgment.
On 5 February 1998, the Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising,
among others, the non-payment of the correct filing fees. It alleged that
petitioners had only paid Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) as docket and
filing fees, notwithstanding the fact that they sought to enforce a monetary
amount of damages in the amount of over Two and a Quarter Billion US
Dollars (US$2.25 Billion). On 9 September 1998, respondent Judge
Santiago Javier Ranada of the Makati RTC issued the subject Order
dismissing the complaint without prejudice. Respondent judge opined that
contrary to the petitioners' submission, the subject matter of the complaint
was indeed capable of pecuniary estimation, as it involved a judgment
rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of definite sums of
money, allowing for easy determination of the value of the foreign
judgment. On that score, Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure would find application, and the RTC estimated the proper
amount of filing fees was approximately Four Hundred Seventy Two
Million Pesos, which obviously had not been paid.
Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary estimation as
the subject matter of the suit is the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and
not an action for the collection of a sum of money or recovery of damages.
They also point out that to require the class plaintiffs to pay Four Hundred
Seventy Two Million Pesos (P472,000,000.00) in filing fees would negate
and render inutile the liberal construction ordained by the Rules of Court, as
required by Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly
the inexpensive disposition of every action.
In dismissing the complaint, the respondent judge relied on Section 7(a),
Rule 141 as basis for the computation of the filing fee of over P472 Million.
The provision states:
SEC. 7. Clerk of Regional Trial Court. —
(a) For filing an action or a permissive counterclaim or money claim against
an estate not based on judgment.. xxx
Issue/s: 1. Whether or not the respondent judge erred when he concluded
that the filing fees should be computed on the basis of the schematic table of

Section 7(a), as the action involved pertains to a claim against an estate
based on judgment. What provision, if any, then should apply in
determining the filing fees for an action to enforce a foreign judgment?
2. Whether or not the respondent judge erred in interpreting the action for
the execution of a foreign judgement as a new case and should be relitigated
in our jurisdiction?
Held/Ratio: 1. Yes, the respondent judge erred in concluding that the filing
fees should be computed on the basis of schematic table of section 7(a). The
complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of
pecuniary estimation. But at the same time, it is also an action based on
judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a)
of Rule 141.
What provision then governs the proper computation of the filing fees over
the instant complaint? For this case and other similarly situated instances,
we find that it is covered by Section 7(b)(3), involving as it does, "other
actions not involving property." Notably, the amount paid as docket fees by
the petitioners on the premise that it was an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation corresponds to the same amount required for "other actions not
involving property." The petitioners thus paid the correct amount of filing
fees, and it was a grave abuse of discretion for respondent judge to have
applied instead a clearly inapplicable rule and dismissed the complaint.
2. Yes, the respondent judge erred in interpreting that the present case is a
new case. The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have
established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of
foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and
rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different
countries.
Section 48 states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. — The effect of a judgment of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment
is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive
upon the title to the thing;
Constitutional Law I | Atty. Evecar Cruz (AY. 2023-2024)
FNALOLOR NOTES _ Arellano University School of Law
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by
a subsequent title;
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally
restricted to a review of jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of
personal notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of fact or law. The
limitations on review is in consonance with a strong and pervasive
policy in all legal systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims and
issues. Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect
party expectations resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard against
the harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be
increased by never- ending litigation of the same disputes, and — in a larger
sense — to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrer's Case of 1599 stated to
be the goal of all law: "rest and quietness." If every judgment of a foreign
court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on
his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
concluded litigation.
And finally, it has been recognized that "public policy" as a defense to the
recognition of judgments serves as an umbrella for a variety of concerns in
international practice which may lead to a denial of recognition. The
viability of the public policy defense against the enforcement of a foreign
judgment has been recognized in this jurisdiction. This defense allows for
the application of local standards in reviewing the foreign judgment,
especially when such judgment creates only a presumptive right, as it does
in cases wherein the judgment is against a person. The defense is also
recognized within the international sphere, as many civil law nations adhere
to a broad public policy exception which may result in a denial of
recognition when the foreign court, in the light of the choice-of-law rules of
the recognizing court, applied the wrong law to the case. The public policy
defense can safeguard against possible abuses to the easy resort to offshore
litigation if it can be demonstrated that the original claim is noxious to our
constitutional values.

