Transcendental Idealism and

Beyond:
Kant’s “Theater of the Mind”


Ken Foldes
Fulbright Scholar

Published by The Da Vinci Center Press, New York

All rights reserved
 Que la tyrannie de l’Objet cesse!
Mort a l’Objet! –Vive l’esprit!
Que le reine eternelle de la liberte commence!


No, great man, you who are of such importance for the human race,
your work will not perish! It will bear rich fruits. It will give
mankind a fresh impetus; it will bring about a total rebirth of man’s
first principles, opinions, and ways of thinking. Believe me, there is
nothing which will be unaffected by the consequences of your work,
and your discoveries have joyous prospects. … Oh great and good
man, what must it be like toward the end of one’s earthly life to be
able to have such feelings as you can have! I confess that the
thought of your example will always be my guide and will impel me
not to retire from the stage before I have been of some use to
mankind, to the extent that it lies within my power to be of such use.

Fichte to Kant, 9-20-17931

1
Early Philosophical Writings, p. 365. Tr. D. Breazeale (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).

2
 CONTENTS
Introduction. The Question, Background, Methodology 4

Chapter One: TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM IN THE AESTHETIC

[The “Screen” of The Theater of the Mind] 19
1.1. PP1 of The Aesthetic 21
1.2. Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Space 22
1.3. Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space 25
1.4. “Conclusions from the above Concepts” 26
1.5. Transcendental Idealism/Empirical Realism 31
1.6. Metaphysical and Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Time 33
1.7. “General Observations on Transcendental Aesthetic” 40

Chapter Two: TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM IN THE ANALYTIC

[The “Projector” of the Theater] 48
2.1. Transcendental Apperception as Absolute Condition 49
2.2. Transcendental Apperception as the Ground of Objectivity 54
2.3. The New “Immanent” Critical Notion of an Object 60
2.4. The Schematism, Principles, Refutation of Idealism, and Ground of Phenomena-
Noumena Chapter 63

Chapter Three: TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM IN THE DIALECTIC

[There is “No Exit” from the Theater] 82
3.1. The Paralogisms 84
3.2. The Antinomies 101
3.3. The Ideal 110
Conclusion 111

Chapter Four: THE CRITICS: THE TRANSCENDENTAL REALISTS 112

4.1. H.E. Allison 116, P.F. Strawson 137, Walker 149, Findlay 151, Bohme 157,
Sherover and Srzednicki 156, 306, and Waxman 157
4.2. Sallis, J.S. Beck, Fichte, and R.P. Wolff 159
4.3. Common Objections 163
4.4. Final Assessment of Kant and His Critics 164

Chapter Five: BEYOND KANT: TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM A LA FICHTE AND

HEGEL 165
5.1. The “Standpoint”: The Difference Between Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel 169
5.2. Transcendental Idealism a la Fichte 175
5.3. Transcendental Idealism a la Hegel 185

Appendices: 202, Bibliography: 207

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 Kant’s “Theater of the Mind”

INTRODUCTION

It is a daring step of reason to liberate mankind to remove it from the

terrors of the objective world, but this daring venture cannot fail,
because man grows in the measure in which he learns to know
himself and his power. In a languid age one cannot expect much
progress from a philosophy which asserts as its highest principle that
the essence of man consists of freedom and only of freedom, that
man is not a thing, not a chattel, and in his very nature no object at
all. 2

“Does Or Does Not Kant Hold The Object Of Experience To

Exist Independently Of Experience?”

This is the most important question to ask with regard to Kant scholarship today, since the
answer one gives to it, I believe, will determine whether or not one has understood Kant’s position -
Transcendental Idealism. Kant’s true position, which it is the burden of this dissertation to show, is
that the object of perception/representation as a matter of fact, has no existence independent or
distinct from perception/representation, which is to say that it is not a thing “in itself” but rather an
“appearance,” or is a thing only for us. This exactly, I contend, is the singular insight or vision the
term “Transcendental Idealism” is intended to communicate. The opposite position, involving
untruth, which takes the object of perception to have an existence in itself and distinct from
perception, regarding it in this way as a thing capable of existing in itself or as self-subsistent and
not as an appearance, is precisely that of “Transcendental Realism.”
In view of the fact that the vast majority of Kant scholars today think it to be Kant’s view
that the object really does have an independent existence and, in some cases, that Kant can be read
as holding both views, and thus as contradicting himself—as is alleged by P.F. Strawson among
others—the importance of the thesis and the problem it engages itself vis-a-vis the contribution it
would make to Kant scholarship overall is, I feel, evident. It will, apart from other things,
determine, if its logic is sound, whether one is a Transcendental Realist or a Transcendental Idealist.
2
Schelling, Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism, trans. by F. Marti in On the Unconditional in Human
Knowledge, 156.

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 Concerning the scope of the question. By “object” is meant the object which is given or
found in immediate experience and perception or representation, and with the properties it is
perceived to possess, i.e. the spatial, temporal, sensory, material or physical, extended object or
thing of experience. The question then concerns whether this object or any of its properties or
predicates can be said in any way to exist in themselves or independently or out of relation with or
apart from experience or perception/representation/intuition/sensibility. For example, whether the
“cabinet” I am looking at right now or any of its spatial, temporal etc., properties can be said to exist
independently or apart from my perception of it; this and not the related question as to whether it
can be said to exist when I am not perceiving or representing it - though this subordinate question
will also receive treatment by me. By “object” then is not meant the transcendental object or the
“transcendent” thing in itself, the concern is only with the Thing of experience - this hand, pen,
book, tree, building, planet, star. Thus the question can be formulated as follows: Does the thing as
given in experience and which certainly exists for us, also have or “enjoy” an existence apart from
us, —Is the thing a thing “in itself”, —Does it possess a self-subsistent existence, or merely an
existence or being for us (and in and as experienced),—Or in Kant’s idiom, Is the thing only an
appearance or is it a thing in itself, i.e. a thing also capable of existing in and by itself?
In essence, Transcendental Realism is the position that the object or thing is a thing in itself,
i.e. it (or some of its properties) can exist apart, —Transcendental Idealism, the position holding that
it cannot, and is thus an appearance only. It is also important to recognize that this distinction
concerns only the object or thing of experience and one’s position concerning the manner of its
existence. It does not at all concern a “transcendent” thing in itself (this term will be clarified
presently). One commits the transcendental realist “blunder,” as Kant makes very clear, only when
one mistakes “appearances for things in themselves,” i.e. when one regards the objects of the senses
as self-subsistent beings able to exist apart from our sensibility or representations of them or, as he
also says, by “hypostatizing” one’s representations, turning them into self-subsistent things (cf.
B519, A369, A385, A389). To be a transcendental realist, then, is not to hold that there are things
in themselves or independently existing objects as such. The position concerns only the thing or
object of immediate experience or perception, and the belief that it has a being in itself and thus can
exist apart from the subject and his intuition (Anschauung) or cognitive faculty. That is, the claim is
that the thing of sense can exist apart from me, not that there are things (beings, entities) apart from
me. It is this claim which leads one directly into the “re-presentational” theory of perception and
epistemology, as Kant indicates at A369, 372, —i.e. if sense things have a being in themselves and
apart from me, are independently existing objects, then as outside me and as not immediately
accessible, it is clear my perceptions cannot be of them as such but only of a “re-presentation” or
copy of them; this is the “empirical idealism” with which transcendental realism is paired,
transcendental idealism is accompanied by an “empirical realism,” that is to say, and this is very
important, only if I hold the things to have no being in themselves/apart from me, can I be certain I
am in touch with reality, the thing itself, and not with just its copy.
Another highly important form of the question, especially for Fichte, is that which couches it
in terms of “object” and “representation”: Does the object of representation have an existence
distinct from its representation, — or, Is the former divorceable from the latter?

Dogmatism versus Criticism

Since the relationship between the Thing and the Thing in itself is so very crucial, it may be
helpful to indicate here briefly, how from what alone is given in experience, viz. the Thing, a

5
“Thing in itself” (or its concept) first originates, and thus how the position of transcendental realism
itself, also known as “dogmatism”—which is contrasted with “criticism” (Kant’s position)—first
arises. This will also shed light on Kant’s own position:
1] We begin with the situation the self finds itself in, “the given” (if you will). I perceive
things/have perceptions. (these things are the only things that are present to me, which I know
anything about).
2] Then I reflect: “The thing I perceive must have an independent existence, i.e., must be a
Thing able to exist by itself, or is a Thing in itself (a Being, a self-subsistent).” That is, I posit them
as having such an existence. In effect, I hypostatize the unity of myself and the object (percept) (cf.
the Transcendental Aesthetic PP1, A19). However, what is important, at this point I have not as yet
entered into the error of Transcendental Realism, an error which forces me to conclude that my
perception is the perception only of a copy, not of the original or reality itself. —The present
position is that of “naive realism” and the standpoint of the empirical sciences, viz. the thing has
independent reality (is a thing in itself) and I have total access to it - it appears, and is as it appears;
reality and appearance coincide.
3] I then reflect: “If they have a being in themselves, then evidently I have no access to
them, but to their copies only, i.e., I must not be in immediate relation with them.”
At this point, what occurs is that a “disjunction,” “split,” or “gap” is instituted which
separates the object from the perception or representation, which can be symbolized as follows:
______________
______________ ____________

4] It is precisely at this point that the position Kant calls “transcendental realism” is born. I
first come to the idea of a Thing existing outside my experience (as cause of the same)! - that is, to
the idea of a Thing existing “in itself,” a “Thing in itself,” for short. Thus, the “Thing in itself”
comes right out of the Thing of immediate experience. It is the (sense) thing.....doubled! One of
the results of the investigation will be that not only is this how the “thing in itself” originates, but
that this is the only “thing in itself” to be found in the Critique. And since Kant’s position is that
one who holds this view is thereby a transcendental realist, Kant’s true position is: —There is no
Thing in itself! This, I submit, expresses Kant’s position precisely.
Further, it is possible to distinguish not less than seven objects operative in the Critique,
viz.,
1] The Thing (of sense; “object,” “appearance”)
2] The Thing in itself, in the immanent sense
3], 4] The Thing in itself, in the transcendent sense, having two senses
5] The Transcendental Object, in the immanent sense
6] The Transcendental Object, in the transcendent sense
7] The Noumenon

1] We have discussed (the object of experience, spatial, temporal, sensible, material-

physical, extended).
2] The Thing in itself in the immanent sense, is the Thing of experience, 1], but viewed as
able to exist by itself, yet totally accessible, and not yet regarded as existing outside experience
(“naive realism”).
3] & 4] The Thing in itself in the transcendent sense, has two senses:

6
 3] This is the “immanent Thing in itself 2]” but now posited as existing outside experience,
and regarded as the “cause” of our perception or of its copy. (the Thing in itself of the
Transcendental Realist, the psychologist, and perhaps Descartes).
4] This is any thing or being taken as existing outside or independently of experience, not
necessarily as a “cause” of our perceptions (or their objects) (e.g. the Divine being, other persons-
minds, angels), and as nonspatial, -temporal, -material, -sensible, -extended, an “intelligible” object
(ens - “originarium,” “realissimum,” etc.); the same as a “Noumenon.”
5] The Transcendental Object in the immanent sense, is that related to Transcendental
Apperception (I am) and the categories and goes into the constituting of an object of experience, 1],
“that in which a manifold of intuition is united,” and which is that of the Understanding’s “Pure
Concept of an Object,” i.e. the “Pure Concept of a Transcendental Object.” —As such, it only refers
to the objects or things of experience, and not to anything “beyond” or “transcendent” of
experience.
6] The Transcendental Object in the transcendent sense [A614/B642], this has the same
meaning as 3] & 4], and always has a reference to objects of experience or appearances as in some
sense their “cause” or “ground”; this will be clarified below.
7] The Noumenon, since it is purely “intelligible” and nonspatial, etc., it is the same as 3], 4]
and 6]. This is a vestige of pre-Kantian, pre-critical philosophy (the “I know not what” of Locke
and the empiricists) and of the “Inaugural Dissertation” (1770). Kant has critical doubts about it (it
“may be nothing at all” A253, A49). —In any case, it can only be “thought of,” and reduces to a
“thought – viz., of an intelligible, nonspatial, -extended, etc., independently existing object, which I
(and others) hold is self-contradictory and unthinkable, though of course Kant’s official position is
that it is not (the positive & negative Noumenon will be treated below). It will turn out that 1] the
Thing, is the only real object in the Critique.

It can be seen from a sampling of their texts that the critics I have selected—Allison,
Strawson, Walker, Waxman, Findlay, Sherover, Bohme and Srzednicki—do in fact give an
affirmative answer to the above question and thus in so doing, I would submit, confess they are in
truth transcendental realists, holding to what the majority refer to as a “weighty” object as present in
the Critique and claiming Kant holds appearance or the object of representation or perception to
exist distinct from the same:

[Kant’s argument] cannot establish any connection between the unity of apperception and
objects in the “weighty” sense (148).3 Allison

How, then, is the doctrine that bodies are but a species of our representations to be
reconciled with the doctrine that we are immediately conscious of the existence of objects in
space distinct from our perceptions?4 (259) P.F. Strawson

Objects are entities in the external world—things like tables and tiepins, capable of existing
independently of their perceivers. … Judgements of experience [are] those which purport to
agree with some independent object.5 (76) R.C.S. Walker
3
H.E. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, An Interpretation and Defense (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1983) 148, 136.
4
P.F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (London: Routledge, 1966) 259.
5
R.C.S. Walker, Kant (London: Routledge, 1978) 76.

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 Generally speaking, Kant has used the term “Gegenstand” … to refer to what is conceived
by us to be external to us and/or to be independent in its being of [our] cognitive or
intellectual processes.6 (253) C.M. Sherover

Kant is right … the object of perception must be objective, i.e. independent of that very
perception.7 (265) J. Srzednicki

We will see that nowhere in his book does Kant speak of the object of experience or define it thus:
“by the object I mean that which has an existence independently or distinct from perception,
representation, and our cognitive faculty.” —This construal of the “object” is the old
“transcendent” concept of an object—qua an “independently existing entity”—of the philosophical
Tradition previous to Kant which his “Copernican Revolution” is to render obsolete and replace
with a new “immanent” conception of an object construed in terms of (as grounded in) an Act of
apperception whereby two or more perceptions/representations are linked (“synthesized”) by a
category in a judgement.

I would like to acknowledge here that I owe no small debt to Daniel Breazeale for the
central vision which informs my interpretation. His fine translation of Fichte’s early texts in his
Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings, one passage in particular, gave me the clue to the correct way
to read Kant’s Critique, viz. without entering it with the assumption of a transcendent, independent
Thing in itself, viewed as behind the appearances and as cause of my perceptions, and instead
starting the book with assuming no more than the I and what is given in experience, viz., the Thing -
making a determined effort to keep from straying out of the present, the immediate, with wings,
flying into transcendent realms. The Fichtean text I refer to is this: ‘I require my readers to “check”
the Thing in itself at the door before they even enter my Wissenschaftslehre; we begin simply with
the “I” and what we find in it [viz. a manifold of intuitions],”—we do not find (look high or low) a
“Thing in itself,”8‘ etc (SW II, 445, my paraphrase; and see below p. 309).
When I applied what he said to the Critique thinking Kant must be at least as smart as
Fichte, and “checked” my “Thing in itself” at the door and entered the Critique without it, I found—
a different Kant. I also found that Kemp Smith’s translation—which many of us rely on—was in
many places intentionally biased so as to support a “transcendent” Thing in itself reading of Kant’s
text. A non-transcendent reading of the Critique not only is possible - upon close inspection of the
German - but turns out to be also correct (as yielding - for the first time - a radically consistent
Kant). —One glaring example is his translation of Kant’s

Dagegen ist der transzendentale Begriff der Erscheinungen im Raume eine kritische
Erinnerung, dass uberhaupt nichts, was im Raume angeschaut wird, eine Sache an sich,
noch dass der Raume eine Form der Dinge sei, die ihnen etwa an sich selbst eigen ware,
sondern dass uns die Gegenstande an sich gar nicht bekannt sind, und usw., (A30)
As:

6
C.M. Sherover, Essays (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1982) 253.
7
Srzednicki, Kant-Studien 75 (1984) 94-103.
8
J.G.Fichte, Sammtliche Werke (SW), Ed. I.H. Fichte, 8 vols. (Berlin: Veit, 1845-46) II:445, trans. by
Breazeale in Fichte, Early Philosophical Writings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press) 325.

8
 The transcendental concept of appearances in space, on the other hand, is a critical reminder
that nothing intuited in space is a thing in itself, that space is not a form inhering in things in
themselves as their intrinsic property, that objects in themselves are quite unknown to us ,
etc.

