Belfiore, E. (1984) - A Theory of Imitation in Plato's Republic PDF

American Philological Association
A Theory of Imitation in Plato's Republic

Author(s): Elizabeth Belfiore
Source: Transactions of the American Philological Association (1974-), Vol. 114 (1984), pp. 121-
146
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Transactionsof theAmericanPhilologicalAssociation114 (1984) 121-146
A THEORY OF IMITATION IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC

ELIZABETH BELFIORE
of Minnesota
University
Plato's discussion of imitation in Republic 10 has often been called

self-contradictory,or at least inconsistentwith the treatmentof mimesis
in Republic 3. It is argued, for example, that while Republic 3 banishes
only some imitativepoetry,Republic 10 opens with the statementthat
all imitativepoetryhas been excluded fromthe ideal state (10.595A), but
then neverthelessallows some formsof imitation,namely hymns and
encomia (10.607A).1 Others claim that Plato fails to define important
terms,such as "imitation,"which he uses inconsistently. For example,
criticshave said that "imitation"means "impersonation"in Republic 3,
but "representation"in Republic 10.2 The most extremepositionis that
Plato has no coherentconcept of the imitationhe attacks,but simply
stringstogethera seriesof bad arguments.3
Numerous attempts have been made to resolve or explain these
alleged inconsistencies.Some deny that Plato reallymeans everythinghe
seems to be saying,4or argue that Book 10 expressesa differentview
1 See especiallyC. Brownson, Plato'sStudiesand Criticism of thePoets(Boston1920)

88-94. More recentlyL. Moss, "Plato and the Poetics," Philological Quarterly 50 (1971)
533-42 argues against various attemptsto reconcile Books 3 and 10. For othersurveysof
views about the problem of consistencysee also T. Gould, "Plato's Hostilityto Art,"Arion
3 (1964) 70-91; G. Sorbom, Mimesis and Art (Stockholm1966) esp. 129-51; M. Partee,
Plato's Poetics (Salt Lake City 1981) 1-22; A. Nehamas, "Plato on Imitationand Poetryin
Republic 10," in Plato on Beauty, Wisdom, and the Arts,eds. J.Moravscikand P. Temko
(Totowa, N.J. 1982) 47-78. Unless otherwisenoted,I followBurnet'sOCT.
2 For the view that Plato uses mimeisthai in several differentsenses see P. Vicaire,
Platon. Critique litteraire (Paris 1960) 221-25 and E. Schaper, Prelude to Aesthetics
(London 1968) 42-48. Some of those who hold that Plato uses mimesis in the sense of
"impersonation"in Republic 3 and in that of "representation"in Republic 10 are Brown-
son (above, note 1) 92-93; F. M. Cornford,The Republic of Plato (Oxford 1941) 324, note
1; E. Havelock, Preface to Plato (Cambridge, Mass. and London 1963) 20-26.
3 See, for example, J.W. H. Atkins,Literary Criticismin Antiquity(Cambridge 1934)
1.48-51 and J.Annas,An Introductionto Plato's Republic (Oxford 1981) 336-44.
4 Representativesof this view are W. C. Greene, "Plato's View of Poetry,"HSCP 29
(1918) 56; A. H. Gilbert,"Did Plato Banish the Poets or the Critics?"Studies in Philology
36 (1939) 1-19; I. M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrines (London 1962)
1.147.

122 Elizabeth Belfiore
fromthatof Book 3 because it was writtenlater.5Othersbelieve thatthe

apparent inconsistenciesare due to the quite differentaims of the two
books.6Still othersargue that Plato definesand discussesa good and a
bad kind of imitation.7Or again, certainscholarsclaim that Plato's aes-
thetictheoriesin otherdialogues can explain some apparent inconsisten-
cies in the Republic.8
It has not been noticed,however,that Republic 3 and 10 contain a
theoryof imitationin the visual and poetic arts that is remarkablycon-
sistentand detailed in certain respects. In these books Plato defines,
explicitlyor by clear implication,manycharacteristics imita-
of different
tive artsand manyrelationshipsamong thesearts.This importantarea of
definitions and relationshipshas never been adequately investigated.9
There are many indications of a consistentlyapplied definitional
strategy,with Book 10.595A-608B elaborating and explaining ideas
brieflystatedor merelyimplicitin Book 3.392C-398B. For example, the
discussionof style (lexis) in the Republic 3 passage definesimitation(to
mimeisthai) as "likeningoneself to someone else" (3.393C5-6), distin-
guishes genres of poetryfromone anotheron the basis of their use of
imitation(3.394B-C), and concludes with the condemnationof one par-
ticular kind of imitation.Republic 10 opens with a referenceto the
Republic 3 discussionof imitation:"We did well ... in not admitting
any [poetry]thatis mimetike"(10.595A2-5) and explicitlyformulatesthe
theorythatthe imitatorimitatesthe worksof craftsmen,a view strongly
suggestedat Republic 3.397Eff. Definitionsand relationshipsamong the
artsare as importantin the Republic 10 passage as theyare in Republic
3. Plato begins the discussionof mimesis in Republic 10 by askingfora
definitionof "mimesis in general," statingthat this has not yet been
adequately given (10.595C). Plato then suggeststhat this definitionis
given withinthe nextfew pages, forhe remarks,at 10.599D3-4, that"we
definedthe imitatoras the craftsmanof an eidolon." Book 10 goes on to
definethe subject matterof one kind of imitativepoetry(603c) and to
5 This is the view of, for example, R. Nettleship,Lectures on the Republic of Plato
(London 19012) 341 and G. Else, The Structureand Date of Book 10 of Plato's Republic
(Heidelberg 1972).
6 Some interpretations along this line are those of W. Jaeger,Paideia: T'he Ideals of
Greek Culture, transl.G. Highet (New York 1943) 2.215; R. G. Collingwood,"Plato's Phi-
losophyof Art,"Mind n.s. 34 (1925) 163-64; Nehamas (above, note 1).
7 The best known proponentof the view that Plato distinguishesbetween a "good" and
a "bad" kind of imitationis J.Tate, "'Imitation'in Plato's Republic," CQ 22 (1928) 16-23
and "Plato and 'Imitation',"CQ 26 (1932) 161-69.
8 See, for example, W. J.Oates, Plato's View of Art (New York 1972) and W. J. Ver-
denius, Mimesis. Plato's Doctrine of ArtisticImitation and Its Meaning to Us (Leiden
1962).
9 Vicaire (above, note 2) 236-60, thoughhe does not examine the Republic in sufficient
detail, is one of the few who have undertakena studyof Plato's views on poetic genres.

A Theoryof Imitation 123
give an account of the reactionsof the audience to differentgenres of

poetry (605C-606D). ThroughoutBook 10 Plato is also concerned with
the relationshipbetween painting and poetry and with that between
imitationand craftsmanship.
Nevertheless,Plato's views on the defining characteristicsof the
imitativearts are, in Republic 3 and 10, oftenobscured by his not pre-
senting them formally and explicitly. Classificationis not, after all,
Plato's primary concern in these books, as it is in portions of his
Sophist,'0but is subordinateto ethical and psychologicalconcerns.It will
thereforebe helpful to reorganize Plato's material,collectinghis some-
times scattered remarks in Republic 3.392C-398B and 10.595A-608B,
assigninga single label to each kind of imitativeart and explicitlydes-
cribingrelationshipsthat Plato sometimesleaves his reader to infer.The
followingexaminationbegins with the most general definitionof imita-
tion (Section I), proceeds to two importantkinds of imitationwhich
Plato distinguishesand which we will call "versatileimitation"and "imi-
tation with knowledge" (Section II), considersthe two kinds of versatile
imitationwith which Plato is concerned: painting and poetry (Section
III), and concludes with a study of the genres of versatilepoetryPlato
mentions:epic, tragedy,lyric,and comedy (Section IV). Our studywill,
as far as possible,limit itselfto the two passages, Republic 3.392c-398B
and Republic 10.595A-608B,thatforma structuraland thematicunity.11
The diagram on p. 124 outlinesour procedure.
I. Imitation
Republic 3.393c5-6 gives the most comprehensivedefinitionof imi-
tation(T-OjAtjA0EaL) we findin our two passages:"Is it nottruethatto
make oneselfsimilar to someone else in sound or in shape is to imitate
that personto whom one makes oneselfsimilar?"(OV'KOViVTO' YE OMOLOVV
' '
EaVTOV aAAW Kaaa a VV Kara OX-a ayLALGtaL EOTLV EKELVOV w av
TL9 01AOLOL' )
10 The many parallels between the treatmentsof imitationin the Sophist and in the
Republic have been studied in detail by Else (above, note 5) 26-41. See also B. Bosanquet,
A Companion to Plato's Republic (London 19062) 85, who notes a parallel between
Plato's introductionof "huntersand imitators"into the "feverishcity" at Republic 2.373B
and his divisionsof huntingand productionin the Sophist. It is not,then,surprisingif the
Republic is also similarto the Sophist in its concernwithclassification.
11 This restrictionmeans, forexample, that we will not attemptto studyPlato's views on
music, an importantimitative art. For more comprehensivestudies of mimesis in the
worksof Plato and other Greek writerssee R. McKeon, "LiteraryCriticismand the Con-
cept of Imitationin Antiquity,"Modern Philology 34 (1936) 1-35; H. Koller, Die Mime-
sis in der Antike (Bern 1954); G. Else, "'Imitation' in the Fifth Century,"CP 53 (1958)
73-90 and addendum 245; Sorbom (above, note 1).

