1

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. 2697             April 19, 1991

ATTY. JOSE S. SANTOS, complainant, 

vs.
ATTY. CIPRIANO A. TAN, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Complainant Atty. Jose S. Santos instituted on November 20, 1984 these disbarment
proceedings against respondent Atty. Cipriano A. Tan for alleged gross misconduct.

Specifically, the complainant who was then Acting Director of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal
Assistance under the Ministry (now Department) of Agrarian Reform, charged the respondent
with having committed acts of immorality, falsification, and bigamy.

In the said complaint, Atty. Santos stated that the respondent, while employed as Trial Attorney
IV, with the Judicial Cases Division under the aforesaid Department, maintained amorous
relationship with a married clerk, a certain Norma O. Pihid (nee Olea), who was then directly
under him. Eventually, the respondent got married to Norma O. Pihid on April 27, 1981 before
the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, purportedly in an attempt to cover up their illicit
relations.
1

The complainant, moreover, alleged that the respondent falsified his marriage contract with
Norma O. Pihid by deliberately misrepresenting himself as single, thus, deceiving the said mayor
into solemnizing the said marriage.  In the information sheet, however, prepared and filed by the
2

respondent prior to his employment, he clearly stated therein that he was married to one Emilia
Benito Tan and had begotten eight (8) children with the latter.3

Consequently, the complainant likewise charged the respondent with bigamy since it appears
from the records of the Local Civil Registrar that he had previously contracted marriage with the
said Emilia A. Benito on January 6, 1941. The complainant asserted that the said marriage
continued to be valid and binding between the said contracting parties when the respondent
entered into a subsequent manage with Norma O. Pihid on April 27, 1981. 4

Finally, the complainant averred that the respondent's second wife, Norma O. Pihid, gave birth to
a child by the respondent on November 21, 1981 at the Children's Medical Center in Quezon
City, as evidenced by the birth certificate of the said child indicating his name to be Noel Olea
Tan.5
On January 9, 1985, the Court acting on the said complaint for disbarment required the
respondent to submit his Answer.

The respondent in an Answer dated February 28, 1985, denied having married Norma O. Pihid
on April 27, 1981 and having fathered a child by the name of Noel Olea Tan, although he
admitted being married to Emilia A. Benito. 6

As regards the charges of bigamy and falsification of official documents, the respondent argued
that the same were issues that were properly the subject of a criminal case filed by the
complainant against him which was pending before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch VI, and therefore raised a prejudicial question in the present controversy.7

Anent the charge of maintaining amorous relationship with Norma O. Pihid, the respondent
contended that the same charge had been previously resolved in an Order dated October 1,
1982 issued by the Minister (now Secretary) of the Ministry (now Department) of Agrarian
Reform. In the said order, the allegation of immorality which was originally the content of an
anonymous letter-complaint was dismissed for being devoid of merit.

The respondent, in turn, suggested that the real and actual motive behind the said complaint was
traceable to the strong resentment harbored by the complainant against the former whose
services as Chief Trial Attorney of the said Ministry (now Department) was extended even
beyond his retirement age at the request of the then Minister (now Secretary) Conrado F.
Estrella. The respondent contended that he and the complainant did not see eye to eye with
respect to the handling and prosecution of agrarian cases. 8

By way of a counter-complaint, the respondent charged the complainant with acts unbecoming of
a lawyer and a member of the Philippine Bar such as obtaining and utilizing confidential
documents without the necessary authorization, introducing a falsified document as evidence in a
court proceeding, and executing an affidavit-complaint containing false statements. The
respondent further assailed the complainant for filing the said complaint based on inadmissible
and unfounded charges. 9

On March 25, 1985, the Court resolved to refer the said complaint to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.

The Report and Recommendation submitted by the Solicitor General on February 23, 1990, in
part, states:

x x x           x x x          x x x

A thorough review of the record of the case duly heard before the Office of the Solicitor
General in several protracted hearings, reveals the existence of a ground for disbarment
against respondent.

Aside from claiming that the documents presented by complainant were allegedly
unauthenticated, hearsay, self-serving, and his defense of alibi at the time of the
marriage on April 27, 1981, respondent has miserably failed in refuting the same and at
the same time presenting strong evidence to convince the Solicitor General of the falsity
of the charges against him.

On April 27, 1981 respondent claims that he was attending a government case at the
then CFI of Caloocan City (Exh. 9-A, rec.) while his alleged second wife was at the Court
of Appeals on official business (Exhs. 6 & 11 A, rec.).

There are serious doubts in entertaining the aforesaid defense.

 A glance at the daily time records (Exhs. 9-A and 11-A, rec.) reveals that both entries of
respondent and Norma Olea were indicated on the line covering April 26, 1981; secondly,
penmanship of the alleged entries for April 27, 1981 are the same; thirdly, the indicated
time in's of respondent and Norma Olea were the same, i.e., 8:01 a.m.; fourthly,
probability that they were together is high because they were both out of the office.

Assuming, arguendo, respondent's alibi that they were married in Meycauayan, Bulacan,

it was highly probable and possible for both to proceed to Meycauayan, Bulacan on April
27, 1981 since the places where they were allegedly then is [sic] not impossibly far from
Meycauayan Bulacan.

Respondent even failed to specify the alleged government case he was attending at the
CFI of Caloocan either by mentioning the title of the case or by presenting other evidence
aside from his self-serving testimony.

