Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Events
Author(s): Concha R. Neeley and Nancy G. Boyd
Source: Journal of Managerial Issues , Winter 2010, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Winter 2010), pp.
546-559
Published by: Pittsburg State University
REFERENCES
Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:
http://www.jstor.com/stable/25822530?seq=1&cid=pdf-
reference#references_tab_contents
You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
Pittsburg State University is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access
to Journal of Managerial Issues
Concha R. Neeley
Assistant Professor - Marketing and Hospitality Serv. Admin.
Central Michigan University
Nancy G. Boyd
Associate Professor - Department of Management
University of North Texas
Amidst the multitude of stories in the popular and trade press recounting the greed
of CEOs and top executives, as well as the academic papers discussing the link of pay to
performance and other methods for determining CEO pay, authors sparsely mention
the influence of CEO pay on workers' morale and behaviors. From 1991 to 2001, rank
and-file wages increased by 36 percent, while pay for CEOs jumped 340 percent (Byrne,
2002; Welch, 2003). While collectively CEO compensation declined 15% in 2007 and
11% in 2008; in 2008, the top 500 executives earned an average of $11.4 million. In
2006, CEOs earned 364 times the pay of the average U.S. worker, down from 411 times
in 2005 (Sahadi, 2007). More recently, the former Merrill Lynch chief received $233
million; Countrywide Financial chief received $272 million, including $169 million in
stock, even as these companies faced failure. Furthermore, Richard Wagoner of General
Motors (GM) received $39 million although the value of GM stock declined 98% during
his tenure (Lambert, 2009). According to the Wall Street Journal, many corporate CEOs
profited handsomely in 2008, even though their companies and their shareholders
fared poorly. For example, Warner Music Group Corporation CEO, Edgar Bronfman
Jr., received a $3 million bonus although the company lost $56 million and the value
of its stock fell 25% (Dvorak, 2009). Recent limits on executive compensation for firms
receiving federal assistance further illustrate concern regarding this issue.
Many empirical studies consider how CEO compensation influences shareholder
wealth. According to the classical view, "there is one and only one social responsibility
of business - to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits
so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free
(546)
competition without deception or fraud" (Friedman, 1962: 81). While this view may be
appropriate for short term profit, studies show positive relationships between corporate
social responsibility and financial performance (Beurden and Gossling, 2008; Cochran
and Wood, 1984; Shen and Chang, 2009). Corporate social responsibility advocates
the interests of all stakeholders, including employees, consumers, the community, and
the environment (Shen and Chang, 2009). The adherence to the classical view tends
to overlook the importance of employees as stakeholders in the firm. Employees are
often seen as dispensable and replaceable. In recent years, however, an emphasis has
been placed on valuing human resources as a core competence that could lead to a
source of sustained competitive advantage (Becker and Gerhart, 1996; Lado and Wilson,
1994; Wright et ai, 2001). Because human resources are a valuable component of an
organization, it is important to understand issues that may influence employee attitudes,
such as morale and justice perceptions, as well as behaviors, such as organizational
citizenship behavior and counterproductive workplace behaviors.
The purpose of this paper is to present a conceptual model depicting the influence
of justice perceptions related to executive compensation on employees' workplace
behaviors. It is proposed that precipitating events, as illustrated by recent corporate
scandals, call attention to the excessive nature of executive compensation, resulting in
injustice perceptions that influence the on-the-job attitudes and behaviors of employees.
The paper includes a review of literature related to executive compensation as well as
the integration of relevant theories, such as equity theory and organizational justice.
Propositions are offered in order to guide future empirical research. Finally, directions
for future research are suggested.
The corporate scandals of the past two decades have led to harsh criticism of
executive compensation. There is a longstanding debate and a great deal of research on
the appropriate method for compensating executives. Currently, most organizations tie
executive compensation to the profitability of the organization. Often their base pay is
a relatively small portion of their overall compensation, with large amounts of their pay
tied to stock options and bonuses that should relate to organizational performance. Many
argue that the ability to reap huge rewards tempts executives to make the organization
look profitable at all costs.