It has not been noticed that thispassage anticipatessome important

featuresof Republic 10. First,it implies that since the imitatorimitates
by makingsomethingthatis similarto somethingelse in sound or shape,
he is both an imitatorof soundsor shapes and a makerof (othersimilar)
soundsor shapes. Plato failsto spell thisout, and it is of littleimportance
in Republic 3. It does become significant, however,for our understand-
ing of Book 10, where Plato calls the imitatorboth an imitatorof eidola
(sounds or shapes), at 10.600E5, for example, and a maker of eid6la, at
10.599A7.12In usingthe conceptsof sound and shape to defineimitation
Republic 3.393c5-6 also anticipatesRepublic 10.603B6-7, which distin-
guishespaintingand poetryby theirrespectiveuse of sightand sound.
Imitation
making something similar to some-
thing else in sound or shape
Imitation with Knowledge Versatile Imitation (Mimetike)

imitation in poetry of the works of ignorant imitation of the works of
craftsmenas they are, to produce what craftsmenas they appear (= making of
is useful eid&la), to produce what gives pleasure
Versatile Painting Versatile Poetry

versatile imitation dealing with shapes, versatile imitation dealing with sounds,
that makes eidola of physical objects that makes eidola of actions, using imi-
tative narrative
Lyric Comedy Tragic Poetry

versatile poetry using only imi- versatile poetry that makes
tative narrative to produce eidola of arete to produce pity
laughter
Tragedy
tragic poetry using mixed tragic poetry using only imi-
narrative in epic verse tative narrative in iambic verse
12 See Nehamas (above, note ]) 62 fora good discussionof thisaspect of Republic 10.

Republic 3.393c5-6 also anticipates another importantconcept of

Republic 10: mistake.To imitatein sound (voice) is to make oneselfsimi-
lar to someone else in voice (3.393C5-6), and this, Plato tells us at
3.393cl-3, is to speak as though one were someone else. To speak as
thoughone were someone else is, in turn,to tryto make people believe
that one is someone else (3.393A8-B2), that is, to try to make people
mistakeone for someone else. Thus, to make oneselfsimilarto someone
else (to imitatesomeone else) is to tryto make people mistakeoneselffor
someone else. On the other hand, Plato writes,there is no imitation
when the poet does not hide himself(3.393Cll-D2) or tryto deceive us
(3.393A6-7).
In Republic 10 also, imitatorstryto make people mistakeimitations
forsomethingelse. At 10.600E7-601A2,forexample, an imitationis said
to be mistakenforthe truthby those "judgingfromcolorsand shapes."'13
In Republic 10, however, Plato does not follow the linguisticusage of
Republic 3, in which the relationshipbetween artifactsand imitationsis
said to be one of similarity.This may be because he wishesto reservethe
vocabulary of similarity for the relationship between artifacts and
Forms;at least,artifacts are said to be TOLOVTOV OLOV TO Ov at 10.597A5.
However we interpretthis latter relationship,we should not confuse it
with that between imitationsand artifacts.Imitationsare mistakenfor
artifacts,but artifactsare never mistakenfor Forms in Republic 3 and
10. Further,Forms could not be imitatedin the sense definedat Repub-
lic 3.393c5-6, "makingsimilarin sound or shape," fortheydo not have
these sensiblequalities. At Republic 5.476B, forexample, Plato explicitly
distinguishesthe Form Beauty from"the beautifulsounds . . . and colors
and shapes and everythingthatis craftedfromsuch things."''4
In one respect,however,3.393c5-6 mightat leastappear to contradict
Plato's view of imitationin Republic 10 and elsewherein Republic 3. Since
it describesonlya kindof imitationin whichone humanbeing useshimself
(Eavrov)to imitateanotherhumanbeing(,KEZVOv and aAAX are mascu-
line),it cannotdefinethe imitationof animalsor of inanimateobjectsmen-
tionedfrequentlyin the two books (forexample,at 3.396B5-7, 3.397A4-7,
10.598A1-3). Many have in fact thoughtthat Plato uses "imitation"to
13 Plato frequentlystressesthe imitator'sabilityto cause his audience to make mistakes.

See, for example, Republic 10.598c1-4, 598D2-3, 598E5-599A3, 601A4-B1, 602B1-4,
602c1O-D4, 605B6-c4. On the kinds of mistakesinvolved, and on audience psychology
generally, in Republic 10, see Belfiore, "Plato's Greatest Accusation Against Poetry,"
Canadian Journalof Philosophysuppl. vol. 9 (1983) 39-62.
14 This passage was called to my attentionby G. Vlastos, "Self-Predicationand Self-
Participationin Plato's Later Period," in his Platonic Studies (Princeton1973) 338, note 9.
We should note that since imitationin the sense defined in Republic 3 is imitationof
sensible qualities, when Plato writesat Republic 6.500c5 of imitationof "that which is
always the same" he cannot be using the term"imitation"in the sense of Republic 3.393c.

mean "impersonation"(in whicha human being uses his own body to imi-
(as
tateanotherhumanbeing) in Republic 3, and to mean "representation"
a bed)inRepublic10.15
when,forexample,a painterimitates
This interpretation, however,risksimputingto Plato a distinctionin
which he is not interested.While it is true that in his Sophist (267A3-4)
Plato distinguishesimitationusing one's own body (acting,forexample)
fromimitationusingimplements(painting,forexample), in the Republic
Plato not onlyignoresthisdistinction,he also failsto distinguishimitation
of humanbeingsfromimitationof animalsor of inanimateobjects,shifting
withoutwarningfromdiscussionof theone to theother.Thus,in Republic
3, Plato equates imitationof the soundsof animalsand of naturalphenom-
ena with imitationof madmen (3.396B5-9); and in Republic 10 he shifts
unexpectedlyfromthe painterwho imitatesthe "productsof craftsmen,"
(10.598A2-3) to the painter who paints "a shoemaker,a carpenter,the
othercraftsmen"(10.598B8-Cl).16The masculinesin 3.393c5-6, then,do
nothave any theoreticalsignificanceand may be replacedby moregeneral
termsin a definitionof "imitation"(Tro't4LyL/ELoOaL).What Plato consistently
means in Republic 3 and 10 is that "To imitateis to make one thing(or
person)similarto anotherthing(or person)in soundor shape."
II. VersatileImitationand ImitationwithKnowledge

A. VersatileImitation(Mimetike)
Mimetike, "versatileimitation,"is Plato's technical term for imita-
tion of many things,and mimetikos,"versatileimitator,"is the termfor
the practitionerof thisart. That the -ike formsof mimeisthaireferonly
to imitationof many thingsand that this helps to reconcilethe account
of Republic 3 with that of Republic 10 has been noticed only by Victor
Menza, in an unpublished dissertation,to which the firstpart of this
sectionowes much.'7
Like otherGreek -ike words,mimetikedesignatesan art or science,
and mimetikosrefersto the expertin this art. As far as we know,these
termswere coined by Plato and firstused by him at Republic3.395E1.18
15 See above, note 2.
16 p. Shorey cites this shift as an example of "inconcinnity"in his "Illogical Idiom,"
TAPA 47 (1916) 207.
17 V. Menza, "Poetryand the Techne Theory,"Diss. JohnsHopkins 1972.
18 P. Chantraine,Etudes sur le vocabulaire grec (Paris 1956) 98, findsmore than 350
-ikos words in Plato, of which more than 250 are not attestedearlier. Chantraine notes
that these words are often used with the termstechne or episteme, expressedor under-
stood, to describe an art or science (141-42). Accordingto the exhaustivestudyof A. N.
Ammann, -IKOY bei Platon (Freiburg 1953), mimetikos does not occur before Plato
(127). Else, "'Imitation,"'(above, note 11) also fails to findany occurrencesof mimetikos
or mimetike in the Fifth Century. L. Brandwood's computer study,A Word Index to
Plato, Compendia Series, vol. 8 (Leeds 1976) indicates that Plato uses the -ike formsof

There, as Menza notes, Plato asks whether the guardian should be a

mimetikos,and immediatelyafter,at 3.395A2,he gives what amountsto
a definitionof thisnew term:"A personwill imitatemany thingsand be
a mimetikos"(7roXXhU.l?)m-rEaL KaL eo-TraL/LUL/?T7LKOS). fIoXXa IuL?,o-,ETraL
explains the new -ike form: the mimetikos is someone who imitates
many things.19 AlthoughPlato also uses other formsof mimeisthaiand
its cognates in this way, mimetikos always has this meaning in the
Republic, and mimetike always designates the art of imitatingmany
things.20
Plato characterizesversatileimitationas imitationof many things,or
as imitationof the works of craftsmen,or as imitationand making of
eidola. As we will see, these differentdescriptionsall referto the same
aspect of the imitator'sactivity.
1. Imitationof Many Things
In Republic3, as Menza pointsout,21Plato condemnsonly the versa-
tile imitator.The young guardians are not allowed to be mimetikoi,
imitatingthe many things(artisans,women, slaves, vicious people) they
shouldnot themselves become (3.395D-396B), but they are allowed to
imitatethe one "craftsmanof freedom"(3.395B8-C5) theyare to become
as adults. Plato also findsacceptable the poet who imitatesthe one good
thing (rov rov E7TLELKOVS9MLM?)T?v aKpaTrov: 3.397D4-5), exiling only the
poet who "is able to become everythingbecause of his clevernessand to
imitateeverything"(3.398A1-2), thatis, the mimetikos.
Republic 10 is, as Menza notes,consistentwithBook 3 in condemning
only the versatileimitator.The technical vocabularyat the opening of
Book 10 alertsus to the factthatversatileimitationalone is being consid-
ered: "We founded the city well ... when we did not admit all of it
[poetry]that is mimetike" (10.595A2-5). This is entirelyconsistentwith
Book 3, which,as we have just seen, also rejectedonly the mimetikos.22
Plato departsfromthistechnicalvocabularywhen he goes on to ask what
"mimesisin general"is (10.595c7). This departureis explainedby the fact
mimesis only in his Republic (where the firstinstanceis that at 3.394E1), Sophist, Laws,
Epinomis, Statesman and Timaeus. Thus, since at least the firstbooks of the Republic are
generallyagreed to have been writtenbefore these other dialogues, Republic 38394E1 is
the earliestoccurrenceof an -ike formof mimesis in Plato and in extantGreek.
19 See Menza (above, note 17) 132. Chantraine (above, note 18) 141-42 notes that Plato
oftendefinesthe -ike wordsas he introducesthem. On the use of kai to introduce"a more
accurate definition"see J.D. Denniston,The Greek Particles (Oxford 1934) 291 (4).
20 According to Brandwood's data (above, note 18) these formsoccur in the Republic
only in Republic 3 (the two instanceswe have just mentioned)and in Republic 10, in 12
otherinstances:595A5, B5; 598B6; 602A11, B7, B10; 603A11, B4, cl, c5; 605A2, B7. In all of
these cases Plato is writingabout the unacceptable imitatorof many things.
21 Above, note 17, 126-33.
22 See Menza (above, note 17) 252 and note 1, p. 362.

