CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW NOTES (DIAGNOSTIC TEST CASES)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW NOTES exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf
Q1: What was the decision of the Supreme Court
on the validity of the Baselines law in Magallona vs.
Ermita?
A: RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional.
RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the
Country’s Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under
UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory
UNCLOS III:
• has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of
territory
• a multilateral treaty regulating, among others,
sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the
territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the
baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles
from the baselines], exclusive economic zone
[200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and
continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.
• culmination of decades-long negotiations among
United Nations members to codify norms
regulating the conduct of States in the world’s
oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal
and archipelagic States graduated authority over
a limited span of waters and submarine lands
along their coasts.
Baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS
III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along
their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either
straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting
points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones
and continental shelf.
Article 48 of UNCLOS III:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the
territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf. The
breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone,
the exclusive economic zone and the continental
shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines
drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory
mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit
with precision the extent of their maritime zones and
continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest
of the international community of the scope of the
maritime space and submarine areas within which States
parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise
of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the
jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and
sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the
right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the
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(Article 77).
Even under petitioner’s theory that the Philippine
territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the
rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the
baselines of the Philippines would still have to be
drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the
only way to draw the baselines in conformity with
UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the
boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area
delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the outermost
islands and drying reefs of the archipelago.
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no
role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners
claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional
international law typology, States acquire (or conversely,
lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and
prescription, not by executing multilateral treaties on the
regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to
comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones
and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features
are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the
rules on general international law.
RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints,
increased the Philippines total maritime space
(covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive
economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles.
Q2: What was the decision of the Supreme Court
on the standing of future and unborn generations in
Oposa v. Factoran?
A: The Court upheld the class suit filed by Oposa, et.
al. Through intergenerational responsibility, petitioners
may represent in favor of their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. The right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned, hence, the upholding of
the class suit.
SC: Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a
class suit. The original defendant and the present
respondents did not take issue with this matter.
Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is
indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint
is of common and general interest not just to several,
but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently,
since the parties are so numerous, it becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them
before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs
therein are numerous and representative enough to
ensure the full protection of all concerned interests.
Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit
under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are
present both in the said civil case and in the instant
petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
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This case, however, has a special and novel element.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find
no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based
on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of
nature.”
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to
the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the
full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.
Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion of their right
to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection
of that right for the generations to come.
Q3: How did the US Supreme Court, as the highest
court of the Philippines in the early 1900s, apply due
process to ancestral lands?
A: By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, chapter 1369,
section 12 (32 Statutes at Large, 691), all the property
and rights acquired there by the United States are to
be administered "for the benefit of the inhabitants
thereof."
It is reasonable to suppose that the attitude thus assumed
by the United States with regard to what was
unquestionably its own is also its attitude in deciding what
it will claim for its own. The same statute made a bill of
rights, embodying the safeguards of the Constitution,
and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to
all. It provides that "no law shall be enacted in said
islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, or deny to any
person therein the equal protection of the laws." (Sec.
5.) In the light of the declaration that we have quoted from
section 12, it is hard to believe that the United States was
ready to declare in the next breath that "any person" did
not embrace the inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant
by "property" only that which had become such by
ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the
inhabitants never had heard, and that it proposed to treat
as public land what they, by native custom and by long
association,—one of the profoundest factors in human
thought,—regarded as their own.
Q4: What is the decision of the Court on the
constitutionality of IPRA in Cruz vs. NCIP?
A: The Court upheld the constitutionality of IPRA
Law.
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SC: Where the votes in the Court en banc are equally
divided and the necessary majority is not obtained, the
case is redeliberated upon, but if after deliberation, the
voting remains the same, the petition is dismissed
pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands and
domains held by native title as never to have been
public land—domains and lands held under native title
are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have never been
public lands and are private.
Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of
the lands of the public domain; they are private and
belong to the ICCs/IPs
The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to
their ancestral domains is held under the indigenous
concept of ownership which maintains the view that
ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community
property.
Q5: What is the decision of the Supreme Court on
the jurisdiction of the Comelc and the HRET on election
cases in Ongsiako Reyes v. COMELEC?
A: The COMELEC retains jurisdiction in the election
case of Regina Ongsiako-Reyes.
SC: As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300
(1995), the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a
candidate who is not a member of the House of
Representatives, to wit: As to the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s supposed assumption
of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications
after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET’s
jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of members of
Congress begins only after a candidate has become a
member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not
being a member of the House of Representatives, it is
obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over
the question.