Note Kemp Smith’s wording clearly suggests Kant is committed to the actuality of transcendent,
independently existing things/entities (“things in themselves”), and note carefully that he illicitly
conflates “der Dinge. . .” and “. . . an sich selbst” so as to read “Things in themselves,” also that the
word “unknown” is not in the German, rather “known” (bekannt). A truer more faithful rendering
—with my annotations—would be,

The transcendental concept of appearances in space, on the other hand, is a critical reminder
that in general nothing intuited in space is a Being (Sache) in itself, that space is not a form
of [sensible] things which would be something belonging to them in themselves [which
would belong to them in themselves], but rather that objects in themselves are in no way
known to us [or: we are not at all acquainted (bekannt not erkannt) with objects in
themselves, —meaning not that there actually are such objects and we are, to boot, deprived
of knowledge of them (the common reading), but rather simply that the objects we are
acquainted with in experience [!] (which we intuit) are not objects in themselves, are not
objects capable of existing in themselves, —for they are merely appearances (“which cannot
exist in themselves” (A42)), —and these are the only objects we are acquainted with (as to a
“thing in itself”, no such thing is to be found within experience, period).]

Thus, it clearly seems possible to read the text without any ontological committment to
“supersensible”, transexperienceable entities.9 I discovered moreover to my amazement, that no
text exists in the Critique which expressly links a “Thing in itself”, “affection,” and
perception/sensibility; —the crucial, often decisive A20 does not say that the “Thing in itself affects
our receptivity,” but rather that an “object” (Gegenstand) does. That this object is not the Thing in
itself but rather an appearance is confirmed at A20 where the “object of an empirical intuition” is
—“to be entitled appearance”! Thus Fichte’s text—thanks to Breazeale—encouraged me to hold
fast to my “new” reading in the face of the great opposition of scholarship that was against it, most
of which—if not all—gives a “dogmatic” reading that assumes at the start and as a matter of course
(established fact) the texts must refer to a transcendent, “causal” Thing in itself and make a
commitment as to its reality.
There are then 2 distinct “Models” (or “standpoints”) one can use in the reading of the
Critique which can be named—after the literature appearing after 1781 in response to it—the
“dogmatic” and the “critical.”
The Dogmatic - which reads the Critique with the assumption of an independent thing in
itself, taking Kant to hold to its real existence (the standpoint of “common sense,” and virtually all
previous philosophy, Ancient through Descartes, Spinoza, and Locke). According to it there are
two things that exist: on the one side, a subject or knower, on the other, an independent thing

9
Kant’s text can be read as also saying merely that “in knowing the objects of experience, we are not in
any way knowing a “Thing in itself”—i.e. a thing which is either “in itself” or can exist in itself, or both a
thing which is able to exist in itself (the transcendental realist position) and a thing as it is in itself (the
naive realist position - and such a thing being impossible), or experience does not yield knowledge of a
Thing in itself, but only of an appearance.”

9
(being, “thing in itself”), that which is to be known. This “traditional” Model immediately lands
one in the insoluble problem (viz. “skepticism”) of how one is to “get at” the object/the known, of
how the independent thing/entity can get into (“migrate” into) the knower and of how I can know
the object not as it appears to me (as re-presented) but as it “really is” in itself—and as well, to the
“standard” view in Kant interpretations, that independent “Things” are already “out there” before
experience, and when we “open our eyes,” or activate our cognitive faculties or “mechanism,” we
thus “put them in” or add/impose space and time on them.
The Critical - which reads the Critique without this “dogmatic” assumption. According to
this one begins simply with what is immediately given/found in sense intuition - and with nothing
else (a merely interior reading of the text, instead of an interior/exterior reading). Hence the only
“object” there is, is the sensible object of experience, the Thing —(and as we shall see, the only
Thing there is in the Critique, - the “thing in itself” being a deception, the ground of a transcendental
“illusion,” namely, of transcendental realism and “dogmatism”). This latter claim, that there is no
“thing in itself” in the Critique, is to be regarded as a subsidiary thesis for which I shall attempt to
argue. As part of my strategy regarding my methodology I will be using the Critical Model in
reading Kant’s text.
As I hold most scholars are entangled in dogmatism or common sense realism of one form
or another and as I hold Kant’s position to be the exact opposite of this, indeed is best understood as
being its contradictory opposite, a more detailed and historical-genetic account of the difference
between Dogmatism and Criticism will shed no small light on our problematic. What is especially
remarkable is that many scholars seem to be completely unaware of this difference and of the fact
that the conversion of “things in themselves” (or “weighty objects”) into “appearances” is precisely
the central motif of Kant’s doctrine of transcendental idealism.
Thus “dogmatism,” is the belief in mind or subject independent realities; in particular, the
view that some or all of the features of the experiential object (primary & secondary qualities) are
able to exist apart from the subject or its power of representation. Transcendental Idealism or
“Criticism”, on the other hand, holds that none of the object’s features, the object being “appearance
only” not “thing in itself,” “can exist outside our mind”(B520) - or, more strikingly, that the
Universe—the entire spatiotemporal continuum—has no existence whatsoever outside, distinct
from our minds and therefore exists only within the bounds of our sensibility (as Strawson correctly
holds).
Thus it can be said that the shift from dogmatism to criticism (or “transcendental idealism”)
is the distinctive feature of Kant’s philosophy, indeed, that all philosophies previous to Kant’s were
infected with some kind or other of dogmatism. It is even fair to say that Modern philosophy,
beginning with Descartes, can be seen as Reason’s gradual emancipation of itself from the
deception of dogmatism, its belief in entities apart from the subject and its cognitive powers/mind.
The over-coming or -turning of this common sense view of the object’s independent existence
began with Descartes’ Meditations, 1641, when the indispensable role and presence of the I
(knower or consciousness) in knowledge came into view. Its result was that no longer were there
“things” but instead merely my perceptions or “ideas” of things—a world of self-subsistent “things”
outside me became a world of ideas inside me, so many contents-modifications of my mind or
Cogito—the focus of philosophy then shifted from ontology to epistemology, from Being as such,
to Being-in-relation-to-consciousness. I, the subject, no longer had a direct access to beings, but
only an indirect one, i.e., via inference from my ideas or re-presentations, from what was “within
me” to what was “without me.” One class of my ideas was “objective” in that it represented
properties actually belonging to things outside my mind, viz. ideas of extension, figure, motion

10
—“primary qualities.” Other of my ideas were only “subjective,” presenting properties which
reflected my sensory make-up rather than the thing itself—color, sound, tactile qualities
—”secondary qualities.” Thus, at this point the Object has experienced a considerable loss of
properties, the bulk of its sensible properties now regarded as not intrinsic to the object but rather
only as relating to the subject, the object in itself being the strictly non-sensible, “mathematical” one
of extension (spatiality-materiality), figure and motion, the “quantified” object of the “new”
physics/natural science (in contrast to the “old” Aristotelian-scholastic “qualified” view of nature).
The former fell on the side of the subject, the latter on that of the object.—This view of the object
was held by Locke and the empiricists as well.
Notice here that (scientific) knowledge of these real, extended, shaped, and moving objects
was mediated or inferred only and not direct. All we had to do with were the immediate contents of
the mind-Cogito, its “subjective” sensations and ideas. We possessed and knew directly merely the
“ideas” of space, figure and motion, not space, figure and motion themselves. All we could do was
to “infer” or believe that the “things” existing outside and independently of our minds did in fact
“correspond” or agree with their ideas or re-presentations existing only in us.—With Leibniz we
take a further step away from dogmatism and closer to criticism by moving from the absolute space
of Newton and Descartes to strictly “relative” space, i.e. space is not in itself but only in relation to
things or “Monads” in space (about which more later). When we reach Kant (via Wolff, Locke,
Hume et al) the final overcoming of dogmatism takes place, viz. with Kant’s ingenious equation,
Space (extension) = Pure Intuition (as well as with his new focus on the “I” and on a “Thing-in-
itself”10). This equation yields two important things. First, the object suffers the loss of its
remaining qualities—extension, figure, motion—which get accordingly transferred to the subject, to
its faculty of sensibility.
Second, since nothing remains to constitute an object independent of the subject (cf. A42,
B44, A253, B345), the dividing line of what falls within the subject and what lies without—
collapses, along with the notion of representations being re-presentations of objects or things (“once
upon a time” sensible, spatial, material) existing outside or independently of the subject.—This
leads directly to the true “critical” view of the actual situation (between knower and known, subject
and object), viz. that the representation (Vor-stellung) and the object are one and the same thing
(Kant e.g. A371, Fichte II, 441; and see Prolegomena (289) 33 Ellington).
“Dogmatism” on the other hand involves a deep-rooted deception or delusion (A388), to be
expelled only by criticism. My ordinary common sense view of the world, which I have been
steeped in since my earliest years, regards the “World,” being, or “things” as something that has
always existed, is “there,” outside of me (in the transcendental sense; cf. Husserl, Cartesian
Meditations), existing on its own account (“in itself”), as a fully self-constituted, indifferent being,
i.e., in advance of my experience of it. The “World” is what is primary or fundamental
10
[?] Cf. This conflict of reason with itself must be resolved, even if it should not prove possible within
the Theoretical Science of Knowledge; and since the absolute existence of the self cannot be given up, the
issue must be decided in favor of the second line of argument, just as in dogmatic idealism (but with this
difference, that our idealism is not dogmatic but practical; does not determine what is, but what ought to
be). But this must be done in such a way as to explain what needs explaining; which dogmatism could not
do. The diminished activity of the self must find an explanation in the self as such; the ultimate ground of
it must be posited in the self. This comes about in that the self, which in this respect is practical, is posited
as a self that ought to contain in itself the ground of existence of the not-self [universe or object], which
diminishes the activity of the intellective self; an infinite Idea which cannot itself be thought, and by
which, therefore, we do not so much explain the explicandum as show, rather, that, and why, it is
inexplicable; the knot is not so much loosed as projected into infinity.

11
(independently “given”); - “I,” on the other hand, exist as what is secondary or derivative (and
inessential, incidental to its being and make-up), a subject, which can as well be as not be. The
World is there complete by itself - the I, the knower is, so to speak, placed or introduced into it
“from outside”—the assumption being that both the knower and the World each have an
independent being and are quite able to exist and “get along perfectly well” without each other, and
apart from their union which is called Knowing (Erkennen) or Experience (Erfahrung). Criticism
finds this assumption (“deception”) misguided, and on two counts: 1. it assumes the I is something
derivative, dispensable, that it is possible to abstract from or ignore the I (subject, knower,
consciousness), and thus to consider the World or Being as it is apart from the I —which is
impossible (for “The ‘I think’ must be able to … etc.” B131). It is impossible to effect this
separating of the object of consciousness-representation from consciousness, i.e. to pretend the I is
not there, is not an ineliminable factor of Experience. 2. If it is assumed that the Knower and Being
(the object, world, known) are from the start independent of one another, exist “outside” of one
another, then the fact of knowledge is made inexplicable, incomprehensible. That is, how can what
is first outside me, come later to be inside me, to be for me, to be an object of knowledge or
experience? This is possible only if Being (the object, world) was within me or in immediate
relation with me (with knowing) from the beginning, if knowing and being are parts/factors of a
single unity, neither able to exist apart from or “overstep” the other. Dogmatism believes it can start
immediately with the object and side-step the I - whereas Criticism knows as against this deception
that one cannot transgress this boundary, or “go beyond the I” - one must—can only—begin with
the I (or with the unity of I and Thing) and never “egress” from or “fracture” it.
Thus it can be said, the hallmark of dogmatism (and the “letter”) is dis-unity, that of
knowing and being, representing and object, subject and object, while that of criticism (the “spirit”)
is unity, of the same. The former is unable to account for the possibility of Experience (the fact that
there is an object for me at all) - whereas the latter alone can. In this lies the true meaning of Kant’s
oft-used expression “in us,” as in “appearances are in us,” “space, time, objects of experience are in
us,” —viz. if an object were not in us, or were outside us or independent of us, then it could not
be/become an object for us, an object of experience and cognition. Thus to start with Being as such,
which dogmatism wants to do, is illicit, as it involves an ungrounded and ungroundable assumption,
based on the deception which (mis)takes appearances for things in themselves (B535).
Because dogmatism, in all its varieties, is so deeply ingrained in us and those around us, it
takes much time and effort to overcome—and this only through criticism. Most scholars (Kantian
and others) have not yet vanquished theirs (as will appear); this is why they settle in most cases for a
“compromise” position, a mixture of criticism and dogmatism, idealism and realism. They realize
doubtless that Kant clearly says in many places that space and appearances in space are
“transcendently ideal”, i.e. have no reality, are nothing apart from us, from our sensibility, but their
dogmatism will not let them fully accept it, hence they go on to speak of objects “in the weighty
sense” as spatial, material objects that are able to exist “independently” of the subject, perceiver,
and his cognitive faculties.

Kant’s Critique as a “Puzzle”

At this point the reader may object, “What about those four or five passages where Kant
clearly speaks of a “transcendental object” underlying appearances and representations as their
“cause” or “ground” - surely that these texts exist cannot be denied, what of them?” Since this is a
weighty objection I feel it necessary to give here some general response to it. First, one must

12
remember that the Critique appeared within a specific historical period and cultural milieu. Kant, it
must be granted, was far ahead of his somewhat “enlightened” but still basically medieval
(“theocentric” – in the pejorative sense) age. Recall he says, in his essay on “Enlightenment,” not
that we live in an enlightened age but rather in an age of enlightenment, meaning much superstition
and dogmatism still clung to humanity and its thinking. I would venture that Kant was acutely
aware of his concrete situation. He knew that on his new critical principles one could not ignore the
“I think” and thus talk meaningfully about entities (e.g. “God”) that are out of relation with the
subject and outside her experience. He knew his standpoint could be viewed as implying atheism—
recall, all of his disciples, e.g. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel sooner or later were branded as
“atheists,” since they all came ultimately to deny any type of independently existing- or mind-
independent- being whatever. Indeed, as they all said, freedom demands that there be no “thing in
itself,” contemporary with itself and having absolute causality, because it would do away with
freedom. Hence, I feel—since freedom, it can be argued, is the real objective and desideratum of his
philosophy—that Kant was forced in effect to accommodate himself to everyone, to dogmatists and
criticists alike. If so, then he deliberately inserted a few “clinkers,” i.e. dogmatic passages into his
text to “throw off” the authorities (much like Descartes did several decades earlier), to leave an open
a place for a “thing in itself” and for the “transcendent” Divine Being of orthodoxy and thus avoid
the charge of “atheism” by the censors. It is to be kept in mind, 1. that Kant knew the categories
only apply within experience, hence that these “dogmatic” passages were in fact meaningless as
involving an illicit use of the categories of cause and ground, and 2. that he knew his Berkeley,
hence that the idea of a “being independent of thought and perception” was self-contradictory and
unthinkable. Indeed, everything points to Kant’s intentionally making the Critique into a kind of
“puzzle,” - one which only the brighter minds of the age would be able to solve, again much like
Descartes was forced to do in regard to his Meditations in order to get it approved by the Catholic
authorities. Thus I submit Kant was fully aware of the incompatibleness of his own standpoint,
“criticism,” and that of the common view, “dogmatism,” however to keep his book(s) in circulation
and thereby enlighten the German nation (to fulfill his literary mission) he, so to speak, had to give
the appearance of being “one of the crowd,” i.e. a dogmatist too, exactly what he was overthrowing,
and leave room for a “thing in itself.” As we will see, one of the “key’s” to his “puzzle” is that the
so-called “Ground” of the phenomena-noumena distinction is in fact an “insufficient ground,” i.e.
there really is no ground (to stand on) for a “thing in itself.”
Of course, another possibility is that Kant himself never fully overcame his own dogmatism.
For he, like everyone else, also began his life and career as a dogmatist, i.e. as a believer in
intelligible entities existing “in themselves” outside the mind. Indeed, as the Inaugural Dissertation
of 1770 makes quite clear Kant originally believed in an “intelligible world” as well as a “sensible
world,” our pure intuition able to make immediate contact with its objects, sensible appearances,
our pure concepts also presumably able to do the same vis-a-vis its non-sensible objects, “things in
themselves”.11 It was only later as he confesses in his letter to Marcus Herz that he began to
question the relation of our concepts to “intelligible things in themselves,” i.e. how can a concept
relate a priori to an object which is totally independent of it and from which it was not derived? It
was at this point that he first began to restrict the use of concepts to experience alone and deny their
validity for metaphysics, i.e., for transcendent objects.

11
See Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation or On the Form and Principle of the Sensible and the Intelligible
World, Section II, “On the Distinction Between Sensible Things and Intelligible Things in general,”
Werke II, 392, 397, Ed. and trans, by L.W. Beck in Kant Selections (New York: Macmillan Publishers,
1988) 54, 58. Also cf. Kant’s important letter to Marcus Herz of February 21, 1772.