Critical to the argument that the current levels of executive compensation are
justified is the notion that the level of pay and incentives provided to executives
contributes to firm performance, and subsequently increases shareholder wealth. The
most widely researched area in the executive compensation literature involves the link
between pay and performance (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Research addresses
the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance (Attaway, 2000;
Anderson et ai, 2000) in an attempt to justify exorbitant salaries at the top. The demand
for justification of top executives' compensation by linking pay and performance is not a
new phenomenon. Murthy and Salter (1975) address the fluctuation of executive pay with
little correlation to profits or other performance metrics. The findings are inconsistent
with regard to the link between CEO rewards and stockholder equity; however, most
studies show a weak relationship at best (Attaway, 2000; Murthy and Salter, 1975).
participate in a stock purchase plan. Further, the precipitating event is generally one in
which the organization suffers economic consequences that may require sacrifice on the
part of employees, such as layoffs and pay cuts. In the worst case scenario, employees
not only lose their jobs, but they lose their retirement savings as well, as illustrated by
the Enron collapse a decade ago.
.a s <L> O <U
o %
S3 8
a?
& W)
8 3
w2
??B
1 el
HH PQ
o8
? "2
7? 3
is
S3
8
3
A core assumption of equity theory (Adams, 1963, 1965) is the notion that individuals
assess their ratio of outcomes to inputs with regard to comparison or referent others.
Further, this referent is not necessarily a coworker, and the referent may even be a group
or the organization as a whole (Miles et ai, 1994). Two underlying dimensions influence
the choice of referent: (1) the availability of information and (2) the relevance of the
referent (Kulik and Ambrose, 1992).
According to the model in Figure I, a precipitating event is an antecedent factor
influencing the referent choice. The precipitating event allows for availability of
information, which may in turn influence the perceived relevance of the executive as a
referent. Organizations that pay their top executives excessively more than the industry
average are likely to be subjected to media and advocacy group scrutiny, particularly
when a corporate scandal brings attention to the issue. As Cosier and Dalton (1983)
note, events may trigger a comparison and the actions individuals take with regard to
inequity are influenced more by present than past events. Thus, a precipitating event with
media attention, like those mentioned above, is likely to result in increased information
available to employees regarding the inequity of executive compensation relative to their
own pay.
With regard to relevance, referents are often chosen based on their similarity to
the individual. Social comparison theory proposes that people will prefer to compare
themselves to similar others (Festinger, 1951). Dissimilar referents, however, may be
preferred "when the comparer (a) perceives those referents as at least minimally relevant
and (b) has access to information about those referents" (Kulik and Ambrose, 1992: 219).
Sweeney and McFarlin (2005) find that similar others not only provide employees with
information that subsequently influences their own pay satisfaction, but they also use
information obtained from dissimilar others. Thus, the availability of information may
influence whether or not a referent is considered relevant. Further, O'Neill and Mone
(2005) propose that psychological climate, defined as the way employees perceive and
interpret the organizational environment, may influence the selection of a referent. Thus,
a precipitating event may call attention to issues that influence employee perceptions of
the organizational climate.
Kulik and Ambrose (1992) note that particular "referent others" may increase in
relevance because they dominate the individual's perceptual field (i.e., through media
attention), and thus the amount of information readily available regarding the referent
choice increases. This attention to the gap in earnings, in addition to the media hype
surrounding the event (such as a scandal involving the executive), may influence
referent selection and lead employees to that threshold where feelings of inequity and
distributive injustice influence attitudes and behavior. Thus, conditions may exist in
which employees expand their perceptual field to include dissimilar referents for the
purposes of comparison.
Based on these arguments, the following is proposed:
Proposition #1:A precipitating event that calls attention to executive pay (increasing
availability of information and relevance of referent) will lead employees to select
the executive as a referent other for the purpose of evaluating pay fairness in terms
of distributive justice.
Once the executive becomes relevant for assessing compensation fairness, the
employee will use this information for evaluating the distributive justice of compensation.
Organizational justice has emerged as a dominant construct for explaining a number of
attitudes and behaviors in the workplace (Gilliland and Chan, 2001; Organ et al, 2006),
and perceived injustice is viewed as a motivator for social protest (Kelloway et al, 2010).
The organizational justice constructs are grounded in equity theory (Adams, 1963,
1965) and include distributive (fairness of outcomes) justice and procedural (fairness of
processes) justice.
Distributive justice refers to "the fairness of a distribution relative to the distribution
allocated to a comparison other" (Gilliland and Chan, 2001: 145). While most research
considers the comparison others to be peers, it is possible that the "referent others"
considered in judging distributive justice are supervisors or top management. In fact,
individuals may use multiple referents for comparison purposes depending on the
outcome of interest, and referents may also change over time (O'Neill and Mone, 2005).