that,since 10.595c-598c is a proofthatthe painter(or at least one kindof

painter)is a mimetikos,Plato does notwantto use the technicaltermuntil
the proofis complete. In this proof,Plato firstcomparesthe painterto a
man who carriesa mirroraround everywhere.Because the man withthe
althoughhe
mirrordoes not tryto deceive people, he is not an imitator,23
resemblesan imitatorin that he "makes" many things.He can make
"everything thateach ofthecraftsmenmakes"(10.596c2), "everyartifact,"
"everythingthat growsfromthe earth,""everylivingcreature,""every-
thing in the heavens," and "everythingunder the earth" (10.596c4-9).
Next, Plato establishesthat the painter is an imitator (mimetes, not
mimetikos)in an argumentendingat 1O.597E1O:"We have agreed on the
imitator(mimeten)." Finally, Plato proves that paintingimitateseidola
and is, therefore,mimetike (10.598A-C). The technical term mimetike
reappearsin thisproof,at 10.598B6,afterwhichit is used frequentlyin the
dialogue. Hereafter,the imitatorBook 10 condemnsis themimetikos,who
pretendsto imitateand know "everything"(forexample at 10.598C5-D1,
10.598E1). At 10.603A11,in fact, Plato replaces the earlier "mimesis in
general"with"mimetikein general."
2. Imitationof the Worksof Craftsmen
The many thingsthe versatileimitatorimitatesare the many works
of many kinds of craftsmen.That Plato's main concern is with crafts-
manshiphas oftenbeen noted,24and is obvious fromhis constantopposi-
tionof imitatorto craftsman.In Republic 10 the painteris said to be "an
imitatorof that which those othersmake." Plato then concludes: "This,
then,is what the tragedianalso will be, if he is an imitator,and all the
otherimitators:someone who is by nature thirdfromthe king and the
truth.... Then we have agreed on the imitator"(10.597E2-10). The
painter is then said to imitate "the works of the craftsmenas they
appear (10.598A-B). Plato also writesthat Homer will be shownto be a
versatileimitatorratherthan a craftsmanif he provesnot to have done
the deeds (erga) of differentkindsof craftsmen(10.599B3-7) but only to
have imitated their words (10.599c2). As we will see below (Section
III.B.2), imitationof ethos in Republic 10 is also imitationof the works
of craftsmenwho have knowledgeof how to act wisely.
23 This differencebetween the man with the mirrorand the painter is not usually
noticed: see, for example, Partee (above, note 1) 113-14; Annas (above, note 3) 336;
R. Cross and A. Woozley, Plato's Republic (New York 1964) 274. There is no question of
deception in Republic 10 until598c, where the painter,"if he is a good painter,"is said to
be able to deceive "childrenand fools"by showinghis works"froma distance."Imitation,
unlikethe act of carryinga mirror,requiresskilland intentto deceive.
24 Some good discussions of this topic are those of Menza (above, note 17) and
J.Moravcsik,"Noetic Aspirationand ArtisticInspiration,"in Plato on Beauty, Wisdom
and the Arts (above, note 1) 29-46.

In Republic 3 also the versatileimitatorimitatesthe worksof crafts-

men,thoughPlato is less explicitabout thisthan he is in Republic 10. The
ideal stateof Republic 3 is foundedon the principleof one man one work.
There must be no "double man" or "manifoldman" in this state,writes
Plato,since "each one does one work"(3.397E1-2). Only in thisstateis the
shoemakera shoemakerand not a pilot in addition,the farmera farmer
and nota jurymanas well (3.397E4-7). For thisreason,the personwho can
"become all sortsof thingsand imitateeverything"mustbe senton hisway
(3.398A-B), and theguardiansmustnotbe mimetikoi (3.394E-395D). Plato
could onlywritein thisway if he thoughtof the versatileimitatoras some-
one who triesto imitateall the crafts.If the versatileimitatorwere himself
a real craftsman,he would be doing one work,like the others.If,however,
he were no craftsmanat all, he would be an idler ratherthana "manifold
man." Instead, the versatileimitatoris exiled because he is a pseudo-
craftsman, a meddlerin everysortofcraft.25
3. Makingof Eidola
That the mimetikosis a pseudo-craftsman who imitatesmany things
has been well understoodin the literature,but Plato's concept of imita-
tion of eidola has been much misunderstood.26 On our presentaccount,
"imitationof eidola" is simplya more accurate,technicaltermfor"imi-
tationof many things"and "imitationof the worksof craftsmen."
At Republic10.599D2-4 Plato remarks,as he cross-examinesHomer,
thatthe imitatorhas been defined: 'fl 4LXE Ò1?)p, EL7TEp ATpLTos ro
T7jr a?OEL'as eL a9prET7 7TEpL, EL&LWXOV 87?y/LOVpyOs, OrV 1 AL/.?JrT?V
cpLo-ajEGa ("Dear Homer, if you are not thirdfromthe truthconcerning
arete, the craftsmanof an eidolon, whom we defined as an imitator
[mimetes]. . ."). Since, as we will see below (Section IV.C), arete' is the
subject matterof only one kind of versatileimitator,Plato's question to
Homer tells us that the mimetikos(mimeten obviouslyhas thismeaning
here) has been defined as "third from the truth, craftsmanof an
eid&lon." Plato must be referring,first,to the argument ending at
10.597E10 (above, Section II.A.2), where the imitator was "agreed"
(WMoXAoy'KaIAEv) to be "thirdfromthe truth"about craftsmanship. Next,
25 N. White, A Companion to Plato's Republic (Indianapolis and Cambridge 1979)

96-97 notes that Plato's condemnationof imitativeart in Republic 3 is based on his "Prin-
ciple of the Natural Division of Labor." See also P. Shorey, What Plato Said (Chicago
1933) 219, and Bosanquet (above, note 10) 99 (cited by White, p. 97).
26 For example, the eidola of Republic 10 have been connected with the images
(eikones) of the Divided Line (Republic 6.509-11) by, among others,H. J.Paton, "Plato's
Theory of Eikasia," Proc. AristotelianSoc. 22 (1921-22) 69-104; S. Ringbom,"Plato on
Images," Theoria 31 (1965) 95-96; J.-P. Vernant, "Image et apparence dans la theorie
platonicienne de la mimesis," Journal de Psychologie 72 (1975) 136. Other common
errorsare discussedbelow, in thissection.

"craftsmanof an eidolon" at 10.599D3 can only refer to 10.597E10-

598B8, where Plato introducedthe technical term eidolon (eidola) to
explain "in what way" (oL'a 7OV7O: 10.598A7) the mimetikosis able to
make "everything."Afterit was agreed that the mimetikosimitatesnot
the Form but the worksof craftsmen(10.598A1-4), Plato asked whether
he imitatesthese works"as they are or as they appear" (o'La EO7TLL V oLa
4)aLVEraL: 10.598A5), and explained this distinctionin the paragraph at
10.598A7-9: "It's like this.A couch, if one sees it fromthe side or from
the frontor in any way whatsoever,does it differat all itselffromitself,
or does it not differat all but appears different?"('Q?E KALLV'7, EaVTE E(K
7r\ayLov avl/v 0Eae Ea'VTE Ka-rav7-LKpV 71 o7r/ov,