There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that
requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a
procedure for the enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted
principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the
Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive
from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees
those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination two
elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part
of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is
a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence
of a rule of law requiring it.
Aside from the widespread practice, it is indubitable that the procedure for
recognition and enforcement is embodied in the rules of law, whether
statutory or jurisprudential, adopted in various foreign jurisdictions. In the
Philippines, this is evidenced primarily by Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court which has existed in its current form since the early 1900s.
Certainly, the Philippine legal system has long ago accepted into its
jurisprudence and procedural rules the viability of an action for enforcement
of foreign judgment, as well as the requisites for such valid enforcement, as
derived from internationally accepted doctrines. Again, there may be
distinctions as to the rules adopted by each particular state, but they all
prescind from the premise that there is a rule of law obliging states to allow
for, however generally, the recognition and enforcement of a foreign
judgment. The bare principle, to our mind, has attained the status of opinio
juris in international practice.
This is a significant proposition, as it acknowledges that the procedure and
requisites outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 derive their efficacy not merely
from the procedural rule, but by virtue of the incorporation clause of the
Constitution. Rules of procedure are promulgated by the Supreme Court,
and could very well be abrogated or revised by the high court itself. Yet the
Supreme Court is obliged, as are all State components, to obey the laws of
the land, including generally accepted principles of international law which
form part thereof, such as those ensuring the qualified recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments.
Thus, relative to the enforcement of foreign judgments in the Philippines, it
emerges that there is a general right recognized within our body of laws,
Constitutional Law I | Atty. Evecar Cruz (AY. 2023-2024)
FNALOLOR NOTES _ Arellano University School of Law
and affirmed by the Constitution, to seek recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments, as well as a right to defend against such enforcement on
the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Soft Law - It is propounded that WHA Resolutions may constitute "soft
law" or non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state
behavior.
"Soft law" does not fall into any of the categories of international law set
forth in Article 38, Chapter III of the 1946 Statute of the International
Court of Justice. As previously discussed, for an international rule to be
considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being
followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such
rules (opinio juris).
Pharmaceutical v. DOH, GR No. 173034, October 9, 2007 (World
Health Assembly guidelines not a treaty)
Doctrine: Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of
the
sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. 11 The
transformation method requires that an international law be transformed
into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local
legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional
ßdeclaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
12
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation
pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that "
[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Thus,
treaties or conventional international law must go through a process
prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law
that can be applied to domestic conflicts.

Facts:
Issue/s:
Held/Ratio:
Knights of Rizal v. DMCI, GR No. 213948, April 25, 2017 (Venice
Charter as mere guidelines)
Doctrine:
The Venice Charter is merely a codification of guiding principles for the
preservation and restoration of ancient monuments, sites, and buildings. It brings
together principles in the field of historical conservation and restoration that have
been developed, agreed upon, and laid down by experts over the years. Each
country, however, remains "responsible for applying the plan within the framework
of its own culture and traditions."
Facts:
On July 5, 2012, DMCI Project Developers, Inc. (DMCI) was granted a building
permit to build a 49-Storey Torre De Manila Residential Condominium on a
7,716.60sqm lot they acquired in the City of Manila. The City Council of Manila
issued Resolution No. 121 enjoining the Office of the Building Official to
temporarily suspend the building permit of DMCI. That the said condominium
project will rise up high above the back of the national monument of Jose Rizal and
would certainly ruin the line of sight of the Rizal Shrine from the frontal Roxas
Boulevard vantage point.
Both the City of Manila and DMCI sought the opinion of the National Historical
Commission of the Philippines (NHCP) on the matter. NCHP maintained that the
Torre de Manila project site is outside the boundaries of the Rizal Park and cannot
possibly obstruct the frontal view of the National Monument.
Following an online petition against the construction project, the City Council of
Manila issued Resolution No. 146, directing the building officials to temporarily
suspend the project. The Manila Zoning Board of Adjustments and Appeals
recommended the approval of the building plan of DMCI and subsequently, the City
Council of Manila agreed to the recommendation of the Zoning Board to let DMCI
continue the project.
Arguments of the Knights of Rizal (KOR)
On September 12, 2014, the KOR, a civic and non-profit organization filed a
petition for injunction seeking a temporary restraining order, and later a permanent
injunction, against the construction of DMCI project. The group argued that:
Constitutional Law I | Atty. Evecar Cruz (AY. 2023-2024)
FNALOLOR NOTES _ Arellano University School of Law
1.) The protest against the project is one of “transcendental importance” involving the
desecration of the Rizal Monument.
2.) The Torre De Manila will ruin the sightline of the Rizal Monument.
3.) That being a National Treasure, the Rizal Monument is entitled to “full protection of
the law” and that the national government must stop the activity that endangers the
nation’s cultural heritage even against the local government pushing for it.
4.) That the project is a nuisance because the destruction of the sight view of the Rizal
Monument is a situation that annoys or offends the Filipinos who honor the memory
of our national hero.
5.) That the project violates the NHCP’s Guidelines on Monuments Honoring National
Heroes, Illustrious Filipinos and other Personages, which state that historic
monuments should assert a visual dominance over its surroundings.
6.) Last, that the DMCI continued in bad faith and is in violation of the City’s zoning
ordinance.
Arguments of DMCI
DMCI argues that KOR’s petition should be dismissed on the ff grounds:
1.) SC has no jurisdiction over this action
DMCI asserts that the petition should have been filed with the RTC under the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts and that the petition involves questions of fact and
not justiciable one.
DMCI also contends that KOR should appeal to the Manila Zoning Board and to
HLURB and not the SC
Injunction is not a remedy but a complaint to be filed with the appropriate cultural
agency under the National Cultural Heritage Act.
2.) KOR has no legal right or interest to file or prosecute this action
KOR’s purpose does not include the preservation of the Rizal Monument and that it
did not suffer an actual or threatened injury as a result of the alleged illegal conduct.
3.) Torre De Manila is not a nuisance
 Constitutional Law I | Atty. Evecar Cruz (AY. 2023-2024)
FNALOLOR NOTES _ Arellano University School of Law

It obtained all necessary permits, licenses, clearances, and certificates for its have been proven over the years to be the most effective in preserving and restoring
construction. There are also other tall buildings even closer to the Rizal Monument. historical monuments, sites and buildings.