With respect to the Birth Certificate (Exh. A) of respondent's alleged son, the former has
not made a categorical denial that Noel Olea Tan is NOT his son. He only argues that the
birth certificate is not authentic. Evidence for complainant, however, shows that Exhibit A-
5 was presented to show the authenticity of the Birth Certificate contrary to respondent's
claim (pls. see Certification dated July 24, 1985 found at the back of the Birth Certificate).
Likewise, respondent has not made any categorical denial of his amorous relationship
with Norma Olea despite the existence of his first marriage with Emilia Benito Tan.

For immorality to be a ground for disbarment, it must be so gross, e.g., it is so corrupt

and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree (Reyes v. Wong, 63 SCRA 667 [1975]).

The circumstances of the case definitely has put respondent's moral character in doubt
despite non-conviction of the criminal case for bigamy against respondent. The
reputation of a lawyer must be such that he be of good moral character during the
continuance of his practice and the exercise of the privilege.

The findings are clear and convincing that respondent entered into a second marriage
despite the existence of his first marriage and that he begot a child with the second
woman. Definitely, such factual findings have put serious doubt on respondent's moral
character. Respondent's main defense of alibi is rather too weak a reason that he did not
engage in an immoral act. As earlier said, respondent has neither categorically denied
that Norma Olea is his wife nor Noel Olea Tan is his son with Norma.

It appears, however, that respondent has retired from government service on March 27,
1983. He was sixty-five (65) years old on September 16, 1982 (Exh. 13, rec.), and
therefore, e. the time of the rendition of this report, respondent is now seventy two (72)
years old.

Considering that respondent has retired and is in the twilight of his life, disbarment would
be too harsh a penalty to impose on respondent. Suspension from the practice of law
would be proper for humanitarian reasons if respondent is still actively engaged in
practice.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, it is respectfully recommended that

respondent be adjudged guilty of immoral conduct, unbecoming of a lawyer, and
accordingly impose the penalty of one (1) year suspension from the active practice of
law.10

We agree with the said findings of the Solicitor General including his favorable and
compassionate consideration of the advanced age of the respondent. Specifically, Rule 1.01 of
Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

Whatever the alleged motives of the complainant are, the respondent has failed to controvert and
refute the charges made by the former. Even granting arguendo that the complainant was not
well-motivated in instituting these disbarment proceedings, the same does not exculpate him
from any liability resulting from his grossly immoral conduct.

As regards the respondent's counter-complaint, the Solicitor General in compliance with the
Court's Resolution dated October 1, 1990, submitted his Supplemental Report and
Recommendation on November 22, 1990, and found that the charges against the complainant
for acts unbecoming a member of the Philippine Bar were all unsubstantiated. We agree with his
findings and recommendation on this regard which state:

No misconduct has been committed by Atty. Santos contrary to Atty. Tan's accusations
which will warrant disciplinary action.  If at all, Atty. Tan's charges were merely in
1âwphi1

defense of the charges against him (immorality) which the Solicitor General has found to
be supported by the evidence. (cf.: Report and Recommendation dated February 23,
1990, pp. 46-52, Records-Adm. Cases)

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, it is respectfully recommended that

Atty. Tan's counter-complaint against Atty. Santos be DISMISSED for being
unsubstantiated. 11

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Cipriano A. Tan guilty of immoral conduct in disregard of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the active practice of
law for a period of one (1) year. The counter-complaint against complainant Atty. Jose S. Santos
is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Let this Decision be spread upon the personal records of the respondent and copies thereof
furnished to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
 2
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

Adm. Case No. 481             February 28, 1969

IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDING AGAINST ARTURO P. LOPEZ. 

VIRGINIA C. ALMIREZ assisted by her father, AGAPITO ALMIREZ complainants, 
vs.
ARTURO P. LOPEZ, respondent.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Respondent Arturo P. Lopez is sought to be disbarred upon the ground of immorality.

Complainant Virginia C. Almirez, assisted by her father Agapito Almirez, charges him with having
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her, under promise of marriage, which he failed and
refused to fulfill, despite a child begotten in consequence thereof.

In his answer, respondent denied having ever had or solicited any sexual relation with the
complainant, but affirmed that they had agreed to be married as soon as he became financially
stable; that he could not carry out his part of the agreement having discovered, on April 4, 1961,
that complainant was pregnant by another man; and that she filed the present charges out of
spite for him, in view of his refusal to marry her.

Upon investigation conducted by the Solicitor General, to whom the matter was referred, the
latter submitted his report finding respondent guilty as charged, and then filed the corresponding
complaint for his disbarment.

In his answer thereto, respondent reiterated, in effect, the allegations and defenses made and
set up in his previous answer. He, moreover, averred that, while the matter was being
investigated in the Office of the Solicitor General, complainant had filed an affidavit stating that
he (respondent) is not the father of her child and a motion withdrawing her complaint.

Respondent having, moreover, expressed the wish to introduce additional evidence, the Court
dated its Legal Officer-Investigator for the reception thereof, after which the latter submitted his
report concurring in the findings of the Solicitor General, although recommending merely the
suspension of respondent herein. After furnishing him with a copy of this report, the case was set
for hearing, at which a representative of the Solicitor General and counsel for respondent
appeared and were given a period to file their respective memoranda in lieu of oral argument.