0L r La4pEL avT)
EavT?)s9, 1 &La(EpEL v,vo 8\ aA\oL'a;)The couch was then
caLvETaL
agreed not to differbut only to appear different(10.598A10) and paint-
ing was said, at 10.598B1-5, to imitate not "that which is" (ro o'v) but
"that which appears" (ro (PaLvdoEvov), and to be imitationof a "phan-
tasm" (PavraTioaTosq), not of "truth"(aA,E0ELasg). The conclusion then
followed:"Mimetikeis, then,far fromwhat is true,and, as it seems,for
this reason makes everything,because it graspssome small part of each
thingand thatan eidolon"(foppw a'pa rov Tov aAnoVs 7) MU/L7/TLK7/
,~~~~~~~
cv7TEpyaET(aL, /, OT
a e /TaL OT 0-kKO TL
EfOTLV KaL, WS EOLKEV, lL\a ToVTo aTavTa ffMLKpov T
EKaOTov Eca7TTETaL, KaL TOVTo E';wAov: 10.598B6-8).
In this passage (10.598A1-B8) eidolon is a synonymof "that which
appears" (\ SbaLvoMEvo0V),of "appearance" (qPavTaco-Ma), and of a thing
"as it appears" (ol'a SbaLvETaL). It is the oppositeof "thatwhich is" (To o'v),
of "truth"(&Ak&Lda),and of a thing"as it is" (ol'a E'oTLv).
Plato distinguishes eidolon fromtruthon an epistemologicalbasis.The
couch "as it is," or the truthabout the couch, is the object of the craft
knowledgeof the useror of the truebeliefofthe maker(10.601C-602B). It
cannotbe perceivedby thesenses:the couch looksdifferent no matterhow
(0rn1oViv)one sees it (10.598A7-9). The couch "as it appears,"the "appear-
or
ance" (to phainomenon) eidolon, on the other hand, is the object of
ignorant versatile imitation. The versatile imitator can imitate eidola
"though he does not know about the crafts of any of these [craftsmen]"
(10.598c1);27he deceives the personwho is "notable to distinguishknowl-
edge and ignorance,that is, imitation"(10.598D4-5);28he neitherknows
norhas rightbeliefabout whathe imitates(10.602A).His ignorancedistin-
guisheshim fromthe craftsman,and is a necessaryconditionforhis imita-
tionofeidola (10.599A6-B7). The same contrastbetween mimetikosand
27 J. Adam, The Republic of Plato (Cambrige 19632) 2.394-95, interpretsthe passage in

thisway,readingTEXvVv insteadofhisearlierconjecture
TEXvLTWv.
28 / O'O T' ecva EflOT/V Ka avE7rnrT7o1vv?v KaL MLMT) 'eETacaLt. The second
kai in this passage links "appositionallyrelated ideas": on this use of kai see Denniston
(above, note 19).

craftsmanwas stronglysuggestedat Republic3.394E-395B, where Plato

stated that it was impossibleto do or imitatemany thingswell: only the
ignorantperson,he implied,could attemptto do this.At 10.601B9-10 Plato
clearly indicates the epistemological basis for his distinctionbetween
eidolon and "truth"when he characterizesthe mimetikosas someonewho
does not know the truthbut only [perceives]the "appearance" (eidolon):
"The makerof an eidolon, the imitator,we say, knowsnothingabout the
truth,but [perceives]the appearance" (o TO?V EL83W?OV
o7roL0T)S9, O 1LIp7)T7)S,
4a/JEk, TOV OVTOv
OVsovEovraLEL, TOV Of fa&oeov).
The eidolon, then,is sound or shape as perceived by someone igno-
rantof anythingbut sound and shape. The makerof eidola makes eidola
that may be mistaken,by someone as ignorant as himself,for "that
which is." "That which is," on the other hand, is a sensible artifact,a
couch or a table, as understoodby someone with knowledge of crafts-
manship. The person with knowledge, like the mimetikos,directs his
attentionto sensibles;however,by also "lookingto the Form" (10.596B7),
and consultingthe user about what is trulyfine (10.601D8-E2), he has
come to understandand not merelyperceive sensibleartifacts.
Because, then, an eidolon is any object perceived by an ignorant
person, it is a mistake to think, as Else does, for example, that the
mimetikoswill be betteroffif he happens to finda well-made artifactto
imitatethan if he imitatesa poorlymade one.29Plato's point is thateven
if,as in the examples in Republic 10, the "model" is a well-made product
of craftsmanship,the ignorantmimetikosis only capable of grasping,
imitating,and makingeidola.
Anothercommonmistakeis to confuseimitationof eidola in Republic
10 with phantastikein the Sophist235D-236c.30 Plato distinguishes
eikastike,which gives imitationsthe true proportionsand colors of the
originals(Sophist235D6-E2), fromphantastike whichgivesthemthe pro-
portionsthatmerelyappear fine,"lettingthe truthgo" (Sophist236A4-6).
It makes,forexample,theupper partsof verylargestatuesproportionately
larger,and the lower partsproportionately smallerthanthoseof the origi-
nals (235E5-236A6). The productsmade by phantastike, Plato writes,only
appear to resemblewhatis fine"because of our view froma poor position"
(&aA TnV OVK EK KaIoV 6Eav),but if someonecould "view themadequately"
(LKavw-sopav),theywould not appear to resemblethe originals(236B4-7).
Thus, while the Sophistdistinguishespoor and good viewingconditions-
good conditionsbeing sufficient to tell us whetheror not the truthis ade-
quatelyrepresented-theRepublic opposesan unchanging"thatwhichis,"
29 Else, The Structureand Date . .. (above, note 5) 35.

30 The connectionis made, for example, by Adam (above, note 27) ad 598B; K. Gilbert
and H. Kuhn, A History of Esthetics (1939; rpt. Bloomington,Indiana 1953) 33; J. P.
Maguire,"The Differentiationof Artin Plato's Aesthetics,"HSCP 68 (1964) 393.

thatcan be understood,to a constantlychanging"thatwhichappears,"that

can only be seen. The couch in Republic 10 appears differentno matter
how (o7r)oi3v:10.598A8)one sees it,and one view is as bad as another.And
again, unlike the Republic, which distinguishesimitationof eidola from
imitationof that which is on the basis of craftknowledge,the Sophist
makes no distinctionbetween phantastikeand eikastikeon thisbasis: the
two artswould requirethesame knowledgeof theproportions of theorigi-
nal in orderto make theirrespectiveproducts.
Once we have rid ourselvesof these misunderstandings we can also
see anotherof Plato's motivesfor introducinghis concept of eidola. In
Republic 3 Plato had characterized the mimetikos as someone who
imitatesmany differentthings.Now, Plato adds that the mimetikosalso
imitatesmany differentappearances of a single thing.He then uses this
very demonstrationof the apparent breadth of the mimetikos'field to
prove its trulynarrowscope, for he concludes that the mimetikosdoes
not really imitate "everything"but only one thing over and over: an
eidolon,which is a "small part of each thing" (598B7). The versatile
imitator'sclaim to universalskillhas been demolishedin a neat elenchus.
Plato's concept of mimetike thus remains the same throughout
Republic 3 and 10: versatileimitationis the ignorantmakingof eidola of
the worksof craftsmenas they appear. This concept is, however,eluci-
dated only gradually.At first,the mimetikosis said to be someone who
imitatesmany things.These many thingsare then explicitlyshownto be
the worksof craftsmen,and finally,to be these works"as they appear,"
that is, eidola as opposed to "that which is." The mimetikosis consis-
tentlydistinguishedfromthe craftsmanby his ignorance.He is ignorant
of the truthabout that which he imitates,and he leads othersequally
ignorantto mistakehis eidola for"thatwhich is."
As many passages indicate,the aim of mimetikeis to produce plea-
sure. At 3.397D6-8 Plato notes that the "mixed man," the mimetikos, is
pleasing,especiallyto boys and the crowd. Republic10.605D3 and 606B4
speak of the pleasure we get from imitations;10.607A5 refersto the
"sweetened Muse"; 10.607C4-5 mentions "that poetry and imitation
[which is] devoted to pleasure," and 10.607D6-E2 asks the defendersof
poetryto prove that it is not only pleasant but also useful.This associa-
tionof pleasureand imitationhas oftenbeen noted.31
B. ImitationWith Knowledge
Plato's views on the possibilityof a "good" kind of imitationare
much less clear and coherentthan his theoryof mimetike.He says very
31 On the opposition of pleasure and the useful in Plato's aesthetics see Moravcsik
(above, note 24) esp. 30, and V. Goldschmidt, "Le Probleme de la tragedie d'apres
Platon,"REG 61 (1948) 23.

little about it, and when he does, he seems at one time to imply that
there is or can be a good kind of imitation,while at anotherhe appears
to deny or ignore this possibility.Nevertheless,our analysisof mimetike
is helpfulhere also. As we will see, Plato's views on mimetikeand crafts-
manship imply that there cannot be a good kind of imitation(in the
sense of "imitation"definedabove, Section I) in painting.In the case of
poetry,however, his views do allow for a good kind of imitation,the
antithesisof imitationof "thingsas theyappear."
Those who argue for a Platonic theory of a "good" kind of
imitation32 can point to a number of passages in Republic 3 and 10 in
which Plato opposes the kind of imitation he condemns not only to
craftsmanshipbut also to imitationof "that which is," or of the good.
Thus, in Republic 3 he exiles the mimetikos,but writesthat "if they[the
guardians]imitate,they should imitate. .. brave, self-controlled, pious
and freemen" (3.395c3-5). He also permitsthe poet who is an "unmixed
imitatorof the good man" to remain (3.397D4-5). Plato is most explicit
about a good kind of art at 3.40Aff., a passage outsidethose with which
we are primarilyconcerned. Here, Plato commends poets who can "put
the image of the good dispositioninto their poems" (3.401B1-3), and
craftsmenwho can "track down the nature of the beautiful and the
graceful" (3.401C4-5), whetherin painting"images of living creatures"
or in makinghouses (3.401B5-6). In Republic 10 also, Plato opposes ver-
satile imitationof the worksof craftsmen"as they appear" to the possi-
bilityof imitationof the worksof craftsmen"as they are" (10.598A-B),
and he contrastsimitationof the "complainingethos" withthe possibility
of imitatingthe "wise and calm ethos" (604E).
In themselves,however,these passages offerlittlesupportfor a Pla-
tonic theoryof good imitation.In all of Republic 10 Plato says nothing
about this kind of imitationexcept to deny that the mimetikosengages
in it. In the passage at 3.395C he discusses this kind of imitationin
merelyhypotheticalterms:"if theyimitate...." Again,in the passage at
3.40Aff., mimesis and its cognates occur only once, in a usage appar-
ently quite differentfrom that in the earlier discussionof mimetike.33
The same passage subsumes both artists and other craftsmenunder
demiourgoi,34though elsewhere imitatorsand craftsmenare strongly
32 See above, note 7.