13
 A third possibility is that, as he says in the B-Edition Preface, he had to “deny knowledge in
order to make room for faith,” i.e. for free practical activity and the moral life, which seem to
demand a place for a “transcendent God” and other supersensible existents (e.g. other selves). But
perhaps we would do well to listen to those who openly declare that the time has come for a new
immanent God or Absolute to replace the old transcendent, inaccessible God of the tradition. –That
is, for example, to Schelling who says:

You may give me a thousand revelations of an absolute causality outside myself, and a
thousand demands for it on behalf of an intensified practical reason, yet I shall never be able
to believe in it as long as my theoretical reason remains the same. My capacity even to
assume an absolute object would presuppose that I had first abolished myself as a believing
subject! [Further, note:] My objections are not aimed at criticism, but at certain expounders
of it, who might have learned that criticism advances the idea of God merely as an object of
action, and not at all as an object to be considered as true. I don’t say that they should have
learned it from the very spirit of critical philosophy. But they might have learned it at the
very least from the word Kant used: postulate. The meaning of this term they should know
from mathematics, if not otherwise.12

—And to Fichte who remarks:

My absolute I is not the individual, though this is how offended courtiers and irate
philosophers have interpreted me. … Instead, the individual must be deduced from the
absolute I. As individuals, we find ourselves at that standpoint which I call the practical
standpoint. (I call the standpoint of the absolute I the speculative standpoint.) According to
this practical point of view, a world exists for us which is independent of us and which we
can do no more than modify. From this standpoint, the pure I is posited outside ourselves
and is called God.13

—And to those in general who say, with three Tubingen seminary students of yore: “We belong to
the new race of men who no longer seek for immortality and God without but rather within
themselves.”14 That is to say, to those who hold freedom and a thing-in-itself to be, in the last
analysis, incompatible.

Methodology and Overview

12
See Schelling’s remarks in his Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism 1795 (Marti 156ff)
which have applicability to many of today’s Kantians. And also cf. 76n: “For whatever can say I to
itself, also says I am! The pity is that, in theoretical philosophy, God is not determined as identical with
my I [!} but etc.” And 99: “In the theoretical sense God is I = Not-I; in the practical sense He is
absolute I, which annihilates all not-I. Insofar as the nonfinite I is represented schematically as the
ultimate [moral] goal of the finite and thus outside the latter, in practical philosophy God can indeed be
represented as outside the finite I (schematically) however only as identical with the nonfinite.”
13
Fichte’s letter to Jacobi, August 30, 1795 (Breazeale, 411).
14
Schelling, Holderlin, and Hegel’s, Earliest System-Programme (Berne, 1796), trans. by H. Harris in
Hegel’s Development, Towards the Sunlight, 1770-1801, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972) 510-
512.

14
 The strategy I will use for establishing my thesis will be that of a textual proof, whose main
principle is the following. In the course of elucidating the central doctrine of Transcendental
Idealism, we will see if in the Aesthetic, the Analytic, and the Dialectic there are any texts which
seem to say or imply either that the object-thing of sense or its properties can exist apart from the
cognitive faculty, i.e. that space, time, matter, bodies or corporeal nature (even moving forces) or
spatial, temporal, extended, physical, sensible predicates/properties have in any way an existence
distinct from experience and the subject, — or that the object exists “beyond” or “behind”
experience and is endowed with said properties/predicates, — and if such texts exist, if there is any
possible sense or way they can be so interpreted, that is, without contradicting doctrines or
principles established by Kant himself (as found in key statements of his), or, in a way consistent
with the texts of the Critique as a whole; a sufficient reason will be given in regard to each text
which is judged negatively. In our investigation, we shall designate such an object capable of
existing independently of the cognitive faculty—following P.F. Strawson and the other
“transcendental realists,” as we will argue—as a “weighty” object.
If at the conclusion of our search and trial it has been found that no such texts exist, which
can sustain such interpretation, then we will consider ourselves justified in concluding that Kant
indeed holds that the object of experience cannot exist independently of experience.
Also, as a result of the inquiry which, anticipatorily, reveals that no such texts nor “weighty”
object exist, several remarkable and hitherto unrecognized features of Kant’s position will come to
light which will provide us with a clearer understanding of his the same and as well help us to
perceive better the difference between criticism and its contrary, dogmatism, and most important,
the difference between critical and dogmatic readings of his book. Additional strategies we shall
employ are given in the following overview:
ONE. The textual proof of my thesis will be carried out in Chapters One, Two, and Three,
viz., “Transcendental Idealism in the Aesthetic,” in “the Analytic,” and in “the Dialectic.” The proof
will be contexted and informed in accordance with the following principle to be confirmed in the
analysis: That an understanding of the way the Aesthetic and Analytic interconnect is essential for a
correct interpretation of the Analytic, viz. the Aesthetic, in turning things in themselves into
appearances, makes a new “immanent” type of objectivity (grounded in the subject) necessary. The
sole purpose of the Analytic is to provide for this new type of objectivity. Moreover, since I hold
that the object cannot exist apart, and this relates to its lack of self-subsistence, which is due to its
being conditioned by the subject and its a priori faculties, a primary concern will be with unpacking
the full implications of the fact of this conditioning of object on the part of the subject.
Accordingly, through a close analysis of the text supplemented by rigorous argumentation I
will try to show:
1) That the key “critical” principle at the base of the Critique and its arguments is: I can
perceive only what I am in immediate relation with; of what is not in such relation to me, I can
have no perception. That is to say (in the Fichtean :formulation): You cannot abstract from or
bypass the subject, and arrive at a thing entirely separate and distinct from it. This demonstrates
that there can be no “gap” between the object (of sense) and myself or my representations.
2) That the object of experience or appearance (e.g. a house) in no way exists “in itself” or
“distinct” from representation; and can in no way be construed as an independent or “weighty”
object —in fact, there is no mention at all in the text of such an object.
3) That the interconnection between the Aesthetic and the Analytic is crucial for realizing
why there can be no independent “weighty” object in the Analytic, i.e. since according to the

15
Aesthetic objects are appearances and not things in themselves, hence not independently existing
objects, there is a need for a new concept of objectivity, the Analytic’s sole purpose is to provide it.
4) That therefore, there is no thing in itself, i.e. meaning the thing or appearance cannot
exist independently of representation/experience.
Moreover, in my textual analysis and proof of my thesis my primary concern will be with
what Kant in fact holds and not with whether what he holds is in fact true—it is to understand his
doctrine and not to pass judgment on it (not that this also will not occur).
TWO. Chapter Four will be devoted to the, as I allege, “transcendental realist” Critics who
have not understood Kant’s doctrine. I hope to show:
1) Their “weighty” object reading cannot be sustained.
2) By holding to such an object they betray the fact they have failed to grasp the vital
Aesthetic-Analytic methodological connection.
3) They have failed to realize that Transcendental Idealism provides the only realism
possible, and thus to see Kant’s genius and the simplicity of his vision which conceives mind and
nature—inner and outer sense—as in a perfect and indissoluble unity.
4) Kant’s shortcomings: he is according to the “letter” of his text, a transitional figure
between the old and the new “object” and old and new philosophy which latter starts from the I
alone, stays with the I, and returns to the I, everything being grounded in it. There is further a need
to make his vision-standpoint systematic or give it systematic form - a task completed (I am
convinced) by his sharpest and most devoted students: Fichte, Schelling and Hegel.
THREE. Finally in Chapter Five I will give merely a sketch of how Fichte and Hegel can
be seen not as repudiations or reactions to but rather as offering different and more “systematic”
presentations of the same simplicity of vision of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism—to wit, “the
object and the representation are one and the same thing” (Fichte), “the in itself is only an in itself
for consciousness” or “ knowledge and the object of knowledge are the same (Hegel, Phen. 566), or,
my favorite, “there are only things for us, and not a thing in itself as well.”
I would also like to acknowledge a debt to Tom Rockmore and John Sallis—to Tom for his
valuable suggestion that it is not Schelling but Fichte who is the proper means of access and point of
departure for an understanding of Hegel, and to John for illuminating and dispelling for me much
that was dark and dense in the Phanomenologie and the Wissenschaftslehre, not to mention the
Kritik.

16
 Kant’s “Theater of the Mind”

Aesthetic Analytic Dialectic

(screen) (projector) (“no exit”)

A. B. A. B. C. D. A. B. C.

(Metaphysics)
A. Space A. The Categories A. Psychology (the soul)
B. Time B. Schematism B. Cosmology (the world)
C. Principles C. Theology (God)
D. Ground of Appearance
Thing-in-itself Distinction

To facilitate a grasp of Kant’s true standpoint, Transcendental Idealism, and the true
meaning behind the key words “Experience,” “(re)Presentation,” “Power of Presentation,” and
“Mind,” I will liken entering the Critique to entering a “theater,” a “theater of the Mind,” in which
these terms come together and reveal their true import. Kant’s position is that space & time and the
whole objective universe is inside your mind, not outside (this is an illusion-deception). The
principle that grounds this is: YOU CANNOT GO BEYOND YOUR I or MIND.
Or, You cannot bypass your I and reach an object independent of it. Or, You are in
immediate relation with everything in the Universe, or, The Universe is part of, attached to, inside
your mind, or, Nothing is mind-independent.

Kant’s “theater” has four sections, two lower and two upper:

The Balcony “No Exit”

3. 4. (The Dialectic)

I a.
2. 1.
The Loge The Mezzanine
(The Analytic) (The Aesthetic)

1) We enter the theater at “a.” into “1.” by going from the “empirical” to the “pure,” i.e.
simply by closing our eyes. We are now in the “Mezzanine,” its lower main part which contains the
“Screen” — now totally black, an undetermined-yet-determinable pure manifold of space/time.
Namely, the Aesthetic, the “passive” part of the Mind. We now open our eyes, and see what else
our mind contains. My word! The Screen is now filled with multiple objects, colors & sounds (the
classroom, the main library, your room).
2) Then we move from “1.” into “2.,” to the “back” of the theater, which we shall call the
“Loge,” and which contains the “Projector” or projection mechanism whereby the Screen

17
(manifold) becomes determined or filled with content or objects—(ob-jects will turn out to be “pro-
jects” or “projections” on the Screen). Namely, the Analytic (categories, schematism, principles),
the “active” part of the Mind [cp. the “active” and “passive” intellect of Aristotle].
3) Next we move from its lower to upper level, from “2.” to “3.” and “4.,” i.e. to the
“Balcony,” where we learn the bitter-sweet lesson that we can never leave the theater, that there is
literally “No Exit” from it (from the Mind or Experience). The Balcony contains a vestibule, viz.
the “Ground of Appearance/Thing-in-itself Chapter” which prepares us for its main part, viz. the
Dialectic, i.e. the exhibition of the “three” unsuccessful attempts to leave or egress from the theater.
This seemingly “sad” realization—that one can never egress—results in our abandoning these
attempts (“flights into the beyond”) and returning to our seats, resigned-reconciled to our fate,
simply to, as it were, “sit back and enjoy the Feature Presentation!” (or, as one of the better poets
of the age said, “Let It Be”). —(in effect, quit theory for practice and the moral, active [eternal]
life).15

The two foundational Principles of Kant’s Theater of the Mind are then:

1. You cannot go beyond the I or Mind. And,

2. Because of 1., all that occurs in Experience—in the Theater—must be accounted for in
wholly immanent fashion, i.e. solely in terms of “Acts” and faculties or powers (Krafte)
of the Mind—conscious and unconscious; and not by recourse to transcendent,
nonverifiable hypothetical entities—e.g. a “Thing in itself” or “deus ex machina.”

Let’s begin. Remember we are checking the “thing in itself” at the door as we enter Kant’s Critique
of Pure Reason.

15
See Kant Critique of Practical Reason, Postulates, Immortality, Fichte, Doctrine of Science SWI,270,
Heath 238, and Hegel, Philosophy of History, Sibree 333.

18
 KANT’S “THEATRE OF THE MIND”

CHAPTER ONE

TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM IN THE AESTHETIC

For Leibniz everything that exists is not-I, even God, in whom all
reality is united. . For the critical system (which starts with a critique
of the subjective powers, i.e. proceeds from the I), I is everything.16

The “Screen” of the Theater of the Mind

My aim in this section will be to show, 1) that no such texts as above-mentioned exist in the
Aesthetic; 2) that the object of experience as conditioned by the I, the subject’s faculty of
representation and forms of intuition, is not a Being (Sache) in itself, i.e. an unconditioned, self-
subsistent entity, a Thing (capable of existing) in itself, but rather a mere Appearance, a relative and
not an absolute existent; and 3) how Kant here lays the cornerstone for the Aesthetic-Analytic hook-
up. One must keep in mind further that, despite appearances, Kant’s chief aim is to put into the
reader’s hands an singular “insight” or “vision and not a string of syllogisms or lifeless dogmas.
The title of this opening division of the Critique, “The Transcendental Aesthetic,” is
intended by Kant to alert us both to the true nature of the doctrine he is espousing, viz.
transcendental idealism, and to that which he is repudiating, viz. transcendental realism or
dogmatism. The term “aesthetic” derives from the Greek word “aisthesis,” meaning “sensation,”
“sense,” or “sense-perception” and their objects—to be contrasted with “thought”, “logos,”
“dianoia,” or “nous” and its objects. The common view, that of the Realist or dogmatist, regards all
or some of the properties or features disclosed to the senses, e.g. spatial, temporal, visual, as
deriving from their objects considered as entirely self-subsistent and in no way conditioned by or
dependent on the subject or percipient. This view then holds there is only an “a posteriori” or
“empirical” Aesthetic. Kant’s distinctive and novel claim is that there is also a “transcendental”
aesthetic, i.e. that some of the features of sense derive from the subject, which further shows that the
object-thing cannot be a nonconditioned thing or a thing in itself, but instead an appearance.
“Transcendental” is Kant’s technical term indicative of a reference to the subject, knower, or
cognitive faculty, that an item or feature of experience or awareness is to be regarded as having its
origin in the subject rather than in experience or the object, is “a priori” (= rooted in the mind) rather
than empirical or “a posteriori.” Such a feature is called “ideal” in that if separated from the subject
it is nothing or ceases to be “real.” Transcendental is opposed primarily to “empirical” or
“experience,” it is that which “transcends” or “goes beyond” in the sense of preceding, experience;
16
Schelling, Of the I as Principle of Philosophy, Marti, 109.

19
hence what can function as a ground or condition of experience, as something which can be said to
make experience “possible.”
However one should be careful not to fall into the trap of thinking of the two aspects as able
to exist in literal separation from each other. When reading the Critique one must bear in mind that
Kant is always engaged in analyzing and taking apart, “isolating,” “dissecting,” what is by its very
nature a unity, viz. experience (A22, B89, A66); —indeed, Kant (and Fichte) will often refer to the
“unity of experience” as something which “cannot be violated” (A67/B92). Thus we will be
arguing below that the transcendental and empirical, a priori and a posteriori, are in reality two
aspects or features of a single thing and are never actually separated or distinct (as one can see for
oneself - try to literally separate them - one cannot!); there never can occur an empirical object or
item which contains no trace of transcendental features. However, even though Experience is a
“single thing,” Reason is a capacity of thought or thinking, and as such it can position itself outside
of experience. Reason can “examine” itself, can engage in “self-critique,” - it can become
objective to itself, can make itself into an object, can make experience or—since experience equals
knowledge—knowing into its object.17 It can become “transcendental,” reflect on its
experience/knowing, and institute a “knowing of knowing” and not just a “knowing of objects.”
However this “standing” or “stepping” outside of experience is an artificial act, and in no way
disrupts the unity of experience. In this artificial act of self-reflection or self-critique, this “rise”
into the “transcendental,” it shifts from life (and the practical) to speculation; moreover, his power
to “reflect” or “think” shows as well that man is not merely a being confined to nature, a merely
“natural” creature, but belongs essentially to a different, higher order (i.e., there is a “natural world
order” and a “moral world order” or, as Leibniz says, a “kingdom of nature” and a “kingdom of
grace”).
Thus owing to this marvelous capacity, Reason is able to “get behind” experience and study
the “mechanism” of its “production” or “possibility”; it can study the transcendental “Acts” of the
mind (of synthesis, i.e. of imagination, apperception, apprehension, etc.), and thus can see what
otherwise can not be seen. In a word, man or “consciousness of a world/manifold” has the capacity
for self-consciousness. Thus, when Kant speaks of a “transcendental” aesthetic he is, in invoking
the modern “turn to the subject,” making a reference to the subject and its specific contribution to
that unity which is called experience or knowledge (Erkenntniss). Ordinary consciousness, on the
other hand, is always oblivious to the subject and its contributing activities, it is “lost in the world,”
in an “independently existing world.”
The transcendental aesthetic or the subject’s contribution to sense experience will consist in
Space (or extension) and Time. In essence, Kant’s remarkable claim is that space and all that
pertains to space—for example, all the (infinite) quantity or magnitude of extension, viz. height,
length, depth, observed in experience—adheres to, is grounded in, or has its “seat” in the Mind or
Cognitive Faculty, or better, has no existence outside or independently of our minds (—as some
have said, “we are not in space and time, space and time are in us!”18).

