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God Is Watching You . . . But Also Watching Over You: The Influence of
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Psychology of Religion and Spirituality
God Is Watching You . . . But Also Watching Over You:
The Influence of Benevolent God Representations on
Secular Volunteerism Among Christians
Kathryn A. Johnson, Adam B. Cohen, and Morris A. Okun
Online First Publication, July 27, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/rel0000040

CITATION
Johnson, K. A., Cohen, A. B., & Okun, M. A. (2015, July 27). God Is Watching You . . . But Also
Watching Over You: The Influence of Benevolent God Representations on Secular
Volunteerism Among Christians. Psychology of Religion and Spirituality. Advance online
publication. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/rel0000040
 Psychology of Religion and Spirituality © 2015 American Psychological Association
2015, Vol. 7, No. 4, 000 1941-1022/15/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/rel0000040

God Is Watching You . . . But Also Watching Over You: The Influence of
Benevolent God Representations on Secular Volunteerism
Among Christians
Kathryn A. Johnson, Adam B. Cohen, and Morris A. Okun
Arizona State University

One prominent theory is that prosociality is promoted by the belief in an authoritarian God. Building
upon this theory, we developed a theoretical model in which beliefs about the self and the world and
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

volunteer motives account for differential effects of benevolent and authoritarian God representations on
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

secular volunteerism (benefiting those outside the family or religious group). This model was tested with
undergraduate (Study 1) and community samples (Study 2) of Christian theists. In support of our model,
representations of a benevolent God were positively associated with a benevolent self-identity and a
moral obligation, with a significant total positive indirect effect on secular volunteerism via internal
motivations. In contrast, representations of an authoritarian God were associated with a low benevolent
self-identity and a significant total negative indirect effect on secular volunteerism. The effects of God
representations on volunteerism via religious obligation and external motivation (eternal rewards) were
inconsistent across samples.

Keywords: God representation, supernatural punisher, intrinsic motivation, volunteerism

The vicissitudes of life dictate that all people will, from time to
time, need assistance from others. Consequently, helping others is
crucial to human flourishing. Moreover, helping others benefits
both the recipient and the benefactor (Okun, Yeung, & Brown,
2013). It is not surprising, then, that helping is a universally
recognized virtue and all religious traditions stress the importance
of helping others (Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder, & Penner, 2006).
Indeed, religious people are often the most likely to engage in
helping behaviors such as volunteerism (Jackson, Bachmeier,
Wood, & Craft, 1995; Ruiter & DeGraaf, 2006). Yet the psycho-
logical mechanisms that link religion and helping have not been
well understood, particularly when prosociality is for the benefit of
strangers.
God Representations and Prosociality
A prominent theory regarding the link between religion and
prosociality is that belief in a moralizing, punishing, authoritarian
God fosters extrinsically motivated cooperation and prosociality
Kathryn A. Johnson, Adam B. Cohen, and Morris A. Okun, Department
of Psychology, Arizona State University.
The authors thank the John Templeton Foundation and the Notre Dame
Science of Generosity for supporting this research. The data in Study 1 was
used in Kathryn A. Johnson’s doctoral dissertation and the results have
been published online–Johnson, K. A. (2013). From beliefs to virtuous
behaviors: The influence of God-concepts on intentions to volunteer (Order
No. AAI3518607). Retrieved from Dissertation Abstracts International:
Section B: The Sciences and Engineering.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Kathryn
A. Johnson, Department of Psychology, Arizona State University, P.O.
Box 871104, Tempe, AZ 85287-1104. E-mail: kathryn.a.johnson@asu.edu
through a combination of mechanisms, including the fear of divine
punishment, the promise of eternal rewards, and by capitalizing on
concerns involving social monitoring (Norenzayan, 2013; Roes &
Raymond, 2003). If people share the belief that God is watching in
order to reward or punish, they will be more likely to help not only
kith and kin, but also the strangers among them. Belief in a
punishing, authoritarian God has been shown to have certain
societal benefits such as inhibiting cheating (Shariff & Noren-
zayan, 2011), and there is evidence that groups that focus on the
authoritarian nature of God are less subject to in-group fragmen-
tation—particularly in harsh environments (Snarey, 1996).
On the contrary, beliefs in an authoritarian God can also have
negative outcomes. When authoritarian God representations are
the focus, people become more aggressive and willing to punish
(Bushman, Ridge, Das, Key, & Busath, 2007), more likely to
characterize the misfortune of others as divine punishment (Aten et
al., 2008; Froese & Bader, 2010), and are sometimes actually less
willing to help others—particularly those outside their own group,
in a form of parochial prosociality (Johnson, Li, Cohen, & Okun,
2013; Norenzayan et al., in press; Ritter & Preston, 2013). Au-
thoritarian God representations have also been positively associ-
ated with the value of power but negatively correlated with the
value of benevolence (Johnson, Okun, & Cohen, 2014). The in-
terpretation of findings regarding the effects of belief in an au-
thoritarian God on prosocial behavior is further clouded inasmuch
as nearly all of the studies using primes investigating religiously
linked prosociality have primed religion in general, rather than
focusing on specific beliefs about the nature of God (Galen, 2012;
Preston, Ritter, & Hernandez, 2010). Thus, it is unclear whether an
authoritarian God, per se, promotes prosociality.
Recent research (Johnson, Li, et al., 2013) suggests that proso-
ciality is also likely to be associated with the belief that God is
gracious, loving, kind, and merciful—a God who watches over you