Thus, employees may consider outcomes (pay) relative to inputs and compare their own
outcomes with management outcomes under certain circumstances. While employees
expect a gap in inputs to outcomes relative to top management, they may be less tolerant
of this discrepancy when management's inputs are viewed as unethical or inadequate
relative to the level of compensation they receive. If there is a disproportionate gap
between the employees' perceptions of their own ratio of inputs and outcomes compared
to that of top management, it is likely that they will experience inequity and injustice
perceptions with regard to distribution of outcomes.
According to relative deprivation theorists, two types of deprivation exist: egoistic
and fraternal. Egoistic deprivation occurs when the referent is similar to the individual,
while fraternal deprivation occurs as a result of an individual comparing his/her cultural
group to another. While egoistic deprivation leads to individual dissatisfaction, fraternal
deprivation may lead to more severe reactions as the individual feels a "shared sense
of injustice with others like himself" (Kulik and Ambrose, 1992: 213). Executives may
be perceived as "role models" to the entire organization, and thus employees impose
a higher standard of behavior on these individuals with regard to "earning what they
are worth." Thus, in the case of executive compensation, individuals will share fraternal
deprivation perceptions with other rank and file employees, leading to potentially
serious implications for the organization as a whole.
Fairness theory suggests that "individuals engage in counterfactual thinking to
determine the fairness of a particular event and whether authorities should be blamed
for that event" (Colquitt et al, 2006: 113). Individuals will react to an event by assessing
the extent to which their own welfare is reduced or threatened, and blame is placed
if they believe an ethical principal of social conduct is violated (Colquitt et al, 2006;
Folger and Cropanzano, 2001). Furthermore, the thought process suggested by fairness
theory is triggered by discrete events and is best suited for explaining counterproductive
reactions (Colquitt et al, 2006). Thus, precipitating events will increase the information
available to subordinates regarding top management. This information will be used in
forming fairness judgments that subordinates use in subsequent decisions regarding
attitudes and behaviors. Gilliland and Chan discuss the distinction between justice and
injustice, suggesting, based on image theory, "that injustice would have a greater impact
on subsequent actions than instances of justice" (2001: 146). They also propose "injustice
is the strongest driver of decisions to retaliate or withhold efforts" (Gilliland and Chan,
2001: 147).
Substantial evidence suggests that there is a relationship between justice perceptions
and both positive and negative voluntary behavior within organizations (Gilliland and
Chan, 2001; Greenberg, 1990; Moorman, 1991). Kickul (2001) finds that when employees
perceive that their organization failed to fulfill promises and behaved improperly in terms
of procedural and interpersonal treatment, they are more likely to engage in deviant
work behaviors. Such counterproductive behaviors are considered to conflict with the
organization's legitimate interests and may harm both the organization and its members
(Bowling and Gruys, 2010; Jones, 2008; Sackett, 2002). Examples of such behaviors
include decreases in performance, failure to comply with organizational rules, stealing
from the employer, taking excessively long breaks or loafing, frequent absenteeism, and
interfering with the work of others, to name a few (Kickul, 2001; Kelloway et al., 2010).
While Wade et al., (2006) find that inequity between CEO pay and the pay of lower
level managers may increase turnover among lower level managers, the likelihood of
turnover may be reduced by a poor economic climate. When employees lack the option
to withdraw from the organization, counterproductive workplace behaviors provide an
opportunity to restore justice.