33 At 3.401A8 Plato writesthat grace and harmonyare "kin and mimemata" of the wise
and good ethos.Though imitationof ethosin Republic10 can involve the idea of mistak-
ing one thing for another it is hard to see how this can be true of the mimemataof
3.401A8.
34 In Republic10 the mimetikos is called a "craftsman,"but he is always clearly just a
"craftsmanof an eidolon"(10.599D3, for example), as opposed to a craftsmanof the
things we use. At 3.401B3-4, however, rots aAXXOLs819,uLOVpyOLTsindicates that Plato
includes poets,painters,and housebuildersin the same category.

contrasted.Thus, it is doubtfulthat Plato is discussingimitationat all at

3.401Aff.What he is praisingmay insteadbe a kind of craftsmanship.
Plato's explicit statementsoffereven less evidence of a theoryof a
good kind of imitationin painting.The account of imitationand mime-
tike in Republic 3.392C-398B is concernedsolely with poetry,and while
we find that the painter and musician are indeed said to produce
mimemata (3.400A7, 3.401A8), no account is given of these products.In
fact,Plato seems to be deliberatelyrefusingto give such an account,for
he leaves considerationof musical mimesis up to the expert Damon
(3.400B), and he writesin only vague termsof grace and harmonyin the
visual arts (3.401A1-8), saying nothingthat mightdefinegrace and har-
mony and distinguishthem from their opposites. Thus, no theoretical
account of imitation in the visual arts, good or bad, is given in
Republic3.
In Republic 10 also Plato fails to give an account of imitationin the
visual arts of "thingsas they are." Here, moreover,his more detailed
account of mimetikeand craftsmanship mustimplythattherecannot be
a good kind of imitationin the visual arts.
At 10.598A-CPlato makes the followingclaims:
1. The painterimitatesthe worksof craftsmen(598A1-3);
2. Painting imitatesthe works of craftsmennot as they are but as
they appear, and is imitationnot of the truthbut of that which
appears (598A5-B5);
3. Therefore(apa) mimetikeis far fromthe truthand graspsonly an
eidolon (598B6-8);
4. For example (olOv) the painterwill paint a shoemaker,a carpen-
ter, though he does not know about the craftsof any of these
[people](598B8-CI).35
In this passage Plato concludes (apa, ol'Ov) that the mimetikosin
general and (at least one kind of) painter in particularare ignorantof
craftknowledgeof what they imitate. He arrivesat this conclusionby
arguing that the painter fails to imitate the truthabout artifacts.Plato
implies,then,thatthe personwho could imitatethe truthabout artifacts
would have craft knowledge about that which he imitates.Thus, the
imitatorof a couch "as it is" would be a carpenter,who had knowledge
(or truebelief) about what makes a usefulcouch (1O.601c-602B).
If such an imitatorexisted,however,he could not,Plato also implies,
imitatea couch "as it is" by paintinga couch. Plato insiststhata painting
of a couch is a couch, just like the artifact(1O.597B5-11). He also holds
that:
1. All of the many thingswhich we call by the same name have the
same unique Form (10.596A5-7); this Form has the same name
of the text,see above, note 27.

35 On thisinterpretation

(for example, "couch") as the many of which it is the Form

(10.597B5-11);
2. The Form is that which determineswhat is the proper function
(chreia)36of thatof which it is the Form (10.596B6-9, 601D4-6).37
From these views it followsthat both the paintingof a couch and the
artifactmustbe judged by the same unique standardof function.But if,
as we may reasonablyassume, a couch functionsas somethingto sleep
on, any paintingof a couch must,Plato's statementsimply,be a useless
couch, a mere apparentcouch.
The same argumentwould apply to sculpture.If a sculpturedoes not
have the functionalcharacteristicsof a couch, it must be an "apparent
couch." If it does functionperfectlyas a couch, on the other hand, it
could hardlybe called an imitationof a couch.
Plato is not,however,committedto the same negativeconclusionin
the case of poetry. The craftsmanof the thingsimitated by the poet
knows "what pursuitsmake people better or worse" (10.599D4-5) and
makes productsusefulfor this purpose. There is no reason why a poem
could not have the same use as these products,if made by a craftsman.
The poet would also be an imitator,however,if he triedto make people
think he was another good man in differentcircumstances,instead of
himself.
This view of the poet who imitatesthings"as theyare" is supported
by Plato's example at Republic 3.396C. The good man, Plato writes,
when he reaches in his narrative"some speech or action of a good man,"
wishesto "relateit as if he himselfwerethatperson"(s aiVrTs OV EI Jt-
voo a7rayyEAXXv) and he will not be ashamed of this kind of imitation
(3.396C5-8). But he does not wish seriouslyto liken himself(a7TELK'4ELV
EavTov) to an inferior(3.396D4-5). This is surelyimitationin the same
sense as that of 3.393A-C: making oneself similar to (tryingto make
othersmistakeone for) someone else in sound or shape. Compare espe-
cially 3.393A8: ò-7rcpaV9 -sWV Ov XpVtI1 AEyEL and 3.396C7: cS av Tbo
" ,
WV EKELvOS a7rayyEAAELV.
Our study of the implicationsof Plato's theories,then, leads us to
conclude that Plato would admit imitationof the good as a separate
categoryof imitationin poetry,but not in the visual arts.Plato, however,
says littleto definethiskind of imitation,mentioningit chieflyin order
to contrastit with mime'tike'.
For this reason,we mustconclude that his
36 As White pointsout (above, note 25), 251-52 [D] and 87 [F], Plato uses the termergon
for"function"in Republic1, while in Republic10 he uses chreia.In Republic10, as I note
below, Section III.B.2, ergon refers not to "function"but to the product made by a
craftsman.
37 For thisinterpretationof the Form of the Bed see N. R. Murphy,The Interpretation
of Plato's Republic(Oxford 1951) 238; Crombie (above, note 4) 143-44; Moravcsik
(above, note 24) 38-39.

views imply that imitationof the good is the antithesisof imitationof

"thingsas they appear." We will, then,define imitationof the good as
imitationwith knowledge,in poetry,of the worksof craftsmenas they
are, to produce what is useful.
III. VersatilePoetryand Painting

Plato distinguishestwo kinds of mimertike, versatile painting and
versatilepoetry,accordingto medium and objectsimitated.
A. Medium
Plato explicitly distinguishespoetry and painting at 10.603B6-7:
".. that [mimettike] ... concerned with sight,or that concerned with
sound, which we call poetry...." The two media, sounds and shapes, of
imitationin the mostgeneralsense (above, SectionI) distinguishtwo kinds
of mime'tike' fromeach other.Paintingimitatesand makesthatwhichhas
colorand shape. While the distinguishing of versatilepoetry
characteristic
is imitationand makingof that which has sound, it also, of course,uses
shapes,"schetmata, in thesenseofgesturesor motions(3.397B2).
Strictlyspeaking,paintingis just one kind of imitationdealing with
shapes and colors. Weaving and embroideryare other visual arts men-
tioned (2.373A7, 3.401A2) but nowhere formallydistinguished.Again,
Plato seems to indicate that poetryis only one kind of imitationdealing
with sound when he writesof "those[imitators]. .. dealing with music,
thatis,poetsand theirhelpers:rhapsodes,actors,dancers,and contractors"
(2.373B5-8), and when he distinguishespoets, rhapsodes,and actors at
3.395A. But thesedistinctions are blurredin Republic 10. At 10.605C10-D2
"Homer" would appear to be a rhapsodeor actor performingthe poems,
thoughat 1O.600A10and cl "Homer"is thelong-deadauthorofthepoems.
We will,then,ignoringdistinctions among the variousvisual and musical
arts,let versatilepaintingbe that kind of mime'tikethat uses colorsand
shapes,and versatilepoetrythatwhich uses,as Plato tellsus at 1O.601A8,
speech,meter,rhythm, and harmony.
B. Objects Imitated
Both versatilepaintingand versatilepoetryimitatethe eidola of the
worksofcraftsmen, sortofcraftsman.
buteach imitatesthoseofa different
1. VersatilePainting
In mostof Plato's examples,the versatilepaintersimitatethe eidola of
skeue. Plato firstmentionstablesand couches (10.596B1ff.), then
artifacts,
bits and reins (10.601C6ff.). But there are indicationsthat the versatile
painteralso imitatesthe bodies of livingcreatures.He is, afterall, often