1
 2 JOHNSON, COHEN, AND OKUN
like a compassionate parent figure (Benson & Spilka, 1973) or
who models compassionate behavior by healing the sick or send-
ing rain in times of drought. A benevolent God is thought to be
aware of one’s needs, attentive, protective, loving, and forgiving,
among other positive attributes (Froese & Bader, 2010). Repre-
sentations of God as benevolent are associated with positive im-
ages of the self (Benson & Spilka, 1973; Roberts, 1989), the value
of benevolence (Johnson et al., 2014), the belief that misfortune
occurs due to natural causes rather than as divine punishment
(Froese & Bader, 2010), and with relatively higher rates of vol-
unteerism (Johnson et al., 2013).
Yet no theoretical model has emerged to explain how belief in
a benevolent God is linked to prosociality. Building upon previous
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
research discussed ahead, we sought to elucidate the relation
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
between benevolent God representations and prosociality. Com-
plementing the notion that authoritarian God representations are
theorized to facilitate prosociality via the expectation of external
rewards and punishments (i.e., the approval of important others
such as God and religious group members; afterlife rewards), we
posited that benevolent God representations facilitate prosocial
behaviors via internal motivations activated by, for example, a
benevolent self-identity or an internalized moral obligation to help
others.
Using undergraduate (Study 1) and community (Study 2) sam-
ples of Christian theists, we tested a mediational model that incor-
porates both authoritarian and benevolent God representations. We
hypothesized that these two God representations would be differ-
entially associated with a set of beliefs about the self and the world
which, in turn, would differentially motivate prosociality.
Assessing Prosociality
Prosociality is broadly defined as acts of helping intended to
benefit others. Helping behaviors can be classified in at least three
ways: (a) planned versus spontaneous helping, (b) indirect versus
direct helping (Pearce & Amato, 1980), and (c) according to the
recipient of the helping behavior (i.e., ingroup or outgroup).
Whereas spontaneous helping involves unplanned acts such as
helping a stranger change a flat tire, planned helping involves
deliberate efforts to assist others (e.g., delivering weekly meals to
a frail grandparent). Indirect helping includes generous acts such
as giving one’s possessions to charity, whereas direct helping
entails giving one’s time to help those in need. We chose to focus
on volunteerism, a relatively high-cost type of helping behavior.
This is important because, although researchers have demonstrated
an association between public forms of religiosity (e.g., church
attendance) and volunteering, there has been insufficient research
investigating how religious cognition might impact volunteerism.
Secular Volunteerism
Organizational volunteering has been defined as unpaid,
planned, direct acts of helping, within an institutional framework,
that provide benefits to others (Piliavin & Siegl, 2007). The
recipients of help are likely to be relatives (Bryan, Hammer, &
Fisher, 2000), people who are like the helper (Dovidio et al.,
2006), or people who share group memberships with the helper
(Flippen, Hornstein, Siegal, & Weitzman, 1996). Much of the
literature on volunteerism has included activities by helpers that
directly benefit their offspring (e.g., little league coaching; Gar-
land, Myers, & Wolfer, 2008) or their religious group (Johnson,
Cohen, & Okun, 2013). However, it is often dissimilar others and
those outside one’s religious or social group that need help—the
poor, the immigrant, prisoner, orphan, and a host of others. There-
fore, we specifically focused on nonkin, nonkith, “secular” vol-
unteering—planned acts of helping directed toward those outside
one’s own family or religious group.
Theoretical Model
We developed a theoretical model in which representations of
God as benevolent and authoritarian were theorized to be differ-
entially associated with beliefs about the self and the world: a
benevolent self-identity, moral obligations to help, and religious
obligations to help1 (Figure 1). Beliefs about the self and the world
were then posited to predict volunteer motives. These motives, in
turn, were predicted to be associated with secular volunteerism.
In the present research, our focus was on the frequency with
which participants had volunteered for the benefit of those outside
their family or religious group during the previous year. However,
there are many situational factors that may prevent (or compel)
individuals from engaging in a planned behavior such as volun-
teering (e.g., lack of opportunity, disability or illness, other time
commitments, etc.). Thus, following Johnson, Li, et al. (2013), we
also assessed intentions to engage in specific acts of secular
volunteerism in the future.
Benevolent and Authoritarian God Representations
Beliefs about the nature and attributes of God are multidimen-
sional (Kunkel, Cook, Meshel, Daughtry, & Hauenstein, 1999) and
vary among individuals even in the same religious group (Froese
& Bader, 2010). For example, people may think of God as in-
volved versus uninvolved (Froese & Bader, 2010), mystical versus
anthropomorphic (Kunkel et al., 1999), or near versus distant
(Spilka, Armatas, & Nussbaum, 1964). In the present research, our
focus was on the benevolent and authoritarian dimensions in
thinking about God which have been identified in previous re-
search (Benson & Spilka, 1973; Johnson et al., 2014).
Recent research has focused on views of a punishing, authori-
tarian God as being associated with depression, neuroticism, or
spiritual struggle (Rosmarin, Krumrei, & Andersson, 2009; Wood
et al., 2010). However, other researchers have shown that author-
itarian God representations are normative for many religious ad-
herents (Froese & Bader, 2010) and, depending upon the measures
used, are generally uncorrelated with neuroticism or insecure at-
tachment styles (Johnson et al., 2014). It may be that benevolent
and authoritarian God representations simply address different
1
Earlier versions of the model included variables for Personal Respon-
sibility (Penner, Fritzsche, Craiger, & Freifeld, 1995) and Belief in a Just
World (Furnham, 2003) in the category “Beliefs about the Self and the
World.” However, across seven different samples (including samples of
Mormons, Muslims, Jews, and individuals who reported being Spiritual-
but-not-Religious), the indirect paths from God representation to Secular
Volunteerism via Personal Responsibility or Belief in a Just World failed
to reach significance in all but two samples. Therefore, in an effort to
provide a more parsimonious model, we have omitted these variables from
the final model.
 GOD REPRESENTATIONS AND VOLUNTEERISM 3
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This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Figure 1. Standardized path coefficients in the revised theoretical model in Study 1. N ⫽ 426. Dotted lines
indicate nonsignificant pathways. The correlations between variables within each class of variables (i.e., God
representations, Beliefs about the Self and the World, Volunteer Motives) and the nonsignificant direct paths
from Benevolent God and Authoritarian God to Secular Volunteerism were included in the model analyses, but
not shown here for clarity. ⴱⴱⴱ p ⱕ .001.