An association between perceived organizational justice and counterproductive
work behaviors is consistently noted by researchers. Kelloway et al. (2010) point out that
when employees experience unfairness, they engage in behavioral attempts to restore
justice. They may alter the outcome itself or attempt to restore justice by altering the
amount of effort invested in the task at hand. If workers feel that top management is
making millions for doing very little, they may be more likely to alter task-related inputs
to maintain a balance in the exchange relationship. Workers will likely do what they need
to get by and keep their jobs, but it is unlikely they will exert extra effort in their jobs
when such effort would likely do little for them. In fact, under conditions associated with
a precipitating event, employees may actively engage in counterproductive or deviant
workplace behaviors (e.g., Aquino et al., 1999; Bennett and Robinson, 2000; Cortina and
Magley, 2003; Robinson and Bennett, 1995), such as theft, loafing, and other types of
behaviors that would bring the inequity into balance. Thus, the following proposition is
suggested:
initiative, civic virtue, and self-development (Podsakoff et al., 2000). If employees feel
as though they are the means to an end that makes the boss more money, thereby
increasing the economic gap, they are unlikely to commit extra discretionary effort to
reaching such ends. Research provides evidence to support the relationship between
organizational justice perceptions and OCB (Moorman, 1991; Scholl etaL, 1987). When
employees who have previously engaged in OCB believe that fairness no longer reigns
in the organization, they will be motivated to reduce their inputs. Organ et al. (2006)
point out that under such circumstances, employees must be very selective as to which
inputs are reduced. In a tight labor market, reducing core task performance is risky,
while reducing OCB is less risky to their continued employment. Thus, participation in
discretionary organizational behavior is likely to decrease.
The following proposition addresses this issue:
Procedural justice denotes the perception of fairness regarding the process by which
the outcomes are determined. Thus, it relates to an assessment of the degree to which
fair procedures are considered to be present and used in an organization (Lind and Tyler,
1988; Zellars et al., 2004). Further, an interactional component to procedural justice
suggests that whether the exchange partner provides accounts of his or her actions
influences employee work attitudes and behaviors (Bies, 1987; Brockner, 2002). While
employees may be aware of how much the CEO earns through information provided
by the media, it is likely that employees may lack information regarding the process
by which top management pay is determined as such information is buried inside the
annual proxy statement. And even that information may not be adequate to assess how
the executive pay is determined.
Lack of information about the process leading to the outcome of this referent
figure may lead to a perception of procedural injustice. Thus, if employees do not
feel that they receive appropriate explanations delivered honestly, they are likely
to develop injustice perceptions from this interactional perspective. In addition, the
perception of procedural injustice has been associated with escapist coping on the part
of employees (Zellars et al., 2004), and such behaviors may include those associated with
counterproductive workplace behaviors. However, communication regarding the process
by which compensation is determined, as well as justification for the amount and type
of compensation, will mitigate the feeling of inequity. For example, Greenberg (1990)
finds procedural justice to be a mitigating factor in the relationship between distributive
injustice and theft. Thus, if individuals understand and accept the justification for the
excessive gap in compensation, they will be less likely to engage in counterproductive
workplace behaviors.
A lack of procedural fairness may also influence the degree to which employees hold
an exchange partner responsible for outcomes. The resulting feelings of resentment
may lead to low levels of support for the decision-maker and the organization as a
whole (Brockner, 2002). Thus, if conditions surrounding the precipitating event lead
to unfavorable outcomes for employees, such as layoffs, furloughs, and pay cuts, then
employees will hold top management to blame. Brockner notes that "people will blame
their unfavorable outcomes on the other party's use of unfair procedures and, as a result,
will feel resentful toward the other party." (2002: 62) This type of reaction is likely to
occur when executives continue to receive pay increases and bonuses while employees
are receiving pay cuts and layoffs. Thus, procedural justice perceptions may influence
the relationship between distributive justice perceptions and both negative and positive
voluntary behavior as follows:
Proposition #5: Trust in top management will moderate the relationship between
distributive justice perceptions and organizational citizenship behavior and
dysfunctional workplace behavior in such a way that increased levels of trust on the
part of employees will mitigate the negative effects of perceived distributive injustice
on employee behaviors.
research that depends upon a precipitating event to call attention to executive pay.
It may be impossible to anticipate such an event so that data may be collected both
prior to and after the event occurs. One option would include the use of longitudinal
archival data on employee fairness perceptions of publicly traded organizations. A
review of precipitating events in the popular press would allow for researchers to discern
differences in perceptions before and after the event. In addition, organizations may be
compared to those in which no such precipitating event occurred. For example, Byrne
and Miller (2009) use a sample of managers from a variety of U.S. organizations who
participated in leadership development through a global management consulting firm.
Such a sample may provide a good source of data related to the study of this topic.1
Cosier and Dalton (1983) also suggest the application of a longitudinal experimental
design to the study of equity theory that permits treatments to groups that take into
account the passage of time.
Exorbitant compensation continues to be the topic of many articles in both
academic and practitioner periodicals. Wilhelm (1993), in an essay concerning the
ethics of excessive executive compensation, suggests that when CEO salaries bear little
relationship to company performance, employee morale, loyalty, and productivity suffer.