called zographos,literally,a painterof livingcreatures.38

At 10.598B9 he is
said to paint a shoemakerand a carpenter,and 10.601D4-6 suggeststhat
livingcreatures,like artifacts,are objectsof craftsmanship,
since theyalso
have excellence and beauty dependenton use. Justas a horsemanknows
whatmakesreinsbeautifuland useful,so he also knowswhatmakesa horse
beautifuland useful,and could, by breedingand training,help to produce
a usefulanimal. A versatilepaintermight,then,imitatethisanimal.39
2. VersatilePoetry
It has long been recognized that the subject matter of (versatile)
poetryis action, praxis, or more exactly,human beings acting.40Plato
explicitlymakes this point in Republic 10.603C4-8: "Mimetike'[sc. in
poetry: 7 T7T W'0OL)TE /LLL7TLK7j: 603c1] imitates, we say, human beings
doing forcedor voluntaryactions,and as a resultof thisacting thinking
they have fared well or ill, and in all these cases feeling pain or plea-
sure." In a sectionof Republic 3 outside that with which we are primar-
ily concerned Plato also mentionsimitationof lexis or praxis (3.396c6).
Plato then draws a distinctionsimilarto that between forcedand volun-
taryactions made at 10.603c, when he writesthat the ideal state should
retain"the harmonythat would imitatethe tonesand accents of a brave
man in warlike action and in every forced deed . . and another har-
mony that would imitate his accents in a peaceful and not forced but
voluntary action . . ." (3.399A-B).
A numberof aspects of Plato's view thatpoetryis imitationof action
become clear when we treat it as an integralpart of the theoryof the
imitativeartswithwhich we are now concerned.
38 Graphein and cognates occur 9 times in Republic 3 and 10; zographein and cognates
occur 12 times. At Gorgias 453c6-8 Plato definesthe zographos as "he who paints living
creatures."
39 For a parallel see Gorgias 464B-466A,where Plato contraststhe crafts,medicine and
gymnastics,thatare concerned with what is best forthe body, withthatbranchof flattery
thatmerelypretendsto have thisconcern.
40 7rTp7rrovras, opa1.dv,'avOpclrovs... 7rp4ets... (10.603c4-5). Contrast Aristotle
Poetics6.1450A16-17: X' yap rpaycpLa plp4tja EorLv OVK aVGpCo'ZTCOVaAAa 7Tpa4ewscKaL
,/L'ov.R. Dupont-Roc, "Mimesis et enonciation,"in Ecriture et theorie poe'tiques (Paris
1976) 11, note 14, notes this differencein phraseologybetween Plato and Aristotle.See
the excellentinterpretation of thisdifferenceby G. Finsler,Platon und die Aristotelische
Poetik (Leipzig 1900) 42-43.
Plato's remarkat 10.603c4-5 is also interestingbecause it restrictspoetic mimetiketo
imitation of humans, and does not mention imitation of gods. Although at 10.598E2
Homer is said to claim to know all divine things,and at 10.596c8 the man withthe mirror
"makes" all thingsin the heavens,Plato is exclusivelyconcerned withimitationof humans
in the passages in which we are primarilyinterested.This restrictionfollowsfromPlato's
definitionof mimetike as imitationof the productsof craftsmen,and not of the Form
made by a god (10.598A).

First,Plato's concept of imitationof action in Republic 10 is antici-

pated by the definitionof imitation(TO MLMELZTOaL)in Republic 3.393c as
"making oneself similar to someone else in sound (or shape)" (above,
Section I). This is evident from the fact that Plato uses "sound" and
"action" interchangeablyin Republic 10. Thus, he introducesversatile
poetry,at 10.603B6-7, as mimettiket concerned with sound (KaT'za Thzv
aKo7)v)and then goes on to write that versatilepoetryimitatesaction
(10.603c). Moreover,the analogy between versatilepaintingand versa-
tile poetry in terms of vision and sound (10.603B6-7) is restated at
10.603D1-3 in termsof visionand action. In Plato's view, praxis,action,
is essentially"sound,"that is, the logos, speech, that communicatesand
expressestrue or false human beliefs.41Thus, at 10.599c the "imitatorof
medical logoi" is clearlyequivalentto the imitatorof medical praxeis. In
the Republic, Plato, unlike Aristotle,does not consider any formal
propertiesof a plot in writingof imitationof praxis.42Even when he
uses logos to mean "story"ratherthan "speech of a human being" he is
concerned only with truth value. Logoi are true or false (Republic
2.376E11), not plotswithbeginnings,middles,and ends.
Second, action is the subject matterof all versatilepoetry,and not
just of one kind.43Plato discussesversatilepoetryas a whole ("that[imi-
tation]concerned with sound, which we call poetry. . ." (10.603B6-7)
just beforehe tells us, at 10.603C, that versatilepoetryimitateshumans
acting. He mentionspleasure as well as pain at 10.603C: "thinkingthey
have fared well," "feelingpleasure,"and would thusseem to be thinking
of comedy as well as tragedy.At 10.606D1-3 Plato statesthatpoetrystirs
up "all the desires and pains and pleasures in the soul, which we say
followupon every action of ours." That comedy, at least, is included in
thisgeneralization,is shownby Plato's statementat 10.606c2-3 that"the
same account" (as thatgiven of tragedy)applies to "comic imitation."
as worksofcraftsmen,
Finally,Plato treatsactions,like artifacts, which
require knowledge to be made (done) well.44This view was implicitin
41 Plato is not departingfromaccepted Greek usage when he treatslogos as a formof

praxis (ergon). See, on this subject, A. M. Parry,Logos and Ergon in Thucydides (New
York 1981) Part I.
42 At Phaedrus 268D4-5, on the other hand, he writes that tragedy is the "proper
arrangement"(orVo'Tao'Lv7rpewovo'av) of parts.
43 Republic 10.603c is not a definitionor descriptionof tragedy,as has been thought,for
example, by Dupont-Roc (above, note 40) 7 and Goldschmidt(above, note 31) 42.
44 T. Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford 1977) 177-248, argues that in the Republic
Plato rejectsthe Socratic analogy between virtue (or virtuousactions) and craft. Irwin's
argument,however,is weakened by his failureto give adequate considerationto Republic
3 and 10. The passages I discuss below seem to me sufficient evidence that at least those
passages in Republic 3 and 10 with which I deal do assume an analogy between craftsand
virtuousactions. (I thank the anonymous refereeof TAPA for remindingme of Irwin's
views.)

Republic 3's characterizationof the guardiansas "craftsmenof freedom"

(3.395cl). In Republic10 Plato is more explicit.First,he uses the same
word,erga, "works,""deeds,"to describeboththe artifactsimitatedby the
versatile painter (10.598A2-3) and the deeds imitated by Homer
(10.599B4-6), and he usesergaand praxeisinterchangeably at 10.600A4-5.
Again,he states,at 10.598E,thatthe defendersof Homer and the poetssay
that "these people know all the craftsand all human thingsconcerning
arete'and vice, and divine things."He thenstatesthathe will notbotherto
questionHomer concerningmedicine or "the othercrafts"(10.599B9-c6)
but will instead examine whetherHomer has knowledgeof "the greatest
and finest things," that is, generalship, government,and education
(10.599c6-D2). The makersof theseactionsor activities,Plato writes,use
knowledgeof "what pursuitsmake humansbetteror worse"(10.599D4-5)
in the particularcircumstancesof war, government,etc. The poet, how-
ever,knowsnothingabout what he imitates,but only"paintson the colors
of each of the craftswith words and phrases,"whetherhe writesabout
generalshipor about anythingelse (601A-B). Moreover,at 601D4-6, Plato
includes praxeis with artifactsand livingcreaturesas thingswhose arete'
and beauty depend on use and of which thereis a user and maker. Now
because pain and pleasure attendeveryaction of ours (10.603c, 10.606D)
and because dealing withpain or pleasurealso requiresknowledgeof what
is good forhumans(10.604B-D), acting well in everycircumstancewould
seem to be, at leastin Republic 10, a kindof craft,and all fineactions(kala
erga) would seem to be craftproducts.Plato suggeststhat acting well in
painfulcircumstancesis a techne when he compares it with medicine at
10.604D1-2. This comparison also links the discussion of acting well
(10.603-604) withthe previous(10.599Bff.)considerationof Homer's craft
knowledgeof medicineand othertechnai.
Like othercraftproducts,fineactionshave two "aspects":actions"as
theyare," and actions "as theyappear," that is eidola. Like the versatile
painters, the versatile poets imitate things "as they appear," making
eidola (Ei~Aa ELb8AO7TOLOVvTa: 10.605C3).45They are "imitators of the
eidola of arete and of the otherthingstheywriteabout" (10.600E5-6).
In praxisas in the visual world, writes Plato at 10.603C10-D7, a
human being is at war with himself,and has contraryelements in his
soul at the same time (aà: 10.603D2). For example, a "reasonableman"
(a7vp 'TLELK'S) who loses a son will bear his misfortune"most easily,"
but he will neverthelessgrieve (10.603E3-8). When he is in the company
of his equals he will fightand resistpain more (MaAAov),but when alone
he will "dare to say many things... and he will do many thingshe
would not want someone to see him doing" (10.604A1-8). We know,
45 This reading,followed by Burnet'sOCT and Adam (above, note 27) is much prefera-
ble to the alternateEiLW0o7rolovTLt. See Adam's note ad loc.

then, Plato writes,that there are two contrarythingsin his soul at the
same time (a`,a: 10.604B4). One part of his soul, which is ready to obey
reason and law (10.604B6-7), resistingpain (10.604A10), is the "wise and
calm ethos,being always nearly the same itselfto itself"(10.604E2-3).
Anotherinferiorpart,which draws him to pain (10.604B1), is the "com-
plaining ethos"(10.604E2). Plato concludes that the mimetikos imitates
only the complaining ethos, which "furnishesmuch and varied imita-
tion"and thathe does not imitatethe wise ethos because it is not easy to
imitateor to understandwhen it is imitated(10.604E1-6).46
Enduring the loss of a son, the praxis in Plato's example, is a craft
product(ergon) made by a craftsman,the "reasonable man," and it has
two "aspects,"correspondingto the carpenter'scouch "as it is" and "as it
appears." The praxis "as it appears" consistsof the many sounds and
movementsthat pain forcesthe man to make. Though he will give in to
pain more in solitude,perhaps beating his breast and wailing, even in
company he will be unable to avoid some outward signsof grief:a sor-
rowfulexpression,sighs,etc. These signsof pain are the eidola imitated
by the versatilepoet. No matterwhen or where the ignorantmimetikos
hears the reasonableman who is enduringgrief,he will grasp only these
many and varied eidola. On the other hand, the praxis "as it is," the
endurance of griefby a craftsmanwith knowledge,is resistanceto and
struggleagainst pain. This struggleremainsthe same, like the couch "as
it is," and can onlybe understoodand imitatedby anothercraftsman.
Plato's example is of emotional reactions in tragic circumstances.
However, since pain and pleasure attend all our actions (10.603C6-7,
10.606D1-3), in comic and other circumstancesas well, someone with
knowledgewill create craftproductsand will also exhibitoutwardsigns
of emotion that may be mistakenfor "that which is" by the ignorant.
Certain kindsof actionsalso require otherspecificapplicationsof knowl-
edge: thatof how to make people betterin war, forexample. The crafts-
men of these actions or activitieswill not only give outward signs of
emotion,they will also make sounds and movementsthat may be mis-
taken for the practice of their specificcraft,for example, generalship.
We will discussimitationof thissortof action in SectionIV.C.
We have found, then, that Plato distinguishestwo kinds of mime-
tike, versatilepaintingand versatilepoetry.Versatilepaintingimitates,
46 Plato's use of thistermis significant.