psychological needs and predict different social attitudes and be-
haviors. Whereas authoritarian God representations may success-
fully inhibit antisocial behavior, benevolent God representations
may be more likely to elicit prosocial intentions and behaviors.
Nevertheless, we also tested the aspect of the supernatural punisher
hypothesis which posits that belief in an authoritarian God leads to
a religious obligation to help and, in turn, external motivations
(i.e., concern for one’s reputation before God and the religious
group), indirectly leading to secular volunteering.
Effects of Benevolent God Representations via
Benevolent Self-Identity
Church attendance is often positively correlated with volunteer-
ism and some suggest this may be because individuals involved in
organized religion receive more invitations to help from religious
leaders and peers—many of whom serve as role models of com-
passionate helping. One can think of other examples of benevolent
volunteer role models such as Mother Theresa or Gandhi. For
Christians, the quintessential role model of compassionate helping
may be God—who also modeled benevolence in the person of
Jesus Christ. Thus, Christians may aspire to be like Jesus who
cared for the sick (Mark 5:19); fed the hungry (Matthew 9:36); and
forgave all, even in death (Luke 23:34). Indeed, self-identifying as
benevolent is a robust predictor of volunteerism (Finkelstein,
2009), and is underscored by research showing that a benevolent
self-identity predicts behavioral intentions over and above previ-
ous behavior, positive attitudes toward volunteering, or subjective
norms (Terry, Hogg, & White, 1999).
The desire to express one’s benevolent self-identity can be
classified as an internal motivation in terms of self-determination
theory (SDT; Ryan & Deci, 2000). SDT posits six types of mo-
tives: no motivation (amotivation), adopting a value as one’s own
(identification), a sense that the value is emanating from the self
(integration), feelings of guilt or self-esteem (introjection), com-
pliance with external regulations (external), and, finally, a purely
intrinsic motivation of personal interest or enjoyment. Identified,
integrated, and intrinsic (pleasure) motivations are considered to
be autonomous and internal, meaning that the desire to act is
perceived as a feeling of volition without external rewards or
punishments. SDT holds that people who are self-motivated rather
than externally controlled (by coercion or reward) are more en-
thusiastic, persistent, creative, and satisfied with life. Grano, Lu-
cidi, Zelli, and Violani (2008) found that, as the value of helping
others becomes an integrated aspect of the self, positive attitudes
about helping increase, although intrinsic motivation (i.e., volun-
teering simply for pleasure) was not a significant predictor of
volunteer intentions.
We predicted that benevolent God representations would be
positively associated with a benevolent self-identity which, in turn,
would be strongly and positively associated with internal (identi-
fication and integration) motives to help others (H1), and nega-
tively associated with amotivation (disinclination) (H2). Thus,
benevolent God representations were hypothesized to have two
positive, indirect effects on secular volunteerism via benevolent
self-identity.
Effects of Benevolent God Representations via
Moral Obligation
Even people who do not self-identify as benevolent may still
value benevolence and have internalized moral intuitions about
helping (White & Plous, 1995). When people observe others in
need, internalized altruistic social norms activate a perceived
 4 JOHNSON, COHEN, AND OKUN
moral obligation to help (Schwartz & Howard, 1980); and the
belief that one has a moral obligation to help others is often cited
as a primary reason for volunteering (Snyder & Omoto, 2000).
When reminded of their moral identity, people are also more likely
to expand the sense of “we” and be willing to care for those outside
their own immediate family or social group (Reed & Aquino,
2003).
We reasoned that a perceived moral obligation may be espe-
cially keen for people who feel they have been the recipient of
divine help in times of trouble or blessings in times of need.
Religious people (here we focus on Christians) may feel obliged
to extend those same benevolent acts toward others. Previous
research indicates that most Christians represent God as benev-
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olent (Johnson et al., 2014), value benevolence (Schwartz &
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Huismans, 1995), and often strive to express their benevolent
values via helping (Okun, O’Rourke, Keller, Johnson, & End-
ers, 2014).
In terms of SDT, people with a perceived moral obligation to
help can be said to have mixed motives. On the one hand, they are
internally motivated by their values and moral intuitions to help.
Yet internalized values and moral intuitions are often derived from
and reinforced by society and the expectations of important others.
Morally obliged people may also feel proud if they do, and yet
guilty if they do not, volunteer (i.e., have introjected motivations).
We expected that benevolent God representations would be
positively associated with a perceived moral obligation to help
others which, in turn, would be positively associated with (a)
internal motivation to express benevolent values and moral intu-
itions about helping (H3); and (b) introjected motivation to help
(H4). Thus, benevolent God representations were hypothesized to
have two positive indirect effects on secular volunteerism via
moral obligations.
Effects of Benevolent God Representation via
Religious Obligation
Moral obligations and religious obligations can be differentiated
(Morewedge & Clear, 2008). Whereas moral obligations arise
from internalized values and moral intuitions, religious obligations
are construed here as being external to the self. For example, God
commands people to help those less fortunate (e.g., Leviticus 23).
We predicted that Christians would acknowledge a religious obli-
gation to help regardless of their God representation.
Religious obligations are, in turn, associated with a system of
(often eternal) rewards and punishments. The promise of such
rewards can also motivate prosociality (Harrell, 2012). In an SDT
framework, religious obligation was expected to be most closely
related to external motivation—volunteering in order to earn rec-
ognition, to obtain rewards, and to avoid punishment or criticism
from important others (including God). As discussed above, how-
ever, external volunteer motivations are typically less potent than
internal ones (Finkelstein, 2009; Stukas, Snyder, & Clary, 1999).
We expected that benevolent God representations would be
positively associated with a perceived religious obligation to help
others which, in turn, would be positively associated with external
motivations to help (H5), and also with feelings of guilt (intro-
jected motivation) if one does not help (H6). Thus, we expected
benevolent God representations to have two positive indirect ef-
fects on secular volunteerism via religious obligations.
Effects of Authoritarian God Representations
A perceived religious obligation and extrinsic motivations (i.e.,
fear of punishment, the expectation of reward, and reputational
concerns) are central to the supernatural watcher, or punishing
God, hypothesis (Norenzayan, 2013). Therefore, we expected au-
thoritarian God representations to be positively associated with
external motivations to help (H7), and also with feelings of guilt
(introjected motivation) if one does not help (H8). In short, con-
sistent with the supernatural punisher hypothesis, we also expected
authoritarian God representations to have two positive, indirect
effects on secular volunteerism via religious obligations.
Study 1: Test of the Theoretical Model in an
Undergraduate Sample
Because many Christians believe that Jesus was God incarnate,
Christians are more likely to personify God compared with mem-
bers of other monotheistic religious groups. Therefore, we chose to
assess the beliefs and motives of Christians in testing the effects of
personified God representations on volunteerism proposed in our
theoretical model. In Study 1, we tested the theoretical model in a
sample of Christian undergraduate college students.
Method
Participants. Participants were 454 Christian (164 Catholics
and 262 non-Catholic Christians) undergraduates attending a large
public university who were enrolled in either introduction to