To be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a
proper oath, and (3) assumption of office. once a
proclamation has been made, COMELEC’s jurisdiction is
already lost and, thus, its jurisdiction over contests
relating to elections, returns, and qualifications ends, and
the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
The petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the
House of Representatives because, primarily, she has
not yet assumed office. The term of office of a Member
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of the House of Representatives begins only “at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following their election.”
Thus, until such time, the Commission on Elections retains
jurisdiction.
Q6: What is the rule on legislative investigations
in Arnault v. Nazareno?
A: The power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is
an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function.
The Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of
legislative field than either the Congress of the United
States or a State Legislature, and the field of inquiry into
which it may enter is also wider. It is difficult to define any
limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be
bounded. Suffice it to say that it must be coextensive
with the range of legislative power.
No person can be punished for contumacy as a witness
before either House unless his testimony is required in a
matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire.
Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within
the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the
investigating committee has the power to require a
witness to answer any question pertinent to the subject
of the inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination.
The materiality of a question that may be propounded to
a witness is determined by its direct relation to the subject
of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any
proposed or possible legislation.
Where the immateriality of the information sought by the
legislative body from a witness is relied upon to contest
its jurisdiction, the Court is in duty bound to pass upon
the contention. Although the legislative body has the
power to make the inquiry, the Court is empowered to
correct a clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of that
power.
Since the Court has no power to determine what
legislation to approve or not to approve, it cannot say that
the information sought from a witness which is material
to the subject of the legislative inquiry is immaterial to any
proposed or possible legislation. It is not within the
province of the Court to determine or imagine what
legislative measures Congress may take after the
completion of the legislative investigation.
There is no sound reason to limit the power of the
legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of
every session and not to the end of the last session
terminating the existence of that body. While the
existence of the House of Representatives is limited to
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four years, that of the Senate is not so limited. The
Senate is a continuing body which does not cease to exist
upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the
House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to
the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases
where that power may constitutionally be exerted.
Q7: What is the power of control as laid down in
Carpio v. Executive Secretary?
A: The presidential power of control was held to
mean the power of the President to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former with that of the latter. It is said
to be at the very “heart of the meaning of Chief Executive."
Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control
powers of the President, is the “Doctrine of Qualified
Political Agency.” As the President cannot be expected
to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in
person, he will have to delegate some of them to his
Cabinet members.
The President’s power of control is directly exercised by
him over the members of the Cabinet who in turn and
by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices
under their respective jurisdiction in the executive
department.
Q8: Did Estrada resign or was he ousted by EDSAS
2 according to Estrada vs Desierto?
A: Estrada resigned as President.
SC: Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It
is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble:
there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be
coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a
resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as
to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express.
It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it
must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not
write any formal letter of resignation before he
evacuated Malacanang Palace in the afternoon of January
20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo.
Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to
be determined from his acts and omissions before, during
and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial
evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. Using
this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as
President.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner
cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving
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Malacañang. In the press release containing his final
statement,
1. he acknowledged the oath-taking of the
respondent as President of the Republic albeit
with reservation about its legality;
2. he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the
seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and
in order to begin the healing process of our
nation. He did not say he was leaving the
Palace due to any kind of inability and that he
was going to re-assume the presidency as soon
as the disability disappears;
3. he expressed his gratitude to the people for
the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt,
he was referring to the past opportunity given
him to serve the people as President;
4. he assured that he will not shirk from any
future challenge that may come ahead in the
same service of our country. Petitioner’s reference
is to a future challenge after occupying the office
of the president which he has given up; and
5. he called on his supporters to join him in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity
could not be attained if he did not give up the
presidency. The press release was petitioner’s
valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency
is now in the past tense.
Q9: How did the Supreme Court rule on the nature
of pardon extended to Joseph Estrada in Alicia Risos-
Vidal, vs. COMELEC and Joseph Ejercito Estrada?
A: Former President Estrada was granted an
absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and
political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek
public elective office. The only reasonable, objective, and
constitutional interpretation of the language of the
pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and
41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII
and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President
of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons,
along with other acts of executive clemency, to wit:
Section 19.
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines
and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. He
shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or
suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules,
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and regulations shall be granted by the President without
the favorable recommendation of the Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions
that the only instances in which the President may not
extend pardon remain to be in:
1. impeachment cases;
2. cases that have not yet resulted in a final
conviction; and
3. cases involving violations of election
laws, rules and regulations in which
there was no favorable
recommendation coming from the
COMELEC.
Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by
way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning
power of the President.
Q10: How did the Supreme Court rule on the legality
of the declaration of martial law by Duterte in
Mindanao in the case of Lagman vs Medialdea?
A: The Supreme Court upheld the legality of the
declaration of martial law by Duterte.