Ethos means both dramatis persona and "deline-
ation of character"in the visual arts (LSJ). 1thos was also a traditionalsubject matterof
poetry,as Havelock notes (above, note 2) 62-64. Havelock defines ethos as "a man's
proper feelings and reactions to intimatesand enemies" (63): it thus includes both an
"inner"state and "outer"manifestations.Plato has a similarconcept of ethos in 10.603-5,
where he treatsit as both a part of the soul and as actions and speech. On the lack of a
distinctionbetween "inner" and "outer" in Greek drama see also J. Jones,On Aristotle
and Greek Tragedy (London 1962) 43-46.

and makes, visible things.It imitatesthe eidola of the works (erga) of

those craftsmenwho have knowledge of artifactsand living creatures.
Versatile poetry,which is Plato's main concern, imitatesand produces
sound (speech) and imitates the eidola of the works (erga) of those
craftsmenwho are concerned with actions (praxeis).Versatile poetry
uses meter,rhythm,and harmony.
IV. CriteriaforDistinguishingGenres
of VersatilePoetry
Plato mentionsfourkindsof versatilepoetry:epic, tragedy(together
these are oftencalled "tragicpoetry"),comedy, and lyric.Epic, tragedy,
and comedy are distinguishedon the basis of style(lexis),meter,actions
imitated,and specificeffectson the audience theyaim at.
A. Style(Lexis)
In all imitativepoetry,whethermimetike or not,the poet of Repub-
lic 3 uses imitativenarrative,thatis, he "makes his speech (lexis)similar
to that of someone else" (3.393c1-2). This is true in Republic10 also,
where sound is the medium of poetryand human speech is what imita-
tive poetryimitates.
Differentpoeticgenres,however,differin theiruse of imitativenarra-
tive,thatis, of dramaticdialogue. Plato liststhreekindsof lexis:(1) "plain
narrative"(a'rA7 bLt/y o-EL: 3.392D5), narrative"by reportof the poet him-
self,"which the dithyrambuses exclusively(3.394c2-3);47 (2) "imitative
narrative"(bL'qy 'o-EL bLaMLM?juae-)E;3.392D5), in which the poet speaks "as
thoughhe were someoneelse" (3.393c1), the kindof narrativetragedyand
comedy use exclusively(3.394C1-2); and (3) "mixed narrative,"a combi-
nationof (1) and (2), used by epic (3.392D6, 3.394c4).
Plato then uses a second lexisclassificationto distinguishthe versatile
poet fromthe non-versatilepoet (3.396B10-397D5). There are two "un-
mixed" styles(3.397D1-2): (4) plain narrativewith littleimitativenarra-
tive (3.396E4-8), the style of the "unmixed imitator of the good"
(3.397D4-5), and (5) "imitationof everything"(3.397A3), that is, either
imitativenarrativealone or imitativenarrativewith littleplain narrative
(3.397B1-2). There is also (6) a "mixed" style(3.397C8-10, D6), a combi-
nation of (4) and (5). Plato accepts only the person who uses (4), the
"unmixedimitatorof the good" (3.397D4-5), and he bans the user of (5)
and (6) on the grounds that the imitatorof everythingis a "manifold
man" who is not in harmonywith the ideal state (3.397D10-398s4). The
47 Plato's treatmentof the dithyrambas purelynarrativepresentsa problem,since it was

in fact dramatic in the classical period. See the discussion of this problem by Vicaire
(above, note 2) 240-42. Partee (above, note 1) 7, note 15, calls attentionto Plato's ambiva-
lent attitudetowardthe dithyramb.

mimetikos,that is, the personwho imitateseverything,is, then,someone

or (6), which includessome (5).
who uses (5), imitationof everything,
It is obvious that these two classificationsare very different.48
Though Plato never attemptsto clarifytheir relationship,our present
studyallows us to draw some conclusionswith confidence.First,poetry
that is mimetikemust have at least some imitativenarrative.Thus, the
dithyramb,which does not contain any imitativenarrative,cannot be
mimetike.Again, since Plato classifiesepic as mimetike,in Republic 10
(10.602B9-10), and since (5) and (6) include some plain narrative,a
genre may be mimetikeeven thoughit containssome plain narrative.
We cannot, however, tell whether every poetic genre using only
imitativenarrativeis mimetike.Plato tells us, in Republic 10 (602B9-10,
606c), that tragedy and comedy are mimetike, and (5), which is
mimetike,includes some genres using only imitativenarrative.But it is
not clear whether(5) includes all genres of this sort. How would Plato
classifya drama with only good characters?Nor do the lexis classifica-
tions help us to classify lyric. The genre's inclusion with epic at
10.607A5, however, indicates that it is mimetike,and the fact that it
containsmuch imitationof unworthyspeeches and actions of men and
gods pointsto the same conclusion.49
In sum, use of some imitativenarrativeis a necessaryand sufficient
conditionfor imitativepoetry.It is a necessaryconditionfor mimetike,
but we do not have enough informationto decide whetheror not exclu-
sive use of imitative narrativeis a sufficientcondition for mimetike.
Plato is much less concernedwithstylethan withimitationof eidola.
B. Meter
Epic and tragedydifferin meter as well as style. At 10.602B9-10,
Plato speaks of "those dealing with tragic poetry in iambic or epic
verse," naming the metersof tragedyand epic respectively.The same
phrase also indicates that he oftentreatstragedyand epic as the same
genre of "tragic poetry."Plato is littleconcerned with meter and says
nothingmore about differencesin meter.50
48 For a helpful summaryof Plato's discussionof the lexis classificationssee Cross and
Woozley (above, note 23) 272-73. Dupont-Roc's attempt(above, note 40) 13-14, note 51,
to coordinatethe two classificationsis, thoughunsuccessful,worthnoting.
49 Brownson(above, note 1) 94-96 argues convincinglyagainst Stallbaum that Plato did
not intend to admit all lyric when he allowed hymnsand encomia. R. G. Collingwood,
The Principles of Art (Oxford 1938) 48 draws the erroneousconclusion that after Plato
excludes all drama "he findshimselfleftwith that kind of poetrywhose chief representa-
tive is Pindar." A glance at the Odes (e.g. 01. 1, Pyth. 4 and 9, Nem. 10) showsthat Plato
would have foundlittleto choose between Pindar and Euripides.
0 See also 10.595B10-c2, 598D7 and 607A1-2, where Homer is called the "leader of
tragedy."Havelock (above, note 2) 8 notes that Plato does not distinguishbetween trag-
edy and epic. Vicaire (above, note 2) 243-44 argues that this assimilationof the two
genresin Republic 10 was a currentidea taken up by Plato.

C. ActionsImitated
As we have seen (above, Section III.B.2), all versatilepoetryimitates
actions (praxeis). Presumably,differentgenresimitatedifferentkinds of
actions,but Plato is specificonly in the case of "tragicpoetry"(tragedy
and epic). Tragedy and its leader Homer are said by theiradvocates to
know "all the craftsand all human thingsabout arete and kakia, and all
divine things"(10.598D7-E2). This list includes the entire range of the
subject matterof tragic poetry.In the paragraph at 10.599B9-E4, how-
ever, Plato says that he will not examine Homer on medicine and the
othertechnai (10.599B9-C6) and proposesinstead to question him about
"wars and generalshipsand the governmentof cities and the education
of human beings" (10.599C7-D1). These are the "greatest and finest
things"Homer writesabout (10.599C7). Plato thenbeginshis questioning
of Homer by asking him if he is someone with knowledgeor merelyan
imitator,"thirdfromthe truthconcerningarete" (10.599D2-3). It is clear
that arete refersto the "greatestand finestthings"just mentioned,that
is, to a particularpart of Homer's total subject matter.The less impor-
tant technai, such as medicine, are excluded, but importantdiscoveries
and inventionsare included,at 10.600A4-7. In the conclusionat 10.600E,
Homer and the poets are again said to be "imitatorsof the eidola of
arete and of the otherthingstheywriteabout."
While it has been recognized that arete' (the "greatestand finest
things")is Homer's subject matter,our analysis suggeststhat, because
Homer is the representativeof only one kind of poetry,tragic poetry,
arete is the subject matterof this kind of poetry,markingit offfrom
other kinds of poetry.51This inferenceis supportedby some unnoticed
featuresof Plato's use of the termarete in Republic 10.598E-600E.
This section of the Republic deliberatelyplays on several different
meanings of arete. Arete, in the technical,Platonic sense, refersto the
order in the soul (Republic 4.444D13-E2) and not to activity.In a less
strictPlatonicsense it can referto usefulactionsdone withknowledgeof
moral excellence,and would include activitiessuch as enduringthe loss
of a son, which are certainlynot among the "greatestand finest"things
Plato discussesin the passage at 10.599C-600E. In the "Homeric" sense,
on the other hand, arete is the excellence of someone with high social
standing,successfulin war and leadership.52Arete in this sense is the
subject matterof the epic poets who sing the klea andron.53In showing
51 Thus, arete is not the subject matterof poetryin general,as is suggested,forexample,