psychology or online sociology courses. Sociology students re-
ceived extra credit and psychology students received partial credit
toward fulfilling a course requirement. There were 162 males (63
were Catholic), 263 females (101 Catholic) and one with missing
data on gender. Participants were Euro American (66%), Hispanic
(20%), or other (14%) ethnicity, and were distributed across three
socioeconomic status (SES) classes. Most reported being “middle
class” (49%), 22% were “lower or working class,” and 29% were
“upper middle or upper class.”
Screening criteria. Belief in God is a central assumption in
the proposed theoretical model of religious volunteerism. There-
fore, Christian participants who responded with a rating of less
than 3, “God might exist,” on a five-option multiple choice ques-
tion at the beginning of the survey, were excluded from the study
(n ⫽ 21).
To guard against careless participation, we included a distractor
page explaining that people often hurry through surveys and ask-
ing participants not to provide a 1 to 7 Likert response to the
statement, “Here is the question that you should not answer.”
Participants who responded with any rating were deemed to have
not followed instructions and were dropped (n ⫽ 7).
Procedure
The online survey consisted of three sections: Beliefs about the
Self and the World; Volunteering (i.e., Volunteer Motivations,
Intentions to Volunteer in the future, and previous Secular Volun-
teer experience for the benefit of those outside one’s family and
religious group); and Religious Beliefs. The three sections were
presented as though they were unrelated studies as described
ahead. In order to guard against order effects, there were two
 GOD REPRESENTATIONS AND VOLUNTEERISM
versions of the survey: (a) Self & World, Volunteering, and
Religion, and (b) Volunteering, Self & World, and Religion. Each
section also included distractor items which were not included in
the model or analyzed here.
Measures
Ratings for each of the following scales were 1 (strongly dis-
agree) to 7 (strongly agree).
God representations. Indicators of belief in a Benevolent
God (B-God; God is helping, forgiving, merciful, gracious, gen-
erous, compassionate, caring, accepting; ␣ ⫽ .90) and an Author-
itarian God (A-God; God is commanding, strict, controlling, re-
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stricting, stern, judging, angry, wrathful, punishing; ␣ ⫽ .86) were
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derived from previous research (e.g., Benson & Spilka, 1973;
Johnson et al., 2014; Kunkel et al., 1999). Participants were asked
to rate the extent to which they agreed that each of the randomly
ordered adjectives were descriptive of God.
Beliefs About the Self and the World
Benevolent self. A benevolent self-identity (BenSelf) was as-
sessed using a new measure adapted from Aquino and Reed’s
(2002) measure of moral identity (␣ ⫽ .79). Participants were
asked to imagine a person who was “caring, compassionate, ac-
cepting of others, generous, and helpful”—adjectives characteriz-
ing a benevolent person and derived from value scales (Schwartz,
1992). Following Aquino and Reed, participants were then asked
to rate the extent to which they agreed with items such as, “I am
the sort of person who has these characteristics.”
Moral obligation. In light of the absence of a published scale
to assess perceived moral obligation to volunteer, we created a
four-item scale (␣ ⫽ .77): “People have a moral obligation to
volunteer to help others,” “I personally feel I have a moral obli-
gation to volunteer to help others,” “If a stranger needs help, a
person who is able to provide it has a moral obligation to do so,”
and “Helping others is an important moral activity.”
Religious obligation. Five items were created to assess the
perceived religious obligation to help others (␣ ⫽ .81): “God
expects people to obey the commandments,” “I have a religious
obligation to help others,” “God commands people to help one
another” “God expects people to care for the needs of others” and
“The scriptures command people to help others.”
Volunteer motivations. The items used to assess volunteer
motivations were adapted from the Volunteer Motivations Scale
(Grano et al., 2008) which consists of six subscales: Integrated
(identity as a volunteer), Identified (valuing volunteerism), Intro-
jected (feeling guilty for not volunteering), External (volunteering
at the behest of others), Amotivation (not volunteering), and Per-
sonal Pleasure (volunteering for personal pleasure).
Because Integrated and Identified motives have been shown to
be highly correlated in previous research (Grano et al., 2008) and
were correlated .64 in the present study, we combined the items on
these two scales (Internal Motivation; (␣ ⫽ .87). In so doing, we
were able to test a more parsimonious model. The External scale
(Grano et al., 2008) was modified to focus on extrinsic motivations
with respect to religion (␣ ⫽ .72): “I volunteer because God
rewards people who help others,” “. . . because I will earn rewards
in the afterlife,” “. . . because God is pleased when I volunteer,”
5
and “. . . because I want to avoid being criticized by others in my
religious group.” The remaining subscales, Introjected (␣ ⫽ .79)
and Amotivation (␣ ⫽ .86), were not modified. Because volun-
teering strictly for personal pleasure does not predict volunteerism
independently of the other volunteer motivations (Grano et al.,
2008), this scale was excluded from the theoretical model.
Secular volunteerism. The final variable in the path model
was the frequency with which people had volunteered for the
benefit of those outside their family or religious group during the
past year (SecVolBHVR; Secular Volunteer Behavior). Partici-
pants read a statement that defined organizational volunteering as
a service performed without compensation for an organization or
agency. Examples were provided of several different types of
organizations such as churches/religious groups, social service
agencies, schools, hospitals, Red Cross, political parties, and en-
vironmental conservation groups. Participants responded to the
question, “During the PAST YEAR, how often did you perform
volunteer services for an organization that benefited people outside
your family or religious group?” Participants rated their frequency
of volunteering on a 7-point scale, with response options of
“never” (coded 1), “a few days per year” (coded 2), “1 day per
month” (coded 3), “2–3 days per month” (coded 4), “once a week”
(coded 5), “2–3 days per week” (coded 6), and “almost daily”
(coded 7). The mean rating of frequency of volunteering was 2.34
(SD ⫽ 1.35).
Intentions to volunteer. Whereas our secular volunteerism
measure assessed volunteering during the past year, a secondary
goal was to assess intentions to engage in secular volunteerism in
the future. Therefore, following Johnson, Li, et al. (2013), we also
assessed intentions to volunteer for specific secular causes. To
sample across individual proclivities, we asked about a variety of
volunteer possibilities. Participants were asked how likely they
would be to volunteer over the next 12 months by: “Helping
underprivileged youths learn to read,” “Distributing reading ma-
terials to hospice patients,” “Helping distribute food at a local food
bank,” “Helping build housing for poor families,” and “Delivering
food to families whose husbands are in prison” (SecVolINT,
Secular Volunteer Intentions; ␣ ⫽ .92).
Results
Descriptive statistics for model variables. Given the com-
plexity of the model, scale scores from observed data were com-
puted for each of the measured God representations, beliefs about
self and the world, volunteer motivations, and the two secular
volunteerism variables, rather than taking a latent variable ap-
proach. This was done by taking the average of all the items for
each scale. The means, standard deviations, and correlations
among all variables in the model are shown in Table 1. As shown,
A-God and B-God were not directly correlated with SecVolBHVR
(M ⫽ 2.34, SD ⫽ 1.35). However, B-God was positively corre-
lated with SecVolINT (M ⫽ 4.66, SD ⫽ 1.34), r ⫽ .17, p ⬍ .001.
In terms of motivational predictors, SecVolBHVR and SecVolINT
were most strongly correlated with Internal motivations, r ⫽ .34
and .47, p ⬍ .001. This is consistent with previous research
applying self-determination theory to volunteer motivations
(Grano et al., 2008).
Path analysis of indirect effects in the theoretical model.
Using MPlus 7.2 (Muthén, & Muthén, 1998 –2012), with robust
 6 JOHNSON, COHEN, AND OKUN