The record shows that respondent was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1957 and has been
engaged in the practice of law in Manila. After meeting the complainant then about 23 years of
age — in Mauban, Quezon — of which their families are residents — sometime in December,
1958, respondent courted her by correspondence. Presently, they became sweethearts.
Complainant having come to Manila in November, 1960 and operated therein a store, in
partnership with others, respondent used to visit her. Although he had told the complainant, as
early as May 1960, of his intent to marry her, it was understood that the wedding would take
place upon consummation of a given deal in which he expected to make a big amount of money.
From November, 1960 to April, 1961, they had carnal knowledge of each other, several times, in
various hotels in Manila, particularly the Palo Alto Hotel, the Springfield Hotel, and the Shanghai
Hotel. On December 31, 1960, complainant informed respondent that her menstruation was
overdue, whereupon he caused her to be examined by a lady physician, who found that she was
in the family way. Thereupon, he gave her some pills, to be taken three (3) times a day, for the
alleged purpose of hastening the flow of her menstruation. Then, he called her up, day and night,
to inquire about her menses and, when the same did not eventually come, he urged her to see
another lady doctor, who could perform an abortion. Complainant was averse thereto, but,
respondent was so insistent that she went to the clinic of said physician. The operation was not
performed, however, for neither the latter nor complainant were agreeable thereto. On August
22, 1961, complainant gave birth to a baby boy, Francisco Arnold, at the Maternity and Children's
Hospital in Manila.

Prior thereto, or late in February, 1961, their respective applications for a marriage license were
filed and their marriage license was issued on March 13, but, the wedding, scheduled for March
18, 1961, did not take place, owing to the absence of the Mayor who was to solemnize it. On
April 6, 1961, complainant learned, from her sister-in-law, that respondent had confided to the
latter his unwillingness to marry her (complainant). When, soon thereafter, complainant asked
him for his reason therefor, respondent blamed her for refusing to undergo an abortion.
Thereupon, or on April 18, 1961, she filed the complaint herein.

It further appears that on September 25, 1962, while this case was pending in the Office of the
Solicitor General a motion signed by the complainant, withdrawing her complaint, was filed with
said office. The reason given was that the complaint was "a result of serious misunderstanding"
and had been filed "in the heat of anger" and that it would be unjustified to proceed further on
account of complainant's belief in his innocence. This motion was, however, withdrawn by her,
on November 25, 1963, for the reason that respondent had secured her signature thereto upon
the assurance that he would thereupon marry her and that he did not only fail to do so, but, also,
married another woman. In fact, respondent and one Evelyn Orense were married in January,
1963.

Upon the other hand, respondent would have us believe that complainant had freely and
voluntarily signed her aforesaid motion to withdraw her complaint. In fact, he added, she made
the affidavit, Exhibit 34, stating that he is not the father of her child. In rebuttal, complainant
testified, however, that she signed said motion and a blank sheet of paper, which is now the
affidavit Exhibit 34, he having convinced her that they would be married soon thereafter. lawphi1 .nêt

He, likewise, tried to prove, through his testimony that it was complainant who asked him to take
her nightclubbing in Manila, which he did; that it was she who asked him, at the Bayside
Nightclub, on December 31, 1960, to marry her; that she reiterated this request in January, 1961,
for fear that her father may call her back to Mauban; that she having brought up the same subject
in February, 1961, they signed the necessary applications late in February, 1961, and got the
corresponding marriage license sometime later, although the wedding, scheduled for March 18,
had to be postponed indefinitely because of the absence of the officer, who was to solemnize it;
that after a drinking spree in Manila, in the evening of April 4, 1961, he felt it would be unwise for
him to drive his car home to Quezon City, in view of which he decided to spend the night at the
Shanghai Hotel; that while there, he remembered having an appointment with complainant,
whom he, accordingly, called by telephone to apologize to her and informed her of his condition
and whereabouts; that soon later, complainant arrived unexpectedly at the hotel and asked
permission to sleep with him there, stating that she had quarreled with her sister-in-law; that after
switching off the light and undressing herself, complainant started massaging his head, for he
had a slight headache; that as complainant kissed him, he noticed that she was pregnant and
told her so; that after saying that she merely had a stomach ache, complainant eventually
confessed that another man had abused her; that angered by this revelation, respondent
dressed up and prepared to step out, but, before he left the hotel, she asked his forgiveness and
promised to behave thereafter; that she went to his office, the next day, but he refused to talk to
her; that as she insisted upon talking with him privately, they went to an ice cream parlor where
she begged him to marry her and save her honor, suggesting that their marriage would be in
name only and that they need not live together, if he did not want to; that complainant even said
that her father 1 would give P5,000 if he married her, but he rejected the offer and volunteered to
prosecute the man responsible for her condition, if she would identify him; and that, when
respondent still refused to marry her, complainant threatened to bring disbarment proceedings
against him.

Upon a review of the record, we agree with the solicitor, who first investigated this case, and the
Legal Officer-Investigator, before whom additional evidence were introduced, that respondent's
version is unworthy of credence. Indeed, despite the averments in his answers to the effect that
he had never solicited or had carnal relations with the complainant, his very testimony shows that
they had met in a hotel room under conditions attesting to a condition of intimacy clearly
revealing past extra-marital relations between them. Then, too, respondent's promise to marry
complainant has been, not only admitted by him, but, also, bolstered up by their applications for a
marriage license and the marriage license actually secured by them.