17
Cf. Kant’s Preface, e.g.: “I have to deal with nothing save reason itself and its pure thinking; and to
obtain complete knowledge of these, there is no need to go far afield, since I come upon them in my own
self” (Axiv, i.a.), and, “For [metaphysics] is nothing but the inventory of all our possessions through pure
reason, systematically arranged. In this field nothing can escape us, etc.” (Axx, i.a. in part). Also cf. A12.
18
Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, tr. Haldane and Kemp (New York: Dolphin, 1961) 434.

20
 1.1. PP 1 of The Aesthetic.
In my view the key to a correct grasp of the relation between mind and senses (nature) is to not
presume an independent causal object from the start. Thus the reader is please advised, as
suggested above, to begin with only the mind and what is “given” within it. Thus, she begins with:
1. eyes closed (Black screen, space and time, the determinable, yet undetermined; categories
dormant but ready for action, - my mind is seen to contain only its thoughts and a black screen [=
space-time manifold]). Then 2. eyes open! —”My word! Look what else my mind contains, what I
find within it or, I submit, attached to it ! —A manifold of intuition/sensibility, and in “technicolor”
too! - with sounds, smells, feels, etc.” 3. STOP HERE. This is Kant’s standpoint. There is no
ground for believing all that you see exists outside or independently of your mind! –and as well no
need to posit an “independent” object as its cause (for this reason Fichte and Schelling call the Mind
a “mechanism of presentation,”indeed, it resembles a “motion picture projector” or “camera”).
Thus, in the spirit of our metaphor, “You have just purchased your ticket. Now just sit back and
relax. . . as we now enter Kant’s “Theatre of the Mind.” Enjoy the show!
—Remember, we will be reading the text guided by the “Critical Model” before discussed.
I will assume nothing but what is given or found in immediate experience, viz. my I and the Thing I
sense or perceive before me (my manifold of intuition). I will refrain from assuming
“dogmatically” an external independently existing object-thing lying “behind” the perceived thing
and cause of it or my perceptions of it. Let us see if the texts are amenable to such a reading.
However, at the same time, I will do my best to give a key text all the benefits of a transcendent-
causal thing in itself reading, with a view to showing that and why such a reading is not sustainable.
The key critical principle operative in the Aesthetic—as well as in the Analytic and Dialectic—is,
“You cannot go beyond the I.” As applied here: 1. I have immediate awareness or experience of
space and time, 2. But since “You cannot go beyond the I”—i.e. ignore or bypass it and reach a
being not in relation to the I—it follows necessarily that space and time cannot be “in themselves”
but only in relation to us, must “adhere” to us, be a feature of the mind, its power of representation.
Kant begins his Critique of Pure Reason with the immortal words:

In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects,
intuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought
as a means is directed. But intuition takes place only insofar as the object is given to us.
This again is only possible, to man at least, in so far as the mind is affected in a certain way.
The capacity (receptivity) for receiving representations through the mode in which we are
affected by objects, is entitled sensibility. … The effect of an object upon the faculty of
representation, so far as we are affected by it, is sensation. That intuition which is in
relation to the object through sensation, is entitled empirical. The undetermined object of an
empirical intuition is entitled appearance. A19 B34 [All italics are Kant’s unless otherwise
indicated; “i.a.” = italics added]

In the first place, most interpreters naturally take “object” in PP1—an “evident” Lockean or
empiricist passage—to refer to the transcendent “thing in itself,” situated “behind” appearances and
regarded as “cause” of them and of our perceptions/representations. However this reading is
suspect. It is quite possible (indeed necessary) to interpret the “object” (Gegenstand) which is said
to “affect” our faculty of representation as being an “appearance” and not a “thing in itself” located

21
completely outside experience. That is: Kant clearly identifies the “object of an empirical
intuition” at A20/B34 as being what is to be “entitled appearance.” Hence sensations can be said to
derive from the object of experience, viz. appearance. I will show below how certain texts reveal
“affection” can be read as “modification,” as in “our sensibility, our pure manifold of space-time
intuition, is affected with sensations or modified by an appearance.” We will see that the weight of
the evidence favors my reading rather than a thing in itself reading.
At A21, A22, Kant explains how by abstraction from understanding and empirical intuition
one is able to “isolate sensibility” and arrive at the elements for a “transcendental” aesthetic, i.e. at
pure intuition, viz. space and time. —And how his doctrine includes the remarkable claim that all
extension we find in experience, comes from the mind alone and “exists in the mind a priori as a
mere form of sensibility.” That is, if I take away all sense and thought properties from the empirical
intuition of e.g. this cup before me, “extension” and “figure” remain, which therefore are “a priori.”
The vital point: all the extension—height, breadth, depth—pertaining to or adhering in the cup
comes or derives from my mind or my pure sensibility, and not from the cup per se.

1.2. Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Space.

As is well known, Kant’s primary targets in the Aesthetic include Newton, Leibniz and perhaps
Hume, all of whom hold that in some fashion the senses give us knowledge of things in themselves
or that space and time and their contents are in some sense things capable of existing in themselves.
Kant’s view as against this is that the senses or sensibility give us knowledge only of appearances.
Before we turn to Kant’s arguments for the transcendental ideality or “a priority” of space and time
it will be helpful to have Newton’s and Leibniz’s accounts of them before us.
In his Principia Newton indicates his understanding of absolute space and time as follows:

Absolute space, in its own nature, without relation to anything external, remains always
similar and immovable. Absolute, true, and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own
nature, flows equably without relation to anything external, and by another name is called
duration. (Scholium to Definition VIII; Philosophical Library, 1964, p.17)

Thus, for Newton space and time are eternal and self-subsistent; they would exist even if bodies, let
alone subjects, did not exist. They are in Kant’s terminology “things in themselves,” i.e. things
capable of existing in themselves and out of relation to the cognitive subject.
In the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, Leibniz indicates the relativity of space and time as
follows:

I hold space to be something merely relative, as time is; I hold it to be an order of

coexistences as time is an order of successions. … space is nothing else but that order or
relation; and is nothing at all without bodies, but the possibility of placing them. … time [is
nothing] distinct from things existing in time … instants [time] considered without the
things, are nothing at all; they consist only in the successive order of things. (Leibniz’ Third
Paper, 4, 5, and 6; Manchester University Press, 1956, pp. 25-27)

He also expresses this teaching in his 1702 essay entitled, On Body and Force, Against the
Cartesians:

22
 From this, it is obvious that extension is not an absolute predicate, but is relative to that
which is extended or diffused [viz. body], and therefore it cannot be separated from that
which is counted. (G, IV 393-400)

For Leibniz space, even though it cannot exist without bodies, can be regarded as a thing in itself in
that it would belong to things even if they were not intuited. Hence they can exist apart or
independently of the faculty of representation or our sensibility. Kant’s main motive, as indicated
as early as the “Inaugural Dissertation,” is to uphold the distinction between the intellect and the
senses as two independent sources of knowledge. Against Leibniz, for example, who admits only a
logical distinction between them, i.e., the senses see the same things the intellect intuits but in a
more confused way.
The key question the Aesthetic seeks to answer Kant tells us is this:

What, then, are space and time? Are they real existences? Are they only determinations or
relations of things, yet such as would belong to things even if they were not intuited? Or are
space and time such that they belong only to the form of intuition, and therefore to the
subjective constitution of our mind, apart from which they could not be ascribed to anything
whatsoever? A23/B37

The first view, viz. that space and time are “real existences,” is that of common sense, the
Realist or dogmatist, and of Newton, who hold that space and time are absolute or self-subsistent
existences or “things in themselves,” as receptacles which contain all that is - i.e. qua extended and
material; this is in essence also the view of Descartes and Locke, though they hold we only have
experience of the “idea” of space, not space itself, to which the idea “corresponds.” The second
view, viz. that they are “determinations of things,” i.e. things “in themselves,” is that of Leibniz who
holds that, contrary to Newton, they are relative or dependent existences; it is also a Realist view as
it holds that spatiality and temporality have existence apart from the subject and intuition, this view
Kant will repudiate as well. The third view, viz. that space and time belong only to the subjective
constitution of our mind “apart from which they cannot be ascribed to anything whatsoever,” is of
course as will become evident Kant’s own critical or transcendental, i.e. subject-related/grounded,
view and the only defensible position.
To decide the question as to the real nature of space and time Kant will offer both a
“metaphysical” and “transcendental” exposition of their concepts. A “metaphysical” exposition he
tells us, is one which “exhibits the concept as given a priori” B38, whereas a “transcendental”
exposition is one which is able to account for the possibility (fact) of “a priori synthetic knowledge”
B40. As I said above, Kant here is primarily concerned with establishing his doctrine or “vision” of
transcendental idealism and of subverting the common or realist view which always mistakes
appearances or objects of experience for “things in themselves” (as Kant says e.g. at A491/B519).
To show that objects of experience are in truth not self-subsistent, self-grounded (“an sich
gegrundete Existenz” B519), or unconditioned existences but rather mere appearances or
representations (Vorstellungen), i.e. determinations or modifications of the mind (A99, A129,
B242), Kant need only show that space and time, in which these objects are found or perceived, are
a priori and have their seat or origin in the mind, subject or cognitive faculty (or in a “component”
of our faculty of representation) and as such are conditions of the possibility of the existence of
these objects. For that which is conditioned cannot at the same time be un-conditioned or “in
itself,” but only in us and for us, in a word, “ideal,” i.e. nothing apart from the subject as I believe
will become very clear. It also can be said that the Kantian project is to undermine the tradition’s

23
concept of the “Thing,” viewed as an independently existing object external to the mind or
consciousness, thus he wants to show there are no “things,” but only representations, i.e. subject
related or dependent determinations (A526/B554).
Kant clearly argues in 1. and 2. of his metaphysical exposition that space is not to be
regarded as of empirical origin but rather as wholly a priori, “a priori” meaning “existing before or
prior to determinate sense-experience and therefore pertaining to the subject or to the subject’s
constitution (powers, faculties)” or, as he often says, “existing or inhering/adhering (anhangen) in/to
the mind itself.” In 1. he argues that the concept of space cannot be derived from experience
because the act of derivation—i.e. of first referring or identifying specific sensations
(Empfindungen) “red,” “cold,” “hard,” “sweet,” as outside me and next to each other, from which
the concept is to be derived or extracted, itself presupposes space as already lying at the ground
(schon zum Grunde liegen) of the act. That is, the mere act of going “outside” myself is only
possible through space, whose essence is “outsidedness” or “exteriority” and which must therefore
be “a priori.” In other words, it is impossible to “abstract from” or “bypass” the subject (and its
capacities, e.g. “space”) and arrive immediately at what exists apart from the subject, i.e. a
sensation. There are no things just “there” in and by themselves for whatever is there (present-to-
hand) is for and in a subject, is in “immediate relation” (A19) with the same (and no matter how
remote - and whether or not perceived, as we will see). Everything that is experienced is subject-
related. The presence of the subject is an ineliminable factor.
Kant’s argument also admits of another form, viz.: If it were true that space (empirical
space) existed on its own account or “in itself,” i.e. out of relation with the subject, then we would
have no experience of it at all. Yet we do. Therefore, space must be in us, or attached to or non-
detachable from us, or have its seat or origin in the subject, or be a priori. Kant concludes by saying
that space, as “a priori,” is a condition of outer experience which is “possible at all only through that
representation.”
Allison, Walker, Bennett and others also miss the point that because “You cannot go beyond
the I, or abstract from the subject,” there can be no difference between “space” and the
“representation of space.” Indeed, what possible meaning can be given to the expression, “space in
itself or as such and totally out of relationship with the subject or its intuition”?! -The only space we
know, ever knew, is experiential space, space as in relation to ourselves, our subject.
In 2. Kant again argues for the a priority of space. If space was dependent upon or an
inherent determination of appearances or objects of experience, then in the act of eliminating
(thinking away - closing our eyes) all the appearances before us, space would of necessity have to
be eliminated as well as it is said to inhere in them. But seeing that this is impossible, that one
cannot think the absence of space or utterly abolish it, it is clear that space cannot be empirical and
grounded in the objects of experience, but instead a priori or grounded in us, our subject. Indeed,
space is “the condition of the possibility of appearances,” without which there would be none.
What is also to be noted is: To say that space is a priori and not empirical is to say 1) that
not only is a priori space not grounded in empirical space, but that the latter is in truth grounded in
or the same as the former! This means that empirical space is in us - since to “get outside” requires
pure space. Thus we never really leave or go outside (“egress”) from ourselves, from the domain of
pure, a priori space - all external space is in us; and 2) that “empirical space” and “a priori” space
are the same space! As “a priori” the one space is pure, i.e. undetermined, unmodified, but able to
take on any modification (or “affection”); as “empirical” the one space, the determinable, is
determined or “filled.” That is to say, empirical space is pure space, which is still in us, but now as
thus and so modified or determined or affected (“with,” not “by” sensations/appearances)! We have

24
still not left or egressed from the domain of the subject and its power of representation, i.e. no
matter how deeply we probe or venture into the empirical sense realm, or into space, we always and
ever have to do with the subject, thus and so modified! (A43, 147) Descartes similarly holds that all
we perceive is the cogito’s or consciousness’s “modifications” (cf., Meditation 319), i.e. we never
leave the cogito; for Descartes real space is “outside” the cogito, whereas for Kant it is inside (B35).
For the former, perceived “things” are only modifications of my thought, “ideas” in me, thus it is
impossible to get out of the cogito, subject or consciousness. For Kant—what is all important—this
is also true, except for him space, extension, body, the Real, is in the cogito qua its faculty of pure
intuition or sensibility. Kant is quite clear that human sensibility embraces all space and all time,
and all their contents, i.e. all physical, material things, including moving forces (cf. A42, A387). It
can be said for Kant, Objects in space are merely myself, my sensibility, thus and so modified.
What is also noteworthy is that Kant clearly suggests that there are as many space-time’s as there
are subjects or sensibilities (a la the Leibnizean “Monad”), and that we all do not share the self-same
sensibility and hence space; for at A363 Kant says that “the time in which the observer sets me is
not the time of my own but of his sensibility places me in the time of his sensibility!” (also compare
Einstein’s concept of inertial frames of reference in his “Theory of Relativity” of time and motion).
In 3. and 4. of the metaphysical exposition Kant argues that space is not a general or
discursive concept but rather a pure or a priori intuition (Anschauung). In 3. he argues that space
must be a pure intuition because we can (re)present to ourselves only one space, and different
spaces can only be regarded not as discrete but as parts or limitations of the one space. This means
first, that “intuition” is that which apprehends what is single and unique—”the representation which
can be given only through a single object is intuition” A32—”concept” (Begriff) being that which
comprehends the universal. —Second, the concept or universal is a concept of “relations of things in
general,” of the common character which several things share, the things constituting a manifold
whose members are external to one another, or discrete. Thus space cannot be a concept since its
parts or members are not separable, and thus it can be only an intuition and a pure one at that, as we
know from 1. and 2.
Finally in 4. Kant lays down that space is presented as an “infinite given magnitude” all of
whose parts “coexist ad infinitum.” Since a concept is that which has an infinite number of possible
representations under but not within itself, as is implied and required of an infinite given magnitude
—only an intuition having this peculiar relation to its manifold—it follows that space cannot be a
concept but rather an a priori intuition. Note above all, that this “infinite given unique magnitude”
is given and exists in the mind a priori and before all experience. There is only one space, and it is
in the mind prior to all experience, hence the infinity of empirical space is really the identical
infinity of pure space.

1.3. The Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space.

As we said above, by “transcendental” Kant means an exposition able to make intelligible
the possibility of a body of a priori synthetic knowledge, in the present case, Geometry. Kant lays
down as not requiring demonstration, that the propositions of Geometry are “synthetic” —as well as
“a priori” and “apodeictic” or necessary. Hence they cannot be derived from concepts of space,
since concepts yield only analytic and not synthetic statements, but only from an “intuition” of
space. Further, because they are one and all apodeictic or certain, the space which grounds their
19
Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. by D. Cress, Meditation Three, 23.