Table 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-Order Correlations Between the Manifest Variables in the Theoretical Model, Study 1

B-God A-God Ben Self Moral Oblig Relig Oblig Amotive Internal Introject External Vol Intent

Mean 6.21 3.28 5.98 4.70 5.26 1.84 4.94 3.64 3.22 4.66
SD .89 1.23 .92 1.10 1.32 1.17 1.10 1.42 1.31 1.34
A-God ⫺.00
BenSelf .34ⴱⴱ ⫺.22ⴱⴱ
MoralOblig .23ⴱⴱ .06 .31ⴱⴱ
ReligOblig .38ⴱⴱ .36ⴱⴱ .13ⴱⴱ .31ⴱⴱ
Amotive ⫺.26ⴱⴱ .23ⴱⴱ ⫺.48ⴱⴱ ⫺.20ⴱⴱ ⫺.05
Internal .20ⴱⴱ .02 .34ⴱⴱ .42ⴱⴱ .21ⴱⴱ ⫺.23ⴱⴱ
Introjected .02 .05 .11ⴱ .40ⴱⴱ .20ⴱⴱ .09 .47ⴱⴱ
External .13ⴱⴱ .28ⴱⴱ ⫺.00 .21ⴱⴱ .39ⴱⴱ .25ⴱⴱ .25ⴱⴱ .40ⴱⴱ
Vol Intent .17ⴱⴱ ⫺.00 .25ⴱⴱ .30ⴱⴱ .22ⴱⴱ ⫺.22ⴱⴱ .47ⴱⴱ .27ⴱⴱ .20ⴱⴱ
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Vol Secular .02 .03 .01 .11ⴱⴱ .06 ⫺.05 .34ⴱⴱ .16ⴱⴱ .04 .15ⴱⴱ
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Note. N ⫽ 425.
ⴱ
p ⬍ .05. ⴱⴱ p ⬍ .01.

maximum likelihood (MLR) estimation, we tested a path model
specifying the predicted paths among the manifest variables in
accord with our theoretical model All variables within each class
of variables (i.e., God representations, beliefs, and motivations)
were allowed to correlate. For example, Amotivation, Internal,
Introjected, and External motives were allowed to correlate with
each other in the volunteer motives class. The direct paths from
God representations (i.e., B-God and A-God) to SecVolBHVR
were also included in the model.
We evaluated the model fit by examining the chi-square
goodness-of-fit test, root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA), comparative fit index (CFI), and standardized root-
mean-square residual (SRMR). An RMSEA less than .05, CFI
greater than .95, and SRMR less than .05 indicate good model fit
(Kline, 2005). We found that the fit of the theoretical model to the
data was adequate but not good according to conventional stan-
dards, ␹2(19) ⫽ 78, p ⬍ .05, RMSEA ⫽ .09, CFI ⫽ .92, SRMR ⫽
.06.
Post hoc model modifications are typically required to develop
better fitting path models (Byrne, 2012). The goal is to specify the
most parsimonious model with both good theoretical justification
for each estimated parameter and with good fit statistics. To
determine which paths to add, we consulted the modification
indices provided in the MPlus output. Modification indices are
estimates of the incremental reduction in chi-square that could be
achieved by the addition of specified pathways. However, paths
suggested by the modification indices were added only if doing so
was reasonable within the theoretical framework as discussed
above.
The modification indices suggested that adding a negative path
from A-God to BenSelf would improve the model fit. This is
consistent with studies showing that self-identity often reflects
representations of God (Roberts, 1989). In other words, if people
represent God as punishing, wrathful, and stern, they may be less
likely to see themselves as compassionate and caring. The incre-
mental improvement in chi-square for the added pathway was
significant, p ⬍ .001. The respecified model provided a good fit
for the data, MLR ␹2(18) ⫽ 52, p ⬍ .05, RMSEA ⫽ .07, CFI ⫽
.96, SRMR ⫽ .04. The standardized coefficients for the significant
pathways predicting SecVolBHVR in the final model are depicted
in Figure 1.
Indirect effects of B-God on secular volunteer behavior.
There were multiple indirect effects that help to understand why
representations of God as benevolent may facilitate volunteering
for the benefit of those outside the family or religious group (Table
2). As expected, B-God was positively associated with BenSelf
which, in turn, was positively associated with Internal Motivation
(H1), which was the strongest motivational predictor of SecVolB-
HVR, as can be seen in Figure 1. Also as expected, B-God was
positively associated with Moral Obligation which, in turn, was
positively associated with Internal Motivation (H3), a positive
predictor of SecVolBHVR. The positive effect of B-God on
SecVolBHVR via Amotivation (H2) was not significant.
Also contrary to our predictions (H4), although Moral Obliga-
tion was associated with Introjected Motivation (i.e., guilt), Intro-
jected Motivation was not a significant predictor of SecVolBHVR.
A simple explanation is that the reduction of negative emotional
states such as guilt is insufficient to motivate people to help
unrelated others. Moreover, as can be seen in Table 1, Introjected
Motivation was also correlated with both Internal Motivation, r ⫽
.47, p ⬍ .001 and External Motivation, r ⫽ .40, p ⬍ .001, but less
highly correlated with SecVolBHVR, r ⫽ .16, p ⫽ .001. It may be
that feelings of guilt for not volunteering come into play only via
the other motivational pathways.
B-God was also positively associated with Religious Obligation;
however, contrary to our predictions (H6), Religious Obligation
was not a significant predictor of Introjected Motivation, suggest-
ing that guilt for not helping may be activated by the failure to
follow internalized values and moral intuitions (i.e., Moral Obli-
gation) rather than religious imperatives. Instead, and as expected,
Religious Obligation was associated with External Motivation
(H5). External motivation (religious rewards for helping) was not
a significant predictor of SecVolBHVR.
Indirect effects of A-God on secular volunteer behavior. In
contrast to the punishing God hypothesis, the indirect effects of
A-God on SecVolBHVR were negative, with a significant total of
the standardized indirect effects ⫽ ⫺2.89, p ⫽ .004 (see Table 2).
As expected, A-God was positively associated with Religious
Obligation which, in turn, was positively associated with External
Motivations (H7). However, as discussed above, External Motiva-
tions were not a positive predictor of SecVolBHVR. Furthermore,
 GOD REPRESENTATIONS AND VOLUNTEERISM 7

Table 2
Standardized Indirect Effects Relative to Standard Errors From Benevolent (B-God) and
Authoritarian (A-God) to Secular Volunteer Behavior and Intentions in Studies 1 and 2