The breach of such promise on his part is thus patent. What is more, when her pregnancy was
confirmed by a physician, respondent firstly persuaded the complainant to take some pills for the
avowed purpose of hastening the flow of her "menstruation", and, eventually, urged her to have
an abortion, to which she did not agree. Worse still, when this case was pending in the office of
the Solicitor General, respondent prevailed upon her to sign a motion withdrawing her complaint,
under the false allegation that he is innocent of the charges preferred against him, as well as to
sign a blank sheet of paper — which now appears to be her aforementioned affidavit Exhibit 34
under — promise to thereupon marry her, without the slightest intention to keep it, because,
instead he married another woman soon later.

WHEREFORE, respondent Arturo P. Lopez is hereby found guilty of gross immoral conduct
rendering him unfit to continue a member of the Bar, 2 for which reason he is hereby barred from
the practice of law, and his name ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee
and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
Complainant's mother had died in 1955.
 3
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. 1053 September 7, 1979

SANTA PANGAN, complainant 
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, respondent,

RESOLUTION

ANTONIO, J.:

This has reference to the motion of complainant, Santa Pangan, to cite respondent Dionisio
Ramos for contempt. It appears from the record that on September 7, 1978 and March 13, 1979,
the hearings in this administrative case were postponed on the basis of respondent's motions for
postponement. These motions were predicated on respondent's allegations that on said dates he
had a case set for hearing before Branch VII, Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled People v.
Marieta M. Isip (Criminal Case No. 35906). Upon verification, the attorney of record of the
accused in said case is one "Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos, 306 Dona Salud Bldg., Dasmarinas
Manila." Respondent admits that he used the name of "Pedro D.D. Ramos" before said court in
connection with Criminal Case No. 35906, but avers that he had a right to do so because in his
Birth Certificate (Annex "A"), his name is "Pedro Dionisio Ramos", and -his parents are Pedro
Ramos and Carmen Dayaw, and that the D.D. in "Pedro D.D. Ramos" is but an abbreviation of
"Dionisio Dayaw his other given name and maternal surname.

This explanation of respondent is untenable. The name appearing in the "Roll of Attorneys" is
"Dionisio D. Ramos". The attorney's roll or register is the official record containing the names and
signatures of those who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name
other than the one inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law.

The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no falsehood". As an
officer in the temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of "truthfulness, candor
and frankness".   Indeed, candor and frankness should characterize the conduct of the lawyer at
1

every stage. This has to be so because the court has the right to rely upon him in ascertaining
the truth. In representing himself to the court as "Pedro D.D. Ramos" instead of "Dionisio D.
Ramos", respondent has violated his solemn oath.

The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes
confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor cannot be overempahisized.
These injunctions circumscribe the general duty of entire devotion of the attorney to the client. As
stated in a case, his I nigh vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of
the case, and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. He violates Ms oath of
office ,when he resorts to deception or permits his client to do so." 
2

In using the name of' Pedro D.D. Ramos" before the courts instead of the name by which he was
authorized to practice law - Dionisio D. Ramos - respondent in effect resorted to deception. The
demonstrated lack of candor in dealing with the courts. The circumstance that this is his first
aberration in this regard precludes Us from imposing a more severe penalty.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Dionisio D. Ramos is severely

REPRIMANDED and warned that a repetition of the same overt act may warrant his suspencion
or disbarment from the practice of law.

It appearing that the hearing of this case has been unduly delayed, the Investigator of this Court
is directed forthwith to proceed with the hearing to terminate it as soon as possible. The request
of complainant to appear in the afore-mentioned hearing, assisted by her counsel, Atty. Jose U.
Lontoc, is hereby granted.

SO ORDERED
 4
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 1334 November 28, 1989

ROSARIO DELOS REYES, complainant, 

vs.
ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, respondent.

Federico A. Blay for complainant.

Luciano Babiera for respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint for disbarment filed against respondent on the ground of gross immorality.

Complainant, a second year medical student of the Southwestern University (Cebu), alleged in
her verified complaint that respondent Atty. Jose B. Aznar, then chairman of said university, had
carnal knowledge of her for several times under threat that she would fail in her Pathology
subject if she would not submit to respondent's lustful desires. Complainant further alleged that
when she became pregnant, respondent, through a certain Dr. Gil Ramas, had her undergo
forced abortion.

In compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 9, 1974, respondent filed his Answer
denying any personal knowledge of complainant as well as all the allegations contained in the
complaint and by way of special defense, averred that complainant is a woman of loose morality.

On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.

The findings of the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:

EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANT

Complainant Rosario delos Reyes testified that:

1) she was a second year medical student of the Southwestern

University, the Chairman of the Board of which was respondent
Jose B. Aznar (pp. 11, 15, tsn, June 6, 1975);

2) she however failed in her Pathology subject which prompted

her to approach respondent in the latter's house who assured her
 that she would pass the said subject (pp. 15,16, 26, 33, tsn, June
6, 1975);

3) despite this assurance, however, she failed (p. 33, tsn, June 6,
1975);

4) sometime in February, 1973, respondent told her that she

should go with him to Manila, otherwise, she would flunk in all her
subjects (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ... ;

5) on February 12, 1973, both respondent and complainant

boarded the same plane (Exh. "A") for Manila; from the Manila
Domestic Airport, they proceeded to Room 905, 9th Floor of the
Ambassador Hotel where they stayed for three days (Exhs. "K",
"K-1" to "K-6"; p. 55, tsn, June 6, 1 975);