SC: Among the three extraordinary powers, the
calling out power is the most benign and involves
ordinary police action. The President may resort to this
extraordinary power whenever it becomes necessary to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or
rebellion. “[T]he power to call is fully discretionary to the
President”; the only limitations being that he acts within
permissible constitutional boundaries or in a manner not
constituting grave abuse of discretion. In fact, “the actual
use to which the President puts the armed forces is x x x
not subject to judicial review.”
The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus and/or declaring martial law
may be exercised only when there is actual invasion or
rebellion, and public safety requires it. The 1987
Constitution imposed the following limits in the exercise
of these powers:
1. a time limit of sixty days;
2. review and possible revocation by Congress;
and
3. review and possible nullification by the
Supreme Court.”
The framers of the 1987 Constitution eliminated
insurrection, and the phrase “imminent danger thereof” as
grounds for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or declaration of martial law. They
perceived the phrase “imminent danger” to be “fraught
with possibilities of abuse”; besides, the calling out power
of the President “is sufficient for handling imminent
danger.
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The declaration of martial law serves as a warning to
citizens that the Executive Department has called
upon the military to assist in the maintenance of law
and order, and while the emergency remains, the citizens
must, under pain of arrest and punishment, not act in a
manner that will render it more difficult to restore
order and enforce the law.
Even the recommendation of, or consultation with, the
Secretary of National Defense, or other high-ranking
military officials, is not a condition for the President to
declare martial law. A plain reading of Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution shows that the
President’s power to declare martial law is not subject
to any condition except for the requirements of actual
invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires it.
In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
declaration and/or the suspension, the Court should look
into the full complement or totality of the factual basis,
and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the
Court expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in
the proclamation and in the written Report as the
President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and
veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of
the situation. To require precision in the President's
appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and
therefore impede the process of his decision-making.
Such a requirement will practically necessitate the
President to be on the ground to confirm the correctness
of the reports submitted to him within a period that only
the circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate.
Q11: How is national revenue distributed according
to Mandanas vs Ochoa?
A: Section 6, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution
textually commands the allocation to the LGUs of their just
share in the national taxes. Sec. 6 embodies three
mandates:
1. the LGUs shall have a just share in the national
taxes;
2. the just share shall be determined by law; and
3. the just share shall be automatically released to
the LGUs.
Congress has exceeded its constitutional boundary by
limiting to the National Internal Revenue Taxes the
base from which to compute the just share of the
LGUs. Although the power of Congress to make laws is
plenary in nature, congressional lawmaking remains
subject to the limitations stated in the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, the phrase “national internal revenue taxes”
engrafted in Section 284 is undoubtedly more restrictive
than the term national taxes written in Section 6.
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Q12: What is a political question according to the
case of Tanada v. Cuenco?
A: The term "political question" connotes, in legal
parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. It refers to those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It
is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.
Q13: What is the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
over the JBC according to Jardeleza v. Sereno?
A: The Court has the power of supervision over the
JBC as stated in Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution.
The supervising official’s task is to see to it that the rules
are followed. They do not have the power to prescribe
rules or the power to modify or replace them.
If they find that the rules are not observed, they may
order that the work be done or redone but only in
order to conform to the rules. They have no power to
prescribe their own manner of execution of the act.
Thus, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC
covers the overseeing of compliance with its rules.
Q14: What was the ruling of the Court on LEB
powers in Pimentel vs LEB?
A: Even after another rumination, the Court still sees
no cogent reason to declare the entire RA 7662
unconstitutional based on the alleged encroachment of
the Supreme Court's authority and violation of academic
freedom. Every presumption should be indulged in favor
of constitutionality. The burden of proof is on the party
alleging an unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
However, the Court hastens to clarify that Sections 2
paragraphs 2, 3(a)(2), 7(g), and 7(h) of RA 7662
remain unconstitutional as declared in the Decision of
the Court. The foregoing provisions unduly infringed on
matters which fall within the exclusive domain of the
Supreme Court.
Sections 2 paragraphs 2, 3(2), and 7(h) were struck down
by this Court because, by their very terms, these
provisions pertain to matters affecting members of the
legal profession.
Admittedly, the study of the law is a comprehensive,
widespread, and life-long process. Hence, it is not
confined to the four corners of a law school and its
pedagogy. However, synthesizing Section 3(b) of RA 7662,
there should be no question that the legislative purpose
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of the law is aimed particularly towards law students. The
goal of RA 7662 is to improve legal education for law
students to learn the essential skills and competencies
that would make them not only strive but thrive in the
fast-changing world outside the law school.