25
certainty must itself be a priori and not empirical, as this cannot yield strict universality and
necessity, the hallmark of mathematical truths. Thus the mere factual existence of Geometry is
sufficient proof that space is an a priori intuition.
Kant clarifies the sense he attaches to “a priori” in the following: “[an an a priori intuition
is one which] must be found in us prior to any perception of an object” B41. Hence what is “a
priori”—to this “pure” and “transcendental” can be added—is something which is found “in us,” i.e.
in “ourselves,” in our subject or Mind (Gemuth). Simply put, “Space is a property of our mind.”
And since there is only one space and it is found in our mind (i.e. the sensibility compartment of it)
and nowhere else, all the space and spatial determinations we perceive to cling to objects outside
ourselves in experience can be said to pertain or belong to our mind alone; in perceiving external
objects we are in truth perceiving merely ourselves, i.e. various “modifications” of our pure
intuition or sensibility. As Kant often says, “Space is not outside us, it is inside us” B522.
Kant begins to articulate this remarkable doctrine in the following passage:

How, then, can there exist in the mind an outer intuition which precedes the objects
themselves, and in which the concept of these objects can be determined a priori. manifestly,
not otherwise than in so far as the intuition has its seat in the subject only, as the formal
character of the subject, in virtue of which, in being affected by objects, it obtains immediate
representation, that is, intuition, of them; and only in so far, therefore, as it is merely the
form of outer sense in general. B41

Kant, in my view, is saying quite obviously and bluntly that outer intuition or space “has its
seat in the subject only” (ihren ... sitz hat ... bloss im Subjekte) and is the “formal character [or
constitution: Beschaffenheit]” of the same. The “only” (bloss) can mean only that it does not also
have its seat or origin in the object of experience or in a “thing in itself.” Since there is only one
space and it inheres in the subject alone, it cannot be objected that space or spatial determinations
can pertain as well to the object itself regarded as not in relation to the subject. It further should be
noted that he does not say it “exists in relation to the mind” but simply it “exists in the mind,” the
former is the Realists device for retaining for space some kind of independent existence which the
latter wording does not permit. More will be said about the “in the mind” and “in us” expressions
below.

1.4. “Conclusions from the above Concepts”

In this important section in which Kant continues to clarify his meaning of the “a priority” of space
also presents us with his first mention and characterization of “transcendental idealism and
empirical realism” and its opposite, “transcendental realism and empirical idealism,” the key terms
by which he distinguishes his own standpoint from all others. At (a) Kant rules out of court the first
two answers to his main question concerning the nature of space (and time), declaring the third
alone to express the truth.

(a) Space does not represent any property of things in themselves, nor does it represent
them in their relation to one another. That is to say, space does not represent any
determination that attaches to the objects themselves, and which remains even when
abstraction has been made of all the subjective conditions of intuition. For no

26
 determinations, whether absolute or relative, can be intuited prior to the existence of the
things to which they belong, and none, therefore, can be intuited a priori. A26 B42

Clearly the text can be read in an “interior” or “critical” manner which does not involve Kant in a
commitment to the existence of transcendent, independently existing “things in themselves.” In fact
a careful reading shows that by “things” and “objects” is meant the perceptible objects of
experience, i.e. appearances, and not “things” which are unperceivable and inaccessible, existing
outside experience. Sentence two clarifies the meaning of sentence one, i.e. “the objects
themselves” can only mean the perceptible objects of experience, since space does not “attach to”
these and does not remain after “abstraction” from the “subjective conditions of intuition.”
Therefore, the “things” in “things in themselves” in sentence one must be the same as the “objects”
in the “objects themselves” in the explicatory sentence two, viz. sensible or perceptible things. Thus
we should read, “Space does not represent any property of sensible things * in (or inhering in)
themselves, nor does it represent them, i.e. sensible things [not transcendent things], in their relation
to one another.”
Second, this text clearly supports a negative response to my thesis question as to the
capacity for independent existence on the part of the spatial objects of experience. First, Kant tells
us that “space does not represent any determination that attaches to the objects themselves, and
which remains even when abstraction has been made of all the subjective conditions of intuition.”
This means that space or spatiality or extension is not a determination belonging to the experiential
object in itself, which is what would be required if it were capable of existing apart or out of relation
with the subject and its sensibility, as the Realists hold. The spatial determinations—”outside of,”
“next to,” “coexistent with” etc—perceived to belong to experiential objects, derive according to the
text from the subject only and its a priori faculty of pure intuition.
Therefore, the object qua spatial can in no way exist independently of the subject, thus
providing no foundation for an object in the “weighty” sense, as the Realists allege. This result
applies with equal force to the “thing in itself” (if such a thing be conceivable), since it is conceived
as existing independently of the subject and thus of transcendental or pure space—the only space
Kant admits, as he cogently argues above—and hence cannot be in space or spatial.
Notice that at (b) Kant says: “Space is nothing but the form of all appearances of outer sense
[and is] the subjective condition of sensibility under which alone outer intuition is possible for us.”
As a “subjective condition” space then is something that pertains or belongs to the subject and not to
the object; as a condition of sensibility, outer intuition cannot take place without it. This means that
since space is grounded in the subject then, if the subject were to be removed, there would be no
experience of objects in space and no space at all. Expressed in a formula: No subject, no space.
Kant is saying simply that space or extension inheres in ourselves, in our subject or mind, is
something that pertains to our very being and cannot be separated or divorced from it. The
implications of this are of course remarkable.
The ordinary view is that space is a thing in itself and exists not in the mind but on its own
account, outside or detached from the mind—it would exist whether or not we existed. On the
contrary, Kant says that “[Space] exists in the mind a priori.” By “space” Kant means “extension”
and extension is not merely a two dimensional but indeed a three dimensional animal.—In this one
can perceive the radicality as well as sublimity of the doctrine. Namely, all the extension, all the
quantity or magnitude of length, width, and depth, we perceive in outer intuition or in the Universe

*
That is, considered as existing out of relation with our intuition or sensibility, - in a dogmatist or realist
fashion.

27
or, in Einsteinean language, to constitute the “space-time continuum,” has its seat and ground in the
human subject, or “exists in the mind a priori” or simply “in the mind” (there is only one space).
Extension therefore comprehends all extension or extendedness whatsoever—internal and
external, and most significantly , all the extension belonging to the physical Universe encompassing
all bodies in space, perceived or perceivable, to infinity. Remember, space is an “infinite given
magnitude,” and given a priori, and all of its parts “coexist ad infinitum” or to infinity, and coexist a
priori. Space is moreover one and unique, hence there is only one space. This is important. There
cannot for Kant be “two spaces,” viz. an a priori space and an a posteriori space—or for that matter
“three spaces,” an a priori, a posteriori, and noumenal space. There cannot be an a priori space
existing in the mind and a second a posteriori or empirical space existing outside the mind and
containing the bodies of the perceived world. There is then—and this is inescapable—only one
space, i.e. a priori space and a posteriori space together constitute one space, or are one and the
same space regarded from different points of view (as Kant says, ‘we can only know a priori of an
object what we ourselves have put into it,’(Bxviii) i.e., we “put” extension into the object).
To have grasped this key point is to have overcome dogmatism, the belief in independently
existing extended things. That is, if there is only one space and it inheres in the subject as its faculty
of pure intuition, or is a priori, and, further, if a priori space and a posteriori space are one and the
same, then it follows: that it is a sheer impossibility for the object of experience, i.e. qua spatial,
extended, physical, to exist independently of the subject and its cognitive faculties or constitution, in
no way can a spatial object, e.g. a table or a star, be separated from its representation.
Kant is in essence requiring nothing less than that the dogmatist, as it has been said, “walk
on his head”—and not just for a while, but permanently. The fact is that the dogmatist is so
accustomed to “walking on his feet”—i.e. to viewing the object as primary, to positing a
“disjunction” between self and world, perceiver and perceived, knower and known—that it takes
some time and effort (e.g. 808 pages of a “phenomenology of mind”) to adjust to this “Copernican
reversal” of our normal modes of consciousness and thought, which reversal (or “inversion”
Verkehrung 20) in effect repudiates this “disjunction” of I and world, denies that there is some kind
of “gap” or “space” between myself and the object/world.
Kant is saying that the mind and the world are in a perfect unity, together they make up the
“unity of experience,” and are thereby inseparable, and not amenable to true or literal cleavage
(such a thing being incomprehensible). One then can literally say, that the world is in the mind.
Indeed, this and this alone explains Kant’s use of the terms which commentators have found so
puzzling, namely, “in us,” “in ourselves,” “in the mind,” “objects are in space but space is in us”
(B370).
Prior to Kant the mind was very “small,” was a “thinking thing” housed within the skull (or
“pineal gland”), with an entire objective world standing over against it and outside of it—even for
Descartes the mind’s contents and scope were limited to its ideas, the whole extended objective
world falling outside it. With the Kantian identification of space or extension (and time) with
sensibility, i.e. the subject’s faculty of sensibility-intuition, the former, the whole extended world,
20
See Hegel’s discussion of “inversion” (Verkehrung) in Phenomenology Miller 55, and in the Critical
Journal 1, 1, 1802, in Between Kant and Hegel, tr. di Giovanni and Harris 282:

Philosophy is, by its very nature, something esoteric, neither made for the vulgar as it stands, nor capable
of being got up to suit the vulgar taste; it only is philosophy in virtue of being directly opposed to the
understanding and hence even more opposed to healthy common sense, under which label we understand
the limitedness in space and time of a race of men; in its relationship to common sense the world of
philosophy is in and for itself an inverted world (i.a.).

28
becomes incorporated into the subject or mind, which now becomes all-embracing. Kant therefore
requires us to view space or extension as a “property” of our mind, as something which belongs or
inheres in us, as part of our cognitive equipment - it is really that simple (thought and space are
inseparable). Thus, prior to Kant—for the dogmatist perennially—the mind is very small (or
marginal, dispensable, a “spectator”), the world very large. After Kant the mind is very “large”
(accommodating), the world very small, indeed is reduced to nothing or is nothing in itself, is
“ideal.” Hence, the mind is not merely very “large,” it is all that exists, the only reality (as Fichte,
Schelling, and Hegel will soon declare), —for the world has been shifted or transposed into the
mind. For the dogmatist, the world predominates and has primacy, for the idealist or critical
philosopher, the mind or subject does. That the dogmatist’s position—i.e. that there is a
“disjunction” between the mind and the world, representation and object—is untenable is, I would
contend, easily seen. If there actually were a separation or cleft between the extended-spatial-
objective world and ourselves, if the former were literally outside or independent of the latter, then
the latter would have no experience whatsoever—perception, representation, consciousness—of the
former (barring a “pre-established harmony” or “migration of properties” theory). But the fact is we
do have experience of it, thus dogmatism cannot be true. The only alternative is that spatiality or
extension be regarded as a property or faculty of our mind, —or that, as I prefer, the Universe is in
our Mind.
The following may assist the reader into the new way of viewing things which the “critical”
standpoint requires, viz. that one begins with the “I” (with a “critique of the pure I or knower”)
rather than with the object or thing, in adherence with the truth that one cannot abstract from or
bypass or overstep the “I”.21 Thus,—and continuing our earlier exercises—one must begin with
one’s I or mind. The reader is asked to close her eyes, and be alone with herself for a space of time,
and become acquainted with her mind and its contents. Assume that, right now and with eyes
closed, this is the first moment of time, all you have ever experienced had never happened. You as a
mind are all alone by yourself, in darkness, pitch black. Now, open your eyes. What you are now
looking at, whatever it is, can only be regarded as a content of your mind, as something that belongs
to your mind, that is consequently in your mind—and not out or independent of your mind. The
reality is, you have never left or egressed from your mind, you have merely been made acquainted
with a further dimension, compartment, aspect of your mind: —you are still fully within the
boundaries of your mind. Your reaction to this event and discovery should be, “My! Look what else
I find to be in my mind (or in myself)” and not, “I have just stepped outside of my mind and entered
an “objective world” which exists independently of myself and indifferent to whether I exist or not,
etc.” When opening your eyes, you find yourself immersed in your own intuition - it is not
someone else’s (whatever this can mean, at this point) intuition, but your own. —It is your intuition,
your perception, your representation (Vorstellung), in a word, you are immersed in yourself. No
matter how infinitely rich , varied, and determinate the contents of this intuition—whether it be of
your study, i.e. the desk before you, a lamp, a few books, paper, pens, wallpaper, a window, or
whether it be of the boundless ocean, mountains, stars, etc.—the intuition, as a content of your
mind, remains your intuition, it is yours, something which belongs to you, is your property alone, is
of your own essence-being-nature (B242/A197). Indeed, there cannot be a particle or fiber of it
which contains “otherness,” something which is not you or yours, —how can it have entered in?
No, it is you and you are it, you pervade every aspect of it. How could it be otherwise and anything
else, you found it in your mind. (It would be a valuable study, I think, to find out how the mind

21
See Fichte SWI,501, Heath 71.

29
comes to find what is its own become not its own, how otherness or a “not-I” enters in). Thus it
becomes somewhat easier to see why,
1. Kant says space and extended things, i.e. the objective world or appearances, only exist
“in us,” “in our minds” (for they cannot exist outside or independently of us, if they did they
would not be experienceable).
2. For Kant all that exists is the I (or mind) and its (inner and outer) representations, i.e.
“determinations of my identical self” (A129).
The preceding makes it clear, I feel, that the best approach to critical philosophy or
transcendental idealism is to begin with the I, mind, subject and then realize that, the mind is not in
space and time (cf. Husserl’s the “Natural Standpoint” 22), rather space and time are in the mind or
are in us. The empirical self can be said to be in time insofar as its states are always changing,
however transcendental consciousness, apperception, or Reason is not in time, or is unchangeable or
eternal, or outside of time and space. This becomes clear when Kant says at B59 that “Time itself
does not alter but only something which is in time,” and since something in time always belongs to
a representation, time pertains only to alteration of representations, as he says at B50, “Time has
only to do with the relations of representations in our inner state, i.e. with the succession of the
mind’s representations (i.a.).” The mind which has the changing representations does not itself
change, or is not in time, while the representations and objects do change and are in time. The same
is true of space. The mind is not in space, rather space is in the mind. Also compare B584 where
Kant observes that “Reason is not itself in time.” 23
That spatial or extended things cannot exist apart from the mind and are transcendentally
ideal receives ample confirmation throughout the remainder of the Aesthetic. Thus for example at
B43 Kant tells us:

It is therefore solely from the human standpoint that we can speak of space, of extended
things [Wesen], etc. If we depart from the subjective condition under which alone we can
have outer intuition, namely, liability to be affected by objects [i.e. appearances, A20], the
representation of space stands for nothing whatsoever. (i.a.)

Clearly, it is Kant’s position that space or extended things (Wesen) pertain only to human sensibility
apart from which it is “nothing at all” (gar nichts). Hence it is impossible that, on Kant’s view,
space or spatial things—whether phenomenal or noumenal—can exist independently of spatial
intuition or perception. This could only occur if there were another space in addition to
transcendental space, but as he holds that there is only one space this possibility is ruled out.

22
Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, First Meditation.
23
Kant’s position that Pure Reason is not in time is echoed by Schelling in his 1800 System, SW, . And
see 484-85, Heath 117: “For pure reason there is no time,” and also by Hegel at e.g., Enc. 247, 258.

30
 1.5. Transcendental Idealism/Empirical Realism
At B44 Kant provides the initial characterization of his empirically real/transcendentally ideal
distinction, the defining feature of the critical philosophy:

Our exposition therefore establishes the reality, that is, the objective validity, of space in
respect of whatever can be presented to us outwardly as object, but also at the same time the
ideality of space in respect of [sense] things when they are considered in themselves through
reason [not metaphysical things], that is, without regard to the constitution of our sensibility.
We assert, then, the empirical reality of space, as regards all possible outer experience; and
yet at the same time we assert its transcendental ideality—in other words, that it is nothing
at all, immediately we withdraw the above condition, namely, its limitation to possible
experience, and so look upon it as something that underlies [sense] things [as considered] in
themselves.

Kant’ primary reason for employing this curious expression to characterize space is at once to
indicate space’s rootedness and inseparability from the mind or human subject, and as well to
repudiate the dogmatic, common sense view which regards space as an independently existing thing
(existing apart from the subject) and accords it an absolute status. Simply put: since space is found
to be rooted in the subject and identical with pure intuition, it is at once real, since intuition is real,
and ideal, in that its reality is limited to the subject and to the subject only, so that when separated
from the subject (what in fact is inconceivable) it is nothing at all. Concerning the “reality” of
space. Kant does not say that space is real simpliciter, but rather that it is empirically real. This is
important. “Real” in the unqualified sense signifies existing on its own account, self-subsisting, as
e.g. a thing in itself, i.e. existing “absolutely” and not “relatively,” not dependent for its being on
something else, but rather self-dependent, existing in itself, through itself, and for itself. Kant
denies this sense of real to space. Space is “empirically” real, it is real (is not nothing or illusory) -
however in a qualified sense. Namely, it is real but only within the boundaries of experience, i.e.
insofar as it pertains to human intuition. It cannot exist apart from human intuition as space is in
reality a property or mode of the same. Thus space, he tells us, has “objective validity.” This means
first that it is not something merely subjective, i.e. private, imaginary or illusory; it is indeed
objective as truly pertaining to the objects of experience. Secondly, it means that it is valid only for
the objects of experience, i.e. for “whatever can be presented to us outwardly as object,” and not for
objects which may lie outside the range of (possible) experience, i.e. for things in themselves
meaning sense things taken as having an existence in themselves or completely out of relationship
with the subject and its intuitive faculties.
It further must be said that Kant’s is the only valid and intelligible realism possible. As Kant
says, dogmatic realism leads necessarily to “empirical idealism.” Thus one is compelled to deny that
perceptual objects can exist independently of perception and on their own account, for if they had
such an existence one could—to the extent that they did—never know of it. One would only have
their copies or “representations” in us (in our faculty of representation) and thus able only to “infer”
their reality on the basis of these. That is to say, their reality would be lost! —As Kant says, only the
transcendental ideality of space (the denial that it has independent existence) is able “to prevent
everything being transformed into mere illusion” (B70, A369). Only by denying their independent
existence can their reality in experience be saved and secured. Thus Kant turns out to be the only

31
true realist. The dogmatists, or “sloppy” realists have not fully thought out their position, which thus
can be said to be a “half-position.” The only true realist is then the transcendental idealist, the one
who perceives that

1. Space is inseparable from the subject

2. Space is intuition and thus real
3. Space is ideal and cannot exist apart from the mind, and
4. Such an “independently existing thing”—whether space or what have you—is totally
meaningless and inconceivable - (the categories, as we will see, have meaning only
within experience).