Volunteer behavior Volunteer intentions

(SecVolBHVR) IE/SE (SecVolINT) IE/SE
Model pathway Study 1 Study 2 Study 1 Study 2

Benevolent God
B-God ¡ BenSelf ¡ Amotivation ⫺.64 ⫺1.42 2.85ⴱⴱ 1.34
B-God ¡ BenSelf ¡ Internal 3.67ⴱⴱ 6.18ⴱⴱ 3.54ⴱⴱ 5.98ⴱⴱ
B-God ¡ Moral Oblig ¡ Internal 3.71ⴱⴱ 6.10ⴱⴱ 3.47ⴱⴱ 5.85ⴱⴱ
B-God ¡ Moral Oblig ¡ Introjected .36 ⫺.37 1.13 ⫺.00
B-God ¡ ReligOblig ¡ Introjected .35 ⫺.37 .83 ⫺.00
B-God ¡ ReligOblig ¡External ⫺1.34 ⫺2.92ⴱⴱ 2.08ⴱ ⫺.55
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Total indirect effects of benevolent God 2.64ⴱⴱ 5.38ⴱⴱ 6.18ⴱⴱ 7.51ⴱⴱ

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Authoritarian God
A-God ¡ BenSelf ¡ Amotivation .63 1.35 ⫺2.78ⴱⴱ ⫺1.34
A-God ¡ BenSelf ¡ Internal ⫺3.65ⴱⴱ ⫺3.93ⴱⴱ ⫺3.42ⴱⴱ ⫺3.82ⴱⴱ
A-God ¡ ReligOblig ¡ Introjected .35 ⫺.37 .81 ⫺.00
A-God ¡ ReligOblig ¡ External ⫺1.32 ⫺2.74ⴱⴱ 2.08ⴱ ⫺.55
Total indirect effects of authoritarian God ⫺2.89ⴱⴱ ⫺4.82ⴱⴱ ⫺1.87† ⫺3.82ⴱⴱ
ⴱ ⴱⴱ
†
p ⫽ .06. p ⬍ .05. p ⬍ .01.

Religious Obligation was not a significant predictor of
SecVolBHVR via Introjected (H8).
Although not hypothesized, there was a significant negative
indirect effect of A-God on secular volunteerism via BenSelf and
Internal Motivations. This is in contrast to the positive effects of
B-God via BenSelf.
Indirect effects of God representations on secular volunteer
intentions. Although our primary focus was on the indirect
effects of God representations on past secular volunteer behavior,
we also tested the indirect effects of God representations on future
secular volunteer intentions. The model fit the data well, MLR
␹2 (18) ⫽ 52, p ⬍ .001, RMSEA ⫽ .07, CFI ⫽ .96, SRMR ⫽ .04.
As shown in Table 2, there was a significant positive total indirect
effect of B-God and a negative total indirect effect of A-God on
SecVolINT.
Discussion
A number of tentative conclusions can be derived from the final
model. The results of Study 1 using a sample of Christian under-
graduates indicate that belief in a benevolent God—rather than
belief in a punishing God—is more strongly and positively asso-
ciated with both previous secular volunteer experience and with
intentions to volunteer for specific secular causes in the future.
This can be explained in that a benevolent self-identity and a
perceived moral obligation to help others were both positively
associated with representations of God as benevolent, but nega-
tively associated or uncorrelated with authoritarian God represen-
tations. Further, a benevolent self-identity and the belief that one
has a moral (but not necessarily a religious) obligation to help were
positive predictors of internal motivations to volunteer. Consistent
with previous research (Gagné, 2003; Grano et al., 2008), internal
motivation was a stronger predictor of secular volunteerism than
was external motivation. Introjected motivation, feeling guilty
about not helping, was not a significant predictor of secular vol-
unteerism after controlling for internal and external motives.
Study 2: Test of the Theoretical Model in a
Community Sample
In concert, the significant indirect pathways observed in Study
1 highlight the ways in which representations of God as benevolent
may foster secular volunteerism in a Christian population. In Study
2, we sought to generalize our finding by testing our respecified
model in a community sample of Christian adults (Figure 2).
Participants and Procedure
Participants were 804 workers on the Mechanical Turk website
(301 male, 503 female) who were paid $2 after completion of the
Benevolence Survey (see Study 1). Belief in God was assessed
using a 5-option multiple choice question in a prescreening survey,
and participants were disqualified if belief in the existence of God
was rated less than 3, “God might exist.” As in Study 1, the data
for Christians only (Catholics, n ⫽ 230, and non-Catholic Chris-
tians, n ⫽ 574) are reported here. Participants were mainly Euro
American (72%), Black or African American (12%), Hispanic
(7%), Asian or Asian American (5%), or other (4%). In terms of
SES, 46% reported being “middle class,” 42% “working or lower
class,” 12% “upper middle or upper class,” with four participants
not responding. With respect to age, 42% of the participants were
19 –29 years old; 27% from 30 to 39 years of age; 23% from 40 to
49 years of age; and 8% over age 50.
Results and Discussion
As in Study 1, scores for both B-God and A-God were uncor-
related with SecVolBHVR. However, B-God was positively cor-
related with (SecVolINT), r ⫽ .23, p ⬍ .001. Scores for A-God
were negatively correlated with SecVolINT, r ⫽ ⫺.13, p ⫽ .015.
Although not presented here, the means, standard deviations, and
correlations between the variables were identical in direction and
similar in magnitude when compared with those in Study 1 (see
Table 1).
 8 JOHNSON, COHEN, AND OKUN
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Figure 2. Path model from Study 1 with standardized path coefficients from Study 2. N ⫽ 804. Dotted lines
indicate nonsignificant pathways. The correlations between variables within each class of variables (i.e., God
representations, Beliefs about the Self and the World, Volunteer Motives) and the nonsignificant direct paths
from Benevolent God and Authoritarian God to Secular Volunteerism were included in the model analyses, but
not shown here for clarity. ⴱⴱ p ⱕ .01. ⴱⴱⴱ p ⱕ .001.