4.) DMCI acted in good faith in constructing Torre De Manila; and

KOR failed to present any proof that DMCI did not follow the proper procedure and
zoning restrictions of the City. The project was also cleared but the City Legal
Officer of Manila and NHCP. Adherence to peace, freedom, amity

KOR is not entitled to a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary Sec. 3. Civilian Supremacy
injunction. KOR stands to suffer no damage because of its lack of direct pecuniary
interest in this petition. To grant the KOR’s petition for injunction would constitute
an unjust taking of property without due process of law. IBP v. Zamora, GR No. 141284, August 15, 2000 (Deployment of
marines) Role of the Armed Forces
Issue/s: Doctrine:
Whether or not the SC can issue a writ of mandamus against the officials of the City Facts:
of Manila to stop the construction of DMCI Torre De Manila Project? Issue/s:
Held/Ratio:
Held/Ratio:

The petition for mandamus lacks merit and must be dismissed. There is no law Sec. 4. Duty of Government to the People
prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila.

In this case, there can be no determination of the Court that the City of Manila had Sec. 5. Maintenance of Peace and Order
been negligent or remiss in its duty under Ordinance No. 8119 considering that this
determination will involve questions of fact. DMCI- PDI had been issued the proper
permits and had secured all approvals and licenses months before the actual Sec. 6. Separation of Church and State
construction began. Even the KOR could not point to any law that respondent City
of Manila had violated and could only point to declarations of policies by the NHCP
and the Venice Charter which do not constitute clear legal bases for the issuance of a Sec. 7. Independent Foreign Policy
Writ of Mandamus.

The Venice Charter is merely a codification of guiding principles for the

Sec. 8. Freedom from Nuclear Weapons
preservation and restoration of ancient monuments, sites, and buildings. It brings
together principles in the field of historical conservation and restoration that have
been developed, agreed upon, and laid down by experts over the years. Each
country, however, remains "responsible for applying the plan within the framework Sec. 9. Social Order
of its own culture and traditions."

The Venice Charter is not a treaty and therefore does not become enforceable as Sec. 10. Social Justice
law. The Philippines is not legally bound to follow its directive, as in fact, these are
not directives but mere guidelines - a set of the best practices and techniques that
 Constitutional Law I | Atty. Evecar Cruz (AY. 2023-2024)
FNALOLOR NOTES _ Arellano University School of Law

Sec. 11 Personal Dignity and Human Rights

Garcia v. Drilon, GR No. 173267, June 25, 2013 (VAWC;
discrimination)
Doctrine:
Sec. 12. Family Life; Mother; Unborn
Facts:
Issue/s:
Family Held/Ratio:
Unborn
Sec. 15. Right to Health
Imbong v. Ochoa, GR No. 204819, April 8, 2014 (RH law)
Doctrine:
Facts:
Sec. 16. Right to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology
Issue/s:
Held/Ratio:
Oposa v. Factoran – 224 SCRA 792 [1993] (Inter-generational justice
Rights and Duty of Parents/Aid from Government and responsibility)

Wisconsin v. Yoder – 40 LW 4476 [1972] (Compulsory education; note Doctrine:

that this pertains to a statute; read with the policy on compulsory Facts:
elementary education A14, Sec. 2 (2) ) Issue/s:
Held/Ratio:
Doctrine:
Facts: Arigo v. Swift – GR No. 206510, September 16, 2014 (Damage to reef)
Issue/s:
Held/Ratio: Doctrine:
Facts:
Spark v. QC, GR No. 225442, August 8, 2017 Issue/s:
Held/Ratio:
Doctrine:
Facts: West Tower v. PIC – 798 SCRA 292 (Precautionary principle not
Issue/s: applied)
Held/Ratio:
Doctrine:
Facts:
Sec. 13. Vital Role of Youth
Issue/s:
Held/Ratio:
Sec. 14. Role of Women and Equality of Men and Women
International Service v. Greenpeace, GR No. 209271, December 8, 2015
and MR, July 26, 2016 reversing 1st judgment. (GMO)
 Constitutional Law I | Atty. Evecar Cruz (AY. 2023-2024)
FNALOLOR NOTES _ Arellano University School of Law

Doctrine:
Facts:
Issue/s:
Held/Ratio:

Sec. 17. Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports

Sec. 18. Labor Protection

Sec. 19. Self-Reliant and Independent National Economy