Moreover, three types of “realist” can be distinguished: Realist #1: who holds that the thing
we perceive can exist outside our sensibility and has a “being in itself”; Realist #2: who holds that
the thing is real but only for me and in sensibility and there may also be real things existing outside
me, “noumena” (Kant’s “official” position); and Realist #3: who holds that the thing we perceive is
not real in the sense of being merely a “copy” in me of the real thing outside me.
As concerns the “ideality” of space, Kant does not say that space is ideal simpliciter, but
rather that it is “transcendentally” ideal. “Ideal,” as the opposite of “real” and in an unqualified or
absolute sense, means simply not real, or, in no way real, in every way nothing (gar nichts). Space
for Kant is not ideal in an absolute sense but in a relative sense, it is “transcendentally ideal.” That
is, if one separates or tries to separate space from its transcendental locus, from its relation (i.e.
unity) with the subject, viewing it by itself, it then becomes ideal or is nothing at all. Space then is
not “absolutely” ideal, it is real and has objective validity but only within experience and for objects
given in our empirical intuition, i.e. in our sensibility. It can also be said that space can be called
“absolutely ideal” or nothing when regarded in itself and apart from relation to the subject.
It may here be helpful to distinguish Kant’s “transcendental” from Descartes’ and
Berkeley’s “problematic” and “dogmatic” idealisms. Dogmatic idealism, as construed by Kant,
considers space and spatial bodies to be absolutely illusory or ideal, whether experiential or
transexperiential—it is certain they have no reality whatsoever. Problematic idealism, on the other
hand, claims one can never be certain spatial bodies exist since one has only immediate experience
of the ideas contained within the mind or cogito and not of the actual things to which they are
believed to correspond which one can know only through “inference,” i.e. “problematically.” They
may or may not exist. In contrast to dogmatic idealism, Kant holds space to be absolutely nothing
only in itself and outside experience, but real within experience. In contrast to problematic
idealism, Kant’s claim is that one has an unmediated or non-inferential direct knowledge of space
and spatial bodies, since space is one and the same with one’s intuition.
Therefore, it is clear that Kant’s doctrine of the transcendental ideality/empirical reality of
space invalidates the dogmatist’s attempt to make a separation between the object of experience
represented as spatial and the representing subject. Space or spatiality cannot in any way, shape or
form pertain to the object in itself and conceived as existing completely out of relationship with
consciousness, sensibility, representation or the subject. Moreover, an object or “thing in itself” (if
conceivable) can be regarded only as non-spatial or a-spatial, or equally as unextended, immaterial,
invisible, — in short, something “merely intelligible.” This receives further support at B45:

The transcendental concept of appearances in space, on the other hand, is a critical reminder
that nothing intuited in space is a thing in itself, that space is not a form inhering in things

32
 in themselves as their intrinsic property, that objects in themselves are quite unknown to us,
and that what we call outer objects [tables, planets] are nothing but mere representations of
our sensibility.

—(This is the passage to which I referred in the Introduction (see p. 11) as an illustration of Kemp
Smith’s biased transcendent “thing in itself” reading of the Critique.)
Thus, transcendental idealism is the teaching that objects intuited in space are not things
capable of existing in themselves or self-subsistent entities, but rather are to be regarded as
“appearances” (Erscheinungen), and that space can in no way be a property of a thing in itself.
Further, “outer objects”—and by this is meant, what cannot be said too much, tables, skyscrapers,
galaxies—are nothing but “mere representations of our sensibility.” This means above all 1. that
these “objects” are reducible to representations (Vorstellungen), 2. that representations inhere in and
cannot be divorced from our sensibility and 3. that this sensibility, in which outer objects—planets,
galaxies—inhere, belongs to and cannot be separated from our subject or mind. Hence, all outer
extended spatial objects given in experience exist only in our mind and cannot be separated
therefrom. In a word, the object of experience cannot be said to exist independently of the subject.
Kant also makes it clear at B44 that an outer object’s sensible as well as spatial properties cannot
exist on their own account in separation from our sensibility:

. . . subjective representations [other than space] belong merely to the subjective constitution
of our manner of sensibility, for instance, of sight, hearing, touch [Gefuhls], as in the case of
the sensations of colours, sounds, and heat, …

He goes on to say: “…which, since they are mere sensations and not intuitions, do not of themselves
yield knowledge of any object, least of all any a priori knowledge. And at A29 he says that

Colours are not properties of the bodies to the intuition of which they are attached, but only
modifications of the sense of sight, which is affected in a certain manner by light. [He goes
on] Space, on the other hand, as condition of outer objects, necessarily belongs to their
appearance or intuition. Taste and colours are not necessary conditions under which alone
objects can be for us objects of the senses. [Note especially] They are connected with the
appearances only as effects accidentally added by the particular constitution of the sense
organs.

This is highly important because it means that not only can the object of experience/representation
qua spatial not exist independently of the subject or of representation, but also the object qua
sensible or sensibly qualified, i.e. its visual, auditory, tactile, etc. qualities, cannot so exist. Kant
even goes so far as to say that no scientific knowledge of objects whatever can be obtained by
means of the sensible qualities of an experiential object.

1.4. Metaphysical and Transcendental Exposition of the

Concept of Time

33
The second section of the Aesthetic treats the second component of the subject’s faculty of a priori
or pure intuition, viz. Time. As in the previous section, Kant’s aim here will be to show that time is
not a thing or being in itself—as is held by dogmatic realists and by mathematical students of nature
(e.g. Newton), nor a relation of things in themselves (“monads”)—as is held by the metaphysical
students of nature (e.g. Leibniz), but instead a feature of the subjective constitution of the mind and
hence a condition of the possibility of experiential objects (e.g. tables and stars). In proving the
transcendental ideality of time, Kant will have proved that not only the spatial and sensible but the
temporal determinations as well of the object of experience—i.e. coexistence or simultaneity
(Zugleichsein) and succession (Aufeinanderfolgen)—are unable, as rooted in the subject and not in
the object (phenomenon or noumenon), to exist apart from the subject. That is to say, it will follow
from this that the object qua temporal cannot be separated from representation or sensibility.
Because the proofs for time’s ideality are nearly the same as those for space’s ideality there is no
need to review them. I will simply mention that the first two “metaphysical” proofs argue that time
is a priori and not empirical while the last two argue that time is not a dicursive concept but an
intuition. For “brevity’s sake” Kant inserts between these what properly belongs to the
“transcendental” exposition of time’s concept. I will accordingly proceed to the important PP6,
“Conclusions from these Concepts.”
At (a) Kant says the following:

Time is not something which exists of itself, or which inheres in things as an objective
determination, and it does not, therefore, remain when abstraction is made of all subjective
conditions of its intuition. Were it self-subsistent, it would be something which would be
actual and yet not an actual object. Were it a determination or order inhering in [sense]
things themselves, it could not precede the objects as their condition, and be known and
intuited a priori by means of synthetic propositions. But this last is quite possible if time is
nothing but the subjective condition under which alone intuition can take place in us. For
that being so, this form of inner intuition can be represented prior to the objects, and
therefore a priori.

First, Kant says, “Time is not something which exists of itself,” or “for itself” (fur sich selbst), i.e.
exists independently. Clearly, it is Kant’s position that time is not a thing in itself or self-subsistent,
as the Realists and Newtonians allege it to be. He adds, “were it self-subsistent, it would be
something which would be actual and yet not an actual object,” i.e. an actual object for an actual
subject. For the very concept of a thing, self-subsistent or “in itself,” is that of something existing
out of relation to a subject, hence which can never become an actual object of consciousness;
however, we do in fact have experience of time, i.e. of coexistence and succession (of
representations), hence time cannot be such an entity, a thing in itself. Second, time does not
“inhere in things as an objective determination.” Since time is an a priori intuition and, according to
PP4 of the metaphysical exposition, there is only one time, time cannot inhere (anhinge) in things or
objects of experience but only in the subject and its cognitive faculties. This is clear since time
“does not … remain when abstraction is made of all subjective conditions of its intuition.” Simply
put, when you remove the subject, you also remove time. This means that time is nothing apart from
the subject. Hence neither time nor any time-determinations whatever can exist by themselves apart
from a human subject, i.e. the object of experience qua temporal can in no wise be separated from
its representation. Indeed, time itself is a representation and no representation can exist apart from a
representor or a subject, such a thought being non-sensical. One can also say, time pertains only to

34
our representations, not to the object per se or out of relation with the subject and its faculty of
representation. Kant goes on to say that if time really were a determination “inhering in [sense]
things themselves” then it would be impossible for us to have an a priori intuition of time, i.e.
knowledge or synthetic propositions concerning time (e.g., time has only one dimension) in advance
of the things themselves. However, the fact is we do have such a priori synthetic knowledge of time,
hence it cannot be a determination inhering in things themselves - whether phenomena or noumena.
In the third place, Kant concludes that time is a “subjective condition” of the possibility of
the objects of experience “under which alone intuition can take place in us.” By “intuition” Kant
means outer as well as inner—as we shall soon see, hence time is an a priori condition of all objects
in space as well as those merely in time (memories, expectations, feelings, pain, etc.). Further it is
noteworthy that intuition (Anschauung) is something which takes place “in us,” i.e. in our subject or
minds (Gemuthe) or power of representation (Vorstellungsvermogen-kraft). The objects of our
intuition, no matter what they are, no matter how near or remote (e.g. a speck of dust on my cornea,
galaxy M-31), all fall and are located within ourselves, within the boundaries of our subject or mind
(sensibility), since they are located within our intuition which, as ours, is in us or inheres (anhingt)
in us. This is a very important point to grasp. Whatever is intuited—actually or potentially—belongs
to intuition and its forms, space and time, which inhere in us (put differently, the subject, qua
intuition, is in immediate relation - actual, not potential! - with every object-body in the universe,
i.e. the spacetime continuum or sensibility, cf. A19, B520, 521, 522, 524). If an object were literally
outside of us, independent of our mind, our power of representation or cognitive faculties it could
never be or become for us an object of intuition-perception, once it is posited as outside us or
separated from us, it can never afterwards get inside us. I will return to this point again.
At (b) Kant says that, “Time is nothing but the form of inner sense, that is, of the intuition of
ourselves and of our inner state. It cannot be a determination of outer appearances; it has to do
neither with shape nor position, but with the relation of representations in our inner state….” B50.
In the first place, Kant says among other things, what is most striking, “Time is nothing but the form
… of the intuition of ourselves.” What this implies is not only that time is something which attaches
to ourselves rather than to objects but that all intuitions of objects are in reality intuitions of
ourselves, insofar as the former involve time-determinations (succession, simultaneity). This
follows of course in a more obvious way from the fact that all representations or intuitions as mine
or as belonging to myself, are ipso facto “determinations or modifications of myself,” as Kant never
tires of repeating (cf. A34, A99, A129, B242, A378, B519, 520). Thus strictly speaking, for Kant
there are no “objects” in the sense of things-entities which are radically “distinct” from and other
than myself or the subject (cf. “all objects and appearances are merely determinations of my
identical self” A99, and “all perception is ap-perception”). There is no “Gegen-stand,” something
standing over against myself and literally opposed to myself (“entgegengesetzt,” to use Fichte’s
expression), since all I have to do with at all times are merely my own representations or
modifications of my mind (Bestimmung des Gemuthszustandes, B242) or sensibility - and all this
as a result of the change of space and time from being independently and self-subsisting things to
being faculties of my mind, existing nowhere but in myself. This Copernican “shift” of space and
time from mind-independent to mind-dependent will, as we shall see, lead Kant to formulate a
radically new conception of an object or objectivity, of (in Aristotelian language) “what-it-is-to-be-
an-object” which awaits us in Chapter Two below.
Second, what is also important, Kant says, time “cannot be a determination of outer
appearances; it has to do . . . with the relation of representations in our inner state (i.a.).” This view
of time completely subverts and inverts the common “objective” view of time which regards it as

35
something totally independent of ourselves and on which we are wholly dependent and to which we
must conform ourselves. Time, on Kant’s view, is on the contrary something wholly dependent on
ourselves and has no existence whatsoever independently of ourselves. It does not at all inhere in
the objects of experience (tables, planets, stars) or in the world viewed as an objective order of
things, i.e. things “in themselves.” Time pertains not to objects per se, but to objects only insofar as
they are objects of representation, representation being always representation of an in a subject or
mind.
All interpreters miss the point, as indicated above, that for Kant, though it is true there is
only one time (and one space), it is also true that each person has her own one time! Compare
Kant’s words: “But if I view myself from the standpoint of another person (as object of his outer
intuition), it is this outer observer who first represents me in time . . . For just as the time in which
the observer sets me is not the time of my own but of his sensibility . . . [!].” (A363) Moreover, as
Robert Paul Wolff has similarly said, “The fact that the original manifold is spatial rather than
spatio-temporal can very easily be missed by even the attentive reader” (193).24
“Time” then pertains only to the ordering of my representations (this will be the key for
understanding the Analytic and categories of objects as well as his solution to Hume’s problem).
“Space” is a special case (i.e. time = 0, but space (as filled) = 1, or the real). The key critical insight
is that there are things only for us, you cannot say anything about the in itself—about space in itself,
time in itself (in fact, as Kant’s students will try to show, there is no in itself at all!).
Consequently, the reader must guard against assuming or bringing into the book, her
common view of “time” as what is in itself, “objective,” independent, or “intersubjective.”
Moreover, it is also important to recognize that for Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel as well, the
subject in its “theoretical” comportment to the universe is alone by herself - there are no other
subjects present (theoretical or practical - only their bodies); only when in the “practical” domain do
other I’s or subjects enter her picture.
Thus, according to Kant, time pertains only to “the relation of representations in our inner
state” or in ourselves, i.e. to the coexistence or succession of our representations. It has to do only
with diverse representations of the subject either existing at the same time or existing one after the
other. To express this in more subversive terms, prior to Kant it was believed that “we were in
time,” while now it is to be understood that “time is in us.” A corollary of this is that we therefore
cannot be in time or we, i.e. the subject or Reason itself, are outside time, since time is within it or
within it qua a feature of its a priori or pure sensibility; indeed, “a priori” itself indicates a condition
prior to, before, and outside time, the world and experience (again cf., “Reason is not in time,” at
B584). This as is obvious, is absolutely important for a correct understanding of Kant’s position.
With this move, not only is time (and space) now made to depend on the subject and not on the
object or world, but the subject itself is taken out of time (as well as space).
This seems to be incontrovertible. By this move, grounded in the fact that one cannot
abstract from the I, the center or fulcrum of things has shifted from the object to the subject.
Previously the object or world or Being had primacy, now the subject does so. The subject is now
the abiding, unchangeable, eternal pole (qua activity), no longer Being or the object since this exists
only in representations, which are now the changeable, inconstant factor. The subject has posited
itself as that from which one cannot abstract; one can take away from experience and thought
everything, every object and idea except space itself (B39), time itself (A31) and, as we shall see,
the subject or I itself (B131)—i.e. “the ‘I think’ must be able to accompany every representation.”