In specifying the model for Study 2, the same 10 variables from
Study 1 were used. The respecified model from Study 1 provided
a good fit to the data, ␹2 (18) ⫽ 103, p ⬍ .05, RMSEA ⫽ .08,
CFI ⫽ .95, SRMR ⫽ .04.
Indirect effects of B-God on secular volunteer behavior.
As in Study 1, there were several significant indirect pathways
from B-God to SecVolBHVR (see Table 2). The pathway from
B-God ¡Benevolent Self ¡ Internal Motivation ¡ SecVolB-
HVR was positive and significant; the path from B-God ¡
Moral Obligation ¡ Internal Motivation ¡ SecVolBHVR was
also positive and significant. Although external motivation and
secular volunteerism were uncorrelated in terms of the bivariate
correlation, the path from B-God ¡ Religious Obligation ¡
External Motivation ¡ SecVolBHVR was negative and signif-
icant, suggesting that perceived religious obligations may have
a statistical suppressor effect via external motivations and may
undermine secular volunteerism (see also Geiser, Okun, &
Grano, 2014).
Indirect effects of A-God on secular volunteer behavior.
As in Study 1, the total indirect effects of A-God on SecVolB-
HVR were significant and negative. This was explained by the
negative path from A-God ¡ Benevolent Self ¡ Internal
Motivation ¡ SecVolBHVR (see Table 2). Also, because Ex-
ternal Motivation was a negative predictor of SecVolBHVR in
the full model, the path from A-God to SecVolBHVR via
Religious Obligation was significant and negative. Other indi-
rect paths from A-God to SecVolBHVR were not significant.
Indirect effects of God representations on secular volunteer
intentions. In terms of secular volunteer intentions, the model
provided a good fit to the data, ␹2 (18) ⫽ 101, p ⬍ .001,
RMSEA ⫽ .08, CFI ⫽ .95, SRMR ⫽ .04. There was a signif-
icant positive total indirect effect of B-God and a significant
negative total indirect effect of A-God on SecVolINT (see
Table 2).
Discussion. The results of Study 2 indicate that belief in a
benevolent God—rather than an authoritarian God—is likely
to be indirectly associated with both previous secular volunteer
behavior and the intention to volunteer in the future for the
benefit of those outside the family or religious group. Benev-
olent God representation was a positive predictor of a benevo-
lent self-identity and a perceived moral obligation to help,
whereas Authoritarian God representation was a negative pre-
dictor of a benevolent self-identity and uncorrelated with a
moral obligation to help. This is important because a benevolent
self-identity and moral obligation were significant positive pre-
dictors of internal motivations, the strongest positive predictor
of secular volunteerism.
Both benevolent and authoritarian God representations were
positively correlated with a perceived religious obligation to help
others. However, the model results pertaining to religious obliga-
tion were more difficult to interpret. As in Study 1, religious
obligation was a negative predictor of previous secular volunteer
behavior via external motivation in the full model. This suggests
that religious obligation may actually suppress internal motiva-
tions to volunteer for the benefit of those outside the family or
religious group (see also Geiser et al., 2014). These results are also
in accord with previous research showing that external motives
(i.e., external rewards and punishments) are often less effective in
eliciting volunteerism (Finkelstein, 2009; Gagné, 2003; Grano et
al., 2008; Stukas et al., 1999). We note, however, that the negative
indirect effects of religious obligation on previous secular volun-
teer behavior were not significant with respect to secular volunteer
intentions.
 GOD REPRESENTATIONS AND VOLUNTEERISM
General Discussion
We identified two pathways that account for the differential
influences of benevolent and authoritarian God representations on
secular volunteerism. First, whereas benevolent God representa-
tions are positively associated with a belief that the self is also
benevolent, authoritarian God representations were uncorrelated
(or negatively correlated) with a benevolent self-identity; and a
benevolent self-identity, in turn, was strongly associated with
internal volunteer motivations—the strongest predictor of secular
volunteerism. Second, representations of God as benevolent were
associated with a perceived moral obligation to volunteer whereas
authoritarian God representations were not. Moral obligations are
grounded on internalized values and moral intuitions about help-
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ing. Like a benevolent self-identity, moral obligations are associ-
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ated with internal motivations to help—a robust predictor of sec-
ular volunteerism. This is consistent with previous research
showing that people often volunteer as an expression of their
prosocial values (Okun et al., 2014), and helping others who are
unlike the self or outside one’s social group may provide an added
opportunity to act on benevolent God beliefs and benevolent
self-concepts (see also Stukas, Worth, Clary, & Snyder, 2009).
Religious obligations appear to have a direct effect on external
motivation but with inconsistent indirect effects on secular volun-
teerism. More specifically, in the community sample, the relation-
ship between religious obligation and secular volunteer behavior
appears to be mediated by external motivation yet the indirect
effect is negative, suggesting that a perceived religious obligation
may reduce secular volunteering. In contrast, the association be-
tween religious obligation and secular volunteer intentions in the
student sample appears to be mediated by external motivation but
with a corresponding increase in secular volunteer intentions.
Moreover, the significant negative indirect effect of religious ob-
ligation on secular volunteer behavior was reduced to nonsignifi-
cance with respect to future volunteer intentions. One possibility is
that as religious obligations become more salient (and, we specu-
late, with a corresponding increase in religious group commit-
ments), Christians are less likely to have had volunteer experience
for the benefit of those outside the religious group even though
they report being willing to do so.
Implications of This Research
This research helps to integrate two disparate literatures—the
psychology of religion and the psychology of volunteerism—to
suggest that varying representations of God are associated with
different beliefs which, in turn, undergird intentions to volunteer
and volunteerism behavior for the benefit of those outside one’s
family or religious group.
Psychology of religion. First, in terms of the psychology of
religion, social scientists are becoming increasingly aware of the
extent to which religious and spiritual beliefs influence social
attitudes. One prominent theory regarding the importance of reli-
gious beliefs posits that belief in a high, punishing God watching
from above fostered prosociality and, consequently, enabled the
development of large scale societies (Norenzayan, 2013). There is
evidence that authoritarian God representations are associated with
strict social norms (Froese & Bader, 2010), the inhibition of
cheating (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2011), and the facilitation of
ingroup cohesion (Roes & Raymond, 2003) (cf., Sanderson &
9
Roberts, 2008; Schloss & Murray, 2011). However, refraining
from antisocial behavior is not necessarily equivalent to engaging
in prosocial behavior (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009).
While we do not dispute that authoritarian God representations
discourage antisocial behavior within a group, this seems to only
partly explain why people are willing to help others— especially
when those others are outside one’s family or religious group.
We speculate that representations of God as authoritarian might
also be associated with the denigration of value-violating out-
groups (see also Froese & Bader, 2010), which, in turn, would
most likely reduce helping (Batson, Denton, & Vollmecke, 2008).
This view is consistent with the idea that the religious prosociality
fostered by an authoritarian God might be parochial in nature
(Norenzayan, 2013). In other words, belief in an authoritarian God
may inspire helping in some contexts, but helping may be circum-
scribed for the benefit of the ingroup (Blogowska & Saroglou,
2011; Preston & Ritter, 2013).