The Court finds no difficulty upholding the purpose of the
law to improve legal education in the country. However,
extending the LEB's authority to those who have
already been accepted to the bar is a legislative
overreach. As explained in the Decision, in authorizing
the LEB to compel mandatory attendance of practicing
lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the LEB
deems necessary, the legislature encroached upon the
Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the
Integrated Bar. Respondents' tenuous assertion that the
continuing legal education under RA 7662 is limited to the
training of lawyer-professors does not justify the
existence of said provision. It still unlawfully intruded into
the power of the Court to promulgate rules concerning
the Integrated Bar, which necessarily includes the
continuing legal education of lawyer-professors, as the
term practice of law encompasses the teaching thereof.45
Similarly, the Court declared Section 7(g) unconstitutional
because its phraseology unduly stretched the authority
of the LEB by authorizing it "to establish a law practice
internship as a requirement for taking the Bar." With
Section 7(g), "the LEB is no longer confined within the
parameters of legal education, but now dabbles on the
requisites for admissions to the bar examinations, and
consequently, admissions to the bar." As underscored in
the Decision, however, "the jurisdiction to determine
whether an applicant may be allowed to take the bar
examinations belongs to the Court." Section 7(g)
unlawfully encroached into the constitutionally
sanctioned authority of the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules concerning the admission to the practice of law.
It is worth noting, as well, that in the Decision, the Court
had explained that Section 7(g) was likewise violative of
the academic freedom of law schools. As the Court held,
while the clause legal internship does not immediately
strike as being intrusive of the academic freedom of law
schools, how the LEB exercised its authority under
Section 7(g) effectively amounted to control. It
blatantly overstepped the authority of law schools to
determine what to teach by dictating upon the law
schools how to undertake the legal apprenticeship
and requiring law schools to submit their
apprenticeship program for assessment and
evaluation prior to endorsement of the same to this
Court for approval.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court cannot agree with
the proposition that Section 7, paragraphs (g) and (h) is
not unconstitutional in view of their "dual aspect that
caters to both legal education and practice of law," and
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that the determination of whether the particular activities
involved in the actual exercise of the powers mentioned
therein would belong to one or the other would have to
be made from the specific circumstances of the activities
concerned.
In sum, the Court acknowledges and upholds the
authority of the LEB to carry out the purpose of the law,
which is in line with the State's constitutional mandate to
promote quality education. However, the foregoing
provisions unduly expand the scope of the LEB's
authority by giving a construction to the term "legal
education" inconsistent with the law's clear intent. By
their terms, the provisions no longer just ventured into
improving the study of the law in law schools, but clearly
and directly encroached upon the Court's exclusive
constitutional authority to promulgate rules
concerning the Integrated Bar, the practice of law, and
admissions to the bar. As such, they cannot be given
imprimatur by this Court.
Q15: What is the ruling of the Supreme Court on
midnight appointments of a Chief Justice in De Castro
v. JBC?
A: The prohibition against presidential
appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not
extend to appointments in the Judiciary.
In particular, Section 9 states that the appointment of
Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President
upon the submission of a list of at least three nominees
by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the
President to fill the vacancy within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy. Had the framers intended to
extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court,
they could have explicitly done so. They could not have
ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as
being equally applicable to the appointment of Members
of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in
Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
Q16: Who are public officers according to Laurel v.
Desierto?
A: A public office is the right, authority and duty,
created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period,
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government,
to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.
The individual so invested is a public officer.
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Q17: What is the power of the Supreme Court to
intervene in impeachment cases according to
Francisco vs House of Representatives?
A: In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the
only constitutional organ, which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof.
Judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and
lower courts, as expressly provided for in the
Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was
given an expanded definition to include the power to
correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of
any government branch or instrumentality.
The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of
impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress.
Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or
in the language of Baker v. Carr, "judicially discoverable
standards" for determining the validity of the exercise
of such discretion, through the power of judicial
review.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of
government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has
provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but
only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to
it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in
truth all that is involved in what is termed “judicial
supremacy” which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed
to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary
in the determination of actual cases and controversies
must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive
and legislative departments of the government.
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this “moderating power”
to “determine the proper allocation of powers” of the
different branches of government and “to direct the
course of government along constitutional channels” is
inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the
judicial power itself, which is “the power of the court to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable.”
[Publish Date]
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant
petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the
Constitution itself which employs the well-settled
principles of constitutional construction.
Q18: How did the Court justify quo warranto
against a Chief Justice in Republic vs. Sereno?
A: quo warranto vs. impeachment:
• quo warranto - involves a judicial
determination of the eligibility or validity of
the election or appointment of a public official
based on predetermined rules
• impeachment - is a political process to vindicate
the violation of the public’s trust.