by Else, The Structureand Date . . . (above, note 5) 34.
52 A. W. H. Adkins,Merit and Responsibility(Chicago and London 1960) 32-33 defines
"Homeric" arete in thisway, and distinguishesit froma Platonic use of the termin which
the cooperativeexcellencesplay a much largerpart (Chapters 13 and 14).
53 Havelock (above, note 2) 64 argues that the poets' subject matteris "the mightydeeds

that Homer is an imitatorof the eidola of arete, Plato is not concerned

withthe orderin the soul but withthatkind of arete belongingto useful
actions that he mentionsat 10.601D4-6. He plays on both the less strict
Platonic sense and on the "Homeric" sense of arete. Afterrestrictingthe
scope of arete to those activitiesin which "Homeric" arete is chiefly
exhibited,he asks (10.599D4-6) whetheror not Homer had arete in the
Platonic sense, knowingwhat makes people betterin public and in pri-
vate. He then demonstratesthat Homer did not have arete in the
"Homeric" sense,since he was not rememberedas a successfulgeneral or
statesmanbut was "much neglected in his own lifetime"(10.600B9-cl).
This allows him to conclude that Homer is an imitatorof the eidola of
arete not only in the Platonic sense (he has no craftknowledge)but also
in the "Homeric" sense (he did not leave behind him memorialsof fine
works:10.599B6).54
Arete, then, as it refersto the objects imitated by tragic poetry,
retainsmuch of its Homeric sense, though with a Platonic twist.Plato
accepts the traditionalview that tragic poetrydeals with arete in the
sense of the importantand memorableactionsrecordedby the singersof
the klea andron. However, he insiststhat since arete depends on use
(10.601D4-6), true arete requires craftknowledge of what is useful. A
general with arete in this sense is one of Plato's craftsmenof freedom,
who uses for purposesof war his knowledgeof what makes people bet-
ter. Someone with no knowledgeof thiskind can only imitatethe eidola
of arete: the shoutingof commands,the waving about of weapons, all
the sounds and gesturesof someone who happens to be in charge of an
army. He will also, as we have seen, imitatethe man's outwardsignsof
emotion.
D. Effectson Audience55
While all versatilepoetry aims at producing pleasure, it can also
arouse more specificemotionsin the audience. Mimetike,Plato tells us,
arouses and increasesall the desiresand pains and pleasures in the soul
(10.606D1-7). Specifically, tragedy arouses pity (10.606B3, c5) and
of formermen / And the blessed gods" (Hesiod, Th. 100-101). Compare Plato's statement
at Republic 10.598E1-2 that some people claim that Homer knows "all human things
concerningarete and kakia, and divine things,"and see Ion 531c. On the close connection
between KAEos and poetryin the Greek traditionsee G. Nagy, Comparative Studies in
Greekand Indic Meter (Cambridge 1974) 229-61.
54 In fact,Plato argues at 10.598E-601Athat Homer was not successful,not that he was
ignorant.Since success is a criterionof Homeric, but not of Platonic arete, Plato has only
proved that Homer lacks Homeric arete, not Platonic,as he leads us to believe. The dem-
onstrationthat he lacks Platonic arete is given in a later section of Republic 10 (603-6),
when Plato argues thatHomer represents"a man claimingto be good, who lamentsout of
season" (10.606B2-3).
55 For a detailed analysisof thistopic see Belfiore(above, note 13).

comedy arouses laughter (10.606C2-9). While Plato links pity and fear
elsewhere,in Republic10 he says that tragic poetryarouses "pity and
praise" (10.606B3) and omitsfear.56
Conclusion
In Republic3.392C-398B and 10.595A-608B Plato maintainsa clear
and consistentview of the relationshipsand distinctionsamong the visual
and poetic imitativearts.To imitatein the mostgeneral sense is to make
somethingsimilarto somethingelse in sound or shape, that is, to tryto
make people mistakethe imitationforsomethingelse. Plato distinguishes
imitationin thisgeneral sense froma particularkind of imitation,imita-
tion of many things,for which he inventsa technical vocabulary,the
-ike forms of mimesis (mimetike,mimetikos).Mimetikealone is
attacked in Republic3 and 10. In Republic10 Plato explains what he
only suggestsin Republic3, that mimetike imitatescraftproducts,in the
sense of thingsmade or done withknowledgeof the useful.Then, intro-
ducing another technical term, Plato shows that mimetikecan imitate
and make only eidola,the worksof craftsmenas they appear. This art
thus turnsout to imitate not many differentthings,but only one thing
over and over, an eidolon.Plato also implies that therecan be a kind of
imitativepoetry,differentfrommimetike in that it imitateswithknowl-
edge, but that there cannot be a kind of painting that imitates with
knowledge. Plato adopts the traditionalview that epic and tragedy,
which he classifiesas kinds of mimetike, deal with the "greatestand
finestthings,"arete. But his theoryallows him to condemn them for
imitatingonly the eidola of arete,which are the mere soundsand shapes
the ignorantassociate with arete. Finally, Plato holds that the aim of
mimetikeis to produce pleasure,and that the aim of tragedyis also to
produce pity.
In sketchingthis outline of Plato's theoryof the imitativearts we
have deliberatelyleftmany problemsunexamined,even in thosesections
of the Republicto which we have restrictedour inquiry. Our outline
may neverthelessprovidea usefultool withwhich to studysome of these
56 Republic 3.387c mentionsfear (OpbKv) as an effectof tragic poetry,but no mentionis

made of this reaction in Republic 3.392C-398B or 10.595A-608B.Althoughat 10.606c5-6
pity and fear are indeed closely connected,fear is the reactionof reason to the desire for
excessivelaughter.Plato linkspityand fear in the Ion (535c) and Phaedrus (268C-D), and
this was of course Gorgias' view in his Encomium of Helen (9), a work with which Plato
was certainly familiar. See M. Pohlenz, "Die Anfange der griechischenPoetik," NGG
1920, 167-72 = Kleine SchriftenII (Hildesheim 1965) 461-66, fora discussionof Gorgias'
influenceon Plato. Plato's omission of fear in Republic 10 may thus be deliberate and
significant.

otherproblems.It will in any case have served its purposeif it has dem-
onstratedthat Plato's theoreticaltreatmentof mimesisin Republic 3 and
10 is, however obscurelypresented,at least much more consistentand
coherentthathas oftenbeen thought.57
57 Portionsof this paper were read at the annual meetingof the Classical Associationof
the Middle West and South,Columbus, Ohio, April, 1983. I wish to thankmy colleagues,
George Sheets and Marcia Eaton, and the anonymous refereesand editor of TAPA for
theirhelpfulcriticismsof an earlier draftof this paper, and the Universityof Minnesota
for a Faculty Single Quarter Leave in the fall of 1982, during which this paper was
completed.


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A Theory of Imitation in Plato's Republic

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A THEORY OF IMITATION IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC

Plato's discussion of imitation in Republic 10 has often been called

1 See especiallyC. Brownson, Plato'sStudiesand Criticism of thePoets(Boston1920)

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fromthatof Book 3 because it was writtenlater.5Othersbelieve thatthe

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give an account of the reactionsof the audience to differentgenres of

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It has not been noticed that thispassage anticipatessome important

Imitation with Knowledge Versatile Imitation (Mimetike)

Versatile Painting Versatile Poetry

Lyric Comedy Tragic Poetry

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Republic 3.393c5-6 also anticipates another importantconcept of

13 Plato frequentlystressesthe imitator'sabilityto cause his audience to make mistakes.

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II. VersatileImitationand ImitationwithKnowledge

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There, as Menza notes, Plato asks whether the guardian should be a

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that,since 10.595c-598c is a proofthatthe painter(or at least one kindof

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In Republic 3 also the versatileimitatorimitatesthe worksof crafts-

25 N. White, A Companion to Plato's Republic (Indianapolis and Cambridge 1979)

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"craftsmanof an eidolon" at 10.599D3 can only refer to 10.597E10-

7r\ayLov avl/v 0Eae Ea'VTE Ka-rav7-LKpV 71 o7r/ov,

27 J. Adam, The Republic of Plato (Cambrige 19632) 2.394-95, interpretsthe passage in

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craftsmanwas stronglysuggestedat Republic3.394E-395B, where Plato

29 Else, The Structureand Date . .. (above, note 5) 35.

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thatcan be understood,to a constantlychanging"thatwhichappears,"that

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32 See above, note 7.

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contrasted.Thus, it is doubtfulthat Plato is discussingimitationat all at

of the text,see above, note 27.

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(for example, "couch") as the many of which it is the Form

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views imply that imitationof the good is the antithesisof imitationof

III. VersatilePoetryand Painting

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called zographos,literally,a painterof livingcreatures.38

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First,Plato's concept of imitationof action in Republic 10 is antici-

41 Plato is not departingfromaccepted Greek usage when he treatslogos as a formof

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Republic 3's characterizationof the guardiansas "craftsmenof freedom"

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46 Plato's use of thistermis significant.

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and makes, visible things.It imitatesthe eidola of the works (erga) of

47 Plato's treatmentof the dithyrambas purelynarrativepresentsa problem,since it was

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mimetikos,that is, the personwho imitateseverything,is, then,someone

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51 Thus, arete is not the subject matterof poetryin general,as is suggested,forexample,

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