According to Harris (2009), critiques of executive compensation should, in fact, focus
on issues related to fairness and effectiveness concerns rather than sensationalizing the
size of their pay packages. Downsizing and an ever increasing gap between executive pay
and the pay of rank and file employees may contribute to decreased commitment and
lower motivation and performance due to injustice perceptions. While numerous studies
exist regarding aspects of executive compensation, little research examines the influence
of top management pay on the attitudes and behaviors of rank and file employees.
It is possible that employees may incorporate moral convictions into their responses
to excessive executive compensation. While the problems associated with executive pay
seem evident, the full impact of these problems is not known. It is important to pursue
this line of research to determine what problems exist as a result of excessive executive
compensation and how one can alleviate the inequity and reduce the gap between top
management and the workforce.
References
We wish to express our thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion regarding the empiri
cal examination of the proposed model.
Attaway, M. C. 2000. "A Study of the Relationship between Company Performance and
CEO Compensation." American Business Review 18 (1): 77-85.
Barkema, H. G. and L. R. Gomez-Mejia. 1998. "Managerial Compensation and Firm
Performance: A General Research Framework." Academy of Management Journal 41
(2): 135-145.
Becker, B. and B. Gerhart. 1996. "The Impact of Human Resource Management on
Organizational Performance: Progress and Prospects." Academy of Management
Journal 39 (4): 779-801.
Bennett, R. J. and S. L. Robinson. 2000. "Development of a Measure of Workplace
Deviance. "Journal of Applied Psychology 85(3): 349-360.
Beurden, P. and T. Gossling. 2008. "The Worth of Values - A Literature Review on the
Relation between Corporate Social and Financial Performance." Journal of Business
Ethics 82: 407-424.
Bies, R. J. 1987. "The Predicament of Injustice: The Management of Moral Outrage." In
Research in Organizational Behavior. Eds. L. L. Cummings and B. M. Staw. Greenwich,
CTJAI Press, pp. 289-319.
_and T. M. Tripp. 1996. "Beyond Distrust: 'Getting Even' and the Need for
Revenge. In Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research. Eds. R. M. Kramer
and T. R. Tyler. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. pp. 246-260.
Binder, A. S. 2009. "Crazy Compensation and the Crisis." Wall Street Journal (May 28):
A. 15.
Bowling, N. A. and M. L. Gruys. 2010. "Overlooked Issues in the Conceptualization and
Measurement of Counterproductive Work Behaviors." Human Resource Management
Review 20: 54-61.
Brockner, J. 2002. "Making Sense of Procedural Fairness: How High Procedural Fairness
Can Reduce or Heighten the Influence of Outcome Favorability." Academy of
Management Review 27(1): 58-76.
_, P. A. Seifel, J. P. Daly, T. Tyler, and C. Martin. 1997. "When Trust Matters:
The Moderating Effect of Outcome Favorability. "Administrative Science Quarterly 42:
558-583.
Byrne, A. S. and B. K. Miller. 2009. "Is Justice the Same for Everyone? Examining
Fairness Items Using Multiple-group Analysis. "Journal of Business Psychology 24: 51
64.
Byrne, J. A. 2002. "How to Fix Corporate Governance." Business Week (May 6): 68-75.
Cochran, P. and R. A. Wood. 1984. "Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial
Performance." Academy of Management Journal 27: 42-56.
Colquitt, J. A, B. A. Scott, T. A. Judge, andj. C. Shaw. 2006. "Justice and Personality:
Using Integrative Theories to Derive Moderators of Justice Effects." Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes 100: 110-127.
Cortina, L. M. and V. J. Magley. 2003. "Raising Voice, Risking Retaliation: Events
Following Interpersonal Mistreatment in the Workplace." Journal of Occupational
Health Psychology 8(4): 247-265.
Cosier, R. A. and D. R. Dalton. 1983. "Equity Theory and Time: A Reformulation."
Academy of Management Review 8: 311-319.
Daniel, C. 2003. "Don Carty Steps Down as American Airlines Chief." Wall Street Journal
(April 25): 21.
De Cremer, D. and T. R. Tyler. 2007. "The Effects of Trust in Authority and Procedural
Fairness on Cooperation. "Journal of Applied Psychology 92: 639-649.