In the case at bar, what is at issue is the legality of
the appointment, thus, the title to a public office may not
be contested collaterally but only directly, by quo
warranto proceedings. Usurpation of a public office is
treated as a public wrong and carries with it public
interest, and as such, it shall be commenced by a verified
petition brought in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines through the Solicitor General or a public
prosecutor. The OSG is given permissible latitude within
his legal authority in actions for quo warranto,
circumscribed only by the national interest and the
government policy on the matter at hand.
Therefore, impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by
which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected
impeachable official may be removed from office. The
language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does
not foreclose a quo warranto action against impeachable
officers. The provision reads:
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman
may be removed from office on impeachment for,
and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. xxx
The provision uses the permissive term "may" which, in
statutory construction, denotes discretion and cannot be
construed as having a mandatory effect. “May" is
indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity or an
option. The grantee of that opportunity is vested with a
right or faculty which he has the option to exercise. An
option to remove by impeachment admits of an
alternative mode of effecting the removal.
The SC has concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to
issue the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto. A
direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to
issue such writs is allowed when there are special and
important reasons therefor, and in this case, direct
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resort to SC is justified considering that the action is
directed against the Chief Justice. Granting that the
petition is likewise of transcendental importance and has
far-reaching implications, the Court is empowered to
exercise its power of judicial review. To exercise restraint
in reviewing an impeachable officer’s appointment is a
clear renunciation of a judicial duty. An outright dismissal
of the petition based on speculation that Sereno will
eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication
of the Court’s duty to settle actual controversy squarely
presented before it. Quo warranto proceedings are
essentially judicial in character – it calls for the
exercise of the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty
and power to decide cases and settle actual
controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be
abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any
other branch of the government including the Congress,
even as it acts as an impeachment court through the
Senate.
In the instant case, direct resort to the Court is justified
considering that the action for quo warranto
questions the qualification of no less than a Member
of the Court. The issue of whether a person usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office is a matter of public concern over which the
government takes special interest as it obviously cannot
allow an intruder or impostor to occupy a public position.
Q19: Was the 1973 Constitution validly ratified
according to Javellana vs. Executive Secretary?
A: On the second question of validity of the
ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,
Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court
also hold that the Constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in
accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935
Constitution, which provides only one way for
ratification, i.e., "in an election or plebiscite held in
accordance with law and participated in only by qualified
and duly registered voters.
Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to
whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been validly
ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the
light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning and
intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens'
Assemblies, specially in the manner the votes therein were
cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the
requirements thereof. In view, however, of the fact that I
have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that
factually there was voting and that the majority of the
votes were for considering as approved the 1973
Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of
plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am constrained
to hold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodox
legal sense, the people may be deemed to have cast their
[Publish Date]
favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the
part required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said
that in its political aspect, which is what counts most, after
all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and,
in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally
ratified."
Q20: What was the Court ruling about initiative and
referendum on Lambino v. COMELEC?
A: The court declared that Lambino Group’s
initiative is void and unconstitutional because it fails
to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be
“directly proposed by the people through initiative upon
a petition.”
The framers intended that the “draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment” should be “ready and
shown” to the people “before” they sign such
proposal, before they sign there is already a draft
shown to them and that the people should sign on the
proposal itself because the proponents must “prepare
that proposal and pass it around for signature.”
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition” is that the
entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. Two
essential elements must be present:
1. the people must author and sign the entire
proposal; and
2. it must be embodied in a petition.
These are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express
their assent by signing such a complete proposal in a
petition.
Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition” only if the
people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments. The full text of the proposed
amendments may be either written on the face of the
petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition
must state such fact. This is an assurance that every one
of the several millions of signatories had seen the full text
of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise,
it is physically impossible to prove.
IN THIS CASE, the Lambino Group did not attach to
their present petition, a copy of the paper that the
people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino
Group submitted a copy of a signature sheet after the oral
arguments. The signature sheet merely asks a question
whether the people approve a shift from the
Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-
Parliamentary system of government. The signature
sheet does not show to the people the draft of the
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proposed changes before they are asked to sign the

signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the
“petition” that the framers of the Constitution envisioned
when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution.

Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the

proposed amendment must be incorporated with, or
attached to, the initiative petition signed by the people. In
the present initiative, the Lambino Group’s proposed
changes were not incorporated with, or attached to,
the signature sheets. The Lambino Group’s citation of
Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would
be physically impossible for all or a great majority of the
6.3 million signatories to have seen the petition before
they signed the signature sheets. The inescapable
conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show
to the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the
proposed changes. If ever, not more than one million
signatories saw the petition before they signed the
signature sheets.

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