6) after arriving at the Ambassador Hotel, they dined at a Spanish

restaurant at San Marcelino, Malate, Manila for around three
hours (pp 56-57, tsn, June 6, 1975);

7) they returned to the hotel at around twelve o'clock midnight,

where respondent had carnal knowledge of her twice and then
thrice the next morning (p. 59, tsn, June 6, 1975; pp. 154, 155 &
157, tsn, July 18, 1975);

8) complainant consented to the sexual desires of respondent

because for her, she would sacrifice her personal honor rather
than fail in her subjects (p.6l, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ...;

9) sometime in March, 1973, complainant told respondent that

she was suspecting pregnancy because she missed her
menstruation (p. 76, tsn, July 17, 1975); ... ... ...;

10) later, she was informed by Dr. Monsanto (an instructor in the
college of medicine) that respondent wanted that an abortion be
performed upon her (p.82, tsn, July l7, 1975); ... ... ... ;

11) thereafter, Ruben Cruz, a confidant of respondent, and Dr.

Monsato fetched her at her boarding house on the pretext that
she would be examined by Dr. Gil Ramas (pp. 87-88, tsn, July 17,
1975);

12) upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Ramas she was given an
injection and an inhalation mask was placed on her mouth and
nose (pp. 88-90, tsn, July 17, 1 975);

13) as a result, she lost consciousness and when she woke up,
an abortion had already been performed upon her and she was
weak, bleeding and felt pain all over her body (pp. 90-91, tsn, July
17, 1975); ... ... ... (Rollo, pp. 38-40)

Monica Gutierrez Tan testified that she met complainant and a man whom
complainant introduced as Atty. Aznar in front of the Ambassador Hotel (pp. 183-
184, tsn, Sept. 10, 1975; Rollo, p. 41).
Dr. Rebecca Gucor and Dr. Artemio Ingco, witnesses for the complainant, testified that
abdominal examinations and x-ray examination of the lumbro-sacral region of complainant
showed no signs of abnormality (Rollo, p. 42).

The evidence for the respondent as reported by the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:

Edilberto Caban testified that:

1. In December, 1972, respondent Atty. Aznar stayed at

Ambassador Hotel with his wife and children; respondent never
came to Manila except in December, 1972; (pp. 8-9,. tsn, Nov. 24,
1977);

2. He usually slept with respondent everytime the latter comes to

Manila (p. 13, tsn, Nov. 24, 1977; Rollo, pp. 42-43).

Oscar Salangsang, another witness for the respondent stated that:

1. In February, 1973, he went to Ambassador Hotel to meet

respondent; the latter had male companions at the hotel but he
did not see any woman companion of respondent Aznar;

2. He usually slept with respondent at the Ambassador Hotel and

ate with him outside the hotel together with Caban (pp. 8-9, 13-
15, tsn, Jan. 13, 1978; Rollo, p. 43).

The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation conducted by the Solicitor
General, respondent Aznar was never presented to refute the allegations made against him.

In his Answer, respondent Aznar alleges that he does not have any knowledge of the allegations
in the complaint. As special defense, respondent further alleged that the charge levelled against
him is in furtherance of complainant's vow to wreck vengeance against respondent by reason of
the latter's approval of the recommendation of the Board of Trustees barring complainant from
enrollment for the school year 1973-1974 because she failed in most of her subjects. It is
likewise contended that the defense did not bother to present respondent in the investigation
conducted by the Solicitor General because nothing has been shown in the hearing to prove that
respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant.

Contrary to respondent's averments, the Solicitor General made a categorical finding to the effect
that respondent had carnal knowledge of complainant, to wit:

From the foregoing, it is clear that complainant was compelled to go to Manila

with respondent upon the threat of respondent that if she failed to do so, she
would flunk in all her subjects and she would never become a medical intern (pp.
42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975). As respondent was Chairman of the College of
Medicine, complainant had every reason to believe him.

It has been established also that complainant was brought by respondent to

Ambassador Hotel in Manila for three days where he repeatedly had carnal
knowledge of her upon the threat that if she would not give in to his lustful
desires, she would fail in her Pathology subject (Exhs. "A", "K", "K-1" to "K-6" pp.
51, 52, 55-59, tsn, June 6, 1975);

xxx xxx xxx

 On the other hand, respondent did not bother to appear during the hearing. It is
true that he presented Edilberto Caban and Oscar Salangsang who testified that
respondent usually slept with them every time the latter came to Manila, but their
testimony (sic) is not much of help. None of them mentioned during the hearing
that they stayed and slept with respondent on February 12 to February 14, 1973
at Ambassador Hotel. ... ... ... Besides, Edilberto Caban testified that respondent
stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his wife and children in December, 1972. The
dates in question, however, are February 12 to 14, 1973, inclusive. His (Caban's)
testimony, therefore, is immaterial to the present case" (Rollo, pp. 43-44).

In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of immorality against respondent Aznar has
been substantiated by sufficient evidence both testimonial and documentary; while finding
insufficient and uncorroborated the accusation of intentional abortion. The Solicitor General then
recommends the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a period of not less than
three (3) years.

On March 16, 1989, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Move in the premises to
determine whether any intervening event occurred which would render the case moot and
academic (Rollo, p. 69).

On April 12, 1989, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and motion praying that the case at
bar be considered submitted for decision on the bases of the report and recommendation
previously submitted together with the record of the case and the evidence adduced (Rollo, p.
75).