24
R.P. Wolff, Kant’s Theory of Mental Activity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963) 193.

36
 Formerly (or for ordinary consciousness) the world was in time, the subject was in the
world, and thus the subject was in time. But now, after Kant, time—and the world—are in the
subject. Therefore, the (transcendental, not empirical, “changeable”) subject is no longer in time, is
now “out of time,” i.e., succession. And this because: that which experiences succession
(representations following one upon the other) cannot itself be “in succession” or subject to
succession, and hence must be immobile, stationary, unchangeable, unalterable, or in a timeless
condition, above and outside time; transcendental apperception will also be characterized thus
below, it will as such be “out of time” Kant also notes that, “Time itself does not alter, but only
something which is in time,” B59, and “The existence of what is transitory passes away in time, but
not time itself,” B183, that is to say, time itself is time-less, or not in time.
Representations—and their objects—change, but the subject and time as such do not
change, they are fixed, abiding, and immovable (compare Aristotle’s “unmoved mover,” perhaps an
anticipation of Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception). With reference to our guiding
metaphor of the “theater of the mind,” one can say: the subject is alone in the dark theater, and then
experiences a succession of representations “within” herself, while they come and go on the screen,
she, au contraire, remains the same; they are in time and in succession, she is not. The one for whom
succession or change exists is not herself changing or altering, but is situated above and outside of
this continual “flux.”
At (c) Kant writes:

Time is the formal a priori condition of all appearances whatsoever. Space, as the pure form
of all outer intuition, is so far limited; it serves as the a priori condition only of outer
appearances. But since all representations, whether they have for their objects outer things
or not, belong, in themselves, as determinations of the mind, to our inner state; and since this
inner state stands under the formal condition of inner intuition, and so belongs to time, time
is an a priori condition of all appearance whatsoever.

First, Kant says time is a more fundamental and universal a priori condition of appearances than
space in that, while space is a condition merely of outer intuition, time is one of both outer and inner
intuition, since all outer intuition stands under time-relations. Second, Kant’s text is clearly
supportive of the reading for which I argue, according to which the subject or mind can be said to
embrace within itself all that was previously regarded as existing outside or independently of itself,
viz., all objects or appearances in space and time. For he states that “all representations … belong,
in themselves, as determinations of the mind, to our inner state” (i.a.). Included under “all
representations” are representations of all outer spatial or extended things, not just tables and chairs
but, more significantly and remarkably, skyscrapers, planets, and galaxies. —For these too count as
“representations” or modifications or determinations “of the mind.” For Kant, to perceive
something, e.g. a star, is the same as to (re)present it.
All of these outer representations are according to Kant to be viewed as “determinations of
the mind,” hence as existing solely within the mind and not capable of existing apart from it, for to
exist apart from the mind would be to exist apart from sensibility (space/time), a component of the
mind, and as such could not be sensed or perceived. They one and all belong to our inner state, to
ourselves, to the subject; note also he says representations “belong in themselves etc,” meaning as
such, hence leaving no residue which can be said or thought to exist outside the mind. Thus since
for Kant an outer spatial object, say a planet, Jupiter, reduces to a “representation of a planet,” and
the latter, qua representation, to a determination of the mind, one can ask How is it possible for a

37
determination of the mind to have an existence independently of it and its representational powers?
How can a representation exist apart from a representor? Obviously it cannot.
Kant goes on to stress time’s transcendentally ideal character: “If we abstract from our
mode of inwardly intuiting ourselves … and so take objects [trees and stars] as they may be in
themselves, then time is nothing (i.a.).” Then he continues:

[Time] has objective validity only in respect of appearances, these being things which we
take as objects of our senses. It is no longer objective, if we abstract from the sensibility of
our intuition, that is, from that mode of representation which is peculiar to us, and speak of
things in general. B51 A35

And then concludes that, “Time is therefore a purely subjective condition of our (human) intuition
… and in itself, outside the subject [ausser dem Subjekt], is nothing.” (Kemp translates this, “apart
from”). Kant’s position clearly is that time and time determinations have application and validity
only within the subject (and in respect of its sensibility) and for the object insofar as it is an object of
intuition. Apart from the subject and its objects, it is nothing at all. What also finds expression here
is that aspect of the doctrine of transcendental idealism which teaches that experiential objects are
no longer to be regarded as “things,” i.e. as self-subsistent, but as “appearances,” - that there are no
“things” but only appearances. “We cannot say,” Kant insists, “that all things are in time,” but we
can say “all things as appearances, i.e. as objects of sensible intuition, are in time (B52).” What was
formerly regarded as a “thing,” as something capable of independent existence, is now to be viewed
as a mere “appearance,” as something which certainly has reality but only within experience, i.e.
within the mind or in relation to the subject’s faculty of intuition, and which has no reality
whatsoever in itself or outside the subject or soul (“ausser dem Subjekt” - cf. A385). By making
space and time subjective or a property of the mind, of the subject’s sensibility, things (beings) have
become appearances:

What we are maintaining is, therefore, the empirical reality of time, that is, its objective
validity in respect of all objects which allow of ever being given to our senses. And since
our intuition is always sensible, no object can ever be given to us in experience which does
not conform to the condition of time. On the other hand, we deny to time all claim to
absolute reality; that is to say, we deny that it belongs to [sense] things absolutely, as their
condition or property, independently of any reference to the form of our sensible intuition;
properties that belong to things [as viewed] in themselves [and apart from us] can never be
given to us through the senses. (i.a.)

That is to say, the senses do not give us properties (red, blue, wet) belonging to things in themselves
but only to things as appearances, as within our sensibility. He continues:

This, then, is what constitutes the transcendental ideality of time. What we mean by this
phrase is that if we abstract from the subjective conditions of sensible intuition, time is
nothing, and cannot be ascribed to the objects in themselves [i.e. to the sense objects when
viewed in themselves, not non-sensed or noumenal objects!] (apart from their relation to our
intuition) in the way either of subsistence or of inherence. B52 A36 (i.a.)

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First, time is real, but only with respect to objects of our senses, apart from which it has no reality or
is “ideal.” That is, time has no “absolute reality” and cannot be said to belong to a thing
“independently of any reference to the form of our sensible intuition.” Clearly, temporality pertains
to the object of experience only insofar as it is experienced or perceived, the object qua temporal
cannot exist independently of experience and outside the range of validity of time-determinations.
Time pertains only to our sensible intuition, apart from which it is nothing.
Again as concerns time’s “ideality” Kant states that “if we abstract from the subjective
conditions of sensible intuition, time is nothing,” and further that time “cannot be ascribed to the
objects in themselves,” and he adds, “apart from their relation to our intuition.” Thus, if a
represented object is separated from its representation (e.g. in thought), all of its temporal aspects
fall away. The transcendental realist view of time, then, it seems must be rejected. Also, Kant at the
end of this passage clearly indicates that appearance itself, i.e. in itself, has no objective reality: “der
Erscheinung selbst … objectiv Realitat habe.” Thus, all that is really needed to refute the Realists is
to point out to them that in admitting, as they do, Kant holds the object of experience to be
“appearance,” they also must admit that such an object and its features (spatiotemporal, material,
sensible) are unable to exist independently of experience or out of relation with the subject, since an
appearance has no objective reality in itself and can exist only in and for the subject.
Kant further elucidates the nature of time’s transcendental ideality in PP7, “Elucidation,” for
example at B54 he writes:

[Time] is nothing but the form of our inner intuition. If we take away from our inner
intuition the peculiar condition of our sensibility, the concept of time likewise vanishes; it
does not inhere in the objects, but merely in the subject which intuits them. (i.a.)

Clearly, time does not “inhere” (“anhangen” = to hang on, attach, fasten) in the object, it attaches
merely to “the subject which intuits them”; the same is true of space. I submit one has not mastered
the Aesthetic if this point has not been thoroughly grasped. Thus the concept of time “vanishes”
(“verschwindet”) if we abstract from our mode of intuition. At B55 Kant further remarks that,
“This form [time] is not to be looked for in the object in itself, but in the subject to which the object
appears; nevertheless, it belongs really and nesessarily to the appearance of this object. (i.a.)” By
“object in itself,” Kant evidently means the object, i.e. the sense and not “noumenal” object, when
regarded out of relation with the subject and independently of its representation or intuition; one
cannot expect to discover time in such an object (indeed, an object apart from representation, I
would submit, is inconceivable, an “empty” concept).
In the next paragraph, Kant first states that space and time are thus to be regarded as” two
sources of knowledge from which ... a priori synthetic knowledge can be derived” (A39/B56) and
then goes on to indicate the weakness in the position of those who maintain the “absolute reality” of
space and time, i.e. the latter as subsistent or inherent. The Newtonians are forced to admit “two
eternal and infinite self-subsistent non-entities,” which are there but not real, only to contain all that
is real. This Kant states, is clearly absurd. The Leibnizians on the other hand, since they hold space
and time to be “relations” of appearances which have been abstracted from experience, are unable to
account for the certainty of a priori mathematical propositions and their validity for objects of
experience. Hence, space and time are mere “creatures of the imagination” having been extracted
from diverse experiences, and are not, as thus obtained, a priori forms of our sensible intuition,
objectively valid for all experiential objects and also making possible synthetic a priori

39
mathematical principles concerning the latter. In this way Kant demonstrates the superiority of his
theory of space and time over that of Newton and Leibniz.

1.7 “General Observations on Transcendental Aesthetic”

Finally in the crucial PP8, Kant makes it quite clear that his transcendental idealism precludes the
possibility of the spatial and temporal features of the experiential object enjoying an existence
independently of the subject and its constitutive faculties or of being separated from its
representation in the mind. In section I., he states:

What we have meant to say is that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of
appearance; that the things which we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them as
being, nor their relations so constituted in themselves as they appear to us [note: no
committal to a transcendent object is implied], and that if the subject, or even only the
subjective constitution of the senses in general, be removed, the whole constitution and all
the relations of objects in space and time, nay space and time themselves, would vanish.
(i.a.) A42/B59

He goes on to say that, “as appearances, they [things: tables, stars] cannot exist in themselves, but
only in us.” This passage contains several formulations of Kant’s idealism: 1) Our inner and outer
intuition is the representation of appearance and not, as is commonly believed, that of independently
existing things or things capable of existing in themselves. 2) The propertied objects presented to us
or found in sense-perception are not true or absolute, i.e. unconditioned, beings which exist in
themselves, but merely relative beings, beings which exist only in relation to ourselves and our
perceptual capacities, i.e. “appearances.” 3) The spatial, temporal, and sensible properties and
relations we intuit objects to possess, do not belong to them in themselves but only in their
appearance in us or in our sensibility.
Kant states in no uncertain terms that if the subject is removed “space and time themselves
would vanish.” This statement leaves little room for doubt that for Kant space and time are
absolutely mind or subject dependent features of experience, that in no way, shape or form can
spatial or temporal properties and thus objects exist on their own account apart from a subject.
Notice also that he words his statement in such a way that not a single one of all an object’s
properties in sensible intuition would remain with the removal of the subject. He says, “the whole
constitution (“Beschaffenheit”) … of objects in space and time,” “whole constitution” evidently
including all visual, audible, tactile et al sensible qualities of objects, whether potentially or actually
sensed. This also gives support to my interpretation according to which Kant’s view is that the
subject or mind contains within itself, i.e. within its sensibility, the entire experiential, extended
universe. How can it be otherwise, if when the subject is removed, so are space and time and all
their contents?
The only way to counter this would be to impute to Kant a “double-space” theory which as
we have seen is not endorsed by him, i.e. there is only one space and it inheres or attaches to the
subject and cannot be separated therefrom. The thing in itself, which is said to be the source or
ground of the determinations of experiential objects on Kant’s principles, cannot be spatial,
temporal or extended. If it can be conceived at all (which it cannot - as it turns out), it must be
conceived merely as “intelligible,” i.e., as unextended and invisible, in a word, “non-sense-ible.”

40
 Kant further tells us quite plainly and bluntly that “appearances … cannot exist in
themselves.” It thus seems inconceivable how the dogmatists (“mind-independentists”) can insist
on maintaining that Kant believes objects of experience or appearances can exist in themselves and
independently of our experience of them, i.e. are “self-subsistent” existences; or that nature, matter,
the universe, i.e. the unconscious, can exist without consciousness; that “being-for-another” can
exist without an “other,” viz. consciousness or “being-for-itself.” Kant clearly says that appearances
can exist “only in us.” And it is well to keep in mind that planets, stars, and galaxies all fall under
the term “appearances.” I realize this is quite an astounding, breath-taking claim, but nevertheless it
is Kant’s position.
At B60 he says that space and time “inhere [“anhangen,” attach to, etc.] in our sensibility”
and “with absolute necessity.” The point is that space and time cannot be separated or divorced from
our sensibility, hence from ourselves or our mind. This means that all appearances and spatial
objects—since they are in space and time and these are attached to and necessarily inseparable from
our sensibility—are in or attached to our sensibility. If it be objected that “in ourselves” or “in us” is
a spatial term and as such cannot be applied to the mind (the “non-spatial”), it must be remembered
that Kant’s “mind” includes space or has a spatial “component” or “dimension,” since space, as
intuition, is a faculty of our mind. So in this case the expression “in us” is applicable, and the
objection falls. I would further not object to it being said that, “appearances are not in us but outside
of us” provided it is understood that the space in which the appearances exist is seen to belong only
to our sensibility or mode of intuition and to have no reality independently of the same. “Outside
us” cannot mean that space or a spatial object is something that exists utterly independent of
ourselves and our sensibility (cf. A373, 369, and Prolegomena 337 25). Indeed, Kant says in this
passage that in knowing the objects in space and time we are in reality knowing “only our mode of
intuition, i.e. our sensibility.” As all these outer objects fall within our sensibility, it is therefore
very incorrect to speak of them, of appearances—which have being only in relation to us and are
not self-subsistent “things in themselves”—as “outside of us.” Here again he says, “space and time
[are] conditions which are originally inherent in [fastened to] the subject,” i.e. they belong to and are
inseparable from the subject.
This point is vital to the whole thrust of the transcendental “turn” and vision of Kant’s
philosophy. It is very important to make the effort to grasp the distinction that lies at its base. For if
one does not, one continues to occupy a “pre-critical/Kantian or dogmatic standpoint and
completely misses the point (and Kant himself, it should be noted, was once himself “dogmatic”).
One continues to regard space and time as “things in themselves” which subsist on their own
account, outside or apart from one’s subject, conceived merely as a thinking and perceiving soul.
This is not Kant’s radical or “revolutionary” new position. Space and time and everything in them
cannot exist in themselves and in separation from the human subject. They are according to the
doctrine inseparable from the subject, fastened or attached to its sensible faculties, i.e.
“transcendental” a priori faculties; indeed, if one removes the key terms “transcendental” and “a
priori” one occupies the dogmatic, realist, common sense standpoint precisely. Further, if they did
not literally “belong” to the subject then the meaning of a “transcendental” aesthetic would entirely
be lost. For either there is a “transcendental” aesthetic, or component of our aesthetic (senses), or
there is not. Either space and time are a priori or they are not. One cannot have it both ways. To be
“a priori” is to be a feature “of the mind or subject,” is to belong to the knower. If space and time
are transcendental and a priori, and they are (for Kant), then there must be a sense in which all the
spatiality, all the height, length, and depth we perceive empirical objects to have—trees, galaxies,
25
Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic, tr. Ellington 37.