In contrast to the punishing God hypothesis, we reasoned that
focusing on the benevolent aspects of God’s nature is more likely
to impel Christian theists to help others— even when the benefi-
ciaries are those outside the religious or social group (Johnson, Li,
et al., 2013, 2014). This can be explained in that benevolent God
representations are associated with an individual’s benevolent self-
identity and sense of moral obligation to help all others and, in
turn, associated with internal motivations to engage in prosocial
behaviors such as volunteering for secular causes. While much
theory about religious beliefs and prosocial behavior has focused
on an authoritarian, punishing God, our results suggest that we also
need to consider the influence of belief in a benevolent God on
prosocial behavior.
Our results also speak to an active debate as to whether or not
religious prosociality actually exists at all (Galen, 2012; Preston et
al., 2010). It may be that the mixed results in previous research are
due, in part, to a failure to recognize individual differences in
religious beliefs. For example, experiments investigating the ef-
fects of religion on prosociality often utilize priming stimuli re-
ferring to “God” or “religion” or “prayer” (Gervais & Norenzayan,
2012; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007; cf., Pichon, Boccato, & Saro-
glou, 2007). However, it is unclear which God representations or
other components of religion these primes may actually be acti-
vating (Ritter & Preston, 2013). Because U.S. Christians are likely
to have higher scores on ratings of God as benevolent rather than
authoritarian (Johnson et al., 2014), general religious primes may
be activating benevolent God representations for many partici-
pants. However, depending upon the participant sample or the
specific religious words used, general religion primes may also
sometimes be associated with authoritarian God representations
which could yield different experimental effects.
Psychology of volunteerism. In the last century, part-time
volunteerism has become a key avenue for extending help to those
in need. Although paid professionals still administer many chari-
table organizations, it is estimated that nearly half of the adult
population in the U.S. and Canada participate in at least some
volunteer activities each year and many humanitarian efforts sim-
ply would not exist without the support of volunteers. Moreover,
the benefits for the volunteer include increased subjective well-
being, self-esteem, educational and occupational achievement, re-
duced risk of mortality, and reduced substance abuse and truancy
rates in youths (Wilson, 2000). Volunteering is a win-win situation
 10 JOHNSON, COHEN, AND OKUN
because it benefits both the recipient and the volunteer (Okun et
al., 2013). Our results suggest that developing strategies focused
on benevolence or on the benevolent nature of God may foster
helping, generally—and volunteering, specifically, thereby serving
the betterment of the community as well as promoting the psycho-
logical well-being of volunteers.
Limitations and Future Directions
Path analysis is an excellent statistical tool for uncovering the
links among a set of variables. If the specified model fits the data
well, the significant pathways in the model begin to shed some
light on the possible causal relations among the variables. How-
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ever, the cross-sectional data we have presented here can only go
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so far in explaining how beliefs about God might influence an
individual’s thoughts, feelings, and behavior. We are aware of only
a handful of published experiments that have activated specific
God representations, as opposed to ideas about religion or about
God in general (Bushman et al., 2007; Johnson et al., 2013;
Roberts, 1989). It is even less clear how and to what extent one’s
own identity, moral intuitions, values, or motivations might shape
representations of God—perhaps in a bidirectional manner or as a
reinforcing cycle (see Epley, Converse, Delbosc, Monteleone, &
Cacioppo, 2009; Ross, Lelkes, & Russell, 2012). Longitudinal and
experimental research is warranted to substantiate the causal path-
ways specified in our theoretical model.
There are also other God representations that were not examined
in the present research. For example, we suggested that Jesus may
serve as a benevolent role model for Christians; however, this was
not directly tested in our model. Representations of God are
complex, and Christians may also think of God as a cosmic force
rather than as a personal being; as a spirit within rather than as a
distant, sovereign ruler; and as engaged versus disinterested in
human affairs. These and other God representations may influence
the values, intentions, and behaviors of Christians and other reli-
gious individuals in ways that we have not considered in the
present research. It is also likely that people have more than one
representation of God (Davis, Moriarty, & Mauch, 2013) and these
may be activated in different contexts.
Additionally, although it is useful and informative to understand
the beliefs and volunteer behaviors of Christians, representations
of God as benevolent and authoritarian exist in nearly all theistic
religions. In Islam, for example, Allah is represented as both
punitive and merciful, and the same in Judaism; Hindu deities may
be malevolent or benevolent. Further, some religious groups may
be more likely to cultivate a reverential fear of God and have a
more powerful sense of religious obligation relative to Christians
(e.g., Muslims; Warner, Kilinc, Hale, Cohen, & Johnson, 2015). In
that case, the positive indirect effect of authoritarian God repre-
sentations may be enhanced.
We also chose to focus on a relatively high-cost prosocial
behavior among Christians: secular volunteerism. However, indi-
viduals in other religious groups may be more inclined to engage
in other kinds of helping behaviors rather than volunteerism (e.g.,
charitable giving). Benevolent and authoritarian God representa-
tions (or any number of other religious cognitions) may influence
these other types of helping in different ways. Further, we did not
assess whether the nonfamily, nonreligious beneficiaries of volun-
teer efforts were also outgroups in terms of social class, ethnicity,
local versus distant locality, and so forth.
We also do not claim to have included all possible explanatory
variables in our theoretical model. Indeed, people volunteer for
many other reasons that we have not examined here (Snyder &
Omoto, 2000). In that same vein, we wish to stress that we are not
suggesting that being religious or that belief in God are prerequi-
sites for volunteering. Many nonreligious and nonbelieving indi-
viduals generously donate their resources and time every day for a
host of secular causes. For example, merely priming a moral
identity, without any explicit reference to religious beliefs, elicits
a universalistic prosociality (Reed & Aquino, 2003). Other inter-
esting variables, such as personality, may also play an important
role in fostering volunteerism (Carlo, Okun, Knight, & de Guz-
man, 2005). Still, research shows that, across multiple cultures,
religious people are more likely to volunteer (Ruiter & DeGraaf,
2006); and, in the present research, we demonstrated that repre-
sentations of God as authoritarian and benevolent are differentially
associated with a set of beliefs about the self and the world which,
in turn, differentially motivate religious prosociality—at least in
terms of secular volunteerism.
Conclusion
We show here that, for Christians, representations of God as
benevolent are likely to indirectly lead to volunteerism for the
benefit of those outside the family or religious group. The explan-
atory model investigated here can potentially be extended to other
religious and secularist groups as well, whose members can also
choose to focus on the good, the benevolent, and not the judgmen-
tal, nature of their own human role models, saints, and deities. We
suggest this may impel people to positively change their self-
concept and sense of moral obligation, cultivate helping motiva-
tions, and thereby promote prosociality and universal compassion
over and above selfish concerns.
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Received December 30, 2014
Revision received March 24, 2015
Accepted May 27, 2015 䡲