After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the finding of the Solicitor General
that respondent Aznar, under the facts as stated in the Report of the investigation conducted in
the case, is guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" and may therefore be removed or suspended by
the Supreme Court for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of
Court).

Respondent failed to adduce evidence sufficient to engender doubt as to his culpability of the
offense imputed upon him. With the exception of the self-serving testimonies of two witnesses
presented on respondent's behalf, the records are bereft of evidence to exonerate respondent of
the act complained of, much less contradict, on material points, the testimonies of complainant
herself.

While respondent denied having taken complainant to the Ambassador Hotel and there had
sexual intercourse with the latter, he did not present any evidence to show where he was at that
date. While this is not a criminal proceeding, respondent would have done more than keep his
silence if he really felt unjustly traduced.

It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to satisfy this Court that he
is a fit and proper person to enjoy continued membership in the Bar. He cannot dispense with nor
downgrade the high and exacting moral standards of the law profession (Go v. Candoy, 21
SCRA 439 [1967]). As once pronounced by the Court:

When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the
charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the
relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still
maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is
expected of him. ... In the case of United States v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice
Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:

An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he

does not perform that duty, he may not always expect the State to perform it for
 him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is
the easiest of easy things, he is hardy indeed if he demand and expect that same
full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by
reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not
only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very means
by which it may assist him (Quingwa SCRA 439 [1967]).

The Solicitor General recommends that since the complainant is partly to blame for having gone
with respondent to Manila knowing fully well that respondent is a married man ,with children,
respondent should merely be suspended from the practice of law for not less than three (3) years
(Rollo, p. 47).

On the other hand, respondent in his manifestation and motion dated April 18, 1989 alleges that
since a period of about ten (10) years had already elapsed from the time the Solicitor General
made his recommendation for a three (3) years suspension and respondent is not practicing his
profession as a lawyer, the court may now consider the respondent as having been suspended
during the said period and the case dismissed for being moot and academic.

We disagree.

Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because respondent reneged on a promise
to marry (Quingwa v. Puno, supra). More importantly. complainant's knowledge of of
respondent's marital status is not at issue in the case at bar. Complainant submitted to
respondent's solicitation for sexual intercourse not because of a desire for sexual gratification but
because of respondent's moral ascendancy over her and fear that if she would not accede, she
would flunk in her subjects. As chairman of the college of medicine where complainant was
enrolled, the latter had every reason to believe that respondent could make good his threats.
Moreover, as counsel for respondent would deem it "worthwhile to inform the the Court that the
respondent is a scion of a rich family and a very rich man in his own right and in fact is not
practicing his profession before the court" (Rollo, p. 70), mere suspension for a limited period,
per se, would therefore serve no redeeming purpose. The fact that he is a rich man and does not
practice his profession as a lawyer, does not render respondent a person of good moral
character. Evidence of good moral character precedes admission to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules
of Court) and such requirement is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. Good moral
character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in the practice of law.
The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members the highest standard of
morality (Quingwa v. Puno, supra).

Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, ... " In Arciga v. Maniwang (106 SCRA 591, [1981]), this Court had occasion to define
the concept of immoral conduct, as follows:

A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his

conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. A member of the bar should have
moral integrity in addition to professional probity.

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is

grossly immoral conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which
render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies
that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be
the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
 Immoral conduct has been defined as 'that which is willful, flagrant, or shameless,
and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community' (7 C.J.S. 959).

Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became

pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six
children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was
justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).

In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to have
taken advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a
student in said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under the
threat that she would flunk in all her subjects in case she refused.

WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered
stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.
 5
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981

MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA complainant, 
vs.
SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG respondent.

AQUINO, J.:

Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for the disbarment of lawyer
Segundino D. Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975  ) on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he
refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her. Their illicit relationship resulted in the birth on September 4, 1973 of their child, Michael
Dino Maniwang.

Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October, 1970 at Cebu City. Magdalena
was then a medical technology student in the Cebu Institute of Medicine while Segundino was a
law student in the San Jose Recoletos College. They became sweethearts but when Magdalena
refused to have a tryst with Segundino in a motel in January, 1971, Segundino stopped visiting
her.

Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the following month. They renewed
their relationship. After they had dinner one night in March, 1971 and finding themselves alone
(like Adam and Eve) in her boarding house since the other boarders had gone on vacation, they
had sexual congress. When Segundino asked Magdalena why she had refused his earlier
proposal to have sexual intercourse with him, she jokingly said that she was in love with another
man and that she had a child with still another man. Segundino remarked that even if that be the
case, he did not mind because he loved her very much.

Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation. Segundino started telling his acquaintances
that he and Magdalena were secretly married.

In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del Sur. He continued his law
studies in Davao City. .Magdalena remained in Cebu. He sent to her letters and telegrams
professing his love for her (Exh. K to Z).

When Magdalena discovered in January, 1973 that she was pregnant, she and Segundino went
to her hometown, Ivisan, Capiz, to apprise Magdalena's parents that they were married although
they were not really so. Segundino convinced Magdalena's father to have the church wedding
deferred until after he had passed the bar examinations. He secured his birth certificate
preparatory to applying for a marriage license.
Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he expressed his love and concern
for the baby in Magdalena's womb. He reassured her time and again that he would marry her
once he passed the bar examinations. He was not present when Magdalena gave birth to their
child on September 4, 1973 in the Cebu Community Hospital. He went to Cebu in December,
1973 for the baptism of his child.