41
etc.—can be said to exist in us, in the mind, in transcendental space and time themselves, and prior
to experience as well. One must accept the doctrine completely, or not at all.
It is moreover very important to see the force of the argument directed against the old
“dogmatic” view. Simply put: if space and spatial objects really existed in a state completely
separated from ourselves, our mind, our cognitive functions, independently and truly outside of us,
then we would never be able to have experience of it; there would be a gulf fixed between us and it,
the knower and the “being” to be known. The simple fact that we do experience space, that we do
have to do with spatial objects and relations, that we are not merely pure thinking beings which only
have thoughts before them and not also intuitions of spatial, sensible objects, itself proves that space
is not and cannot be separated from us but rather inheres in or is part of our cognitive “make-up”; or
as Kant likes to succinctly put it, is “in us.”
Kant’s is indeed—contrary to general (“realist”) opinion—an extremely sane, wholesome
and “holistic” account of experience and cognition, one which militates against all forms of
“alienation” of the subject with respect to the object. The knower and the known, the mind and the
object have a natural affinity for each other in that together they constitute a single whole, are two
sides or components of a single phenomenon, viz. experience. This is Kant’s truly great, original
and watershed insight, which is well worth mastering; it also opens the door to an understanding of
Kant’s idealist successors. It contains the truth and principle that man qua knower is not a “stranger”
to the universe or Cosmos, but instead a vital, essential ingredient of it. The universe (the object)
could not exist without man (the subject), as little as man could not exist without the universe,
which is the same as to say that sensibility could not exist without understanding and vice versa.
Sensibility and understanding in Kant’s “vision” are inseparable, as are nature and mind, subject
and object, knower and known, form and matter or content. This is his doctrine precisely.
In the middle of a discussion in which he distinguishes his own transcendental distinction
between the sensible and the intelligible from the merely logical and thus “non-distinction” of the
same advanced by Leibniz and Wolff, Kant underscores the fact that none of the features of a
perceptible body (Korpers) are able to exist in themselves apart from the subject’s sensibility. At
B61 he writes that, “The representation of a body in intuition, on the other hand, contains nothing
that can belong to an object in itself, but merely the appearance of something, and the mode in
which we are affected by that something.” Hence it is that all the determinations—spatial,
temporal, sensible—of a body exist only in or as a part of its representation and can in no way be
separated from it. It seems possible to interpret the “something” in this passage which is said to
“affect us” and in effect be the cause or ground of the appearance or representation in us, as being
the so-called “thing in itself” which is the only type of object or existent in the Kantian theory that
can be said to exist apart from the subject and representation. However, this passage, as well as
others, makes it clear that such a “thing in itself” (if conceivable) can in no wise be located in space
or construed as spatially outside us. This because none of a body’s properties “can belong to an
object in itself,” among which properties are spatiality; and thus the former can only be a purely
non-sensible, unextended or “intelligible” entity. Thus even if Realist interpreters decide to identify
their object “in the weighty sense” with the “thing in itself,” such an independently existing object
can in no wise be thought of as spatial, extended, or temporal, which is how they would like to
conceive it. We will give closer scrutiny to the “thing in itself” below.
Observe again that Kant stresses, “however deeply we inquire into its objects, we have to do
with nothing but appearances.” Whether it is with the aid of an electron microscope or a high
powered telescope atop the Mt. Palomar observatory or on “Sky-Lab,” our explorations into the
world of sense concern and bring to light nothing but appearances, i.e. things the properties and

42
relations of which have no existence whatsoever in themselves and apart from our power of
representation or a priori intuition. In this passage Kant first uses the term “modification” in
referring to experiential objects:

We then realize that not only are the drops of rain mere appearances, but that even their
round shape, nay even the space in which they fall, are nothing in themselves, but merely
modifications or fundamental forms of our sensible intuition, and that the transcendental
object remains unknown to us. A46/B63 [i.e. in knowing them we are not knowing a
transcendental object, i.e. a transcendent thing in itself; Kant is not saying there is a “thing in
itself” and further we are denied knowledge of it]

The inference clearly is that space and all of its material and sensible contents are nothing in
themselves, hence cannot exist out of relation with the subject. Indeed, spatial, extended objects are
“merely modifications … of our sensible intuition” or, it can be said, of ourselves, our subject, our
minds. Concretely, Kant holds that such things or appearances as tables, skyscrapers, and galaxies
are one and all merely modifications of my sensible intuition, hence must be viewed as in a radical
and ontological sense nondetachable or -divorceable from myself or my faculty of intuition. This is
inescapable, for what is a modification of myself cannot be regarded as having an existence
independently of myself, i.e. be at the same time not a modification of myself. The only truly
foreign element or reference to otherness in Kant’s “ego-logical” universe is bound up with the
“givenness” of the contingent aspects found in experience. That is, Kant holds that the matter of
experience, i.e. sensations, though they exist only in our sensibility, appear to have an origin outside
experience and do not seem to be derivable from the mind or subject. This does not however - even
if true - affect the situation that sensations fall within us and are modifications of ourselves. I will
return to this important point below and merely add here that this (perhaps) points to a weakness in
Kant’s account of experience which had to be corrected by his disciples (it will be seen that once the
“thing in itself” is done away with the only alternative is to account for the “given” (or “produced”)
by means of a “blind” unconscious yet “indispensable” faculty of the mind, the “common root” of
understanding and sensibility, viz. the productive imagination or (a la Schelling) intuition).
The following gives an even more striking statement of this teaching,

If our subjective constitution be removed, the represented object [das vorgestellte Objekt],
with the qualities which sensible intuition bestows upon it, is nowhere to be found, and
cannot possibly be found. B62

The reader must realize that by “the represented object” Kant is referring to any object whatsoever
that can appear in the experience of a subject, not just chairs, tables and books, but buildings,
mountains, planets, and galaxies, these are all “represented objects”—the entire experienced
(potential or actual) physical, sensible universe is what is meant, it cannot be it seems otherwise.
And “qualities” must refer to all sensible and physical qualities, - colors, shapes, sounds, feelings,
tactile, olfactory, etc., qualities, as well as spatial, temporal and material. Kant clearly says that the
represented object with all of these qualities is “nowhere to be found” and even “cannot possibly be
found.” —Even if we had God’s intuition we would not be able to perceive or encounter these
objects or qualities (except if His intuition were spatial). Thus it begins to be obvious that the
Realists have misinterpreted Kant’s position, as we shall see, and have tried to import their own
natural, common sense view of the object into the Critique, resulting in a hybrid or “patchwork”
Kant. Here is another telling passage:

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 If, as generally happens, we stop short at this point, and do not proceed, as we ought, to treat
the empirical intuition as itself mere appearance, in which nothing that belongs to a thing
[Sache] in itself can be found, our transcendental distinction is lost. We then believe that we
know things [which can exist] in themselves, and this in spite of the fact that in the world of
sense, however deeply we inquire into its objects, we have to do with nothing but
appearances. B63

The common view (dogmatist, Realist), whether of the man on the street or the scientist, habitually
regards the objects of empirical intuition as “things—capable of existing—in themselves,” i.e. self-
subsistent entities existing wholly independently of consciousness and sensibility. The whole point
of the critical philosophy and of a “transcendental” aesthetic is precisely to point out that this
common view is desperately mistaken in that it ignores the transcendental conditions involved in
sensible experience, viz. space and time. It is these a priori conditions contributed by the subject
itself which constrains us to regard the objects of the senses as appearances and not “things in
themselves.” It is this “transcendental distinction” between appearances and things in themselves
that everyone ignores and against which the major thrust of Kant’s critical (in effect
“deconstructive” efforts are directed.—Indeed the goal of philosophy can be said to be the
“deconstruction” or “subversion-inversion” of the ordinary, “natural” common sense view of things
(compare Husserl and Hegel’s standpoint).
In this section he also elaborates on an earlier point made in PP3, the point namely, that if
space and time were in truth objective in themselves it would then be impossible to explain the
existence of a large body of a priori synthetic mathematical propositions, since the latter can be
accounted for only if space and time were a priori formal conditions of our intuition on which alone
the synthetic propositions of mathematics could be grounded. Of interest to us here is the
occurrence of a passage in which Kant defines precisely what he understands by the phrase “in
itself,” as in a thing “in itself” or a “something in itself.” Namely, “If the object [the triangle] were
something in itself, apart from any relation to you, the subject [etwas an sich selbst ohne Beziehung
auf euer Subjekt], how could you say etc.” Hence, by “in itself” Kant means an existence or feature
of existence which is conceived as existing apart from any relation to yourself, or without having or
taking up a relation to yourself, or existing in absolute independence from yourself, without their
being any bridge or connection or mediating element to mitigate the radicalness of the breach
existing between yourself and the posited “in itself existence.”
As I said earlier, one of the keys to understanding Kant’s standpoint and philosophy is the
simple insight and truth, I hold to be the basis of his transcendental doctrines, that since what is “in
itself” and completely out of relation with the subject or consciousness can never be experienced or
become an object of experience, the things found within experience and the space and time in which
they are found cannot be in themselves or “things in themselves” but instead merely appearances,
things which exist only in or in relation with ourselves, our consciousness or subjectivity. Of course
I, and others, go one step further than Kant and assert that the thought of a “thing in itself” is an
empty thought, that it is impossible to go beyond oneself and even to think this thought, that a
“thing in itself” or “independently existing thing” is a self-contradiction and nonsensical, in the
sense that there are no beings at all independent of us; indeed, if there were freedom would have to
be given up, as I know Kant, i.e. the “spirit” of Kant, was well aware of (cf. Bxxvii), that is, if
appearances were true beings or “things in themselves” then we would be subject to the same
determinism and causation as they, not to mention, as Hegel quips, we would then die of hunger.

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Thus one is forced to conclude that space and time and their contents must be in a very real sense
attached to us as conscious subjects. Nature or the universe must be conceived as “bone of our bone,
flesh of our flesh” and thus as belonging to our nature or being; the “gap” or separation thought to
exist between the two is in truth “imaginary.”
I would venture to assert, further, that all the efforts of Reason throughout the course of the
history of philosophy were implicitly directed to this singular issue and its solution, a solution which
does away once and for all with the separation of the subject or knower and Being or the universe.
—The issue, namely, of whether the move or attempt to posit a Being apart from the subject or
consciousness is legitimate (possible) or not; whether the thought of a Being existing independently
of consciousness or the subject, or utterly out of relationship with it, is or is not a non-contradictory
concept - and if not, why not. —or whether it is at all possible to abstract from the subject, to go
beyond the subject to something absolutely “cut off” and unrelated to the subject (Kant’s watershed
problem as expressed in his letter to Marcus Herz, 1772), and whether talk about an object so-
conceived has any sense to it whatever, and what are the consequences, if so, of our not being able
to make that move (the flight into the beyond, the “intelligible,” the “thing in itself”)—i.e., a radical
“subjectivism”?, a “skepticism”?, an”atheism”?—or perhaps, more happily, a true and the only
possible realism and objectivism, viz. a subjective-objectivism (and perhaps ‘salvation’ too)?
It is precisely this thought of an “in itself” (in one of its forms) that it is the hallmark of
ordinary consciousness, for which all of the objects in its perception are naturally and invariably
regarded as existing independently of itself. In this way, it forever shuts itself out from Being,
estranging itself and restricting its “I.” These things are taken by it as existing completely out of
relation with itself, even though the mere fact that it perceives them implies that they must have an
aspect which relates itself to it (ordinary consciousness) and thus is inseparable from it. However,
this is an illusion or delusion (as Kant himself notes at A385, 395 et al); an unwarranted
assumption, due to long habit,—i.e. this “gap” is never experienced, it is merely assumed. The
watershed question is, Is it really possible to go out beyond oneself to an Other, a radical Other, -
and if it is not, then does this mean there is no such other, or just that we have no access to it, yet it
is really “there”? I would hold that the fact of its inconceivability means that it is not in fact there;
what can not be thought can in no wise be, such a thing being “self-contradictory.” Moreover, one
cannot separate Being from thought or consciousness; the only “being” one knows anything about is
the being which is in (within) consciousness (experience), i.e. being-in-consciousness, -in-relation-
to-consciousness, or being for consciousness; any other “being” is a mere (“empty”) thought, and a
self-contradictory one at that. This is precisely what Fichte in the Doctrine of Science and Hegel
especially in the Phenomenology is doing as we shall see below; the “object,” the “in itself and for
us,” in the latter treatise, will consistently show itself to be an in itself only “for us,” i.e. to be unable
to exist apart from us, from consciousness (i.e. Self-consciousness or the Concept (der Begriff)).
If one should require still more textual proof that it is Kant’s position that the “things” of
experience, that appearances, that in short the objective universe has no existence whatsoever apart
from sensibility or the mind (or cogito or monad) consider his text at B66 where he says that “…
without [our] subjective conditions outer objects [trees, stars] are in themselves nothing.” One
should note here that Kemp Smith for the first (perhaps only) time indicates in a note that “an sich”
refers to “outer objects,” i.e. to the e.g. “tree” regarded as existing outside our sensibility or
cognitive constitution, and not to the usual transcendent thing in itself (the nonspatial, -extended,
-sensible, i.e. intelligible “cause” or “ground” of the tree-appearance). Smith does however manage
to relapse into his biased “thing in itself” reading of the text a few sentences on by conflating “fur
sich” (not “an sich”!) and “Dinge” into “things in themselves,” though the careful reader can see

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that this expression can only refer to the “immanent” and not the “transcendent” thing in itself. And
at A49 we find: “that in relation to these conditions [space and time] all objects are therefore mere
appearances, and not given us as things in themselves which exist in this manner” (A49). The last
clause is a translation of Kant’s: “… und nicht fur sich in dieser Art gegebene Dinge sind.” —
which is more accurately rendered, “… and [objects-appearances are] not for themselves things
given in this manner [as spatial and temporal; i.e. they are not spatial or temporal in or by
themselves].”
Kant’s next sentence makes clear that it is a live possibility for him that there may be
nothing at all underlying appearance (as I suggested above it was mainly his fear of being accused
of “atheism” and of the possibility of permanent censorship of his books—resulting in no one’s ever
becoming aware of the “critical” philosophy and the new standpoint aimed at putting metaphysics
on the “sure path of a science”—which prevented him from stating unequivocally, “There is no
Thing-in-itself.” (= “there is no (transcendent) God” as well). Kant writes: “For this reason also,
while much can be said a priori as regards the form of appearances, nothing whatsoever can be
asserted of the thing in itself, which may underlie these appearances. (A49) (i.a.)” The thing in
itself, he writes, “may,” and therefore also “may not” underlie the appearances; “thing in itself”
meaning an appearance, e.g. a “tree” but viewed as existing out of relation with the subject, i.e. as
non- or a-spatial, -temporal, etc., or as merely “intelligible.”
Also noteworthy in this section is Kant’s view, against Plato and essentialists, that
mathematical objects such as triangles, circles, and squares have no existence in themselves and
apart from the mind, i.e. apart from their construction or generation by the mind in its pure intuition,
implied in the following at B66, to wit: “You could not then add anything new (the figure) to your
concepts (of three lines) as something which must necessarily be met with in the object, since this
object is [on that view] given antecedently to your knowledge, and not by means of it [i.a.].” The
triangle, thus, exists only in its construction, not independently of it in a world of “Forms” (eide), or
as an eternal archetype. This is because it requires space and space exists only, or is to be found
only, in our pure intuition or in us.
Section II also contains several references to his transcendental idealism doctrine according
to which objects can in no way be separated from their representation or the subject. He begins at
B67 by way of “confirmation of this theory of the ideality of both outer and inner sense” to assert in
no uncertain terms that “since outer sense gives us nothing but mere relations, this sense can contain
in its representation only the relation of an object to the subject, and not the inner properties of the
object in itself (i.a.).” This again underlines the subject-related aspect of his doctrine, viz. that one
cannot ignore or abstract from the subject, that no object appears in experience which is unrelated to
the subject -that there can be no “gap” or “separation”—as ordinary consciousness thinks there to be
—between the object of experience and the subject or knower. The relation of the object to the
subject is irremovable and inviolable and that to such an extent that the object, as thus qualified, can
exist only in this relation to a subject and is nothing at all outside of this relation to a subject.
Also of note here is Kant’s famous remark in Section III that his doctrine does not entail that
appearances are “illusion.” Indeed Kant says that, “It is only if we ascribe objective [i.e.
independent] reality to these forms of representation, that it becomes impossible for us to prevent
everything being thereby transformed into mere illusion etc. B70.” In the note to B70 Kant
underscores the “critical” insight into the subject-relatedness of the object of experience, only the
neglect of which first leads to error and illusion:

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 On the other hand, if I ascribe redness to the rose in itself, or extension to all outer objects in
themselves, without paying regard to the determinate relation of these objects to the subject
[i.a.], and without limiting my judgement to that relation, illusion then first arises.

In his “Conclusion of the Transcendental Aesthetic” Section Kant states that a partial answer has
been obtained as concerns the main question of transcendental philosophy regarding the possibility
of “synthetic a priori judgements.” Briefly, it is precisely the a priori intuition (of space and time) of
an object, say a triangle, that is the “third thing” which allows us to connect two conceptually
unrelated concepts in an a priori yet “synthetic” manner, such judgements being valid only for
objects of possible experience. Evidence that Kant never departed from this position is found in his
following remarks from the Prolegomena:

Long before Locke’s time, but assuredly since him, it has been generally assumed and
granted without detriment to the actual existence of external things that many of their
predicates may be said to belong, not to the things in themselves, but to their appearances,
and to have no proper existence outside our representation. Heat, color, and taste, for
instance, are of this kind. Now, if I go further and, for weighty reasons, rank as mere
appearances also the remaining qualities of bodies, which are called primary—such as
extension, place, and in general, space, with all that which belongs to it (impenetrability or
materiality, shape, etc)—no one in the least can adduce the reason of its being inadmissible.
(Ellington, p. 33, Carus 289, i.a.)26

Summary of Our Results:

1) No texts have been found on the strength of which it can be claimed that Kant held that the object
qua spatial, temporal, extended, and sensible enjoys an existence independently of the cognitive
subject or mind and its sensibility; in fact, a very close reading of the texts reveals quite clearly, I
feel, that none of the properties of appearance are able to so exist.
2) No texts have been found which point conclusively to Kant holding to the existence of a
transcendent “thing in itself,” it being possible to read the Aesthetic without such assumption.
3) Objects of experience as conditioned by transcendental space and time are “appearances” and not
self-subsistent “things capable of existing in themselves.” It may be thought, since the Aesthetic
does not mention “matter” per se, that it has only been shown to be Kant’s position that space and
extension but not “matter” (as a kind of “substrate” behind appearances) have no existence apart
from the subject. In the Fourth Paralogism it will be seen that even matter, viewed by Kant as a
“species of our representations,” in like manner cannot be separated from its representation.

26
Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic, tr. Ellington. Also compare Schelling’s remark
concerning the common “deception” of matter seeming to be prior to form in all intuition-perception.
And also see Appendix A for: “The 3 ways an object can exist independent of subject,” the “Schema of 4
standpoints,” and “On the relation between intuition & perception.”

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