Segundino passed the bar examinations. The results were released on April 25, 1975. Several
days after his oath-taking, which Magdalena also attended, he stopped corresponding with
Magdalena. Fearing that there was something amiss, Magdalena went to Davao in July, 1975 to
contact her lover. Segundino told her that they could not get married for lack of money. She went
back to Ivisan.

In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see Segundino who was then in
Malaybalay, Bukidnon. She followed him there only to be told that their marriage could not take
place because he had married Erlinda Ang on November 25, 1975. She was broken-hearted
when she returned to Davao.

Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon her because she had a
confrontation with his wife, Erlinda Ang. She reported the assault to the commander of the
Padada police station and secured medical treatment in a hospital (Exh. I and J).

Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers and that he is the father of
the child Michael. He also admits that he repeatedly promised to marry Magdalena and that he
breached that promise because of Magdalena's shady past. She had allegedly been accused in
court of oral defamation and had already an illegitimate child before Michael was born.

The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. In his opinion, respondent's
cohabitation with the complainant and his reneging on his promise of marriage do not warrant his
disbarment.

An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral character. He is required to
produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges
against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court.

If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession
of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession.
Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character
(Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).

A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to
professional probity.

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral
conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional
behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.

Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community" (7 C.J.S. 959).

Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by reason
of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six children, disbarment of the attorney
on the ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).
There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be inconsonance with the canons of the
moral code but he is not subject to disciplinary action because his misbehavior or deviation from
the path of rectitude is not glaringly scandalous. It is in connection with a lawyer's behavior to the
opposite sex where the question of immorality usually arises. Whether a lawyer's sexual
congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as
"grossly immoral conduct," will depend on the surrounding circumstances.

This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-fashioned morality still prevailed, observed
that "the legislator well knows the frailty of the flesh and the ease with which a man, whose
sense of dignity, honor and morality is not well cultivated, falls into temptation when alone with
one of the fair sex toward whom he feels himself attracted. An occasion is so inducive to sin or
crime that the saying "A fair booty makes many a thief" or "An open door may tempt a saint" has
become general." (People vs. De la Cruz, 48 Phil. 533, 535).

Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated in the following cases:

(1) Where lawyer Arturo P. Lopez succeeded in having carnal knowledge of Virginia C. Almirez,
under promise of marriage, which he refused to fulfill, although they had already a marriage
license and despite the birth of a child in consequence of their sexual intercourse; he married
another woman and during Virginia's pregnancy, Lopez urged her to take pills to hasten the flow
of her menstruation and he tried to convince her to have an abortion to which she did not agree.
(Almirez vs. Lopez, Administrative Case No. 481, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 169. See
Sarmiento vs. Cui, 100 Phil. 1102).

(2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera believe that they were married before
Leoncio V. Aglubat in the City Hall of Manila, and, after such fake marriage, they cohabited and
she later give birth to their child (Cabrera vs. Agustin, 106 Phil. 256).

(3) Where lawyer Jesus B. Toledo abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another women
who had borne him a child (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768. As to disbarment for contracting a
bigamous marriage, see Villasanta vs. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313).

(4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of Concepcion Bolivar by living on her
bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities, while dangling
before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies,
keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from the complainant, and
trying to sponge on her and persuade her to resume their broken relationship after the latter's
discovery of his perfidy are indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the bar (Bolivar
vs. Simbol, 123 Phil. 450).

(5) Where Flora Quingwa, a public school teacher, who was engaged to lawyer Armando Puno,
was prevailed upon by him to have sexual congress with him inside a hotel by telling her that it
was alright to have sexual intercourse because, anyway, they were going to get married. She
used to give Puno money upon his request. After she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby
boy, Puno refused to marry her. (Quingwa vs. Puno, Administrative Case No. 389, February 28,
1967, 19 SCRA 439).

(6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras, a married man, misrepresenting that he was single and
making a promise of marriage, succeeded in having sexual intercourse with. Josefina Mortel.
Aspiras faked a marriage between Josefina and his own son Cesar. Aspiras wrote to Josefina:
"You are alone in my life till the end of my years in this world. I will bring you along with me
before the altar of matrimony." "Through thick and thin, for better or for worse, in life or in death,
my Josephine you will always be the first, middle and the last in my life." (Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100
Phil. 586).
(7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena, who had been having adulterous relations for fifteen years with
Briccia Angeles, a married woman separated from her husband, seduced her eighteen-year-old
niece who became pregnant and begot a child. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).

The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases. This case is similar to the
case of Soberano vs. Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1206, where lawyer Eugenio V. Villanueva had sexual
relations with Mercedes H. Soberano before his admission to the bar in 1954. They indulged in
frequent sexual intercourse. She wrote to him in 1950 and 1951 several letters making reference
to their trysts in hotels.

On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly sensual, tantalizing and vulgar nature as
to render them unquotable and to impart the firm conviction that, because of the close intimacy
between the complainant and the respondent, she felt no restraint whatsoever in writing to him
with impudicity.

According to the complainant, two children were born as a consequence of her long intimacy with
the respondent. In 1955, she filed a complaint for disbarment against Villanueva.

This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was not so corrupt nor
unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. (See Montana vs. Ruado, Administrative Case No. 507,
February 24, 1975, 62 SCRA 382; Reyes vs. Wong, Administrative Case No. 547, January 29,
1975, 63 SCRA 667, Viojan vs. Duran, 114 Phil. 322; Abaigar vs. Paz, Administrative Case No.
997, September 10, 1979,93 SCRA 91).

Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents, the complaint for disbarment
against the respondent is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.
 6
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. 1856 October 28, 1983

SALVACION E. MARCAYDA, complainant, 
vs.
JUSTINIANO P. NAZ, respondent.

R. G. Tansinsin for complainant.

Justiniano P. Naz in his own behalf.

AQUINO, J.:

This is a revival of the immorality charge against respondent Justiniano P. Naz. Salvacion E.
Marcayda in a handwritten letter filed in this Court on April 19, 1977 asked that Naz's oath-taking
as a member of the bar (after having flunked twice) be withheld pending negotiations for the
support of his alleged child begotten with Salvacion.

Naz in his answer of April 27, 1977 denied the paternity of the child. He alleged that the
complaint was pure harassment and blackmail. He said that Salvacion could have filed an
administrative complaint with the Department of Education and Culture since he was employed in
the Legaspi branch of that Office but she never filed any such complaint.

Accompanying his answer was an affidavit wherein Naz requested that, because clearance could
not be given him to take the oath on April 29, 1977 due to Salvacion's complaint, he be allowed
to take the oath but his signing of the Roll of attorneys be deferred pending resolution of
Salvacion's complaint.

On the following day, April 28, 1977, Naz and Salvacion, both 47, natives of Camalig Albay,
executed in Manila a notarized agreement before lawyer Braulio R. G. Tansinsin wherein Naz
admitted that he had an affair with Salvacion in 1964 as a result of which a boy named Rey E.
Marcayda was born on January 8, 1965, (should be March 8, 1965, as shown in Exhibit 2). Naz
was a married man. Salvacion was married to Primo Marcayda who died of tuberculosis on July
5, 1965 (Exh. 1).

Naz in that agreement bound himself to pay Salvacion for Rey's support (1) back support of
P2,000 on or before December 25, 1977 and another P2,000 on or before December 25, 1978
and (2) P100 or its dollar equivalent in advance within the first five days of every month, starting
May, 1977 until Rey reached the age of twenty-one.
Because of that public instrument admitting paternity and the promise to support the adulterous
child, Salvacion on that same date, April 28, 1977, withdrew her complaint filed in this Court to
withhold the oath-taking of Naz on the ground of immorality.

The withdrawal document was also executed before Notary Tansinsin. It is document No. 628 of
his notarial book while the document of acknowledgment and support is No. 629.

The result of these last minute maneuvers was this Court's resolution of April 28, 1977 allowing
Naz to take his oath by reason of Salvacion's withdrawal of her complaint (SBC-582). He took his
oath on April 29, 1977 But Naz did not live up to his promise to give support.

In a verified complaint dated December 23, 1977 Salvacion asked for the reopening of the
administrative case. She alleged that she withdrew the complaint so that Naz would have a
higher salary and would be in a better position to support Rey. He is now an incumbent legal
officer of Region V of the Ministry of Education and Culture in Legaspi City, with an annual salary
of P17,724.

She testified that after Rey's birth Naz gave her forty pesos a month for six months. After she
withdrew her complaint, Naz gave her one hundred pesos for May, 1977. As already stated, he
did not comply with his commitment in the notarial agreement of support which was the basis of
the withdrawal of the immorality complaint against him.

Naz in his comment on the complaint and in his testimony in the Solicitor General's office
declared that Rey was not his son. Rey's 1965 birth certificate shows that he was born in
wedlock to Salvacion and her husband, Primo (Exh. 21). He alleged that he was "coerced" to
sign the agreement of support. The complaint was like "an Armalite trained on the head of the
respondent".

We hold that, as noted by the Solicitor General, Naz is not guilty of gross immorality. He should
not be disbarred because he had admitted the paternity of Rey in a public document and agreed
to support him. This circumstance rendered his immorality not so gross and scandalous. (Arciga
vs. Maniwang, Adm. Case No. 1608, August 14,1981, 106 SCRA 591).

The agreement of support was the basis of the withdrawal of the 1917 complaint against
him. The eleventh-hour withdrawal paved the way for his oath-taking. He cannot be allowed to
repudiate that public document of the ground of supposed coercion.

Respondent Naz's stand of not giving any value to that public document shows a certain
unscrupulousness unbecoming a member of a noble profession. It is tantamount to self
stultification. His attitude is highly censurable. He wants to make a mockery of the proceedings in
this Court by making it appear that he lied brazenly about the filiation of Rey Marcayda just to
facilitate his admission to the bar. In his oath, he swore to do no falsehood.

The remedy of complainant Marcayda is a civil action for support on the basis of the agreement
of support which is irrevocably binding on Naz. She could also file an administrative complaint
against him with the Ministry of Education and Culture which could require him to give support to
the child, Rey (See Sec. 36, Civil Service Decree, P.D. No. 807).

WHEREFORE, respondent Naz is severely reprimanded for his attempt to nullify the notarial
agreement to support a child whose filiation he had admitted. A copy of this resolution should be
attached to his record in the Bar Confidant's office.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos and Escolin, JJ., concur.

De Castro, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:

He should be disbarred for immorality and his brazen repudiation of a notarial deed wherein he
committed adultery with a married woman even while he himself then as now is married.

Separate Opinions

MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:

He should be disbarred for immorality and his brazen repudiation of a notarial deed wherein he
committed adultery with a married woman even while he himself then as now is married.